G.R. No.

90273-75 November 15, 1989

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE
CORP., petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM INOCENCIO, ET AL. AND EDWIN
CARDONES, THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS AND EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, respondents.

not received any moneys from them; and (4) the

amounts claimed by complainants had been paid by
them as deposits and not as placement fees.
A hearing was held by the POEA on 14 April 1988, at
which time complainants presented their evidence.
Petitioner Finman, though notified of this hearing, did
not appear.
On 30 May 1989, the POEA Administrator issued an
Order which, in its dispositive portion, said:

David I. Unay, Jr. for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

respondents are hereby ordered to
pay jointly and severally complainants'
claims as follows:

FELICIANO, J.:

1. William Inocencio P6,000 .00

Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. ("Pan

Pacific") is a private, fee-charging, recruitment and
employment agency. T in accordance with the
requirements of Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the
Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), Pan Pacific
posted a surety bond issued by petitioner Finman
General Assurance Corporation ("Finman") and was
granted a license to operate by the POEA.

2. Perfecto Palero, Sr. P5,500 .00

Private respondents William Inocencio, Perfecto

Palero, Jr., Edwin Cardones and one Edwin
Hernandez filed with the POEA separate complaints
against Pan Pacific for violation of Articles 32 and 34
(a) of the Labor Code, as amended and for refund of
placement fees paid to Pan Pacific. The complainants
alleged that Pan Pacific charged and collected such
fees from them but did not secure employment for
them.
Acting on the complaints, the POEA
Administrator motu proprio impleaded petitioner
Finman as party respondent in its capacity as surety
for Pan Pacific. Separate summonses were served
upon Finman and Pan Pacific. The return of the
summons served on Pan Pacific at its official address
registered in the POEA records, showed that Pan
Pacific had moved out therefrom; no prior notice of
transfer or change of address was furnished by Pan
Pacific to the POEA as required under POEA rules.
The POEA considered that constructive service of the
complaints had been effected upon Pan Pacific and
proceeded accordingly.
For its part, petitioner Finman filed an answer denying
liability and pleading, by way of special and
affirmative defenses, that: (1) the POEA had no
"jurisdiction over surety bonds," that jurisdiction being
vested in the Insurance Commission or the regular
courts; (2) it (Finman) had not violated Articles 32 and
34 (a) of the Labor Code and complainants' claims
had accrued during the suspension of the principal
obligor, Pan Pacific; (3) complainants had no cause of
action against Finman, since it was not privy to the
transactions between them and Pan Pacific and had

Page 1 of 48

3. Edwin Cardones P2,000 .00

Respondent agency is ordered to
release Cardones' passport, the
expenses or obtaining the same of
which (sic) shall be deducted from the
amount of P2,000.00 as it appears
that it was respondent agency who
applied for the processing thereof. The
claim of Edwin Hernandez is
dismissed without prejudice.
For the established violations
respondent agency is hereby imposed
a penalty fine in the amount of
P60,000.00. Further, the ban earlier
imposed upon it is herein reiterated.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Finman went on appeal to the Secretary of
Labor insisting that: (1) the POEA had no authority to
implead petitioner as party respondent in the
proceedings before the POEA; and that (2) the POEA
had no authority to enforce directly the surety bond
against petitioner. In an Order dated 3 August 1989,
the Secretary of Labor upheld the POEA Order
appealed from and denied the appeal for lack of merit.
Petitioner Finman now comes before this Court on a
Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order, raising much
the same issues it had already ventilated before the
POEA and the Secretary of Labor. It is contended
once again by petitioner Finman that the POEA had
no authority to implead petitioner in the proceedings
commenced by private respondents: and that the
POEA was not authorized to require, in those same
proceedings, petitioner to pay private respondents'
claims for refund against Pan Pacific on the basis of
the surety bond issued by petitioner.

Petitioner's contentions are interrelated and will be

dealt with together. They are, however, quite bereft of
merit and must be rejected.
Petitioner cannot seriously dispute the direct and
solidary nature of its obligations under its own surety
bond. Under Section 176 of the Insurance Code, as
amended, the liability of a surety in a surety bond is
joint and several with the principal obligor. Petitioner's
bond was posted by Pan Pacific in compliance with
the requirements of Article 31 of the Labor Code,
which states that
Art. 31. Bonds. All applicants for
license or authority shall post such
cash and surety bonds as determined
by the Secretary of Labor
to guarantee compliance with
prescribed recruitment procedures,
rules and regulations, and terms and,
conditions of employment as
appropriate.
The Secretary of Labor shall have the
exclusive power to determine, decide,
order or direct payment from, or
application of, the cash and surety
bond for any claim or injury covered
and guaranteed by the bonds.
(Emphasis supplied).

While petitioner Finman has refrained from attaching

a copy of the bond it had issued to its Petition for
Certiorari, there can be no question that the
conditions of the Finman surety bond Pan Pacific had
posted with the POEA include the italicized portions of
Section 4, Rule 11, Book I quoted above. It is settled
doctrine that the conditions of a bond specified and
required in the provisions of the statute or regulation
providing for the submission of the bond, are
incorporated or built into all bonds tendered under
that statute or regulation, even though not there set
out in printer's ink. 2
In the case at bar, the POEA held, and the Secretary
of Labor affirmed, that Pan Pacific had violated Article
32 of the Labor Code, as amended
Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers.
Any person applying with a private
fee charging employment agency for
employment assistance shall not be
charged any fee until he has obtained
employment through its efforts or has
actually commenced employment.
Such fee shall be always covered with
the approved receipt clearly showing
the amount paid. The Secretary of
Labor shall promulgate a schedule of
allowable fees. (Emphasis supplied).
as well as Article 34 (a) of the same Code:

The tenor and scope of petitioner Finman's

obligations under the bond it issued are set out in
broad ranging terms by Section 4, Rule II, Book I of
the POEA Rules and Regulations:
Section 4. Payment of Fees and
Posting of Bonds. Upon approval of
the application by the Minister, the
applicant shall pay an annual license
fee of P6,000.00. It shall also post a
cash bond of P100,000.00 and
a surety bond of P150,000.00 from a
bonding company acceptable to the
Administration duly accredited by the
Office of the Insurance Commission.
The bonds shall answer for all valid
and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the
grant and use of the license or
authority and contracts of
employment. The bonds shall likewise
guarantee compliance with the
provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations
relating to recruitment and placement,
the rules of the Administration and
relevant issuances of the Ministry and
all liabilities which the Administration
may impose. The surety bonds shall
include the condition that notice of
garnishment to the principal is notice
to the surety. 1 (Emphasis supplied).

Page 2 of 48

Article 34. Prohibited practices. It

shall be unlawful for any individual,
entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept, directly or
indirectly, any amount than that
specified in the schedule of allowable
fees prescribed by the Secretary of
Labor, or to make a worker pay any
amount greater than actually received
by him as a loan or advance.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is, hence, no question that, both under the
Labor Code 3 and the POEA Rules and
Regulations, 4 Pan Pacific had violated at least one of
the conditions for the grant and continued use of the
recruitment license granted to it. There can, similarly, be
no question that the POEA Administrator and the
Secretary of Labor are authorized to require Pan Pacific
to refund the placement fees it had charged private
respondents without securing employment for them and
to impose the fine of P60,000.00 upon Pan Pacific.
Article 36 of the Labor Code authorizes the Secretary of
Labor "to restrict and regulate" the recruitment and
placement activities of agencies like Pan Pacific and "to
issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of
[Title I on "Recruitment and Placement of Workers],"
including of course, Article 32 on "Fees to be paid by
workers," quoted earlier. Upon the other hand, Section
13 of Rule VI, Book I of the POEA Rules and
Regulations expressly authorize the POEA Administrator

or the Secretary of Labor to impose fines "in addition to

or in lieu of the penalties of suspension or cancellation"
of the violator recruitment agency's license.

If Pan Pacific is liable to private respondents for the

refunds claimed by them and to the POEA for the fine
of P60,000.00, and if petitioner Finman is solidarily
liable with Pan Pacific under the operative terms of
the bond, it must follow that Finman is liable both to
the private respondents and to the POEA. Petitioner
Finman asserts, however, that the POEA had no
authority to implead it in the proceedings against Pan
Pacific.
We are not persuaded by this assertion. Clearly,
petitioner Finman is a party-in-interest in, certainly a
proper party to, the proceedings private respondents
had initiated against Pan Pacific the principal obligor.
Since Pan Pacific had thoughtfully refrained from
notifying the POEA of its new address and from
responding to the complaints, petitioner Finman may
well I be regarded as an indispensable party to the
proceedings before the POEA. Whether Finman was
an indepensable or merely a proper party to the
proceedings, we believe and so hold that the POEA
could properly implead it as party respondent either
upon the request of the private respondents or, as it
happened, motu propio. Such is the situation under
the Revised Rules of Court 5 and the application
thereof, directly or by analogy, by the POEA can
certainly not be regarded as arbitrary, oppressive or
capricious.
The fundamental argument of Finman is that its
liability under its own bond must be determined and
enforced, not by the POEA or the Secretary of Labor,
but rather by the Insurance Commission or by the
regular courts. Once more, we are not moved by
petitioner's argument.
There appears nothing so special or unique about the
determination of a surety's liability under its bond as
to restrict that determination to the Office of the
Insurance Commissioner and to the regular courts of
justice exclusively. The exact opposite is strongly
stressed by the second paragraph of Article 31 of the
Labor Code:
Art. 31. Bonds. ... ...
The secretary of Labor shall have the
exclusive power to determine, decide,
order or direct payment from, or
application of, the cash or surety bond
for any claim or injury covered and
guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis
supplied)
We believe and so hold that to compel the POEA and
private respondents the beneficiaries of Finman's
bond-to go to the Insurance Commissioner or to a
regular court of law to enforce that bond, would be to
collide with the public policy which requires prompt
resolution of claims against private recruitment and

Page 3 of 48

placement agencies. The Court will take judicial notice

of the appealing frequency with which some, perhaps
many, of such agencies have cheated workers avid
for overseas employment by, e.g., collecting
placement fees without securing employment for them
at all, extracting exorbitant fees or "kickbacks" from
those for whom employment is actually obtained,
abandoning hapless and unlettered workers to
exploitative foreign principals, and so on. Cash and
surety bonds are required by the POEA and its
predecessor agencies from recruitment and
employment companies precisely as a means of
ensuring prompt and effective recourse against such
companies when held liable for applicants or workers'
claims. Clearly that public policy will be effectively
negated if POEA and the Department of Labor and
Employment were held powerless to compel a surety
company to make good on its solidary undertaking in
the same quasi-judicial proceeding where the liability
of the principal obligor, the recruitment or employment
agency, is determined and fixed and where the surety
is given reasonable opportunity to present any
defenses it or the principal obligor may be entitled to
set up. Petitioner surety whose liability to private
respondents and the POEA is neither more nor less
than that of Pan Pacific, is not entitled to another or
different procedure for determination or fixing of that
liability than that which Pan Pacific is entitled and
subject to.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari with prayer
for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner. This Resolution is immediately
executory.
G.R. No. L-79436-50 January 17, 1990
EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA
VENTURA, ESTER TRANGUILLAN, et
al., respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & San
Vicente for petitioner.

NARVASA, J.:
In connection with the application with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) of J &
B Manpower Specialist, Inc. for a license to engage in
business as a recruitment agency, a surety bond was
filed on January 2, 1985 by the applicant and the
Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation, herein
petitioner, in virtue of which they both held themselves

. . . firmly bound unto (said) Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration,

Ministry of Labor in the penal sum of

PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND ONLY . . . (Pl50,000.00)
for the payment of which will and truly
to be made, . . . (they bound
themselves, their) heirs, executors,
administrators, successors and
assigns, jointly and severally . .
The bond stipulated that:
a) it was "conditioned upon the true and faithful
performance and observance of the . . . principal (J &
B Manpower Specialist, Inc.) of its duties and
obligations in accordance with all the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Labor
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and
with the terms and conditions stipulated in the
License;
b) the liability of the . . . Surety (petitioner) shall in no
case exceed the sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) ONLY,
PHILIPPINE CURRENCY; 1
c) notice to the Principal is also a notice to the Surety;
and
d) LIABILITY of the surety . . . shall expire on
JANUARY 02, 1986 and this bond shall be
automatically cancelled ten (10) days after its
expiration and the surety shall not be liable for any
claim not discovered and presented to it in writing
within said period of . . . from expiration and the
obligee hereby expressly waives the rights to file any
court action against the Surety after termination of
said period of . . . . above cited. 2
As narrated by respondent Secretary of Labor, the
facts are as follows: 3
From June 1983 to December 1985 . .
. thirty three (33) . . . (persons) applied
for overseas employment with . . . (J &
B). In consideration of promised
deployment, complainants paid
respondent various amounts for
various fees. Most of' the receipts
issued were sighed by Mrs. Baby
Bundalian, Executive Vice-President
of . . . (J & B).
Because of non-deployment . . . (the
applicants) filed separate complaints
with the Licensing and Regulation
Office of POEA against . . . (J & B) for
violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of
the Labor Code between the months
of April to October 1985.
Despite summons/notices of
hearing,, . . . (J & B) failed to file
Answer nor appear in the hearings
conducted.

Page 4 of 48

In its separate Answer, . . . EASCO

essentially disclaimed liability on the
ground that the claims were not
expressly covered by the bond, that
POEA had no jurisdiction to order
forfeiture of the bond, that some of the
claims were paid beyond or prior to
the period of effectivity of the bond.
On September 8, 1986, the POEA
Administrator issued the Order in favor
of complainants ruling thus:
After careful
evaluation, we find that
the receipts and
testimonies of
complainants, in the
absence of
controverting evidence
substantially establish
that respondent
charged and collected
fees from them in
amounts exceeding
what is prescribed by
this Administration.
Complainants' nondeployment strongly
indicates that there
was no employment
obtained for them.
Hence, violation of
Articles 32 and 34 (a)
of the Labor Code, as
amended, is
established against
respondent. The
claims of complainants
having arose (arisen)
out of acts of the
principal covered
under the surety
(bond), the respondent
surety is equally liable
therefor.
Except for complainants Ramos,
Samson, de Leon and Rizada, whose
claims were transacted prior to the
effectivity of the bond, . . . EASCO
was declared jointly and severally
liable with . . . (J & B) to twenty-nine
(29) complainants.
(The dispositive portion of the POEA
Administrator's Order also contained
the following statement and
direction, viz.:
Respondent was
suspended on May 23,
1985, June 26, 1985
and January 17, 1986

all for illegal exaction.

Considering its track
record of illegal
exaction activities and
considering further the
gross violation of
recruitment rules and
regulations established
against it in the instant
cases, and the
expiration of its license
on February 15, 1985,
it is hereby forever
banned from
participation in the
overseas employment
program. It is ordered
to cease and desist
from further engaging
in recruitment activities
otherwise it shall be
prosecuted for illegal
recruitment.')
(J & B filed a motion for
reconsideration). On December 19,
1986, the then deputy Minister of
Labor and Employment denied the . . .
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit and affirmed the findings in the
Order of the POEA Administrator
finding no reversible error therein.
On appeal by EASCO J & B having as aforestated
taken no part in the proceeding despite due service of
summons the judgment was modified by the
Secretary of Labor, by Order dated July 1, 1987,
disposing as follows: 4
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Resolution of the then
Deputy Minister of Labor dated
December 19, 1986 affirming the
Order of the POEA Administrator
dated September 8, 1986 is hereby
MODIFIED. Respondent J & B
Manpower Specialist is directed to
refund all thirty-three (33)
complainants as listed in the Order of
September 8, 1986 in the amounts
listed thereto with the modification that
complainants Lucena Cabasal and
Felix Rivero are both entitled only to
P15,980 and not P15,980
each. Respondent Eastern Assurance
and Surety Corporation is hereby
found jointly and severally liable with
respondent J & B Manpower
Specialist to refund nineteen (19)
complainants in the modified
amounts . . . (particularly specified).
The other findings in the Order of the
POEA Administrator dated September

Page 5 of 48

8, 1986 affirmed in the Resolution of

the then Deputy Minister . . . are also
hereby AFFIRMED. This Order is
FINAL. No further Motion for
Reconsideration hereof shall be
entertained.
It is noteworthy that EASCO's liability for the refund,
jointly and severally with its principal, was limited to
19 named complainants (in contrast to verdicts of the
POEA and the Deputy Minister which both ordered
payment to no less than 33 complainants) and was
correspondingly reduced from P308,751.75 and US $
400.00 5 to the aggregate amount of P 140,817.75. 6
The special civil action of certiorari at bar was
thereafter instituted by EASCO 7 praying for the
nullification of the POEA Administrator's Order of
September 8, 1986, the Resolution of the Deputy
Minister of Labor of' December 19, 1986, and the Order
of the Secretary of Labor of July 1, 1987, It theorizes
that:
1) the POEA had no jurisdiction over
the claims for refund filed by nonemployees;
2) neither did the Secretary of Labor
have jurisdiction of the claims;
3) assuming they had jurisdiction, both
the POEA and Secretary of Labor also
committed legal errors and acted with
grave abuse of discretion when they
ruled that petitioner is liable on the
claims.
EASCO contends that the POEA had no "adjudicatory
jurisdiction" over the monetary claims in question
because the same "did not arise from employeremployee relations." Invoked in support of the
argument is Section 4 (a) of EO 797 providing in
part 8 that the POEA has
. . . original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money
claims, involving employer-employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment
including seamen . . .
The complaints are however for violation of
Articles 32 and 34 a) of the Labor Code.
Article 32 and paragraph (a) of Article 34 read
as follows:
Art. 32. Fees to be paid by workers.
Any person applying with a private
fee-charging employment agency for
employment assistance shall not be
charged any fee until he has obtained
employment through its efforts or has
actually commenced employment.

Such fee shall be always covered with

the approved receipt clearly showing
the amount paid. The Secretary of
Labor shall promulgate a schedule of
allowable fees.

would result either in rewarding unlawful acts, as it

would leave the victims without recourse, or in
compelling the latter to litigate in another forum, giving
rise to that multiplicity of actions or proceedings which
the law abhors.

