Case Compilation

1|In General
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
G.R. No. 104988 June 18, 1996

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and
ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions
and Investigations Division, DENR, respondents.
G.R. No. 106424 June 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.
G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A.
ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation
Division, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN,
TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA,
JR., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No.
123784, were originally assigned to the Second and Third
Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were
subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the
Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at
Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with
a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de
Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a
lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development
(BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-0925900469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September
1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and
respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the
time material to these cases, the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and
Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge
stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen
inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw
coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with

Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver
could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its
cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. 1 The team was not able to
gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the
owner. 2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search
warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By
virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the
petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber;
and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts
of various species including almaciga and supa. 3
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under
administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000
board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin,
auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from
the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the
legitimacy of their source and origin. 4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an
administrative seizure the owner retains the physical
possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the
articles is taken and signed by the owner or his
representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing
them until further orders. 5
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to
Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14
April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the
seized articles because some of them, particularly the
certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province
of Quirino Robles denied the motion on the ground that the
documents being required from the petitioner must
accompany the lumber or forest products placed under
seizure. 6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandumreport recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber
Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an
unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of
Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required
documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang
Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322
and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR
compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents
showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten
days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner
of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the
circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and
2|In General
almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation
no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and
CDV. 458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for transport
lumber using "recycled" documents. 7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order
suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's
permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner
to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumberdealer's permit should not be cancelled.
20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes

stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt
therefor. 10
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the
petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the
SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No.
90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another

letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had
already secured the required documents and was ready to
submit them. None, however, was submitted. 8
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of

Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president
and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After
appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating
prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution 11
whose dispositive portion reads:
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order

wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1
April and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor
of the government to be disposed of in accordance with
law" the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa,
and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the
petitioner's lumberyard. 9
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby

recommended that an information be filed against
respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and
lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by
E.O. 277, series of 1987.
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila

a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a
restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles.
The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to
Branch 35 of the said court. The petitioner questioned
therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search
and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate
No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting
of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and
dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the
orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of
prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra

shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents be
released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that

violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting
upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No.
897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the
business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352
Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the
petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumberdealer's permit had already been suspended or 23 April
1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was
open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep
with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the
team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer
was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also
came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The
members of the team then introduced themselves to the
caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of
the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri
Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's
photographer was able to take photographs of the
stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust
around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and
the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team
thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or

subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have in his possession
truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and
regulations. 14
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice

Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as Chairman of the Task
Force on Illegal Logging." 13
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on
5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of
Section 58 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the
CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the
information reads as follows:
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered

its decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as
follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the
approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end
almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and
seized from the Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune
3|In General
Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside
and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to
report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and
almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as
directed by Law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute
the appropriate action before the proper court regarding the
Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No.
CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on
August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon
compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this judgment;.
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan,
supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned
above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned
to said petitioner is withheld in this case until after the
proper court has taken cognizance and determined how
those Lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of;
and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the
warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the
petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded
with large volumes of lumber without covering document
showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend
the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of
the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless
search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving
vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April
1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a
continuation of that made the previous day and was still
pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did
not even question. 17 And, although the search warrant did
not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that
the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands
observed during the conduct of the
search. 18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's
order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized
articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since
the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant
issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been
returned to him in compliance with the directive in the
warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary
Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been
rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the
petitioner's lumber dealer's permit on 25 September 1990,

a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL
CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings
based on the following grounds: (a) the information does
not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as
opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that
lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the
same may not be used in evidence against him for they
were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case
No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of
Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a
prejudicial question. 19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is
included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
possession thereof without the required legal documents is
penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the
definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that
exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very
purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal
logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our
forest resources. 20
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21
respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the
motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that
"possession of lumber without the legal documents
required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the
order of 18 October 1991, 23 the People filed a petition for
certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it
contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in
dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of
merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the
issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not
carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing
the possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber
whose possession without the required legal documents is
unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of
Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature
of the forest product involved has always been foisted by
those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business
of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is
that when appellant was required to present the valid
documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of
the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the
period of extension granted to it. 25
4|In General
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March
1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of
a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which
was filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila
handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition
because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative
remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17
September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell
lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the
seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as
amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a
warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No.
33778.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778
for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by
the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz.,
"timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the
market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the
English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or
adapted for various building purposes," the respondent
Court held that since wood is included in the definition of
forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term
forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest
officer or employee can seize the forest product involved in
a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to
Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which
provides in part as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest
officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall
arrest even without warrant any person who has committed
or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined
in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor
of the Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered
or taken by the offender in the process of committing the
offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in
said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products or possession of
timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied
by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February
1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February
1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R.
No. 106424 with which the other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not
charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong
granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is
neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession
thereof without the required legal documents is not
prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that
the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has
been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is
the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is,
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of the
offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered."
Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the
information state the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277,
which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or
Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers
who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering,
collection, or removal of timber or other forest products
from the places therein mentioned without any authority;
and (b) possession of timber forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68.
But conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an
exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the
facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE
validly charge a violation of the said section?
5|In General
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an
infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject
matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in
the possession of the private respondent, without the
required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1)
are not described as "lumber." They cannot refer to the
"lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the
words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction
"and," and not with the preposition "of." They must then be
raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under
Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. -xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top,
resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or
other forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic,
historical, recreational and geological resources in forest
lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered
by the information. The public and the private respondents
obviously miscomprehended the averments in the
information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in
Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall
within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the
information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests
in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four
corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether
the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of
the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the
conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the
indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his
proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in
the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be
considered in determining whether an information charges
an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are
insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the
Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng,
which is one of the annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead
one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber.
Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found
approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings
and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa which are
classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31
of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis
for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to

lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed against
respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000
bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for
illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec.
63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be
construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's
conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus
possession thereof without the required legal documents is
not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such
possession is penalized in the said section because lumber
is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter
is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs
and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market." 32 Simply put, lumber
is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33
And insofar as possession of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, makes no distinction between raw or
processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non
distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong
of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion
to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in
dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has
miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29
November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's
truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the
petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and transport
6|In General
documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a
valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or
employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the
search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search
could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate 34 that
no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (3)
search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4)
consented warrantless search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a
continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and
by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days.
Hence, it could be served at any time within the said
period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished
in one day, the same may be continued the following day
or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a
warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued
under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still
within the ten-day period. 36
Head or his duly authorized representative may order the

confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of
lumber is not penalized must also fail view of our
disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No.
106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative
seizure as a consequence of the violation of the
suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are
nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.
705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to
block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the
decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the
public in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive
action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous
destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not
the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of
sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its
vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without
fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for
the utilization and protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
G.R. No. 123784
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b)

SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged
orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of
respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172,
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c) REINSTATING the
information in the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING
the respondent Judge or her successor to hear and decide
the case with purposeful dispatch; and
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in

this case palpally fail to shaw prima facie that a reversible
error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its
challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6
February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must,
forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to
require the respondents to comment on the petition.
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R.

No. 123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that
the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of
31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND
CIVIL CASE.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's

appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its
lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by
Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was
never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up
to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no
right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber.
Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized
representative had the authority to seize the Lumber
pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
which provides as follows:
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was

illegal because possession of lumber without the required
legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein
nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly
merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No.
106424.
Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head

or his Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or
other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
7|In General
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th
August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the
motion of private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the
information that has charged him with the Violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705
(otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code, as
amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 277 1) and the
18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged
inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI
CHUY PO of the crime of violation of Section 68,
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or
Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his
possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
various species including almaciga and supa, without the
regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the
quashal of the information on the ground that the facts
comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense,
or in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the
ground of a prejudicial question, private respondent having
formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber
in question in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the
Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now
questioned order granting the motion of private respondent
to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the
possession of "timber or other forest products" (without
supporting legal documents), the mere possession of
"lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense
under Section 68 of PD 705. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to
come within the purview of "timber" defined by Section 2.26
(b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986.
The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the
petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution
before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes
"timber" and "other forest products," on the one hand, from
"lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other,
and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or
dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga,
supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series
of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition of
almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is
not considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR

Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or
gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species
(supa included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make
possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa
included) punishable by mere inference; and (4) that
Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of
1983, clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of
1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on
lumber shipped outside the province, city or the greater
Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO,
an invoice to accompany a lumber shipment from
legitimate sources if the origin and destination points are
both within the greater Manila area or within the same
province or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the
lumber is not removed from the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan
lumber products found in the compound of Mustang
Lumber, Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as
amended by EO No. 277, the possession of which without
requisite legal documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated
17 March 1989, that defines "lumber" to be a -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing,
resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged
lumber;
and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated 28 December 1987, to
be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at
least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all
mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered
as timber regardless of size;
which may either be -a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other
similar mechanical hard tools in the forest and which from
the size of the piece and the character of the wood is
obviously unfit for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR
Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated
December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and
squared timber shall include logs longitudinally sawn into
pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling, as
well as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise
worked to approximate its finished form, such as house
posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas,
troughs, bowls, cart wheels, table tops and other similar
articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR Administrative Order No. 50,
Series of 1986, dated November 11, 1986) -(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705
would be to defeat the purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or
minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid
denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private
respondent that a CLO is required only upon the
transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber
is merely stored in a compound, contravenes the
provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that the failure to
8|In General
show any CLO or other legal document required by
administrative issuances raises the presumption that the
lumber has been shipped or received from illegal sources;
and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 9053648 sustaining the legality of the seizure has rendered
moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in
G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases
(G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not
the term "timber or other forest products" the possession of
which without the required legal documents would be a
criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers
"lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging
private respondent with the possession without required
legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan
and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has
failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there
mentioned refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal
of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however,
would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the
indictment. For instance -(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio
Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, 3 subscribed and sworn to
before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis
the latter recommended the filing of the information, read,
as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the
security detail from our agency continued to monitor the
activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended
and later on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler
truck loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber after the truck
driver failed to produce any documents covering the
shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a
criminal complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of
Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as
amended by Executive Order 277, having in its possession
prohibited wood and wood products without the required
documents." 4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by
Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by
Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that
-" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to
monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact
apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the
compound of Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber without the necessary legal documents covering the
shipment." 5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of
Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber,
Inc., was issued because of, among other things, the
latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the required
documents. 6
(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued

by Secretary Factoran, authorized the confiscation of
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and
dimensions owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc. 7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A.
Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the Department of
Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for
possession of lauan and almaciga lumber without required
legal documents, 8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by
EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's
motion to quash, sought to argue that the possession of
"almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound
of Mustang Lumber, Inc., 9 was covered by the penal
provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section
32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal
order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber"
should be held to be among the items that are banned
under Section 68 of PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information
should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following
the standing rule that the allegations of the information
must alone be considered and should not be challenged,
there should, however, be no serious objections to taking
into account additional and clarificatory facts which,
although not made out in the information, are admitted,
conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the
case of People vs. Navarro, 10 reiterated in People vs. Dela
Rosa, 11 the Court has had occasion to explain -. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the
consideration of the motion the parties and the judge were
precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted
to be true, simply because they were not described in the
complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar
motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go
beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to
be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his
evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from
making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts,
because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated
that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that
all accused are convicted, but that the guilty are justly
punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court
from considering those admissions, and deciding
accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of
justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or
9|In General
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section
68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to
"timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the
decree defines "forest product" to mean -(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin,
gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other
forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the
associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geologic resources in forest lands
(emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the
law, from that which has undergone processing. In defining
a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to
refer to -. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest
raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard,
block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished
wood products (emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the
law, as a forest product, while lumber has been
categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various
finished wood products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor
General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28
December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to
be --
cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the

basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an
interpretation or construction of a statute by the
government agency called upon to implement the
enactment, 13 the rule would only be good, however, to the
extent that such interpretation or construction is congruous
with the governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can
aptly carry the law into effect 15 but it would be legal
absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect,
particularly those which are penal in nature, of extending
the scope of the law or its plain
mandate. 16
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in
G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988
and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784.
I must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the
well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36,
Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving
whatever remains of the country's forest reserves can
never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed
and checked, the continued denudation of forest resources,
already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as well
as of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on end
the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those
who call for the passage of remedial legislation before the
problem truly becomes irreversible.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th
August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the
motion of private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the
information that has charged him with the Violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705
(otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code, as
amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 277 1) and the
18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged
inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads:
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at

as timber regardless of size; 12
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI

CHUY PO of the crime of violation of Section 68,
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as follows:
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19,

dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber"
includes --
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or

Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his
possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
various species including almaciga and supa, without the
regulations.
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing,

lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988,
dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest
products" shall include "lumber --
10 | I n G e n e r a l
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the
quashal of the information on the ground that the facts
comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense,
or in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the
ground of a prejudicial question, private respondent having
formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber
in question in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the
Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now
questioned order granting the motion of private respondent
to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the
possession of "timber or other forest products" (without
supporting legal documents), the mere possession of
"lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense
under Section 68 of PD 705. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to
come within the purview of "timber" defined by Section 2.26
(b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986.
The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the
petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution
before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes
"timber" and "other forest products," on the one hand, from
"lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other,
and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or
dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga,
supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series
of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition of
almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is
not considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR
Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or
gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species
(supa included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make
possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa
included) punishable by mere inference; and (4) that
Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of
1983, clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of
1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on
lumber shipped outside the province, city or the greater
Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO,
an invoice to accompany a lumber shipment from
legitimate sources if the origin and destination points are
both within the greater Manila area or within the same
province or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the
lumber is not removed from the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan
lumber products found in the compound of Mustang
Lumber, Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as
amended by EO No. 277, the possession of which without
requisite legal documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated
17 March 1989, that defines "lumber" to be a -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing,
lumber;
and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative

Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated 28 December 1987, to
as timber regardless of size;
which may either be -a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other
similar mechanical hard tools in the forest and which from
the size of the piece and the character of the wood is
obviously unfit for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR
Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated
December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and
squared timber shall include logs longitudinally sawn into
pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling, as
well as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise
worked to approximate its finished form, such as house
posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas,
troughs, bowls, cart wheels, table tops and other similar
articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR Administrative Order No. 50,
Series of 1986, dated November 11, 1986) -(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705
would be to defeat the purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or
minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid
denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private
respondent that a CLO is required only upon the
transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber
is merely stored in a compound, contravenes the
provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that the failure to
show any CLO or other legal document required by
administrative issuances raises the presumption that the
lumber has been shipped or received from illegal sources;
and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 9053648 sustaining the legality of the seizure has rendered
moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in
G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases
(G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not
the term "timber or other forest products" the possession of
which without the required legal documents would be a
criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers
"lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging
private respondent with the possession without required
legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan
and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has
failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there
mentioned refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal
of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however,
would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the
indictment. For instance -(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio
Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, 3 subscribed and sworn to
before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis
the latter recommended the filing of the information, read,
as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the
security detail from our agency continued to monitor the
activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended
and later on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler
truck loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber after the truck
driver failed to produce any documents covering the
shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a
criminal complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of
Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as
amended by Executive Order 277, having in its possession
prohibited wood and wood products without the required
documents." 4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by
Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by
Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that
-" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to
monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact
apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the
compound of Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber without the necessary legal documents covering the
shipment." 5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of
Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber,
Inc., was issued because of, among other things, the
latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the required
documents. 6
(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued
by Secretary Factoran, authorized the confiscation of
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and
dimensions owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc. 7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A.
Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the Department of
Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for
possession of lauan and almaciga lumber without required
legal documents, 8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by
EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's
motion to quash, sought to argue that the possession of
"almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound
of Mustang Lumber, Inc., 9 was covered by the penal
provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section
32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal
order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber"
should be held to be among the items that are banned
under Section 68 of PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information
should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following
the standing rule that the allegations of the information
must alone be considered and should not be challenged,

there should, however, be no serious objections to taking
into account additional and clarificatory facts which,
although not made out in the information, are admitted,
conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the
case of People vs. Navarro, 10 reiterated in People vs. Dela
Rosa, 11 the Court has had occasion to explain -. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the
consideration of the motion the parties and the judge were
precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted
to be true, simply because they were not described in the
complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar
motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go
beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to
be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his
evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from
making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts,
because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated
that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that
all accused are convicted, but that the guilty are justly
punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court
from considering those admissions, and deciding
accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of
justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section
68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to
"timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the
decree defines "forest product" to mean -(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin,
gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other
forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the
associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geologic resources in forest lands
(emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the
law, from that which has undergone processing. In defining
a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to
refer to -. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest
raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard,
block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished
wood products (emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the
law, as a forest product, while lumber has been
categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various
finished wood products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor
General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28
December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to
as timber regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19,
dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber"
includes -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing,
lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988,
dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest
products" shall include "lumber -cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the
basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an
interpretation or construction of a statute by the
government agency called upon to implement the
enactment, 13 the rule would only be good, however, to the
extent that such interpretation or construction is congruous
with the governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can
aptly carry the law into effect 15 but it would be legal
absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect,
particularly those which are penal in nature, of extending
the scope of the law or its plain
mandate. 16
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in
G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988
and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784.
I must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the
well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36,
Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving
whatever remains of the country's forest reserves can
never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed
and checked, the continued denudation of forest resources,
already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as well
as of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on end
the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those

who call for the passage of remedial legislation before the
problem truly becomes irreversible.
G.R. No. L-108208 March 11, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of Quezon City,
and ALEXANDER DIONISIO Y MANIO, respondents.
HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman,
intervenor-respondent.
employ personal violence upon the person of one T/SGT.

ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO, by then and there
shooting the latter with the use of a gun, .45 caliber pistol,
thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his
neck and on his thorax, which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y
MACABEO in such amount as may be awarded to them
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Contrary to law.
De Guzman, Florentino, Celis, Moncupa & Torio for private

respondent.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224

and was raffled off to Branch 104 of the RTC, prescribed
over by the respondent Judge.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 4 September 1992, while trial was already in progress,

the respondent Judge issued, motu proprio, an order 3
requiring the prosecution and the defense to comment on
whether the Court should still proceed with the trial of the
case:
Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 1 provides that

"criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts." The principal
issue in this case is whether the term "regular courts"
includes the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner maintains that it
does not while the respondent Judge and the intervenorrespondent hold otherwise.
Section 46 reads as follows:
Sec. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases
involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courtsmartial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850
shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already
been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by
the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act
No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, as
amended, and Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known
as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, That
criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have
not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall
be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or
municipal trial court judge.
The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are as
follows:
On 31 July 1991, private respondent Alexander Dionisio y
Manio, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2
in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his
Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to
respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble
there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he
subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang.
On 7 August 1991, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an
Information 2 charging Dionisio with the crime of homicide
committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of July, 1991, in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, and without any justifiable motive, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
[i]n view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case

of Deloso vs. Domingo (Vol. 191 SCRA, 545), quoted as
follows:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses
committed by public officials when penalty prescribed by
law for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec.
4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the
petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period of death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code),
hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.
In his Order of 24 September 1992, 4 the respondent Judge
dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 "for re-filing with
the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan, and not the Regional Trial Court, has
jurisdiction over the case. The body of the order reads:
Which Court has jurisdiction over police officers who are
charged with the crime of homicide or murder?
Accused Quezon City Patrolman Alexander Dionisio y
Manio is being tried for homicide for killing T/Sgt. Romeo
Sadang y Macabeo on July 31, 1991 in Quezon City.
Several witnesses were already presented by the
prosecution. Nobody raised the issue of jurisdiction. On
September 4, 1992, the Court issued an order requiring the
prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the
Court has jurisdiction over the matter in view of the ruling of
the Supreme Court in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo, 191
SCRA 945 [sic] which rules as follows:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses
committed by public officials when the penalty prescribed
by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional
(Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge
against the petitioner carries
the penalty of reclusion temporal in maximum period to
death
(Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction to investigate it.
As a matter of fact, even if the act or crime is not related to
or connected with or arising from the performance of official
duty, it must be investigated by the Ombudsman or any of
its duly deputized representative:
The clause "any (illegal) act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed
by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of
the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee
that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require
that the act or omission be related to or be connected with
or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the
law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Sandiganbayan, although trying only certain special
classes of crimes, still can be classified as a regular court
functioning within the framework of the judicial department
of the government. It is a "trial court and bound by the rules
governing trial courts. It is one of the 'inferior courts' in
Article X of the Constitution whose jurisdiction may be
questioned before the Supreme Court and whose
judgments are subject to its review, revision, affirmance or
setting aside. The independence of the judiciary enshrined
in the Constitution calls for the unitary judicial system with
the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchical set-up"
(Rules of Criminal Procedures by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, Jr.,
1986 Edition, p. 26).
Conformably therefore to the foregoing consideration, the
regular court referred to in Section 46 of Republic Act 6975
(An Act establishing the Philippine National Police) is the
Sandiganbayan. Since the penalty for homicide, the charge
against the accused, carries the penalty of reclusion
temporal, said case is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate it. (Art. 249, RPC).
WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby
dismissed for refiling with the Sandiganbayan.
On 6 October 1992, the private prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration 5 of the dismissal, citing the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice of 31 July 1991 6 that "crimes
committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan" because "[t]hey fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts" as provided in Section 46
of R.A. No. 6975 and "[t]he Sandiganbayan is not a regular
court but a special court."
The respondent Judge denied the motion in the Order of 7
October
1992: 7
The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 31, 1992
[sic] . . . is not binding to this Court.
This Court still holds that the regular Courts referred to in
Sec. 46 of RA 6975 (An Act establishing the Philippine
National Police) includes the Sandiganbayan which has
exclusive original jurisdiction to try offenses on felonies
committed by public officers in relation to their office,
whether simple or complex with other crimes where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional (Sec. 4, par. c, PD 1606)
What is contemplated in the law is the regular civil court to
the exclusion of non-regular courts such as military courts
which had previous jurisdiction over police officers. The

police force being civilian in character should be under the
jurisdiction of the civil court. What is meant by "regular
courts" mentioned in Sec. 46, RA 6975 are the "inferior
courts" in Article X of the constitution which calls for a
unitary judicial system with the Supreme Court at the top of
the hierarchical set-up (Rules in Crim. Procedure by Dr.
Fortunato Gupit, page 26, 1986 edition).
On 6 January 1993, petitioner filed the instant petition. We
required the respondents to comment thereon.
On 5 February 1993, the office of the Ombudsman filed a
motion for leave to intervene and to file comment 8 alleging
that its constitutional duty to investigate criminal cases
against public officers, including PNP members, and to
prosecute cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are
affected by the issue raised; and that the office of the
Ombudsman and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had
issued a joint circular on 14 October 1991 9 wherein (a)
both agencies agreed that, subject to the final
determination by competent authorities, the term "regular
courts" in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 refers to "civilian
courts" as distinguished from military courts, and (b) certain
guidelines were adopted to govern the investigation and
prosecution of PNP members. Attached to the motion is the
Ombudsman's Comment 10 on the petition. We granted this
motion to intervene, admitted the Comment, and required
petitioner to reply thereto. 11
In their separate Comments, 12 the respondent Judge
reiterates the reasons stated in the assailed orders, and
the private respondent concurs with the position and
amplifies the arguments of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner filed its Reply 13 to the Comments of the
respondents and the intervenor.
On 6 July 1993, we resolved to consider the separate
comments of the respondents as answers, to give due
course to the petition, and to require the parties to file
simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty
days from notice, which they did, with the petitioner
submitting its memorandum only on 29 December 1993
after obtaining several extensions of time to do so.
In the main, petitioner insists that the dismissal of the
criminal case below, "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan"
was erroneous because Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 vests
the exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases involving PNP
members only in the "regular courts" which excludes the
Sandiganbayan since it is, constitutionally and statutorily, a
"special court" and not a regular court. To bolster this
claim, petitioner points to Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution which described the Sandiganbayan as "a
special court" and Section 4, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that "[t]he present anti-graft
court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law."
It further asserts that (a) if it were the intention of R.A. No.
6975 to grant to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over PNP
members, then Section 46 should have explicitly stated or
used the term "civil courts" considering that members of the
Integrated National Police (INP) were then integrated with
and under the operational control and administrative set-up
of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and, under P.D. No.
1850, were subject to court-martial proceedings for all
crimes cognizable by the civil courts; (b) if it were the
intention of R.A.
No. 6975 to include the Sandiganbayan in the term "regular
courts" in
Section 46, then it should not have provided therein that
"criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have
not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall
be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or
municipal trial court judge"; instead, it should have directed
such transfer to "the Ombudsman or the Special
Prosecutor since the Ombudsman or the Special
Prosecutor is mandated by law to entertain cases
cognizable only by the Sandiganbayan" under Section 15
of R.A. No. 6770; and (c) there is an irreconcilable conflict
between Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606 (revising P.D. No. 1486 which created the
Sandiganbayan), as amended, which vests in the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over "[o]ther
offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office . . . where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional . . . or
a fine of P6,000.00"; the latter then should be deemed
impliedly repealed by the former, which is a later law.
Petitioner finally contends that P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
is a general law of it applies to all public officers, while R.A.
No. 6975 is a special law for it sets out a special rule of
jurisdiction for PNP members. The latter should thus
prevail.
Petitioner then prays that the assailed orders of respondent
Judge of
24 September 1992 and 7 October 1992 be reversed and
set aside and that the respondent Judge be directed to
reinstate and continue the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-9123224.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman maintains the view
that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the subject criminal case
in view of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 and the Joint Circular
of 14 October 1991. It asserts that the term "regular courts"
in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 includes the Sandiganbayan
and that R.A.
No. 6975 has not repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606.
Amplifying its view, it opines that: (a) while the
Sandiganbayan is a special court, it is a regular court within
the context of Section 46 of R.A.
No. 6975 because it is a "court normally functioning with
continuity within the jurisdiction vested in it," and that the
term "regular courts" is used in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975
to distinguish the said courts from the court-martial for it
seeks to divest the latter of such jurisdiction and mandates
its transfer to the former pursuant to the policy of the law to
establish a police force national in scope and civilian in
character; and (b) since the creation of the Sandiganbayan
is mandated by the Constitution 14 to take cognizance of
crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office
and P.D. No. 1606 created it pursuant to such mandate,
then the repeal of the latter, as suggested by petitioner,
would diminish and dilute the constitutional jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan and would operate to amend the
Constitution, which no statute can do. Moreover, there is
no irreconcilable inconsistency between the two laws to
warrant an implied repeal.
Finally, the Ombudsman asserts that the proviso in Section
46 of R.A. No. 6975 that "criminal cases against PC-INP
members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the
effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper city
or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge" only
means a referral to the proper city or provincial prosecutor
or municipal trial court judge for appropriate preliminary
investigation and not the filing of the criminal information
with the proper court it being a fact that all city and
provincial prosecutors have been deputized by the
Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
As to which law is the special law, the Ombudsman
maintains that it is P.D. No. 1606 because it deals
specifically with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 does not specifically mention
any particular court.
The resolution of the principal issue hinges on the
interpretation of the term regular courts in Section 46 of
R.A. No. 6975 which, in turn, requires an inquiry into the
legislative intent and purpose of the law.
There can be no doubt that the provisions of R.A. No. 6975
on the PNP are intended to implement Section 6, Article
XVI (General Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution which
reads:
Sec. 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police
force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character, to be administered and controlled by a national
police commission. The authority of local executives over
the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
The sponsors of House Bill No. 23614, 15 which together
with Senate Bill No. 463 16 eventually became R.A. No.
6975 were unequivocal on this. Representative Antonio
Cerilles, after referring to the aforementioned mandate,
declared:
Today is a date with history, Mr. Speaker, when this august
chamber will try its best to pursue what is mandated by the
Constitution. Today, we shall insist, though legislative fiat,
that the State should establish and maintain one police
force. Its civilian character on a national scope shall be
paramount. Today, we should insist that no office in any
element or unit of the police force can be occupied or run
by military personnel and officer. We should also insist that
the only way to professionalize our police force is to
separate them from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 17
In this sponsorship speech, Representative Nereo Joaquin
stated:
First and foremost among all these is, as already
mentioned earlier, the fact that the bill is undoubtedly in
harmony and in conformity not only with the letter but more
importantly with the spirit of the new Constitution
particularly Section 6 of Article XVI, the General
Provisions. . . . 18
Police forces have traditionally been under civilian
authority. However, the dictatorial regime of then President
Ferdinand Marcos, consistent with his own agenda to
strengthen the machinery of martial law rule, exploited to
his advantage the provision of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated the establishment and maintenance of "an
integrated national police force whose organization,
administration, and operation shall be provided by law." 19
First, he issued a series of decrees consolidating and
integrating various local police forces and placing them
under the operational control, direction, and supervision of
the Philippine Constabulary (PC); 20 then on 8 August
1975, he promulgated P.D. No. 765 which "established and
constituted the Integrated National Police which shall be
composed of the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus,
and the integrated police forces as established by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as
components, under the Department of National Defense."
By this decree, Mr. Marcos succeeded in militarizing the
police forces by making them mere components of the PC
which was then one of the four major commands of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). He did not stop
there. For, even after the farcical lifting of Martial Law in
1981 through Proclamation No. 2045, and pursuant to the
infamous Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, 21 he
promulgated on 4 October 1982 P.D. 1850 which provided
for court-martial jurisdiction over police officers, policemen,
firemen, and jail guards. Section 1 thereof reads:
Before P.D. No. 1850, or specifically on 16 January 1981,

Mr. Marcos, through P.D. No. 1822, placed under courtmartial jurisdiction, pursuant to the Articles of War, all
officers, soldiers, and personnel in the active service of the
AFP or of the PC, charged with any crime or offense
related to the performance of their duties.
Sec. 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National

Police and Members of the Armed Forces. Any provision
of the law to the contrary notwithstanding (a) uniformed
members of the Integrated National Police who commit any
crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall
henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant
to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all
persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the
aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense
shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case
disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that,
in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be
disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities
when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has
prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act
Numbered 408, as amended, or court martial jurisdiction
over the person of the accused military or Integrated
National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by
virtue of their separation from the active service without
jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless
otherwise provided by law.
SENATOR ANGARA:
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the

Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers,
policemen, firemen and jail guards.
In a manner of speaking, this decree completed the
militarization of the INP and consummated the aberration in
the police organization. Two years later, or on 5 September
1984, he issued P.D. No. 1952 which amended
P.D. No. 1850 by inserting a proviso to the first paragraph
of Section 1 granting himself the authority "in the interest of
justice, [to] order or direct, at any time before arraignment,
that a particular case be tried by the appropriate civil court."
Needless to state, the overwhelming sentiment of the

framers of the 1987 Constitution against the martial law
regime 22 and the militarization of the police forces
prompted them to explicitly direct the establishment and
maintenance of one police force, which shall be national in
scope and civilian in character. This civilian character is
unqualified and unconditional and is, therefore, allembracing. The Declaration of Policy (Section 2) of R.A.
No. 6975 faithfully carried out this mandate when it
declared therein that:
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped
primarily for the performance of police functions. Its
national scope and civilian character shall be paramount.
No element of the police force shall be military nor shall
any position thereof be occupied by active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.
That civilian character refers to its orientation and structure.
Thus, during a bicameral conference committee meeting
on House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463, Senator
Edgardo Angara remarked:
That's what we're trying to interpret nga eh. Civilian in

character meaning, were separating the police both in
orientation and structure from the military discipline and
structure, I think that's essentially the mandate we're trying
to implement.
Civilian character necessarily includes, according to him:
SENATOR ANGARA:
Civilian system of justice na. 23
It is thus evident that the mandate of Section 46 of R.A. No.
6975 is to divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving PNP members and to return or
transfer that jurisdiction to the civil courts. This return or
transfer of jurisdiction to the civil courts was explicitly
provided for in the original Section 68 of House Bill No.
23614 which reads as follows:
Sec. 68. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Any provision of
the law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases
involving PNP members shall, immediately upon effectivity
of this Act, be exclusively tried by the Civil Courts:
Provided, however, That in cases where a member of the
PNP is unable to post bail, he may be placed upon order
by the court under the custody of his supervisor upon
petition of the latter. 24
Upon motion of Representative Rodolfo Albano, accepted
by the Committee and approved in plenary session, this
section was amended, to read as follows:
ANY PROVISION OF LAW TO THE CONTRARY
NOTWITHSTANDING, CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING
PNP MEMBERS SHALL BE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL COURTS. 25
In the course of the interpellation on his amendment, Mr.
Albano had the occasion to emphasize the purpose of the
law and the transfer of jurisdiction to civil courts of criminal
cases involving members of the PNP:
MR. ALBANO:
Considering that we are creating here a purely civilian
police force, he [the PNP member] should, therefore, also
fall under our civil force, and there should be no iota of
military syndrome [referring to the proviso in Sec. 68] so to
speak. 26
During the deliberation by the Bicameral Conference
Committee on National Defense on House Bill No. 23614
and Senate Bill No. 463, more specifically on Section 68 of
the former, its Chairman, Senator Ernesto Maceda, used
the term "regular courts" in lieu of civil courts. Thus:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):
Okay, Rey at saka iyong House, you work on the flow
chart.
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong
"Jurisdiction in criminal cases?" What is this all about?
REP. ZAMORA:
In case they are charged with crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):
Ah, the previous one is administrative, 'no. Now, if it is
charged with a crime, regular courts. 27
The term regular courts was finally carried into the
reconciled bill, 28 entitled "An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganization
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for
Other Purposes," and incorporated in the Conference
Committee Report received by the Office of the Secretary
of the Senate on 19 November 1990. Section 46 of the
proposed reconciled bill is Section 68 of House Bill No.
23614, with further modifications and amendments. The
reconciled bill was approved by such both House of
Congress and became R.A. No. 6975.
The foregoing considered, we have no doubt that the terms
civil courts and regular courts were used interchangeably
or were considered as synonymous by the Bicameral
Conference Committee and then by the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular
courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts.
There could have been no other meaning intended since
the primary purpose of the law is to remove from courtsmartial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
members of the PNP and to vest it in the courts within our
judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which, as
contradistinguished from courts-martial, are the regular
courts. Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine
judicial system; they pertain to the executive department of
the government and are simply instrumentalities of the
executive power. 29 Otherwise stated, courts-martial are not
regular courts.
Parenthetically, in Quiloa vs. The General Court Martial, 30

this Court found correct and impliedly adopted as its own a
statement of the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Comment that Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 mandates the
transfer of criminal cases against members of the PNP to
the civilian courts. Thus:
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General
in his comment
xxx xxx xxx
The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly
invested is declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in line
therewith, the law mandates the transfer of criminal cases
against its members to civilian courts. 31
Having thus ruled that the term "regular courts" in Section
46 of R.A.
No. 6975 refers to the civil courts, we must now determine
if the Sandiganbayan is included in that term.
Regular courts are those within the judicial department of
the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such
lower courts as may be established by law. 32 Per Section
16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987,
33 such lower courts "include the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, Shari'a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and
Shari'a Circuit Courts."
The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486 34
pursuant to the mandate of Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution. 35 This was revised by P.D. No. 1606. 36
The latter was amended by P.D. No. 1860 37 and lastly by
P.D. No. 1861. 38 Under the amendments introduced by
P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
following cases:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall
be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally
decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments,
resolution or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their
respective jurisdiction. . . .
Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court
and is thus included in the term regular courts in Section 46
of R.A. No. 6975.
Petitioner's insistence that it is not because, by the
Constitution and by the statutes, the Sandiganbayan is a
special court and, therefore, not a regular court is
untenable. In the first place, a comparison between the
words regular and special is inappropriate since the
opposite of the latter is not the former and vice versa.
Special means "designed for a particular purpose; confined
to a particular purpose, object, person, or class," 39 and is,
therefore, the antonym of general. 40 On the other hand,
regular means "steady or uniform in course, practice, or
occurrence," as opposed to casual or occasional. 41 In
other words, special and general are categories in the
distributive order. 42 With reference then to the courts, they
principally relate to jurisdiction. Thus, there are courts of
general jurisdiction and courts of special jurisdiction. It is, of
course, incorrect to say that only courts of general
jurisdiction are regular courts. Courts of special jurisdiction,
which are permanent in character, are also regular courts.
The Sandiganbayan is a court with special jurisdiction
because its creation as a permanent anti-graft court is
constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited to
certain classes of offenses.
That the Sandiganbayan is among the regular courts is
further strongly indicated by Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606
which vests upon it "all the inherent powers of a court of
justice" and places it on "the same level as the Court of
Appeals," and by Section 4 thereof, as amended by P.D.
No. 1861, which grants it appellate jurisdiction over certain
cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
There is, as well, no merit in the theory of petitioner that
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, as regards
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over members of the
PNP. First, the argument is based on the faulty assumption
that the Sandiganbayan, being a special court, is not a
regular court within the contemplation of Section 46.
Second, both provisions are not irreconcilable and the
presumption against an implied repeal has not been
overcome. Implied repeal may be indulged in only if the two
laws are inconsistent, or the former law must be repugnant
as to be irreconcilable with the latter law. Necessarily then,
an attempt must be made to harmonize the two laws. In
Valera vs.
Tuason, 43 this Court stated:
One of the well-established rules of statutory construction
enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize the
provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be
effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal
another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent.
The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable

[sic] with the latter act. (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208).
Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same
subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the
new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old
one. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634).
In Gordon vs. Veridiano, 44 this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, emphasized the task of courts to
reconcile and harmonize laws:
Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently
conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same
instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against
the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy
is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible,
bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the
same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the
same time also according due respect to a coordinate
department of the government.
Indeed, it has been appropriately said:
The presumption against implied repeals is classically
founded upon the doctrine that the legislature is presumed
to envision the whole body of the law when it enacts new
legislation, and, therefore, if a repeal of the prior law is
intended, expressly to designate the offending provisions
rather than to leave the repeal to arise by necessary
implication from the later enactment. Still more basic,
however, is the assumption that existing statutory and
common law, as well as ancient law, is representative of
popular will. As traditional and customary rules, the
presumption is against their alteration of repeal. The
presumption has been said to have special application to
important public statutes of long standing. 45
It can thus be reasonably presumed that in the enactment
of R.A. No. 6975, Congress had the whole body of the law
in mind and, for consistency, coherence, and harmony,
took into account the provisions of the Constitution
regarding the Sandiganbayan, the law creating it, and the
amendments thereto relative to its jurisdiction. Since under
the law, the Sandiganbayan is a special anti-graft court
with exclusive original jurisdiction over (a) violations of R.A.
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) other offenses or
felonies committed by public officers and employees
(including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations) in relation to their office where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, and
since members of the PNP are public officers or
employees, 46 Congress can be logically presumed to have
read into Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 the constitutional and
statutory provisions regarding the Sandiganbayan. The
alleged inconsistency seen by petitioner is non-existent for,
on the contrary, the two provisions can well go together
with full and unhampered effect to both and without doing
violence to either, thereby giving spirit to the maxim,
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi
or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with
other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. 47 As harmonized, the conclusion is
inevitable that members of the PNP, as public officers and
employees, are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan with respect to (a) violations of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, and (b)
other offenses or felonies committed by them in relation to
their office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a
fine of P6,000.00. All other offenses committed by them are
cognizable by the appropriate courts within the judicial
system such as the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
That the public officers or employees committed the crime
in relation to their office must, however, be alleged in the
information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over
a case under Section 4(a) (2). 48 This allegation is
necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the information. 49
In the instant case, the trial court dismissed Criminal Case
No. Q-91-23224 on the ground that since the penalty
prescribed for the crime charged which is homicide is
higher than prision correccional, 50 then pursuant to Deloso
vs. Domingo, 51 it is the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the case. In order to avoid a
misapprehension of the ruling in Deloso, which was based
on P.D. No. 1606 alone, it must be stressed that we had
unequivocally ruled in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas 52 that for
the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction
over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or
employees, under Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D.
No. 1861, it is not enough that the penalty prescribed
therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary
that such offenses or felonies were committed in relation to
their office. We then concluded:
Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for
the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine
whether that offense was committed or alleged to have
been committed by the public officers and employees in
relation to their offices.
In the recent case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 53 we
reiterated our ruling on the requirement that the offenses or
felonies covered by Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D. No. 1861, have to be committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their office and
likewise elucidated on the meaning of offenses committed
in relation to their office by reiterating the principle in
Montilla vs. Hilario 54 that an offense may be considered as
committed in relation to the office if "the offense cannot
exist without the office," or that "the office must be a
constituent element of the crimes as . . . defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the
Revised Penal Code," and the principle in People vs.
Montejo 55 that the offense must be intimately connected
with the office of the offender and perpetuated while he
was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his
official functions. Further, we intimated that the fact that the
offense was committed in relation to the office must be
alleged in the information.
Just recently, in Natividad vs. Felix, 56 we explicitly

declared that we had re-examined the Deloso case in
Aguinaldo and in Sanchez and reiterated the requisites for
an offense under Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D. No. 1861, to fall under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
In the light then of the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City would be without jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. Q-91-23224 if the information therein would show
that the offense of homicide charged was committed by the
accused (private respondent) in relation to his office. The
information has failed to do so. The pleadings of the parties
are of little help. We can only speculate therefrom that the
crime charged might have been committed while the
private respondent was in the pursuit of his mission. Under
the sub-heading in the petition entitled "Relevant
Antecedents," the petitioner merely states:
1. On July 31, 1991, private respondent . . . then a member
of the PNP-NCR assigned to the Central Police District
Command Station 2, based in Novaliches, Quezon City,
was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay
Street in Novaliches to check on a complaint regarding a
person creating trouble in the place. While in Novaliches,
private respondent shot Romeo Sadang to death.
There is no indication at all that the trouble-maker was the
victim and that he was shot by the private respondent in
the course of the latter's mission. On the other hand, the
private respondent asserts in his Comment that he "shot
Romeo Sadang in the performance of a lawful duty and in
lawful defense of his life." 57 Petitioner ignored this claim in
its Reply to the Comment. This claim is an anticipatory
defense yet to be proved and its assertion in the Comment
does not cure the deficiency, pointed out earlier, of the
information. It would appear to us that with respect to the
issue of jurisdiction, the parties only took into account the
prescribed penalty, relying upon Deloso vs. Domingo, for
which reason they did not consider important and relevant
the issue of whether the offense charged was committed
by the private respondent in relation to his office. But as
stated earlier, Deloso vs. Domingo was modified by
Aguinaldo vs. Domagas.
The dismissal then of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 solely
on the basis of Deloso vs. Domingo was erroneous. In the
light of Aguinaldo and Sanchez, and considering the
absence of any allegation in the information that the
offense was committed by private respondent in relation to
his office, it would even appear that the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. However, it may yet be true that
the crime of homicide charged therein was committed by
the private respondent in relation to his office, which fact,
however, was not alleged in the information probably
because Deloso vs. Domingo did not require such an
allegation. In view of this eventuality and the special
circumstances of this case, and to avoid further delay, if not
confusion, we shall direct the court a quo to conduct a
preliminary hearing in this case to determine whether the
crime charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 was
committed by the private respondent in relation to his
office. If it be determined in the affirmative, then it shall
order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which
shall forthwith docket and proceed with the case as if the
same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a
quo shall set aside the challenged orders, proceed with the
trial of the case, and render judgment thereon.
Henceforth, any officer authorized to conduct a preliminary
investigation 58 who is investigating an offense or felony
committed by a public officer or employee (including a
member of the PNP) where the penalty prescribed by law
is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
years, or a fine of P6,000.00, must determine if the crime
was committed by the respondent in relation to his office. If
it was, the investigating officer shall forthwith inform the
Office of the Ombudsman which may either (a) take over
the investigation of the case pursuant to Section 15(1) of
R.A. No. 6770, 59 or (b) deputize a prosecutor to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to
Section 31 thereof. 60 If the investigating officer determines
that the crime was not committed by the respondent in
relation to his office, he shall then file the information with
the proper court.
In the light of the foregoing, further discussion on the other
collateral issues raised has become unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING
the respondent Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy of this Decision, a preliminary
hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to determine
whether the crime charged was committed by the private
respondent in relation to his office, and
(1) If he determines that the crime charged was committed
by the private respondent in relation to his office,
DIRECTING the respondent Judge to forthwith transmit the
records of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall
docket and proceed with the case as if the same were
originally filed with it; or
(2) If he determines otherwise, DIRECTING him to set
aside the challenged Orders of 24 September 1992 and 7
October 1992, to proceed with the hearing of Criminal
Case No. Q-91-23224, and to render judgment thereon.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I),
FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and
NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"
respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of
the Anti-Subversion
Act, 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines
and other "subversive associations," and punishes any
person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates
himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party
or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of
section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the
respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted
a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case
against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the
corresponding information. The twice-amended
information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the
Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer
and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of
force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal
means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under the
control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training
school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military
arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following
aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or
with insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford
impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or
afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion
Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint
was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo
Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary

investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as
amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State
Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to
collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to
the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby
accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA,
ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO
GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias
COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose
identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT
No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law,
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto
and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the
Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as
offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in
Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and
COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly,
willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a
member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not
only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of
the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist
Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named
accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the
aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit
subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and
stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and
tumultuously and take up arms against the government,
and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the
Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or
other illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the
accused conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the
said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting
the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and
toward this end, the said accused organized, among others
a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio
Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of
undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive
and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots
and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to
established in the Philippines a Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias
TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO
Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and/or
seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members
for the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and
inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion
and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the
Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or
persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or
disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the
validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of
attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one
subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied
him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in
its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute
void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is
vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations
against the two accused. The Government appealed. We
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for
certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No
bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted." 2 A
bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without trial. 3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative
for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban
against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle
of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation
of the judicial function. 7 History in perspective, bills of
attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes
and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a
definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a
legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of
attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned
by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and
feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a
"continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to
the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the
trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the
judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards
of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the
only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused
is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of
attainder because it has expressly created a presumption
of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be
seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to
be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed
organization. The term "Communist Party of the
Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact
the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also to "any other organization having the

same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of
the U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was
held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional.
Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the
Communist
Party ... shall serve
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive
board or similar governing body, business agent, manager,
organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee
performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any
labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his
membership in the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes
disability and penalties on its members. Membership in the
Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from
becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of
any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United
States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly
constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly
possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact
legislation designed to keep from positions affecting
interstate commerce persons who may use of such
positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504,
however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it
by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a
generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who
commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics
(acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make
them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union
office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding
what persons have committed the specified acts or
possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it
designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess
the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union
office without incurring criminal liability members of the
Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to
our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order
by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to
register as a "Communist-action organization," under the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50
USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of
"Communist-action organization" which the Board is to
apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is
substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the
foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this
title, and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of
such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC
sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act
was a bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not
specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations
setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth
a general definition. Although the Board has determined in
1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action
organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to
be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always
come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of
Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist
Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages,
comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at
anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it is once
registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate
means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it
would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in
court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to
secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that
their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character
and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and
other illegal means and place the country under the control
and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is
nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of
knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is
precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred
to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be
correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere
membership devoid of any specific intent to further the
unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically
required that membership must be knowing or active, with
specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party.
That is what section 4 means when it requires that
membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The
ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of
the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes
an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of
guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while
the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies
individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to
render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or
employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as
officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be
subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to

the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret,
oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty
to register, and punishing any person who becomes a
member of such society which fails to register or remains a
member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation
it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux
Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the
Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with
the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the
effect that they are not members of the Communist Party
and that they are not members of any organization which
teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by
any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this
Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon
this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had
taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the
United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or
from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the
payment of further compensation to individuals named in
the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in
subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a
member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or
employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills
of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so
universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially
noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and
judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such
determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New
York legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oathbound society with a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who joined or remained
a member of such a society failing to register. While the
statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the
law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute
against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux
Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound
organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of
Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on
common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku
Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the
cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the
classification was justified by a difference between the two
classes of associations shown by experience, and that the
difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part
of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose
and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to
personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence
of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In
pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku
Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class: "It
is a matter of common knowledge that this organization
functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods
and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into
the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class:
"These organizations and their purposes are well known,
many of them having been in existence for many years.
Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no
complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or
interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts
said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the
association or organization of which the relator is
concededly a member exercises activities tending to the
prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens.
But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and later
said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized
lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the
Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative
scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that
the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather
than harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing
"the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing
that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially
demonstrated," meaning in that state, said:
"Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities
have existed for many years, and, while not immune from
hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their
existence."
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the

Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the
New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the
evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts
about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have
publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and
have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against
the Government of the Philippines.
We assume that the legislature had before it such

information as was readily available including the published
report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of
Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the
formation, purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If
so it was advised putting aside controverted evidence
that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an
earlier time with additional features borrowed from the
Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that
its memberships was limited to native-born, gentile,
protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed
creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full
adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in
another exacted of its member an oath to shield and
preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared
any person actively opposing its principles to be "a
dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and
an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that
it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and
Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudices; that it was striving for political power and
assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of
local, state and national affairs; and that at times it was
taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of
its members conceived to be crimes. 27
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any

public office or employment in the service of the City of Los
Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective
or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the
effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught,
or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a
member of or affiliated with any group, society, association,
organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches
or has within said period of five (5) years advised,
advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of
the Government of the United States of America or of the
State of California.
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party

has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In
1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to
be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the
objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine
Government by armed struggle and to establish in the
Philippines a communist form of government similar to that
of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in
Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or

groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the
prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary
that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct.
This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of
attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice
Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ...
doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features.
This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs
in one
clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is
also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto
law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive
that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City
of Los Angeles which provided:
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective

application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the
charter provision insofar as it purported to apply
restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date.
We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter
Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's
public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in
1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of
the Government or who are or become affiliated with any
group doing so. The provisions operating thus
prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the
municipal service by establishing an employment
qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under
which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett
case did not declare general and prospectively operative
standards of qualification and eligibility for public
employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further
payment of compensationto named individuals or
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against
the legislative background, the statutewas held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is
thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it
mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of
attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive
Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of
attainderby the fact that the conduct which it regulates is
describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few
organizationswill come within the statutory terms.
Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard
as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is
found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long
as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who
engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can
escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own
present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder.
33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAntiSubversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the
prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the
approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully
and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines
and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after
June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of
the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time
of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of
purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and
under oath their membershipin the Party. The law
expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to
exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties
prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2
of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment
is inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of
guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of
expression and freedom of association are sofundamental
that they are thought by some to occupy a"preferred
position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35
Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe
justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe
reason why before enacting the statute in question
Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated
itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines
althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an organized
conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of
the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose
of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime
subject to alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the

CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and
persistentsubversion, national in scope but international in
direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines
and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation
to cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and
security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento
question if, instead of making these findings in enactingthe
statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed
judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper
account of the distinction between legislative fact and
adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe
crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore
than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of
legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable
relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement
problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages
(assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation
by rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact,
i.e., whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the
meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental
action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we
mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion
founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for
weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those
facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment will
not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while
adjudicativefacts those which tie the legislative
enactment to the litigant are to be demonstrated and
found according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for
judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted
by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are
seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio."
The recital of legislative findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin
the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950
(that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the
foreign government controlling the worldCommunist
movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the
objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S.
Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of
theselegislative findings and reject them....They are the
productof extensive investigation by Committes of
Congress over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot
dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if
we accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable
appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist
organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the
United States, but to the United States as asovereign,
independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of
Congress to regulate Communist organizations of
thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of
thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion
Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself
againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require
elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of
society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value,
"forif a society cannot protect its very structure from
armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be
protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in
Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the
argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial
governmentsis without force where the existing structure of
government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We
rejectany principle of governmental helplessness in the
face of preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to
its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could
conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to
prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force
and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as
explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed
its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as
distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen held as
a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive
organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and
encouragement to the organization; and when membership
is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization
is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or
retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes himself
a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad
because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the
Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful
means, misconceives the function of the phrase"knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely
a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties
prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in
section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist
Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first
"whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow
contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand violence
but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The
absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due
more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe

use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a
metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow
ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in
metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use
ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is
hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the
"overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under
thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What
thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is
appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly
imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and
it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in
which it wasevidently intended to be understood. The word
'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise.
The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his
audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument
designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is
inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the appellant
wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against
conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force,
violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in
freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed
by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the
Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so
insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the
overriding considerationsof national security and the
preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis
similar in many respects to the membership provision ofthe
Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize
anysociety, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any
such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or
assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned
notmore than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible
for emplymentby the United States or any department or
agencythereof, for the five years next following his
conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in
Scales vs. United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we
arehere concerned is not constitutionally protected speech,
and itwas further established that a combination to promote
suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to
be a politicalparty, is not such association as is protected
by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why
membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of
complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection
from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the
problemsof accommodating the exigencies of selfpreservationand the values of liberty are as complex and
intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that
threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of
personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because
the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have
chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether
it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an
effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order
and individual freedom,and when the legislative
compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the
court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its
resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional
commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle
of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with
anyother person to overthrow the Government of the
Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its
political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion
or illegal means,for the purpose of placing such
Government or political subdivisionunder the control and
domination of any lien power, shallbe punished by prision
correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory
penalties provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes
notonly membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any
conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any
local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not
to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime,
evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an
aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic
power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even
an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or
Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe
Communist Party of the Philippines and
SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and
forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1
providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short
title of the statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject
matter is subversionin general which has for its
fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian
regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely
subversion by Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its
contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a
valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature,
scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its
operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be
avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin

order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the
Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAntiSubversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the needfor
prudence and circumspection in its enforcement,
operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following
basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under
the Act.The Government, in addition to proving such
circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the
following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist
Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe
Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of
the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of
the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian
regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the
accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so
knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the
Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the
objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an
organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government
by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country
under thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused
joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly
and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime
or remaining a member of the Communist Party ofthe
Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave
this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of
September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are
herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
Costs de oficio.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
It is with regard that I find myself unable to join therest of
my brethren in the decision reached upholding thevalidity
of the Anti-Subversion Act. 1 It is to be admittedthat the
learned and scholarly opinbion of Justice Castro hasthe
impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny ofthe
constitutional issues raised. What is more, the stressin the
concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines thatwill
assure in the trial of those prosecuted under suchAct
respect for their constitutional rights is to be
commended.Nonetheless, my own reading of the
decisionscited, interpreting the bill of attainder clause 2
coupled withthe fears, perhaps induced by a toolatitudinarian constructionof the guarantees of freedom of
belief and expression 3 as well as freedom of association 4
as to impermissible inroadsto which they may be exposed,
compels a differentconclusion. Hence this dissent.
1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that theequally
pressing concern of state safety and security shouldbe
ignored. The political branches of the governmentwould lay
themselves oepn to a justifiable indictment fornegligence
had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the
nation against its sworn enemies. In a simplerera, where
the overthrow of the government wasusually through the
rising up in arms, with weapons farless sophisticated than
those now in existence, there wasno constitutional issue of
the magnitude that now confrontsus. Force has to be met
with force. It was as clearcutas that. Advances in science
as well as more subtlemethods of inducing disloyalty and
weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced
complexities in coping withsuch problems. There must be
then, and I am the firstto recognize it, a greater
understanding for the governmentalresponde to situations
of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the AntiSubversion Act isto be appraised. From ny standpoint, and
I am not presumptuousenough to claim that it is the only
perspectiveor that is the most realistic, I feel that there was
an insufficientappreciation of the compulsion of the
constitutionalcommands against bills of attainder and
abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the thought
that evenhad my view prevailed, all that it would mean is
that anew legislation, more in comformity to my way of
thinkingto what is ordained by the fundamental law,
wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be
entertained thenthat a setback would be occasioned to
legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of subversive
activities, in whateverform manifested.
2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof
the bill of attainder clause is the meaning attachedto it by
the Constitutional Convention of 1934 and by the people
who adopted it. As was explained by the then Delegate,
later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on
November19, 1934 as Chairman of the Committee on the
Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of the Court: "A billof
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4Wall.
277, 18 L ed 356). In England, the Bill of Attainder was an
act of Parliament by which a man was tried, convictedand
sentenced to death without a jury, without ahearing in
court, without hearing the witnesses againsthim and
without regard to the rules of evidence. His bloodwas
attainted or corrupted, rendering him devoid of allheritable
quality of acquiring and disposing property bydescent.
(Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty
imposed was less than death, the act wasknown as a 'bill
of pains and penalties.' Bills of attainder, like ex post facto
laws, were favorite methods of Stuartoppression. Once, the
name of Thomas Jefferson was includedin a bill of
attainder presented to Parliament becauseof his reform
activities." 5 Two American SupremeCourt decision were
thus in the minds of the framers.They are Cummings v.
Missouri 6 and Ex parte Garland. 7 They speak
unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form,
that apply either to named individuals or
easilyascertainable members of a group in such a way as
to inflicton them punishment amounting to a deprivation
ofany right, civil or political, without judicial trial are billsof
attainder prohibited by the Constitution. 8
Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa
Catholic priest for refusing to take the loyalty oath
requiredby the state Constitution of Missouri of 1865.
Undersuch a provision, lawyers, doctors, ministers, and

otherprofessionals must disavow that they had ever, "by
act orword," manifested a "desire" for the success of the
nation'senemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the
AmericanCivil War. If they swore falsely, they were guilty of
perjury.If they engaged in their professions without theoath,
they were criminally liable. The United States Supreme
Court condemned the provision as a bill of
attainder,identified as any legislative act inflicting
punishment withoutjudicial trial. The deprivation of any
right, civil orpolitical, previously enjoyed, amounted to a
punishment.Why such a conclusion was unavoidable was
explained inthe opinion of Justice Field thus: "A bill of
attainder isa legislative act, which inflicts punishment
without a judicialtrial. If the punishment be less than death,
the actis termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the
meaningof the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills
ofpains and penalties. In these cases the legislative body,
inaddition to its legitimate functions, exercises the
powersand office of judge; it assumes, in the language of
thetextbooks, judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon
theguilt of the party, without any of the forms or
safeguardsof trial; it determines the sufficiency of the
proofs produced,whether conformable to the rules of
evidence orotherwise; and it fixes the degree of
punishment in accordancewith its own notions of the
enormity of the offense. ... If the clauses of the 2d article of
the Constitutionof Missouri, to which we have referred, had
in termsdeclared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or should
be heldguilty, of having been in armed hostility to the
UnitedStates, or of having entered that state to avoid
beingenrolled or drafted into the military service of the
UnitedStates, and, therefore, should be deprived of the
right topreach as a priest of the Catholic church, or to teach
inany institution of learning, there could be no question
thatthe clauses would constitute a bill of attainder within
themeaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses,
insteadof mentioning his name, had declared that all
priestsand clergymen within the state of Missouri were
guiltyof these acts, or should be held guilty of them, and
hencebe subjected to the like deprivation, the clause would
beequally open to objection. And further, it these
clauseshad declared that all such priests and clergymen
shouldbe so held guilty, and be thus deprived, provided
they didnot, by a day designated, do certain specified acts,
theywould be no less within the inhibition of the Federal
Constitution.In all these cases there would be the
legislativeenactment creating the deprivation, without any
of theordinary forms and guards provided for the security
ofthe citizen in the administration of justice by the
establishedtribunales." 10
On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings
washanded down, Ex parte Garland 11 was also decided.
Thatwas a motion for leave to practrice as an attorney
beforethe American Supreme Court. Petitioner Garland
wasadmitted to such bar at the December term of 1860.
Underthe previous rules of such Court, all that was
necessarywas that the applicant have three years practice
in the statecourts to which he belonged. In March 1865, the
rule waschanged by the addition of a clause requiring that
an oathbe taken under the Congressional acts of 1862 and
1865to the effect that such candidate for admission to the
barhad never voluntarily borne arms against the
UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could not in conscience
subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a
presidentialpardon extended on July 15, 1865. With such
actof clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue
inpractice contending that the test oath requirement
wasunconstitutional as a bill of attainder and that at any
rate,he was pardoned. The same ruling was announced by
theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus: "In the
exclusionwhich the statute adjudges, it imposes a
punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were not
punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other
of the actsit adds a new punishment to that before
prescribed, andit is thus brought within the further inhibition
of the Consitutionagainst the passage of an ex post facto
law. Inthe case of Cummings v. Missouri, just decided, ...
wehave had occasion to consider at length the meaning of
abill of attainder and of an ex post facto law in the clauseof
the Constitution forbidding their passage by the states,and
it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said.A like
prohibition is contained in the Constitution
againstenactments of this kind by Congress; and the
argumentpresented in that case against certain clauses of
the Constitutionof Missouri is equally applicable to the act
ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12
There was a reiteration of the Cummings and
Garlanddoctrine in United States v. Lovett, 13 decided in
1946.There it was shown that in 1943 the respondents,
Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for several
yearsworking for the government. The government
agencies,which had lawfully employed them, were fully
satisfiedwith the quality of their work and wished to keep
thememployed on their jobs. Over their protest, Congress
providedin Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency
AppropriationAct of 1943, by way of an amendment
attached to theHouse Bill, that after November 15, 1943,
no salary orcompensation should be paid respondent out of
any moneythen or thereafter appropriated except for
services as jurorsor members of the armed forces, unless
they wereprior to November 15, 1943, again appointed to
jobs bythe President with the advide and consent of the
Senate.Notwithstanding such Congressional enactment,
and thefailure of the President to reappoint the
respondents, theagencies, kept all the respondents at work
on their jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943,
but their compensationwas discontinued after that date.
Respondentsbrought this action in the Court of Claims for
the salariesto which they felt entitled. The Ameican
Supreme Courtstated that its inquiry was thus confined to
whether theaction in the light of proper construction of the
Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so, whether
Section304 is a bill of attainder insofar as the respondents
wereconcerned.
After holding that there was a juditiciable, view
theAmerican Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice
Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section 304
fallsprecisely within the category of Congressional
actionswhich the Constitution barred by providing that 'No
Billof Attainder or ex post Law shall be passed.'
InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If the punishment be
lessthan death, the act is termed a bill of pains and
penalties.Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of

attainderinclude bills of pains and penalties.' ... On the
sameday the Cummings case was decided, the Court, in
Exparte Garland, also held invalid on the same grounds
anAct of Congress which required attorneys practicing
beforethis Court to take a similar oath. Neither of
thesecases has ever been overruled. They stand for the
propositionthat legislative acts, no matter what their
form,that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainablemembers of a group in such a way as to
inflictpunishment on them without a judicial trial are billsof
attainder prohibited by the Constitution. Adherenceto this
principle requires invalidation of Section 304. Wedo adhere
to it." 14
United States v. Brown 15 a 1965 decision was the firstcase
to review a conviction under the LaborManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, making
it a crimefor a member of the Communist Party to serve as
anofficer ir, except in clerical or custodial positions,
anemployee of a labor union. Respondent Brown, a
longshoremanon the San Francisco docks, and an open
andavowed Communist, for more than a quarter of a
centurywas elected to the Executive Board of Local 10 of
theInternational Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Unionfor consecutive one-year terms in 1959, 1960, and
1961.On May 24, 1961, respondent was charged in a onecountindictment returned in a district court of California
withservicing as a member of an executive board of a
labororganization while a member of the Communist Party,
inwillful violation of the above provision. The question ofits
validity under the bill of attainder clause was thusproperly
raised for adjudication. While convicted in thelower court,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuitreversed. It was
sustained by the American SupremeCourt. As noted in the
opinion by Chief Justice Warren,"the wide variation in form,
purpose and effect of ante-Constitutionbills of attainder
indicates that the properscope of the Bill of Attainder
Clause, and its relevance tocontemporary problems, must
ultimately be sought by attemptingto discern the reasons
for its inclusion in theConstitution, and the evils it was
desinged to eliminate.The best available evidence, the
writings of the architectsof our constitutional system,
indicates that the Bill ofAttainder Clause was inteded not as
a narrow, technical(and therefore soon to be outmoded)
prohibition, but ratheras an implementation of the
separation of powers, ageneral safeguard against
legislative exercise of the judicialfunction, or more simply
trial by legislature." 16 Then after referring to Cummings,
Garland, and Lovett,Chief Justice Warren continued:
"Under the line of casesjust outlined, Sec. 504 of the Labor
Management Reportingand Disclosure Act plainly
constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly
possesses power under theCommerce Clause to enact
legislation designed to keepfrom positions affecting
interstate commerce persons whomay use such positions
to bring about political strikes. In Sec. 504, however,
Congress has exceeded the authoritygranted it by the
Constitution. The statute does not setforth a generally
applicable rule decreeing that any personwho commits
certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and
characteristics whhich, in Congress'view, make them likely
to initiate political strikes) shallnot hold union office, and
leave to courts and juries thejob of deciding what persons
have committed the specifiedacts or possessed the
specified characteristics. Instead,it designates in no
uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec
characteristics and therefore cannothold union office
without incurring criminal liability members of the
Communist Party." 17
Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
ControlBoard, 18 where the provision of the Subversive
ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the Communist Party
ofthe United States to register was sustained, the opinionof
Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a fivemanmajority, did indicate adherence to the
Cummingsprinciple. Had the American Communist Party
been outlawed,the outcome certainly would have been
different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches
notto specified organizations but to described activities
inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The
singlingout of an individual for legislatively prescribed
punishmentconstitutes an attainder whether the individualis
called by name or described in terms of conduct
which,because it is past conduct, operates only as a
designationof particular persons. ... The Subversive
Activities ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the
registrationonly of organizations which, after the date of the
Act,are found to be under the direction, domination, or
controlof certain foreign powers and to operate primarily
toadvance certain objectives. This finding must be
madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial
reviewwhich opens the record for the reviewing
court'sdetermination whether the administrative findings as
tofact are supported by the preponderance of the
evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element
to whichthe statute attaches legal consequences, not
merely a pointof reference for the ascertainment of
particularly personsineluctably designated by the
legislature." 19
The teaching of the above cases, which I find
highlypersuasive considering what appeared to be in the
mindsof the framers of the 1934 Constitutional
Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the AntiSubversionAct falls within the ban of the bill of attainder
clause. Itshould be noted that three subsequent cases
upholding theCummings and Garland doctrine were
likewise cited in theopinion of the Court. The interpretation
accorded to themby my brethren is, of course, different but
I am unable togo along with them especially in the light of
the categoricallanguage appearing in Lovett. This is not to
lose sightof the qualification that for them could deprive
such aholding of its explicit character as shown by this
excerptfrom the opinion of the Court: "Indeed, were the
Anti-SubversionAct a bill of attainder it would be totally
unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law
alone,without more, would suffice to secure their conviction
andpunishment. But the fact is that their guilt still has to
bejudicially estblished. The Government has yet to proveat
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Partyknowing its
subversive character and with specific intentto further its
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Governmentby
force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the
control and domination of a foreign power. 20While not
implausible, I find difficulty in yielding acceptance.In
Cummings, there was a criminal prosecution ofthe Catholic

priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.Again in Brown,
there was an indictment of the laborleader who, judging by
his membership in the CommunistParty, did transgress the
statutory provision subsequentlyfound offensive to the bill
attainder clause. If the constructionI would place on theoffrepeated pronouncementof the American Supreme Court is
correct, then the merefact that a criminal case would have
to be instituted wouldnot save the statute. It does seem
clear to me that fromthe very title of the Anti-Subversion
Act, "to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and
similar associations,"not to mention other specific
provisions, the taintof invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my
inability to concurin the judgment reached as the statute
not suffering fromany fatal infirmity in view of the
Constitutional prohibitionagainst bills of attainder.
3. This brings me to the question of the alleged
repugnancyof the Anti-Subversion Act to the intellectual
libertysafeguarded by the Constitution in terms of the free
speechand free assocition guarantees. 21 It is to be
admitted thatat the time of the enactment of Republic Act
No. 1700,the threat that Communism, the Russian brand
then, didpose was a painful reality for Congressional
leaders andthe then President. Its shadow fell squarely
across thelives of all. Subversion then could neither be
denied notdisparaged. There was, in the expert opinion of
those conversantwith such mattes, a danger to out national
existenceof no mean character. Nonetheless, the remedies
toward off such menace must not be repugnant to our
Constitution.We are legally precluded from acting in
anyother way. The apprehension justly felt is no warrant
forthrowing to the discard fundamental guarantees.
Vigilantwe had to be, but not at the expense of
constitutional ideals.
One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost
significance,is the right to dissent. One can differ,
evenobject; one can express dissatisfaction with things as
theyare. There are timew when one not only can but
must.Such dissent can take the form of the most critical
andthe most disparaging remarks. They may give offense
tothose in authority, to those who wield powe and
influence.Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional
protection.Insofar as the content of such dissent is
concerned, thelimits are hardly discernible. It cannot be
confined totrivial matters or to such as are devoid of too
much significance.It can reach the heart of things. Such
dissentmay, for those not so adventurous in the realm of
ideas,possess a subversive tinge. Even those who oppose
a democraticform of government cannot be silenced. This
is trueespecially in centers of learning where scholars
competentin their line may, as a result of their studies,
assert thata future is bleak for the system of government
now favoredby Western democracies. There may be
doubts entertainedby some as to the lawfulness of their
exercisingthis right to dissent to the point of advocary of
such adrastic change. Any citizen may do so without fear
thatthereby he incurs the risk of a penal sanction. That
ismerely to affirm the truth of this ringing declaration
fromJefferson: "If there be any among us who would wish
todissolve this union or to change its republican form,
letthem stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety
withwhich error of opinion may be tolerated where reason
isleft free to combat it." 22 As was so well put by the
philosopher,Sidney Hook: "Without holding the right to
theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be
absolute for even the right to non-heretical speech
cannot beabsolute it still seems wise to tolerate the
expression evenof Communist, fascist and other heresies,
lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of heresies,
and deprive ourselvesof the opportunity to acquite possibly
sounder ideasthan our own." 23
The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount
to an incitement to commit the crime of seditionor rebellion.
The state has been reached, to follow theformulation of
Cardozo, where thought merges into action.Thus is loyalty
shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the
Constitution. It does not bar the expressionof views
affecting the very life of the state, even ifopposed to its
fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not require
as a matter of fact, that unorthodoxideas be freely
ventilated and fully heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.
Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled
constitutionalprinciple "that even though the governmental
purposesbe legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursuedby means that broadly stifle fundamental
personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved.For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an
areaso closely related to our most precious freedoms." 24
This is so for "a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
notbe achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadlyand thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." 25 It isindispensable then that "an over breadth"
in the applicabilityof the statute be avoided. If such be the
case, then theline dividing the valid from the constitutionally
infirm hasbeen crossed. That for me is the conclusion to be
drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-Subversion Act.
There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe
dissent of Justice Black in the Communist Party
casediscussed above. What is to be kept in view is that a
legislativemeasure certainly less drastic in its treatment
ofthe admittedly serious Communist problem was found
inthe opinion of this noted jurist offensive to the
FirstAmendment of the American Constitution
safeguardingfree speech. Thus: "If there is one thing
certain aboutthe First Amendment it is that this Amendment
was designedto guarantee the freest interchange of ideas
aboutall public matters and that, of course, means the
interchangeof all ideas, however such ideas may be
viewed inother countries and whatever change in the
existing structureof government it may be hoped that these
ideas willbring about. Now, when this country is trying to
spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world
ideals that are revolutionary in many countries seems to
be aparticularly inappropriate time to stifle First
Amendmentfreedoms in this country. The same arguments
that areused to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas
here couldbe used to justify an outlawry of the ideas of
democracyin other countries." 26 Further he stated: "I
believe with theFramers of the First Amendment that the
internal securityof a nation like ours does not and cannot
be made todepend upon the use of force by Government to
make allthe beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a
commonmold on any single subject. Such enforced
conformity ofthought would tend only to deprive our people

of the boldspirit of adventure and progress which has
brought thisNation to its present greatness. The creation of
publicopinion by groups, organizations, societies, clubs,
and partieshas been and is a necessary part of our
democraticsociety. Such groups, like the Sons of Liberty
and theAmerican Corresponding Societies, played a large
part increating sentiment in this country that led the people
ofthe Colonies to want a nation of their own. The Father
ofthe Constitution James Madison said, in speakingof
the Sedition Act aimed at crushing the Jefferson Party,that
had that law been in effect during the period beforethe
Revolution, the United States might well have continuedto
be 'miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke.'In
my judgment, this country's internal security can betterbe
served by depending upon the affection of the peoplethan
by attempting to instill them with fear and dreadof the
power of Government. The Communist Party hasnever
been more than a small group in this country. Andits
numbers had been dwindling even before the
Governmentbegan its campaign to destroy the Party by
force oflaw. This was because a vast majority of the
Americanpeople were against the Party's policies and
overwhelminglyrejected its candidates year after year. That
is the trueAmerican way of securing this Nation against
dangerousideas. Of course that is not the way to protect
the Nationagainst actions of violence and treason. The
Foundersdrew a distinction in our Constitution which we
would bewise to follow. They gave the Government the
fullest powerto prosecute overt actions in violation of valid
lawsbut withheld any power to punish people for nothing
morethan advocacy of their views." 27
With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in mymind
and congenial to my way of thinking, I cannot sharethe
conclusion reached by my breathren as to the AntiSubversion Act successfully meeting the test of validity
onfree speech and freedom of association grounds.
4. It could be that this approach to the
constitutionalquestions involved arises from an appraisal of
the challengedstatute which for me is susceptible of an
interpretationthat it does represent a defeatist attitude on
thepart of those of us, who are devotees at the shrine of
aliberal-democratic state. That certainly could not
havebeen the thought of its framers; nonetheless, such an
assumptionis not devoid of plausibility for why resort tothis
extreme measure susceptible as it is to what apparentlyare
not unfounded attacks on constitutional grounds?Is this not
to ignore what previously was accepted as anobvious truth,
namely that the light of liberalism sendsits shafts in many
directions? It can illuminate, and itcan win the hearts and
minds of men. It if difficult forme to accept the view then
that a resort to outlawry isindispensable, that suppression
is the only answer to whatis an admitted evil. There could
have been a greater exposureof the undesirability of the
communist creed, itscontradictions and arbitrarines, its lack
of fealty to reason,its inculcation of disloyalty, and its
subservience tocentralized dictation that brooks no
opposition. It is thus,in a realistic sense, a manifestation of
the fear of freethought and the will to suppress it. For
better, of course,is the propaganda of the deed. What the
communists promise,this government can fulfill. It is up to it
then to takeremedial measures to alleviate the condition of
our countrymenwhose lives are in a condition of destitution
andmisery. It may not be able to change matters
radically.At least, it should take earnest steps in that
direction.What is important for those at the bottom of the
economicpyramid is that they are not denied the
opportunity for abetter life. If they, or at least their children,
cannot evenlook forward to that, then a constitutional
regime is nothingbut a mockery and a tragic illusion. Such
a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit
of thinning,if not completely eliminating, the embattled
ranksand outposts of ignorance, fanaticism and error. That
forme would be more in accordance with the basic
propositionof our polity. This is not therefore to preach a
doctrine of object surrender to the forces apparently bent
on the adoption of a way of life so totally opposed to the
deeply felt traditions of our people. This is, for me at least,
an affirmation of the vitality of the democratic creed, with
an expression of regret that it could not have been more
impressively set forth in language worthy of the subject.
It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find
myself unable to yield concurrence to the ably-written
opinion of Justice Castro for the Court sustaining the
validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.
DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR.,
respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those
whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege.
It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,1[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which
raise a single question of profound importance to the
nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the
highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the
judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is
he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with
Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the
rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the
fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that
could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939
and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled
"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission
on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January
2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ
and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of

candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming
to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according
to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage
to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC
on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim,
presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the
certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an
affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with
Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth
of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of
the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to
the fact that there was no record in the National Archives
that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be
found in the files of the National Archives regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two
documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones
being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of
the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
appeared to be no available information regarding the birth
of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-InCharge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of
birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No.
P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No.
23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the
purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the
records of birth in the said office during the period of from
1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World
War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No.
04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January
2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC
en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would
stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No.
161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the
other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue
on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and
to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs
certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen)
before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC
expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code
which would authorize "any interested party" to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 642[2] in an
action for certiorari under Rule 653[3] of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987

Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution
provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R.
No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken
cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a
gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be
fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could
or should be elected to occupy the highest government
post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez,
in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme
Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted
before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution.
The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to
designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential
and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court
to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,4[4] as not (being)
justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on
the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the VicePresident-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the
Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary
form of government under the 1973 Constitution might
have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the
statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed
revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are

held.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference

to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of
either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view,
i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule
14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April
1992, would support this premise -
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a

brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge

of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by
the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate
for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30)
days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or VicePresident. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined
as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5[5] In
such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or
third highest number of votes could file an election protest.
This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.

Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G.
R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that

given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C.,
described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.6[6]
Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the
constituency of the "State," which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be adequate in
number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.7[7] The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and
be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy,
judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was
seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand,
and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8[8] In its
ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over
the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited,
by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the
rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to
property, personal liberty and justice.9[9] Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in
the exercise of political power.10[10] The 20th century saw
the next stage of the development of social citizenship,
which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic
well-being and social security.11[11] The idea of citizenship
has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage
of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global
village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.12[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the
Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
subjects."13[13] In church records, the natives were called
'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number
made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all
of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to
apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.14[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the
Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July
1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts;15[15] however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
1841,16[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
specifically defining the political status of children born in
the Philippine Islands,17[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera
de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.18[18]
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898

between Spain and the United States.21[21] Under Article
IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United
States would be determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes
or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or
may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their
rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have
the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and
professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws
as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year
from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty,
a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance;
in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they reside.
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to

the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of
its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the
Ultramar among which this country was included, would be
governed by special laws.19[19]
Thus
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this

jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the
first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens.
-
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation

by the United States Congress on the subject, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens,
they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American
laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.
(a)
Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b)
Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if
they were born outside of Spain,
(c)
Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
(d)
Those who, without such papers, may have
become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.20[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower,
Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted
principle of international law dictated that a change in
sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political
laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which
would remain virtually intact.
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants

of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determined by the Congress."22[22]
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for

the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly
referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United
States on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing
to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th
day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."23[23]
who could become citizens of the United States under the

laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one

who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish
subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant
was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an
inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11
April 1899.24[24]
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the

Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines
as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and,
3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the

Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during
which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
of territoriality, operative in the United States and England,
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within
that period.25[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made
the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
other insular possession of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."26[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept
of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized.
The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first
Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially
made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the
Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also
known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of
Congress in 1912 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and
except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on

whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship,
the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are
citizens of the Philippines (1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2)
Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had
been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3)
Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(4)
Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
(5)
law.
Those who are naturalized in accordance with
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken

together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which
provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands,
resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively
incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required
illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly
found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the
framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of
the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2)
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
(3)
Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five.
(4)
law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also

further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien
retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced
her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that
aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2)
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
(3)
Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4)
law.
The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."27[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28[28]
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs29[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor30[30] (1947), jus sanguinis
or blood relationship would now become the primary basis
of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to
indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of
FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of

birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence,
his death certificate, however, identified him to be a
Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84
years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954.
The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe,
showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta
Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of
a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the
date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five
years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would
disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F.
Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie
Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the
only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of
certainty from the documents would be that 1.
Kelley;
The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
2.
FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3.
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to
each other on 16 September, 1940;
4.
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5.
At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to
establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen?
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley,
the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody
of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for
petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted
as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit
"5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(d)
When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie
proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules
of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value
given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1)
the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement
made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of
that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most
such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which
makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as
might have occurred.31[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he
died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo
Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would
argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during
the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that
there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however,
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other
place during the same period. In his death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
time of his death was also his residence before death. It
would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management
and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation

(relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or
mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the
father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently
being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior
to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines
took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish
filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial
(compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the
lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.32[32] Complementary to the new code was Act
No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5
thereof, that In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be
signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or
only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it
shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document
the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the
child, or to give therein any information by which such
father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to
prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity,
the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the
father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same
useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.33[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,34[34] the Court
ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was
enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth
certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the
registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his
having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in
our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the
names of both parents, there is no showing that they
signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as
required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might
have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register.
Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in
the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according
to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case,
there must be a clear statement in the document that the
parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both
parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of
Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by
decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary
recognition remained to be "some other public document."
In Pareja vs. Pareja,35[35] this Court defined what could
constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of
public documents, those executed by private individuals
which must be authenticated by notaries, and those
issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or
judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment
could be demanded generally in cases when the child had
in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action
to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of
the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the
child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could
only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral
argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic
writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as
being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The
term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent
official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article
172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1)
The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2)
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted
to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state
of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of

five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate

filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively
applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36[36] the
Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized
natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code
provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or
before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize
the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of
keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs
of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would
also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship
to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship"
could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be
taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil
law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double
purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of
property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among members of a
family, and those which exist among members of a society
for the protection of private interests."37[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x
x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern
Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond,
the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as
between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal causes
for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree
it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce
upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are
questions that are governed exclusively by the national law
of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is
best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a
reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships
found in different parts of the Civil Code,39[39] such as on
successional rights and family relations.40[40] In adoption,
for instance, an adopted child would be considered the
child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights
as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only
to define his rights under civil law41[41] and not his political
status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to
the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were
strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy
were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the
sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the
domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family
Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on
evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the

matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from
being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of
a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a)
the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the
pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between
the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit
20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the
acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley
and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind,
presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after
being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1.
I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2.
Sr.
Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe,
3.
Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the
name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4.
Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20,
1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxx
xxx
xxx
7.
Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and
became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced
to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8.
Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had
their first child in 1938.
9.
Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their
first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando
II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until
the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
10.
Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were
blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxx
xxx
xxx
18.
I am executing this Declaration to attest to the
fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born
Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe,
Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of
January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals,42[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong
weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies,
one copy from the mother and the other from the father.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence
is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate
case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an

illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making
his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than
respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents
showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
father and an American mother who were married to each
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an
American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de
Leon44[44] and Serra vs. Republic.45[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus
curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he
states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota
was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on
jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of
stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to
the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision
but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I
therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an
illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson
of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese
mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather.
Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not
have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about
the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a
legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue
was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his
mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46[46] This is a more complicated
case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan
who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed
that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father.
But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof
that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The
Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin.
Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino
but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it
followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that
even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin
would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x
It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the
obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would

have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not
once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate
child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was
established long ago by People vs. Cayat.47[47] I would
grant that the distinction between legitimate children and
illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real
differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not
for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to
elective public service? What possible state interest can
there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from
becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of
the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To
disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important
public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And
if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction,
then the distinction transgresses the equal protection
clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a
former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and
Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely
on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as
taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for
the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or

discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of
birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it
is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are
none provided.
In Sum
(1)
The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No.
161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails
the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in
SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification
of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation
in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2)
The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction
and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No.
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in
the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court
can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections
are held.
(3)
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether
grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether
or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4)
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate
his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48[48] must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1.
G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
"Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2.
G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the
petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95832 August 10, 1992
MAYNARD R. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Tranquilino F. Meris Law Office for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25
September 1989 in the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI). His appointment was classified as
"Reinstatement/Permanent". Before said appointment, he
was working at the Philippine Cotton Corporation, a
government-owned and controlled corporation under the
Department of Agriculture.
On 8 December 1989, petitioner received his initial salary,
covering the period from 25 September to 31 October
1989. Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI
deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his
absences during the covered period, namely, 29
September 1989 and 20 October 1989, inclusive of
Saturdays and Sundays. More specifically, the dates of
said absences for which salary deductions were made, are
as follows:
1. 29 September 1989 Friday
2. 30 September 1989 Saturday
3. 01 October 1989 Sunday
4. 20 October 1989 Friday
5. 21 October 1989 Saturday
6. 22 October 1989 Sunday
Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief,
General Administrative Service) on 15 December 1989
inquiring as to the law on salary deductions, if the
employee has no leave credits.
Amando T. Alvis answered petitioner's query in a
memorandum dated 30 January 1990 citing Chapter 5.49
of the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil
Service which states that "when an employee is on leave
without pay on a day before or on a day immediately
preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, such Saturday,
Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay (CSC, 2nd
Ind., February 12, 1965)."
Petitioner then sent a latter dated 20 February 1990
addressed to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas raising the following question:
Is an employee who was on leave of absence without pay
on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a
Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, also considered on leave of
absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or
Holiday? 1
Petitioner in his said letter to the CSC Chairman argued
that a reading of the General Leave Law as contained in
the Revised Administrative Code, as well as the old Civil
Service Law (Republic Act No. 2260), the Civil Service
Decree (Presidential Decree No. 807), and the Civil

Service Rules and Regulation fails to disclose a specific
provision which supports the CSC rule at issue. That being
the case, the petitioner contented that he cannot be
deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the
intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in the factual
situation posed), and that the withholding (or deduction) of
the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law.
On 25 May 1990, respondent Commission promulgated
Resolution No. 90-497, ruling that the action of the DTI in
deducting from the salary of petitioner, a part thereof
corresponding to six (6) days (September 29, 30, October
1, 20, 21, 22, 1989) is in order. 2 The CSC stated that:
In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 12, 1965 of this
Commission, which embodies the policy on leave of
absence without pay incurred on a Friday and Monday,
reads:
Mrs. Rosalinda Gonzales is not entitled to payment of
salary corresponding to January 23 and 24, 1965, Saturday
and Sunday, respectively, it appearing that she was
present on Friday, January 22, 1965 but was on leave
without pay beginning January 25, the succeeding Monday.
It is the view of this Office that an employee who has no
more leave credit in his favor is not entitled to the payment
of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays unless such
non-working days occur within the period of service
actually rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale for the above ruling which applies only to
those employees who are being paid on monthly basis,
rests on the assumption that having been absent on either
Monday or Friday, one who has no leave credits, could not
be favorably credited with intervening days had the same
been working days. Hence, the above policy that for an
employee on leave without pay to be entitled to salary on
Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, the same must occur
between the dates where the said employee actually
renders service. To rule otherwise would allow an
employee who is on leave of absent (sic) without pay for a
long period of time to be entitled to payment of his salary
corresponding to Saturdays, Sundays or holidays. It also
discourages the employees who have exhausted their
leave credits from absenting themselves on a Friday or
Monday in order to have a prolonged weekend, resulting in
the prejudice of the government and the public in general. 3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and in
Resolution No. 90-797, the respondent Commission denied
said motion for lack of merit. The respondent Commission
in explaining its action held:
The Primer on the Civil Service dated February 21, 1978,
embodies the Civil Service Commission rulings to be
observed whenever an employee of the government who
has no more leave credits, is absent on a Friday and/or a
Monday is enough basis for the deduction of his salaries
corresponding to the intervening Saturdays and Sundays.
What the Commission perceived to be without basis is the
demand of Peralta for the payment of his salaries
corresponding to Saturdays and Sundays when he was in
fact on leave of absence without pay on a Friday prior to
the said days. A reading of Republic Act No. 2260 (sic)
does not show that a government employee who is on
leave of absence without pay on a day before or
immediately preceding Saturdays, Sunday or legal holiday
is entitled to payment of his salary for said days. Further, a
reading of Senate Journal No. 67 dated May 4, 1960 of
House Bill No. 41 (Republic Act No. 2625) reveals that
while the law excludes Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in
the computation of leave credits, it does not, however,
include a case where the leave of absence is without pay.
Hence, applying the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, the claim of Peralta has no merit. Moreover, to
take a different posture would be in effect giving more
premium to employees who are frequently on leave of
absence without pay, instead of discouraging them from
incurring further absence without
pay. 4
law shall become effective thirty days after publication in

the Official Gazette;
xxx xxx xxx
(k) To perform other functions that properly belong to a
central personnel agency. 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied,

petitioner filed the present petition.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the Commission

promulgated the herein challenged policy. Said policy was
embodied in a 2nd Indorsement dated 12 February 1965 of
the respondent Commission involving the case of a Mrs.
Rosalinda Gonzales. The respondent Commission ruled
that an employee who has no leave credits in his favor is
not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays,
Sundays or Holidays unless such non-working days occur
within the period of service actually rendered. The same
policy is reiterated in the Handbook of Information on the
Philippine Civil Service. 6 Chapter Five on leave of absence
provides that:
What is primarily questioned by the petitioner is the validity

of the respondent Commission's policy mandating salary
deductions corresponding to the intervening Saturdays,
Sundays or Holidays where an employee without leave
credits was absent on the immediately preceding working
day.
5.51. When intervening Saturday, Sunday or holiday

considered as leave without pay when an employee is
on leave without pay on a day before or on a day
immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or holiday,
such Saturday, Sunday or holiday shall also be without
pay. (CSC, 2nd Ind., Feb. 12, 1965).
During the pendency of this petition, the respondent

Commission promulgated Resolution No. 91-540 dated 23
April 1991 amending the questioned policy, considering
that employees paid on a monthly basis are not required to
work on Saturdays, Sunday or Holidays. In said
amendatory Resolution, the respondent Commission
resolved "to adopt the policy that when an employee,
regardless of whether he has leave credits or not, is absent
without pay on day immediately preceding or succeeding
Saturday, Sunday or holiday, he shall not be considered
absent on those days." Memorandum Circular No. 16
Series of 1991 dated 26 April 1991, was also issued by
CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas adopting and promulgating the
new policy and directing the Heads of Departments,
Bureaus and Agencies in the national and local
governments, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, to oversee the strict
implementation of the circular.
It is likewise illustrated in the Primer on the Civil Service 7

in the section referring to Questions and Answers on Leave
of Absences, which states the following:
Because of these developments, it would seem at first

blush that this petition has become moot and academic
since the very CSC policy being questioned has already
been amended and, in effect, Resolutions No. 90-497 and
90-797, subject of this petition for certiorari, have already
been set aside and superseded. But the issue of whether
or not the policy that had been adopted and in force since
1965 is valid or not, remains unresolved. Thus, for reasons
of public interest and public policy, it is the duty of the
Court to make a formal ruling on the validity or invalidity of
such questioned policy.
- (3) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from

Saturday to Monday.
The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) conferred

upon the Commissioner of Civil Service the following
powers and duties:
Sec. 16 (e) with the approval by the President to prescribe,
amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law,
and the rules prescribed pursuant to the provisions of this
27. How is leave of an employee who has no more leave

credits computed if:
(1) he is absent on a Friday and the following Monday?
(2) if he is absent on Friday but reports to work the
following Monday?
(3) if he is absent on a Monday but present the preceding
Friday?
- (1) He is considered on leave without pay for 4 days
covering Friday to Monday;
- (2) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from
Friday to Sunday;
When an administrative or executive agency renders an

opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets
a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of
the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means. 8 It has also been held that
interpretative regulations need not be published. 9
In promulgating as early as 12 February 1965 the
questioned policy, the Civil Service Commission interpreted
the provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 (which took effect
on 17 June 1960) amending the Revised Administrative
Code, and which stated as follows:
Sec. 1. Sections two hundred eighty-four and two hundred
eighty-five-A of the Administrative Code, as amended, are
further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 284. After at least six months' continues (sic) faithful,
and satisfactory service, the President or proper head of
department, or the chief of office in the case of municipal
employees may, in his discretion, grant to an employee or
laborer, whether permanent or temporary, of the national
government, the provincial government, the government of
a chartered city, of a municipality, of a municipal district or
of government-owned or controlled corporations other than
those mentioned in Section two hundred sixty-eight, two
hundred seventy-one and two hundred seventy-four hereof,
fifteen days vacation leave of absence with full pay,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, for each
calendar year of service.
reading of House Bill No. 41 (which became R.A. 2625).

He said:
Sec. 285-A. In addition to the vacation leave provided in

the two preceding sections each employee or laborer,
whether permanent or temporary, of the national
government, the provincial government, the government of
a chartered city, of a municipality or municipal district in
any regularly and specially organized province, other than
those mentioned in Section two hundred sixty-eight, two
hundred seventy-one and two hundred seventy-four hereof,
shall be entitled to fifteen days of sick leave for each year
of service with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays: Provided, That such sick leave will be
granted by the President, Head of Department or
independent office concerned, or the chief of office in case
of municipal employees, only on account of sickness on the
part of the employee or laborer concerned or of any
member of his immediate family.
The purpose of the present bill is to exclude from the

computation of the leave those days, Saturdays and
Sundays, as well as holidays, because actually the
employee is entitled not to go to office during those days.
And it is unfair and unjust to him that those days should be
counted in the computation of leaves. 12
The Civil Service Commission in its here questioned

Resolution No. 90-797 construed R.A. 2625 as referring
only to government employees who have earned leave
credits against which their absences may be charged with
pay, as its letters speak only of leaves of absence with full
pay. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading of
R.A. 2625 does not show that a government employee who
is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or
immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday
is entitled to payment of his salary for said days.
Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not
necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the
judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of
power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment. 10
We find this petition to be impressed with merit.
As held in Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo: 11
. . . . where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for
the application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction
that such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof,
for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the
statute, since adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the
plain and vital purpose of the statute.
The intention of the legislature in the enactment of R.A.
2625 may be gleaned from, among others, the sponsorship
speech of Senator Arturo M. Tolentino during the second
The law actually provides for sick leave and vacation leave
of 15 days each year of service to be with full pay. But
under the present law, in computing these periods of
leaves, Saturday, Sunday and holidays are included in the
computation so that if an employee should become sick
and absent himself on a Friday and then he reports for
work on a Tuesday, in the computation of the leave the
Saturday and Sunday will be included, so that he will be
considered as having had a leave of Friday, Saturday,
Sunday and Monday, or four days.
With this in mind, the construction by the respondent

Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the
legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that
government employees are entitled to fifteen (15) days
vacation leave of absence with full pay and fifteen (15)
days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays and Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks
of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a
distinction between those who have accumulated leave
credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in
order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. The fact remains that government
employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave
credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays,
Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared
absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are
not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot
and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to
said non-working days just because they were absent
without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said
non-working days. A different rule would constitute a
deprivation of property without due process.
Furthermore, before their amendment by R.A. 2625,
Sections 284 and 285-A of the Revised Administrative
Code applied to all government employee without any
distinction. It follows that the effect of the amendment
similarly applies to all employees enumerated in Sections
284 and 285-A, whether or not they have accumulated
leave credits.
As the questioned CSC policy is here declared invalid, we
are next confronted with the question of what effect such
invalidity will have. Will all government employees on a
monthly salary basis, deprived of their salaries
corresponding to Saturdays, Sundays or legal holidays (as
herein petitioner was so deprived) since 12 February 1965,
be entitled to recover the amounts corresponding to such
non-working days?
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though
it had never been passed. 13
But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
State
Bank: 14
. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements
as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects
with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate; and particular conduct, private and official.
To allow all the affected government employees, similarly
situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted
salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein
invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial
burden on the national and local governments considering
the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also,
administrative and practical considerations must be taken
into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective
application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the
respondent Commission and the Congress of the
Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice
and equity to all affected government employees.
It must be pointed out, however, that after CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of 1991 amending
the herein invalidated policy was promulgated on 26
April 1991, deductions from salaries made after said date
in contravention of the new CSC policy must be restored to
the government employees concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, CSC Resolutions
No. 90-497 and 90-797 are declared NULL and VOID. The
respondent Commission is directed to take the appropriate
action so that petitioner shall be paid the amounts
previously but unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary
as above indicated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D.
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging
that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala
kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo,
makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina"
sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang
mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob,
nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan
nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan
na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo
kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon

M'am.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung

baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari

sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko
sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and

alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act,
dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong
binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic)
mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan
hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nagaaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi
hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon icocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung
gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok
dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung
hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng
mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa
hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano
ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi
ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako

makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro
D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay
City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro
D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to
record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use
of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation
and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the
said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial
court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner
that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200
refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other
than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's
order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing
the information based on the ground that the facts alleged
do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal
issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200
does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by
one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that
the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a
private conversation by a party other than those involved in
the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that
the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a
"private communication," not a "private conversation" and
that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under
the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11
or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes

it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as
a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover,
supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make
illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded,
the element of secrecy would not appear to be material.
Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by
all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal
cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would
cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings
whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the
parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent
of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such
a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention
is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill,
Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in
the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in
Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on
tape recorded conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your
Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not
sporting to record the observation of one without his
knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is
not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record
the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in
meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording
is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know.
It is but fair that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of
persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you
say here may be used against you." That is fairness and
that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he
makes damaging statements against his own interest, well,
he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take
a recording of the observations and remarks of a person
without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded,
without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12,
1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that
under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party
secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized
under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the
recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between
one person and another person not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12,
1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision,
taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from
the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the
view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks
to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need
not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice
to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As
the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before
the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the
nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to
a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting

signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process
by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad
enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication"
were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear
from their conversations being overheard. But this
statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well
the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to
be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been
assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the
framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the
unaudited, and free exchange of communication between
individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by
whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case
which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we
held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose
of overhearing a private conversation without authorization
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension
devise was neither among those "device(s) or
arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the
principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a
different note, because the applicable facts and
circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions
the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at
bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
52 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. &
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, respondents.
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for

the second offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and
imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and subsequent
offenses.
Sec. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days
from publication thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner
Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
CRUZ, J.:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced
the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious
elements echoed the objection and so did the women's
groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the
mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of
the city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous
success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it
enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF
BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING
BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR
THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS
PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF

CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
THEREFOR.
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early
as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed
another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against
the establishment of CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business
Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to any
establishment for the using and allowing to be used its
premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO;
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub
paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep.
Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the
implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City
Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to
suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general
welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such
activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order
to protect social and moral welfare of the community;
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly
assembled that:
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the

City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:
Sec. 1. The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of

Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 1. That pursuant to the policy of the city banning

the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no
business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership
or corporation for the operation of casino within the city
limits.
Sec. 2. Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject

to the following penalties:
Sec. 2. That it shall be a violation of existing business

permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its
business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use
thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling
activities.
Sec. 3. PENALTIES. Any violation of such existing
business permit as defined in the preceding section shall
suffer the following penalties, to wit:
a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for
the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed

against the proprietor, partnership or corporation
undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of
gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more
than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or
both at the discretion of the court against the manager,
supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the
establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling
CASINO.
Sec. 3. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days
after its publication in a local newspaper of general
circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals,
where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was
denied on July 13, 1993. 2
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in
this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding that:
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public

morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically
declares that:
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the

City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and
authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a
PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits.
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and

Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:
2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of

chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) (v) of
R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling."
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for

an efficient and effective city government, and in this
connection, shall:
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869

and are therefore invalid on that point.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino

and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that
point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not
consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or
policy of the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of
Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991,
197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in this
present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to
help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the
constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of
the entity to the national economy as the third highest
revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR
and the Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions,
is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the
General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as
follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government
unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage
and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and

impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in
public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution,
establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute,
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent
devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug
addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing,
juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition
of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and
such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of
the inhabitants of the city;
This section also authorizes the local government units to
regulate properties and businesses within their territorial
limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of
casinos because they involve games of chance, which are
detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by
general law and even by the Constitution itself. The
legislative power conferred upon local government units
may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only
over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously
argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been
permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de
Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory
pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local
Government Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the
policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section
25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various
other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the
character of the nation. In giving the local government units
the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social
problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the
competence of such communities to determine and adopt
the measures best expected to promote the general
welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the
State.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly
authorized the local government units to prevent and
suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance,
like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all
forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit,
nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have
expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos
and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it
could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply
means that the local government units are permitted to
prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories,
including the operation of casinos.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed
out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the
PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than
P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of
inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers
of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly
discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to
its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its
repealing clause reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding
the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in
accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its
liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units.
Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of
the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit
shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of
devolution of powers and of the lower local government
unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of
the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned;
authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within

the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is
nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it
at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it
sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature
may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and
allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but
permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making
such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to
resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the
prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of
statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be
resolved only by the legislative and executive departments,
to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way
these branches decide, they are answerable only to their
own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately
judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition
is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No.
3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the
criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on
the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long
line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance
must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
xxx xxx xxx
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be

liberally interpreted to give more powers to local
government units in accelerating economic development
and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically

harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and
several decisions of this Court expressive of the general
and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the
State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of
the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the
old case of U.S. v. Salaveria, 7 which sustained a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The
petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also
impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as
"a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and
6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local
Government Code, local government units are authorized
to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are
in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than
accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded
such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The
language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under
the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of,
words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude
that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and
other prohibited games of chance," the word should be
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the
other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or
suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the
problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous
efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of
Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their
advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they
contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied
therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising
the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to
this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have
changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot
prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change
has been made by the Local Government Code itself,
which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really
repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in
the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over
the objection of the local government unit concerned. This
modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is
permissible because one law can change or repeal another
law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words.
While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro
tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead,
repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because
the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize
and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may
now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in
fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated
by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used
therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local
government units have now no choice but to prevent and
suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes
both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction,
PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate
or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local
government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed
upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot
continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white
elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers
as a prime source of government revenue through the
operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f)
of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of
the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific
laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified)
by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A
reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced
below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code,"
Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No.
319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such
other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and
issuances related to or concerning the barangay are

hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act
No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2)
of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education
Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential
Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and
Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632,
752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no
force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed
insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or
amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68,
69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No.
972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not
lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co.
v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all
proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking
power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be
given effect; but there must always be a sufficient
revelation of this intention, and it has become an
unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to
repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature
when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with
reference to which the question arises bear to each other
the relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D.
1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points
out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two
later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a
Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the
benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of
violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for
the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are
tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the
PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local
Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were
to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems
of the government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting
one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming
respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D.
1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case
before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is
to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except
only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The
exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
effective and mutually complementary.
new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy

of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that
policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the
local government units although in significantly reduced
degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The
power to create still includes the power to destroy. The
power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall.
True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now
be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two
kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized
by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is
probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so.
The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them
to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction
between these two forms of gambling without a clear
indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly,
following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere
ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169
and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro
Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the

petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their
apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will
be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the
view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without
special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that
"habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In
People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of
gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling
must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called
gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and
the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize
the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to
legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D.
1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government
Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it
contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all
official acts. We do not find such contravention here.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of

arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners
that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary,
we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has
the character and force of a statute, as well as the public
policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of
certain games of chance despite the prohibition of
gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should
not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments
are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to
suggest that the local government units can undo the acts
of Congress, from which they have derived their power in
the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate
of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes
into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist.
As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may
abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act,
and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so
great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not
prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to
the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and
the local government units has not been enfeebled by the
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and

regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land
and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,
remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by
the Local Government Code, which empowers the local
government units to prevent or suppress only those forms
of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree
has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent
for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.
3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in
question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's
general authority to establish and maintain gambling
casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 1869.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a
separate opinion that:
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the
prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity
known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It is,
therefore, the political departments of government, namely,
the legislative and the executive that should decide on
what government should do in the entire area of gambling,
and assume full responsibility to the people for such
policy." (Emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent
PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any
form runs counter to the government's own efforts to reestablish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is
generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon
government to carefully weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the
country.
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the
government is not enough reason for setting up more
gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help
improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino
moral character.
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal
is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify
the means.
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with
gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not render
it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the
government can be realized from it. The same is true of
gambling.
In the present case, it is my considered view that the
national government (through PAGCOR) should reexamine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the
gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City;
for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is
very much against it, and again the question must be
seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be
realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of
the Filipino sense of values?
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to

express my views on certain aspects of this case.
I.
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce
Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the
Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition,
thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to
issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg.
129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action
therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
unconstitutional for, inter alia, having been enacted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the
obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with
public policy the challenged ordinances enacted by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro.
The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further
underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action.
PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being contrary to the
non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and
against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No.
1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have
jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming
arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under
this Court's established policy relative to the hierarchy of
courts, the petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no
special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the
said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that
PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which
case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may
have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal
of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in
order pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma
(172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs.
Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court
stated:
A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared
by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of
First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in
any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this
court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on
August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is
not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking
any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the revenue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This
is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the
restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this
regard, supra resulting from the deletion of the qualifying
phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was evidently
intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the
burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs
which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's
corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with
it. (citations omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in
this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of
the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has
to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped
to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts.
We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
II.
The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of
Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit
To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be
Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of
Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and
Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were
enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled,
"Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit
and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling
Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was
promulgated on 19 November 1990 nearly two years
before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of
lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's
Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino
which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution
No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the
Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by
Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii),
and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and

pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the
general welfare clause) which reads:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting
local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro)
the above powers and functions, the Local Government
Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as
PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain
gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is
concerned.
I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot
repeal P.D. No. 1869.
III.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged
ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in
contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A
contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of
the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand
even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They
can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So
reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not
applying to PAGCOR.
IV.
From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and
the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious
reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling
casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be
inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City,
or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a
government-owned corporation, must consider the valid
concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and
should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not
despotic, manner.
# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in
question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's
general authority to establish and maintain gambling
casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 1869.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a
separate opinion that:
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the
prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity
known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It is,
therefore, the political departments of government, namely,
the legislative and the executive that should decide on
what government should do in the entire area of gambling,
and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy.
(emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent
PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any
form runs counter to the government's own efforts to reestablish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is
generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon
government to carefully weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the
country.
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the
government is not enough reason for setting up more
gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help
improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino
moral character.
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal
is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify
the means.
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with
gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not render
it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the
government can be realized from it. The same is true of
gambling.
In the present case, it is my considered view that the
national government (through PAGCOR) should reexamine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the
gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City;
for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is
very much against it, and again the question must be
seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be
realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of
the Filipino sense of values?
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to
express my views on certain aspects of this case.
I.
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce
Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the
Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition,
thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to
issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg.
129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action
therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
unconstitutional for, inter alia, having been enacted

without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the
obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with
public policy the challenged ordinances enacted by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro.
The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further
underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action.
PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being contrary to the
non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and
against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No.
1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have
jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming
arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under
this Court's established policy relative to the hierarchy of
courts, the petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no
special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the
said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that
PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which
case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may
have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal
of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in
order pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma
(172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs.
Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court
stated:
A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared
by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of
First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in
any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this
court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on
August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is
not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking
any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the revenue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This
is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the
restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this
regard, supra resulting from the deletion of the qualifying
phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was evidently
intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the
burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs
which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's
corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with
it. (citations omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in
this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of
the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has
to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped
to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts.
We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
II.
The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of
Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit
To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be
Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of
Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and
Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were
enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled,
"Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit
and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling
Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was
promulgated on 19 November 1990 nearly two years
before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of
lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's
Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino
which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution
No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the
Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by
Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii),
and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and
pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the
general welfare clause) which reads:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those

The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting
local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro)
the above powers and functions, the Local Government
Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as
PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain
gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is
concerned.
I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot
repeal P.D. No. 1869.
III.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged
ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in
contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A
contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of
the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand
even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They
can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So
reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not
applying to PAGCOR.
IV.
From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and
the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious
reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling
casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be
inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City,
or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a
government-owned corporation, must consider the valid
concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and
should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not
despotic, manner.
G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna
seeks the reversal of the decision dated August 14, 1974 1
in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People of the
Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna,
defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of the City Court of Cabanatuan 2
rendered on August 2, 1971 which found the petitioner
guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act
(Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a
fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of
Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance
Act on November 21, 1970 in an information 3 which reads
as follows:
That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of
Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of
an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized
insurance company, registered under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a
Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the
amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969, without said accused
having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such
agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner,
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals
are quoted hereunder:
IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7
March, 1969 and as of 21 June, 1969, appellant's husband,
Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance
Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, with
license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at
Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was
issued by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo S.
Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with
beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00;
apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of
policy, and for reasons not explained in record, present
information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private
prosecutor, charging wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec.
189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously acted, "as agent in the solicitation for insurance
by soliciting therefore the application of one Eugenio S.
Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaa de Seguros, ...
without said accused having first secured a certificate of

authority to act as such agent from the office of the
Insurance Commission, Republic of the Philippines."
and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly
disputed, that aforementioned policy was issued with active
participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which
appellant in her defense sought to show that being the wife
of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work,
as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was
issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew,
and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so
she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew ...
Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty
as charged. On appeal, the trial court's decision was
affirmed by the respondent appellate court finding the
petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, this present
recourse was filed on October 22, 1974. 5
In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved,
without giving due course to this instant petition, to require
the respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. In the
comment 7 filed on December 20, 1974, the respondent,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
submitted that petitioner may not be considered as having
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 8 On April 3,
1975, petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a manifestation
10 in lieu of a Brief on May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that
the petitioner has not violated Section 189 of the Insurance
Act.
In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner
assigns the following errors 11 allegedly committed by the
appellate court:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF COMPENSATION IS NOT
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY
THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE
INSURANCE ACT.
GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-17,
INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER.
We find the petition meritorious.
The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be
convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section
189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second
paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is
necessary to determine whether or not the agent
mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is
governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on
its second paragraph.
The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
reads as follows:
No insurance company doing business within the Philippine
Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any commission
or other compensation to any person for services in
obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have
first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a
certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company
as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of
applications for insurance, or receive for services in
obtaining new insurance, any commission or other
compensation from any insurance company doing business
in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the
Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually
on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter.
Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance
Commissioner only upon the written application of persons
desiring such authority, such application being approved
and countersigned by the company such person desires to
represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the
Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he
may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the
right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such
certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be
valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of the
year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal
certificates may be issued upon the application of the
company.
Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains
insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or
transmits for a person other than himself an application for
a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or
assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall
be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and
shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements,
liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company
is subject.
Any person or company violating the provisions of this
section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On
the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or
broker, of the commission of any offense connected with
the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner
shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued
to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to
such convicted person.
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that
the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as
agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or
procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the
Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph
defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this
section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes
the penalty to be imposed for its violation.
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is
prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189
of the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. Thus
... it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most
active endeavors that resulted in issuance of policy to
Isidro, she was there and then acting as agent, and
received the pay thereof her defense that she was only
acting as helper of her husband can no longer be
sustained, neither her point that she received no
compensation for issuance of the policy because
any person who for compensation solicits or obtains
insurance on behalf of any insurance company or transmits
for a person other than himself an application for a policy of
insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to
act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an
insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall
thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements,
liabilities, and penalties, to which an agent of such
company is subject. paragraph 2, Sec. 189, Insurance Law,
now it is true that information does not even allege that she
had obtained the insurance,
for compensation
which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the
Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph, but what appellant
apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not under
the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it
is provided that,
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker, in the
solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance, or
receive for services in obtaining new insurance any
commission or other compensation from any insurance
company doing business in the Philippine Island, or agent
thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority to
act from the insurance commissioner, which must be
renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six
months thereafter.
therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of
the charge, so that Errors 2 and 4 must be overruled. 12
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate
court seems to imply that the definition of an insurance
agent under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not
applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first
paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes
that under the second paragraph of Section 189, a person
is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an
insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph,
there is no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for
compensation in order to be called an insurance agent.
We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance
agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is
intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first
and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More
significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly
provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within
the intent of Section 189. Hence
Any person who for compensation ... shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, ...
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the
second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent
mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section.
The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and
interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent"
mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the
aforesaid section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second
paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three
paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.
The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce harmonious whole. 13 A statute must be so
construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the law, it
must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any
single part, portion or section or from isolated words and
phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context. This means that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment,
not separately and independently. 16 More importantly, the
doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides
that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or
with which it is associated. 17
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as
found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the
agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a
compensation by the agent is an essential element for a
violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The
appellate court has established ultimately that the
petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for
the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate
court for, according to the latter, the receipt of
compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not an
essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911,
Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for
direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without
a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an
information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive
compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no
offense. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the provision
of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma
1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as
insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in
such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance
contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the
information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the
negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with
Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation
is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of
the crime must be alleged and proved. 20
After going over the records of this case, We are fully

convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that accused
did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed
and the accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183137
April 10, 2013
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented

herein by its President, GREGORY K. LOY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The principal issue in this case is the scope of authority of
a province to impose an amusement tax.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court praying that the December 10, 2007
decision of the Regional Trial Court,- Branch 62, La
Trinidad, Benguet in Civil Case No. 06-CV-2232 be
reversed and set aside and a new one issued in which: ( 1)
respondent Province of Benguet is declared as having no
authority to levy amusement taxes on admission fees for
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, tourist
spots, and other places for recreation; (2) Section 59,
Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005
is declared null and void; and (3) the respondent Province
of Benguet is permanently enjoined from enforcing Section
59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of
2005.
Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owns
Palm Grove Resort, which is designed for recreation and
which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function
halls. It is located at Asin, Angalisan, Municipality of Tuba,
Province of Benguet.
On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board of the Province
of Benguet approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107,
otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005
("Tax Ordinance"). Section 59, Article X of the Tax
Ordinance levied a ten percent (10%) amusement tax on
gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots."
Specifically, it provides the following:
Article Ten: Amusement Tax on Admission
The appeal/petition was filed within the thirty (30)-day

period from the effectivity of a tax ordinance allowed by
Section 187 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code (LGC).1 The appeal/petition
was docketed as MSO-OSJ Case No. 03-2006.
Under Section 187 of the LGC, the Secretary of Justice has
sixty (60) days from receipt of the appeal to render a
decision. After the lapse of which, the aggrieved party may
file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Treating the Secretary of Justice's failure to decide on its
appeal/petition within the sixty (60) days provided by
Section 187 of the LGC as an implied denial of such
appeal/petition, Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief and Injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet. The petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. 06-CV-2232.
Pelizloy argued that Section 59, Article X of the Tax
Ordinance imposed a percentage tax in violation of the
limitation on the taxing powers of local government units
(LGUs) under Section 133 (i) of the LGC. Thus, it was null
and void ab initio. Section 133 (i) of the LGC provides:
Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of
Local Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the
levy of the following:
xxx
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters
or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services
except as otherwise provided herein
The Province of Benguet assailed the Petition for
Declaratory Relief and Injunction as an improper remedy. It
alleged that once a tax liability has attached, the only
remedy of a taxpayer is to pay the tax and to sue for
recovery after exhausting administrative remedies.2
A tax of ten percent (10%) of gross receipts from admission

fees for boxing, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots is likewise levied. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
On substantive grounds, the Province of Benguet argued

that the phrase other places of amusement in Section 140
(a) of the LGC3 encompasses resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots since "Article
220 (b) (sic)" of the LGC defines "amusement" as
"pleasurable diversion and entertainment x x x
synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."4
However, the Province of Benguet erroneously cited
Section 220 (b) of the LGC. Section 220 of the LGC refers
to valuation of real property for real estate tax purposes.
Section 131 (b) of the LGC, the provision which actually
defines "amusement", states:
Section 162 of the Tax Ordinance provided that the Tax

Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 2006.
Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title,

the term:
It was Pelizloy's position that the Tax Ordinance's

imposition of a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from
admission fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the
part of the Province of Benguet. Thus, it filed an
appeal/petition before the Secretary of Justice on January
27, 2006.
xxx
Section 59. Imposition of Tax. There is hereby levied a tax

to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators
of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, cockpits,
dancing halls, dancing schools, night or day clubs, and
other places of amusement at the rate of thirty percent
(30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees; and
(b) "Amusement" is a pleasurable diversion and

entertainment. It is synonymous to relaxation, avocation,
pastime, or fun On December 10, 2007, the RTC rendered
the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for
Declaratory Relief and Injunction for lack of merit.
Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a
proper remedy. On the validity of Section 59, Article X of
the Tax Ordinance, the RTC noted that, while Section 59,
Article X imposes a percentage tax, Section 133 (i) of the
LGC itself allowed for exceptions. It noted that what the
LGC prohibits is not the imposition by LGUs of percentage
taxes in general but the "imposition and levy of percentage
tax on sales, barters, etc., on goods and services only."5 It
further gave credence to the Province of Benguet's
assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the phrase
other places of amusement in Section 140 of the LGC.
On May 21, 2008, the RTC denied Pelizloys Motion for
Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Pelizloy filed the present petition on June 10,
2008 on pure questions of law. It assailed the legality of
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance as being a
(supposedly) prohibited percentage tax per Section 133 (i)
of the LGC.
In its Comment, the Province of Benguet, erroneously
citing Section 40 of the LGC, argued that Section 59,
Article X of the Tax Ordinance does not levy a percentage
tax "because the imposition is not based on the total gross
receipts of services of the petitioner but solely and actually
limited on the gross receipts of the admission fees
collected."6 In addition, it argued that provinces can validly
impose amusement taxes on resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs, and tourist spots, these being
amusement places.
For resolution in this petition are the following issues:
1. Whether or not Section 59, Article X of Provincial Tax
Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet
Revenue Code of 2005, levies a percentage tax.
2. Whether or not provinces are authorized to impose
amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being
"amusement places" under the Local Government Code.
The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty,"7 and as
such, inheres in the State. Such, however, is not true for
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays as they are
not the sovereign;8 rather, they are mere "territorial and
political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines".9
The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities,
muncipalities and barangays is summarized in Icard v. City
Council of Baguio:10
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign
state is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that
power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power
when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any
doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting
that power must be resolved against the municipality.
Inferences, implications, deductions all these have no
place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a
municipal corporation.11 [Underscoring supplied]
Therefore, the power of a province to tax is limited to the
extent that such power is delegated to it either by the
Constitution or by statute. Section 5, Article X of the 1987

Constitution is clear on this point:
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power
to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes,
fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations
as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic
policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
[Underscoring supplied]
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the
power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress;
local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to
levy taxes, fees and other charges."12 Nevertheless, such
authority is "subject to such guidelines and limitations as
the Congress may provide".13
In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution,14 Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal
matters.
Relevant provisions of Book II of the LGC establish the
parameters of the taxing powers of LGUS found below.
First, Section 130 provides for the following fundamental
principles governing the taxing powers of LGUs:
1. Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.
2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
a. be equitable and based as far as practicable on the
taxpayer's ability to pay;
b. be levied and collected only for public purposes;
c. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
d. not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic
policy, or in the restraint of trade.
3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other
impositions shall in no case be let to any private person.
4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the
LGC shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to
the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge or
other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided by
the LGC.
5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
Second, Section 133 provides for the common limitations
on the taxing powers of LGUs. Specifically, Section 133 (i)
prohibits the levy by LGUs of percentage or value-added
tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar
transactions on goods or services except as otherwise
provided by the LGC.
As it is Pelizloys contention that Section 59, Article X of the
Tax Ordinance levies a prohibited percentage tax, it is
crucial to understand first the concept of a percentage tax.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Citytrust
Investment Phils. Inc.,15 the Supreme Court defined
percentage tax as a "tax measured by a certain percentage
of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods
sold, bartered or imported; or of the gross receipts or
earnings derived by any person engaged in the sale of
services." Also, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known
as the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in Section
125, Title V,16 lists amusement taxes as among the (other)
percentage taxes which are levied regardless of whether or
not a taxpayer is already liable to pay value-added tax
(VAT).
Amusement taxes are fixed at a certain percentage of the
gross receipts incurred by certain specified establishments.
Thus, applying the definition in CIR v. Citytrust and drawing
from the treatment of amusement taxes by the NIRC,
amusement taxes are percentage taxes as correctly
argued by Pelizloy.
However, provinces are not barred from levying
amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of
percentage taxes. Section 133 (i) of the LGC prohibits the
levy of percentage taxes "except as otherwise provided" by
the LGC.
Section 140 of the LGC provides:
SECTION 140. Amusement Tax - (a) The province may
levy an amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors,
lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at
a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross
receipts from admission fees.
(b) In the case of theaters of cinemas, the tax shall first be
deducted and withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or
operators and paid to the provincial treasurer before the
gross receipts are divided between said proprietors,
lessees, or operators and the distributors of the
cinematographic films.
(c) The holding of operas, concerts, dramas, recitals,
painting and art exhibitions, flower shows, musical
programs, literary and oratorical presentations, except pop,
rock, or similar concerts shall be exempt from the payment
of the tax herein imposed.
(d) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may prescribe the time,
manner, terms and conditions for the payment of tax. In
case of fraud or failure to pay the tax, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan may impose such surcharges, interests and
penalties.
(e) The proceeds from the amusement tax shall be shared
equally by the province and the municipality where such
amusement places are located. [Underscoring supplied]
Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC carves a clear exception
to the general rule in Section 133 (i). Section 140 expressly
allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes
on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement."
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots are not among those places
expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being
subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of
whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to

resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
tourist spots hinges on whether the phrase other places of
amusement encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general
word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class or where the latter follow
the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed
to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases
akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned."17
The purpose and rationale of the principle was explained
by the Court in National Power Corporation v. Angas18 as
follows:
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect
to both the particular and general words, by treating the
particular words as indicating the class and the general
words as including all that is embraced in said class,
although not specifically named by the particular words.
This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body
intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted
sense, it would have not made an enumeration of particular
subjects but would have used only general terms. [2
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-400].19
In Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of Appeals,20
the Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret a starkly
similar provision or the counterpart provision of Section 140
of the LGC in the Local Tax Code then in effect. Petitioner
Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) contended that it
was subject to the imposition by LGUs of amusement taxes
(as opposed to amusement taxes imposed by the national
government).1wphi1 In support of its contentions, it cited
Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 231, otherwise
known as the Local Tax Code of 1973, (which is analogous
to Section 140 of the LGC) providing the following:
Section 13. Amusement tax on admission. - The province
shall impose a tax on admission to be collected from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of
amusement xxx.
Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the Supreme
Court rejected PBA's assertions and noted that:
In determining the meaning of the phrase 'other places of
amusement', one must refer to the prior enumeration of
theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with
artistic expression as their common characteristic.
Professional basketball games do not fall under the same
category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and
circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of
entertainment while the former caters to sports and
gaming.21 [Underscoring supplied]
However, even as the phrase other places of amusement
was already clarified in Philippine Basketball Association,
Section 140 of the LGC adds to the enumeration of 'places
of amusement' which may properly be subject to
amusement tax. Section 140 specifically mentions 'boxing
stadia' in addition to "theaters, cinematographs, concert
halls and circuses" which were already mentioned in PD
No. 231. Also, 'artistic expression' as a characteristic does
not pertain to 'boxing stadia'.
In the present case, the Court need not embark on a
laborious effort at statutory construction. Section 131 (c) of
the LGC already provides a clear definition of amusement
places:
Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title,
the term:
xxx
(c) "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one
seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing
the show or performances [Underscoring supplied]
Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and
boxing stadia are bound by a common typifying
characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the
staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows,
exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be
viewed by an audience. Accordingly, other places of
amusement must be interpreted in light of the typifying
characteristic of being venues "where one seeks admission
to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances" or being venues primarily used to stage
spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances,
and other events meant to be viewed by an audience.
As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary,22
show means "a spectacle or display of something,
typically an impressive one";23 while performance means
"an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other
form of entertainment."24 As such, the ordinary definitions
of the words show and performance denote not only
visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things)
but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or
presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and
(correspondingly) perceived by an audience.
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be
considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission
to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances". While it is true that they may be venues
where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily
venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display,
stage or present shows and/or performances.
Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs
and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or
class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and
boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as
among the other places of amusement contemplated by
Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject
to amusement taxes.
At this juncture, it is helpful to recall this Courts
pronouncements in Icard:
The power to tax when granted to a province is to be
construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the term used in granting that power must be
resolved against the province. Inferences, implications,
deductions all these have no place in the interpretation

of the taxing power of a province.25
In this case, the definition of' amusement places' in Section
131 (c) of the LGC is a clear basis for determining what
constitutes the 'other places of amusement' which may
properly be subject to amusement tax impositions by
provinces. There is no reason for going beyond such basis.
To do otherwise would be to countenance an arbitrary
interpretation/application of a tax law and to inflict an
injustice on unassuming taxpayers.
The previous pronouncements notwithstanding, it will be
noted that it is only the second paragraph of Section 59,
Article X of the Tax Ordinance which imposes amusement
taxes on "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots". The first paragraph of Section
59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance refers to "theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, cockpits, dancing halls,
dancing schools, night or day clubs, and other places of
amusement".1wphi1 In any case, the issues raised by
Pelizloy are pertinent only with respect to the second
paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance.
Thus, there is no reason to invalidate the first paragraph of
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance. Any declaration
as to the Province of Benguet's lack of authority to levy
amusement taxes must be limited to admission fees to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and
tourist spots.
Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of
the Tax Ordinance is not limited to resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots but also
covers admission fees for boxing. As Section 140 of the
LGC allows for the imposition of amusement taxes on
gross receipts from admission fees to boxing stadia,
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance must be
sustained with respect to admission fees from boxing
stadia.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The second paragraph of Section 59, Article X
of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005, in so far
as it imposes amusement taxes on admission fees to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and
tourist spots, is declared null and void. Respondent
Province of Benguet is permanently enjoined from
enforcing the second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of
the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005 with respect
to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and
tourist spots.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15045
January 20, 1961
IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE

BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitionerappellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General
for respondent-appellee.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social Security
Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all
religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations,
which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated
by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be
exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No.
1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security
Law of 1954. The request was based on the claim that the
said Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and
charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and
activities organized for profit. Acting upon the
recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security
Commission in its Resolution No. 572, series of 1958,
denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional
objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution.
The request, however, was denied by the Commission in
its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958; hence, this appeal
taken in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No.
1161, as amended.
Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended,
provides that coverage "in the System shall be compulsory
upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty
rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a
the service of an employer who is a member of the System,
Provided, that the Commission may not compel any
employer to become member of the System unless he shall
have been in operation for at least two years and has at the
time of admission, if admitted for membership during the
first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees,
and if admitted for membership the following year of
operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x x." The
term employer" as used in the law is defined as any
person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries
in the Philippines any trade, business, industry,
undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of
another person who is under his orders as regards the
employment, except the Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including
corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par.
[c], see. 8), while an "employee" refers to "any person who
performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both
mental and physical efforts are used and who receives
compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8).
"Employment", according to paragraph [i] of said section 8,
covers any service performed by an employer except those
expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under
the Government, or any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned

and controlled by the Government, domestic service in a
private home, employment purely casual, etc.
From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the
coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or
less permanent nature and extends to employment of all
kinds except those expressly excluded.
Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in
the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis
be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or
activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which
are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity
of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any
trade, business, industry, undertaking." The contention
cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies
only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where
the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would
thereby be hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American
Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the
definition of the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently
comprehensive as to include religious and charitable
institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein
appellant, within its meaning. This is made more evident by
the fact that it contains an exception in which said
institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had
the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the
law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have
defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the
Government and yet make an express exception of it.
It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161
was enacted, services performed in the employ of
institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes
were by express provisions of said Act excluded from
coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That
portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express
provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in
1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended
to include charitable and religious institutions within the
scope of the law.
In support of its contention that the Social Security Law
was intended to cover only employment for profit or gain,
appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions
of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however,
nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the
question of whether the law should be limited to
organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said
discussions dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet
the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight
of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily
explained by the fact that the majority of those to be
affected by the operation of the law are corporations and
industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.
Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a
labor law and, consequently, following the rule laid down in
the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R.
No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases1, applies
only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and
gain. The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the
reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its
application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural
establishments, or enterprises. .
Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted
pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security
system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people
throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old
age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the
police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to
working women and minors, and is in full accord with the
constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice
to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with
the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of
the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the
extent of its provisions to relations between capital and
labor in industry and agriculture.
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious
organizations under the coverage of the Social Security
Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the
application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of
any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds
contributed to the System created by the law are not public
funds, but funds belonging to the members which are
merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate,
assuming that said funds are impressed with the character
of public funds, their payment as retirement death or
disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the
cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment
shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but
because he is an employee.
Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the
Social Security Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate
religious information. All that is required of appellant is to
make monthly contributions to the System for covered
employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to
appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on
employment." Together with the contributions imposed
upon the employees and the Government, they are
intended for the protection of said employees against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line
with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572
kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social Security
Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs
against appellant.
[G.R. No. 146943. October 4, 2002]
SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG
and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari49[1] of the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC
for brevity) en banc50[2] dated June 10, 1999 and October
26, 2000. The assailed Resolutions dismissed the
complaint51[3] filed by petitioner Sario Malinias (Malinias
for brevity) and Roy S. Pilando (Pilando for brevity) for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for
violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 664652[4] and
Sections 232 and 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.53[5]
The Facts
Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas
Pilando was a candidate for congressional representative
of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections.54[6]
The Provincial Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of
election returns at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol
Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province from May 11, 1998
to May 15, 1998.55[7]
On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint
with the COMELECs Law Department for violation of
Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i)
of B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz,
Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who
was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez
(Dominguez for brevity) was then the incumbent
Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province.
Teofilo Corpuz (Corpuz for brevity) was then the Provincial
Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain
Province while Anacleto Tangilag (Tangilag for brevity) was
then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc,
Mountain Province.
Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police
checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province
blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc,
and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial
Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged that
policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented
their supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the
Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol

grounds.
In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the
COMELEC and its Law Department to investigate and
prosecute private respondents for the following alleged
unlawful acts.
3. That on May 15, 1998 at the site of the canvassing of
election returns for congressional and provincial returns
located at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol
Building the public and particularly the designated
representatives/watchers of both affiants were prevented
from attending the canvassing.
xxx
4. That the aforementioned Mass-affidavits support our
allegations in this affidavit-complaint that we and our
supporters were prevented from attending the provincial
canvassing because of the illegal checkpoint/blockade setup by policemen in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mt.
Province and as an evidence to these allegations,
Certification of the Police Station is hereto attached as
Annex D and affidavits of supporters hereto attached as
Annex E, both made an integral part of this affidavitcomplaint; and that said mass-affidavits show that the
Provincial canvassing were not made public or (sic)
candidates and their representatives/watchers prevented
because of barricade, closure of canvassing rooms,
blockade by armed policemen that coerce or threaten the
people, the candidates or their representatives from
attending the canvassing;56[8]
In support of the complaint, several supporters of Malinias
and Pilando executed so-called mass affidavits uniformly
asserting that private respondents, among others, (1)
prevented them from attending the provincial canvassing,
(2) padlocked the canvassing area, and (3) threatened the
people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. They
likewise alleged that the Provincial Board of Canvassers
never allowed the canvassing to be made public and
consented to the exclusion of the public or representatives
of other candidates except those of Dominguez.57[9]
Consequently, the COMELECs Law Department conducted
a preliminary investigation during which only Corpuz and
Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-Affidavit.
In their Counter-Affidavit, Corpuz and Tangilag admitted
ordering the setting up of a checkpoint at Nacagang,
Sabangan, Mountain Province and securing the vicinity of
the Provincial Capitol Building, to wit:
3. We admit having ordered the setting up of check points
in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province;
as in fact, this is not the only checkpoint set up in the
province. There are other checkpoints established in other
parts of the province, to enforce the COMELEC gun ban
and other pertinent rules issued by the Commission on
Election during the election period.
4. Policemen were posted within the vicinity of the capitol
grounds in response to earlier information that some
groups were out to disrupt the canvass proceedings which
were being conducted in the second floor of the Provincial
Capitol Building. This is not remote considering that this
had happened in the past elections. In fact, during the
canvass proceeding on May 15, 1998 a large group of
individuals identified with no less than affiantscomplainants Roy S. Pilando and Sario Malinias was
conducting a rally just in front of the capitol, shouting
invectives at certain candidates and their leaders. This
group likewise were holding placards and posted some in
front of the capitol building.
Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Thus, the

checkpoint at Sabangan, Mountain Province was not
established as alleged only upon request of Congressman
Dominguez on May 15, 1998 but way before the
commencement of the campaign period. Granting
arguendo that the Congressman did make a request for a
checkpoint at Sitio Nacagang, it would be a mere
surplusage as the same was already existing.
Furthermore, an alleged text of a radio message requesting
advice from the PNP Provincial Director at Bontoc, Mt.
Province was attached to complainants affidavit-complaint.
However, said person by the name of Mr. Palicos was
never presented to affirm the truth of the contents and the
signature appearing therein.60[12]
Finding that Malinias failed to adduce new evidence, the
COMELEC dismissed Malinias Motion for
Reconsideration.61[13]
x x x58[10]
The Courts Ruling
After the investigation, in a study dated May 26, 1999, the

COMELECs Law Department recommended to the
COMELEC en banc the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of probable cause.59[11]
The sole issue for resolution is whether the COMELEC

gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Malinias and
Pilandos complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause for alleged violation of Section 25 of R.A.
No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881.
In a Resolution dated June 10, 1999, the COMELEC en

banc dismissed the complaint of Malinias and Pilando for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause
against private respondents. On October 26, 2000, the
COMELEC dismissed Malinias Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, Malinias filed the instant petition.
The Comelecs Ruling
In dismissing the complaint against private respondents,
the COMELEC ruled as follows:
As appearing in the Minutes of Provincial Canvass,
complainant Roy Pilando was present during the May 15,
1998 Provincial Canvass. He even participated actively in a
discussion with the members of the Board and the counsel
of Congressman Dominguez. The minutes also disclosed
that the lawyers of LAMMP, the watchers, supporters of
other candidates and representatives of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines were present at one time or another
during the canvass proceedings. The minutes does not
indicate any charges of irregularities inside and within the
vicinity of the canvassing room.
Pursuant to Comelec Res. No. 2968 promulgated on
January 7, 1998, checkpoints were established in the entire
country to effectively implement the firearms ban during the
election period from January 11, 1998 to June 10, 1998. In
Mountain Province, there were fourteen (14) checkpoints
established by the Philippine National Police way before
the start of the campaign period for the May 11, 1998
elections including the subject checkpoint at Nacagang,
We rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of

discretion.
For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the
assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious and
despotic manner.
There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of
the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act
at all in contemplation of law.62[14]
Such is not the situation in the instant case. The
COMELEC dismissed properly the complaint of Malinias
and Pilando for insufficient evidence, and committed no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
First, Malinias charged private respondents with alleged
violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646, quoted,
as follows:
Sec. 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the
Canvass. Any registered political party, coalition of parties,
through their representatives, and any candidate has the
right to be present and to counsel during the canvass of the
election returns; Provided, That only one counsel may
argue for each political party or candidate. They shall have
the right to examine the returns being canvassed without
touching them, make their observations thereon, and file
their challenge in accordance with the rules and regulations
of the Commission. No dilatory action shall be allowed by
the board of canvassers.
In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to
substantiate his claim that private respondents denied him
his right to be present during the canvassing. There was
even no showing that Malinias was within the vicinity of the
Provincial Capitol Building or that private respondents
prevented him from entering the canvassing room.
As found by the COMELEC and admitted by Malinias,
Pilando was present and even participated actively in the
canvassing.63[15] Malinias failed to show that his rights as
a gubernatorial candidate were prejudiced by the alleged
failure of his supporters to attend the canvassing. Malinias
claimed that even though Pilando was present during the
canvassing, the latter was only able to enter the room after
eluding the policemen and passing through the rear
entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building.64[16] This
allegation, however, is not supported by any clear and
convincing evidence. Pilando himself, who was purportedly
prevented by policemen from entering the canvassing
room, failed to attest to the veracity of this statement
rendering the same self-serving and baseless.
In an analogous case where a political candidates watcher
failed to attend the canvass proceedings, this Court held:
Another matter which militates against the cause of
petitioner is that he has not shown that he suffered
prejudice because of the failure of his watcher to attend the
canvassing. Had the watcher been present, what
substantive issues would he have raised? Petitioner does
not disclose. Could it be that even if the watcher was
present, the result of the canvassing would have been the
same?
There is therefore no merit in petitioners claim that
respondent Commission on Elections gravely abused its
discretion in issuing its questioned decision. And, as
emphatically stated in Sidro v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 853,
this Court has invariably followed the principle that in the
absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of
the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by the
respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its
competence is entitled to the utmost respect, xxx. There is
justification in this case to reiterate this principle.65[17]
Assuming that Pilando in fact entered the canvassing room
only after successfully evading the policemen surrounding
the Provincial Capitol grounds, Pilando could have easily
complained of this alleged unlawful act during the canvass
proceedings. He could have immediately reported the
matter to the Provincial Board of Canvassers as a violation

of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646. However, Pilando opted
simply to raise questions on alleged irregularities in the
municipal canvassing.66[18] While he had the opportunity
to protest the alleged intimidation committed by policemen
against his person, it is quite surprising that he never
mentioned anything about it to the Provincial Board of
Canvassers.
Surprisingly, the COMELEC and private respondents
apparently overlooked that R.A. No. 6646 does not punish
a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election
offense. Section 25 merely highlights one of the recognized
rights of a political party or candidate during elections,
aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or
irregularities in the canvassing of election returns. Section
2767[19] of R.A. No. 6646, which specifies the election
offenses punishable under this law, does not include
Section 25.
Malinias further claims that, in violation of this right, his
supporters were blocked by a checkpoint set-up at
Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province. This allegation
is devoid of any basis to merit a reversal of the
COMELECs ruling. Malinias supporters who were
purportedly blocked by the checkpoint did not confirm or
corroborate this allegation of Malinias.
Moreover, the police established checkpoints in the entire
country to implement the firearms ban during the election
period. Clearly, this is in consonance with the
constitutionally ordained power of the COMELEC to
deputize government agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.68[20]
Second, Malinias maintains that Corpuz and Tangilag
entered the canvassing room in blatant violation of Section
232 of B.P. Blg. 881. His sole basis for this allegation is the
affidavit of his supporters who expressly stated that they
saw Dominguez and Corpuz (only) enter the canvassing
room.69[21] Malinias likewise contends that Corpuz and
Tangilag impliedly admitted that they were inside or at least
within the fifty (50) meter radius of the canvassing room as
they were able to mention the names of the persons who
were inside the canvassing room in their CounterAffidavit.70[22]
The provision of law which Corpuz and Tangilag allegedly
violated is quoted as follows:
Sec. 232. Persons not allowed inside the canvassing
room. It shall be unlawful for any officer or member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the Philippine
Constabulary, or the Integrated National Police or any
peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging
to an extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction
forces, strike forces, home defense forces, barangay selfdefense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the
security or police organizations or government ministries,
commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities,
or government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries or of any member of a privately owned or
operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence
agency performing identical or similar functions to enter the
room where the canvassing of the election returns are held
by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty
meters from such room: Provided, however, That the board
of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems necessary,
may make a call in writing for the detail of policemen or any
peace officers for their protection or for the protection of the
election documents and paraphernalia in the possession of
the board, or for the maintenance of peace and order, in
which case said policemen or peace officers, who shall be
in proper uniform, shall stay outside the room within a
radius of thirty meters near enough to be easily called by
the board of canvassers at any time.
Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked
that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election
offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of
B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it
is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the
canvassing room, this act is not one of the election
offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262
of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of
B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election
offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the
penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262
is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more
than six years.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the
COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged
violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because
this is a non-criminal act.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is
the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that
which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus,
where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.
xxx
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its
variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are
based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. They are predicated upon ones own

voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed
from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.71[23]
Also, since private respondents are being charged with a
criminal offense, a strict interpretation in favor of private
respondents is required in determining whether the acts
mentioned in Section 232 are criminally punishable under
Sections 26172[24] and 26273[25] of B.P. Blg. 881. Since
Sections 261 and 262, which lists the election offenses
punishable as crimes, do not include Section 232, a strict
interpretation means that private respondents cannot be
held criminally liable for violation of Section 232.
This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg.
881 is without any sanction. Though not a criminal election
offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after
proper hearing, the imposition of administrative penalties.
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC may recommend to the President the
imposition of disciplinary action on any officer or employee
the COMELEC has deputized for violation of its directive,
order or decision.74[26] Also, under the Revised
Administrative Code,75[27] the COMELEC may
recommend to the proper authority the suspension or
removal of any government official or employee found
guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with
COMELEC orders or rulings.
In addition, a careful examination of the evidence
presented by Malinias shows that the same are insufficient
to justify a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the COMELEC. Obviously, the evidence relied upon by
Malinias to support his charges consisted mainly of
affidavits prepared by his own supporters. The affidavits of
Malinias own supporters, being self-serving, cannot be
accepted at face value under the circumstances. As this
Court has often stated, reliance should not be placed on
mere affidavits.76[28]
Besides, if Corpuz really entered the canvassing room,
then why did Pilando and the representatives of other
candidates, who were inside the room, fail to question this
alleged wrongful act during the canvassing? Malinias
contention that Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted
they were inside the canvassing room because they
mentioned the names of the persons present during the
canvassing deserves scant consideration as the same is
not supported by any evidence.
Finally, Malinias asserts that private respondents should be
held liable for allegedly violating Section 261 (i) of B. P.
Blg. 881 because the latter engaged in partisan political
activity. This provision states:
Sec. 261 (i) Intervention of public officers and employees.
Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those
holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force,
special forces, home defense forces, barangay selfdefense units and all other para-military units that now exist
or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or
indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages
in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to
preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 defines the term
partisan political activity as an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to
a public office.77[29] Malinias asserts that, in setting up a
checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain
Province and in closing the canvassing room, Corpuz and
Tangilag unduly interfered with his right to be present and
to counsel during the canvassing. This interference
allegedly favored the other candidate.
While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting
up of the checkpoint, they did so to enforce the
COMELECs firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2968, among others.78[30] There was no
clear indication that these police officers, in ordering the
setting up of checkpoint, intended to favor the other
candidates. Neither was there proof to show that Corpuz
and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their authority in
implementing the COMELEC rules. Further, there is no
basis to rule that private respondents arbitrarily deprived
Malinias of his right to be present and to counsel during the
canvassing.
The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the
checkpoint was plainly in accordance with their avowed
duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the
vicinity of the canvassing site. Thus, the act is untainted
with any color of political activity. There was also no
showing that the alleged closure of the provincial capitol
grounds favored the election of the other candidates.
In summary, we find that there is no proof that the
COMELEC issued the assailed resolutions with grave
abuse of discretion. We add that this Court has limited
power to review findings of fact made by the COMELEC
pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and
prosecute actions for election offenses.79[31] Thus, where
there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness,
fraud or error of law, this Court may not review the factual
findings of the COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings
on the sufficiency of evidence.80[32]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed Resolutions of public respondent COMELEC are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SHARICA MARI L. GOTAN
G.R. No. 168852
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an

Order/Notice89[9] granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
Petitioner,
- versus
SPOUSES PERFECTO
C. TAN
and JUANITA L. TAN,
Promulgated:
Respondents.*
September 30,
2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution81[1] dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q05-54536 and the RTC Resolution82[2] dated July 11,
2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan

(petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.83[3]
Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra
Danielle84[4] and Kristen Denise.85[5] On January 12,
2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO)86[6] against Steven and her
parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L.
Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that
Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and
(i)87[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,88[8] otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion

to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent
Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,90[10] contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner,
they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a

Comment on Opposition91[11] to respondents' Motion to
Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A.
No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at
promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a

Resolution92[12] dismissing the case as to respondents on
the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner,
they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A.
No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.93[13]
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified

Motion for Reconsideration94[14] contending that the
doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the
broader interests of substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their

Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration95[15]
arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly
broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the
relationship between the offender and the alleged victim
was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No.
9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a

Resolution96[16] denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned
that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No.
9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of
the law.
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,

psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of

law, to wit:
While the said provision provides that the

offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does
not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the RPC.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTSSPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW

OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004.97[17]
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be

understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of
R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory
application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and,
accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of
the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that
Steven and respondents had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from
the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents
should be included as indispensable or necessary parties
for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they

are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof
explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the
victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or
sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of
respondents require a factual determination which cannot
be done by this Court in a petition for review; that
respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or
necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not
only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the
non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence
against women and their children'' as any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly

provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act,

the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this

Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal

Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No.
9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular
matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,98[18] the Court

applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty
under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act
No. 3992, otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law, noting that the special law did not contain any
provision that the defendant could be sentenced with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,99[19] the Court

applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused
who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, considering the lack of similar rules under the special
law.
In People v. Chowdury,100[20] the Court applied

suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the
words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A.
No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because said words were
not defined therein, although the special law referred to the
same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime
of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,101[21] the Court applied

suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment
under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.
22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, noting
the absence of an express provision on subsidiary
imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,102[22] the

Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a
contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of

conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express
provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the
RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable,
may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied

to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert
to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.103[23]
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No.

9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against
women and their children may be committed by an offender
through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and

Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless

conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in

public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the

residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the

property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal

belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or

violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be

issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection

orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any,
some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening

to commit or committing, personally or through another,
any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,

annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a

liberal construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally

construed to promote the protection and safety of victims
of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis
supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is

the law104[24] and that this intent must be effectuated by
the courts. In the present case, the express language of
R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal
construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object
of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the

maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is
only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not of
universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent
which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the
legislature.105[25]
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily

argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances
evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and
respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary
matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on
the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition
since this Court is not a trier of facts.106[26] It is thus
premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since
this controversy is centered only on the determination of
whether respondents may be included in a petition under
R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can
be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of

conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262,
the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may
be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do
so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of
the petition against respondents is concerned.
G.R. No. 202242
April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH
G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the
respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly
opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from
the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of
petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory
pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1]
whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having
two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with
one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed
subject decision, disposing the same in the following
manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current
numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only
one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in
its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents motion for
reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution
Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject
motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012.7 On August
3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments
and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the
second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17,
2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately
executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012
Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit
their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from
notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS
the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion
of the Courts July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This
disposition is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and
respondents filed their respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of

the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing
members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive
prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the
government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both
the Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12
vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary
in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. It was during these times that the country
became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants
seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary
to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative
body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the
executive and legislative powers in one body, the
appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of
scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive
and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition
that the appointees must have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments
to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and
partisan activities,15 the members of the Constitutional
Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent
and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and
called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers
carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress
designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the
constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1)
representative, each House sent a representative to the
JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was
substantially altered.1wphi1 An eighth member was
added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with
each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the
situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the
Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on
the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one
representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to
absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the
failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when
there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a
plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress
would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate
the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale
of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition
would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not
exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in
amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by
respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the
assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the
first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second
grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of
this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall
discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino
people by which the fundamental powers of government
are established, limited and defined and by which those
powers are distributed among the several departments for
their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on
one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the
principles and the framework upon which government and
society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the
constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic
postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The
language used in the Constitution must be taken to have
been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every
word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to
exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained
inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the
Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels
acceptance and bars modification even by the branch
tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument
of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional
construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in
opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe
"representative of Congress," the Filipino people through
the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one
(1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided,
as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that
several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune
with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4,
Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential
election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20
Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to
replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of
all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the
Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority

of all its Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral
nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter
would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust
Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their
decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not
persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain
oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very
clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the
provision on congressional representation in the JBC
because it was not in the exercise of its primary function
to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive
power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was
merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can
easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The
need to recognize the existence and the role of each
House is essential considering that the Constitution
employs precise language in laying down the functions
which particular House plays, regardless of whether the
two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or
separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its
non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of
appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of
war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and
Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of
each House must be acknowledged and recognized
considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all
these instances, each House is constitutionally granted
with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with
keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other
chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks
and balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction
between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC.
No mechanism is required between the Senate and the
House of Representatives in the screening and nomination
of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the
Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four
(4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the
major branches of government - the Chief Justice as exofficio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department),
the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive
Department), and a representative of the Congress
(representing the Legislative Department). The total is
seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply
gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in
the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it
as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao,
submitted his well-considered position28 to then Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one
representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with
Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and
does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt
to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction
and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."
seven voting members with the three ex-officio members

having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in

the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle
of equality among the three branches of government which
is enshrined in the Constitution.
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of

Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its
legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers
under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation
to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the
matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand,
the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires
the Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate
and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress role
under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies
and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such
dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the
other two co-equal branches of government.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the

Council should adopt the rule of single representation of
Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right
meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief
Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which
reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and
citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to
curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the
appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven
(7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the
interpretation of two votes for Congress runs counter to the
intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually
gives Congress more influence in the appointment of
judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the
number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to
voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership,
and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the
Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice
Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision,
the JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives coming
from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent
that each category of members pertained to a single
individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the
bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond
dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx
a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from
Congress would increase the number of JBC members to
eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has
contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by
retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC
consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission
reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the
Commissions desire "to have in the Council a
representation for the major elements of the community."
xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of
representatives from the three main branches of
government while the regular members are composed of
various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable
tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each exofficio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have
xxx
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three

governmental branches to assign the same weight to
considerations that any of its representatives may have
regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The
representatives of the Senate and the House of
Representatives act as such for one branch and should not
have any more quantitative influence as the other branches
in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the
three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of
the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is,
thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress,
whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives,
is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority,
but it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone
representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This
pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting
the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause
disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the
essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic
and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done
directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the
splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a
constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced
by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution
envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is
sensible to presume that this representation carries with
him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the
President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC
simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are
his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still
safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular
members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is
composed of members of Congress.
Respondents contention that the current irregular
composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply
because it was only questioned for the first time through
the present action, deserves scant consideration. Wellsettled is the rule that acts done in violation of the
Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or notorious
cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of
estoppel or laches, because once an act is considered as
an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very
beginning and cannot be the source of any power or
authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a
general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the
general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration
of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception
applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the
Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the
Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents
perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the
Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of
the Constitution, read into the law something that is
contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as
correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would
otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment
to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative
omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case
omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The
principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a
particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court
cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted
from inadvertence or because the case in question was not
foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply
what it thinks the legislature would have supplied had its
attention been called to the omission, as that would be

judicial legislation."37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another
member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of
the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against
usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its
powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself.
Judicial activism should never be allowed to become
judicial exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of
practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to
perform either an excision or an insertion that will change
the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope
of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to
the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in
the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional
mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional
provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no
matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may
sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondents is hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of
the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the
Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately
executory," is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78585 July 5, 1989
JOSE ANTONIO MAPA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOKER ARROYO, in his Capacity as Executive
Secretary, and LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Francisco T. Mamaug for petitioner.
Emiliano S. Samson for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
We are called upon once again, in this special civil action
for certiorari, for a pronouncement as to whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the executive branch
of Government, particularly in the adjudication of a
controversy originally commenced in one of its regulatory
agencies.
Petitioner herein seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Office of the President, rendered by the Deputy Executive
Secretary on April 24,1987, 1 which dismissed his appeal
from the resolution of the Commission Proper, Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC, for short),
promulgated on January 10, 1986 and affirming the
decision of July 3, 1985 of the Office of Adjudication and
Legal Affairs (OAALA, for brevity) of HSRC. Petitioner
avers that public respondent "gravely transcended the
sphere of his discretion" in finding that Presidential Decree
No. 957 is inapplicable to the contracts to sell involved in
this case and in consequently dismissing the same. 2
The established facts on which the assailed decision is
based are set out therein as follows:
Records disclose that, on September 18, 1975, appellant
Jose Antonio Mapa and appellee Labrador Development
Corporation (Labrador, for short), owner/developer of the
Barangay Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, entered into
two contracts to sell over lots 12 and 13 of said subdivision.
On different months in 1976, they again entered into two
similar contracts involving lots 15 and 16 in the same
subdivision. Under said contracts, Mapa undertook to make
a total monthly installment of P2,137.54 over a period of
ten (10) years. Mapa, however, defaulted in the payment
thereof starting December 1976, prompting Labrador to
send to the former a demand letter, dated May 5, 1977,
giving him until May 18, 1977, within which to settle his
unpaid installments for the 4 lots amounting to P15,411.66,
with a warning that non-payment thereof will result in the
cancellation of the four (4) contracts. Despite receipt of
said letter on May 6,1977, Mapa failed to take any action
thereon. Labrador subsequently wrote Mapa another letter,
dated June 15, 1982, which the latter received on June 21,
1982, reminding him of his total arrears amounting to
P180,065.27 and demanding payment within 5 days from
receipt thereof, but which letter Mapa likewise ignored.
Thus, on August 16, 1982, Labrador sent Mapa a notarial
cancellation of the four (4) contracts to sell, which Mapa
received on August 20, 1982. On September 10, 1982,
however, Mapa's counsel sent Labrador a letter calling
Labrador's attention to, and demanding its compliance with,
Clause 20 of the four (4) contracts to sell which relates to

Labrador's obligation to provide, among others,
lighting/water facilities to subdivision lot buyers.
On September 10, 1982, Labrador issued a certification
holding the implementation of the letter dated August 16,
1982 (re notarial cancellation) pending the complete
development of road lot cul de sac within the properties of
Mapa at Barangay Hills Subdivision.' Thereafter on October
25,1982, Labrador sent Mapa a letter informing him 'that
the construction of road, sidewalk, curbs and gutters
adjacent to Block 11 Barangay Hills Subdivision are
already completed' and further requesting Mapa to 'come
to our office within five (5) days upon receipt of this letter to
settle your account.'
On December 10, 1982, Mapa tendered payment by
means of a check in the amount of P 2,137.54, but
Labrador refused to accept payment for the reason that it
was agreed 'that after the development of the cul de sac,
he (complainant) will pay in full the total amount due,' which
Labrador computed at P 260,138.61. On December 14,
1982, Mapa wrote Labrador claiming that 'you have not
complied with the requirements for water and light facilities
in lots 12, 13, 15 & 16 Block 2 of Barangay Hills
Subdivision.' The following day, Mapa filed a complaint
against Labrador for the latter's neglect to put 1) a water
system that meets the minimum standard as specified by
HSRC, and 2) electrical power supply. By way of relief,
Mapa requested the HSRC to direct Labrador to provide
the facilities aforementioned, and to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining Labrador from cancelling the
contracts to sell.
After due hearing/investigation, which included an on-site
inspection of the subdivision, OAALA, issued its decision of
July 3, 1985, dismissing the complaint and declaring that
after the lapse of 5 years from complainant's default
respondent had every right to rescind the contract pursuant
to Clause 7 thereof. . .
Per its resolution of January 10, 1986, the Commission
Proper, HSRC, affirmed the aforesaid OAALA decision. 3
It was petitioner's adamant submission in the administrative
proceedings that the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
957 4 and implementing rules form part of the contracts to
sell executed by him and respondent corporation, hence
the obligations imposed therein had to be complied with by
Labrador within the period provided. Since, according to
petitioner, Labrador failed to perform the aforementioned
obligations, it is precluded from rescinding the subject
contracts to sell since petitioner consequently did not incur
in delay on his part.
Such intransigent position of petitioner has not changed in
the petition at bar and unyielding reliance is placed on the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 and its
implementing rules. The specific provisions of the Decree
which are persistently relied upon read:
SEC. 20. Time of Completion. Every owner or developer
shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, including
water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium
plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters letters or in
any form of advertisements, within one year from the date
of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or
condominium project or such other period of time as may
be fixed by the Authority.
not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated

by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure
which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable
errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest." 8
SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision

lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the
effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the
owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium
project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as
provided in the preceding section within two years from the
date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the
Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed
in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
A careful scrutiny of the records of the instant case reveals

that the circumstances thereof do not fag under the
aforesaid excepted cases, with the findings duly supported
by the evidence.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the

obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall
constitute a violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39
of this Decree.
Rule V of the implementing rules, on the other hand,
requires two (2) sources of electric power, two (2) deepwell and pump sets with a specified capacity and two
standard fire hose flows with a capacity of 175 gallons per
minute. 5
The provision, in said contracts to sell which, according to
petitioner, includes and incorporates the aforequoted
statutory provisions, is Clause 20 of said contracts which
provides:
Clause 20. SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT To insure
the physical development of the subdivision, the SELLER
hereby obliges itself to provide the individual lot buyer with
the following:
a) PAVED ROADS
b) UNDERGROUND DRAINAGE
c) CONCRETE CURBS AND GUTTERS
d) WATER SYSTEM
e) PARK AND OPEN SPACE
These improvements shall apply only to the portions of the
subdivision which are for sale or have been sold. All
improvements except those requiring the services of a
public utility company or the government shall be
completed within a period of three (3) years from date of
this contract. Failure by the SELLER to reasonably comply
with the above schedule shall permit the BUYER/ S to
suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or
interest charges until such time that these improvements
shall have been made as scheduled. 6
As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that
absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the
administrative agency on matters falling within its
competence will not be disturbed by the courts. 7
Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are
accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special
knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from
handling the specific matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Presidential

Decree No. 957 must be rejected. Said decree was issued
on July 12, 1976 long after the execution of the contracts
involved. Obviously and necessarily, what subsequently
were statutorily provided therein as obligations of the
owner or developer could not have been intended by the
parties to be a part of their contracts. No intention to give
restrospective application to the provisions of said decree
can be gathered from the language thereof. Section 20, in
relation to Section 21, of the decree merely requires the
owner or developer to construct the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of
development but only such as are offered and indicated in
the approved subdivision or condominium plans,
brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any
form of advertisements. Other than what are provided in
Clause 20 of the contract, no further written commitment
was made by the developer in this respect. To read into the
contract the matters desired by petitioner would have the
law impose additional obligations on the parties to a
contract executed before that very law existed or was
contemplated.
We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous
application of the so-called doctrine of last antecedent in
the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of
Section 21. He would thereby have the enumeration of
"facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of
development" interpreted to mean that the demonstrative
phrase "which are offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of
development" and not to "facilities, improvements and
infrastructures." While this subserves his purpose, such
bifurcation whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set
apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous.
The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum
antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. 9 Relative
words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be
prevented by the context. In the present case, the
employment of the word "and" between "facilities,
improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of
development," far from supporting petitioner's theory,
enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics
that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or union.
Thus, if ever there is any valid ground to suspend the
monthly installments due from petitioner, it would only be
based on non-performance of the obligations provided in
Clause 20 of the contract, particularly the alleged nonconstruction of the cul-de-sac. But, even this is unavailing
and is obviously being used only to justify petitioner's
default. The on-site inspection of the subdivision conducted
by the OAALA and its subsequent report reveal that
Labrador substantially complied with its obligation. 10
Furthermore, the initial non-construction of the cul-de-sac,
as private respondent Labrador explained, was because
petitioner Mapa requested the suspension of its
construction since his intention was to purchase the
adjoining lots and thereafter enclose the same. 11 If these
were not true, petitioner would have invoked that supposed
default in the first instance. As the OAALA noted, petitioner
"stopped payments of his monthly obligations as early as
December, 1976, which is a mere five months after the
effectivity of P.D. No. 957 or about a year after the
execution of the contracts. This means that respondent still
has 1 and 1/2 years to comply with its legal obligation to
develop the subdivision under said P.D. and two years to
do so under the agreement, hence, it was improper for
complainant to have suspended payments in December,
1976 on the ground of non-development since the period
allowed for respondent's obligation to undertake such
development has not yet expired." 12
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition
should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-13160
January 30, 1960
BIENVENIDO NERA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
PAULINO GARCIA, Secretary of Health, and
TRANQUILINO ELICANO, Director of Hospitals,
respondents-appellants.
Jose Tumanong Guerrero for appellee.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor
Camilo D. Quiason for appellants.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Respondents are appealing the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dated October 30, 1957, ordering
them to reinstate petitioner Bienvenido Nera to his former
position as clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital,
and to pay him his back salary from the date of his
suspension until reinstatement.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Petitioner Nera a
civil service eligible, was at the time of his suspension,
serving as clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital, a
government institution under the supervision of the Bureau
of Hospitals and the Department of Health. In the course of
his employment, he served as manager and cashier of the
Maternity Employer's Cooperative Association, Inc. As
such manager and cashier, he was supposed to have
under his control funds of the association. On May 11,
1956, he was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Manila with malversation, Criminal Case No. 35447, for
allegedly misappropriating the sum of P12,636.21
belonging to the association.
Some months after the filing of the criminal case, one
Simplicio Balcos, husband of the suspended administrative
officer and cashier of the Maternity and Children's Hospital,
named Gregoria Balcos, filed an administrative complaint
case then pending against him. Acting upon this
administrative complaint and on the basis of the
information filed in the criminal case, as well as manager
and cashier of the association, he was liable in the amount
of P12,636.21, the executive officer, Antonio Rodriguez,
acting for and in the absence of the Director of Hospitals,
required petitioner of the communication, Exhibit D, why he
should not be summarily dismissed from the service for
acts involving dishonesty. This period of seventy-two hours
was extended to December 20, 1956. Before the expiration
of the period as extended, that is, on December 19, 1956,
Nera received a communication from respondent Director
of Hospital suspending him from office as clerk of the
Maternity and Children's Hospital, effective upon receipt
thereof. This suspension carried the approval of
respondent thereof. This suspension carried the approval
of respondent Garcia, Secretary of Health.
The petitioner asked the PCAC to intervene on his behalf,
which office recommended to respondents the lifting of the
suspension of petitioner. Upon failure of respondents to
follow said recommendation, petitioner asked respondents
for a reconsideration of his suspension, which request was
denied. Petitioner then filed the present special action of
prohibition, certiorari and mandamus to restrain
respondents from proceeding with the administrative case
against him until after the termination of the criminal case;
to annul the order of suspension dated December 19.,

1956, and to compel respondents to lift the suspension.
After hearing of this special civil action, the appealed
decision was illegally suspended, first because the
suspension came before he was able to file his answer to
the administrative complaint, thereby depriving him "of his
right to a fair hearing and an opportunity to present his
defense, thus violating the due process clause"; also, that
assuming for a moment that petitioner were guilty of
malversation or misappropriation of the funds of the
association, nevertheless, said irregularity had no
connection with his duly as clerk of the Maternity and
Children's Hospital.
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he
could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice
it say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty
for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only
as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step
in an administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal,
then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There
is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer
pending his investigation and before the charges against
him are heard and he given an opportunity to prove his
innocence.
As to the holding of the trial court about dishonesty or
misconduct in office having connection with one's duties
and functions in order to warrant punishment, this involves
an interpretation of Section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which for purpose of reference we
reproduced below:
SEC. 694. Removal or suspension. No officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law.
The President of the Philippines may suspend any chief or
assistant chief of a bureau or office and in the absence of
special provision, any other officer appointed by him,
pending an investigation of his bureau or office. With the
approval of the proper head of department, the chief of a
bureau in his bureau or under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge against such subordinate or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty.
(Emphasis supplied).
It will be observed from the last four lines of the second
paragraph that there is a comma after the words
dishonesty and oppression, thereby warranting the
conclusion that only the phrase "grave misconduct or
neglect "is qualified by the words "in the performance of
duty". In other words, dishonesty and oppression to warrant
punishment or dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of them performance of duty by the person charged.
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the Civil
Service Act on 1959, which refers to the same subject
matter of [preventive suspension, throws some light on this
seeming ambiguity. We reproduced said section 34;
SEC. 34. Preventive Suspension. The President of the
Philippines may suspend any chief or assistant chief of a
bureau or office and in the absence of special provision,
any other officer appointed by him, pending an
investigation of the charges against such officer or pending
an investigation of his bureau or office. With the approval of
the proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or
office may likewise preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee in his bureau or under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer,
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or to believe that the performance of duty, or if
there are strong reason to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the
service. (Emphasis supplied).
It will be noticed that it introduces a small change into
Section 694 of the Revised Penal Code by placing a
comma after the words "grave misconduct," so that the
phrase "in the performance or neglect", as it did under
Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, now
qualifies only the last word "neglect", thereby making clear
the person charged is guilty merely to neglect, the same
must be in the performance of his duty; but that when he is
charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
these need have no relation to the performance of duty.
Thus is readily understandable. If a Government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his force, they affect his right to continue in
office. The Government cannot well tolerate in its service a
dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly
and well, because by reason of his government position, he
is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and
entities of the Government other than the office where he is
employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which renders the
victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty
less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his
evil acts and actuations. As the Solicitor General well
pointed out in his brief, "the private life of an employee
cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty
inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee
to continue in office and the discipline and morals of the
service."
It may not be amiss to state here that the alleged
misappropriation involved in the criminal case is not
entirely disconnected with the office of the petitioner. True,
the Maternity Employee's Cooperative Association that
own, the funds said to have been misappropriated is a
private entity. However, as its name implies a, it is an
association composd of the employees of the Maternity
Children's Hospital where petitioner was serving as an
employee. Moreover, if petitioner was designated to and
occupied the position of manager and cashier of said
association, it was because he was an employee of the
Maternity and Children's Hospital. The contention though
indirect, and, in the opinion of some, rather remote, exists
and is there.
The trial court cites a cases of Mondano vs. Silvosa 97
Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., [6], 284 Lacson vs. Roque (92
Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., 93), and others to support its
holding that an official may not be suspended
for]irregularities not committed in connection with his office.
These cases, however, involve elective officials who stand

on ground different from that of an appointive officer or
employee, and whose suspension pending investigation is
governed by other laws. Furthermore, an elective officer,
elected by popular vote, is directly responsible only to the
community that elected him. Ordinarily, he is not
amendable to rules of official conduct governing appointive
officials, and so, may not be fortwith and summarily
suspended, unless his conduct and acts of irregularity have
some connection with his office. Furthermore, an elective
official has a definite term of office, relatively of short
duration; naturally, since suspension from his office said
suspension should not be ordered and done unless
necessary to prevent further damage or injury to the office
and to the people dealing with said officer.
In view of the conclusion that we have arrived at, we deem
it unnecessary to discuss and determine the other
questions raised in the appeal. In view of the foregoing, the
appealed decision is hereby reversed, with costs.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR
OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely,
respondents and intervenors separate motions for
reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17,
1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this
Court en banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our
Resolution dated November 17, 1998, wherein we voted
two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration of our
earlier Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result of which the
Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve
the said motions for reconsideration inasmuch as the
matter should have been referred to the Court sitting en
banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the
Constitution. Respondents and intervenors also assail our
Resolution dated January 27, 1999, wherein we noted
without action the intervenors Motion For Reconsideration
With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc
filed on December 3, 1998, on the following considerations,
to wit:
the movants have no legal personality to further seek
redress before the Court after their motion for leave to
intervene in this case was denied in the April 24, 1998
Decision. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration of
the said decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the
Court En Banc, was also denied in the November 17, 1998
Resolution of the Court. Besides, their aforesaid motion of
December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2,
Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure). The impropriety of movants December
3, 1998 motion becomes all the more glaring considering
that all the respondents in this case did not anymore join
them (movants) in seeking a reconsideration of the
November 17, 1998 Resolution.i[1]
Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed their Motion For Reconsideration Of
The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc
(With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)
on December 3, 1998, accompanied by a Manifestation
and Motionii[2] and a copy of the Registered Mail Billiii[3]
evidencing filing of the said motion for reconsideration to
this Court by registered mail.
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both
respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred
to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated
April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the
required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not
met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be

decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following
constitutional provision:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided
en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the Court
sitting en banc.iv[4]
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision,
however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a
distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters,
on the other hand, such that cases are decided while
matters, which include motions, are resolved. Otherwise
put, the word decided must refer to cases; while the word
resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule of
reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the
interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3),
but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where
these words appear.v[5]
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear
that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for
decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in
this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the
resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only
of case and not matter. The reason is simple. The abovequoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition
of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is
no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to
refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case
has already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the
division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting
does not leave the case undecided. There is still the
decision which must stand in view of the failure of the
members of the division to muster the necessary vote for
its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a
tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed
decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be
deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998.
It is the movants further contention in support of their plea
for the referral of this case to the Court en banc that the
issues submitted in their separate motions are of first
impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio
M. Martinez during the resolution of the motions for
reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the following was
expressed:
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the
movants are matters of no extraordinary import to merit the
attention of the Court en banc. Specifically, the issue of
whether or not the power of the local government units to
reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no
longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in the
case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals wherein we held that local government units need
not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The
dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited case
states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial courts order
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession
of private respondents property; (b) orders the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires
the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval
of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
xxx
xxx
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was

arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of
the Second Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this
Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by
movants are nothing new and do not deserve the
consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation
of the full Court in the resolution of movants motions for
reconsideration would be inappropriate.vi[6]
The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November
17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier motions for
reconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is
flawed. Consequently, the present motions for
reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a
second motion for reconsideration which, according to the
clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in
relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may
entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as
where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even
then, we have ruled that such second motions for
reconsideration must be filed with express leave of court
first obtained.vii[7] In this case, not only did movants fail to
ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have
been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons for
us to give due course to their second motions for
reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of
this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of
this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the
motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the
allegations contained therein have already been raised
before and passed upon by this Court in the said
Resolution.
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the Win-Win
Resolution dated November 7, 1997. We maintain that the
same is void and of no legal effect considering that the
March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President had
already become final and executory even prior to the filing
of the motion for reconsideration which became the basis
of the said Win-Win Resolution. This ruling, quite
understandably, sparked a litany of protestations on the
part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for
a liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that

notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the
case was disposed of on a technicality. The situation,
however, is not as simple as what the movants purport it to
be. While it may be true that on its face the nullification of
the Win-Win Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule
pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for
reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was
the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. The
succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban are
quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, viz: Just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his/her case.viii[8]
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land
in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of
Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be
benefited by the development of the property. The issue in
this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality but of
substance and merit.ix[9]
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it
necessary to rule once and for all on the legal standing of
intervenors in this case. In their present motions,
intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest
inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of
land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are
seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been
identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the
property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as
in fact they have already been raised in intervenors earlier
motion for reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 Decision.
Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez,
intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal
farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive
interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no
right to own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to a
just share of the fruits of the land.x[10] Moreover, the WinWin Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries
have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform.xi[11] Absent any definitive
finding of the Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors
cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in
the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case.
Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not
grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the
Win-Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a
resolution that is null and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following
incidents, namely: intervenors Motion For Reconsideration
With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc,
dated December 3, 1998; respondents Motion For
Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17,
1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This Honorable
Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A
Restraining Order), dated December 2, 1998; and
intervenors Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme
Court Sitting En Banc To Annul The Second Divisions
Resolution Dated 27 January 1999 And Immediately
Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration
Filed By The Intervenors, dated March 2, 1999; are all
DENIED with FINALITY. No further motion, pleading, or
paper will be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., see separate opinion.
Puno, J., in the result, he maintain his original position that
the case should go to CA for further proceedings.
Mendoza, J., in the result.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO, J.:
On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno
that this case should be referred to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
Since what is now before us is a second motion for
reconsideration, which under the rules is generally
proscribed, the majority deemed it pertinent to limit its
resolution in regard to cogent procedural points.
At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am
bound to abide by the Court En Bancs Resolution No. 991-09-SC dated January 22, 1999, which settled the issue of
an even (2-2) vote in a division, I am constrained to vote
with the majority in denying all of the subject motions in the
above-captioned case. Nevertheless, I wish to express my
views on this issue and put them on record, so, in the event
that the Court decides to re-open and re-discuss this issue
at some future time, these considerations may be referred
to.
I continue to have some reservations regarding the
majoritys position regarding an even (2-2) vote in a
division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division
when the required majority of at least 3 votes in the
division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by
the Court En Banc. Specifically, Paragraph 3, Section 4,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides that:
xxx
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided
or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such
members. When the required number is not obtained,
the case shall be decided en banc: provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
disclose that if the case is not decided in a division by a
majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a
larger division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to the
Banc shall be automatic. Thus,
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, may I ask some
questions for clarification.
MR. PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO: Under these provisions, there are 3

kinds of divisions : one would be a division composed of 3
justices in which case there will be 5 divisions; another
division is composed of 5 justices each, in which case
there will be 3 divisions; and the other is composed of 7
members each, in which case, there will be 2 divisions.
Let us take the smallest division of 3 and the vote is 2-1.
So, it is less than 3 votes. Should it immediately go to the
court en banc of 15 justices or should it first go to a bigger
division?
MR. CONCEPCION:
Yes.
MR. RODRIGO:
banc?
They immediately go to the court en
MR. SUAREZ:
Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: Is that automatic? Let us say that in the

division of 3, the vote is 2-1, automatically it goes to the
court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ:
Yes, because the required number of 3
is not obtained. So, this last phrase would operate
automatically WHEN THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS NOT
OBTAINED, THE CASE SHALL BE DECIDED EN BANC.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(V Record 635, Oct. 8, 1986)

