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Stable Economic and Political Conditions Including positive economic conditions, an established and reliable political system, and a relatively transparent operating and legal environment.
Human Resources A sufficient supply of professional and technical expertise
in a non-union work environment.
Reasonable Overall Cost Structure Recurring cost considerations such as
labor rates, taxation, tariffs, customs fees, and capital repatriation.
A Pro-Business Environment Government interested in assisting in
economic development and foreign investment, including observable signs of
economic liberalization.
Logistics and Manufacturing Lead Times Ability to physically move product
with efficiency, from the plant to an international point of departure, and then
through customs and export procedures.
Fast Track Permit Process Permits necessary within a tight time schedule
of four to six months.

Using these important but rough criteria, the Intel team cut its original list of 12
candidate countries down to seven: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Indonesia,
Mexico and Thailand. Then the decision was made to regionally diversify into Latin
America. The four remaining candidates were apparently Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica
and Mexico.
The second stage of Intels process began quickly thereafter, in the spring of 1996,
with on-site visits designed to glean an insiders perspective, including local
meetings with government officials, and local consulting, accounting and law
firms on matters such as reliability and transparency of the Costa Rican legal and
financial systems. In addition, in-depth analysis was conducted in areas of critical
importance to Intel, such as local infrastructure, including the opinions and past
experiences of other foreign investors. Also at this critical early stage, Costa Ricas
Minister for Foreign Trade, Jos Rossi, and President Jos Mara Figueres were
actively involved and clearly supportive. Importantly at this stage, the Minister took
up the specific role as the central point of coordination for Intel within the Costa
Rican government.
The third stage was a highly interactive process, during which a variety of Intel executives visited Costa Rica weekly to address different concerns. CINDE served as the
lead agency on each visit, with general issues raised in prior analysis and visits now
requiring specific resolution and clarification. One of Intels top issues regarding
Costa Rica related to the countrys relatively small size and the impact Intel could
have upon the overall physical infrastructure, including airport cargo handling and
Intels planned consumption of two key Costa Rican resources energy and water.
A second area of critical importance was the education system, which would need
various targeted improvements to meet technical skill requirements and capacity,
as well as the levels of English proficiency desired by Intel. These requirements
were matched with great specificity to Intels needs, making the governments
programmatic concession to several improvements perhaps the most interesting
element of the deal. A final concern was a series of financial considerations,
including the overall operating cost structure net of taxes, and other standard
incentives. While Costa Rica offered a standard set of free trade zone exemptions,
it did not offer any other special government grants to Intel alone.
The fourth and final stage of the process began with Intels announcement of
Costa Ricas selection in November 1996, the same year in which the site selection
process began. Mexico reportedly had been the frontrunner, but was eliminated

INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT INTEL COSTA RICA

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