SECOND DIVISION

funds, and despite notice of dishonor and demands made

upon her to make good her check by making proper
arrangement with the drawee bank or pay her obligation
in full directly to Flor Catapang de Tenorio, accused failed
and refused to do so, which acts constitute a clear
violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and
prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in
general and of Flor Catapang de Tenorio in particular in
the aforementioned amount.

When arraigned in both cases, the petitioner,

assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. While trial was
going on, the petitioner jumped bail. No evidence was
thereby adduced in her defense in any of the two cases.

DECISION

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by

Norma de Joya praying for her release from the Batangas
City Jail on the claim that her detention was illegal.

Criminal Case No. 25773

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Norma de Joya

guilty of the crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
and hereby sentences said accused to suffer an
imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify the
offended party, Flor Catapang Tenorio, in the sum of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency.

[G.R. Nos. 159418-19. December 10, 2003]

NORMA DE JOYA, petitioner, vs. THE JAIL WARDEN
OF BATANGAS CITY AND HON. RUBEN A.
GALVEZ AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BATANGAS
CITY MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
BRANCH I, respondents.

The Antecedents
The petitioner was charged separately with violations
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Municipal Trial
Court In Cities in Batangas City. The docket numbers and
accusatory portion of each of the Informations reads:
Criminal Case No. 25484
That on or about September 28, 1994 at Batangas City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, well-knowing that she
does not have funds in or credit with the Solid Bank,
Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue
to Flor Catapang de Tenorio, Solid Bank Check No. 040297
postdated to October 28, 1994 in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to apply on account or for value, but
when said check was presented for full payment with the
drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, the same was dishonored by the
drawee bank on the ground account closed, which in
effect is even more than a dishonor for insufficiency of

That on or about October 17, 1994 at Batangas City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, well-knowing that she
does not have fund in or credit with the Security Bank and
Trust Company, Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make
and issue to Resurreccion T. Castillo, Security Bank and
Trust Company Check No. 038111 postdated to October
24, 1994 in the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P225,000.00), Philippine Currency, to
apply on account or for value, but when said check was
presented for full payment with the drawee bank within a
period of ninety (90) days from the date of the check, the
same was dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground
of account closed, which in effect is even more than a
dishonor for insufficiency of funds, and despite notice of
dishonor and demands made upon her to make good her
check by making proper arrangement with the drawee
bank or pay her obligation in full directly to Resurreccion
T. Castillo, accused failed and refused to do so, which acts
constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the
damage and prejudice of transaction in commercial
documents in general and of Resurreccion T. Castillo in
particular in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

On December 14, 1995, the trial court promulgated

its decision in Criminal Case No. 25484. The petitioner
and her counsel failed to appear despite due notice. The
decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:

SO ORDERED.[3]
On March 21, 1997, the decision in Criminal Case No.
25773 was likewise promulgated in absentia. The
decretal portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Prosecution having satisfactorily
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court hereby sentences herein-accused Norma
de Joya of imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR and to pay
complainant Resurreccion Castillo of the amount of TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P225,000.00) PESOS
by way of damages.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The petitioner remained at large and no appeal was
filed from any of the said decisions. In the meantime, the
Court issued Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
12-2000 on November 21, 2000 enjoining all courts and
judges concerned to take notice of the ruling and policy of
the
Court
enunciated
in Vaca
v.
Court
of
Appeals[5] and Lim v. People[6] with regard to the
imposition of the penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested

while she was applying for an NBI clearance. She was
forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail on December
3, 2002. On July 28, 2003, the petitioner filed an urgent
motion with the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City
asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000
retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code and to order her release from detention. The public
prosecutor opposed the motion. In an Order dated
August 15, 2003, the trial court denied the motion on
three grounds: (a) its decision convicting the petitioner of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become final and
executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change
the penalty imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be
applied prospectively; and (c) the SC Circular did not
amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but merely
encourages trial court judges to have a uniform
imposition of fine.
Hence, the petition at bar.
The petitioner posits that SC Admin. Circular No. 122000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the imposition of a fine. The
trial court was mandated to apply SC Admin. Circular No.
12-2000 retroactively conformably with Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code citing the ruling of this Court
in United States v. Pacrose.[7] The petitioner prays that
the Court declare her detention illegal and order her
release from the Batangas City Jail.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the
petition contending that:
1)

THE TWO (2) JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION

AGAINST THE PETITIONER HAD LONG
ATTAINED FINALITY AND COULD NO
LONGER BE MODIFIED.

2)

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000

AS
MODIFIED
BY
ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 DID NOT DELETE
THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT IN BP 22
CASES.[8]

The OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Abarquez v.

Court of Appeals.[9]
The petition has no merit.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not
allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of
a court of record:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized.
If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained
pursuant to the final judgment of the Municipal Trial Court
of Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg.
22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is not entitled to a
writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners reliance of our ruling
in Ordonez v. Vinarao[10] that a convicted person is
entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty
introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon,[11] is
misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 122000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001
should benefit her has no basis.
First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal
law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable. The circular applies only to those cases

pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases

already terminated by final judgment.
Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin.
Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000
merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of
the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not
amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent
behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely
urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose
of the law but also the circumstances of the accused
whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence and such other
circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court
believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed. The Court
thus emphasized that:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular
No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference
in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg.
22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the
possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22.
Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the
law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a
rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether the
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed
a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:

1.

2.

3.

Administrative Circular No. 122000

does
not
remove
imprisonment as an alternative
penalty for violations of B.P. Blg.
22;
The Judges concerned may, in the
exercise of sound discretion, and
taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each
case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would
best serve the interests of justice
or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate
the seriousness of the offense,
work violence on the social order,
or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;
Should only a fine be imposed and
the accused be unable to pay the
fine, there is no legal obstacle to
the application of the Revised
Penal
Code
provisions
on
subsidiary imprisonment.[12]

B.P. Blg. 22 provides for alternative penalties of fine

or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment as
follows:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person
who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by
a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed

two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and

imprisonment at the discretion of the court.[13]
The courts are given the discretion to choose
whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive
penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or
a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine
and imprisonment.
In providing for alternative penalties in B.P. Blg. 22,
Congress took into account the principal objectives of the
law, namely, the prohibition on the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. The practice is
prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on
public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless
checks transcend the private interest of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interest of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but
also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in circulation
multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property but an offense against public
order.[14]
However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts
must bear in mind that Philippine penal law is based on
the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of
the positivist theory of criminal law. The positivist
theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum
total of the social and economic phenomena to which the
offense is expressed. The adoption of the aspects of the
theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law,
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
(impossible crime), Article 68 and Articles 11 to 14, not to
mention Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (penalties
for heinous and quasi-heinous crimes). Philippine penal
law looks at the convict as a member of society. Among
the important factors to be considered in determining the
penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship
towards his dependents, family and their relationship with

him; and (2) his relationship towards society at large and

the State. The State is concerned not only in the
imperative necessity of protecting the social organization
against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but
also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness
and other social ends.[15] The purpose of penalties is to
secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be
retributive but must also be reformative, to give the
convict an opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society
as a productive and civic-spirited member of the
community. The court has to consider not only the
primary elements of punishment, namely, the moral
responsibility of the convict, the relation of the convict to
the private complainant, the intention of the convict, the
temptation to the act or the excuse for the crime was it
done by a rich man in the insolence of his wealth or by a
poor man in the extremity of his need? The court must
also take into account the secondary elements of
punishment, namely, the reformation of the offender, the
prevention of further offenses by the offender, the
repression of offenses in others.[16] As Rousseau said,
crimes can be thoroughly repressed only by a system of
penalties which, from the benignity they breathe, serve
rather than to soften than to inflame those on whom they
are imposed.[17] There is also merit in the view that
punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so
much punishment of innocence.[18]
In this case, even if the Court applies SC Admin.
Circular No. 12-2000, as revised, retroactively, the
petition must nevertheless be dismissed. The petitioner
did not offer any evidence during trial. The judgment of
the court became final and executory upon her failure to
appeal therefrom. Worse, the petitioner remained at
large for five long years. Were it not for her attempt to
secure an NBI clearance, she would have been able to
elude the long arm of the law.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Puno,
(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Austria-

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
March 8, 1922
G.R. No. 17584
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.

L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
Romualdez, J.:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7
years old, by striking him with automobile that he was
driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime
of homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to
suffer one year and one day of prision correccional, and to
pay the costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this
court alleging that the court below committed four errors,
to wit:

The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30

miles an hour on a highway 6 meter wide,
notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow
space between a wagon standing on one side of the road
and a heap of stones on the other side where the were
two young boys, the appellant did not take the precaution
required by the circumstances by slowing his machine,
and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the
circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in
order to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as
unfortunately did occur, as his automobile ran over the
boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the result
of the accident.
These facts are so well established in the records that
there cannot be a shade of doubt about them.

