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SECONDDIVISION

[G.R.No.108619.July31,1997]

EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA,

Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE
OFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO,J.:

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
theissuanceofatemporaryrestrainingorderiswhetherornotachargeofillegalpossessionof
"lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to
warrantthequashalofaninformationchargingtheformeroffenseora"nonexistentcrime."
OnJuly23,1991,aninformationforviolationofSection68ofP.D.No.705,asamendedby
Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against
petitionerEpifanioLalican,[1]RubenBenitez,AllanPulgarandJoseRoblobeforetheRegional
TrialCourtofthatcity.DocketedasCriminalCaseNo.9543,theinformationreads:
"Thatonoraboutthe9thdayofFebruary,1991,atSitioCadiz,BarangayBacungan,CityofPuerto
Princesa,Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,
withoutlawfulauthorityorpermit,conspiringandconfederatingtogetherandmutuallyhelpingone
another,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyhaveintheirpossession,custodyand
control1,800boardfeetofassortedspeciesanddimensionsoflumberonboardtwo(2)passengerjeeps,
withavalueofFourteenThousandPesos(14,000.00),PhilippineCurrency,tothedamageandprejudice
oftheGovernmentintheamountaforestated.
CONTRARYTOLAW."
At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the
groundthatthefactschargeddidnotconstituteanoffense.ContendingthatSec.68ofP.D.No.
705refersto"timberandotherforestproducts"andnotto"lumber,"andassertingthat"timber"
becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that
saiddecree"doesnotapplyto'lumber.'"Headdedthatthelawis"vagueandstandardless"as
it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and
regulations.Hence,petitionerassertedthattheinformationshouldbequashedasitviolatedhis
constitutionalrightstodueprocessandequalprotectionofthelaw.[2]
Theprosecutionopposedthemotiontoquashonthegroundthatitisnotforthecourtsto
determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it
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properthattheword"timber"shouldinclude"lumber"whichisa"productorderivativeafterthe
timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the
easycircumventionofthelaw,foronecouldstealthilycuttimberfromanyforest,haveitsawn
intolumberandescapecriminalprosecution.Theprosecutionassertedthattheissueraisedby
petitionerwasmoresemanticalthanaquestionoflaw.[3]
OnSeptember24,1991,thelowercourt,[4]guidedbytheprinciplesthatpenallawsshould
be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused,issuedanOrderquashingtheinformation.Itheldthatthedistinctionbetween"timber"
and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two
terms.Sec.3(q)ofP.D.No.705classifies"timber"asaforestproductwhileSec.3(aa)thereof
considers"lumber"asafinishedwoodproduct.Addingthatunlicensedcutting,gatheringand/or
collectingof"timber"ispenalizedunderSec.68whilesaleof"lumber"withoutcompliancewith
grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court
categoricallystatedthat:
"Logically,lumber,beingamanufacturedwoodproduct,posesnomoredangertoforestlandsbybeing
cut,gathered,collectedorremoved.Itisinfact,onlyboughtandsold.Thus,Sec.68cannotbemadeto
applytolumber."
The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner
uponaholdingthatthecasecouldberesolvedonsomeothergroundsorissues.[5]
TheprosecutionfiledamotionforthereconsiderationofthisOrder,pointingoutthatunder
the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR),
timberisnotjustanypieceofwoodforitmayconsistofsquaredandmanufacturedtimberor
one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to
consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd
interpretationofthelaw.
Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused
presentedPrivateLandTimberPermitNo.030140datedFebruary10,1991whichhadexpired
thatwhilethecertificateoforiginindicatedBrgy.Sta.Cruz,theproductactuallycamefromSitio
Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of
transportagreement.Addedtothiswasthefactthat,iftheproductwereindeedlumber,then
theaccusedcouldhavepresentedacertificateoflumberorigin,lumbersaleinvoicesincaseof
sale,tallysheetsanddeliveryreceiptsfortransportationfromonepointtoanother.[6]
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's
definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn
lumber."Thenoninclusionof"lumber"inSec.68couldonlymeanaclearlegislativeintentto
excludepossessionof"lumber"fromtheactspenalizedunderthatsection.[7]
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49
inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was
subsequentlyassignedtoBranch52.
OnJune10,1992,thelowercourt[8]issuedthehereinquestionedOrdersettingasidethe
quashalOrderofthepreviousjudge.Itdeclaredthatfromthelawitself,itisevidentthatwhatis
soughttobepenalizedisnotthepossession,withouttherequiredlegaldocuments,oftimber
onlybutalsoof"otherforestproducts."Itstatedthateveniflumberisnottimber,still,lumberis
a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the
lawwhichincludes"wood"inthedefinitionofforestproducts.
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PetitionersoughtthereconsiderationofthisOrderbutthelowercourtdeniedit.Hence,the
instantpetitionarguingthatthelowercourtgravelyabuseditsdiscretionamountingtolackof
jurisdictioninsettingasidethequashalorderandindenyinghismotionforreconsiderationon
thegroundthatSec.68ofP.D.No.705neitherspecifiesnorincludes"lumber"inthephrase
"timberorotherforestproducts."
Thepetitionisdevoidofmerit.
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on
July25,1987bythenPresidentCorazonC.Aquino,provides:
"SEC.68.Cutting,Gatheringand/orcollectingTimber,orOtherForestProductsWithoutLicense.Any
personwhoshallcut,gather,collect,removetimberorotherforestproductsfromanyforestland,or
timberfromalienableordisposablepublicland,orfromprivateland,withoutanyauthority,orpossess
timberorotherforestproductswithoutthelegaldocumentsasrequiredunderexistingforestlawsand
regulations,shallbepunishedwiththepenaltiesimposedunderArticles309and310oftheRevised
PenalCode:Provided,Thatinthecaseofpartnerships,associations,orcorporations,theofficerswho
orderedthecutting,gathering,collectionorpossessionshallbeliable,andifsuchofficersarealiens,they
shall,inadditiontothepenalty,bedeportedwithoutfurtherproceedingsonthepartoftheCommission
onImmigrationandDeportation.
TheCourtshallfurtherordertheconfiscationinfavorofthegovernmentofthetimberoranyforest
productscut,gathered,collected,removed,orpossessed,aswellasthemachinery,equipment,
implementsandtoolsillegallyusedintheareawherethetimberorforestproductsarefound."
(Underscoringsupplied.)
Punishedtheninthissectionare:(a)thecutting,gathering,collection,orremovaloftimber
or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority or (b)
possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existingforestlawsandregulations.
IntherecentcaseofMustangLumber,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,[9] this Court, thru Justice
HilarioDavide,held:
"The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
formerisincludedinforestproductsasdefinedinparagraph(q)ofSection3,thelatterisfound
inparagraph(aa)ofthesamesectioninthedefinitionof'Processingplant,'whichreads:
(aa)Processingplantisanymechanicalsetup,machineorcombinationofmachineusedforthe
processingoflogsandotherforestrawmaterialsintolumber,veneer,plywood,wallboard,blockboard,
paperboard,pulp,paperorotherfinishedwoodproduct.
Thissimplymeansthatlumberisaprocessedlogorprocessedforestrawmaterial.Clearly,theCodeuses
thetermlumberinitsordinaryorcommonusage.Inthe1993copyrighteditionofWebster'sThirdNew
InternationalDictionary,lumberisdefined,interalia,as'timberorlogsafterbeingpreparedforthe
market.'Simplyput,lumberisaprocessedlogortimber.
Itissettledthatintheabsenceoflegislativeintenttothecontrary,wordsandphrasesusedinastatute
shouldbegiventheirplain,ordinary,andcommonusagemeaning.Andinsofaraspossessionoftimber
withouttherequiredlegaldocumentsisconcerned,Section68ofP.D.No.705,asamended,makesno
distinctionbetweenraworprocessedtimber.Neithershouldwe.Ubilexnondistinguitnecnos
distingueredebemus."
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Bethatasitmay,thelegislativeintenttoincludepossessionoflumberinSec.68isclearly
gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No.
277,arethefollowing:
"WHEREAS,thereisanurgencytoconservetheremainingforestresourcesofthecountryforthebenefit
andwelfareofthepresentandfuturegenerationsofFilipinos
WHEREAS,ourforestresourcesmaybeeffectivelyconservedandprotectedthroughthevigilant
enforcementandimplementationofourforestrylaws,rulesandregulations
WHEREAS,theimplementationofourforestrylawssuffersfromtechnicaldifficulties,duetocertain
inadequaciesinthepenalprovisionsoftheRevisedForestryCodeofthePhilippinesand
WHEREAS,toovercomethesedifficulties,thereisaneedtopenalizecertainactstomakeourforestry
lawsmoreresponsivetopresentsituationsandrealitiesxxx"
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly
emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act
whichisprohibitedbylaw,norsointerpretedastoaffordanopportunitytodefeatcompliance
withitsterms,createaninconsistency,orcontravenetheplainwordsofthelaw.[10]Afterall,the
phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is
manufacturedtimber.Hence,tomentionlumberinSec.68wouldmerelyresultintautology.As
thelowercourtsaid:
"Evenshoulditbeconcededthatlumberisnottimberandisthusnotcoveredbytheprohibition,stillit
cannotbedeniedthatlumberisaforestproductandpossessionthereofwithoutlegaldocumentsis
equallyand,tothesameextent,prohibited.Sec.3(q)ofPD705asamendedorotherwiseknownasthe
RevisedForestryCodedefinesforestproducts,viz.,xxx
StressmustbegiventothetermWOODembodiedinthedefinitionofforestproduct(supra).Ifweareto
followtherathertangentialargumentbytheaccusedthatlumberisnottimber,then,itwillbeveryeasy
forapersontocircumventthelaw.Hecouldstealthilycuttimberfromanyforest,haveitsawninto
lumberandescapecriminalprosecution.Itisrathertoonarrowaninterpretation.Butthelawalso
providedaplugfortheloophole.Iflumberisnottimber,thensurely,lumberiswood.xxx.
Ifinseekingtoabatetheproceedingstheaccusedalsoseektoimplythatlumberseizedintheir
possessionwereprocuredfromlawfulsource,alltheyhavetodoisproducethelegaldocuments
contemplatedbythelaw.Itisnotthemerecuttingorpossessionoftimber,forestproductsorwhatever
thatisprohibitedandpenalizedbythelaw.Whatisprohibitedandpenalizedistheactofcuttingor
possessingoftimber,wood,orotherforestproductswithoutlawfulauthority."
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denyingthequashaloftheinformation.Thepetitionsimplyhasnolegalbasis.Certiorari may
beissuedonlywhereitisclearlyshownthatthereispatentandgrossabuseofdiscretionasto
amounttoanevasionofpositivedutyortovirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylaw,or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despoticmannerbyreasonofpassionorpersonalhostility.[11]Graveabuseofdiscretionimplies
acapriciousandwhimsicalexerciseofpower.[12]
On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the
respondentcourtlackedorexceededitsjurisdictionorcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretion.[13]
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Wherethecourthasjurisdictionoverthecase,evenifitsfindingsarenotcorrect,itsquestioned
actswouldatmostconstituteerrorsoflawandnotabuseofdiscretioncorrectiblebycertiorari.
[14]
AsthisCourtsaid:
"xxx.Whenacourtexercisesitsjurisdiction,anerrorcommittedwhilesoengageddoesnotdepriveitof
thejurisdictionbeingexercisedwhentheerroriscommitted.Ifitdid,everyerrorcommittedbyacourt
woulddepriveitofitsjurisdictionandeveryerroneousjudgmentwouldbeavoidjudgment.Thiscannot
beallowed.Theadministrationofjusticewouldnotsurvivesucharule.Consequently,anerrorof
judgmentthatthecourtmaycommitintheexerciseofitsjurisdictionisnotcorrectiblethroughthe
originalcivilactionofcertiorari."[15]
Inotherwords,certiorariwillissueonlytocorrecterrorsofjurisdictionandnottocorrecterrors
ofprocedureormistakesinthejudge'sfindingsandconclusions.[16]
Theunavailabilityofthewritofcertiorari,andeventhatofprohibition,inthiscaseisborne
out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the
denialofhismotiontoquashtheinformationfiledagainsthimandthreeothers.ThisCourthas
consistentlydefinedtheproperprocedureincaseofdenialofamotiontoquash.Theaccused
hastoenteraplea,gototrialwithoutprejudiceonhisparttopresentthespecialdefenseshe
hadinvokedinhismotionand,ifaftertrialonthemerits,anadversedecisionisrendered,to
appealtherefrominthemannerauthorizedbylaw.[17]
Certiorariisnottheproperremedywhereamotiontoquashaninformationisdenied.That
the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such
conviction,aswellasthedenialofthemotiontoquash,isimpelledbythefactthatadenialofa
motiontoquashisaninterlocutoryproceduralaspectwhichcannotbeappealednorcanitbe
the subject of a petition for certiorari.[18] The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive.[19] An interlocutory order may be assailed by
certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of
jurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.[20]However,thisCourtgenerallyfrownsuponthis
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the
administrationofjusticebutalsowouldundulyburdenthecourts.[21]
Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan[22] for his contention that a
denial of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an
entirelydifferentfactualmilieufromtheoneatbar.Theinformationhereinnot being"patently
defective"northattheoffensechargedhasprescribed,[23]thiscasemaynotbeconsideredan
exceptiontotheruleontheproperremedyforthedenialofamotiontoquash.
WithrespecttotheconstitutionalityofSec.68ofP.D.No.705whichpetitionerwouldhave
this Court consider,[24] this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues.
Thus,evenifalltherequisitesforjudicialreviewofaconstitutionalmatterarepresentinacase,
[25]
thisCourtwillnotpassuponaconstitutionalquestionunlessitisthelismotaofthecaseor
ifthecasecanbedisposedofonsomeothergrounds,suchastheapplicationofthestatuteor
generallaw.[26]
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this
country,consideringthatthedeleteriouseffectsofthisproblemarenowimperilingourlivesand
properties,morespecifically,bycausingrampagingfloodsinthelowlands.Whileitistruethat
the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is
equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the
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prosecutionofacrime,theCourtmustarriveatasolutiononlyafterafairandjustbalancingof
interests.ThistheCourtdidinarrivingattheforegoinginterpretationofSec.68oftheRevised
ForestryReformCode.Thistask,however,hasnotatallbeenadifficultoneconsideringthat,
contrarytopetitioner'sassertion,hisrightstodueprocessandequalprotectionofthelawhave
notbeenclearlyshowntohavebeenjeopardized.
WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionisherebyDISMISSED.The
lowercourtisenjoinedtoproceedwithdispatchintheprosecutionofCriminalCaseNo.9543.
ThisDecisionisimmediatelyexecutory.Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
Regalado,(Chairman),Puno,andMendoza,JJ.,concur.
Torres,Jr.,J.,onleave.
[1]Lalican'ssurnameappearsas"Nalican"intheinformationbuthesignedtheinstantpetitionasLalican(Rollo,p.