Explicit, therefore, is the requirement that at least 3
members must concur in any case or matter heard by a
division. Failing thus, or, when the required number of 3
votes is not obtained, the case or matter will have to be
decided by the Court En Banc.
In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the
5th member having inhibited himself or is otherwise not in a
position to participate, or has retired, a minimum of 3 votes
would still be required before there can be any valid
decision or resolution by that division. There may, then, be
instances when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the votes tied
at 2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear and
unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if the
required majority is not reached in a division, the case
should automatically go to Court En Banc.
A distinction has been made between cases and matters
referred to in the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Cases being decided, and matters being resolved. Only
cases are referred to the Court En Banc for decision
whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.
Matters are not referred anymore.
I regret I cannot square with such position.
The majority view is that cases would only refer to
deliberations at first instance on the merits of a case filed
with the Court, and other deliberations, such as motions,
including motions for reconsideration, are matters to be
resolved. To give flesh to this distinction, it is cited that if a
tie occurs in the voting on deliberations of cases, no
decision is passed, whereas, if a tie occurs in the voting on
motions for reconsideration, the decision which had already
been passed stands.
This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original
cases, as opposed to appealed cases, filed with the Court.
However, because of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts,
the only original cases which are taken cognizance of by
this Court are those wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction.
But, invariably, these cases are all required by the
Constitution to be heard by the Court En Banc. So, there
will be no instance when a division will be ever taking
cognizance of an original action filed with this Court.
It may be noted that cases taken cognizance of by the
divisions are either petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way of petition for
review on certiorari is not a matter of right. Thus, should
there be a tie in the voting on deliberation of a case by the
division, although apparently no action is passed, a
decision may still be rendered-the petition is hereby
DENIED due course, and it is forthwith DISMISSED. This is
definitely in consonance with the majoritys line of reasoning
in the 2-2 vote on motions for reconsideration. But why is
that, the 2-2 vote in the deliberation of the case at the first
instance should still be referred to the Court En Banc? The
reason is simple. Because the express provision of the
Constitution requires a vote of at least three justices for
there to be a valid and binding decision of the Court. But,
why do we not apply the same rule to motions for
reconsideration? Even on this score alone, it is my view
that, in all instances, whether it be in the deliberations of a
case at first instance or on a motion for reconsideration, a
division having a 2-2 vote cannot pass action.
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to
motions for reconsideration because the provision
contemplates cases or matters (which for me has no
material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned)
heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration
cannot be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks
to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum
majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion for
reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as
mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To
say that the motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, is to
construe something which cannot be sustained by a
reading of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for
reconsideration is not a case but only a matter which does
not concern a case, so that, even though the vote thereon
in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not required to
elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage in a lot of
unfounded hairsplitting.
Furthermore, I humbly submit that the theory of leaving the
issue hanging on a 2-2 vote or any even vote may be
sustained only in cases where there is no recourse to a
higher assemblage.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a
division of 5 (2-2, with 1 abstaining) would result in the
motion not being carried, but only because there is and
there cannot be recourse to the Court of Appeals En Banc
which, does not act on judicial matters. In a legislative
body, an even vote results in the failure of the proposition,
only because there is no higher body which can take over.
In our own Court En Banc, if the voting is evenly split, on a
7-7 vote with 1 slot vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or
disqualifying himself, the motion shall, of course, not be

carried because that is the end of the line.
But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a
division, and there being recourse to the Court En Banc,
and more so, this being expressly directed by the
Constitution, the matter of the motion for reconsideration
should, by all means, be decided by the Court En Banc.
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A.
AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A.
AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.
AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA,
petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN
JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P.
DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO
ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and
natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN,
and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was
looking forward to the commencement exercises where he
would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives
and friends receive his high school diploma. These
ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned
out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in
the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that
mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life
as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held
the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum
of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of
earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees .
3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision
was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved . 4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable
as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of
arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It
also held that the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester had
already ended, that there was no clear identification of the
fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went

to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in
its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a
classmate. On the implications and consequences of these
facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to
show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his
graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the
private respondents. The private respondents submit that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the
purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was
no longer in their custody because the semester had
already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used
which the petitioners consider important because of an
earlier incident which they claim underscores the
negligence of the school and at least one of the private
respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on
April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys,
confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but
later returned it to him without making a report to the
principal or taking any further action . 6 As Gumban was
one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the
gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was
the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban
and that their son would not have been killed if it had not
been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however,
that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm
that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is
invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting
positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their
custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in
connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit:
Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and
Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this
opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended
a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school
supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took
over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle,
resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was
found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence.
In the separate civil action flied against them, his father
was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article
1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort
committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista
Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter
dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground
that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes
concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school
authorities who should be held liable Liability under this
rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and
(2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The
modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades"
should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an
elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade
during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in
Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits
parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court
declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not
been sued that the school was not liable because it was
not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the
custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents."
Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other
members of the court concurred in this decision
promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16year old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in
the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although
the wrongdoer who was already of age was not
boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in
charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court
declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long
as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10
including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to
the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age
were covered by the provision since they were equally in
the custody of the school and subject to its discipline.
Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and
submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed
by students not yet of age as the school would be acting
only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with
Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that
"since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school,
the question as to the applicability of the cited codal
provision to academic institutions will have to await another
case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be
held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not
a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of

learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the
question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts
and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is
supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court
has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic. Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the
general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where the school
is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words
"pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts
and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion
expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he
said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old
Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to
academic ones. What substantial difference is there
between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision
and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended
that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of
watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the
detriment of third Persons, so long as they are in a position
to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In my
opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments
of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code,
the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but
only "heads of establishments." The phrase is only an
updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y
artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to
have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would
seem clear that where the parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason/that
the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of
the school nor with the authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is
no authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same
vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of
the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the
Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would
make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts
and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its
custody but if that same tort were committed in an
academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or
the school head. All other circumstances being the same,
the teacher or the head of the academic school would be
absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the nonacademic school would be held liable, and simply because
the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance
should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis
only of the nature of their respective schools. There does
not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature
and for increasing such vigilance where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused
by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result
of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of
the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly
should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing
that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the school
were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of
the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts
committed by his students, why is it the head of the school
only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic
or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the
head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of
the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades
were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to
their master who personally and directly instructed them on
the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the
school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students,
who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast,
the head of the academic school was not as involved with
his students and exercised only administrative duties over
the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had then (as
now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the
acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and
trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at
present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and
trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and
the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal
contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the
provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into
account the charges in the situation subject to be

regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the
responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility coextensive with the period when the student is actually
undergoing studies during the school term, as contended
by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is
clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc
v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the
student should be within the control and under the
influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean
that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester,
beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the
close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such
period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of
graduating students, the period before the commencement
exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the
custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the
discipline of the school only upon the start of classes
notwithstanding that before that day he has already
registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither
should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day
of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain
requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such
as submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the
like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider
himself released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in
the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company
of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody
and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under
the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-incharge who must answer for his students' torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are responsible
for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-incharge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or
other administrative superior to exercise supervision over
the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they
are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the
injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to
prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on
the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of
such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the
student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of
the school at any time when its authority could be validly
exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by
this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school
itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held
to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head
thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior,
but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it
had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to
answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as
the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can
exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article
2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher
will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require that the offending
student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be
liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case,
liability attached to the teacher and the head of the
technical school although the wrongdoer was already of
age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed
by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc
that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under
this article in view of the increasing activism among the
students that is likely to cause violence and resulting
injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be
sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly
liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available
to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as principal
for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its
employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in
selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate
supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the
pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases
now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help the
teacher physically enforce those rules upon the students.
Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be
committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it

would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable
for the damage caused by his students as long as they are
in the school premises and presumably under his influence.
In this respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the
teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the
parent for their influence over the child is not equal in
degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience
from the child because the latter's dependence on him is
greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that
such dependence includes the child's support and
sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's influence,
besides being coterminous with the period of custody is
usually enforced only because of the students' desire to
pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline
on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a
greater accountability than the teacher for the tort
committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in
question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student
or apprentice even if he is already of age and therefore
less tractable than the minor then there should all the
more be justification to require from the school authorities
less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable
diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent
himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he
has reached majority age and so is no longer under the
former's control, there is then all the more reason for
leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the
acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has
arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still
in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San JoseRecoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had
formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to
submit his physics report for what is important is that he
was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed,
even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would
have also brought him in the custody of the school
authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was
exercising only a general authority over the student body
and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections
and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The
evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacherin-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection
with his physics report did not necessarily make the
physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacherin-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge,
there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing
discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of
the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their
non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened
cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed or required to report to school on that day. And
while it is true that the offending student was still in the
custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not
been established that it was caused by his laxness in
enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the
private respondents have proved that they had exercised
due diligence, through the enforcement of the school
regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the
dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view
of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated
an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned
the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was
clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him
to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he
confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the
article because only the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held
to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been found to have been
charged with the custody of the offending student or has
been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection
with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the
record and in the light of the principles herein announced
that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted
by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the
latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize
with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the
tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a
balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978
ISIDRO G. ARENAS, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL
OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN
POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO
BULATAO, CATALINA B. CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO
RAMOS, FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN,
MARCELO LAPEA, LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and
TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official capacities as City
Mayor, City Vice Mayor, City Councilors and City
Treasurer, respectively, and Honorable Presiding
Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS
CITY (PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, respondents.
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner.
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at San Carlos City,
Branch X, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil
Case No. SCC-182. 1
In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San
Carlos City (Pangasinan), instituted against the City of San
Carlos (Pangasinan), City Council of San Carlos City and
the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer
of San Carlos City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is
the incumbent City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan,
that the respondent City of San Carlos, from the time of its
creation in 1966 up to the present, has been classified as a
third class city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which became
effective on June 21, 1969 provides that the basic salaries
of city judges of second and third class cities shall be
P18,000.00 per annum; that the petitioner was then
actually receiving a monthly salary of P1,000.00 of which
P350.00 was the share of the national government and
P650.00 is the share of the city government, which salary
was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a City
Judge of a third class city; that under Republic Act No.
5967, the difference between the salary actually being
received by a City Judge and the basic salary established
in said act shall be paid by the city government; that from
June 21, 1969 up to the filing of the petition on January 21,
1971, the petitioner was entitled to a salary differential of
P9,500.00 with the respondent City of San Carlos
(Pangasinan); that the petitioner had repeatedly requested
the respondents to enact the necessary budget and to pay
him the said differential but the respondents, without any
justification, whatsoever, refused and still refuse to do the
same; that it is the clear duty of the respondent to enact the
necessary budget providing for the payment of the salary of
the petitioner as provided for in Republic Act No. 5967; that
petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy
except the present action for mandamus; and that because
of the refusal of the respondent to comply with their
obligation as provided in Republic Act No. 5967, the
petitioner was forced to engage the services of a lawyer to

file this action for which he was to pay the sum of
P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees. 2
In their answer dated February 10, 1971, the respondents
admitted and denied the allegations in the petition and
alleged that Republic Act No. 5967 further provides, among
other things, that the salary of the city judge shall at least
be one hundred pesos per month less than that of a city
mayor; that the city judge receives an annual salary of
P12,000.00 which is P100.00 per month less than the
salary being received by the city mayor which is
P13,200.00 yearly; that assuming the existence of a salary
difference, in view of the provision of Republic Act No.
5967, that the payment of the salary difference shall be
subject to the implementation of the respective city
government, which is discretionary on the part of the city
government as to whether it would or would not implement
the payment of the salary difference, and in view of the
financial difficulties of the city which has a big overdraft, the
payment of the salary difference of the city judge cannot be
made; and that the petitioner should pay his lawyer and
should not charge the attorney's fees to the respondents
who have not violated any rights of the petitioner. 3
The Court of First Instance of San Carlos City
(Pangasinan), Branch X, rendered its decision dated May
31, 1971 dismissing the petition, without pronouncement as
to costs.
The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967
reads:
Sec. 7. Unless the City Charter or any special law provides
higher salary, the city judge in chartered cities shall receive
a basic salary which shall not be lower than the sums as
provided thereinbelow:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand
pesos per annum;
xxx xxx xxx
For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first
class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand
pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for
second and third class cities, the city judge shall receive
one thousand five hundred pesos less than that fixed for
the district judge, and for other cities, the city judge shall
receive two thousand pesos less than that fixed for the
district judge: Provided, however, That the salary of a city
judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per month less
than that of the city mayor.
The petitioner contends that "... if the last proviso of said
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967 would be interpreted as
the controlling measure for fixing the salary of the city
judges, then the principal provision of Section 7 fixing the
salaries of City Judges at rate very much higher than that
of a City Mayor (particularly in the case of second and third
class cities) would be rendered totally useless." The
petitioner submitted "that since the principal intention of the
legislature in enacting Section 7 of Republic Act 5967 is to
increase the salary of the city judges, then the last proviso
of said Section 7 should give way to the provisions of said
section preceding said proviso."
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took
effect on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was
a third class city; that the petitioner as city judge received
an annual salary of P12,000.00; and that the city mayor of
San Carlos City received an annual salary of P13,200.00
which was exactly P100.00 a month more than the salary
of the city judge.
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No.
17046, which became Republic Act No. 5967, the following
discussion took place:
SENATOR GANZON Because with the bill as drafted, I
recall that there will be some cities where the city judges
will receive salaries higher than those of the mayors. And
in all charters, Your Honor, the city judge is considered a
department head theoretically, at least, under the
mayor. It would not be fair for the purposes of public
administration that a city department head should receive a
salary higher than that of the chief executive of the city.
SENATOR LAUREL. That point is very well taken, and I
would like to congratulate Your Honor.
SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understand the
concern of the distinguished gentleman from Davao. But in
this particular amendment prepared by the distinguished
lady from La Union, this will not require the council to pay it
at P100.00 exactly less than the salary of the mayor. It is
just the limit the maximum but they may fix it at much
less than that. That is why the words "at least" were
suggested by the Committee. It need not be exactly just
P100.00 less. It may be P500.00 less.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example
the cities of Iloilo, Cebu, Bacolod or Manila for that matter.
The Mayors are receiving at least P1,500 a month. Now,
under the amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva
Ecija and
Davao which has already been accepted by the sponsor
does it mean that if the salary of the city mayor is
P1,500, the city judges will receive P1,400?
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR ANTONINO I would like to call his attention
to lines 13 to 20. We presented this amendment because it
says here: "For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and
other first class cities, the city judge shall receive one
thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge".
So it will happen, and my attention was called by the
gentlemen from Iloilo that the city judge win be receiving
more salary than the city mayor. Hence the amendment,
Mr. President.
xxx xxx xxx
I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas,
and this was their objection. We have proposed this
amendment to at least solve this problem, so that no city
judge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So they
will be receiving less than what is proposed in this Bill. (Vol.
IV, No. 61, Senate Congressional Records, pages 27732787. (Emphasis supplied .) 4
It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the

intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 5967
was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher
than the salary of the city mayor. The saving clause
"Provided, however, That the salary of a city judge shall be
at least P100.00 per month less than that of the city mayor"
qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary of city
judges for second and third class cities at P18,000.00 per
annum.
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general
language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable
repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the
statute the former is given precedence over the latter on
the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of the
legislature.
Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) was receiving an annual salary of
P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelled to
provide for an annual salary of P18,000.00 for the
petitioner as city judge of the said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed
and the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43182 November 25, 1986
MARCIAL F. SAMSON, City Mayor of Caloocan City,
THE CITY TREASURER, THE CITY AUDITOR, both of
Caloocan City, and HERMOGENES LIWAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CFI-RIZAL
and FELICIANO C. TALENS, respondents.
Hermenegildo V. Lopez and Amado B. Cresini, Jr. for
petitioners.
Dominador G. Magno for private respondent.
ALAMPAY, J.:
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is the legality of
Administrative Order No. 3, issued on January 10, 1972, by
the then mayor Marcial F. Samson, of Caloocan City, one
of the petitioners herein, whereby petitioner mayor
summarily terminated the services of the private
respondent, Feliciano C. Talens, who held the position of
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, on the ground of "lack
and loss of confidence" and appointing in place of the latter
Hermogenes Liwag, a co-petitioner in this case. Cited in
support of the challenged administrative order is section
5(f) of Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Act of 1959, as amended. The above-cited
provision declares the position of secretaries to city mayors
non-competitive and this was interpreted by herein
petitioner Mayor as to include the position of Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor.
In a resolution dated October 29, 1982, this Court granted
the motion of the widow of private respondent to substitute
the heirs of private respondent Feliciano C. Talens in place
of respondent, in view of the latter's death on August 28,
1982.
There is no dispute as to the factual antecedents of this
case. Private respondent Feliciano C. Talens, a civil
service eligible, was appointed on March 16, 1970 by then
City Mayor Macario Asistio of Caloocan City, as Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor. His appointment was attested to as
a permanent one under Section 24(b) of Republic Act No.
2260, as amended by the Commissioner of Civil Service.
He performed the duties of Assistant Secretary to the
Mayor and even twice received increases in salary.
On January 11, 1972, City Mayor Marcial F. Samson, who
succeeded City Mayor Macario Asistio, furnished private
respondent herein with the questioned Administrative
Order No. 3, which is hereunder reproduced:
TO: Mr. Feliciano C. Talens
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor
Caloocan City
Pursuant to the provision of Sec. 5 (f) of R.A. No.2260,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, as
amended, making the positions of Secretaries of City
Mayors, among others, non-competitive, and it being the
inherent nature of your position to be primarily and highly
confidential, you are hereby informed and advised that
effective the closing hours of January 10, 1972, your

services as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are hereby
TERMINATED for lack and loss of confidence.
You are therefore directed to turnover all official
documents, papers and all other government records to
Atty. Casiano P. Anunciacion, Jr.
(SGD.) MARCIAL F. SAMSON City Mayor (Rollo, p. 20)
Private respondent acknowledging receipt of said order
demurred on the ground Sec. 5(f) of the Civil Service Law,
which specifies as non-competitive only the positions of
"secretaries of provincial city and municipal boards and
councils." He asked that the administrative order be
recalled as he was permanently appointed to a classified
position in the city government and that in accordance with
Section 32 of the Civil hat his position as Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor was not covered by Sec. Service
Law, he can be removed only for cause and after due
process has been observed.
On January 17, 1972, petitioner Mayor, in a letter-reply
sent to private respondent, declined to recall Administrative
Order No. 3, reiterating the reasons set forth in the order.
Consequently, a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and quo warranto was filed with the then Court
of First Instance of Caloocan City on January 21, 1972 by
the private respondent in order to annul the disputed
administrative order, to enjoin the petitioner mayor,
treasurer and auditor from enforcing the same, and to
compel all the said public officials to pay to private
respondent the salaries and emoluments due to him as
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor. He also sought the,
ouster from the disputed position of Hermogenes Liwag,
one of the petitioners herein, who was appointed by Mayor
Samson as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, in place of
private respondent.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the plaintiff
Feliciano C. Talens, by declaring Administrative Order No.
3 null and void, and granting all the aforestated reliefs
claimed by Feliciano C. Talens. On Appeal of the siad
judgment to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed. Hence the petition.
According to petitioners, the only issue which this Court
has to resolve is the legality of the termination private
respondent Talens' services as assistant secretary to the
Mayor of Caloocan City (Petitioners' Brief, p. 4).
Petitioners' contention is that the termination of private
respondent's services is authorized by Section 5(f) of
Republic Act No. 2260, as amended by Republic Act No.
6040 which declares the position of Secretaries of City
Mayors as belonging to the non-competitive service.
Petitioners further aver that termination of the services of
private respondent Talens is justified by the fact that the
disputed position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor is
inherently and primarily highly confidential in nature.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended by

Republic Act No. 6040 provides that "That non-competitive
service shall be composed of positions expressly declared
by law to be in the non-competitive service and those
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical in nature" and continues with an
enumeration of specific officers and employees embraced
within the scope of non-competitive service. Among those
included in the enumeration are heads of departments
created in charters of cities and secretaries of provincial
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors.
Although the position of assistant secretary to the city
mayor is not among those expressly declared in Section 5
of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, to be within the
non-competitive service, petitioners, however, argue that
an assistant secretary is also a secretary, and thus
comprised within the general term "secretaries" as provided
for in Section 5(f).
We are not persuaded and find unacceptable such
submission of the herein petitioners. As may be noted, the
general purpose of the Civil Service Law (Republic Act No.
2260) is "to insure and promote the consitutional mandate
regarding appointment only according to merit and fitness,
and to provide within the public service a progressive
system of personal administration to insure the
maintenance of an honest and efficient progressive and
courteous civil service in the Philippines." (Section 2, R.A.
2260).
As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the governmentalities of the
government, including those in government owned or
controlled corporations, belong to the competitive service.
The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to
be in the non-competitive service and those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
in nature. (Section 3, R.A. 2260, as amended by R.A. No.
6040).
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule
is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not
curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication ...
(Francisco, Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J.,
Section 643, pp. 1092-1093, emphasis supplied).
Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on
which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding
from its effects all those not expressly mentioned (Martin,
Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., p. 71 citing Dave's Place
vs. Liquor Control Comm., 269 N.W., p, 504).
The exceptions provided for in Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 2260, as amended should be, therefore, strictly
construed. It follows then that on this general governing
principle, the position of assistant secretary to the City
Mayor of Caloocan City should be considered as belonging
to the non-competitive service.
The parties are agreed that the nature of the functions
attaching to officer position ultimately determines whether
such position is policy-detrermining, primarily confidential
or higly technical. It is the nature of the position which
finally determines a position to be primarily confidential
(Leon A. Pinero, et al. vs. Rufino Hechanova, et al., 18
SCRA 421). Stated differently, it is not the powers and

duties exercised and discharged by the Assistant Secretary
to the Mayor as may be delegated and assigned by the
Mayor that makes the position of Assistant Secretary
primarily confidential. While duties possibly involving
confidential matters are sometimes handled by the
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, this does not necessarily
transform the nature of the position itself as one that is
primarily and highly confidential.
It should be stressed that the position of Secretary to the
Mayor and that of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are two
separate and distinct positions. While both individuals may
be called "secretary," nevertheless, one is certainly of a
higher category and rank than the other with the added
distinction that a Secretary must enjoy the confidence of
the Mayor. However, the position of Assistant Secretary
being of a lower rank, need not carry the requisites
attaching to the primarily confidential position of the actual
Secretary to the Mayor.
Moreover, if it was the intention of Congress to include the
Assistant Secretaries within the purview of Section 5(f) of
R.A. No. 2260, as amended, so that Assistant Secretaries
are also embraced in the non-competitive service, the law
could have been easily worded "secretaries and their
assistance."
Petitioners also contend that an assistant secretary is also
a secretary and thus included in the general term
"secretaries as provided for in Section 5(f) in the abovequoted provision. From this premise, the conclusion drawn
by petitioners is that the position of Assistant Secretary to
the Mayor should be considered as in the non-competitive
service and that the tenure of assistant secretary lasts only
as long as the Mayor's confidence in him remains.
Petitioners' submission is that the assistant secretary is no
less a secretary to the mayor.
We are not disposed to agree with petitioners. What
petitioners fail to consider is that an "assistant secretary,"
although described as secretary, technically differs in
function from the "Secretaries." An "assistant" merely
helps, aids or serves in a subordinate capacity to the
person who is actually clothed with all the duties and
responsibilities of "secretary." Needless to say, the
functions strictly attributable to a "secretary" and which
wuld repose on such person the trust and confidence of
the employer, is not automatically vested or transferred to
an "assistant secretary," because the latter simply assists
or aids the former in the accomplishment of his duties.
The rulings of this Court in De Los Santos vs. Mallare, 87
Phil. 289 and Besa vs. PNB, 33 SCRA 330 which have
been invoked by the petitioners do not provide support to
petitioners' case. The aforestated cases have no parallel to
the case at bar. The case of De los Santos vs. Mallare,
relates to a quo warranto proceeding, questioning the
legality of the appointment of the respondent therein to the
office of the City Engineer for the City of Baguio which
petitioner De los Santos was then occupying. Said position
was in fact declared to be neither primarily confidential,
policy-determining, nor highly technical and petitioner
therein was adjudged to be entitled to remain in office and
the respondent's appointment was declared ineffective.
Neither would the other case of Besa vs. PNB find any
application to the instant case because the position therein
involved was that of Chief Legal Counsel which, by its very
nature, was rightfully ruled to be both impressed with a
highly technical aspect and confidential character. It can be
readily noted that the facts and circumstances in the
present case and even the principal issue involved in the
case at bar are distinctly different from the cases cited by
petitioners.
Court of the death of the herein private respondent

Feliciano C. Talens, on August 28, 1982 (Rollo, p. 184), the
dispositive portion of the subject decision of the trial court
in Civil Case No. C-2308, is hereby MODIFIED, to now
read as follows:
More pertinent and relevant are the pronouncements in

Ingles vs. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 177. wherein We stated:
1) Declaring Administrative Order No. 3, dated January 10,

1972, of Respondent City Mayor Marcial F. Samson, null
and void;
. . . . On the contrary, the compensation attached and the

designation given thereto suggest the purely, or, at least,
mainly clerical nature of their work. The fact that they, at
times, handle 'confidential matters' does not suffice to
characterize their 'positions' as primarily confidential.
Indeed, it is admitted that plaintiffs, likewise, handle 'other
routine matters,' and it has not even been shown that their
work is, at least, principally confidential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED but considering the notice of death given to this
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,

the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of Petitioner
Feliciano C. Talens, and against the Respondents, and
2) Ordering Respondents, except private respondent

Hermogenes Liwag, to pay Petitioner Feliciano C. Talens,
all the salaries and emoluments appurtenant to and due to
the latter as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of Caloocan
City, but for a limited period of three years. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

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1|In General

INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

G.R. No. 104988 June 18, 1996

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with

20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes

On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another

In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of

On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby

On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila

It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra

On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or

This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice

On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered

petitioner's lumber dealer's permit on 25 September 1990,

G.R. No. 106424

for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to

Head or his duly authorized representative may order the

G.R. No. 123784

1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b)

The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in

2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R.

The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's

Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.

As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was

Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head

VITUG, J., dissenting:

not considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR

(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued

cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the

. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at

The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI

(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19,

"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or

. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing,

and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative

must alone be considered and should not be challenged,

the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those

employ personal violence upon the person of one T/SGT.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

De Guzman, Florentino, Celis, Moncupa & Torio for private

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On 4 September 1992, while trial was already in progress,

Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 1 provides that

[i]n view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case

which had previous jurisdiction over police officers. The

would diminish and dilute the constitutional jurisdiction of

Before P.D. No. 1850, or specifically on 16 January 1981,

Sec. 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National

As used herein, the term uniformed members of the

Needless to state, the overwhelming sentiment of the

That's what we're trying to interpret nga eh. Civilian in

Parenthetically, in Quiloa vs. The General Court Martial, 30

The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable

Just recently, in Natividad vs. Felix, 56 we explicitly

Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary

Philippines but also to "any other organization having the

subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to

Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the

We assume that the legislature had before it such

... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any