1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the

fact that the appellant was being prosecuted in
conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature
and that the Act is unconstitutional and gave no
jurisdiction in this case.

Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be

seen that they deal with the fundamental questions as to
whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint
in the present case was filed, is valid and constitutional.

2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint

after the presentation of the evidence in the case, if not
before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is
unconstitutional and the proceedings had in the case
under the provisions of the Act constitute a prosecution of
appellant without due process of law.

This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it

introduces in General Orders No. 58, the defense arguing
that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized
to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending
section 2 thereof because its provisions have the
character of constitutional law. Said section 2 provides as
follows:

3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked

jurisdiction over the person of the accused and over the
subject- matter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of
the crime charged and in sentencing him to one year and
one day of prison correccional and to the payment of
costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that
we have examined the record and find that the
conclusions of the trial judge, as contained in his wellwritten decision, are sufficiently sustained by the
evidence submitted.

All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of

the United States against the persons charged with the
offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the
People of the Philippine Island is made the plaintiff in this
information, contains the following provisions in section 1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered
Fifty-eight, series of nineteen hundred, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the

name of the People of the Philippine Islands against the
persons charged with the offense.
Let us examine the question.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is
not incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is
left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within
the realm of public statutory law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
Subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of
all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal code,
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It
would probably never be understood by the public.
(MCulloch vs. Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316, 407; 4 L.
ed., 579.)
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United
States, each States, each State has the authority, under
its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay
down the rules of criminal procedure.
The states, as a part of their police power, have a large
measure of discretion in creating and defining criminal
offenses. . . .
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws if it prescribes a
different procedure in the case of persons in like situation.
Subject to this limitation, however, the legislature has
large measure of discretion in prescribing the modes of
criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins
vs. Johnston, 237 U.S., 502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed.,
1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218 U.S., 57;
30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs. Flancders, 141
Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)

This power of the States of the North American Union was

also granted to its territories such as the Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses
over the territories and possessions of the United States
may be exercised by that body itself, or, as is much more
often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency,
such as a legislature, the organization of which proceeds
upon much the same lines as in the several States or in
Congress, which is often taken as a model, and whose
powers are limited by the Organic Act; but within the
scope of such act is has complete authority to legislate, . .
. and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within the
police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)
The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from
Congress. By act of Congress their power extends to all
rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States; and this
includes the power to define and punish crimes. (16 C. J.,
62.)
And in the exercise of such powers the military
government of the army of occupation, functioning as a
territorial legislature, thought it convenient to establish
new rules of procedure in criminal matters, by the
issuance of General Orders No. 58, the preamble of which
reads:
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil
liberties of the inhabitants of these Islands, the criminal
code of procedure now in force therein is hereby
amended in certain of its important provisions, as
indicated in the following enumerated sections.
(Emphasis ours.)
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal
procedure and its intention is to give to its provisions the
effect of law in criminal matters. For that reason it
provides in section 1 that:
The following provisions shall have the force and effect of
law in criminal matters in the Philippine Islands from and

after the 15th day of May, 1900, but existing laws on the
same subjects shall remain valid except in so far as
hereinafter modified or repealed expressly or by
necessary implication.
From what has been said it clearly follows that the
provisions of this General Order do not the nature of
constitutional law either by reason of its character or by
reason of the authority that enacted it into law.
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character
because this order was made its own by the Congress of
the United States for, as a mater of fact, this body never
adopted it as a law of its own creation either before the
promulgation of Act No. 2886, herein discussed, or, to our
knowledge, to this date.
Since the provisions of this General Order have the
character of statutory law, the power of the Legislature to
amend it is self-evident, even if the question is considered
only on principle. Our present Legislature, which has
enacted Act No. 2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the
legal successor to the Military Government as a legislative
body.
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the
Philippines the legislative branch of our government has
undergone transformations and has developed itself until
it attained its present form. Firstly, it was the Military
Government of the army of occupation which, in
accordance with international law and practice, was
vested with legislative functions and in fact did legislate;
afterwards, complying with the instructions of President
McKinley which later were ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of
the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the
Military Government were transferred to the Philippine
Commission; then, under the provisions of section 7 of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine
Assembly was created and it functioned as a colegislative
body with the Philippine Commission. Finally, by virtue of
the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law, the Philippine
Commission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the
Philippine
Assembly
became
the
House
of

Representatives, and thus was formed the present

Legislature composed of two Houses which has enacted
the aforesaid Act No. 2886.
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that
amends General Orders No. 58. The Philippine
Commission, at various times, had amended it by the
enactment of laws among which we may cite Act No. 194,
regarding preliminary investigation, Act No. 440 relating
to counsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary
investigations by justices of the peace of provincial
capitals. Later on, and before the enactment of Act No.
2886, herein controverted, the Legislature had also
amended this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of
Act No. 2677 regarding appeals to the Supreme Court of
causes originating in the justice of the peace courts and
by Act No. 2709 which deals with the exclusion of accused
persons from the information in order to be utilized as
states witnesses.
These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine
Commission as well as by our present Legislature are
perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said
legislative bodies as the successors of the Military
Government that promulgated General Orders No. 58.
No proof is required to demonstrate that the present
Legislature had, and had, the power to enact and amend
laws. (U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil., 7.) That it has the power to
legislate on criminal matters is very evident from the
wording of section 7 of the Jones Law which says:
That the legislative authority herein provided shall have
power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by due
enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law,
civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may
from time to time see fit.
It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an
attributed of sovereignty. This assertion is right; but it is
also true that by reason of the principle of territoriality as
applied in the supression, of crimes, such power is
delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such
as territories. As we have seen in the beginning, the

territorial legislatures have the power to define and

punish crimes, a power also possessed by the Philippine
Legislature by virtue of the provisions of sections 7,
already quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial
governments are local agencies of the Federal
Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the
territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and
punishes public crimes it does so by virtue of the
authority delegated to it by the supreme power of the
Nation.
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the
case of the several States of the Union and incorporated
territories like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the
case with the Philippines, which is an organized territory
though not incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 181-205.)
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no
demonstration. As a matter of fact, the crimes committed
within our territory, even before section 2 of General
Orders No. 58 was amended, were prosecuted and
punished in this jurisdiction as is done at present; but
then as now the repression of crimes was done, and is still
done, under the sovereign authority of the United States,
whose name appears as the heading in all pleadings in
criminal causes and in other judicial papers and notarial
acts.
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in
form 1 of section 784 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in
criminal causes the constant practice followed in this
jurisdiction established its use; and in notarial matters its
use is provided by section 127 of Act No. 496. This long
continued practice in criminal matters and the legal
provision relating to civil cases and notarial acts have not
been amended by any law, much less by Act No. 2886,
the subject of the present inquiry.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to
the Philippines prescribing the name to be used as party
plaintiff in criminal cases.

The fact that the political status of this country is as yet

undetermined and in a transitory stage, is, in our opinion,
responsible for the fact that there is no positive provision
in our constitutional law regarding the use of the name of
the People of the Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, in
criminal prosecutions, as is otherwise the case in the
respective constitutional charters of the States of the
Union and incorporated territories a situation which
must not be understood as depriving the Government of
the Philippines of its power, however delegated, to
prosecute public crimes. The fact is undeniable that the
present government of the Philippines, created by the
Congress of the United States, is autonomous.
This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines
reaches all judicial actions, the case at bar being one of
them; as an example of such autonomy, this Government,
the same as that of Hawaii and Porto Rico (People of Porto
Rico vs. Rosaly y Castillo [1913], 227 U.S., 270; 57 L. ed.,
507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be sued without its
consent. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
34 Phil., 311; L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p. 27, ante.)
The doctrine, laid down in these cases, acknowledges the
prerogative of personality in the Government of the
Philippines, which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any
responsibility in court in its own name unless it consents
thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative in
law, to give that government the right to prosecute in
court in its own name whomsoever violates within its
territory the penal laws in force therein.
However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the
form of the complaint in criminal matters, it is within the
power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of the
criminal complaint as long as the constitutional provision
of the accused to be informed of the nature of the
accusation is not violated.
Under the Constitution of the United States and by like
provisions in the constitutions of the various states, the
accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him . . .

