Doctrine of Proximate Cause

It is not enough that there be just some kind of

connection between fault or negligence and the loss or
injury, but that the former must be the proximate cause
of the latter. The proximate cause is that which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred (38 Am. Jur. 695;
Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 714). In Taclan
vs. Medina, 54 O.G. 1805, 102 Phil. 181, citing with approval
38 Am. Jur. 695-696, see also Urbano vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 1), the Court held:
The proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having
a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately affecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of
329
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded (Art. 2179, Civil Code; Philippine
National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87).
Where the plaintiff contributes to the principal occurrence,
as one of its determining factors (proximate cause),
he cannot recover, but if, in conjunction therewith, he
merely contributes to his own injury (results), he may
still recover less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for
his own imprudence (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad
& Light Co., 16 Phil. 8).
Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later in time than the other or
when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence

shall be attributed to the incident, the one who had

the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof (Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, of Supervening
Negligence, or of Discovered Peril; see Picart vs.
Smith, 37 Phil. 809; LBC Air Cargo, Inc., et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 241 SCRA 619, 23 February 1995).
Stated in another way, the doctrine of last clear
chance means that an antecedent negligence of a person
does not preclude recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought
by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by exercising
due diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa,
179 SCRA 5; Glan Peoples Lumber and Hardware vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 173 SCRA 462). Thus, it
was ruled that the antecedent negligence of a telephone
company in not earlier providing warning signs on its
excavations would not make it liable if the claimant had
a clear chance to avoid the accident (Philippine Long
Distance Tel. Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 94).
The doctrine does not apply if only one of the two
parties is negligent and the other is not. The volonti non
fit injuria rule does not apply if a person, although knowing
a possible danger, takes some risks because he has to
in order to preserve life or property (see Ilocos Norte
Electric Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5; also Philippine
Long Distance Tel. Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 178
SCRA 94).
The doctrine of last clear chance would also be inapplicable
to ward off a claim of an innocent third person
against the parties guilty of the antecedent negligence
and the supervening negligence who, as joint tort-feasors,
are both made solidarily liable to said third person (see
Art. 2194, Civil Code).
damnum absque injuria
The term damages refers to the sum of money which
the law awards or imposes by way of pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a
wrong sustained as a consequence of either a breach of a
contractual obligation or a tortuous or illegal act, while
the term damage pertains to the actionable loss, hurt or
harm which results from the unlawful act, omission or
negligence of another. In fine, damages are the amounts
recoverable or that which can be awarded for the damage

done or sustained (People vs. Dianos, 297 SCRA 191). In

common law, injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury. Damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. Not always is this distinction followed, however,
for the words damage and injury are not infrequently
used interchangeably (22 Am Jur. 2d. 13). In Spouses
Lim vs. UNI-TAN Marketing Corporation (G.R. No.
147328, 20 February 2002), the Court has said that those
who exercise their rights properly do no legal injury. If
damages result from the exercise of their legal rights, it is but damnum
absque injuria, which is a loss without injury, for which the law gives no
remedy.
Damages may be: (a) actual or compensatory; (b) moral;
(c) nominal; (d) temperate or moderate; (e) liquidated; or (f)
exemplary or corrective (Art. 2197, Civil Code).
Except for actual or compensatory damages which
must be duly proved (De los Santos vs. De la Cruz, 37
SCRA 555), no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in
order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages may be adjudicated. The assessment of
such damages, except liquidated ones, by and large, is
left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances
of each case (see Art. 2216, infra., Civil Code;
People vs. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62).

Extraordinary diligence requires

common carriers to render service with the greatest skill
and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain
the nature and characteristics of goods tendered for
shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and
stowage, including such methods as their nature requires
(Tabacalera Insurance Co. vs. North Front Shipping Services,
Inc., 272 SCRA 527).
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and
1745, Nos. 5, 6 and 7, while the extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers is similarly elaborated in
Articles 1755 and 1756 (Art. 1733, Civil Code). The provisions
of Articles 1733 to 1753 shall apply to the passengers

baggage which is not in his personal custody or in

that of his employees. As to the baggage in his custody,
the rules in Articles 1988 and 2000 to 2008, concerning
the responsibility of hotel-keepers, shall be applicable
(Art. 1754, Civil Code). In all matters not regulated by
the Civil Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers
shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by
special laws (Art. 1766, Civil Code). To be precise, the
governing laws are to be applied in the following order:
the Civil Code on Common Carriers, the Code of Commerce
on Overland and Maritime Commerce, special laws
whenever applicable (e.g., COGSA), and the general provisions
of the Civil Code.
The Public Service Commission may, on its own motion
or on petition of any interested party, after due hearing,
cancel the certificate of public convenience granted
to any common carrier that repeatedly fails to comply
with his or its duty to observe the prescribed extraordinary
diligence (Art. 1765, Civil Code).
The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier
for their loss, destruction or deterioration (Art. 1753,
Civil Code).
The start of extraordinary diligence does not necessarily
coincide with the birth of the contract nor end at
the latters extinguishment; although being predicated
or premised on a contractual relationship, it is co-existent
within the life thereof. In the carriage of goods, the
extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are
surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession
of, and received by, the carrier for transportation
until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time
for their acceptance by, the person entitled to receive
them (see Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code; Sarkies Tours
Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 87 SCAD 573, 280

CASO fortuito
G.R. No. L-55300 March 15, 1990
FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M. GACAL, the latter assisted by her
husband, FRANKLIN G. GACAL, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., and THE HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON C. ANIMAS,

in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

SOUTH COTABATO, BRANCH I, respondent
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence (Philippine
National Railways v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87 [1985]) and it must be shown that
the carrier had observed the required extraordinary diligence of a very cautious person
as far as human care and foresight can provide or that the accident was caused by a
fortuitous event (Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 [1976]). Thus, as ruled by this
Court, no person shall be responsible for those "events which could not be foreseen or
which though foreseen were inevitable. (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is
synonymous with caso fortuito (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]) which is of the
same sense as "force majeure" (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, Vol. 17, p.
362).
In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a person from
liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the following elements
must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the
human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free
from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor (Lasam v. Smith, 45
Phil. 657 [1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527 [1971]; Estrada v.
Consolacion, supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 [1985]; Juan F. Nakpil
& Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596 [1986]). Caso fortuito or force majeure, by
definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that
the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same (Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation, 21 SCRA 279 [1967]).

Volenti non fit iniuria (or injuria) (Latin: "to a willing person, injury is not done") is
a common law doctrine which states that if someone willingly places themselves in a
position where harm might result, knowing that some degree of harm might result, they
are not able to bring a claim against the other party in tort or delict. Volenti only applies
to the risk which a reasonable person would consider them as having assumed by their
actions; thus a boxer consents to being hit, and to the injuries that might be expected
from being hit, but does not consent to (for example) his opponent striking him with an

iron bar, or punching him outside the usual terms of boxing. Volenti is also known as a
"voluntary assumption of risk."
Volenti is sometimes described as the plaintiff "consenting to run a risk." In this
context, volenti can be distinguished from legalconsent in that the latter can prevent
some torts arising in the first place. For example, consent to a medical procedure
prevents the procedure from being a trespass to the person, or consenting to a person
visiting your land prevents them from being a trespasser.