G.R No. 70766 November 9, 1988 AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.

,
petitioner, VS.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND JOSE M. ALEJANDRINO,
respondents, FACTS: The case is an appeal to reduce the amount of moral and
exemplary damages in Civil Case No. 8882-P of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, to P240,000 and P100,000 respectively, and the
latter, dated April 29, 1985, restoring the amount of the damages awarded by the
trial court: P2,000,000 as moral damages and P400,000 as exemplary damages with
interest thereon at 12% per annum from notice of judgment, plus costs of suit. In
November 1979, petitioner mailed to Alejandrino at his Philippine address a bill for
US $70 (joining fee of US $35and a December 1979 account of US $35). When it did
not receive any payment, petitioner sent Alejandrino another statement of account
in January 1980. As there was still no remittance made, petitioner cancelled
Alejandrino's account in February 1980. Alejandrino knew of this cancellation.
However, on May 2, 1980, Alejandrino received from the Manila office of petitioner,
thru a private courier service, another statement of account. This happened
because the Hongkong office did not inform the Manila office of the status of
Alejandrino's account. Alejandrino sent to petitioner a check for US $70.Petitioner
received the amount but it did not reinstate Alejandrino's account. Instead it merely
entered the payment as a credit in said account. Alejandrino was not informed
about this action taken by petitioner. In August 1980, Alejandrino received the July
1980 statement of account for US $70. Having previously paid a similar bill in May
1980, and not having ever used his credit card before, Alejandrino wrote petitioner
inquiring what the bill was for. He did not receive any reply. ISSUE:(a) Whether the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's motion, filed on
May 15, 1985,for extension of time to file a petition for review of the Court of
Appeals' resolution dated April 29, 1985, in view of Section 39 of B. P. Blg. 129, in
relation to Section 5(2),Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (b) whether this Court
has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review filed in this case, without leave of
court, -by waiving the requirement of Section 2, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, and
without the petition containing an assignment of errors. RULING: On May 7, 1985,
petitioner received a copy of the, Court of Appeals' resolution dated April 29, 1985
which am . the original decision of February 7, 1985 by restoring the damages
granted by the trial court. Eight (8) days afterwards on May 15, 1985, within the
reglementary period, petitioner filed with this Court a motion for extension of 30
days counted from May 16, 1985 within which to file its petition for review on June
10, 1985. This Court gave due course to the petition for review in its resolution
dated October 28, 1985.The petition for review was seasonably filed. There is no
infirmity in its filing. The appeal on questions of law to this Court thru a petition for
review on certiorari is governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25of
the Interim Rules, and not by B.P. Blg. 129. In fact, the Supreme Court is outside the
scope of B.P. Blg. 129.Besides, there is nothing sacred about the procedure of
pleadings. This Court may go beyond the pleadings when the interest of justice so
warrants. It has the prerogative to suspend its rule for the same purpose. In the
language of Mr. Justice Moreland, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities in

which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather, a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then,
brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done up on the merits. Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. "WHEREFORE, the
assailed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) is hereby SET
ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered, ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages, with six (6%) percent interest thereon computed from the finality of this
decision until paid. No costs.

LUISITO P. BASILIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE
ADVINCULA G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000 QUISUMBING, .: DOCTRINE: There are
two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an
accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the
criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard,
which is the essence of due process. FACTS: Simplicio Pronebo was charged with the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide
and double physical injuries. The court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula.
Pertinently, the trial court found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused
Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by
petitioner Luisito Basilio. Petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a Motion
for Reconsideration praying that the judgment be reconsidered and set aside insofar
as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of
the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of merit . Aggrieved, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not
afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of
the accused Pronebo in the criminal case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was afforded with due process HELD: Yes.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding
where the award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues,
there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence
of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some
kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and
found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; 4) that said