It is within the power of the legislatures under such a

constitutional provision to prescribe the form of the
indictment or information, and such form may omit
averments regarded as necessary at common law. (22
Cyc., 285.)
All these considerations a priori are strengthened a
posteriori by the important reason disclosed by the
following fact that the Congress has tacitly approved Act
No. 2886. Both the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
section 86, and the Jones Law, last paragraph of section
19, provide that all the laws enacted by the Government
of the Philippines or its Legislature shall be forwarded to
the Congress of the United States, which body reserves
the right and power to annul them. And presuming, as
legally we must, that the provisions of these laws have
been complied with, it is undisputed that the Congress of
the United States did not annul any of those acts already
adverted to Nos. 194, 440, 490 (of the Philippine
Commission), and 2677, 2709 and the one now in
question No. 2886 (of the present Legislature) all of
which were amendatory of General Orders No. 58. The Act
now under discussion (No. 2886) took effect on February
24, 1920, and the criminal complaint in this case was filed
on May 10, 1920. The silence of Congress regarding those
laws amendatory of the said General Order must be
considered as an act of approval.
If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial
legislation the reasonable inference is that it approves
such act. (26 R.C.L., 679; vide Clinton vs. Englebrcht, 13
Wall., 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S.,
549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57 [L. ed.], 960; Nixon vs. Reid, 8
S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A., 315.)
Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the
mention of the People of the Philippine Islands as plaintiff
in the title of the information constitutes a vice or defect,
the same is not fatal when, as in the present case, it was
not objected to in the court below.
An indictment must, in many states under express
statutory or constitutional provision, show by its title or
by proper recitals in the caption or elsewhere that the

prosecution is in the name and by the authority of the

state, the commonwealth, or the people of the state,
according to the practice in the particular jurisdictions;
but omissions or defects in this respect may be supplied
or cured by other parts of the records, and the omissions
of such a recital or defects therein, even when required
by the constitution or by statute, is a defect of form within
a statute requiring exceptions for defect of form to be
made before trial. (23 Cyc., 237, 238.)
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General
Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not
partake of the same character as the provisions of a
constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not
violative of any constitutional provisions and that the
court a quo did not commit any of the errors assigned.
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the
appellant being furthermore sentenced to the accessory
penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both instances.
So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur in the result.

Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP Chief

of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
received intelligence reports that some members of the
AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their
designated places of assignment. Their aim was to
destabilize the government. The President then directed
the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track
and arrest them.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY
TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT.
GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT.
GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT.
(SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS,
LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG,Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B.
GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity
as the Judge Advocate General of the Judge
Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), Respondents.
DECISION

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300

heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP
mostly from the elite units of the Armys Scout Rangers
and the Navys Special Warfare Group entered the
premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on
Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security
guards and planted explosive devices around the
building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops
sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of
the"Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then,
through broadcast media, announced their grievances
against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military,
the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies"
of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to
acquire more military assistance from the US
government. They declared their withdrawal of support
from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she
resign as President of the Republic. They also called for
the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass
of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion,
followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and
PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the
rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called
the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five oclock in
the afternoon of that same day.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with
prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by the
above-named members of the Armed Forces of the

In order to avoid
sent negotiators
was to persuade
the law. After

a bloody confrontation, the government

to dialogue with the soldiers. The aim
them to peacefully return to the fold of
several hours of negotiation, the

government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay

down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around
the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually,
they returned to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein,
surrendered to the authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated
the incident and recommended that the military
personnel involved be charged with coup detat defined
and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the filing of the corresponding Information
against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of
the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya,
then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention
of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and
directed the AFP to conduct its own separate
investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup
detat 2against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch 61,
presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this
case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678,
involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148
of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B.
Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct
a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter
Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the
military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of
War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended,
against the same military personnel. Specifically, the
charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect
toward the President, the Secretary of National Defense,
etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a
superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or
sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation

of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good order and

military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784,
only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC,
Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial
court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with
the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7055. 5
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge
Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the
suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall
have resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff
recommending that the military personnel involved in the
Oakwood incident be charged before a general court
martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of
the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after
conducting a reinvestigation, found probable cause
against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused
in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the
prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted
the Amended Information and dropped the charge ofcoup
detat against the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial
Investigation
Panel
submitted
its
Final
Pre-Trial
Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that,
following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged
withcoup detat before the RTCshould not be charged
before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of
War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an
Order 8 stating that "all charges before the court martial
against the accusedare hereby declared not serviceconnected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the
alleged crime of coup detat." The trial court then
proceeded to hear petitioners applications for bail.

In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity

as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of
the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29
of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including
petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial
for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magnos recommendation was
approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate
General then directed petitioners to submit their answer
to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this
Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to
the Oakwood incident. 9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a
determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the
offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not
service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup
detat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit
to its jurisdiction.

not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2)

years from the date of the commission of the alleged
offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of
War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25,
2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however,
that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00
midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July
26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent
that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution
suddenly changed its position and asserted that 23 of the
accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and that
petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied
by the general court martial in its Order dated September
14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the
Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of merit. He
alleges that "contrary to petitioners pretensions, all the
accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18,
2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July
13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present" and, "(o)n that
day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the
Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open
court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,

counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses
covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected.
These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95
to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles
are properly cognizable by the court martial. As the
charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which,
under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense, then
it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.

The sole question for our resolution is whether the

petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a

Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue that the
offense charged before the General Court Martial has
prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during the
pendency of their original petition, respondents
proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of
charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of
War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then referred
the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two
years since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only
petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and
this was done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that
in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they were

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following

persons are subject to these articles and shall be
understood as included in the term "any person subject to
military law" or "persons subject to military law,"
whenever used in these articles:

There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the

AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise
known as the Articles of War, the term "officer" is
"construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2
provides:

(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of

the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the
Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force,
from the dates of their call to active duty and while on
such active duty; all trainees undergoing military
instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted,
or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said

service, from the dates they are required by the terms of

the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local
government ordinances, regardless of whether or not
civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties,
which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried
by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as
determined before arraignment by the civil court, is
service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be
tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the
Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct
at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or
offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or
offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to
70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the
court-martial may take into consideration the penalty
prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other
special laws, or local government ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and
unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule that
members of the AFP and other persons subject to military
law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat),
other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried
by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception
to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before
arraignment, has determined the offense to be serviceconnected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a
court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the
exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in
the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any
such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further
identifies the "service-connected crimes or offenses" as

"limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles

72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War.
Violations of these specified Articles are triable by court
martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil
courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses
committed by military personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is
necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military
justice system over military personnel charged with
service-connected offenses. The military justice system is
disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of
military efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely
to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve
the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace;
for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace
and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military
body. 19 The administration of military justice has been
universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the
armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the
power of military law and its administration as the most
effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason,
the court martial has become invariably an indispensable
part of any organized armed forces, it being the most
potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in
war. 20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July
2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro Manila,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn
oath as officers to defend the Constitution, the law
and the duly-constituted authorities and abused
their constitutional duty to protect the people and
the State by, among others, attempting to oust the
incumbent duly-elected and legitimate President by force
and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and
tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to
protect,thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to
the military profession, conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the
Articles of War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)

Article 96 of the Articles of War

21

provides:

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Any officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying
cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman shall be dismissed from the service.
(Underscoring ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the
Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly
provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No.
7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the
petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their
solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and
the
duly-constituted
authorities.Such
violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the
military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing
on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected"
nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the
same dismissal from the service imposable only by
the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in
character, evidently intended to cleanse the military
profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent
standard of military discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners argument that
they can no longer be charged before the court martial
for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because
the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of
February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup
detat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in
making such declaration, practically amended the law
which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction
over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the
law has conferred the court should not take away. It is
only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction
on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is
only through a constitutional amendment or legislative
enactment that such act can be done. The first and
fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law
"as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such
declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
is, therefore, void.

In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice

Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping
declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the
dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004
that all charges before the court-martial against the
accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in
furtherance of the crime of coup detat, cannot be given
effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in
excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.

Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.

or wrongful Disposition.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned

Officer.

Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property

Issued to Soldiers.

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies what are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, also known as
the Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.

Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs

Redressed.

Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.

Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.

Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.

Art. 92. Dueling.

Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.

Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 77. Subordinates

Surrender.

Compelling

Commander

to

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 97. General Article.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.

Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public

Service.

Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the

Enemy.

Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National

Art. 83. Spies.
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss,

Damage

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the

military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing
offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did
not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases
involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92,
and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In
fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the courtmartial.

Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T.

Carpio during the deliberation of this case is worth
quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its
ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in
furtherance to the alleged crime of coup detat. Firstly,
the doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to
criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by
the same statute,25 unlike here where different statutes
are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the
trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here,
Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction
over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of
the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of
crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d
184 [1975]), applicable only to military personnel
because the military constitutes an armed organization
requiring a system of discipline separate from that of
civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]).
Military personnel carry high-powered arms and other
lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History,
experience, and the nature of a military organization
dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a
separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed
civilians or unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another
place by his superior may question his reassignment by
asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a
civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court
and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military
commander reassigns him to another area of military
operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will
collapse.
xxx
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are
instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control,
and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of
Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military Law
and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courtsmartial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures
the Presidents control, and thus civilian supremacy, over

the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the

President who exercises review powers over decisions of
courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War;
quoted provisions omitted).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is

DISMISSED.

xxx

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or

similar proceedings, it did so sparingly and only to release
a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of
Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to correct objectionable
procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The
Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on
the ground that the offense charged is absorbed and in
furtherance of another criminal charge pending with the
civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense
charged is not one of the service-connected offenses
specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation
in the present case.

