The act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures

G.R. No. 196271 Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already established that the supermajority
vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[15] is unconstitutional for violating the principle
that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the
legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down
such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained inDuarte v. Dade:[16]
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by
the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or
its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and
even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a
particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there
is quorum.[17] In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the
Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we
sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of,
future legislatures.[18]
We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he stated:
Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively
and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress amendatory powers. One Congress cannot limit
or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what the
Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold
because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the Constitution.[19]
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
I.

THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic
Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November
26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on
the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to
be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1.

YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which
show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with
the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional
mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the
ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through
three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents
certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate
from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
3.

YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on
who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire
when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs,
[their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by
the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the
elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in
a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can
be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way
it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section
7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent
is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule
that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order
special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date
for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by
another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power
or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall
not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special
elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to
declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not
to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum,
while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the
President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law
as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to
be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
[emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials
that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153
is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose nonobservance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law
of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing
elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May
2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No.
10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order
for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires.
Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals G. R. No. 93833 September 25 1995
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200, entitled An Act to
Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA 4200. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
agreeing with petitioner.
From the trial courts Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the CA.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial courts order null and void.

Issue:
W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.
Held:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.
Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any
private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge
of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA 4200.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Stat Con Principle: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
Legal Maxims: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of the statute is plain and free from
ambiguity)
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC
FACTS
1.Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands
of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities.
2.The report prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered
into a partnership styled Concave Commercia land Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of
Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar.
3.The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own
personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The
airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.
4.Moreover, it appeared in the investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in
transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles
of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts
of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
5.Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, GMCR placed private respondent Salazar under preventive
suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984,thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to explain her
side. But instead of submitting an explanation, three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984, Salazar filed a complaint
against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, after petitioner
notified her in writing that effective November 8,1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to
refute and disprove these findings."
6.After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter ordered GMCR to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent
position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal.
Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00.
7.On appeal, the NLRC in its resolution affirmed the said decision with respect to there instatement of Salazar but
limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages.
ISSUES
1.Whether or not the suspension of Salazar was illegal.
2.Whether or not Salazar was entitled to reinstatement and two (2) years' backwages with respect to her subsequent
dismissal.
HELD
1. YES. The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his
position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely
associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by the discovery of the missing
airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances,
preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By
itself, preventive suspension does not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she
was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property
pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. Thus, it is not correct to
conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all,
the fault lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum "giving her ample opportunity to
present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for
illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
2.YES. Under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended: Security of Tenure.-In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary

equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. "In the case at bar, there was no evidence which clearly showed an authorized, much less a legal,
cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well,
to full backwages. The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary
meaning of the word "reinstate is "to restore to a state, condition, position, etc. from which one had been removed"
and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the
past, would perforce make her "whole. "The Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement ... and to his full backwages . . ." Neither does the provision
admit of any qualification. An exception to the rule is when there instatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing
strained relations between the employer and the employee. In such cases, it should be proved that the employee
concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if
reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and
productivity of the employee concerned. The principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately.
Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the
parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal
act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the
service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that this relationship with his employer had already
become strained. Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that
may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating
reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed. As a system analyst, Salazar was very far removed
from operations involving the procurement of supplies. In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of
Salazar on loss of confidence. As has been held before, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
termination, it must rest on some basis which must be convincingly established. An employee may not be dismissed
on mere presumptions and suppositions. While the Court should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee,
neither should it dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences. To rely on the Maramara
report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally
Saldivars alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely
insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of
Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.
Thus, she was illegally dismissed.