Art. 34. Prohibited practices.It shall

be unlawful for any individual, entity,
licensee, or holder of authority:

Even more untenable is EASCO's next argument that

the recruiter and its victims are in pari delicto the
former for having required payment, and the latter for
having voluntarily paid, "prohibited recruitment fees"
and therefore, said victims are barred from
obtaining relief. The sophistical, if not callous,
character of the argument is evident upon the most
cursory reading thereof; it merits no consideration
whatever.

a) To charge or accept, directly or

indirectly, any amount greater than
that specified in the schedule of
allowable fees prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor, or to make a
worker pay any amount greater than
actually received by him as a loan or
advance; . . .
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of
license or authority are prescribed for violations of the
above quoted provisions, among others. And the
Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of
the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the
authority, conferred by Section 36, not only, to "restrict
and regulate the recruitment and placement activities
of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement
the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to
this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of
Labor gave the POEA 9 "on its own initiative or upon
filing of a complaint or report or upon request for
investigation by any aggrieved person, . . . (authority to)
conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension
or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency
or entity" for certain enumerated offenses including
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly,
of any amount of money, goods or services, or any
fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the
Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the
Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and
regulations. 10
The Administrator was also given the power to
"order the dismissal of the case or the
suspension of the license or authority of the
respondent agency or contractor or
recommend to the Minister the cancellation
thereof." 11
Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate
relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the
respondent agency or contractor, specially the refund
or reimbursement of such fees as may have been
fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such
money, goods or services imposed and accepted in
excess of what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical
and absurd to limit the sanction on an offending
recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or
cancellation of its license, without the concomitant
obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims. It

Page 6 of 48

The Court is intrigued by EASCO's reiteration of its

argument that it should not be held liable for claims
which accrued prior to or after the effectivity of its
bond, considering that the respondent Secretary had
conceded the validity of part of said argument, at
least. The Secretary ruled that EASCO's "contention
that it should not be held liable for claims/payments
made to respondent agency before the effectivity of
the surety bond on January 2, 1985 is well taken."
According to the Secretary: 12
. . . A close examination of the records
reveal(s) that respondent EASCO is
not jointly and severally liable with
respondent agency to refund
complainants Lucena Cabasal, Felix
Rivero, Romulo del Rosario, Rogelio
Banzuela, Josefina Ogatis, Francisco
Sorato, Sonny Quiazon, Josefina
Dictado, Mario del Guzman and
Rogelio Mercado (10 in all). These
complainants paid respondent agency
in 1984, or before the effectivity of the
bond on January 2, 1985 as evidence
by the reciept and their testimonies.
The related argument, that it is also not liable for
claims filed after the expiry (on January 2, 1986) of
the period stipulated in the surety bond for the filing of
claims against the bond, must however be rejected,
as the Secretary did. The Court discerns no grave
abuse of discretion in the Secretary's statement of his
reasons for doing so, to wit:
. . . While it may be true that
respondent EASCO received notice of
their claims after the ten (10) day
expiration period from cancellation or
after January 12, 1986 as provided in
the surety bond, records show that . . .
EASCO's principal, respondent
agency, was notified/ summoned prior
to the expiration period or before
January 12, 1986. Respondent
agency received summons on July 24,
1985 with respect to claims of
complainants Penarroyo, dela Cruz
and Canti. It also received summons

on November 26, 1985 with respect to

Giovanni Garbillons' claim.
Respondent agency was likewise
considered constructively notified of
the claims of complainants Calayag,
Danuco Domingo and Campena on
October 6, 1985. In this connection, it
may be stressed that the surety bond
provides that notice to the principal is
notice to the surety. Besides, it has
been held that the contract of a
compensated surety like respondent
EASCO is to be interpreted liberally in
the interest of the promises and
beneficiaries rather than strictly in
favor of the surety (Acoustics Inc. v.
American Surety, 74 Nev-6, 320 P2d.
626, 74 Am. Jur. 2d).
So, too, EASCO's claim that it had not been properly
served with summons as regards a few of the
complaints must be rejected, the issue being factual,
and the Court having been cited to no grave error
invalidating the respondent Secretary's conclusion
that summons had indeed been duly served.
Finally, EASCO's half-hearted argument that its
liability should be limited to the maximum amount set
in its surety bond, i.e., P150,000.00, is palpably
without merit, since the aggregate liability imposed on
it, P140,817.75, supra, does not in fact exceed that
limit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit, and this decision is declared to be immediately
executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 98273 October 28, 1991
CLARITA V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(NLRC), PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA), EMS MANPOWER &
PLACEMENT SERVICE (PHIL.), ABDUL KARIM AL
YAHYA, and TRAVELLERS
INSURANCE, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Manuel T. Collado for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:p
Clarita V. Cruz** went abroad pursuant to an
employment contract that she hoped would improve
her future. Although a high school graduate, she
agreed to work as a domestic helper in Kuwait in
consideration of an attractive salary and vacation
leave benefits she could not expect to earn in this
Page 7 of 48

country. But her foreign adventure proved to be a

bitter disappointment. On March 18,1988, after
completing her two-year engagement, she was back
home in the Philippines with her dead dreams and an
angry grievance.
On March 23,1988, she filed a complaint against EMS
Manpower and Placement Services (Phil.) and its
foreign principal, Abdul Karim Al Yahya, for
underpayment of her salary and non-payment of her
vacation leave. She also claimed that she was
charged a placement fee of P7,000.00 instead of the
legal maximum of only P5,000.00. She alleged that
her foreign employer treated her as a slave and
required her to work 18 hours a day. She was beaten
up and suffered facial deformity, head trauma and
decreased sensation in the right portion of her body.
On top of all this, she was paid only $120 per month
and her total salaries were given to her only three
hours before her flight back to Manila. This was after
the plane she was supposed to take had left and she
had to stay in the airport for 24 hours before her
employer finally heard her pleas and delivered her
passport and ticket to her.
In its answer and position paper, the private
respondent raised the principal defense of settlement
as evidenced by the Affidavit of Desistance executed
by the complainant on June 21, 1988. In this
document, she declared inter alia that
xxx xxx xxx
2. Thereafter going thoroughly over
the facts of the case by reconciling our
records, we came to discover that it
was only a plain case of
misunderstanding on our part, and
that we have already settled our
differences;
3. That I am no longer interested in
further continuance of the above case
against EMS Manpower & Placement
Services either criminal, civil or
administrative or whatever nature as I
hereby desist now and hereafter;
4. That I am executing this affidavit of
desistance to attest to the truth of the
foregoing facts and circumstances and
for the purpose of asking the dismissal
of my said complaint against EMS
Manpower & Placement Services.
On the basis of this affidavit, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) dismissed her
complaint in a decision dated May 16, 1989. This was
affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in its resolution dated December 28, 1990,
reconsideration of which was denied on February 21,
1991.

The petition now before us faults the POEA and the

NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for having
upheld the Affidavit of Desistance. Cruz rejects the
settlement as having been obtained from her under
duress and false pretenses and insists on her original
claim for the balance of her salaries and vacationleave pay at the agreed rate of P250.00 per month.
Her contention is that she was inveigled into signing
the Affidavit of Desistance without the assistance of
counsel. The "Attorney" Alvarado who assisted her
was not really a lawyer but only a helper in the
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. Atty.
Biolena, on the other hand, merely acknowledged the
document. Moreover, when she signed the affidavit,
she was under the impression when she was
agreeing to settle only her claim for one month unpaid
vacation leave, as the wording of the receipt she
issued on the same date showed, to wit:

did not even really represent the commutable value of

the 1 month vacation leave at the rate of $250.00). In
fact, the total claim of the petitioner is for P88,840.00,
itemized as follows:
a) P84,240.00, representing the salary
differentials of $130 for 24 months (US
$3,120.00 x P27.00).
b) P2,600.00, representing the
balance of her vacation leave pay.
c) P2,000.00, representing her excess
placement fee.
In Principe v. Philippine-Singapore Transport Service,
Inc., 1 this Court held:

June 21, 1988

Receipt
This is to certify that I received the
amount of P2,400.00 from EMS
Manpower & Placement Services in
settlement of 1 month unpaid vacation
leave.
(Sgd.) CLARITA V.
CRUZ
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Sgd.) O.G. ALVARADO
OWWA Legal Dept.
For its part, the private respondent argues that the
petitioner is bound by her Affidavit of Desistance,
which she freely and knowingly executed. After all,
she was not an ignorant and illiterate person but a
high school graduate who understood what she was
signing. The due execution of the instrument must
also be sustained on the basis of the presumptions of
regularity of official functions and of good faith.
Significantly, neither the private respondent nor the
Solicitor General refuted the petitioner's submission
that the person who allegedly assisted her in the
execution of the Affidavit of Desistance and explained
to her its content and meaning was not a lawyer but a
mere employee in the OWWA. His status was merely
assumed but not established by the respondents
although it was directly questioned. The comments of
the public and private respondents did not meet this
challenge squarely.
It is no less noteworthy that the receipt the petitioner
issued on the same day was only for "P2,400.00 . . .
in settlement of 1 month unpaid vacation." This clearly
shows that she was not waiving the rest of her
demands in exchange for that measly amount (which
Page 8 of 48

Even assuming for the sake of

argument that the quitclaim had
foreclosed petitioner's right over the
death benefits of her husband, the
fact that the consideration given in
exchange thereof was very much less
than the amount petitioner is claiming
renders the quitclaim null and void for
being contrary to public policy. The
State must be firm in affording
protection to labor. The quitclaim
wherein the consideration is
scandalously low and inequitable
cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's
pursuing her legitimate claim. Equity
dictates that the compromise
agreement should be voided in this
instance. (Emphasis supplied.)

The following guidelines were likewise set in Periquet

v. NLRC: 2
Not all waivers and quitclaims are
invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered
into and represents a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties
and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the
terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the
law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Court is convinced that the petitioner was not
fully aware of the import and consequences of the
Affidavit of Desistance when she executed it,
allegedly with the assistance of counsel. Except for
the disputable presumptions invoked by the private
respondent, such assistance has not been
established against the petitioner's allegation that the
"Attorney" Alvarado who supposedly counseled her

was not even a lawyer. Indeed, even assuming that

such assistance had been duly given, there is still the
question of the intrinsic validity of the quitclaim in view
of the gross disparity between the amount of the
settlement and the petitioner's original claim. It is
difficult to believe that the petitioner would agree to
waive her total claim of P88,840.00 for the unseemly
settlement of only P2,400.00. And even if she did, the
waiver would still be null and void as violative of
public policy.
It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of
the private respondent in the proceedings below that
it has no privity of contract with the petitioner, we have
held in a long line of cases that the local recruiter is
solidarily liable with the foreign principal for all
damages sustained by the overseas worker in
connection with his contract of employment. Such
liability is provided for in Section 1, Rule II, Book II, of
the POEA Rules and Regulations, which we have
consistently sustained.
This decision demonstrates once again the
tenderness of the Court toward the worker subjected
to the lawless exploitation and impositions of his
employer. The protection of our overseas workers is
especially necessary because of the inconveniences
and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for
a better life in a foreign land away from their loved
ones and their own government.
The domestic helper is particularly susceptible to
abuse because she usually works only by herself in a
private household unlike other workers employed in
an open business concern who are able to share and
discuss their problems and bear or solve them
together. The domestic helper is denied that comfort.
She has no companions in her misery. She usually
broods alone. There is no one to turn to for help. That
is why we must carefully listen to her when she is
finally able to complain against those who would rob
her of her just rewards and even of her dignity as a
human being.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the NLRC dated
December 28, 1990, and February 21, 1991, are SET
ASIDE, and the Affidavit of Desistance is DECLARED
null and void. POEA Case No. 88-03-255 is
REMANDED to the POEA for further proceedings and
expeditious resolution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997
TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR,
ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON,
JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG, VERDELINA
BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA LITURCO,
GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN
ALVAREZ, CANDELARIA NONO, NITA

Page 9 of 48

BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE

AGUILAR, DIGNA PANAGUITON, VERONICA
BAYOGOS, JULIANITA ARANADOR, LEONORA
CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR, NIMFA BUCOL,
ZITA GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS, MARJORIE
MACATE, RUBY SEPULVIDA, ROSALIE SONDIA,
NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO,
LENIROSE ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA, ANTONIA
NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA
SOBREQUIL, SONY JAMUAT, CLETA
MAYO,respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or
not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of a private
fee-charging employment agency.
From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans
Action Overseas Corporation, a private fee-charging
employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible
recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong.
Private respondents sought employment as domestic
helpers through petitioner's employees, Luzviminda
Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille. The
applicants paid placement fees ranging from
P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to
deploy them. Their demands for refund proved
unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute
complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles
32 and 34(a) 1 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denied having received the amounts
allegedly collected from respondents, and averred
that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and
interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were
not authorized to collect fees from the applicants.
Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the money
claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it
even warned respondents not to give any money to
unauthorized individuals.
POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar
Somes testified that although he was aware that
petitioner collected fees from respondents, the latter
insisted that they be allowed to make the payments
on the assumption that it could hasten their
deployment abroad. He added that Mrs. Honorata
Manliclic, a representative of petitioner tasked to
oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him that
she was leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon
as she cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of
the applicants. Manliclic, however, denied this version
and argued that it was Somes who instructed her to
leave the receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to
collect fees.
On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves
R. Confesor rendered the assailed order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, respondents are

hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the following claims:
1. Rosele Castigador
P14,000.00
2. Josefina Mamon
3,000.00
3. Jenelyn Casa
3,000.00
4. Peachy Laniog
13,500.00
5. Verdelina Belgira
2,000.00
6. Elma Flores
2,500.00
7. Ramona Liturco
2,500.00
8. Grace Sabando
3,500.00
9. Gloria Palma
1,500.00
10. Avelyn Alvarez
1,500.00
11. Candelaria Nono
1,000.00
12. Nita Bustamante
5,000.00
13. Cynthia Arandillo
1,000.00
14. Sandie Aguilar
3,000.00
15. Digna Panaguiton
2,500.00
16. Veronica Bayogos
2,000.00

Page 10 of 48

21. Selfa Palma

3,000.00
22. Lenirose Abangan
13,300.00
23. Paulina Cordero
1,400.00
24. Nora Maquiling
2,000.00
25. Rosalie Sondia
2,000.00
26. Ruby Sepulvida
3,500.00
27. Marjorie Macate
1,500.00
28. Estelita Biocos
3,000.00
29. Zita Galindo
3,500.00
30. Nimfa Bucol
1,000.00
31. Nancy Bolivar
2,000.00
32. Leonora Caballero
13,900.00
33. Julianita Aranador
14,000.00
The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa,
Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo are
hereby dismissed in view of their
desistance.
The following complaints are hereby
dismissed for failure to
appear/prosecute:
1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6.
Edna Salvante

17. Sony Jamuat

4,500.00

2. Rosa de Luna
Senail 7. Thelma
Beltiar

18. Irma Sobrequil

2,000.00

3. Elnor Bandojo 8.
Cynthia Cepe

19. Elsie Penarubia

2,000.00

4. Teresa Caldeo 9.
Rosie Pavillon

20. Antonia Navarro

2,000.00

5. Virginia Castroverde

The complaints filed by the following

are hereby dismissed for lack of
evidence:
1. Aleth Palomaria 5.
Mary Ann Beboso
2. Emely Padrones 6.
Josefina Tejero
3. Marybeth Aparri 7.
Bernadita Aprong
4. Lenia Biona 8. Joji
Lull
Respondent agency is liable for twenty
eight (28) counts of violation of Article
32 and five (5) counts of Article 34 (a)
with a corresponding suspension in
the aggregate period of sixty six (66)
months. Considering however, that
under the schedule of penalties, any
suspension amounting to a period of
12 months merits the imposition of the
penalty of cancellation, the license of
respondent TRANS ACTION
OVERSEAS CORPORATION to
participate in the overseas placement
and recruitment of workers is hereby
ordered CANCELLED, effective
immediately.
SO ORDERED. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for
Temporary Lifting of Order of Cancellation alleging,
among other things, that to deny it the authority to
engage in placement and recruitment activities would
jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its
foreign principals, but also the welfare, interests, and
livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for
their respective assignments. Finally, it manifested its
willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the
claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion be
denied.
Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary
Confesor provisionally lifted the cancellation of
petitioner's license pending resolution of its Motion for
Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991. On January 30,
1992, however, petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was eventually denied for lack of merit, and the April
5, 1991, order revoking its license was reinstated.
Petitioner contends that Secretary; Confesor acted
with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed orders on alternative grounds, viz.: (1) it is
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) which has the exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal recruitment
cases, including the authority to cancel recruitment
licenses, or (2) the cancellation order based on the
1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-

Page 11 of 48

compliance with the Revised Administrative Code of

1987 regarding its registration with the U.P. Law
Center.
Under Executive Order No. 797 3 (E.O. No. 797) and
Executive Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247), 4 the POEA was
established and mandated to assume the functions of
the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB),
the National Seamen Board (NSB), and the overseas
employment function of the Bureau of Employment
Services (BES). Petitioner theorizes that when POEA
absorbed the powers of these agencies, Article 35 of the
Labor Code, as amended, was rendered ineffective.
The power to suspend or cancel any license or
authority to recruit employees for overseas
employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code, as
amended, which provides:
Art. 5. Suspension and/or Cancellation
of License or Authority The Minister
of Labor shall have the power to
suspend or cancel any license or
authority to recruit employees for
overseas employment for violation of
rules and regulations issued by the
Ministry of Labor, the Overseas
Employment Development Board, and
the National Seamen Board, or for
violation of the provisions of this and
other applicable laws, General Orders
and Letters of Instructions.
In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety
Corp. v. Secretary of
Labor, 5 we held that:
The penalties of suspension and
cancellation of license or authority are
prescribed for violations of the above
quoted provisions, among others. And
the Secretary of Labor has the power
under Section 35 of the law to apply
these sanctions, as well as the
authority, conferred by Section 36, not
only to "restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement activities of
all agencies," but also to "promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the
provisions" governing said activities.
Pursuant to this rule-making power
thus granted, the Secretary of Labor
gave the POEA, 6 "on its own initiative
or upon filing of a complaint or report or
upon request for investigation by any
aggrieved person, . . (authority to)
conduct the necessary proceedings for
the suspension or cancellation of the
license or authority of any agency or
entity" for certain enumerated offenses
including

1) the imposition or acceptance,

directly or indirectly, of any amount of
money, goods or services, or any fee
or bond in excess of what is
prescribed by the Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code and
other relevant laws, rules and
regulations. 7
The Administrator was also given the
power to "order the dismissal of the
case of the suspension of the license or
authority of the respondent agency or
contractor or recommend to the Minister
the cancellation thereof." 8 (Emphasis
supplied)

This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor

and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz, 9 viz.:
A non-licensee or non-holder of
authority means any person,
corporation or entity which has not
been issued a valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and
placement by the Secretary of
Labor, or whose license or authority
has been suspended, revoked or
cancelled by the POEA or the
Secretary. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we
rule that the power to suspend or cancel any license
or authority to recruit employees for overseas
employment is concurrently vested with the POEA
and the Secretary of Labor.
As regards petitioner's alternative argument that the
non-filing of the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties
with the UP Law Center rendered it ineffective and,
hence, cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing
them, we agree with Secretary Confesor's
explanation, to wit:
On the other hand, the POEA Revised
Rules on the Schedule of Penalties
was issued pursuant to Article 34 of
the Labor Code, as amended. The
same merely amplified and
particularized the various violations of
the rules and regulations of the POEA
and clarified and specified the
penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the
questioned schedule of penalties
contains only a listing of offenses. It
does not prescribe additional rules
and regulations governing overseas
employment but only detailed the
administrative sanctions imposable by
this Office for some enumerated
prohibited acts.

