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ARTICLE 7

BESO V. DAGUMAN 323 SCRA 566


JAN 28, 2000
FACTS:
Respondent Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan,
Samar, solemnized the marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman,
on August 28, 1987, at the Judges residence in Calbayog City, Samar, or outside
his jurisdiction, because complainant was to leave for abroad the same day as she
was an OFW, and for several complications. After the wedding, Yman abandoned
Beso for no apparent reason. In consequence to that, she then went to Local Civil
Registrar of Calbayog to check their marriage contract, from which she learned that
said marriage was not registered. Upon learning of the situation, she wrote to Judge
Daguman, in which he responded that Yman took all the copies and he retained
none.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for solemnizing the marriage outside of
his courts jurisdiction;
Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for negligently not retaining a copy and
not registering the marriage in the office of the Local Civil Registry
HELD:
A marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or courtroom
following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing
statement to this effect but none of these instances were present in
hand.

only in the
accordance
in a sworn
the case at

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge
should exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of
his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra
precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with
Article 23 of the Family Code that - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing
the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the
marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate.
ANTONIO MECANO V. COA GR No. 103982
DEC 11, 1992
FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Mecano, a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation,


filed a petition for certoriari to nullify the decision of Commission of Audit (COA) in
the 7th Indorsement denying him of reimbursement anchored on the provisions of
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) in the amount of Php
40,831.00.
Earlier, the petitioner was hospitalized because of cholecystitis and incurred the
abovementioned amount. Under Sec. 699 of RAC, he is entitled to allowances in
case of injury, sickness, death incurred in the performance of duty. Hence, the
petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses to NBI Director Alfredo Lim
forwarding the request to the Secretary of Justice. The request was returned due to
the comments of the COA Chairman stating that the Administrative Code of 1987
already repealed the RAC being relied upon. The petitioner resubmitted the request
asserting that the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its
entirety the RAC, including Section 699. Director Lim transmitted the request to the
Justice Secretary who recommended the payment to the COA Chairman. The COA
Chairman again denied the request asserting the same reason and furthered that
Section 699 was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987.
According to the COA Chairman, the claim may be filed with the Employees'
Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano
occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987. Eventually, the
request was again returned to Director Lim with an advice of elevating the matter
in the Supreme Court if he so desires.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated the Revised
Administrative Code including Section 699
HELD:
In determining whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent
law is a matter of legislative intent which is manifested in the incorporation of a
repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws,
and portions that are intended to be repealed. Hence, before there can be a
repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent
in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must
be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will
continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent
with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

The repealing clause of the Administrative Code of 1987 is repeal by implication


because it failed to identify which specific laws shall be repealed. The failure to
indicate specific laws reveal that the intent was not to repeal any existing law,
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new
and old laws.

NAVARRO V. JUDGE DOMAGTOY 259 SCRA 129


JUL 19, 1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint
on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and
ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a

subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was
told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been
heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of
Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction
on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he
solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located
40 to 50 km away.
ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction
Whether or not the marriages he solemnized were null and void
HELD:
Yes. Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law.
Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to his former wife.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law
has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request
to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride,
NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision
is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.

ARTICLE 8
People v Licera
FACTS:
In 1961, Rafael Licera was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In
1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at
the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that
the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a
"peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of
the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm
licenses. Later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided and revoked the Macarandang rule, the
earlier case should be held applicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial decision in People v. Macarandang have the force and
effect of law?
HELD:
Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or
interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
The Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal
system.
A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely
affect those favored by the old rule.
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as
secret agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester
rifle, but as well at the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non compliance with the legal requirements
relating to firearm
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs
de oficio.

People v. Jabinal
FACTS:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas
finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The
validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts
ruling in People vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5,
1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint
was without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET
AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential
Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official
duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang
and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his acquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless
decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed
and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in
Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
HELD:
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of
the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,
but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

ARTICLE 9
Chu Juan v. Bernas
FACTS:
Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match,
defendant Lucio Bernas was declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of P160 before
the cockfight. Justice of peace court decided that bout was a draw. Defendant appealed to
Court of First Instance praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide and comply with
rules and regulations governing cockfights to pay P160 and return the other amount which s
in safekeeping of Cockpit owner Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved
to dismiss cost against plaintiff. Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special
findings. On plaintiff's motion, an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible,
Municipal Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu Jan.
Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of exceptions
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings
since grounds for dismissal pronounced by lower court appealed from ere that court has
always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing

cockfights and duties of referees; that he does not know where to find the law and that he
knows of no law that governs the right to plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights.
HELD:
Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to
him for decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the
proceedings by dismissing them without deciding on the issue. Such excuse is less
acceptable because foreseeing that a case may arise to which no law would be applicable,
the Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of Art 6, provides that Customs of the place shal l be
observed and in absence thereof, the general principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and
order appealed from are reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to court
from when they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is
made with regard to cost.

People v. Lorenzo Veneracion


FACTS:
In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide committed against a seven-year-old girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo
Veneracion.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which treats of the crime of Rape with
Homicide, the penalty imposable shall be death. However, Judge Veneracion refused to
impose the death penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion perpetua.
The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be
imposed upon the four accused but the judge refused to act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty than
that imposed by law.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the
judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless
of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the judge must impose the death penalty.
This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof), which provides
that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity,
or insufficiency of the laws.

Instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for
the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with
respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case had committed
the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.