Nollora vs People

professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from liability

for the crime of bigamy.

FACTS:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she
heard rumors that her husband of two years has another
wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage
with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for
bigamy.
When asked about the moral damages she
suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage
her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for return of her
money in the amount of P 50,000.
Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he
claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back to 1992. He
presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of
Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim
in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly
entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.
Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous
marriage. She claimed that she does not know Jesusa and
only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted
that she is the one lawfully married to Nollora because she
believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he told her so
prior to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage
of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert.
After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and
he also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is
bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab
initio under Article 35 of the Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the
case: that 1) Atilano is legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their
marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of
the second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of
his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the second marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack
of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage.
Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his
Muslim religion as his sole defense. Granting arguendo that
he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies
were not conducted in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 17 up
to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states
that any marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim
solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence
the Family Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's
religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages were
solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his

His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines providing: "[N]o
Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can
deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as
enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases." Only
with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim
be permitted to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk
of court shall serve a copy to the wife or wives, and should
any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be
constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's
consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall subject to
Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection
(Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws)
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that
his civil status is "single." Both of his marriage contracts do
not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood
of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an
essential requirement for marriage, his omissions are
sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false
declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded
by these omissions.
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent
attempt to escape criminal liability, he recelebrated their
marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this
can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been
violated.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

v.LIBERTY D. ALBIOS,Respondent.
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the
RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and
to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only
Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly
notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage voidab initio. The RTC
opined that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship and that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00.
However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because
the latter never processed her petition for citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking.

ISSUE:Whether or not the marriage contracted for the

sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship voidab
initioon the ground of lack of consent?
HELD:The marriage between the parties is valid
CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if
the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married.This standard
was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which
now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws of the United States.The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however,
that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on
the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which
declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the
husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that
a valid marriage could not be avoided erely because
the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
m a r r i a g e w a s i n t r i n s i c a l l y d i ff e r e n t f r o m a
nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be
valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A reely givenconsent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be
real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles
45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also
be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of,
and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences
of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced
by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created

between them, since it was that precise legal tie which

was necessary to accomplish their goal.

VICTORIA S. JARILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
Victoria Jarillo, petitioner, and Rafael Alocillo were married
in a civil wedding ceremony in Taguig, Rizal in 1974. Both
newlyweds celebrated a second wedding, this time a church
ceremony, in 1975 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of
the union, the spouses bore a daughter. Jarillo, however,
contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora
Santos Uy celebrated through a civil ceremony. Thereafter,
Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital vows in a church wedding
in Manila. In 1999, Uy filed a civil case for annulment
against Jarillo. On the basis of the foregoing, Jarillo was
charged with Bigamy before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo
filed a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Alocillo in 2000. The trial court rendered the
assailed decision, holding Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy.
Jarillo posits, as defenses, that her marriage to Alocillo were
null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a
certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, that her marriages to Alocillo and Uy were
both null and void for lack of a marriage license, and that
the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA confirmed the
ruling of the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC where
Jarillo filed a civil case against Alocillo rendered judgement
declaring Jarillos marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio
on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Jarillo,
in her motion for reconsideration, invoked the ruling of the
trial court as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. In
a Resolution by the CA, the latter denied reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jarillo can be convicted of the crime of
bigamy
HELD:
Petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be
affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered
a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment
petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void,
the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent second
marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet
been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither
would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners
marriage tojurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.

Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of

petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference.
As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A
plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the
mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
Mendoza v. Republic
G.R. No. 157649; November 12, 2012
FACTS:
Anabelle and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the
country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. After
a month of courtship, they became intimate and their
intimacy led to her pregnancy. They got married 8 months
after on June 24, 1991. Being one with the fixed income,
she shouldered all of the familys expenses. Ironically, he
spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash
with his friends. In September 1994, she discovered his
illicit affair with his co-employee and they started to sleep
in separate rooms affecting their sexual relationship.
Dominic eventually got fired from his employment and
was criminally charged with the violation of B.P. 22 and
estafa.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage null and void on the basis of Article 36 of
the Family Code?
HELD:
The appeal has no merit. The CA correctly indicated that
the ill-feelings that the petitioner harbored against
Dominic furnished the basis to doubt the findings of the
expert witness; that such findings were one-sided and
that he did not participate in the proceedings. The
findings and conclusions on his psychological profile were
solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions
of him by the petitioner and her witnesses. The court finds
the totality of evidence adduced by the petitioner
insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically
unfit. Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominics
psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. His
alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse did
not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. The
court denies the petition for certiorari and affirms that
decision of the Court of Appeals.