15).
[2]Rollo,pp.2728.
[3]Ibid.,pp.3031.
[4]PresidedbyJudgeSabasR.Acosta.
[5]Rollo,pp.3234.
[6]Ibid.,pp.3637.
[7]Ibid.,pp.3839.
[8]PresidedbyJudgeFilomenoA.Vergara.
[9]G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Teresita DizonCapulong, etal., G.R. No.

106424,June18,1996MustangLumber,Inc.v.Hon.CourtofAppeals,etal.,G.R.No.123784,June18,
1996.
[10]AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 3rd ed. (1995), p. 202 citing Uy Hav.City Mayor of Manila, 108

Phil.400(1960)andAsturiasSugarCentral,Inc.v.CommissionerofCustoms,G.R.No.19337,September
30,1969,29SCRA617(1969).
[11]Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170

SCRA246,254citingLittonMillsv.GalleonTraders,Inc.,L40867,July26,1988,163SCRA489.
[12]PhilippineAirlines,Inc.v.Confesor,G.R.No.11480,March10,1994,231SCRA41,53GoldCityIntegrated

PortServices,Inc.v.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.Nos.7177173,March31,1989,171SCRA579,
585PureFoodsCorporationv.NLRC,G.R.No.78591,March21,1989,171SCRA415,425Sorianov.
Atienza,G.R.No.68619,March16,1989,171SCRA284,290.
[13]SanPedrov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.114300,August4,1994,235SCRA145,150.
[14]NewYorkMarineManager,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.111837,October24,1995,249SCRA416,420.
[15] Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101789, April 28, 1993, 221 SCRA 582, 588 quoting Pure

Foods

Corporationv.NLRC,supra.
[16]MunicipalityofBian,Lagunav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.94733,February7,1993,219SCRA69,70.
[17]Yapv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.68464,March22,1993,220SCRA245,253Reyesv.Camilon,

L46198, December 20, 1990, 192 SCRA 445, 452Acharonv.Purisima,G.R.No. L23731, February 26,
1965,13SCRA309,311.
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[18]Peoplev.Bans, G.R. No. 104147, December 8, 1994, 239 SCRA 48, 54 citing Cruz, Jr. v.Court of Appeals,

G.R.No.83754,February18,1991,194SCRA145.
[19]OrientalMedia,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.80127,December6,1995,250SCRA647,253.
[20]Alcasidv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.94927,January22,1993,217SCRA437,440.
[21]Atienzav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.85455,June2,1994,232SCRA737,744.
[22]L48088,July31,1978,84SCRA477Petition,p.10.
[23]Flordelisv.Himalaloan,supraatp.482.
[24]Petition,pp.710.
[25]Theserequisitesare:(1)theexistenceofanactualandappropriatecase(2)apersonalorsubstantialinterestof

the party raising the constitutional question (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity, and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case (Philippine Constitution
Associationv.Enriquez,G.R.Nos.113105,113174,113766&113888,August19,1994,235SCRA506).
[26]Laurelv.Garcia,G.R.Nos.92013&92047,July25,1990,187SCRA797,813.

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