Associate Justice

With respect to the issue of prescription raised by

petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say
that we cannot entertain the same. The contending
parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among the
petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of
their arraignment. These are matters involving questions
of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a
trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one
at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the
basis of the undisputed facts. 26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The
office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being
no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated differently,
prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts,
corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have
not been vested by law. 28
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the
authority in convening a court martial and in charging
petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of
War.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270

January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance
of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by
section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered
thereon appealed to this court, where under proper
assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3)
that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and
void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the
evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day
of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then
and there master of a steam sailing vessel known
as the steamship Standard, which vessel was
then and there engaged in carrying and
transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals
from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine
Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while
master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about
the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport,

and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard

said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa,
six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of
cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit,
so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering
to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H.
N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there
fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit
and suitable means for trying and securing said
animals in a proper manner, and did then and
there cause some of said animals to be tied by
means of rings passed through their noses, and
allow and permit others to be transported loose in
the hold and on the deck of said vessel without
being tied or secured in stalls, and all without
bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect
and failure of the accused to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while so in
transit, the noses of some of said animals were
cruelly torn, and many of said animals were
tossed about upon the decks and hold of said
vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and
No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1,
1901, provides that
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other
vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals, from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign
port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall
carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such
animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to
provide for the suitable sustenance of such
animals during the ordinary period occupied by
the vessel in passage from the port of shipment
to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such
animals to be provided with adequate forage and
fresh water at least once in every twenty-four

hours from the time that the animals are

embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was
amended by adding to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other
vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign
port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall
provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the animals, and
suitable and proper facilities for loading and
unloading cattle or other animals upon or from
vessels upon which they are transported, without
cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby
made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or
from vessels by swinging them over the side by
means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of
such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to
comply with the provisions of section one, shall,
for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of
not less that one hundred dollars nor more that
five hundred dollars, United States money, for
each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be
instituted in any Court of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in
which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient
because it does not state that the court was sitting at a
port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the
offense was committed on board a vessel registered and
licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created
thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost court

organized in the province or port in which such animals

are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent
therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the
organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act
No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the
courts over certain offenses committed on the high seas,
or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of
the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or
water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof.
(U.S. vs.Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be
exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province
into which such ship or water upon which the offense or
crime was committed shall come after the commission
thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship
carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no
doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is
expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with
well recognized and established public law. But
the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded
that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question
whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the
master thereof, when the neglect and omission which
constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship
was within the territorial waters of the United States. No
court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within
the territorial waters of any other country, but when she
came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines
which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was
within territorial waters, and a new set of principles
became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255,
note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490et seq.; Latour, La
Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject
to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject
through the proper political agency. This offense was
committed within territorial waters. From the line which
determines these waters the Standard must have
traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor.
During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue
continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is
concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may

have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The
offense, assuming that it originated at the port of
departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every
element necessary to constitute it existed during the
voyage across the territorial waters. The completed
forbidden act was done within American waters, and the
court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the
jurisdiction raises the further question whether that
jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of
the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and
jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict
legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of
a friendly power without permission, but it is now
conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports
are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly
powers. The exemption of such vessels from local
jurisdiction while within such waters was not established
until within comparatively recent times. In 1794,
Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General
Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of
nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war
with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country
into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.)
This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an
opinion given by him to the British Government as late as
1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange
vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice
Marshall said that the implied license under which such
vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed
as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the
sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of
hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva
Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge
of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been
admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right,
but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of
courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law,
sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer,
2. C.X.)

Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of

peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise but
little control over their actions, and offenses committed
by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting
under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance.
This limitation upon the general principle of territorial
sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and
convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that
experience shows that such vessels are generally careful
to respect local laws and regulation which are essential to
the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity
and convenience does not require the extension of the
same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are
two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities
ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory
and practice, matters happening on board a merchant
ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or
persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the
court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The
French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in
foreign ports by one member of the crew against another.
(See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628;
Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip.
de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.)
Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by
Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently
conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.),
vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers
who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory
have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is
doubtless the leading English authority, says that
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing
asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels
that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a
foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of
the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view
that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is
subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless
the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or

through treaty arrangements consented to waive a

portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S.,
178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean
Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice
Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of
trade, in would be obviously in convinient and
dangerous to society and would subject the laws
to continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not
owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said
that the merchant vessels of one country visiting the
ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject
themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit,
so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in
peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U.
S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts
are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and
navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United
States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul,
vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The
right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as
may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels
belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to
their charge, without the interference of the local
authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the
captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the
country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This
exception applies to controversies between the members
of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes
regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318;
Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and
tranquillity of the country are affected by many events
which do not amount to a riot or general public
disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew
upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the
public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this

treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local

authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and
Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the
port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a
justice of the peace, but the United States district
attorney was instructed by the Government to take the
necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and
the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the
view to "guard against a repetition of similar
proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip,
Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore,
Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of
such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal
laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the
Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts
of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery
committed on board the ship while lying in the port of
Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the
treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.)
Representations were made through diplomatic channels
to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts,
Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the
Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the
matter careful consideration in connection with
the views and suggestion of your note and the
provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of
1827 between the United States and Sweden and
Norway. The stipulations contained in the last
clause of that article . . . are those under which it
is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred
on the consular officers, not only in regard to such
differences of a civil nature growing out of the
contract of engagement of the seamen, but also
as to disposing of controversies resulting from
personal violence involving offense for which the
party may be held amenable under the local
criminal law.

This Government does not view the article in

question
as
susceptible
of
such
broad
interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the
consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to
sit as judges or abitratorsin such differences as
may arise between captains and crews of the
vessels, where such differences do not involve on
the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of
the order or tranquillity of the country. When,
however, a complaint is made to a local
magistrate, either by the captain or one or more
of the crew of the vessel, involving the
disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the
country, it is competent for such magistrate to
take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of
the local laws, and under such circumstances in
the United States it becomes a public duty which
the judge or magistrate is not at liberty
voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must
necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities
whether the procedure shall take place in the
United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact
there had been such disturbance of the local
order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is
supported by such proof as results in the
conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the
offenders such punishment as may be defined
against the offense by the municipal law of the
place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of
jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a merchant
vessel by one member of the crew against another which
amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the
country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the
language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal
laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The
offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing
to so with any difference between the captain and the
crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law
of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the
place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions
of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the

court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over

the offense charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective
because it does not allege that the animals were
disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it
is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court
sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this
issue would be to construe the language of the complaint
very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation
of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the
completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the
language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court
sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They
are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far
as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the
disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional
element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient
because
it
fails
to
allege
that
the
defendant knowingly andwillfully failed to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of
the complaint that the act was committed willfully
includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly.
As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67
Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when
used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the
act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with
knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed
the act." So in Wongvs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it
was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not
show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant
'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think,
was fully answered by the respondent's counsel that
the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same
meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done
by design done for a certain purpose; and I think that it
would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To
the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505),
which seems to be on all fours with the present case.

The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts

were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the
assertion that "according to his experience, the system of
carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is
preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the
animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done
was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders,
No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act
or omission complained of as constituting a crime or
public offense in ordinary and concise language, without
repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the
statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person
of common understanding to know what is intended and
the court to pronounce judgment according to right. A
complaint which complies with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon
the master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable
means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to
avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in
English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and
wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said
animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect
and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for
securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said
animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of
said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish
text of the information does not charge him with failure to
provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words
used are "medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In
view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared
in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by
the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente,"
according to the context and circumstances, we
determine this point against the appellant, particularly in
view of the fact that the objection was not made in the

court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure

to provide "suitable means for the protection of the
animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality
of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems to rest
upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the
constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes
acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of
live stock between foreign ports and ports of the
Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating
commerce with its ports been enacted by the legislature
of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have
been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution
of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R.
A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to
the United States is controlled by constitutional principles
different from those which apply to States of the Union.
The importance of the question thus presented requires a
statement of the principles which govern those relations,
and consideration of the nature and extent of the
legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and
considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable
constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the
express power to make war and treaties, and it has the
power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by
conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the
United States, and to guard against the possibility of the
power of Congress to provide for its government being
questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in
express terms that Congress should have the power "to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting territory and other property belonging to the
United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the
acquisition of the territory by the United States, and until
it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of
providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress.
It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may
create a local government, and delegate thereto the

ordinary powers required for local government.

(Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual
procedure. Congress has provided such governments for
territories which were within the Union, and for newly
acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has
been customary to organize a government with the
ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative,
and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain
general conditions in accordance with which the local
government should act. The organic act thus became the
constitution of the government of the territory which had
not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the
validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was
determined by its conformity with the requirements of
such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U.
S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government
Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power
which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the
government of the territory, reserving, however, the right
to annul the action of the local legislature and itself
legislate directly for the territory. This power has been
exercised during the entire period of the history of the
United States. The right of Congress to delegate such
legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned.
(Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.
S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own
force operate within such territory, although the liberality
of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous
territory tended to create an impression upon the minds
of many people that it went there by its own force.
(Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with
reference to this territory, the power of Congress is
limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution
which go to the very root of its power to act at all,
irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is
plenary.
(De
Limavs. Bidwell,
182
U.
S.,
1;
Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi,
190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138;
Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout
the whole history of the United States, and legislation

founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the

acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section
1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The
Constitution and all laws of the United States which are
not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and
effect within all the organized territories, and in every
Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the
United States." When Congress organized a civil
government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that
this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to
the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was
acquired by the United States as a result of the war with
Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have
consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles
above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the
United States on August 13, 1898, and the military
commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and
harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which should
determine the control, disposition, and government of the
Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American
authorities to preserve peace and protect person and
property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor
was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General
Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The
treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the
22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the
city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine
Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty
therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control,
disposition, and government of the Islands had been
ceded to the United States. During the periods of strict
military occupation, before the treaty of peace was
ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted
(Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was
governed under the military authority of the President as
commander in chief. Long before Congress took any
action, the President organized a civil government which,
however, had its legal justification, like the purely military
government which it gradually superseded, in the war
power. The military power of the President embraced
legislative, executive personally, or through such military

or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by

Secretary Root in his report for 1901
The military power in exercise in a territory under
military occupation includes executive, legislative,
and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens
that in a single order of a military commander can
be found the exercise of all three of these
different powers the exercise of the legislative
powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action;
of judicial power by determination of right; and
the executive power by the enforcement of the
rules prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil
government as rapidly as conditions would permit. After
full investigation, the organization of civil government
was initiated by the appointment of a commission to
which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On
September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to
the approval of the President. "that part of the military
power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is
legislative in its character" was transferred from the
military government to the Commission, to be exercised
under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed
by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil
government should be established, or congress otherwise
provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the
Commission was declared to include "the making of rules
and orders having the effect of law for the raising of
revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the
appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the
Islands; the establishment of an educational system to
secure an efficient civil service; the organization and
establishment
of
courts;
the
organization
and
establishment
of
municipal
and
departmental
government, and all other matters of a civil nature which
the military governor is now competent to provide by
rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of
legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised
in conformity with certain declared general principles, and
subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of
individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind
that the government to be instituted was "not for our

satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views,

but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people
of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should
be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and
even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with
the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just
and effective government." The specific restrictions upon
legislative power were found in the declarations that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation; that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a
punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post
facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the
rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition
the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship without discrimination or preference shall forever
be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these
proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to the
Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided
that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to
govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise
provided by Congress be vested in such person and
persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the
President of the United States shall direct, for the
establishment of civil government, and for maintaining

and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free

enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion."
Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been
exercised previously by the military governor, was
transferred to that official. The government thus created
by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the
affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President
until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control
of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in
connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900,
constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in
the form of government which the President had erected.
Congress adopted the system which was in operation,
and approved the action of the President in organizing the
government. Substantially all the limitations which had
been imposed on the legislative power by the President's
instructions were included in the law, Congress thus
extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the
Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the
rights and privileges of individuals which were
appropriate under the conditions. The action of the
President in creating the Commission with designated
powers of government, in creating the office of the
Governor-General
and
Vice-Governor-General,
and
through the Commission establishing certain executive
departments, was expressly approved and ratified.
Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a
tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of
peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of
March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206
U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise
provided by law the Islands were to continue to be
governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future
the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By
authority of the United States" instead of "By the
authority of the President." In the course of time the
legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the
Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was
to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses
the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly.
The government of the Islands was thus assumed by

Congress under its power to govern newly acquired

territory not incorporated into the United States.

interests and the protection of individual rights and

priviliges.

This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or

a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat
resembles that of both. It stands outside of the
constitutional relation which unites the States and
Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation
and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the
United States, which, however, operates on the President
and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine
Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting
through the President and Congress, both deriving power
from the same source, but from different parts thereof.
For its powers and the limitations thereon the
Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the
President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress
after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from
the formally and legally expressed will of the President
and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign
constituency which lies upon any subject relating to the
Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise
such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines
the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in
the United States.

In instituting this form of government of intention must

have been to adopt the general constitutional doctrined
which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the
Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of
the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national
Constitution, and the States under the national and state
constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as
are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all
governments operating under written constitutions, must
determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well
as the legality of all private and official acts. In
performing these functions it acts with the same
independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the
United States. Under no other constitutional theory could
there be that government of laws and not of men which is
essential for the protection of rights under a free and
orderly government.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the

Philippines is a complete governmental organism with
executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising
the functions commonly assigned to such departments.
The separation of powers is as complete as in most
governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is
this separation such as is implied in the abstract
statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal
Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and
the President to some extent controls legislation through
the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to
exercise much control over legislation. The GovernorGeneral, the head of the executive department in the
Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine
Commission, but as executive he has no veto power. The
President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which Americans are familiar, and which has
proven best adapted for the advancement of the public

Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of

the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must
consider the question of the validity of an act of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a
State court considers an act of the State legislature. The
Federal Government exercises such powers only as are
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of
the United States, while the States exercise all powers
which have not been granted to the central government.
The former operates under grants, the latter subject to
restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends
upon whether the Constitution of the United States
contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact
it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal
or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its
enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the
Philippines Government which has not been expressly
disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter
has been covered by congressional legislation, or its
enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic
laws.

The legislative power of the Government of the

Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific
limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to
legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the
legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is
true that specific authority is conferred upon the
Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of
legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon
certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed
simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was
fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any
restriction upon the local legislative authority in other
matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16,
1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul
specific acts of legislation by the Government of the
Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for
purposes of construction the Government of the
Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead
of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was
unusual. The new government was to operate far from
the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the
necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was
thought better to grant general legislative power to the
new government, subject to broad and easily understood
prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul
its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore
provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the
Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which
hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the
same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This
provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of
the Philippines until approved by Congress, or when
approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the
laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government
of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners
Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must
then ascertain whether the Legislature has been
expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3,
Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States
operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no

application to the Government of the Philippine Islands.

The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in
Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the
territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate
foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this
directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created
by it, to which its power in this respect if delegate.
Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties
which shall be paid upon goods imported into the
Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the
Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of
commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A
few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce
may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general
regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines,
subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul such
legislation as does not meet with its approval. The
express limitations upon the power of the Commission
and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority
with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign
countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took
over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended
by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2,
1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil
government instituted by the President, had the power,
whether it be called legislative or administrative, to
regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports
of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164,
190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act
has remained in force since its enactment without
annulment or other action by Congress, and must be
presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore
satisfied that the Commission had, and the Legislature
now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the
regulation of commerce between foreign countries and
the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as
amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable
within the meaning of the Act can not be left to the
judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which
must be determined by the court from the evidence. On
December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and
disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle,

which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without

providing suitable means for securing said animals while
in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act
No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of
which are fully sustained by the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and
master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or
thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December,
1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle
and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to
and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the
defendant, as such master and captain as
aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard
said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship
was anchored, under the directions of the said
defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the
city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the
jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of said
cattle then and there had broken legs and three
others of said cattle were dead, having broken
legs; and also that said cattle were transported
and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the
defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said
ship, without suitable precaution and care for the
transportation of said animals, and to avoid
danger and risk to their lives and security; and
further that said cattle were so transported
abroad said ship by the defendant and brought
into the said bay, and into the city of Manila,
without any provisions being made whatever
upon said decks of said ship and in the hold
thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable
condition and position for such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which
to transport cattle abroad steamship coming into
Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is
by way of individual stalls for such cattle,

providing partitions between the cattle and

supports at the front sides, and rear thereof, and
cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand
and are transported, of that in case of storms,
which are common in this community at sea, such
cattle may be able to stand without slipping and
pitching and falling, individually or collectively,
and to avoid the production of panics and hazard
to the animals on account or cattle were
transported in this case. Captain Summerville of
the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and
experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in
behalf of the Government, and stated positively
that since the introduction in the ships with which
he is acquainted of the stall system for the
transportation of animals and cattle he has
suffered no loss whatever during the last year.
The defendant has testified, as a witness in his
own behalf, that according to his experience the
system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks
and in the hold is preferable and more secure to
the life and comfort of the animals, but this
theory of the case is not maintainable, either by
the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged
with logic that, for instance, three hundred cattle
supports for the feet and without stalls or any
other protection for them individually can safely
and suitably carried in times of storm upon the
decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is
against the law of nature. One animal falling or
pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might
produce a serious panic and the wounding of half
the animals upon the ship if transported in the
manner found in this case.