Page 12 of 48

Under the circumstances, the license

of the respondent agency was
cancelled on the authority of Article 35
of the Labor Code, as amended, and
not pursuant to the 1987 POEA
Revised Rules on Schedule of
Penalties. 10
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
decision of the Secretary of Labor dated April 5, 1991,
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the
Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting
illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie
Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza,
Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed
with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA for
brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia
Salazar, viz:
04. T:
Ano ba
ang
dahilan
at ikaw
ngayon
ay
narito
at
nagbibi
gay ng
salaysa
y.
S: Upang ireklamo sa
dahilan ang aking

PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng
dati kong manager.
Horty
Salazar 615 R.O.
Santos, Mandaluyong,
Mla.
05. T:
Kailan
at saan
nagana
p and
ginawa
ng
panlolo
ko sa
iyo ng
tao/mg
a taong
inirekla
mo
mo?
S. Sa
bahay
ni
Horty
Salazar
.
06. T:
Paano
naman
nagana
p ang
pangya
yari?
S.
Pagkag
aling
ko sa
Japan
ipinata
wag
niya
ako.
Kinuha
ang
PECC
Card
ko at
sinabin
g
hahana
pan
ako ng
bookin
g sa
Japan.
Mag 9
month'
s na

Page 13 of 48

ako sa
Phils.
ay
hindi
pa niya
ako
napaalis. So
lumipat
ako ng
ibang
compa
ny pero
ayaw
niyang
ibigay
and
PECC
Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public
respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez
to whom said complaint was assigned,
sent to the petitioner the following
telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY
DIRECTED TO
APPEAR BEFORE
FERDIE MARQUEZ
POEA ANTI ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT UNIT
6TH FLR. POEA
BLDG. EDSA COR.
ORTIGAS AVE.
MANDALUYONG MM
ON NOVEMBER 6,
1987 AT 10 AM RE
CASE FILED
AGAINST YOU. FAIL
NOT UNDER
PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having
ascertained that the petitioner had no
license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso
issued his challenged CLOSURE AND
SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which
reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me
under Presidential Decree No. 1920
and Executive Order No. 1022, I
hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the

seizure of the documents and

paraphernalia being used or intended
to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it
having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or
authority from the
Department of Labor
and Employment to
recruit and deploy
workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are
committing acts
prohibited under Article
34 of the New Labor
Code in relation to
Article 38 of the same
code.
This ORDER is without
prejudice to your
criminal prosecution
under existing laws.
Done in the City of
Manila, this 3th day of
November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA
Director on Licensing and Regulation
Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an
office order designating respondents
Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara
and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members
of a team tasked to implement Closure
and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing
so, the group assisted by
Mandaluyong policemen and
mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's
Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News
Today proceeded to the residence of
the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it
was found that petitioner was
operating Hannalie Dance Studio.
Before entering the place, the team
served said Closure and Seizure order
on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who
voluntarily allowed them entry into the
premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed
the team that Hannalie Dance Studio
was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when
required to show credentials, she was
unable to produce any. Inside the
studio, the team chanced upon twelve
talent performers practicing a
dance number and saw about twenty
more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which
were duly receipted for by Mrs.

Page 14 of 48

Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by

Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner
filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615
R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, we respectfully request that
the personal properties seized at her
residence last January 26, 1988 be
immediately returned on the ground
that said seizure was contrary to law
and against the will of the owner
thereof. Among our reasons are the
following:
1. Our client has not
been given any prior
notice or hearing,
hence the Closure and
Seizure Order No.
1205 dated November
3, 1987 violates "due
process of law"
guaranteed under Sec.
1, Art. III, of the
Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also
violate Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Philippine
Constitution which
guarantees right of the
people "to be secure
in their persons,
houses, papers, and
effects against
unreasonable
searches and
seizures of whatever
nature and for any
purpose."
3. The premises
invaded by your Mr.
Ferdi Marquez and five
(5) others (including 2
policemen) are
the private residence
of the Salazar family,
and the entry, search
as well as the seizure
of the personal
properties belonging to
our client were without
her consent and were
done with
unreasonable force
and intimidation,
together with grave
abuse of the color of

authority, and
constitute robbery and
violation of domicile
under Arts. 293 and
128 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Unless said personal
properties worth
around TEN
THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) in all
(and which were
already due for
shipment to Japan) are
returned within twentyfour (24) hours from
your receipt hereof, we
shall feel free to take
all legal action, civil
and criminal, to protect
our client's interests.
We trust that you will
give due attention to
these important
matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA
could answer the letter, petitioner filed
the instant petition; on even date,
POEA filed a criminal complaint
against her with the Pasig Provincial
Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for
prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are
alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too
late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in
view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or
the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of
search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the
Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the
petitioner for the Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be
seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search
and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors
may not exercise this power:

Page 15 of 48

xxx xxx xxx

But it must be emphasized here and
now that what has just been described
is the state of the law as it was in
September, 1985. The law has since
been altered. No longer does the
mayor have at this time the power to
conduct preliminary investigations,
much less issue orders of arrest.
Section 143 of the Local Government
Code, conferring this power on the
mayor has been abrogated,
renderedfunctus officio by the 1987
Constitution which took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date of its
ratification by the Filipino people.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertinently provides that
"no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to
be seized." The constitutional
proscription has thereby been
manifested that thenceforth, the
function of determining probable
cause and issuing, on the basis
thereof, warrants of arrest or search
warrants, may be validly exercised
only by judges, this being evidenced
by the elimination in the present
Constitution of the phrase, "such other
responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" found in the
counterpart provision of said 1973
Constitution, who, aside from judges,
might conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of
arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential AntiDollar Salting Task Force exercises, or
was meant to exercise, prosecutorial
powers, and on that ground, it cannot
be said to be a neutral and detached
"judge" to determine the existence of
probable cause for purposes of arrest
or search. Unlike a magistrate, a
prosecutor is naturally interested in
the success of his case. Although his
office "is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused," he
stands, invariably, as the accused's
adversary and his accuser. To permit
him to issue search warrants and
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make

him both judge and jury in his own

right, when he is neither. That makes,
to our mind and to that extent,
Presidential Decree No. 1936 as
amended by Presidential Decree No.
2002, unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now
written, was entered as an amendment by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late
President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree
No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely
exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly
authorized representative shall have
the power to recommend the arrest
and detention of any person engaged
in illegal recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential
Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving
more teeth to the campaign against illegal
recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor
arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and
Employment shall have the power to
cause the arrest and detention of such
non-licensee or non-holder of authority
if after proper investigation it is
determined that his activities
constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further
exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the closure of
companies, establishment and entities
found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated
Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor
Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power
to cause the arrest and detention of
such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is
determined that his activities
constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further
exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the search of the
office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties
and other implements used in illegal
recruitment activities and the closure
of companies, establishment and

Page 16 of 48

entities found to be engaged in the

recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38,
paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as
the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight
moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a
judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional
and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case
of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a
deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct
Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the
Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation
cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the
President or his duly authorized representatives, in order
to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is
valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of
the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We
have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to
deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco
Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L.
Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That
power may be exercised by the Chief
Executive "when he deems such
action necessary for the peace and
domestic tranquility of the nation."
Justice Johnson's opinion is that when
the Chief Executive finds that there
are aliens whose continued presence
in the country is injurious to the public
interest, "he may, even in the absence
of express law, deport them". (Forbes
vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16
Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch
Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or
deport aliens because their continued
presence is detrimental to public
welfare is absolute and unqualified
(Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs.
Commissioner of Immigration and the
Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of
aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the
power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to
other cases, like the one at bar. Under the
Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question,

assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly
issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me
under Presidential Decree No. 1920
and Executive Order No. 1022, I
hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended
to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it
having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or
authority from the
Department of Labor
and Employment to
recruit and deploy
workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are
committing acts
prohibited under Article
34 of the New Labor
Code in relation to
Article 38 of the same
code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to
your criminal prosecution under
existing laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the
things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus:

and any and all

documents/communic
ations, letters and
facsimile of prints
related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2) Subversive
documents,
pamphlets, leaflets,
books, and other
publications to
promote the objectives
and purposes of the
subversive
organizations known
as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-aFire Movement and
April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used
in the
distribution/circulation
of the "WE FORUM"
and other subversive
materials and
propaganda, more
particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla,
colored yellow with
Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up
colored white with
Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with
Plate No. NBS 542;

xxx xxx xxx

Another factor which makes the
search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that
they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be
seized in this wise:
1) All printing
equipment,
paraphernalia, paper,
ink, photo equipment,
typewriters, cabinets,
tables,
communications/
recording equipment,
tape recorders,
dictaphone and the
like used and/or
connected in the
printing of the "WE
FORUM" newspaper

Page 17 of 48

4) TOYOTATAMARAW, colored
white with Plate No.
PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux,
pick-up truck with Plate
No. NGV 472 with
marking "Bagong
Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the
search warrant which authorized the
search for "books, records, pamphlets,
cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the
Communist Parties of Texas, and the
operations of the Community Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S.
Supreme Court for being too general.
In like manner, directions to "seize any
evidence in connection with the

violation of SDC 13-3703 or

otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure
of any "paraphernalia which could be
used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the
Connecticut General Statutes (the
statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy)" was held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. The
description of the articles sought to be
seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized
differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S.
Supreme court calls to mind a notable
chapter in English history; the era of
disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press,
when "Officers of the Crown were
given roving commissions to search
where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan."
Reference herein to such historical
episode would not be relevant for it is
not the policy of our government to
suppress any newspaper or
publication that speaks with "the voice
of non-conformity" but poses no clear
and imminent danger to state
security.14
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we
reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the
l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and
no other, who may issue warrants of
arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of
deportation of illegal and undesirable
aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may
order arrested, following a final order
of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38,
paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
seized as a result of the implementation of Search
and Seizure Order No. 1205.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121777

Page 18 of 48

January 24, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her
conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and
assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law
defining and penalizing said crime.
The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and
the conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty
imposed upon her.
The accused was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga City in an information alleging:
That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without having previously obtained from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, a license or
authority to engage in recruitment and overseas
placement of workers, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, offer and promise for a fee
employment abroad particularly in Singapore thus
causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy
Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, all
qualified to apply, in fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto
had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the
accused for and in consideration of the promised
employment which did not materialized [sic] thus
causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said
sum; furthermore, the acts complained of herein
tantamount [sic] to economic sabotage in that the
same were committed in large scale.1
Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not
guilty2 to these charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5)
witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin
Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and
Lourdes Modesto. The succeeding narration is
gathered from their testimonies:
On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning,
Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone
call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the
legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain
Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include
the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters,
immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth
Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan
Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the
recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon
arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m.,
Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an
applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the
pavement, from where he was able to see around six
(6) persons in the house's sala. Ramos even heard a

woman, identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the

possible employment she has to provide in Singapore
and the documents that the applicants have to comply
with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out
with a bio-data form in hand.
On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain
Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal
recruiter. Also present were other members of the
CIS, including Col. Rodolfo Almonte, Regional
Director of the PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen
Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group
planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the next day by
having Fermindoza pose as an applicant.3
On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col.
Almonte directed the case to SPO2 Erwin
Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine National
Police who was assigned as an investigator of the
CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm
the report of illegal recruitment. Accordingly, he, along
with Eileen Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to
Tetuan Highway. The two did not enter the house
where the recruitment was supposedly being
conducted, but Fermindoza interviewed two people
who informed them that some people do go inside the
house. Upon returning to their office at around 8:30
a.m., the two reported to Capt. Mendoza who
organized a team to conduct the raid.
The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza,
SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain Oscar
Bucol, quickly set off and arrived at the reported
scene at 9:30 that morning. There they met up with
Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then
proceeded to enter the house while the rest of the
team posted themselves outside to secure the area.
Fermindoza was instructed to come out after she was
given a bio-data form, which will serve as the team's
cue to enter the house.4

applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then only

wearing a towel, told her that she would just get
dressed. Jasmine then came back and asked
Fermindoza what position she was applying for.
Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a
babysitter or any other work so long as she could go
abroad. Jasmine then gave her an application form.
A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine
informed Carol that Fermindoza was an applicant.
Fermindoza asked Carol what the requirements were
and whether she (Fermindoza) was qualified. Carol
told Fermindoza that if she had a passport, she could
fill up the application papers. Fermindoza replied that
she had no passport yet. Carol said she need not
worry since Jasmine will prepare the passport for her.
While filling up the application form, three women who
appeared to be friends of Jasmine arrived to follow up
the result of their applications and to give their
advance payment. Jasmine got their papers and put
them on top of a small table. Fermindoza then
proceeded to the door and signaled to the raiding
party by raising her hand.
Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a
married couple, for permission to enter the same. The
owners granted permission after the raiding party
introduced themselves as members of the CIS. Inside
the house, the raiding party saw some supposed
applicants. Application forms, already filled up, were
in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS
asked Figueroa if she had a permit to recruit.
Figueroa retorted that she was not engaged in
recruitment. Capt. Mendoza nevertheless proceeded
to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she
was holding as the raiding party seized the other
papers5 on the table.6
The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain
Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women suspected
to be applicants, to the office for investigation.7

Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a

man and a woman, apparently the owners of the
house, and went inside. There, she saw another
woman, later identified as Jasmine, coming out of the
bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza earlier
introduced herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza was

In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered

that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them,
Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra. The accused was
not able to present any authority to recruit when
asked by the investigators.8 A check by Ramos with
the POEA revealed that the acused was not licensed

or authorized to conduct recruitment.9 A

certification10 dated February 2, 1994 stating thus was
executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge
of the POEA.

Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra

Aquino, arrived at Jasmine's house at around 4:30 p.m.
Jasmine welcomed them and told them to sit down. They
listened to the "recruiter" who was then talking to a
number of people. The recruiter said that she was
"recruiting" nurses for Singapore. Araneta and her
friends then filled up bio-data forms and were required to
submit pictures and a transcript of records. They were
also told to pay P2,000, and "the rest will be salary
deduction." Araneta submitted her bio-data form to Carol
that same afternoon, but did not give any money
because she was "not yet sure."

The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants,

Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all
registered nurses working at the Cabato Medical
Hospital, who executed their respective written
statements.11
At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was
at Jasmine Alejandro's house in the afternoon of January
30, 1994. Araneta had learned from Sandra Aquino, also
a nurse at the Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman
was there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.