employee is insolvent. There are two instances when the existence of an employeremployee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be
determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and the other, during the
proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner should
be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process. In the
instant case, petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused
because it was his truck that was involved in the incident. Further, it was the
insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for
the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract. Petitioner did not
intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the
prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship. With the
convicts application for probation, the trial courts judgment became final and
executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it found that
petitioner was not denied due process. Petitioner was also given the opportunity
during the proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming that he
was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of subsidiary
liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he did
where he properly alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship
between him and accused and that the latter was not discharging any function in
relation to his work at the time of the incident. Manliclic v. Calaunan G.R. No.
150157 January 25,2007 512 SCRA 642 Facts:Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.(PRBLI) While driving his bus going to Manila, he
bumped rear left side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan.Because of
the collision, petitioner was criminally charged withreckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property with physical injuries.Subsequently, respondent filed a damage
suit against petitioner and PRBLI. According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at
the speed of 60 to70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when
the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the
jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. Atthe time
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other
words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was
hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner,explained that when the Philippine
Rabbit bus was about togo to the leftlane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep
swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it.Petitioner
was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However, in the civil case,
he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still madeto pay damages to respondent.
Issue: What is the effect of Manliclics acquittal to the civil case? Held:Since the civil
case is one for quasi delict, Manliclics Acquittal Does not affect the case. Manliclic
and PRBLI are still liable for damages. A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that isentirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a
distinction existsbetween the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility
forquasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causingdamages
may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the PenalCode, or create an

action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual underthe Civil Code.It is now

settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on afinding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the extinction of the civilliability based on quasi delict.In other
words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonabledoubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved bypreponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on thebasis that he was not the author of the
act or omission complained of (orthat there is declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civilmight arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door
to civil liability basedon the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being
no crime ordelict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not
possible. Inthis case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than
thedelict complained of.As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana,same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omissioncomplained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the
factfrom which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibilityarising
from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict Is entirely separate anddistinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under thePenal Code.An acquittal or conviction
in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in thecivil case based on quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana.

DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE,- versus SPS. JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA S. GO, G.R.
No. 160889 April 27, 2007 FACTS: Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist inObstetrics
and Gynecology at the Dr. JesusDelgado Memorial Hospital. She was theattending
physician of respondent Nora S. Go,who was admitted at the said hospital on
April19, 1992. At 1:30 a.m. of April 20, 1992, Noragave birth to her fourth child, a
baby boy.However, at around 3:30 a.m., Nora sufferedprofuse bleeding inside her
womb due to someparts of the placenta which were notcompletely expelled from
her womb afterdelivery. Consequently, Dr. Milagros L. Cantreperformed various
medical procedures to stopthe bleeding and to restore Noras bloodpressure.While
massaging Noras uterus for it tocontract and stop bleeding, she ordered adroplight
to warm Nora and her baby. Noraremained unconscious until she recovered.While in
the recovery room, her husband,respondent John David Z. Go noticed a freshgaping
wound two and a half (2 ) by threeand a half (3 ) inches in the inner portion of
her left arm, close to the armpit. He asked thenurses what caused the injury. He
wasinformed it was a burn. Forthwith, on April 22,1992, John David filed a request
forinvestigation.On May 7, 1992, John David brought Nora tothe National Bureau of
Investigation for aphysical examination, The medico-legal officerlater testified that
Noras injury appeared to bea burn and that a droplight when placed nearthe skin
for about 10 minutes could cause suchburn He dismissed the likelihood that
thewound was caused by a blood pressure cuff asthe scar was not around the arm,
but just onone side of the arm. The costs of the skingrafting and the scar revision

were shoulderedby the hospital.Unfortunately, Noras arm would never be thesame

Aside from the unsightly mark, the painin her left arm remains. When sleeping,
shehas to cradle her wounded arm. Hermovements now are also restricted.
Herchildren cannot play with the left side of herbody as they might accidentally
bump theinjured arm, which aches at the slightest touch. Thus, on June 21, 1993,
respondent spousesfiled a complaint for damages against Dr.Cantre, Dr. Abad, and
the hospital.In view of the foregoing consideration, judgment was rendered in favor
of Sps. Johnand Nora GO. Dr. Cantre, Dr. Abad, and thehospital all appealed to the
Court of Appeals,which affirmed with modification the trial courtdecision, the motion
for reconsideration wasdenied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, theinstant
petition.ISSUE:Whether or not Dr. Cantre isresponsible for the injury sustained by
Nora S.Go.HELD: Yes, the gaping wound on Noras leftarm, by its very nature and
considering hercondition, could only be caused by somethingexternal to her and
outside her control as shewas unconscious while in hypovolemic shock.Whether the
injury was caused by the droplightor by the blood pressure cuff is of no
moment.Both instruments are deemed within theexclusive control of the physician
in chargeunder the "captain of the ship" doctrine. Thisdoctrine holds the surgeon in
charge of anoperation liable for the negligence of hisassistants during the time
when thoseassistants are under the surgeons control. In cases involving medical
negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mereexistence of an injury to
justify a presumptionof negligence on the part of the person whocontrols the
instrument causing the injury,provided that the following requisites concur:1. The
accident is of a kind whichordinarily does not occur in theabsence of someones
negligence;2. It is caused by an instrumentalitywithin the exclusive control of the
defendant ordefendants; and3. The possibility of contributingconduct which would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