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the

revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the
defendant to the information that initiated this case and
in which the appellee is accused of having illegally
smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the
city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the lower court, which so held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our
consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not;
and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court
has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the
Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924

October 19, 1922

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a

fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendantappellee.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland,

JJ., concur.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:

There are two fundamental rules on this particular

matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the
French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard
a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in
the courts of the country within whose territorial
jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory; and the
English rule, based on the territorial principle and
followed in the United States, according to which, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general
triable in the courts of the country within territory they
were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that
obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States
on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is
now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs.
M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice
Marshall said:

. . . When merchant vessels enter for the

purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would
subject the laws to continual infraction, and the
government to degradation, if such individuals or
merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court
held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had
jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed
on the high seas or within the territorial waters of
any other country, but when she came within
three miles of a line drawn from the headlands,
which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she
was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles
became
applicable.
(Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105;
Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La
Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign subject to such limitations as have
been conceded by that sovereignty through the
proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations
is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the
Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole
matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the
peace of the ship or those on board are to be
dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the
home of the ship, but those which disturb the
public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be,
the offenders punished by the proper authorities
of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all
times to determine which of the two jurisdictions
a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedly
depend
on
the
attending
circumstances of the particular case, but all must

concede that felonious homicide is a subject for

the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper
authorities are proceeding with the case in the
regular way the consul has no right to interfere to
prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil.,
573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article
of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard
a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does
not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable
by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being
considered as an extension of its own nationality,
the same rule does not apply when the article,
the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is
landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in
such a case an open violation of the laws of the
land is committed with respect to which, as it is a
violation of the penal law in force at the place of
the commission of the crime, no court other than
that established in the said place has jurisdiction
of the offense, in the absence of an agreement
under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever
consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect
so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship
where the crime in question was committed belongs.
Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume
1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the
United States of America, and all the territories of
His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty
of commerce. The inhabitants of the two
countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely
and securely to come with their ships and cargoes
to all such places, ports and rivers, in the
territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are
permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to
remain and reside in any parts of the said

territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy

houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce; and, generally, the merchants and
traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the
most complete protection and security for their
commerce, but subject always to the laws and
statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1,
Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium
aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court
not triable by or courts, because it being the primary
object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the
use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship,
without being used in our territory, does not being about
in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is
not considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits,
even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly
a breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within
our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General
aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium
securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in
the port of Manila in open defiance of the local
authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on
him, is simply subversive of public order. It
requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to
conceive that a foreign ship may come into the
port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese
residents to smoke opium on board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause
ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special
findings as to costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand

and Johns, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C. J.:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, stated that he "carried,
kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96

kilogrammes of opium," and that "he had been surprised

in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."

searched several times for opium, he ordered two

other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.

The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds,

the second of which was the more than one crime was
charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as
the court found that the complaint contained two
charges, one, for the unlawful possession of opium, and
the other, for the unlawful sale of opium, and,
consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal
should separated one charge from the other and file a
complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this
cause concerns only the unlawful possession of opium. It
is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of this
court.

It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium,

designated as Exhibits A and B, properly constitute
thecorpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of
opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was the subject matter of
investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the
chief of the department of the port of Cebu testified that
they were found in the part of the ship where the firemen
habitually sleep, and that they were delivered to the first
officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after
the vessel should have left the Philippines, because the
firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the
instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were
permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always
provided it should not be taken shore.

The facts of the case are contained in the following

finding of the trial court:
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and
12 o'clock a. m. on the present month (stated as
August 19, 1909), several persons, among them
Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department
of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of
Cebu,
respectively,
went
abroad
the
steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo,
and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one
sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the hold,
another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as
Exhibit A contained 49 cans of opium, and the
other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained
several cans of the same substance. The hold, in
which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found,
was under the defendant's control, who
moreover, freely and of his own will and accord
admitted that this sack, as well as the other
referred to in Exhibit B and found in the cabin,
belonged to him. The said defendant also stated,
freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these
sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of
selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera
Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been

And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is

also corpus delicti and important as evidence in this
cause. With regard to this the internal-revenue agent
testified as follows:itc-alf
FISCAL. What is it?
WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought
from the defendant by a secret-service agent and
taken to the office of the governor to prove that
the accused had opium in his possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this
answer might be stricken out "because it refers to a sale."
But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the
department of customs had already given this testimony,
to wit:
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my
office and said that a party brought him a sample
of opium and that the same party knew that there
was more opium on board the steamer, and the
agent asked that the vessel be searched.

The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on

the ground of its being hearsay evidence, and the court
only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more
opium, on board the vessel" be stricken out.
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that
the receptacles mentioned as Exhibits A, B, and C,
contained opium and were found on board the
steamship Erroll, a vessel of English nationality, and that
it was true that the defendant stated that these sacks of
opium were his and that he had them in his possession.
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent,
the defendant stated to him, in the presence of the
provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards
was not needed, because the defendant spoke English),
the warden of the jail, and four guards, that the opium
seized in the vessel had been bought by him in
Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can and five
pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of
selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera
Cruz; that on the 15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on
the same day he sold opium; that he had tried to sell
opium for P16 a can; that he had a contract to sell an
amount of the value of about P500; that the opium found
in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in
another cause, was his, and that he had left it in their
stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had
already been searched many times; and that, according
to the defendant, the contents of the large sack was 80
cans of opium, and of the small one, 49, and the total
number, 129.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English
nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was
bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the
grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same
and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a
crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument, asked
that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon
the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of
opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack

jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed

within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
The court sentenced the defendant to five years'
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not
to exceed one third of the principal penalty, and to the
payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation,
in favor of the Insular Government, of the exhibits
presented in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal
being taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced
should have been served, the defendant be not released
from custody, but turned over to the customs authorities
for the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing laws on
immigration.
From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this
court.lawphi1.net
The appeal having been heard, together with the
allegations made therein by the parties, it is found: That,
although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use
in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any
of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a
crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of
such vessel being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the
article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from
the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open
violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as
it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in
that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of
the drug seized, the subject matter of the present case,
was considerable, it does not appear that, on such
account, the two penalties fixed by the law on the
subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine
imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively, we

affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from,

with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ.,
concur.

MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a
violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law),
and sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13005

October 10, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

The following facts are fully proven: The defendant

is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the
steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign
steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25,
1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The
defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought
them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them
in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu.
When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April
25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the
eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes
below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant
confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that
he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess,
however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did
not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct
or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was
to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands,
was introduced.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into
the Philippine Islands been proven?
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the
judgment of the trial court, but with the intimation that
there exists inconsistently between the doctrines laid
down in the two cases. However, neither decision is
directly a precedent on the facts before us.
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910],
18 Phil., 573), in the opinion handed down by the Chief
Justice, it is found

That, although the mere possession of a

thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their
ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a
crime triable by the courts of this country, on
account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule
does no apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an
open violation of the laws of the land, with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal
law in force at the place of the commission of the
crime, only the court established in the said place
itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence
of an agreement under an international
treaty.1awphil.net
A marked difference between the facts in the Look
Chaw case and the facts in the present instance is readily
observable. In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the
illegal possession and sale of opium in the present case
the charge as illegal importation of opium; in the Look
Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit in the
present case the foreign vessel was not in transit; in the
Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel
upon Philippine soil in the present case of United
States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and
the one on which resolution turned, was that in a
prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or
other prohibited drug, the Government must prove, or
offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the
vessel from which the drug is discharged came into
Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on
board. In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted
because it was not proved that the opium was imported
from a foreign country; in the present case there is no
question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu.
However, in the opinion in the Jose case, we find the
following which may be obiter dicta, but which at least is
interesting as showing the view of the writer of the
opinion:

The importation was complete, to say the

least, when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic
Bay. It was not necessary that the opium
discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It
was sufficient that the opium was brought into the
waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat destined
for a Philippine port and which subsequently
anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with
intent to discharge its cargo.

that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in

transit, a situation not present.

Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the

authority of the views just quoted, we return to an
examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It is to
be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any
person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are
synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United
States have held that the mere act of going into a port,
without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.)
And again, the importation is not the making entry of
goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them
into port; and the importation is complete before entry of
the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas.,
1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As
applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any
person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug
into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person's control on a vessel which has
come direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case,
a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless
contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves
otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb
to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back
and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure
of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive
that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for
his personal use. No better explanation being possible,
the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this
opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We
accordingly find that there was illegal importation of
opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands.
To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ.,

concur.

The defendant and appellant, having been proved

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the
sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided
by law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed with
the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES,
JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA,
accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accusedappellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No.
13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta
Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio

Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found

all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest
and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They
were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of
P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of
P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd
Peacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay
Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course
Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and
before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court
of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except
Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose
instead to pursue their respective applications for parole
before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice,
Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It
modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Lloyd Peacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00.
In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People
vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us
for review. 6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21,
1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay
Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed
Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd
Peacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the
authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife
allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress

smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew

of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the
Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's
nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode"
on his motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon
reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed
the police on duty of the incident. That same night,
Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and
the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla.
Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja,
Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's
residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident
allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of
Lloyd Peacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled
face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for
about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno
inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch
thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The next day,
February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning,
Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a photographer,
went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further
investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was
brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to
the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno
and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two
members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara,
Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident,
were already there conducting their own investigation.
Patrolman
Centeno
continued
with
his
sketch;
photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body
of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of
Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peacerrada's cadaver was
performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981;
after completed, a report was made with the following
findings:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm.
in length, located at the lower 3rd
anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed
upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at
the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior
aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width
and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the
middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at
the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth
visualizing the right lateral border of the
sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located
1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in
depth, directed inward to the thoracic
cavity
right,
located
at
the
left
midclavicular line at the level of the 5th
rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in
depth directed toward the right thoracic
cavity, located at the mid left scapular
line at the level of the 8th intercostal
space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width,
located at the base of the left armpit
directed toward the left thoracic cavity.

PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in
height, body moderately built and on
cadaveric rigidity.

8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm.

in length, directed toward the left deltoid
muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla
left.

9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5

cm in length, located at the anterior
aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed
downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in
width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect,
palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area,
right, directed inward with portion of large
intestine and mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at
the posterior portion of the shoulder,
right, directed downward to the aspex of
the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm.
in length, located at the medial portion of
the medial border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm.
in length, located at the posterior aspect
of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm.
in length, located at the posterior portion,
middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior
tantanelle with fissural fracture of the
skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5,
injuring the left ventricle
of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6,
severely injuring the right
lower lobe of the lungs.

3. Stab wound No. 7,

injuring the right middle
lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11,
injuring the descending
colon
of
the
large
intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12,
severely injuring the apex
of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE
HEMMORR
HAGE DUE
TO
MULTIPLE
LACERATE
D,
STABBED
(sic),
INCISED A
ND
PUNCTUR
ED
WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found
sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because
they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and
intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto
Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in the
poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police
Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody

for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd

Peacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C.
headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was
already detained having been indorsed thereat by the
Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations
conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C.
Company, an information for murder dated August 26,
1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information
read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses
FAUSTA
GONZALES
and
AUGUSTO
GONZALES of the crime of MURDER
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February,
1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed
accused
with
four
other
companions whose identities are still
unknown and are still at large, armed with
sharp-pointed and deadly weapons,
conspiring, confederating and helping
each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with deliberate intent and
decided purpose to kill, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and
number, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D.
Peacerrada, with the weapons with
which said accused were provided at the
time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D.
Peacerrada multiple wounds on different
parts of his body as shown by autopsy
report attached to the record of this case
which multifarious wounds caused the
immediate death of said Lloyd D.
Peacerrada.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981.

14

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and

Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial,
however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed
the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, presented himself to
Nanie Peacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6,
1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A
reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an
Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as
additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein
appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and
Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as
earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the
Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy
on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay
captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno
and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret)
Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st
P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and
Nanie Peacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on
the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around
11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the
municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the
victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4)
incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his
testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that
only one weapon might have caused all the wounds
(except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim,
nevertheless opined that due to the number and different
characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least
two instruments were used is high. 18 The police
authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified
on the aspect of the investigation they respectively
conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peacerrada
testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason

of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain

Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the
surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to
him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as
on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's
alleged eyewitness account of the incident. According to
Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on
July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on
February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central,
in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver
by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut
route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales
spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he
heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to
approach the place where the shouts were emanating.
When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself
behind
a
clump
of
banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the
accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and
hacking the victim Lloyd Peacerrada, near a "linasan" or
threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the
accused
as
the
place
was
then
awash
in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the
accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim,
they then lifted his body and carried it into the house of
the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25
meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then
proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he
related what he saw to his mother and to his
wife 26 before he went to sleep.27 Huntoria explained that
he did not immediately report to the police authorities
what he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981
however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he
allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the
fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim
which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the
latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie
Peacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from
his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla
Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs.
Peacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on
February 21, 1981. 29

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peacerrada in

defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape
her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The
herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed
that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located
some one kilometer away from the scene of the
crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he
only came to know of it after his grandchildren by
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night
of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32

reticence of most people to get involved

in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As
held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial
reluctance of witnesses in this country to
volunteer information about a criminal
case and their unwillingness to be
involved in or dragged into criminal
investigations is common, and has been
judicially
declared
not
to
affect
credibility.'"

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it

believed the testimony of Huntoria.

It is noteworthy that the accusedappellant self admitted that he had

known Huntoria for about 10 years and
that he and Huntoria were in good terms
and
had
no
misunderstanding
whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He
said that he could not think of any reason
why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p.
34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond
question. 33

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr.,

the lone appellant, contended that the trial court erred in
convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose
Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not
appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned
errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate
court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the
accused, including the herein accusedappellant,
as
the
assailants
of
Peacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982)
The claim that Huntoria would have
difficulty recognizing the assailant at a
distance of 15 to 20 meters is without
merit, considering that Huntoria knew all
the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria
could not say who was hacking and who
was stabbing the deceased, it was only
because the assailant were moving
around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident
to the authorities, we think that
Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He
said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51,
65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99
SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's

defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found
the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accusedappellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court
erroneously sentenced the accusedappellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal.
The penalty for murder under Article 248
is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. As there was no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the imposible penalty should be reclusion
perpetua. Consequently, the appeal
should have been brought to the Supreme
Court. With regard to the indemnity for
death, the award of P40,000.00 should be
reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance
with the rulings of the Supreme Court.
(E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA
518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA

31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43

(1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No.
68731, Feb. 27, 1987). 35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon
certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed
being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the
appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police
authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno
of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even
gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March
21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene
is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged
various blood stains and their locations relative to the
scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to
their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the
prosecution because, considering that there are two
versions proferred on where the killing was carried out,
the extent of blood stains found would have provided a
more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If,
as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired
inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would
have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom
or even on the ground directly under it. And this
circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the
claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the
other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing
was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth,
then blood stains in that place would have been more
than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation
conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal Ben
Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales
surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state
clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even
appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be
safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal
Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to

him the participation of other persons in the killing of the

victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C.
investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise
conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in
their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons,
aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to
have conspired in killing Lloyd Peacerrada.

ATTY. GATON
counsel
on
examination):

Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is

possible that the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy
report were caused by two or more bladed instruments.
Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed
instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr.
Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned,
Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was
responsible for the killing appears not at all too
impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr.
Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal
out of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We
shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.

A Yes, Sir.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of

the appellant by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can
only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the selfproclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of
Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the
accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking
and stabbing Lloyd Peacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a
"linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a
clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from
where the crime was being committed. According to him,
he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because
the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further
stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour.
But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he
could not determine who among the six accused did the
stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was
used by each of them.

(defense
cross-

Q And you said that the

moon was bright, is it
correct?

Q And you would like us to

understand that you saw
the hacking and the
stabbing, at that distance
by the herein accused as
identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the
moon
was
brightly
shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing
and the hacking, will you
please tell this Honorable
Court who was hacking
the victim?
A Because they were
surrounding Peacerrada
and were in constant
movement, I could not
determine who did the
hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not
clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.

A The moving around or

the hacking or the "labu"
or "bunu" is rapid. I only
saw the rapid movement
of their arms, Your Honor,
and I cannot determine
who was hacking and who
was stabbing. But I saw
the hacking and the
stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively
identify before this Court
who really hacked Lloyd
Peacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot
positively tell who did the
hacking.
Q
And
likewise
you
cannot positively tell this
Honorable Court who did
the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of
the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct
testimony that you could
not even identify the
weapons used because
according to you it was
just flashing?
A Yes, sir. 39

From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a

definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the
appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada.

Felonies are committed not only by

means of deceit (dolo) but also by means
of fault (culpa).

It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings

of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would
categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a
principal by direct participation under Article 17,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is
nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that
inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the
same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under
paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the
killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate
punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?

There is deceit when the act is performed

with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight,
or lack of skill.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal

liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability Criminal liability
shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which
would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate
or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is
incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how
felonies are committed.

