Power Relations in Muslim Mindanao:

History, Context, and Issues

F. Lara Jr. PhD

Power Relations in Muslim Mindanao Autonomy:

Parliamentary System and Role of LGUs
20 July 2015, Philippine Senate

Four propositions

To understand power relations in Muslim Mindanao we need to understand

institutional multiplicity and integrity, and challenge the simplistic propositions
offered by the advocates of good governance and democracy.

To understand the foundations of political legitimacy and authority in Muslim

Mindanao we need to recognize the historical origins and sources of power of
local strongmen and the nature and dynamics of clan institutions.

To understand the nature of political transitions and political settlements we need

to focus our attention on the decisive role that local elites play in Muslim
Mindanao.

To recognize the potential for transition-induced violence we need to study the

ungoverned spaces of Muslim Mindanao and the evolution and resilience of
Mindanaos shadow economies.

Proposition 1: Good governance and institutional multiplicity

Institutional multiplicity: the interplay between formal and informal institutions and their
respective political agents in narratives of state fragility or resilience (Hesselbein, GoloobaMutebi, and Putzel, 2007). Individuals and organizations operate often simultaneously in
multiple institutional systems, governed by very different sets of incentives thus placing them
in complex, often unsolvable situations, but at the same time offering them the possibility of
shifting strategically from one institutional universe to another. (Putzel, 2006).

Institutional integrity: Institutions that are indigenously designed, adopted or adapted are
far more likely to be effective because they are more likely to enjoy both local legitimacy and
appropriateness. Governance and management (however distinctive and different their
purposes or designs), may be said to have integrity when the institutional arrangements
sustain the integrity of its personnel and its processes and crucially when the personnel
and processes sustain the institutions because they perceive it to be both legitimate and
effective.

Institutional map of people living in Muslim Mindanao

Clan
( safety net)

Rebels
(protection/rido)

Islam
Among the four rule systems the (Symbols, family laws)
most embedded are clan rules
and dynamics. Clans influence is
manifest across other
institutions. Clans pay for the
costs of missionaries and the
construction and maintenance of
the madrasah, clan structures are
transported into the state, rebel
factions emerge from tribes and
clans, even humanitarian work
for ICGs are shaped by clan
dynamics.

State/OIC/ODA

(legal documents, property rights, some

welfare provision, access to aid)

Implications
Institutions do not necessarily complement each other, oftentimes they
rival, clash, or collide with each other.
Institutions do not reproduce themselves automatically. Political agency is
strategic to making them work across different situations.
Constant need to identify which institutions trump the rest.
Constant need to appeal to various institutions.

Problems with good governance

The World Bank used over 100 indicators to introduce a composite index of good
governance, based on perceptions of voice and accountability, political stability and the
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and levels
of corruption.

The indicators failed to account for country-specific challenges and conditions, with crosscountry statistical analyses suffering from selection bias and ignoring the interlinkages among
a wide array of variables. Worse, good-governance reforms are now a condition for
international aid, forcing developing-country governments to mimic donor expectations,
instead of addressing the issues that are most pressing for their own citizens.

Moreover, the required reforms are so wide-ranging that they are beyond the means of most
developing countries to implement. As a result, good-governance solutions tend to distract
from more effective development efforts. And though so-called good governance standards
are formally neutral, they often favour particular vested interests, with grossly unfair
consequences. Reforms aimed at decentralization and devolution have, in some cases,
enabled the rise of powerful local political patrons.

MAYBE WE SHOULD JUST AIM FOR GOOD ENOUGH GOVERNANCE?

Good Governance
agenda attempts
institutional changes
without attention to
the political
settlement

Political
Settlement
(configuration of power
on which states and
sub-states are built)

State Organisations

Executive
Authority

Legislative
Authority

State Institutions

Judicial
Authority

Property rights
& entitlements

Control over
assets

Organisational
structure of the
state

Access to
income
streams

Regulatory
Structure of the
economy

Rules
governing
transactions

Rules on Access
to state
organisations

Taxation
rules

Can observe the

political settlement
by looking at
organisations and
institutions of the
state.

Object of contention
& bargaining

Political
Settlement
(configuration of power
on which the state is
built)

State Organisations

Executive
Authority

Legislative
Authority

When institutions are at

odds with configuration of power
within state organizations, a
settlement is unstable.