G.R. No. 68102. July 16, 1992. GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE,petitioners,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO,
respondents. FACTS: To avoid hitting 2 boys who suddenly darted from the right side
of the road andinto the lane of the car, Jose Koh blew the horn of his car, swerved to
the left andentered the lane of the truck. He attempted to return to his lane but
before he could doso, he already collided with the cargo truck.-Truck and Ford
collided in Pulong PuloBridge along MacArthur Highway. 3 people in the Ford escort
died including the driver,Jose Koh. RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court
dismissed petitioners' complaints in CivilCase No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of
the then Court of First Instance (now RegionalTrial Court) of Pampanga entitled
"Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero,Araceli Koh McKee and
Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and"George McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo,"respectively, and granted
the private respondents' counterclaim for moral damages,attorney's fees and
litigation expenses. RULLING BY THE IAC: On 29 November 1983, respondent Court,

by then known as theIntermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated

decision in A.C.-G.R. CVNos. 69040 and 69041,the dispositive portion of which
reads: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set aside
and anotherone is rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffsappellants. ISSUE: WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo)are liable
for theresulting damages RULLING BY THE SC: YES, The Court rules that it was the
truck driver's negligence infailing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which
was, in law, the proximatecause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver,
Manalo and Tayag are, underArticle 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily
liable for the resulting damages. Thepresumption that they are negligent flows from
the negligence of their employee. Thatpresumption, however, is only juris tantum,
not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to preventthe damage. Article 2180 reads as
follows: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall beliable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting withinthe scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in anybusiness or industry. The responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when thepersons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The diligence of a good
father referred to means thediligence in the selection and supervision of employees.
The answers of the privaterespondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not
interpose this defense. Neitherdid they attempt to prove it.The diligence of a good
father referred to means the diligence in the selection andsupervision of employees.
The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos.4477 and 4478 did not
interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.The respondent Court
was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversingthe decision of the
trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Itsassailed Resolution of
3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.In the light of recent
decisions of this Court, the indemnity for death must, however,be increased from
P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution of therespondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its
Decision of 29 November 1983 inC.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject
to the modification that theindemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.Costs against private
respondents. SO ORDERED. DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE,- versus SPS. JOHN DAVID Z.
GO and NORA S. GO, G.R. No. 160889 April 27, 2007 FACTS: Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is
a specialist inObstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr. JesusDelgado Memorial Hospital.
She was theattending physician of respondent Nora S. Go,who was admitted at the
said hospital on April19, 1992. At 1:30 a.m. of April 20, 1992, Noragave birth to her
fourth child, a baby boy.However, at around 3:30 a.m., Nora sufferedprofuse
bleeding inside her womb due to someparts of the placenta which were
notcompletely expelled from her womb afterdelivery. Consequently, Dr. Milagros L.
Cantreperformed various medical procedures to stopthe bleeding and to restore