Page 19 of 48

On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was

again at the Alejandro residence to submit her transcript
of records and her picture. She arrived at the house 30

minutes before the raid but did not witness the arrest
since she was at the porch when it happened.12
Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine
Alejandro's house on January 30, 1994. A friend of
Jasmine had informed her that there was someone
recruiting in Jasmine's house. Upon arriving at the
Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by
Jasmine.
1wphi1.nt

Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already

briefing some people when she arrived. Carol Figueroa
asked if they would like a "good opportunity" since a
hospital was hiring nurses. She gave a breakdown of the
fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip
ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the
processing of the papers. The initial payment was
P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction.
Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to
Jasmine. After the interview, she gave the initial payment
of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured Lourdes that she
was authorized to receive the money. On February 2,
1994, however, Lourdes went back to the house to get
back the money. Jasmine gave back the money to
Lourdes after the raid.13
Denial comprised the accused's defense.
Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of
Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman from Cebu,
the manager of the Region 7 Branch of the Grollier
International Encyclopedia. They own an apartment in
Cebu City, providing lodging to students.
The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit
her relatives. She first traveled to Singapore on August
21, 1993 as a tourist, and came back to the Philippines
on October 20 of the same year. Thereafter, she
returned to Singapore on December 10, 1993.
On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused
was invited to a Christmas party sponsored by the
Zamboanga City Club Association. On that occasion,
she met a certain Laleen Malicay, who sought her help.
A midwife, Malicay had been working in Singapore for
six (6) years. Her employer is a certain Mr. Tan, a close
friend of Carol.
According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home
for her father who was then seriously ill. Malicay was not
sure, however, whether her father received the money
so she requested the accused to verify from her relatives
receipt thereof. She informed the accused that she had a
cousin by the name of Jasmine Alejandro. Malicay gave
the accused Jasmine's telephone number, address and
a sketch of how to get there.
The accused returned to the country on January 21,
1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to Zamboanga
City on January 23, 1994 to give some presents to her
friends.
On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine
Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's cousin, to inform her that
she would be going to her house. At around noon that

Page 20 of 48

day, the accused, accompanied by her friend Hilda

Falcasantos, arrived at the house where she found
Jasmine entertaining some friends. Jasmine came down
with two of her friends whom she introduced as her
classmates. Jasmine told them that the accused was a
friend of Laleen Malicay.
The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's message
regarding the money the latter had sent. Jasmine
assured her that they received the money, and asked
Carol to tell Malicay to send more money for medicine
for Malicay's mother. Jasmine also told her that she
would send something for Malicay when the accused
goes back to Singapore. The accused replied that she
just needed to confirm her flight back to Cebu City, and
will return to Jasmine's house. After the meeting with
Jasmine, the accused went shopping with Hilda
Falcasantos. The accused was in the house for only
fifteen (15) minutes.
On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine
Airlines office at 7:30 in the morning to confirm her 5:30
p.m. flight to Cebu City. She then proceeded to
Jasmine's residence, arriving there at past 8 a.m.
Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, "Are
you Carol from Singapore?" The accused, in turn, asked
the woman if she could do anything for her. The woman
inquired from Carol if she was recruiting. Carol replied in
the negative, explaining that she was there just to say
goodbye to Jasmine. The woman further asked Carol
what the requirements were if she (the woman) were to
go to Singapore. Carol replied that she would need a
passport.
Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house
looking for Jasmine. The woman Carol was talking with
then stood up and went out. A minute after, three (3)
members of the CIS and a POEA official arrived. A big
man identified himself as a member of the CIS and
informed her that they received a call that she was
recruiting. They told her she had just interviewed a
woman from the CIS. She denied this, and said that she
came only to say goodbye to the occupants of the
house, and to get whatever Jasmine would be sending
for Laleen Malicay. She even showed them her ticket for
Cebu City.
Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's room and
returned with some papers. The accused said that those
were the papers that Laleen Malicay requested Jasmine
to give to her (the accused). The accused surmised that
because Laleen Malicay wanted to go home but could
not find a replacement, one of the applicants in the forms
was to be her (Malicay's) substitute. Ramos told the
accused to explain in their office.
The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmine's
residence to engage in recruitment. She claimed she
came to Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to whom
she could confide since she and her husband were
having some problems. She denied she knew Nancy
Araneta or that she brought information sheets for job
placement. She also denied instructing Jasmine to
collect P2,000 from alleged applicants as processing
fee.14

The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her

defense.
The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met
the accused for the first time only on January 30, 1994
when the latter visited them to deliver Laleen Malicay's
message regarding the money she sent. Carol, who was
accompanied by a certain Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in
their house for 10 to 15 minutes only. Carol came back
to the house a few days later on February 2 at around
8:00 in the morning to "get the envelope for the
candidacy of her daughter." Jasmine did not elaborate.
Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or
Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused
conducted recruitment. She claimed she did not see
Carol distribute bio-data or application forms to job
applicants. She disclaimed any knowledge regarding the
P2,000 application fee.15

SEARCH WARRANT IN VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF, SHALL
BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN
ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3, (2) OF THE SAME
CONSTITUTION;
III
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic]
EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE
RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO,
THERE WAS NO CRIME COMMITTED
WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;
[IV]

The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a

policeman, merely testified that the accused stayed in
their house in No. 270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga City, for
four (4) days before her arrest, although she would
sometimes go downtown alone. He said he did not
notice that she conducted any recruitment.16
On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting the accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
consideration[s][,] this Court finds the accused
Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol
Figueroa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale
and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is
entitled to the full time of the period of her
detention during the pendency of this case
under the condition set forth in Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.17

V
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY
ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED
BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE,
ACCUSED SHOULD BE EXONERATED;
VI
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA
LOURDES MODESTO WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT,
HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE
EXCULPATED;
VII

The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court

the following errors:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D.
442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
APPREHENDING TEAM COMPOSED OF
POEA AND CIS REPRESENTATIVES
ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF
JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY

Page 21 of 48

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT

ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2
[sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT
ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT
SHOULD BE ACQUITTED;

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT

ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH LARGE
SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON
JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN
THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE
CRIME, BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON
FEB. 2, 1994 AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic]
INDICATED [sic] THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME
WERE [sic] COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994,
HENCE, THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY
DEFECTIVE;
VIII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED
CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS
COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE,

HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE LIFE

IMPRISONMENT;
IX
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE
EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF
JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO
THE COURT WERE PLANTED BY A BOGUS
ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE
POEA;
X
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE
ANY PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO
FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID NOT
SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER, YET SHE
WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER ENTIRE
LIFE BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH
PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL,
HENCE, A WANTON VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION.18
In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the
law defining "recruitment and placement" violates due
process. Appellant also avers, as part of her sixth
assigned error, that she was denied the equal protection
of the laws.
We shall address the issues jointly.
Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code
defining "recruitment and placement" is void for
vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.19
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties.20 A criminal statute that "fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is
so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness.21 The
constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the
injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an
offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning. 22
We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario:23
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2)
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
We added, however, that:

Page 22 of 48

x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face,

that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a
saving clause or by construction. Thus,
in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance that had made it
illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on
any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to persons passing by."
Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at
all "because one may never know in advance
what 'annoys some people but does not annoy
others.'"
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a
"perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident
on its face. It is to be distinguished, however,
from legislation couched in imprecise language
but which nonetheless specifies a standard
though defectively phrasedin which case, it
may be "saved" by proper construction.
Here, the provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
x x x.
When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority, recruitment activities are punishable as
follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any
recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any
law enforcement officer may initiate complaints
under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be considered
an offense involving economic sabotage and
shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39
hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating
with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale

if committed against three (3) or more persons

individually or as a group.
x x x.
Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if
illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage as defined herein:
(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found
violating or causing another to violate any
provision of this Title or its implementing rules
and regulations, shall upon conviction thereof,
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than five years or a fine of not less than P10,000
nor more than P50,000 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the
court;
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a
holder of authority under this Title found violating
any provision thereof or its implementing rules
and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof,
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than four years nor more than eight years or a
fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than
P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at
the discretion of the court;
x x x.
In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for
vagueness, appellant invokes People vs. Panis,24 where
this Court, to use appellant's term, "criticized" the
definition of "recruitment and placement" as follows:
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the
meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records
of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have
been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a
statute rather than a presidential decree is that they
could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous
public discussion or consultation, the promulgator
heeding only his own counsel or those of his close
advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not
infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the
interest of the greater number and, as in the instant
case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read
against the background facts usually reported in the
legislative journals.
If the Court in Panis "had to speculate on the meaning of
the questioned provision," appellant asks, what more
"the ordinary citizen" who does not possess the
"necessary [legal] knowledge?"
Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute
"recruitment and placement" suffer from overbreadth
since by merely "referring" a person for employment, a
person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
These contentions cannot be sustained.

Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced.

The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of
Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be
committed only "whenever two or more persons are in
any manner promised or offered any employment for a
fee." The Court held in the negative, explaining:
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose
a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception
thereto but merely to create a presumption. The
presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing
with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a
fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the
course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential
ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of
workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in
Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement
even if only one prospective worker is involved. The
proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a
fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to
be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The
words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure
of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds
or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall
beprima facie evidence that he has put them to personal
use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have
malversed such funds or property. In the instant case,
the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token
be given the force of a disputable presumption or
of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and
placement.
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the
meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records
of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have
been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a
statute rather than a presidential decree is that they
could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous
public discussion or consultation, the promulgator
heeding only his own counsel or those of his close
advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not
infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the
interest of the greater number and, as in the instant
case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read
against the background facts usually reported in the
legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give
more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment
and placement, which has victimized many Filipino
workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and
investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in
pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality
of a cynical deception at the hands of their own
countrymen.
Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the penultimate
paragraph in the excerpt quoted above out of context.

Page 23 of 48

The Court, in Panis, merely bemoaned the lack of

records that would help shed light on the meaning of the
proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding,
the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable
interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in
criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of
the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a "perfectly
vague act" whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at
all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise
language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is
not void for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the
ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a
showing that the defect is such that the courts are
unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of
certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this
connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that
"legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of
uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction
that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be
declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it
furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for
which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason
can devise and provide the means, and all the
instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within
the reach of those intrusted therewith."25
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant
apparently considers as customary and harmless acts
such as " labor or employment referral" ("referring" an
applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a
prospective employer) does not render the law
overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept
of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates
to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively
guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of
speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when
construed to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to
the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the
boundary between the constitutionally permissible and
the constitutionally impermissible applications of the
statute.26
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,27 for
instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth
provisions prohibiting the posting of election propaganda
in any place including private vehicles other than in
the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC.
We held that the challenged provisions not only deprived
the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also
deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and
information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so
broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed
rights and, hence, void for overbreadth. In the present
case, however, appellant did not even specify what
constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the
definition of "recruitment and placement" that would
render the same constitutionally overbroad.
Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause 28 in
her defense. She points out that although the evidence
purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out
application forms and even received Lourdes Modesto's

Page 24 of 48

payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged.

Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From
this, appellant concludes that the prosecution
discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins.
Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a
Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in
Zamboanga City.
The argument has no merit.
At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not
confined to the language of the statute under challenge
in determining whether that statute has any
discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its
face may be grossly discriminatory in its
operation.29 Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.30
The prosecution of one guilty person while others
equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by
itself, a denial of the equal protection of the
laws.31 Where the official action purports to be in
conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or
mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a
violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of
the equal protection of the laws.32 The unlawful
administration by officers of a statute fair on its face,
resulting in its unequal application to those who are
entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an
element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This
may appear on the face of the action taken with respect
to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown
by extrinsic evidence showing a
discriminatory design over another not to be inferred
from the action itself.But a discriminatory purpose is
not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear
and intentional discrimination."33 Appellant has failed
to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there
was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the part of
the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the
prosecution's sound assessment whether the evidence
before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person has
committed an offense.34 The presumption is that the
prosecuting officers regularly performed their
duties,35 and this presumption can be overcome only by
proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed,
appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome
this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a
Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime,
while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellant's
eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that
the prosecution officers denied appellant equal
protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining
appellant's prosecution.

While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on

a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that
they are to be protected in the commission of crime. It
would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a
defendant guilty of murder because others have
murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal
enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in
the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x
x. Protection of the law will be extended to all persons
equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no
person has the right to demand protection of the law in
the commission of a crime.36
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws
as to some persons should be converted into a defense
for others charged with crime, the result would be that
the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would
become an issue in the trial of many persons charged
with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would
suffer a complete breakdown.37
We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned
errors, all of which involve the finding of guilt by the trial
court.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements
concur. First, the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers.
Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within
the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined
under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.38 In case
of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is
added: that the accused commits said acts against three
or more persons, individually or as a group.39
In this case, the first element is present. The certification
of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that
appellant is not licensed or authorized to engage in
recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present. Appellant is
presumed engaged in recruitment and placement under
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both Nancy Araneta
and Lourdes Modesto testified that appellant promised
them employment for a fee. Their testimonies
corroborate each other on material points: the briefing
conducted by appellant, the time and place thereof, the
fees involved. Appellant has not shown that these
witnesses were incited by any motive to testify falsely
against her. The absence of evidence as to an improper
motive actuating the principal witnesses of the
prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no improper
motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full
faith and credence.40
Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the positive
declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Affirmative
testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the fact
asserted easily overrides negative testimony.41
That appellant did not receive any payment for the
promised or offered employment is of no moment. From
the language of the statute, the act of recruitment may

Page 25 of 48

be "for profit or not;" it suffices that the accused

"promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant
conviction for illegal recruitment.
The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as
they do from credible witnesses, meet the standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed
recruitment and placement. We therefore do not deem it
necessary to delve into the second and third assigned
errors assailing the legality of appellant's arrest and the
seizure of the application forms. A warrantless arrest,
when unlawful, has the effect of invalidating the search
incidental thereto and the articles so seized are rendered
inadmissible in evidence.42 Here, even if the documents
seized were deemed inadmissible, her conviction would
stand in view of Araneta and Modesto's testimonies.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the prosecution's
case by claiming in her ninth assigned error that Erlie
Ramos of the POEA supposedly "planted" the
application forms. She also assails his character,
alleging that he passed himself off as a lawyer, although
this was denied by Ramos.
The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense that has
been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it
can easily be concocted but difficult to prove.43 Apart
from her self-serving testimony, appellant has not offered
any evidence that she was indeed framed by Ramos.
She has not even hinted at any motive for Ramos to
frame her. Law enforcers are presumed to have
performed their duties regularly in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.44
Considering that the two elements of lack of license or
authority and the undertaking of an activity constituting
recruitment and placement are present, appellant, at the
very least, is liable for "simple" illegal recruitment. But is
she guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale? We find
that she is not.
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be
based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of
three or more persons whether individually or as a
group.45 In this case, only two persons, Araneta and
Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by
appellant. The third person named in the complaint as
having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn
Baez, was not presented in court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at least three
victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is necessary
that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense
was committed against three or more persons.46 In this
case, evidence that appellant likewise promised her
employment for a fee is sketchy. The only evidence that
tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy
Araneta, who said that she and her friends, Baez and
Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that they (she
and her "friends") filled up application forms.
The affidavit47 Baez executed jointly with Araneta cannot
support Araneta's testimony. The affidavit was neither
identified, nor its contents affirmed, by Baez. Insofar as it
purports to prove that appellant recruited Baez,
therefore, the affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible.48 In

any case, hearsay evidence, such as the said affidavit,

has little probative value.49
Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS
agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other persons
present in the briefing of January 30, 1994. Appellant is
accused of recruiting only the three persons named in
the information Araneta, Modesto and Baez. The
information does not include Fermindoza or the other
persons present in the briefing as among those
promised or offered employment for a fee. To convict
appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons
other than those alleged to have been offered or
promised employment for a fee would violate her right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her.50
In any event, the purpose of the offer of the testimonies
of Araneta, Morales and Fermindoza, respectively, was
limited as follows:
FISCAL BELDUA:
Your Honor please, we are offering the
oral testimony of the witness, as one of
those recruited by the accused, and also
to identify some exhibits for the
prosecution and as well as to identify
the accused.51
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
We are offering the oral testimony of the
witness, Your Honor, to testify on the
fact about her recruitment by the
accused and immediately before the
recruitment, as well as to identify some
exhibits for the prosecution, and also the
accused in this case, Your Honor.52
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:

Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that the

information is fatally defective since it charges her with
committing illegal recruitment in large scale on January
30, 1994 while the prosecution evidence supposedly
indicates that she committed the crime on February 2,
1994.
We find that the evidence for the prosecution regarding
the date of the commission of the crime does not vary
from that charged in the information. Both Nancy
Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that on January
30, 1994, while in the Alejandro residence, appellant
offered them employment for a fee. Thus, while the
arrest was effected only on February 2, 1994, the crime
had already been committed three (3) days earlier on
January 30, 1994.
The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively,
pertain to the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by
the trial court as well as the constitutionality of the law
prescribing the same, appellant arguing that it is
unconstitutional for being unduly harsh.55 Section 19 (1),
Article III of the Constitution states: "Excessive fines
shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted."
The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant
must be reduced. Because the prosecution was able to
prove that appellant committed recruitment and
placement against two persons only, she cannot be
convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale, which
requires that recruitment be committed against three or
more persons. Appellant can only be convicted of two
counts of "simple" illegal recruitment, one for that
committed against Nancy Araneta, and another count for
that committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is
sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four
(4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth assigned
error, which assumes that the proper imposable penalty
upon appellant is life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court
is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby declared guilty of
illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is sentenced,
for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6)
years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

1wphi1.nt

This witness is going to testify that at

around that date Your Honor, she was
connected with the CIS, that she was
instructed together with a companion to
conduct a surveillance on the place
where the illegal recruitment was
supposed to be going on, that she acted
as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain
the truthfulness of the illegal recruitment
going on, to identify the accused, as well
as to identify some exhibits for the
prosecution.53
xxx
Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the
purpose for which it was offered,54 and the purpose of the
offer of their testimonies did not include the proving of
the purported recruitment of other supposed applicants
by appellant.

Page 26 of 48

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179931

October 26, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NIDA ADESER y RICO, Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated June 28, 2007, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01902,
affirming the Decision2 dated May 2, 2005, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 118 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 03-2700 and 03-2701. The RTC

convicted appellant of the crimes of syndicated illegal

recruitment constituting economic sabotage and estafa.
On November 12, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Pasay filed before the RTC two Informations3 against
appellant Nida Adeser y Rico, Lourdes Chang, and the
spouses Roberto and Mel Tiongson. The Informations
read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 03-2700
That on or about and sometime in the month of May,
2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, by means of false
representation and fraudulent allegation to the effect that
they could secure employment abroad for complainant
JOSEPHINE R. PALO, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit for a fee aforesaid
person without the corresponding license from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a
syndicated illegal recruitment involving economic
sabotage.

meeting held at the Naples office in Villaruel Tower,

Villaruel Street, Pasay City, appellant and the spouses
Tiongson informed Palo that for a placement fee
of P80,000, she can work as an apple picker in Australia
with a monthly salary of $1,400.
Thus, on November 8, 2002, Palo and Caraig went to
the Naples office and gave Roberto Tiongson and
Lourdes Chang, operations manager of Naples, P15,000
as first installment for the placement fee. Palo was
issued a voucher7 signed by Roberto and Chang stating
therein that the P15,000 was for Palos visa application.
On November 11, 2002, Palo and Caraig returned to the
Naples office and paid P58,500. She was again issued a
voucher8 signed by Roberto and Chang stating therein
that the amount paid was for Palos visa application.
Palo insisted that the voucher should indicate that her
payments were for "placement fees" but they were able
to convince her that it is not necessary because they
know her.
After making her payments, she was required to submit
her resume and pictures and was promised that she
would be employed within three months.