(Emphasis supplied)
Art. 3. Definition Acts and omissions
punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there
must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must
be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the
act is performed or the omission incurred by means of
deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower
courts both found, that the appellant has committed a
felony in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, forsooth there is
paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the
appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3
of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any
bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore
be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which
would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim
that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite
candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or who
"hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not
say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked
or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what
specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of
specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid
down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously
discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained
only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted,
as adverted to above, while there are six accused
charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the
six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound.
And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex

gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and

stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not
after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time)
and practically the father of the five accused? And
pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is
possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or
two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal
wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them.
And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay
probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the
non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in
rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor.
But more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence
that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal
wounds, coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove
the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the
appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise
tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in
October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly
saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the
failure of a witness to report at once to the police
authorities
the
crime
he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and
should not affect his credibility, 41 here, the unreasonable
delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his
veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged
eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility
doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one who was mute
for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in
reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been
satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared
his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed.
There is no showing that he was threatened by the
accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared
a possible retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he
finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already
under police custody, the rest of the accused were then
still free and around; they were not yet named in the
original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on
Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he
testified.

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness

as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that he was
a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of
the principal reasons why he testified was because the
victim was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why
did it take you so long
from the time you saw the
stabbing and hacking of
Lloyd Peacerrada when
you told Mrs. Peacerrada
about what happened to
her husband?
A At first I was then afraid
to tell anybody else but
because I was haunted by
my
conscience
andsecondly the victim
was also my landlord I
revealed what I saw to the
wife of the victim. 46
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under
our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source
of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord
who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu,
tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their
landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate
themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering
his services as a purported eyewitness and providing that
material testimony which would lead to the conviction of
the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta,
has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, would,
in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought
to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his

deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need

to get into the good graces of his landlord's family
assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to
be employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his
services would alleviate the financial distress he was in.
And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of
action for shortly after he volunteered and presented
himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the
protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who
gave him employment and provided lodging for his
family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can
not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to
say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the
alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peacerrada doubtful it is contrary to our customs and
traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture,
aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult
children from any possible physical and emotional harm.
It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are
much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to
summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year
old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone
adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an
adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence
was about one kilometer from the scene of the
crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there
just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons
(Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the
brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of
Lloyd Peacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived
enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under
appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in
which the participation of the appellant is not beyond
cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should
not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if
taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may
be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35748

December 14, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN
ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
Teofilo Mendoza for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan convicting them upon the information of the
crime of arson as follows: The former as principal by
direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight
months, and one day of cadena temporal, in accordance
with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the latter
as accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day
ofpresidio mayor; and both are further sentenced to the
accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons
whose houses were destroyed by the fire, jointly and
severally, the amount set forth in the information, with
costs.
Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accusedappellants de oficio, after delivering his argument, prayed
for the affirmance of the judgment with reference to the
appellant Martin Atienza, and makes the following
assignments of error with reference to Romana Silvestre,
to wit:
1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana
Silvestre as accomplice of the crime charged in
the information.
2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said
defendant from the information upon the ground
of insufficient evidence, or at the least, of
reasonable doubt.

The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a

reasonable doubt:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second
marriage, cohabited with her codefendant Martin Atienza
from the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol,
municipality of Paombong, Province of Bulacan. On May
16, 1930, the complaining husband, Domingo Joaquin,
filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a
sworn complaint for adultery, supported by affidavits of
Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz (Exhibit B). On the
same date, May 16, 1930, the said accused were arrested
on a warrant issued by said justice of the peace. On the
20th of the month, they were released on bail, each
giving a personal bond of P6,000. Pending the preliminary
investigation of the case, the two defendants begged the
municipal president of Paombong, Francisco Suerte Felipe,
to speak to the complaint, Domingo Joaquin, urging him
to withdraw the complaint, the two accused binding
themselves to discontinue cohabitation, and promising
not to live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza
voluntarily signed the promise (Exhibit A). The municipal
president transmitted the defendants' petition to the
complaining husband, lending it his support. Domingo
Joaquin acceded to it, and on May 20, 1930, filed a motion
for the dismissal of his complaint. In consideration of this
petition, the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed
the adultery case commenced against the accused, and
cancelled the bonds given by them, with the costs against
the complainant.
The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to
live in that of Santo Nio, in the same municipality of
Paombong.
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre
met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in
the barrio of Santo Nio, and under pretext of asking him
for some nipa leaves, followed him home to the village of
Masocol, and remained there. The accused, Martin
Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said Romana
Silvestre, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de
la Cruz. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas
de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered

together with the appellants herein after supper, Martin

Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the
house because he was going to set fire to it. Upon being
asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to
the house, he answered that that was the only way he
could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he
said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him
and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre. As Martin Atienza
was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say
anything to him, not even Romana Silvestre, who was
about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed at
what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at
once to communicate with the barrio lieutenant,
Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just heard Martin
Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred arms'
length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back
they saw their home in flames, and ran back to it; but
seeing that the fire had assumed considerable
proportions, Antonia took refuge in the schoolhouse with
her 1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to the
home of his parents-in-law, took up the furniture he had
deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse. The
fire destroyed about forty-eight houses. Tomas Santiago
coming from the barrio artesian well, and Tomas
Gonzalez, teacher at the barrio school of Masocol, and
Felipe Clemente, an old man 61 years of age, coming
from their homes, to the house on fire, saw Martin Atienza
going away from the house where the fire started, and
Romana Silvestre leaving it.lawphil.net
As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this
court to defend the accused-appellant de oficio, prays for
the affirmance of the judgment appealed from with
reference to defendant Martin Atienza. The facts related
heretofore, proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the
hearing, justify this petition of the de oficio counsel, and
establish beyond a reasonable doubt said defendant's
guilt of arson as charged, as principal by direct
participation.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre,
the only evidence of record against her are: That, being
married, she lived adulterously with her codefendant
Martin Atienza, a married man; that both were denounced

for adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana Silvestre's

second husband; that in view of the petition of the
accused, who promised to discontinue their life together,
and to leave the barrio of Masocol, and through the good
offices of the municipal president of Paombong, the
complaining husband asked for the dismissal of the
complaint; that in pursuance of their promise, both of the
accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Nio, in the
same municipality; that under pretext for some nipa
leaves from her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la
Cruz, who had gone to the barrio of Santo Nio, Romana
Silvestre followed him to his house in the barrio of
Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained there; that
her codefendant, Martin Atienza followed her, and stayed
with his coaccused in the same house; that on the night
of November 25, 1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all were
gathered together at home after supper, Martin Atienza
expressed his intention of burning the house as the only
means of taking his revenge on the Masocol resident, who
had instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the complaint for
adultery against them, which compelled them to leave
the barrio of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to
her codefendant's threat without raising a protest, and
did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the
house. Upon the strength of these facts, the court below
found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection
with article 13, defines an accomplice to be one who does
not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who
does not force or induce other to commit it, nor
cooperates in the commission of the act by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished, yet
cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous actions.
Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts
complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson
committed by her codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her
silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas de la Cruz and
Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because
he was going to set fire to their house as the only means
of revenging himself on the barrio residents, her passive
presence when Martin Atienza set fire to the house, where

there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation, and her

failure to give the alarm when the house was already on
fire?
The complicity which is penalized requires a certain
degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice,
encouragement, or agreement, or material, through
external acts. In the case of the accused-appellant
Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or
material cooperation, and none of an agreement to
commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and
silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not
constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they
encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime
of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that
being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an
accomplice.
The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza
guilty of arson, defined and penalized in article 550,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be
imposed upon:

2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited

house or any building in which people are
accustomed to meet together, without knowing
whether or not such building or house was
occupied at the time, or any freight train in
motion, if the damage caused in such cases shall
exceed
six
thousand
two
hundred
and
fiftypesetas.
While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself
and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre, there was nobody
in De la Cruz's house at the moment of setting fire to it,
he cannot be convicted merely arson less serious than
what the trial court sentenced him for, inasmuch as that
house was the means of destroying the others, and he did
not know whether these were occupied at the time or not.

If the greater seriousness of setting fire to an inhabited

house, when the incendiary does not know whether there
are people in it at the time, depends upon the danger to
which the inmates are exposed, not less serious is the
arson committed by setting fire to inhabited houses by
means of another inhabited house which the firebrand
knew to be empty at the moment of committing the act, if
he did not know whether there were people or not in the
others, inasmuch as the same danger exists.
With the evidence produced at the trial, the accusedappellant Martin Atienza might have been convicted of
the crime of arson in the most serious degree provided for
in article 549 of the Penal Code, if the information had
alleged that at the time of setting fire to the house, the
defendant knew that the other houses were occupied,
taking into account that barrio residents are accustomed
to retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in
purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion
and so hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene
of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do
not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of
the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the
crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one
has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the
houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there are
people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant
at the time, which results in destroying the rest, commits
the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550,
paragraph 2, Penal Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
modified as follows: It is affirmed with reference to the
accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with
reference to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, who
is
hereby
acquitted
with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm,
Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Villamor,

JESUS
D.
ROJAS,
M.D.
Rural
Health
Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo
Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which
are fatal because they penetrated the internal

organs,
decease