Noras bloodpressure.While massaging Noras uterus for it tocontract and stop

bleeding, she ordered adroplight to warm Nora and her baby. Noraremained
unconscious until she recovered.While in the recovery room, her
husband,respondent John David Z. Go noticed a freshgaping wound two and a half
(2 ) by threeand a half (3 ) inches in the inner portion of her left arm, close to
the armpit. He asked thenurses what caused the injury. He wasinformed it was a
burn. Forthwith, on April 22,1992, John David filed a request forinvestigation.On May
7, 1992, John David brought Nora tothe National Bureau of Investigation for
aphysical examination, The medico-legal officerlater testified that Noras injury
appeared to bea burn and that a droplight when placed nearthe skin for about 10
minutes could cause suchburn He dismissed the likelihood that thewound was
caused by a blood pressure cuff asthe scar was not around the arm, but just onone
side of the arm. The costs of the skingrafting and the scar revision were
shoulderedby the hospital.Unfortunately, Noras arm would never be thesame Aside
from the unsightly mark, the painin her left arm remains. When sleeping, shehas to
cradle her wounded arm. Hermovements now are also restricted. Herchildren
cannot play with the left side of herbody as they might accidentally bump theinjured
arm, which aches at the slightest touch. Thus, on June 21, 1993, respondent
spousesfiled a complaint for damages against Dr.Cantre, Dr. Abad, and the
hospital.In view of the foregoing consideration, judgment was rendered in favor of
Sps. Johnand Nora GO. Dr. Cantre, Dr. Abad, and thehospital all appealed to the
Court of Appeals,which affirmed with modification the trial courtdecision, the motion
for reconsideration wasdenied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, theinstant
petition.ISSUE:Whether or not Dr. Cantre isresponsible for the injury sustained by
Nora S.Go.HELD: Yes, the gaping wound on Noras leftarm, by its very nature and
considering hercondition, could only be caused by somethingexternal to her and
outside her control as shewas unconscious while in hypovolemic shock.Whether the
injury was caused by the droplightor by the blood pressure cuff is of no
moment.Both instruments are deemed within theexclusive control of the physician
in chargeunder the "captain of the ship" doctrine. Thisdoctrine holds the surgeon in
charge of anoperation liable for the negligence of hisassistants during the time
when thoseassistants are under the surgeons control. In cases involving medical
negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mereexistence of an injury to
justify a presumptionof negligence on the part of the person whocontrols the
instrument causing the injury,provided that the following requisites concur:1. The
accident is of a kind whichordinarily does not occur in theabsence of someones
negligence;2. It is caused by an instrumentalitywithin the exclusive control of the
defendant ordefendants; and3. The possibility of contributingconduct which would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

Republic vs. palacio 23 scra899 G.R. No. L-20322 May 29, 1968 Facts: Ildefonso
Ortiz instituted a civil case against the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc.,

acorporation with principal place of business in Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the
IrrigationService Unit [ISU], an office or agency under the Department of Public
Works andCommunications, to recover possession, with damages, a lot located in
Handong, San Juan,Libmanan, Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association
allegedly entered and occupied, atthe instance of its co-defendant. For failure to
appear and answer the complaint, thereindefendant Irrigation Service Unit was
declared in default. The RTC [respondent Judge Palacio]rendered a decision in favor
of Ortiz. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Subsequently, awrit of
garnishment was issued. Petitioner then questions the wit of garnishment, on the
soleissue that the funds of ISU is a public fund. Issue: Whether or not the fund of ISU
can be garnished to satisfy the award of damages. Held: NoThe answer to the
petition lies in the determination of the function of ISU as a governmentagency. The
office of the ISU was originally created under the Department of Agriculture
andNatural Resources by virtue of a Memorandum Agreement between the
governments of thePhilippines and the United States. It was later transferred to the
Department of Public Worksand Communications as an office directly under the
Office of the Secretary, "to prosecute tocompletion the rehabilitation of pump
systems transferred from the former Irrigation Pump Administration of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the settlementof the
obligations of said administration.It is clear from the foregoing that the ISU is not
only an office in the Government of theRepublic of the Philippines, created to
promote a specific economic policy of said government,but also that its activity (of
selling irrigation pumps to farmers on installment basis) is notintended to earn profit
or financial gain to its operator. The mere fact that interests are beingcollected on
the balance of the unpaid cost of the purchased pumps does not convert
thiseconomic project of the government into a corporate activity. As previously
pointed out, theinstallment payments and interests receivable from the farmers are
to be used to replenish thecounterpart funds utilized in furtherance of the operation
of the project.The confusion arises from the Stat's waiver to be sued. The CA
assumed that because the Statehas waived its immunity, its property and funds
become liable to seizure under the legalprocess. This emphatically is not the law, as
held in Meritt vs. Insular government: "Even though the rule as to immunity of a
state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courtsends when the judgment is
rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judiciallyascertained, the state
is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not,and
execution can not issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not
authorize aseizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only
convey implication that thelegislature will recognize such judgment as final and
make provision for the satisfactionthereof.Judgments against a state, in cases where
it has consented to be sued, generally operatemerely to liquidate and establish
plaintiff's claim in the absence of express provision; otherwisethey can not be
enforced by processes of law; and it is for the legislature to provide for
theirpayment in such manner as it sees fit."It needs no stressing that to allow the
levying under execution of the ISU funds would amountto diverting them from the