State Institutions

Judicial
Authority

Property rights
& entitlements

Control over
assets

Organisational
structure of the
state

Access to
income
streams

Regulatory
Structure of the
economy

Rules
governing
transactions

Rules on Access
to state
organisations

Taxation
rules

Proposition 2: Origins and sources of strongman rule

Cognatic kinship and segmentary systems
Kinship defined beyond blood to include authority
(responsibility for protection)
Combination of alliances based on kinship as well as skills
The ability to foment violence is among those skills.
Hence, a thin line between power, legitimacy, and authority.
The extension of legitimacy and authority across the Sulu
zoneand nowadaysincluding various quarters/ghettoes in
the country.
THESE QUALITIES PRIVILEGE THE CLAN

CLAN INSTITUTIONS RULE!

Tribal and clan origins of insurgent groups
Nur Misuari and the MNLF
Tausug and Sama
1969-1996 Kiram, Tan, Loong, Salapuddin

Hashim Salamat, Al Haj Murad and MILF

Maguindanao
1988-2009 Mastura, Sinsuat, Ampatuan, Datumanong

Pundato MNLF Reformist Group and Bravo

MILF
1996-2009 Maranao
Alonto, Lucman, Dimaporo, Adiong, Mutilan

Clan dynamics

Clans determine inheritance rules. Clans collect zakat and possess the tarsila that
trace their royal lineage.
Clans observe rules in allocating the use of land. Numerous cases of rido have started
from institutional clashes in the case of communally owned land being subjected to
VOS/agrarian reform. Rare cases of fixed rent, usually a share in the harvest given as
tribute.
Clans provide protection to members, demand obedience to rules, impose penalties,
decide on rido (start and end).
Clans often demand that rebel members (MNLF or MILF) join them whenever a rido
erupts (either to fight or mediate). In exchange, clans provide additional warm bodies
and HPFs when rebellion-related conflict erupts.
Clans deliver the votes to candidates that are either clan members, or supported by
the clan.
Clans are distinguished by their level of engagement in the illegal economy, providing
capital, and mediating when conflicts arise. Few cases of inter/intra clan conflict over
the informal economy (bad for business), though politicians expect payments for
protection.
Clan networks extend beyond Muslim Mindanao. Rules and penalties are imposed as
far away as Manila, Cebu, etc.

Clan imprint on the ARMM state (Lara 2009)

Sarip Ampatuan, Datu Puti Ampatuan, Nuali

Ampatuan : provincial board members of
Maguindanao province

Gov. Zaldy Uy Ampatuan

ARMM
Datu Saudi B., Jr. Ampatuan Mayor, Datu Saudi
Ampatuan
Datu Yacob Ampatuan, - Mayor, Rajah Buayan
Anwar Ampatuan Sr. Mayor, Sharif Aguak

Gov. Andal Ampatuan,

Maguindanao
Akmad Ampatuan, Acting
Vice Gov. Maguindanao

Mayor Andal Ampatuan

Jr.
Municipality of Datu Unsay

Didagen Dilangalen Rep, 1st District,

Maguindanao (Grandson of Andal Sr.)
Simeon Datumanong Rep. 2nd District,
Maguindanao. (Nephew of Andal Sr.)

Some conclusions ..

In Muslim Mindanao, clan institutions trump all other institutions, including

(a) constitutional rules, local governments/devolution (b) Islamic rule systems
(c) rebel rule-systems, even (d) the international rules and agreements
imposed by aid givers. To emphasize this point, clan institutions and
organizations were more important in providing protection and welfare, and
consequently in maintaining legitimacy (Buldon);

Successful rule in MM entailed using clans, or kinship networks (Mc Coy) as

a corridor for dealing with other institutions. Successful rule required
simultaneous but calibrated identification with competing sources of
legitimacy. This was critical in bargaining with elites and fortifying political and
social support.

Proposition 3: National-regional-local continuum..

Shift in the power of Moro elites due to the post-Aquino constitution which made
national elites more beholden to them. Solid vote banking (2004, 2007) became
more important in determining electoral competition. (1M floor)

LGC and the IRA (government-to-government fund transfers) fed local warlords,
and institutionalized the soft-budget constraint.

Prior to 2004, warlords extended the reach of the State and were harnessed to
fight the separatists and communists. The outsourcing of violence leads to the
Maguindanao massacre. Guns are used against competing Moro elites. However,
impunity means violating other institutional identifications.

Local elites gain further legitimacy through their links to supranational criminal
networks and to ODA

Proposition 4: Ungoverned spaces

Informal economies are:

alternative economic systems that are

unrecorded in official accounts and
statistics, yet are interlinked with
formal/official economies in complex
ways, and are as much political and social
as they are economic. Mac Gaffey (1991,
1-3)

social networks that exacerbate the

regulatory problems of weak and corrupt
states, yet constitute an informal
mechanism of economic coordination that
fills the gaps in state provision, and a
novel form of economic governance that is
surprisingly efficient and flexible in the
face of widespread economic uncertainty.
(Meagher,2010; Stiglitz, 2000; Hamilton,
1996, Castells, 1996, Granovetter, 2005)

SIZE OF INFORMAL SECTOR

Percent

employment

income

80

80

70

70

60

60

50

50

40

40

30

30

20

20

10

10

0
1988

1991

Philippines

1994
Luzon

1997

2000
Visayas

2003

2006

2009

Mindanao

1988

1991

Philippines

1994

1997

Luzon

2000
Visayas

2003

2006

2009

Mindanao

Source: 2009 Labor Force Survey (LFS)

Luzon
Visayas
Mindanao

CARAGA

ARMM

SOCCSKSARGEN

Davao

N. Mindanao

Zam Pen

E. Visayas

C. Visayas

W. Visayas

Bicol

MIMAROPA

CALABARZON

C. Luzon

Cagayan V

Ilocos

CAR

NCR

Percent

INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT, BY REGION (2009)

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT, BY PROVINCE (1988 AND 2009)

What does proposition 4 tell us?

The informal economy as a drag on state building. Revenue generation needs to

address the soft-budget constraint especially in Mindanao. Yet regulation will be a
trigger for violent conflict (secondary land markets).

The informal economy as a survival mechanism. Gradual incorporation in the

formal economy depends upon the ability to provide conditions for alternative
livelihoods and government protection. The informal economy as indicative of
access barriers in formal markets that need to be disentangled and removed
(insurance markets in Mindanao).

The informal economy as an arena for legitimacy construction and the creation of
inclusive political settlements. The informal economy as the basis of elite bargains
and social contracts in places beyond the effective control of the State (Olsons
roving and stationary bandits)

HENCE, ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN MUSLIM

MINDANAO.

A final note:
beware the rise in transition-induced violence
Violent conflict in Mindanao has many sources and triggers,
apart from vertical political violence.
Wars make states!

BBLs Fate Hangs in the Balance

Despite its positive effects, every political settlement will
encounter problems related to:

Incompleteness: not all critical issues are addressed

Counter-productiveness: new problems have been created
Potential blowback: peace outcomes create conditions for
future turbulence.

Vertical and horizontal conflict

2011-2014
180
160
140
120
2011
100

2012

80

2013
2014

60

40

.
20
0

Vertical conflict

Horizontal conflict

Violence density is highest in Basilan.

90
80
70

60
50

2011

40

2012
2013

30
20
10
0

Basilan

Maguindanao

Sulu

Lanao del Sur

Tawi Tawi

Violence density refers to the number of violent incidents per 1,000 square
kilometers

Causes of violent conflict, 2011-2014

[CATEGORY
NAME]
[PERCENTAGE]

Identity-based
13%

Political issues
23%

Resource-based
3%

Shadow
economies
33%

Extra-judicial
issues
20%

Number of
incidents

Conflict deaths

Resource-based
Governance issues
Identity-based
Extra-Judicial
issues
Political issues
Shadow
economies
-1200

-1000

-800

2011

-600

2012

-400

2013

2014

-200

0 0

200

400

600

2011

800

2012

1000

2013

1200

2014

1400

1600

While GDP was falling during the war, tax

revenues increased in the ARMM provinces
1,200,000,000.00

60,000,000,000.00

1,000,000,000.00

50,000,000,000.00

800,000,000.00

40,000,000,000.00

600,000,000.00

30,000,000,000.00

400,000,000.00

20,000,000,000.00

200,000,000.00

10,000,000,000.00

Tax collections
Nominal GDP

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

26

Thank you