Contrary to law.4
Criminal Case No. 03-2701
That on or about and sometime in the month of May,
2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, defrauded private
complainant JOSEPHINE R. PALO, in the following
manner to wit: that said accused, by means of false
representations and fraudulent allegations that they
could facilitate private complainants working and travel
papers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously ask, demand and receive from the said
complainant the amount of P80,000.00 as placement fee
for the latters supposed deployment to Australia as
"Apple Picker/Office Worker"; and said private
complainant carried away by said misrepresentations, in
fact gave and delivered to said accused the amount
of P80,000.00, which amount accused in turn
misapplied, misappropriated and converted to their own
personal use and benefit, failing, however, to deploy
private complainant to Australia, and despite repeated
demands accused failed and refused to do so, or
account for the said amount, to the damage and
prejudice of the said private complainant in the aforesaid
amount of P80,000.00.
Contrary to law.5
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty6 to both
charges while her co-accused remained at large. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.
Private complainant Josephine R. Palo and her sister
Teresa Caraig testified that sometime in November
2002, the spouses Roberto and Mel Tiongson, agents of
Naples Travel and Tours, introduced Palo to appellant,
owner and general manager of Naples, to discuss
employment opportunities in Australia. During their

Page 27 of 48

More than three months passed, however, but Palo was

not deployed to Australia. Neither did she get her
Australian visa.
In May 2003, she learned from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) that Naples had closed down. NBI
likewise informed her that Naples had no license to
operate and deploy workers abroad. Upon advice of the
NBI, Palo filed a complaint9 against appellant, the
spouses Tiongson and Chang.
Appellant on the other hand denied the charges against
her. She admitted that she was the owner and general
manager of Naples which was a travel agency that
offered visa assistance, ticketing, documentation, airport
transfer and courier services, but denied having
engaged in recruitment. She claimed that she cannot
remember meeting Palo in her office and asserted that
she met her for the first time only at the fiscals office
when Palo was already claiming for a refund. She
testified that Roberto, to whom Palo claims to have given
her payment, was neither her employee nor her agent
but was only her drivers brother. Based on her records,
Roberto endorsed to her office P30,000 from Palo for
tourist visa assistance. Appellant also admitted that she
and Roberto offered to settle the P30,000 but not the
amount claimed by Palo per vouchers issued to her.
On May 2, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision
finding appellant guilty of both charges. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered NIDA
ADESER is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
constituting Economic Sabotage in Criminal Case No.
03-2700 andEstafa in Criminal Case No. 03-2701.
Accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
following penalties:

1. In Criminal Case No. 3-2700 LIFE

IMPRISONMENT and a FINE of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), and
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2701 Indeterminate
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 13 years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify Josephine R. Palo the sum of Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) with legal interest
from the time of the filing of the information.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.10
Appellant appealed her conviction but the same was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
June 28, 2007. The appellate court did not give
credence to appellants denials and found that the
prosecution evidence fully supports the finding that
appellant and her co-accused engaged in recruitment
and placement as defined under the Labor Code despite
having no authority to do so. It likewise held that the
same evidence proving the commission of the crime of
illegal recruitment also established that appellant and
her co-accused acted in unity in defrauding Palo and in
misrepresenting to her that upon payment of the
placement fee, they could obtain employment abroad for
her. The appellants act of deception and the resultant
damage suffered by Palo render appellant guilty
of estafa.
In this appeal, appellant raises the following lone
assignment of error:
THE [APPELLATE] COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.11
Essentially, the issue is whether appellants guilt for the
crimes of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that she was able to prove that she
was not part of the group that defrauded Palo. She
points out that as can be gleaned from the facts
established and even from Palos testimony, she was not
involved in the evil scheme orchestrated by Roberto and
Chang as her signature did not even appear on the
vouchers issued to Palo.
Appellant likewise contends that the elements of the
crime of illegal recruitment were not established with
moral certainty. Naples was never into recruitment as it
was only engaged in the business of assisting clients
procure passports and visas. She argues that it should
be Roberto and Chang who should be convicted as she
had no hand in recruiting Palo.
Appellants arguments are bereft of merit.
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two
elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license

Page 28 of 48

or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully

engage in the recruitment and placement of workers,
and (2) the offenders undertake any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement defined in Article
13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in Article
34 of the Labor Code. Under Article 13(b), recruitment
and placement refers to "any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the
simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by
persons who, without authority from the government,
give the impression that they have the power to send
workers abroad for employment purposes.12 The law
imposes a higher penalty when the crime is committed
by a syndicate as it is considered as an offense involving
economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme
defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the
Labor Code.13
Undoubtedly, what transpired in the instant case is illegal
recruitment by a syndicate. As categorically testified by
Palo and Caraig, appellant, together with her coaccused, made representations to Palo that they could
send her to Australia to work as an apple picker. There is
no denying that they gave Palo the distinct impression
that they had the power or ability to send her abroad for
work such that the latter was convinced to part with a
huge amount of money as placement fee in order to be
employed. And this act was committed by appellant and
her co-accused even if they did not have the required
license to do so. Appellant herself admitted that Naples,
the travel agency which she owned and managed, only
offered visa assistance, ticketing, documentation, airport
transfer and courier services. Clearly, neither she nor her
agents had a license to recruit Palo to work abroad. It is
the lack of the necessary license or authority that
renders the recruitment unlawful or criminal.14
Thus, as against the positive and categorical testimonies
of Palo and Caraig, appellants denials cannot
prevail.15Moreover, there is no reason to overturn the trial
and appellate courts findings on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses as there is no showing that any of
them had ill motives against appellant or her co-accused
and especially since it appears they were motivated
solely by the desire to bring appellant and her coaccused to justice for the crimes they have committed. 16
Neither can this Court sustain appellants contention that
her participation in the recruitment is negated by the fact
that her signature does not even appear on the vouchers
issued to Palo. Even if Palo did not present receipts
signed by appellant, this would not rule out the fact that
appellant did receive the money. This Court has
consistently ruled that absence of receipts as to the
amounts delivered to a recruiter does not mean that the
recruiter did not accept or receive such payments.
Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of
evidence is the presentation of receipts required in order
to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and
the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases.

Such proof may come from the credible testimonies of

witnesses17 as in the case at bar.
We likewise uphold appellants conviction for estafa. A
person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may also
be convicted of estafa under Article 315(2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are
present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the
accused and as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.18
Such is the case before us. Palo parted with her money
upon the prodding and enticement of appellant and her
co-accused on the false pretense that they had the
capacity to deploy her for employment in Australia.
Unfortunately, however, Palo was not able to work
abroad nor get her Australian visa. Worse, she did not
get her money back.
As to the penalties, Section 7 of Republic Act No.
804219 or the Migrant Workers Act of 1995 provides the
penalties for illegal recruitment:
SEC. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not
more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less
than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein. (Emphasis supplied.)

latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall

be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be;
xxxx
Considering that the total amount paid by Palo
is P73,500 or P51,500 in excess of the P22,000 limit, an
additional sentence of five years should be imposed
based on the above-quoted provision. Thus, appellant
was correctly meted the maximum penalty of 13 years
of reclusion temporal.
1avvphi1

As to the amount to be indemnified to Palo, contrary to

the findings of the trial and appellate courts, Palos
testimony and the vouchers she presented establish that
the total amount she paid is only P73,50020 and not
theP80,000 quoted as placement fee. Thus, she should
only be indemnified the said amount, plus legal interest
of 12% per annum from the time of filing of the
information.21
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated June 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01902 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The amount to be indemnified to
private complainant Josephine R. Palo is reduced to
Seventy-Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P73,500) with legal interest of 12% per annum from the
time of filing of the information until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145734-35

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS, ANGEL MATEO, AIDA DE
LEON (at large) and JEAN AM-AMLAW (at
large),appellants.

xxxx
As appellant was found guilty of syndicated illegal
recruitment constituting economic sabotage, she was
aptly meted out the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P500,000.
With respect to the estafa case, Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the

Page 29 of 48

October 15, 2002

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Illegal recruiters prey on our gullible and impoverished
people by inveigling them with false or fraudulent
promises of attractive employment in foreign shores.
Such vultures deserve the full sanction of the law.
The Case
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo appeal the
March 6, 2000 Joint Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City (Branch 138), finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and
estafa. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court rules

"1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112[,] accused
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo are
pronounced guilty of violating Section 6, of
Republic Act No. 8042, the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and they are both
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment. Pursuant
to the last paragraph of Section 7, Republic Act
No. 8042, considering that both accused are
non-licensers or non-holders of authority, they
are both sentenced to pay fines of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) each. Both accused are
ordered to indemnify both complainants jointly
and severally of the amount of P118,000.00, the
net amount after deducting the recovery
of P40,000.00. They are likewise ordered to pay
both complainants jointly and severally the
amounts of P24,000.00 as reimbursement for
traveling expenses; P4,000.00 as rental for
boarding house, and P100,000.00 as unrealized
income;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113[,] accused
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo are
guilty of violating Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code and they are both
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal.
"No civil liability need be imposed considering that in
Criminal Case No. 99-1112 the same was already
provided.
"Let the case as against Jane Am-amlao and Aida de
Leon be sent to the archives to be revived upon arrest,
surrender or acquisition of jurisdiction over their person.
"SO ORDERED."2
Two separate Informations,3 both dated April 20, 1999,
charged appellants with syndicated illegal recruitment
under Republic Act (RA) 80424 and estafa under
paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code.5
In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, they were charged as
follows:
"That on or about March, 1998 and thereafter in Makati
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with each other, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit the
herein complainants, MELCHOR F. DEGSI and
PERPETUA L. DEGSI for employment as an office
worker and as a cook or mechanic in Japan, for and in
consideration thereof, they were required to pay the
amount of P158,600.00 as alleged placement and
processing fees, which the complainants delivered and
paid the amount of P158,600.00 Philippine Currency,
without the accused having deployed the complainants
despite the lapse of several months, to their damage and
prejudice."6
In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, the Information reads:
"That on or about March, 1998 and thereafter in Makati
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

Page 30 of 48

conspiring and confederating with each other, did then

and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit and
promise employment to spouses MELCHOR and
PERPETUA DEGSI in Japan for a total consideration of
one hundred fifty eight thousand and six hundred pesos
(P158,600.00) as placement and processing fees,
knowing that they have no capacity whatsoever and with
no intention to fulfill their promise, but merely as a
pretext, scheme or excuse to get or exact money from
said complainant as they in fact collected and received
the amount of P158,600.00 from said MELCHOR and
PERPETUA DEGSI to their damage, loss and prejudice
for the aforesaid amount."7
With the assistance of their counsel de oficio,8 appellants
pleaded not guilty to the charges during their
arraignment on July 27, 1999.9
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) relates how
appellants, despite their lack of authority or license,
represented themselves as persons who had the
capacity to send the victims abroad for employment. We
quote its version of the facts as follows:
"The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely,
Melchor Degsi and Perpetua Degsi (Complainants for
brevity) and Priscilla Marreo (or Priscilla Marelo).
"The prosecution and appellants stipulated that
appellants are not licensed or authorized to recruit
workers for employment abroad, in lieu of the testimony
of Senior Labor Researcher Johnson Bolivar of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
"Complainants are husband and wife, residents of
Baguio City. They made a living earning an average
ofP20,000.00 a month by selling fish and vegetables in a
rented stall in said City, at least until March 24, 1998
when they closed shop for reasons of attending to the
demands of the promised jobs for them in Japan. Both
categorically identified Jane Am-amlao (or Jean Amamlaw), their co-vendor in Baguio City Market, as the
person who approached them and assured them that
she knew a legal recruiter, an ex-POEA employee, who
had the capacity to send them both abroad. Jane Amamlaw (or Am-amlaw for brevity) recruited complainants
and personally accompanied them on March 24, 1998 to
meet the person she earlier referred to, or Aida de Leon
(or Alma de Leon), in the latters apartment at No. 7280
J. Victor St., Pio del Pilar, Makati.
"Complainants likewise categorically identified Aida de
Leon (de leon for brevity) as the person who arranged a
meeting in her apartment on March 24, 1998 between
complainants and appellant Angel Mateo (Mateo for
brevity) whom de Leon introduced as their contact
person for Japan-bound workers. In said meeting, Mateo
represented himself as having the capacity to send
people abroad and showed complainants various
documents to convince them of his legitimate
recruitment operations. Convinced that Mateo had
indeed the capacity to facilitate their employment as an
office worker and as a cook or mechanic in Japan,
complainants, on that same day, handed
Mateo P15,000.00 which Mateo required them to pay for

their processing fees. This was to be the first of a series

of sums of money to be extracted from complainants.

been shown to them by Mateo to prove the legality of his

recruitment operations."10 (Citations omitted)

"Complainants were able to positively identify Mateo in

court as the contact person of de Leon and who
collected from them, from March 24, 1998 to June 23,
1998, sums of money for the alleged necessary
expenses relative to the promised jobs awaiting them in
Japan in the total amount of P158,600.00. Complainants
likewise categorically identified Mateo as the same
person whose authorization was needed for the recovery
of P40,000.00 of theP45,000.00 they gave Mateo who in
turn deposited it to Sampaguita Travel Agency under his
own name.

Version of the Defense

"Complainants likewise positively identified appellant

Vicenta Vicky Lapis (Lapis for brevity) in Court as the
person introduced to them by Mateo as his wife on April
29, 1998 at Maxs Restaurant in Makati when Lapis
required complainants to pay P49,240.00 for their plane
tickets and travel taxes. Lapis is, in fact, only the live-in
partner of Mateo. Lapis told complainants that she was
helping to speed up the process[ing] of their papers
relative to the promised jobs awaiting them in Japan.
Complainants met again Lapis, who was with Mateo on
May 2, 1998 at the Makati Restaurant, annex of Maxs
Restaurant, when Lapis assured them that Mateo could
really send them abroad and even wrote in a piece of
paper appellants address at Phase I, Lot 14, Blk 13
Mary Cris Subd., Imus, Cavite. On May 17, 1998,
complainants once more met Lapis who was with Mateo,
de Leon and de Leons husband in Baguio City at the
house of Priscilla Marreos daughter. Both appellants
updated complainant as to the status of their paper and
reiterated their promise that complainants would soon be
leaving for Japan, then collected from complainants
unreceipted amount of P20,000.00. Complainants met
again with Lapis, who was again with Mateo, on May 19,
1998 at the Sampaguita Travel Agency. Mateo
extracted P45,000.00 from complainants and deposited
it under his name. On that occasion, Perpetua wanted to
ask from the Sampaguita Travel Agencys employees
where to pay the P45,000.00 but failed to do so because
Lapis took her attention away from asking while Mateo
asked Melchor to hand over to him said sum.
"Priscilla Marreo (Priscilla for brevity) is the sister of
Melchor who loaned complainants part of
the P158,000.00 which appellants extracted from
complainant[s]. Thus, she made herself present in most
of the meetings between complainants and appellants
together with the two other accused where she
witnessed the assurances and promises made by
appellants relative to complainants immediate departure
for Japan and their corresponding demands of sums of
money. The testimony of Priscilla underscored the
testimony of complainants showing that Am-amlaw, de
Leon, Lapis and Mateo indeed corroborated and
confederated in the commission of illegal recruitment.
"The prosecution presented documentary evidence,
such as varied unofficial receipts all bearing the
signature of Mateo; Sinumpaang Salaysay of Perpetua
L. Degsi executed on July 21, 1998; Affidavit executed
by complainants on July 21, 1998; Requirement for
Guarantee Letter of Visa bearing the names of both
private complainants; Request for Certification of POEACIDG, Team to Mr. Hermogenes Mateo, Director II,
Licensing Branch of POEA as represented by Johnson
Bolivar, Senior Labor Researcher of POEA, and the
various documents that complainants alleged to have

Page 31 of 48

For their part, appellants deny that they were engaged in

recruitment activities, and that they promised foreign
employment to the victims. Below is the version of the
facts presented by the defense:
"VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS testified that she is the live-in
partner of her co-accused Mateo. They have been living
together for almost three (3) years. According to her, she
first met both complainants at Maxs Restaurant in
Makati when they talked to accused Mateo. She was
there only to accompany her live-in partner. The subject
of the conversation between the complainants and
accused Mateo was a contract in Baguio City. She did
not see complainant deliver money to accused Mateo
while they were in that meeting. She also has no
knowledge about the transaction between complainant
and accused Mateo. She admitted that she went to
Baguio City together with accused Mateo to talk to the
City Mayor. She likewise admitted that the handwriting
appearing in Exhibit F is hers but the reason why she
gave it was only to comply to the request of the
complainant Perpetua Degsi regarding a matter to be
followed up at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The result of her follow-up rendered was that
complainant Perpetua Degsi has a pending case of
estafa.
"ANGEL MATEO averred that he is engaged in the
importation of heavy equipment and containers but he
has never been engaged in recruitment. To prove that he
was really engaged in the delivery of heavy equipment,
he presented a document of Import Service signed by a
certain Alexander Arcilla addressed to Honorable
Timoteo Encar Jr., City Mayor, Cavite City dated March
14, 1997 and were marked as Exhibit 1 and 1-a. He
also presented another document of Import Services
issued by the Department of Trade and Industry
addressed to Honorable Mayor Maliksi as Municipal
Mayor of Imus, Cavite; a photocopy of a Bill of Lading
from Trade Bulk cargoes by Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc.; and Invoice of used vehicles, airconditioners and
washing machines and the packing list which were all
marked as Exhibits 3 to 5. Sometime in March 24, 1998,
he met the complainants at Pio del Pilar, in Makati City
at the apartment of accused Aida de Leon. He went
there to follow-up their transaction about heavy
equipment with Mayor Binay because, it was accused de
Leon who entered the transaction with Mayor Binay.
While he was there, the complainants were introduced to
him by accused de Leon. He admitted meeting the
complainants on April 29, 1998 at Maxs Restaurant but
the reason was for him to meet Mrs. Marero in person
and also because complainant Perpetua Degsi has a
pending case for large scale estafa and she needed a
clearance. He denied having signed Exhibit B. He
further claimed that the topic of their meeting was to
supply heavy equipment in Baguio City. He denied
having asked for P50,000.00 on May 6, 1999. He
likewise denied signing the receipt showing the total
amount of P158,600.00."11
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court held that the evidence for the prosecution
sufficiently established the criminal liability of appellants
for the crimes charged. It ruled in this manner:

"Evidence for the prosecution clearly established that

both complainants were enticed by accused Mateo and
were led to believe that the latter has the capacity to
send them for employment to Japan. Complainant
Melchor Degsi and his wife Perpetua Degsi both testified
to this fact. Acting on their belief that indeed accused
Mateo can deploy them to Japan, amounts were
disbursed by both complainants to accused Mateo to
cover the processing and placement fees. x x x The
Court finds the evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficient to establish that accused Mateo violated
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 when he demanded
amounts for placement and processing fees but he failed
to deploy both complainants. The Court has a similar
conclusion insofar as the accusation for estafa is
concerned as the evidence shows accused Mateo knew
beforehand that he has no capacity to deploy both
complainants abroad and that the enticement to work
abroad was merely a scheme or plan to exact money
from both complainants. Deception was proven.
"Insofar as the accused Lapis is concerned it is to be
noted that the theory of the prosecution is that she acted
in conspiracy with her co-accused Mateo who is her livein partner. Evidence for the prosecution shows that at
least on three (3) occasions accused Lapis was present
when accused Mateo asked and received money from
complainants in connection with their intended
employment in Japan. x x x The Court conclude[d] that
accused Lapis has knowledge of the intention of her coaccused Mateo in asking for money from both
complainants. There was active participation on her part
in the recruitment of both complainants and in deceiving
them about the capacity to secure employment. The
Court believes that conspiracy was established beyond
reasonable doubt. Her defense of ignorance of the
transaction cannot be considered given the positive
evidence presented by the prosecution which should
prevail over her plain denial."12
Hence, this appeal.13
The Issues
In their Brief, appellants interpose the following
assignment of errors:
"I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations
of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) committed by a
syndicate and Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.
"II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accusedappellant Vicenta Medina Lapis guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa.
"III
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate.
"IV

Page 32 of 48

The court a quo gravely erred in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended."14
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
Appellants aver that the finding of syndicated illegal
recruitment by the lower court was erroneous; its
conclusion that the offense was committed by three (3)
or more persons had no factual or legal basis. Allegedly,
without sufficient evidence, the trial court wrongfully
presumed that all of them had acted in conspiracy.
According to them, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that they had conspired and
confederated in illegally recruiting complainants.
Appellants conclude that, if at all, they could only be held
liable for illegal recruitment in its simple form. We
disagree.
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two
elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license
or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers,
and (2) the offenders undertake any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement15 defined in Article
13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in Article
34 of the Labor Code.16
Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to
"any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers[;] and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not." In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment
is committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the
power to send workers abroad for employment
purposes.17
We believe that the prosecution was able to establish
the elements of the offense sufficiently. The case records
reveal that appellants did in fact engage in recruitment
and placement activities by promising complainants
employment in Japan. Undisputed is the fact that the
former did not have any valid authority or license to
engage in recruitment and placement activities.
Moreover, the pieces of testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution clearly show that,
in consideration of their promise of foreign employment,
they indeed received various amounts of money from
complainants totalling P158,600.
Where appellants made misrepresentations concerning
their purported power and authority to recruit for
overseas employment, and in the process, collected
from complainants various amounts in the guise of
placement fees, the former clearly committed acts
constitutive of illegal recruitment.18 In fact, this Court held
that illegal recruiters need not even expressly represent
themselves to the victims as persons who have the
ability to send workers abroad. It is enough that these
recruiters give the impression that they have the ability

to enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to

induce the latter to tender payment of fees.19
It is also important to determine whether illegal
recruitment committed by appellants can be qualified as
a syndicated illegal recruitment or an offense involving
economic sabotage.

Q When Jane Am-Amlao told you that she

knows somebody who has the capacity to send
you abroad what happened next?
A On March 24, 1998 Jane accompanied us
here in Manila.
Q Where in Manila particularly?

Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant

Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, provides
that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage when it is committed by a
syndicate or carried out by a group of three or more
persons conspiring and confederating with one another.

A At No. 72 J. Victor Street, Pio del Pilar, Makati

in the apartment of Aida de Leon.
Q So what happened at the apartment of Aida
de Leon?

In several cases, illegal recruitment has been deemed

committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating
with each other in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under Article
38(b) of the Labor Code.20

A Jane told us that Aida de Leon was an exemployee of POEA and she was able to send
many workers abroad.

In this case, it cannot be denied that all four (4) accused

-- Jane Am-amlaw, Aida de Leon, Angel Mateo and
Vicenta Medina Lapis participated in a network of
deception. Verily, the active involvement of each in the
various phases of the recruitment scam formed part of a
series of machinations. Their scheme was to lure
complainants to Manila and to divest them of their hardearned money on the pretext of guaranteed employment
abroad. The prosecution evidence shows that
complainants were convinced by Jane Am-amlaw to go
to Manila to meet someone who could find employment
for them abroad. Upon reaching the city, they were
introduced to Aida de Leon and Angel Mateo; Mateo
claimed to have the contacts, the resources and the
capacity to employ them overseas. After that initial
meeting, complainants made several payments to him,
supposedly for the processing requirements of their
deployment to Japan. Later on, they met Vicenta Medina
Lapis who volunteered her assistance in the processing
of their employment papers and assured them that
Mateo could easily send them abroad. Complainant
Perpetua Degsi testified on the devious trail of
transactions with all of the accused as follows:

A Yes, maam.

"Q How did you come to know the accused in

this case?
A They were introduced to me by one Aida de
Leon and Jane Am-Amlao.
Q Who is this Jane Am-Amlao you are referring
to?
A She is our co-member in Baguio.
Q What is she in relation to your recruitment by
Angel Mateo and Vicenta Lapis?
A She was the first one who mentioned to us
that she knows somebody who has the capacity
to send us abroad.
Q When was this?
A March, 1998.

Page 33 of 48

Q Were you able to meet Aida de Leon?

Q What happened when you met her?

A Aida called us by phone and according to her
she has the contact person who can explain [to]
us the details on how to be able to work abroad.
Q After Aida called you up on the phone what
happened next?
A We waited because according to her, that
person is coming over to the house.
Q A[fter] waiting what happened after that?
A ANGEL MATEO arrived and he was
introduced to me as the contact person and we
could ask him how we could work abroad.
Q Who is this siya, you are referring to?
A ANGEL MATEO.
Q Who introduced you to ANGEL MATEO?
A AIDA DE LEON.
Q After introducing you to ANGEL MATEO what
happened?
A ANGEL MATEO showed us some documents
AND HE WAS ABLE TO convince us that he has
the capacity to send us abroad.
Q What documents were shown to you?
A Incorporation documents of two companies
one, Philippine company and one is Japan
company and some other documents they made
in order to send workers abroad.
Q After convincing you that he can send you
abroad what happened after that?

A He asked for a processing fee and I asked him

how much.

Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO asked for the

balance of P5,000.00, were you able to pay the
said amount to ANGEL MATEO?

Q What did he tell you?

A Yes, maam.
A He told me that he does not know because
AIDA DE LEON will be the one to give us the
price.
Q After that what happened?
A I asked AIDA how much and she answered,
twenty thousand pesos.
Q After telling you that the amount is P20,000.00
what happened next?

xxxxxxxxx
Q After receiving said amount of P5,000.00 what
happened?
A After that meeting at Pasay City we parted
ways but [he] did not issue us any receipt so on
April 15, [he] again called us up and told me that
he needs NBI clearance so we processed our
NBI clearance.

A We went to the bank to withdraw P20,000.00

but we were only able to withdraw P15,000.00
and then we handed the P15,000.00 to ANGEL
MATEO, in front of Jane Am-Amlaw.

Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO called you,

where were you at that time?

Q After receiving said amount from you by

ANGEL MATEO what happened next?

Q Were you able to come here in Manila?

A Baguio City.

A Yes maam, we met in Quiapo.

A We parted ways.
Q Was there anything else that happened after
that?

Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in

QUIAPO?
A [He] did not arrive in Quiapo.

A Before we parted ways, [he] asked from us

other documents like ID, birth certificate,
marriage contract in order for him to begin
processing our papers.
Q After that what happened next?

Q So what did you do?

A We proceeded [to] the NBI and we called up
AIDA and asked her why ANGEL MATEO did not
arrive and whom did AIDA talk to.

A On March 31, we went back to [him] and we

gave [him] the other documents needed and we
also gave [him] the balance for the processing
fee.

Q What was the reply of AIDA DE LEON?

Q Who is this niya or he you are referring to?

Q After that what happened?

A Angel Mateo.

A The processing of our NBI clearance did not

finish so on April 15 ANGEL MATEO asked
for P2,000.00 in order to help us process the
NBI.

Q Where did you meet?

A [He] called me and we met in the apartment of
AIDA.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in the
apartment of AIDA DE LEON?

A She told me that whatever ANGEL MATEO

would tell us, thats what we should follow.

Q After calling you on April 15, what happened

next?

A Yes.

A On April 29, 1998 me, my sister, Melchor, and

Melchors sister together with ANGEL MATEO
met at Maxs Restaurant in Makati.

Q What happened there?

xxxxxxxxx

A We gave [him] the documents and we started

processing the documents

Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO?

Q What are those documents that you gave to

ANGEL MATEO?
A Birth certificate authenticated, marriage
contract and passport IDs and then we went to
Pasay City to start the processing of the
passport.

Page 34 of 48

A Yes maam, they arrived together with

somebody whom [she] introduced to us as [his]
wife.
Q Who is this wife you are referring to?

A She is Vicky Lapis, and later on we found out

that she is Vicenta Medina Lapis.
Q What was this meeting all about?
A We were updated on what was happening on
our papers and then ANGEL MATEO AND
VICENTA LAPIS asked for a plane ticket.
Q What was the update for the processing of
your papers?
xxxxxxxxx
A Vicenta Lapis told us that she is just helping to
speed up the processing of papers so that we
could be sent abroad immediately and she even
showed us some documents and I even told her
that I could help them in typing those
documents."21
The foregoing testimony very clearly
demonstrates that the individual actuations of all
four (4) accused were directed at a singular
criminal purpose -- to delude complainants into
believing that they would be employed abroad.
The nature and the extent of the formers
interactions among themselves as well as with
the latter clearly show unity of action towards a
common undertaking. Certainly, complainants
would not have gone to Manila to meet Aida de
Leon and Angel Mateo without the prodding of
Am-amlaw. They would not have made various
payments for their travel and employment
papers without the fraudulent representations of
Mateo De Leon. Moreover, they would not have
complied with further instructions and demands
of Mateo without the repeated assurances made
by Lapis.
Even assuming that the individual acts of the
accused were not necessarily indispensable to
the commission of the offense, conspiracy would
have still been present. Their actions, when
viewed in relation to one another, showed a
unity of purpose towards a common criminal
enterprise and a concurrence in their resolve to
commit it.
In People v. Gamboa,22 the Court had occasion
to discuss the nature of conspiracy in the
context of illegal recruitment as follows:
"Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas
contract workers was evident from the acts of
the malefactors whose conduct before, during
and after the commission of the crime clearly
indicated that they were one in purpose and
united in execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary
as it may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to
a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. As such, all the accused,
including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of
the crime of illegal recruitment since in a
conspiracy the act of one is the act of
all."23 (Emphasis supplied)

Page 35 of 48

To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that

there be actual proof that all the conspirators
took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that
they acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.24
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with
the criminal design of another, indicated by the
performance of an overt act leading to the crime
committed.25
The OSG avers, as an incident to this issue, and
in line with People v. Yabut,26 that complainants
are entitled to recover interest on the amount
of P118,000, which the trial court awarded from
the time of the filing of the Information until fully
paid. We agree with the OSGs observation and
hereby grant the legal interest on the amount
prayed for.
In a number of cases,27 this Court has affirmed
the trial courts finding that victims of illegal
recruitment are entitled to legal interest on the
amount to be recovered as indemnity, from the
time of the filing of the information until fully
paid.
Second Issue:
Appellants Liability for Estafa
Appellants argue that in a prosecution for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, it
is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting of
fraudulent representations or false statements of the
accused, be made prior to or simultaneous with the
delivery of the thing; and that such misrepresentations or
false statements induce the complainants to part with the
object of the crime. The former allege that the
prosecution failed to point out with certainty whether
their misrepresentations or false statements were made
prior to or at least simultaneous with the latters delivery
of the money.
Under the cited provision of the Revised Penal Code,
estafa is committed by any person who defrauds another
by using a fictitious name; or by falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business; by imaginary transactions or similar
forms of deceit executed prior to or simultaneous with
the fraud.28 Moreover, these false pretenses should have
been the very reason that motivated complainants to
deliver property or pay money to the perpetrators of the
fraud. While appellants insist that these constitutive
elements of the crime were not sufficiently shown by the
prosecution, the records of the case prove otherwise.
During almost all of their meetings, complainants paid
various amounts of money to appellants only after
hearing the feigned assurances proffered by the latter
regarding the formers employment prospects in Japan.
Even as early as their first meeting in the house of Aida
de Leon, the payment by complainants of the initial
amount ofP15,000 was immediately preceded by an
onslaught of promises. These enticing, albeit empty,
promises were made by Angel Mateo, who even showed
them documents purportedly evincing his connections
with various foreign companies. Equally important, they
relied on such misrepresentations, which convinced
them to pay the initial amount as "processing fees."

Complainant Melchor Degsi testified on the matter in this

wise:

insidious words and machinations, appellants deluded

complainants into believing that, for a fee, the latter
would be provided overseas jobs.31

"Prosecutor Ong:
So when Angel Mateo arrived at the apartment of Aida
de Leon, what did he do, if any?
Witness:
He introduced himself to us and told us that he
can easily send us to Japan because he knows
many Japanese employers and he also showed
us some documents, maam. (Nagpakilala siya
at ang sabi niya ay kayang-kaya niya kaming
padalhin sa Japan dahil marami siyang
kilalang Japanese employer at may ipinakita
siyang mga dokumento, maam).
Q What are these documents, if you remember,
that were shown to you?
A Papers of Japanese companies, Clean
Supplies Co. Ltd., Arabian Boy Express
Corporation and that is the reason why we were
convinced, maam.
Q So, after being convinced that Angel Mateo
can send you abroad, what did you do after
that?
A Nakumbinsi nga po kami at pagkatapos noon
ay nag-usap-usap silang tatlo nina Jean Amamlaw at humihingi na sila ng processing fee
na P20,000, maam.
Q So what did you do when they were already
asking for the amount of P20,000 from you as
processing fee?
A We told them that we do not have any money
that time and we have to withdraw from the bank
and then we went to Pasay and we withdrew the
amount of P15,000.00 so that was the only
amount we were able to give them that time,
maam.
Q Who were with you when you withdrew the
said amount from the bank in Pasay?
A Jean Am-amlaw and Angel Mateo, maam.
Q Who received the amount of P15,000?
A Angel Mateo in front of Jean Am-amlaw,
maam."29 (Emphasis supplied)
p align="justify">From the foregoing, it is evident that the
false statements that convinced complainants of the
authenticity of the transaction were made prior to their
payment of the various fees. Indubitably, the requirement
that the fraudulent statements should have been made
prior to or simultaneous with the actual payment was
satisfied.
Verily, by their acts of falsely representing themselves as
persons who had the power and the capacity to recruit
workers for abroad, appellants induced complainants to
pay the required fees.30 There is estafa if, through

Page 36 of 48

Although we agree with the ruling of the RTC convicting

appellants of estafa, we note that it failed to apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalty.
Under Section 1 of that law, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty properly
imposed, considering the attending circumstances; while
the minimum term shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the
Code.32 Hence, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the trial court should have fixed the minimum and
the maximum penalties.33
The Revised Penal Code provides the penalties for
estafa as follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -- Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000.00 but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be." (Italics supplied)
Considering that complainants were defrauded in excess
of the P22,000 limit fixed by law, the maximum penalty of
prision mayor should be imposed in its minimum period,
or six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, plus
one (1) year for each additional P10,000 in excess of
the P22,000 limit. The total amount defrauded from the
complainants was P158,600 -- or P136,600 in excess
of P22,000, which translates to an additional prison
sentence of thirteen (13) years based on the
aforementioned computation. Accordingly, the maximum
penalty to be imposed should be nineteen (19) years
and one (1) day to twenty-one (21) years, thus raising
the penalty to reclusion temporal. However, the penal
provisions for the crime of estafa provide that the total
penalty to be imposed should not in any case exceed
twenty (20) years imprisonment.
In Criminal Case No. 99-1113 for estafa, consonant with
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants should thus
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor which is the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by the Code for the offense to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Indeed, the
expression "the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
said Code for the offense," used in Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, means the penalty next
lower than that determined by the court in the case
before it as the maximum.34
Third Issue:
Liability as Co-conspirator

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court should not

have convicted Vicenta Medina Lapis because the
prosecution evidence did not sufficiently prove her
participation in the conspiracy to defraud the victims.
They maintain that she merely accompanied Angel
Mateo during his meetings with complainants and that
she had no knowledge of the intentions of her coaccused. They add that mere knowledge, acquiescence
or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute
one as a co-conspirator.
We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, Lapis not
only knew of the conspiracy, but she also offered her
assistance in the processing of the employment
requirements of complainants. Contrary to her claim that
she was merely an unknowing spectator in the
underhanded transactions, she deliberately inveigled
them into pursuing the promise of foreign employment.
The records clearly bely her claim of innocence and
indicate that her participation in the criminal scheme
transcends mere knowledge or acquiescence.
Complainant Melchor Degsi describes one of the many
instances of how deeply involved Lapis was in the whole
recruitment charade:
"Prosecutor Ong:
Mr. Witness, you testified a while ago that you were at
Max Restaurant together with Vicenta Lapis and Angel
Mateo?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Q: Could you remember what Vicenta Medina
[Lapis] said to you?
A: She promised that we will be sent to Japan
sooner as OCW, maam.
Q: Could you recall how she said it?
A: She said Sigurado kay, makakapunta kayo
ng Japan, maam.
Q: During that time that she was telling
you sigurado kay makakapunta kayo ng Japan,
did she show you anything?
A: Tinanong namin ang address nila at kusang
loob na ibinigay ni Vicenta Medina [Lapis] sa
amin ang address at direksyon para makapunta
kami sa Imus, Cavite, maam.
Q: What was the reason why Vicenta Medina
Lapis gave you the address?
A: Para sigurado raw kami na hindi sila illegal
kaya ibinigay niya ang address nila,
maam."35 (Emphasis supplied)
Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes
the act of all regardless of the degree of individual
participation.36 Moreover, the precise modality or extent
of participation of each individual conspirator becomes
merely a secondary consideration.37 Notwithstanding
nonparticipation in every detail of the execution of the
crime, the culpability of the accused still exists.38