purpose originally contemplated by the P.I.U.S. Bilateral Agreement,and would

amount to a disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by law.

City of Manila v. Teotico Posted on October 4, 2012 G.R. No. L-23052 22 SCRA 267
January 29, 1968 Facts: In January 1958, at about 8pm, Teotico was about to board a
jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole, resulting
injuries upon him . Thereafter he sued for damages under Art.2189 of the Civil Code
the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city
treasurer, and the chief of police. The CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. Upon appeal,
the CA reversed the CFI ruling and held that the City of Manila should pay damages
to Teotico. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the
charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the
negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special
law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the
accident happened in national highway. Issue: Whether the City of Manila have
control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages
suffered by Teotico. Held: Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails
over a general law; that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code
is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law
concerned, the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by
the negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city
from negligence of its officers in general. There is no particular exemption but
merely a general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and
municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision. The allegation that the incident happened
in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the Citys motion for
reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any
rate, even though it is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if
whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is
under the Citys control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by
reason of the defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they
have control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged
that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the citys roads, P. Burgos
included LIBI VS IAC 214 scra 16 FACTS: Wendell Libi, son of petitioners, and Julie
Ann Gotiong, the daughter of privaterespondent spouses, were sweethearts until
Julie broke up withWendell upon findingout of his sadistic and irresponsible
character.Wendell tried hard to reconcile with JulieAnn but when the latterrefused,
Wendell started making threats. On that fateful day of January 14,1978, Julie Ann
and Wendell diedfrom a single gunshot wound eachcomingfrom the same Smith and
Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitionerCresencio Libi. There being no

eyewitnesses to the crime, petitioners andprivaterespondents herein advanced

conflicting versions of the case.Privaterespondents claimed that with the use of the
same gun, Wendell took hisown lifeafter killing Julie Ann. On the other hand, the
petitioners argued thatan unknown thirdparty, whom Wendell may have displeased
by reason of his work as a narcoticinformant, must have caused the death of
Wendell and Julie Ann.As a result of thedeath of Julie Ann, private respondents filed
an actionto recover damages arising fromthe vicarious liability of the parents of
Wendell (petitioners herein) under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Aftertrial, the
case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.Likewise, thecounterclaim filed by
the petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.Onappeal lodged by private
respondents, the respondent court setaside the dismissal of the case and held
petitioners liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC. Hence this case.Hereinpetitioners seek
for the reversal of judgment of requiring themto pay P30,000.00 formoral damages,
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. ISSUE: Are petitioners liable for vicarious
liability under Art 2180 of the NCC? HELD: Under said Article 2180, the enforcement
of such liability shall be effected againstthefather and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by theChildand Youth Welfare Code which
provides that the same shall devolve upon thefather and,in case of his death or
incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death orincapacity,upon the guardian,
but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by arelative or familyfriend of the
youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability isnow, without
such alternative qualification, the responsibility of theparents and those
whoexercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civilliability arising
fromquasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply inaccordance
with Articles2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.In the case at bar,
whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused byafelony or a
quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err inholding
petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the
precedingmodifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases
of the legalimperatives hereinexplained, we conjoin in its findings that said
petitioners failed toduly exercise therequisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent
suchdamages.ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondentCourt of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
petitioners.

Amadora v CA (160 scra 315)Facts:Pabling Daffon shot classmate Alfredo Amadora

in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose. He was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Alfredos parents filed a civil action to recover damages against CSJ, its
rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
together with Pabling and two other students.The CFI found the school officials
liable for damages. The CA, however, reversed the CFI decision because: 1) Art
2180 was not applicable since CSJ was not a school of arts and trades; 2) the

students were not in the custodyof the school at the time of the incident since the
semester had already ended; 3) there was no clear identificationof the gun; and 4)
the defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.In this
petition for certiorari, petitioners contend that Alfredo went to school to finish his
physics experiment asa prerequisite for graduation; hence, he was under the
custody of the private respondents. The privaterespondents, on the other hand,
contend that Alfredo went to school to submit his physics experiment; hence, hewas
no longer under their custody since the semester had already ended.Issue:1)
Whether Art 2180 applies to establishments which are technically not schools of
arts and trades2) Whether private respondents are liable for damages under Art
2180Held:1) YES Art 2180 applies to all schools , academic as well as non-academic.
Teachers, in general, shall be liable forthe acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. Following the cannon of reddendo singula singulis, teachers should
apply to the words pupils and students and heads of establishments of arts and
trades to the word apprentices. 2) NOThe same vigilance is expected from the
teacher over his students, regardless of the nature of the schoolwhere he is
teaching. The injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the
school or any of itspersonnel and equipment. It may be inflicted by any student
regardless of the school where he is registered.The student is under the custody of
school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises , whether the semester has already begun or has already ended.
As longas it can be shown that the student is in the school in the pursuit of a
legitimate student objective, in the exerciseof a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of theschool
continues.The teacher-in- charge is liable for his students torts as he is designated
to exercise supervision over them.Moreover, the teacher is liable regardless of the
students age. In this case, none of the private respondents were held liable. The
rector, dean of boys, and high schoolprincipal cannot be held liable because they
were not teachers-in-charge. The physics teacher was not negligent.The school
cannot be held directly liable since Art 2180 only speaks of teacher or head of the
school of arts andtrades.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. COURT OF APPEALS 194 scra 341 FACTS: The
complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at
the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken byClass I-B
and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents,respondents
spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice,did not
allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers forthe
picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so.
However,because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the
beach.During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the

water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students,
includingFerdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself
whodrowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed.
He wasbrought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel
GeneralHospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. ISSUE: Whether or not
there was negligence attributable to the defendants which willwarrant the award of
damages to the plaintiffs. HELD: While it is true that respondents-spouses did give
their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners
were already relieved of theirduty to observe the required diligence of a good father
of a family in ensuring the safetyof the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners
were able to prove that they hadexercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim
for moral or exemplary damagesbecomes baseless.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, findingpetitioners herein guilty of
negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo andawarding the
respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitionersherein are
concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim,there
being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED. Philippine School of Business
Administration vs. CA [205 SCRA 729 GR No. 84698. February 4, 1942] Facts:
Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second floor premises of the schools by
assailants who were not members of the schools academic community. This
prompted the parents of the deceased to file a suit in the RTC of Manila for damages
against PSBA and its corporate officers. The defendant schools (now petitioner)
sought to have the suit dismissed on the ground of no cause of action and not
within the scope of the provision of Art 2180 since it is an academic institution. The
trial court overruled the petitioners contention and its decision was later affirmed
by the appellate court. Issue: Whether the decision of the appellate court primarily
anchored on the law of quasi-delicts is valid. Held: Although the Supreme Court
agreed to the decision of the Court of Appeals to deny the petition of motion to
dismiss by the PSBA, they do not agree to the premises of the appellate courts
ruling. Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil code establishes the rule of
in loco parentis, they can not be held liable to the acts of Calitos assailants which
were not students of the PSBA and because of the contractual relationship. The
school and the students, upon registration established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations. The institution of learning must provide their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge, and maintain peace and order within its premises. The SC
dismissed the petition and the case was remanded to the trail court to determine if
the school neglected its obligation to perform based on the contractual relation of
them and the students. St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos GR No. 143363,
February 6, 2002 FACTS: Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were
studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old

student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless
manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages. HELD: CA held
petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family
Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and
not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them
to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the
proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal
connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events,
unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to
show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no
evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The
mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they
may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. The registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven
on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the
trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein
petitioner.