Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 3

Sps Dalion v.

CA (1990)
Petitioners: Spouses Dalion
Respondents: CA and Sabesaje, Jr.
Ponente: Medialdea, J.
Doctrine: A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which
means that the sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular
form is
required for its validity.
Short version:
(saying his signature was forged) and also says that assuming
the signature was valid, sale is still invalid because it was not
executed in a public document. SC says Dalions argument is
wrong. In a contract of sale, no part

based on a private document of absolute sale, allegedly


executed by Segundo Dalion.

o
o
o
evidenced by the "Escritura de Venta Absoluta.

with Sabesaje to be allowed to administer the land because


Dalion did not have livelihood.

Sabesaje, grandfather of Sabesaje, who died in 1956.

Issue: Was the contract of sale valid? Is a public document


needed for transfer of ownership?
Held: Yes. No.
Ratio:
Re: validity of the contract

Re: Public document

o
o
rights over immovable property must appear in a public
instrument." (NCC 1358 par. 1)

o
o
vendee may compel transfer of ownership of the object of the
sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to
pay the thing sold (NCC 1458

corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a public document.

thing.
o
the vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by
embodying the sale in a public instrument
(constructive).

Decision affirmed.
HELD:
The authenticity of the signature of Dallion was proven by the
testimony of several witness including the person who made the
deed of sale. Dalion never presented any evidence or witness to
prove his claim of forgery.
Dallions claim that the sale is invalid because it was not made in
a public document is of no merit. This argument is misplaced.
The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document
is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a
requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of
land that this be embodied in a public instrument. Sale is
perfected upon meeting of the minds of both parties.

Lee Tek Sheng vs. CA


Wednesday, June 18, 2014
Facts:
After his mothers death, petitioner Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng filed
a complaint against his father (private respondent) for the
partition of the conjugal properties of his parents.
The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land
registered in petitioners name are conjugal properties.
The PR contends that the lots were registered under Leoncios
name only as a trustee because during the registration, Leoncio
was the only Filipino in the family.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for
the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner the conjugal
regime.
To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the
pendency of the case, PR caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT 8278.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it was
denied by RTC on the grounds that: (a) the notice was not for the
purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep
the property within the power of the court pending litigation. CA
affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.
Petitioners contention: The resolution of an incidental motion for
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was improper to thresh
out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership
cannot be passed upon in a partition case and that it would
amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28
years ago.
Private respondents contention: The evidence of ownership is
admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land
registration proceedings when the courts jurisdiction is limited.
Issue: WON the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is valid.
Held: Yes.
Petitioners claim is not legally tenable. The annotation of a
notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be
considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of
title for a parcel of land.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.

Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best


evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case,
contrary to petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being
assailed by private respondent. What the latter disputes is the
formers claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioners
certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year
after issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar
private respondent from questioning his ownership.
A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds:
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of
the adverse party
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the
party who caused it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly
shown to concur in this case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens is only for the purpose of announcing to the whole
world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over said property
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in
partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is
definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the
property. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens,
there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking
annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. Besides, an
action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens is proper.
REPUBLIC VS CA
Maria Consuelo Felisa Roxas vs Rafael Enriquez
Facts:
1) Maria Consuelo applied for a titles of 4 parcels of
land in 1906.
2) The adjoining owners of the land were informed of
such application, but no one went to question it so
they were declared in default.
3) The same application was published in two
newspapers.
4) The City of Manila questioned in court the borders
of Parcel A. The Court ordered the correction but
none was executed.
5) The court approved the application and Consuelo
was given the titles.
6) In 1912, the City of Manila appied for the correction
of the title because it covered a public road.
7) It was also in 1912 the Consuelo went to court to
ask for a correction of the title because there were
2 buildings which were not included in the title,
although it was in the application.
8) She sold the same to Masonic Temple Assoc.
9) During the hearing, the heirs of Antonio Enriquez,
owners of the adjoining land, appeared in court
questioning the title.
10) The Court granted the motions of the City of Manila
and Consuelo.
ISSUE:
Was the court correct in denying the opposition of the heirs of
Enriquez?
HELD:

1)

NO notice was served to the heirs of Enriquez: Records


show that the counsel of Enriquez received a notice.
Even if it is denied by the party, personal notification is
not a requirement of the law. Registration is a
proceeding in rem and not in personam. It is the only
practical way that allows the Torrens system to fulfill its
purpose.

Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915


Posted by Pius Morados on November 27, 2011
.entry-meta
.entry-header
(Land Titles and Deeds Purpose of the Torrens System of
Registration)
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda
and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands
is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in
1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in
favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under
the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the
latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it
stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement
which has been registered under the name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496)
affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two
certificates purports to include the same registered land, the
holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet
title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of
the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su
casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has
entered into the Torrens system.
TIBURCIO VS PHHC
Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Patria Capay, et al
G.R. No. 118862, Sept. 24, 1999 (315 SCRA 190)
"Torrens System"
"latches"
Facts:
A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to
and subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal
Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public auction, the
Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the
mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds of
the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before
the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book.
Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the
sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a
new one was entered in TRBs name without the notice of lis
pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the
property and damages. Court rendered a decision declaring the
mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled
TRBs title and issued a new cert. of title for the Capays.
Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to
Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who
were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the subsequent
buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good
faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a

pending suit before the court. Although the lis pendens notice
was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book
constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with
adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith
upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation.
The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute
while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.

Issues:
1. WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the
issue of ownership.
2. Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the
Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral
attack?

Issue:
Who has the better right over the land in dispute?
Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Held:

Ruling:
The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which
purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties. When the
subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens
annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not
obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title.
Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers obtained the
property from a clean title in good faith and for value. On one
hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice
for lis pendens, the same was not annotated in the TRB title.
They did not take any action for 15 years to find out the status of
the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the property. In
consideration to the declaration of the mortgage as null and void
for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no
legal effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the
real owner of the property it has already been passed to
purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the property
cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty
bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at
the time they sold it to Santiago.

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for


partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence
of co-ownership between the parties. Until and unless this issue
of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or
petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest
over the subject properties.

Lacbayan vs. Samoy


Monday, June 16, 2014
Facts:
Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy (respondent)
had an illicit relationship.
During their relationship, they, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services
company.
The company acquired five parcels of land were registered in
petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and
wife.
When their relationship turned sour, they decided to divide the
said properties and terminate their business partnership by
executing a Partition Agreement.
Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to
the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will
go to respondent.
However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be
included in the partition agreement, Samoy refused.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition
of the said properties.
Petitioners contention: She claimed that they started to live
together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of
marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring
real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.
Respondents contention: He purchased the properties using his
own personal funds.
RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.

1. No.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition


Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which
necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is
a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely
divide among themselves the subject properties.
2. No.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at
bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast,
the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often
than not, represented by that document.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the
property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a
property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
Other topic:
Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership
over the subject realties.
YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the
Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to
include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist
on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to
sign.
Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow
respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of
his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled coownership over the said properties.

Похожие интересы