Page 37 of 48

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby

AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, appellants are
ordered to pay legal interest on the amount
of P118,000 from the time of the filing of the
Information until fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, appellants are
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138535-38

April 19, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUZ GONZALES-FLORES, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1of the Regional Trial
Court, branch 77, Quezon City, finding accusedappellant Luz Gonzales-Flores guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale and of three counts of estafa
against Felizberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo,2 and
Larry Tibor and sentencing her to suffer four prison
terms and to pay indemnity and damages to
complainants.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59470, the information for
estafa against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with several
persons whose true names and true identities
have not as yet been ascertained, and helping
one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud FELIXBERTO
LEONGSON, JR. y CASTAEDA in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which she made to said
complainant to the effect that they had the power
and capacity to recruitment employ complainant
abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the
processing of the requirements thereof, and by
means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said complainant to give
and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the
strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that
the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain
the amount of 1245,000.00, which amount once
in possession, with intent to defraud FELIXBER
TO LEONGSON, JR. wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to their own personal use and benefit,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant
in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00,
Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59471, also for estafa, the
information charged:
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring. together , confederating with several
persons whose true names and true identities
have not as yet been ascertained and helping
one another did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud RONALD
F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made to said
complainant to the effect that they had the power
and capacity to recruit and employ complainant
abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the :..
" necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, and by means of other similar deceits,
induced and succeeded in inducing said
RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA to give
and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the
strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that
the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain
the amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in
possession, with intent to defraud complainant
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to
their own pers9nal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said RONALD
F[RE]DERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA in the aforesaid
amount of P45,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LA W.4
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, another case for
estafa, the information averred:
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with several
persons whose true names and whereabouts
have not as yet been ascertained and helping
one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud LARRY
TIBOR Y MABILANGAN in the following manner,
to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations
which they made to said complainant to the
effect that they had the power and capacity to
recruit and employ complainant abroad as [a]
seaman and could facilitate the processing of
the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and
by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said complainant to give
and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P38,000.00 on the
strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that
the same were false and fraudulent and were

Page 38 of 48

made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain

the amount of P38,000.00 which amount once in
possession, with intent to defraud LARRY
TIBOR Y MABILANGAN wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously mis-appropriated misapplied and
converted to their own personal use and benefit)
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant
in the amount of P38,000.00, Phi1ippine
Currency.
CONTRAR Y TO LAW.5
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59473,
the information for illegal recruitment in large scale
charged:
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with several
persons whose true names and whereabouts
have not as yet been ascertained and helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously canvass, enlist,
contract and promise employment to the
following persons, to wit:
1. RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HlJSENIA
2. LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN
3. FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. y
CASTANEDA
after requiring them to submit certain documentary
requirements and exacting from them the total amount of
P128,000,00 Philippine Currency as recruitment fees
such recruitment activities being done without the
required license or authority from the Department of
Labor.
That the crime described above is committed in large
scale as the same was perpetrated against three (3) or
more persons individually or as group as penalized
under Articles 38 and 39) as amended by P.D. 2018, of
the Labor Code.6
When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to
the criminal charges, whereupon the cases were jointly
tried.
The evidence for the prosecution is as follows:
On August 6, 1994, at around 1:00 p.m., complainant
Felixberto Leongson, Jr. chanced upon his neighbors,
Cloyd Malgapo, Jojo Bumatay, and accused-appellant,
who were talking in front of his house at 68-C East
Riverside, Bgy. Paltok, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City. Complainant was asked by accusedappellant if he was interested to work as a seaman in
Miami, Florida, United States of America. He replied that
he was interested to work abroad but he had doubts
regarding his qualification for the job. Accused-appellant
assured him that this was not a problem because she
could fix his application. All he had to do was pay
P45,000.00 as processing fee. Accused-appellant told
him that Jojo and Cloyd were departing soon.

Complainant told accused-appellant that he would

consider the offer.
That night, accused-appellant came to see Felixberto
and reiterated her proposal. Felixberto said he wanted
the job but he only had P10,000.00. Accused-appellant
told him the amount would be sufficient as an initial
payment.
Accused-appellant came back with Joseph Mendoza,
whose brother-in-Iaw, Engr. Leonardo Domingo,
according to accused- appellant, was recruiting seamen.
Thereafter, accused-appellant and Mendoza took
complainant, Cloyd, and Jojo's wife, Clarita, to a house
on Second Street, near Camp Crame in Quezon City,
where the latter were introduced to Andy
Baloran.7 Complainant and his companions were told
that Baloran was an employee of the National Bureau of
Investigation and he would take care of processing the
applications for employment. Baloran told complainant
and the other job applicants that those who would be
employed would be paid a monthly salary of US$
l,000.00, plus tips, and given vacation leaves of 45 days
with pay. Baloran asked complainant to submit his
picture, bio-data, and birth certificate, which complainant
later did. Accused-appellant then asked complainant to
give her the P10,000.00 as initial payment. Complainant
handed her the money and asked for a receipt, but
accused-appellant told him not to worry and assured him
that she would be responsible if anything untoward
happened. Complainant, therefore, did not insist on
asking accused-appellant for a receipt. Accusedappellant said she gave the money to Baloran.
Two days later, Baloran and Domingo went to the
compound where Felixberto and accused-appellant were
residing and called Felixberto, Cloyd, and Jojo to a
meeting. Domingo told the applicants that he was the
chief engineer of the luxury ocean liner where they
would embark and repeated to them the salaries and
other benefits which they would receive. He told them
not to get impatient.
Accused-appellant later saw complainant to collect the
balance of P35,000.00. Complainant was told to give the
money to accused-appellant at Wendy's in Cubao,
Quezon.City on August 12, 1994.
At the appointed date and place, complainant and his
wife delivered the amount to accused-appellant who, in
turn, handed it to Baloran. No receipt was, however,
issued to Felixberto.
Another meeting was held on August 16, 1994 at the
Mandarin Hotel in Makati City by accused-appellant,
Domingo, Baloran, Mendoza, the Leongson spouses,
the Malgapo spouses, and Jojo Bumatay. The applicants
were told by Domingo that they would be employed as
waiters and attendants in the luxury liner and asked
them again to wait a while.
On August 18, 1994, accused-appellant saw
complainant again to collect the P 25,000.00 balance.
Felixberto paid the amount to accused- appellant four
days later. As in the case of the first two payments, no
receipt was given for the P25,000.00. Accused-appellant
told him that she would turn over the amount to Baloran.

Page 39 of 48

Although complainant regularly followed up his

application with accused-appellant, he was told each
time to have patience and to just wait for the call from
Domingo or from Baloran. But Felixberto never heard
from either one of these two.8
Felixberto's testimony was corroborated by his wife,
Maria Luz, who said that accused-appellant claimed she
could help her husband get a job as a seamen despite
the latter's lack of formal training. She knew of the three
payments made to accused-appellant, totalling P
45,000.00, and witnessed the last two payments of
P10,000.00 at Wendy's, Cubao, and P25,000.00 at
accused-appellant's residence. Maria Luz said she met
Baloran, Mendoza, and Domingo and discussed with
them the job offered to her husband and the salaries and
benefits appurtenant thereto.9
Complainant Ronald Frederizo, a resident of 68-A East
Riverside, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, also
testified. According to him, in the morning of August 10,
1994, he received a call from his sister, Elsa Cas, at Far
East Bank, Binondo Branch, Manila, asking him to go
home because accused-appellant, their neighbor, was in
his house recruiting seaman for employment abroad.
Ronald said that when he arrived home, he was told by
accused-appellant that he had to pay P10,000.00 as
initial payment for the processing of his application.
Ronald withdrew the amount from Elsa's account. Then,
Ronald went with accused-appellant to a house on
Second Street near Camp Crame in Quezon City. On the
way to that place, accused-appellant assured him that
he would receive a salary of US$1,000.00. At an
apartment on Second Street, Ronald saw his neighbors,
complainant Felixberto, Jojo, and Cloyd. Baloran and
Mendoza were also there. Accused-appellant introduced
Baloran to Ronald, Cloyd, and Jojo. She told them that
Baloran was going to take care of their applications and
that he could pull strings at the NBI. Ronald paid
accused-appellant P10,000.00 for which no receipt was
issued. He was assured by accused-appellant that he
would be able to leave for his job abroad in one or two
weeks. He was told to be ready with the balance of
P35,000.00 for the plane ticket on August 12, 1994.
Hence, on August 15, 1994, Ronald mortgaged his land
in Batangas just so he could pay the P35,000.00
remaining balance. Accused-appellant went to Ronald's
house to meet him. Thereafter, Ronald, Elsa, and
accused-appellant took a cab to Mandarin Hotel in
Makati City. Accused-appellant told Ronald to have no
fear because the persons whom he was dealing with
were her relatives. Elsa gave the P35,000.00 to
accused-appellant. Ronald no longer asked for a receipt
because he trusted accused-appellant. At the hotel were
Felixberto and his wife, Baloran, and Domingo. Domingo
showed Ronald and Felixberto his identification card and
said that he was the captain of a ship. He told them that
they would receive a salary of US$1,000.00 plus other
benefits. He also assured them that he would inform
them of developments in their applications through
accused-appellant. After the meeting, Ronald went to his
office and tendered his resignation. Ronald followed up
his application almost every week but every time he was
told by accused-appellant to be patient10 because
Domingo had not yet called.

Complainant Larry Tibor said that on August 10, 1994,

he went to the house of his cousin, Elsa Cas, at 68-A
East Riverside, Bgy. Paltok, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, because accused-appellant was there
recruiting seamen to work abroad. Larry was then
looking for a job. Accused-appellant introduced herself
and told him that she could get him a job abroad if he
had the necessary documents and P 45,000.00. Larry
said he had only P3,000.00. He was told by accusedappellant to bring the amount the next day for his fare
and certification. As instructed, Larry paid the amount in
the presence of his sister, Junet. He asked for a receipt,
but accused-appellant told him to trust her. Accusedappellant instructed Larry to prepare extra money as his
initial payment was insufficient. Larry left for the province
to get a loan. He went to accused-appellant's house on
August 15, 1994 and paid her an additional amount of
P35,000.00. Again, no receipt was issued to him.
Thereafter, accused-appellant took him to Mandarin
Hotel where he was introduced to Baloran and Domingo.
Larry kept waiting for a call, but none came. He was later
told by accused-appellant that he could not leave yet
because Baloran was sick and he had to postpone his
trip.11
Junet T. Lim, Larry's sister, testified that she was present
her when brother paid P3,000.00 to accused-appellant,
although no receipt was issued. She stated that she
asked accused-appellant questions to make sure she
could help Larry get a job abroad as a seaman. Janet
said accused-appellant was able to convince her that
she could do so. Junet also testified that she
accompanied her brother in following up his job
application for about three months until November 1994,
when they realized they had been defrauded by
accused-appellant, Domingo, and Baloran12
Realizing that they had been deceived, complainants
went to the Baler Police Station 2 in Quezon City on
November 11, 1994 to file their complaints for illegal
recruitment and estafa against accused-appellant,
Baloran, Domingo, and Mendoza. Felixberto executed
his sworn statement13 on the same day, while Ronald
and Larry gave their respective statements14 on
November 12, 1994.
On November 14, 1994, complainants went to the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
and discovered that accused-appellant and her
companions did not have any license or authority to
engage in any recruitment activity.
Felixberto and Ronald asked the court to order accusedappellant to pay them back the placement fees of
P45,000.00 which each of them had paid and moral
damages of P200,000.00 for each of them for the
shame, anxiety, and loss of jobs they suffered. They also
sought the reimbursement for litigation expenses they
each incurred, amounting to P20,000.00 as attorney's
fees and P500.00 per court appearance. Larry, on the
other hand, sought the recovery of the total amount of
P150,000.00 for placement fee, travelling expenses from
the province to Manila to follow up his application, and
the anguish and .shame he suffered.15
In her defense, accused-appellant Luz Gonzales-Flores,
a resident of 68-B East Riverside, San Francisco del

Page 40 of 48

Monte, Quezon City, testified that she knew Felixberto

Leongson, Jr., who was her neighbor and a nephew of
the owner of the house in which they were staying. She
came to know Ronald Frederizo and Larry Tibor through
Elsa Cas. Accused-appellant denied having promised
complainants overseas employment and having
collected money from them. According to her, she came
to know Andy Baloran and Engr. Leonardo Domingo
through Joseph Mendoza, who referred her and her son,
Noli, to them in connection with their own applications for
overseas employment. She came to know Joseph
Mendoza through Elsa Cas and Felixberto Leongson, Jr.
Accused-appellant claimed that she and Noli agreed to
pay Baloran, Domingo, and Mendoza the total sum of
P90,000.00 for their application fees. Since she did not
have enough money to cover the amount, she asked her
neighbors and friends to help her get a loan. Felixberto
and his wife offered help and introduced her to Jenny
Tolentino, from whom she got a loan of P15,000.00
guaranteed by Felixberto's wife. Accused-appellant said
she used the amount to pay for her and her son's
recruitment fees. Accused-appellant claimed that she
paid the total amount of P46,500.00 for her recruitment
fee in three instalments, i.e., P10,000.00 to Mendoza at
her house, P10,000.00, and Pl6,500.00 to Baloran at the
Mandarin Hotel. She alleged that she also gave them
several pieces of jewelry worth P10,000.00. According to
her, no receipts were issued for the money and jewelry
she gave.
1wphi1.nt

Accused-appellant said that because Domingo, Baloran,

and Mendoza did not make good their promises,
accused-appellant filed a complaint for illegal recruitment
and estafa against them on November 7, 1994 in the
NBI, including as her co-complainants Felixberto
Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo, Larry Tibor, Eduardo
Sibbalucas, Har Taccad, Romeo Gallardo, Joseph
Mendoza, and her son, Noli Flores.16
Accused-appellant was investigated by the Baler Police
Station 2 on November 11, 1994 as a result of the
complaints filed against her by Felixberto, Ronald, and
Larry. Thereafter, she was detained.17
On November 24, 1994, she appeared before the NBI
accompanied by a policewoman to comply with the
subpoena18 issued regarding her complaint. According to
NBI Agent Jesus Manapat, accused-appellant's
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.19
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court
rendered its assailed decision on November 23, 1998,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for
illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in
three (3) counts having been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, she is hereby convicted of
said crimes and is sentenced:
(1) To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
pay a fine of P100,000 in Criminal Case No. Q94-59473;
(2) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE (3)

MONTHS ofprision correccional, as minimum,

and up to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal
Case No. Q-94-59470;
(3) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE (3)
MONTHS ofprision correccional, as minimum,
and up to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal
Case No. Q-94-59471; and
(4) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE (3) MONTHS
of prision correccional, as minimum, and up to
NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal Case
No. Q-94-59472.
The accused is also directed to pay: (a) Ronald
Federi[z]o, the amount of P45,000.00 as and by
way of actual damages; (b) Felixberto
Leongson, Jr. P45,000.00 as and by way of
actual damages; and (c) Larry Tibor, P38,000.00
as and by way of actual damages.
The accused is further directed to pay to the
said private complainants moral damages in the
sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) each.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING
UPON THE JURISPRUDENCE AND
AUTHORITIES CITED, I.E., PEOPLE VS.
COMIA, PEOPLE VS. MANOZCA, PEOPLE VS.
HONRADA, PEOPLE VS. TAN TIONG MENG,
PEOPLE VS. VILLAS AND PEOPLE VS.
SENDON BECAUSE, WITH DUE RESPECT,
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AVAILING
IN SAID CASES ARE DIFFERENT AS IN THE
PRESENT CASE; AND
II. [THE LOWER COURT] ERRED IN HOLDING
THE ACCUSED GUlLTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
PROSECUTION TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED
ON VERY MATERIAL POINTS,21
The contentions are without merit.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59473, accused-appellant
was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale, the
essential elements of which are: (1) that the accused
engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers
defined under Art. 13 (b) or in any of the prohibited
activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) that the
accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with
respect to the securing of a license or an authority to
recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas;

Page 41 of 48

and (3) that the accused commits the unlawful acts

against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.22
In these cases, according to the certification of the
POEA, accused-appellant had no license or authority to
engage in any recruitment activities.23 In fact, this was
stipulated at the trial.24 Accused-appellant claims,
however, that she herself was a victim of illegal
recruitment and that she simply told complainants about
job opportunities abroad.
The allegation is untenable. Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code
defines "recruitment and placement" as referring to any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.
The same article further states that any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.25
The evidence for the prosecution shows that accusedappellant sought out complainants and promised them
overseas employment. Despite their initial reluctance
because they lacked the technical skills required of
seamen, complainants were led to believe by accusedappellant that she could do something so that their
applications would be approved. Thus, because of
accused-appellant's misrepresentations, complainants
gave her their moneys. Accused-appellant's
companions, Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza, made
her ploy even more plausible.
Accused-appellant contends that all she did was to refer
complainants to Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza.
However, under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code,
recruitment includes "referral," which is defined as the
act of passing along or forwarding an applicant for
employment after initial interview of a selected applicant
for employment to a selected employer, placement
officer, or bureau.26 In these cases, accused-appellant did
more than just make referrals. She actively and directly
enlisted complainants for supposed employment abroad,
even promising them jobs as seamen, and collected
moneys from them.
The failure of complainants to present receipts to
evidence payments made to accused-appellant is not
fatal to the prosecution case. The presentation of the
receipts of payments is not necessary for the conviction
of accused-appellant. As long as the prosecution is able
to establish through credible testimonies and affidavits
that the accused-appellant was involved in the prohibited
recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well be
justified.27 In these cases, complainants could not
present receipts for their payment because accusedappellant assured them she would take care of their
money.
It must be remembered that the trial court's appreciation
of complainants' testimonies deserves the highest
respect since it was in a better position to assess their
credibility.28 In these cases, complainants' testimonies, to
the effect that they paid money to accused-appellant and
her companions, Domingo and Baloran, because the

latter promised them overseas employment, were

positive, straightforward, and categorical. They
maintained their testimonies despite the lengthy and
gruelling cross-examination by the defense counsel.
They have not been shown to have any ill motive to
falsely testify against accused-appellant. Naive, simpleminded, and even gullible as they may have been, it is
precisely for people like complainants that the law was
made. Accordingly, their testimonies are entitled to full
faith and credit.29
In contrast, accused-appellant's defense is merely
denial. Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial,
being negative evidence which is self-serving in nature,
cannot prevail over the positive identification of
prosecution witnesses.30 Here, complainants positively
identified accused-appellant as one of those who
represented that they could be deployed for overseas
work upon payment of the fees.
Accused-appellant claims that she herself had to borrow
P15,00.00 from Jenny Tolentino, guaranteed by Maria
Luz Leongson, to defray her own and her son's
application expenses. The claim has no merit. Maria Luz
Leongson, who is Felixberto's wife, testified that
accused-appellant sought her help to guarantee a loan
to pay the tuition fees of her daughter and the rent of the
apartment in which she and her family were
staying,31 and not to finance her and her son's overseas
job applications.
Accused-appellant likewise testified that she paid in cash
a total of P36,500.00 in three
installments, i.e.,P10,000.00 to Mendoza at her house,
and P10,000.00 and P16,500.00 to Baloran, at the
Mandarin Hotel. This testimony cannot be deemed
worthy of belief. When cross-examined, accusedappellant could not remember the dates when she
allegedly made these payments. For someone who was
jobless32 and looking for employment, it is very doubtful
that she would pay considerable sums of money to
strangers without even remembering at least the month
or the year when the same were supposed to have been
paid.
Accused-appellant further contends that if she was
indeed a conspirator in the illegal recruitment
transactions with complainants, she would not have filed
a complaint33 in the NBI against Domingo and Baloran.
The complaint was, as already stated, dismissed and it
is apparent that accused-appellant filed the complaint
only to make it appear that she herself had been the
victim of swindling and illegal recruitment. First, the
complaint shows that it was filed on November 7, 1994,
even before she was detained at the Baler Police Station
2 upon the sworn statements of complainants.
Complainants were included as complainants in a
complaint filed by accused-appellant. Yet, the
complainants were never told, nor did they ever knew, of
the complaint until the trial of these cases. Second,
accused-appellant could have easily told them at least of
the complaint because Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald
Frederizo and Elsa Cas, a relative of complainant Larry
Tibor, were her immediate neighbors. Third, it is also
noteworthy that despite her claim that she paid
P10,000.00 to Mendoza, accused-appellant made the

Page 42 of 48

latter a co-complainant in the complaint she filed with the

NBI.
More importantly, accused-appellant's defense is
uncorroborated. Not one of the persons she included in
her complaint to the NBI was ever presented in her
defense in these cases. Nor did she present Domingo,
Baloran, or Mendoza to corroborate her statements. It is
probable that had she presented any of these persons,
their testimonies would have been adverse to accusedappellant.34
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is
not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode in
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and
design.35 In these cases, the fact is that there was
conspiracy among accused-appellant, Domingo, and
Baloran in recruiting complainants for employment
overseas. The evidence shows that each had a role in
that conspiracy. Domingo posed as a representative of
the luxury liner in recruiting crew for the vessel. Baloran
represented himself as the person who would actually
process complainants' travel documents, while accusedappellant acted as a scout for job applicants and a
collector of their payments. It was only Mendoza who did
not misrepresent himself as someone capable of helping
complainants go abroad nor collect money from them.36
In sum, we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly
found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in
large scale: The imposition on accused-appellant of the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 is
thus justified.
Accused-appellant was likewise found guilty of estafa
under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code
committed
By means of any of the following false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending
to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
Both elements of the crime were established in these
cases, namely, (a) accused-appellant defrauded
complainant by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit and (b) complainant suffered damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation as a
result.37 Complainants parted with their money upon the
prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on the
false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them
for employment abroad. In the end, complainants were
neither able to leave for work overseas nor did they get
their money back, thus causing them damage and
prejudice. 38
The issues that misappropriation on the part of accusedappellant of the money paid by complainants and their
demand for the same were not sufficiently established
are immaterial and irrelevant, conversion and demand

not being elements of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-59470 and Q-94-59471, the
amounts involved are both P45,000.00, as testified to by
complainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr. and Ronald
Frederizo. Pursuant to Art. 315, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and the
ruling in People v. Gabres,39 the trial court correctly
meted accused-appellant the maximum penalty of ten
(10) years of prision mayor in each case. This is so
considering that the maximum penalty prescribed by law
for the felony is six (6) years, eight (8) months, and 21
days to eight (8) years of prision mayor. The amounts
involved in these cases exceed 1222,000.00 by at least
1220,000.00, necessitating an increase of one (1) year
for every 1210,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the sentence is thus from
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months ofprision correccional. The trial court can
exercise its discretion only within this period. Thus; the
minimum penalty imposed by the trial court should be
reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, where the amount
involved is 1238,000.00, the indeterminate sentence
which should be imposed on accused-appellant should
range from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision
mayor, as maximum.
In accordance with the ruling in People v. Mercado,40 the
fact that no receipts were presented to prove the
amounts paid by complainants to accused-appellant
does not prevent an award of actual damages in view of
the fact that complainants were able to prove by their
respective testimonies and affidavits that accusedappellant was involved in the recruitment process and
succeeded in inveigling them to give their money to her.
The award of moral damages should likewise be upheld
as it was shown to have factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant guilty
of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa against
complainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald
Frederizo, and Larry Tibor is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICA TIONS that, in the cases for estafa, accusedappellant is sentenced:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-S9470, to suffer a
prison term ranging from four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum;
(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-S9471, to suffer a
prison term ranging from four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum; and
(3) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-S9472, to suffer a
prison term ranging from four (4) years and two
(2) months ofprision correccional, as minimum,
to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Page 43 of 48

G.R. No. 183879

April 14, 2010

ROSITA SY, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1dated July 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30628.
Rosita Sy (Sy) was charged with one count of illegal
recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-0537 and one count
of estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-0536. In a joint
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Sy was
exonerated of the illegal recruitment charge. However,
she was convicted of the crime of estafa. Thus, the
instant appeal involves only Criminal Case No. 02-0536
for the crime of estafa.
The Information2 for estafa reads:
That sometime in the month of March 1997, in the City of
Las Pias, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Felicidad Mendoza-Navarro y Landicho in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false
pretenses and fraudulent representation which she
made to the said complainant that she can deploy her for
employment in Taiwan, and complainant convinced by
said representations, gave the amount of P120,000.00 to
the said accused for processing of her papers, the latter
well knowing that all her representations and
manifestations were false and were only made for the
purpose of obtaining the said amount, but once in her
possession[,] she misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the same to her own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of Felicidad
Mendoza-Navarro y Landicho in the aforementioned
amount ofP120,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On May 27, 2007, Sy was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial ensued thereafter.
As summarized by the CA, the facts of the case are as
follows:
Version of the Prosecution
Sometime in March 1997, appellant, accompanied by
Corazon Miranda (or "Corazon"), went to the house of
Corazons sister, Felicidad Navarro (or "Felicidad"), in
Talisay, Batangas to convince her (Felicidad) to work
abroad. Appellant assured Felicidad of a good salary
and entitlement to a yearly vacation if she decides to
take a job in Taiwan. On top of these perks, she shall
receive compensation in the amount of Php120,000.00.
Appellant promised Felicidad that she will take care of
the processing of the necessary documents, including

her passport and visa. Felicidad told appellant that she

will think about the job offer.

On January 8, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision,5 the

dispositive portion of which reads:

Two days later, Felicidad succumbed to appellants

overseas job solicitation. With Corazon in tow, the sisters
proceeded to appellants residence in Better Homes,
Moonwalk, Las Pias City. Thereat, Felicidad handed to
appellant the amount of Php60,000.00. In the third week
of March 1997, Felicidad returned to appellants abode
and paid to the latter another Php60,000.00. The latter
told her to come back the following day. In both
instances, no receipt was issued by appellant to
acknowledge receipt of the total amount of
Php120,000.00 paid by Felicidad.

WHEREFORE, premises considered the court finds the

accused Rosita Sy NOT GUILTY of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment and she is hereby ACQUITTED of the said
offense. As regards the charge of Estafa, the court finds
the accused GUILTY thereof and hereby sentences her
to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision
correctional as minimum to 11 years of prision mayor, as
maximum. The accused is ordered to reimburse the
amount of sixty-thousand (Php60,000.00) to the private
complainant.
SO ORDERED.6

On Felicidads third trip to appellants house, the latter

brought her to Uniwide in Sta. Cruz, Manila, where a
male person showed to them the birth certificate that
Felicidad would use in applying for a Taiwanese
passport. The birth certificate was that of a certain
Armida Lim, born to Margarita Galvez and Lim Leng on
02 June 1952. Felicidad was instructed on how to write
Armida Lims Chinese name.
Subsequently, appellant contacted Felicidad and
thereafter met her at the Bureau of Immigration office.
Thereat, Felicidad, posing and affixing her signature as
Armida G. Lim, filled out the application forms for the
issuance of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and
Immigrant Certificate of Registration (ICR). She attached
to the application forms her own photo. Felicidad agreed
to use the name of Armida Lim as her own because she
already paid to appellant the amount of Php120,000.00.
In December 1999, appellant sent to Felicidad the birth
certificate of Armida Lim, the Marriage Contract of
Armida Lims parents, ACR No. E128390, and ICR No.
317614. These documents were submitted to and
eventually rejected by the Taiwanese authorities,
triggering the filing of illegal recruitment and estafa
cases against appellant.
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied offering a job to Felicidad or receiving
any money from her. She asserted that when she first
spoke to Felicidad at the latters house, she mentioned
that her husband and children freely entered Taiwan
because she was a holder of a Chinese passport.
Felicidad commented that many Filipino workers in
Taiwan were holding Chinese passports.
Three weeks later, Felicidad and Corazon came to her
house in Las Pias and asked her if she knew
somebody who could help Felicidad get a Chinese ACR
and ICR for a fee.
Appellant introduced a certain Amelia Lim, who, in
consideration of the amount of Php120,000.00, offered
to Felicidad the use of the name of her mentally deficient
sister, Armida Lim. Felicidad agreed. On their second
meeting at appellants house, Felicidad paid
Php60,000.00 to Amelia Lim and they agreed to see
each other at Uniwide the following day. That was the
last time appellant saw Felicidad and Amelia Lim.4

Page 44 of 48

Aggrieved, Sy filed an appeal for her conviction of

estafa. On July 22, 2008, the CA rendered a
Decision,7affirming with modification the conviction of Sy,
viz.:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION sentencing
accused-appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for resolution is whether Sy should be
held liable for estafa, penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).9
Swindling or estafa is punishable under Article 315 of the
RPC. There are three ways of committing estafa, viz.: (1)
with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means
of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through
fraudulent means. The three ways of committing estafa
may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of
confidence; or (2) by means of deceit.
The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a)
that an accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage
and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused
the offended party or third person.
The act complained of in the instant case is penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein
estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud
another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the
following, viz.: (a) that there must be a false pretense or
fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or
fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to

or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c)

that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to
part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.10
In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are
present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as
found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that Sy
misrepresented and falsely pretended that she had the
capacity to deploy Felicidad Navarro (Felicidad) for
employment in Taiwan. The misrepresentation was made
prior to Felicidads payment to Sy of One Hundred
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00). It was Sys
misrepresentation and false pretenses that induced
Felicidad to part with her money. As a result of Sys false
pretenses and misrepresentations, Felicidad suffered
damages as the promised employment abroad never
materialized and the money she paid was never
recovered.
The fact that Felicidad actively participated in the
processing of the illegal travel documents will not
exculpate Sy from liability. Felicidad was a hapless
victim of circumstances and of fraud committed by Sy.
She was forced to take part in the processing of the
falsified travel documents because she had already
paid P120,000.00. Sy committed deceit by representing
that she could secure Felicidad with employment in
Taiwan, the primary consideration that induced the latter
to part with her money. Felicidad was led to believe by
Sy that she possessed the power and qualifications to
provide Felicidad with employment abroad, when, in fact,
she was not licensed or authorized to do so. Deceived,
Felicidad parted with her money and delivered the same
to petitioner. Plainly, Sy is guilty of estafa.
Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be filed
simultaneously or separately. The filing of charges for
illegal recruitment does not bar the filing of estafa, and
vice versa. Sys acquittal in the illegal recruitment case
does not prove that she is not guilty of estafa. Illegal
recruitment and estafa are entirely different offenses and
neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the other. A person who is convicted of illegal
recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC.11 In the
same manner, a person acquitted of illegal recruitment
may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not
set in because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent,
whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of
which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.12

The penalty prescribed for estafa under Article 315 of the

RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount
defrauded is over Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00)
but does not exceed Twenty-two Thousand Pesos
(P22,000.00), and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); but the total penalty that
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
that may be imposed under the provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
The addition of one year imprisonment for each
additional P10,000.00, in excess of P22,000.00, is the
incremental penalty. The incremental penalty rule is a
mathematical formula for computing the penalty to be
actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as the
starting point. This special rule is applicable in estafa
and in theft.13
1avvphi1

In estafa, the incremental penalty is added to the

maximum period of the penalty prescribed, at the
discretion of the court, in order to arrive at the penalty to
be actually imposed, which is the maximum term within
the context of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL).14 Under the ISL, attending circumstances in a case
are applied in conjunction with certain rules of the Code
in order to determine the penalty to be actually imposed
based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the
offense. The circumstance is that the amount defrauded
exceedsP22,000.00, and the incremental penalty rule is
utilized to fix the penalty actually imposed.15
To compute the incremental penalty, the amount
defrauded shall be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the
difference shall be divided by P10,000.00, and any
fraction of P10,000.00 shall be discarded.16
In the instant case, prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period is the
imposable penalty. The duration of prision correccional in
its maximum period is from four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years; while prision
mayor in its minimum period is from six (6) years and
one (1) day to eight (8) years. The incremental penalty
for the amount defrauded would be an additional nine
years imprisonment, to be added to the maximum
imposable penalty of eight years. Thus, the CA
committed no reversible error in sentencing Sy to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
As to the amount that should be returned or restituted by
Sy, the sum that Felicidad gave to Sy, i.e., P120,000.00,
should be returned in full. The fact that Felicidad was not
able to produce receipts is not fatal to the case of the
prosecution since she was able to prove by her positive
testimony that Sy was the one who received the money
ostensibly in consideration of an overseas employment
in Taiwan.17

Page 45 of 48

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated July 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30628, sentencing petitioner Rosita Sy to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, is hereby AFFIRMED. We, however, MODIFY
the CA Decision as to the amount of civil indemnity, in
that Sy is ordered to reimburse the amount of One
Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00) to
private complainant Felicidad Navarro.
SO ORDERED.

Page 46 of 48

The diplomatic corps or corps diplomatique is the collective body of foreign diplomats accredited to a particular country
or body.
The diplomatic corps may, in certain contexts, refer to the collection of accredited heads of mission (ambassadors, high
commissioners, and others) who represent their countries in another state or country. As a body, they usually only
assemble to attend state functions like a coronation, inauguration, national day or State Opening of Parliament, depending
on local custom. They may also assemble in the royal or presidential palace to give their own head of state's New Year
greeting to the head of state of the country in which they are based.
The term is sometimes confused with the collective body of diplomats from a particular countrythe proper term for which
is diplomatic service. The diplomatic corps is not always given any formal recognition by its host country, but can be
referenced by official orders of precedence.
In many countries, and especially in Africa, the heads and the foreign members of the country offices of major
international organizations (United Nations agencies, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
agencies of the African Union, etc.) are considered membersand granted the rights and privilegesof the diplomatic
corps.
Diplomatic vehicles in most countries have distinctive license plates, often with the prefix or suffix CD, the abbreviation for
the French

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Thirteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of July, two thousand six.
Republic Act No. 9422

April 10, 2007

AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE REGULATORY FUNCTIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT

ADMINISTRATION (POEA), AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE "MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIFINOS ACT OF 1995"
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 23, paragraph (b.1) of Republic Act. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" is hereby amended to read as follows:
"(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration - The Administration shall regulate private sector
participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of workers by setting up a licensing and registration
system. It shall also formulate and implement, in coordination with appropriate entities concerned, when
necessary, a system for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into
consideration their welfare and the domestic manpower requirements.
"In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall inform migrant workers not only of their rights as
workers but also of their rights as human beings, instruct and guide the workers how to assert their rights and
provide the available mechanism to redress violation of their rights."
"In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the requirements for trained and competent Filipino
workers of foreign governments and their instrumentalies, and such other employers as public interests may
require, the administration shall deploy only to countries where the Philippines has concluded bilateral labor
agreements or arrangements: Provided, That such courtries shall guarantee to protect the rights of Filipino
migrant workers; and: Provided, further, That such countries shall observe and/or comply with the international
laws and standards for migrant workers."

SEC. 2. Section 29 of the same law is hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. Section 30 of the same law is also hereby repealed.
SEC. 4. All laws, orders, issuances, rules or regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
SEC. 5. if, for any reason, any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other portions or
provisions hereof shall not be affected thereby.
SEC. 6. This Act Shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,

JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

Speaker of the House of
Representatives

MANNY VILLAR
President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5498 and Senate Bill No. 2501 was finally passed by the House of
Representative and the Senate on January 31, 2007.

ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Represenatives

OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of Senate

Approved: APR 10, 2007

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines