Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Review
Author(s): John R. Everett
Review by: John R. Everett
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 45, No. 22 (Oct. 21, 1948), pp. 603-605
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2019609
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BOOK REVIEWS

603

but I know of none which can. It is, however,based

verification,
on a careful analysis of the phenomenaand the acceptance of all
well verifiedscientificfindings. It uses no termsthat do not have
referentsclearlypresentin experience. It introducesno hypothesis
that is not a vera causa, i.e., supportedby good analogy. In terms
of such hypothesesit gives an account of all the relevantfacts and
in doing so employsa minimumof hypothesis. It thereforeadheresto all the canonsof scientificmethodapplicable to the problem,
as requiredby naturalists. This, I think,can not be said for any
otherhypothesis,and certainlynot,as I have tried to show,for the
type of theoryhere criticized,which usually goes under the name
of naturalismtoday.
A. CAMPBELL GARNETT
THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

BOOK REVIEWS
New York: Oxford UniEclipse of Reason. MAX HORKHEIMER.
versityPress. 1947. 187 pp. $2.75.
Professor Horkheimerhas written a book which states more
clearlythan he had done previouslyhis fundamentalthesisregarding the decline of the West. His avowed purpose is to show how
the conditionof Westernphilosophyindicatesthe disintegrationof
meaningfulsociety. True to his dialectical heritagehe sometimes
blames philosophyforthe social collapse,and at othertimescharges
commercializedcapitalism with responsibilityfor bad philosophy.
Modern philosophy,says Professor Horkheimer,has allowed
reason to become "subjective," with the result that Westernman
can no longer discern "a structureinherentin reality that by itself calls for a specific mode of behavior." Subjective reason
("the ability to calculate probabilitiesand therebyto coordinate
the rightmeans with a given end") is incapable of giving direction to modernsocietybecause it can only deal with the proximate
problems involved in correlatinggiven facts of experience. The
trulygreatphilosophicalsystemsof thepast, such as thoseof "Plato
and Aristotle,scholasticismand German idealism," were based
firmlyin the idea that reason has both subjective and objective
characteristics. The subjective aspect was, however, always regarded as "only a partial, limited expressionof a universal rationality." The fundamentalemphasis of the late great systems
was upon objective reason which concerneditself with "evolving
a comprehensivesystem,or hierarchy of all beings" and with
"ends rather than means." With the loss of objective reason,

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604

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

man's ends are dictatedby irrationalurges,whilehis means achieve

a high degree of rational organization. The conclusion,seen in
part today,but certainlyin the future,is Westernman, busily,efand rationallyorganizinghimselfformeaninglessactivity,
ficiently,
and, probably,for purposelessdestruction.
This book does not attemptto give an answer,except to imply
that salvation will be achieved only when the ability to determine
ultimate and objective truth is once again regained. Whatever
this objective truthis, it will never be found by science. Science,
and all philosophieswhich equate truth with the conclusionsof
scientificanalysis,are only capable of calculatingprobabilitiesand
organizingproper means. They are totallyincapable of determining the differencebetween ultimate truth and falsity. The positivists,and these include all naturalists,and men such as Dewey,
Russell, James,Max Weber,Nagel, Hook, and Carnap, have denied
"autonomousphilosophyand a philosophicalconceptof truth" and
have therefore become classifiers and formalizers of scientific
methods,and not philosophersat all. The scientisticpanacea which
they hold out is a murderousdelusion with "meaninglessnessas
its meaning," which "restricts intelligenceto functionsnecessary
to the organizationof materialalready patternedaccordingto that
very commercialculturewhich intelligenceis called upon to criticize. Such restrictionmakes intelligencethe servant of the apparatus of production.
As ProfessorHorkheimersees it, there is another panacea in
conflictwithpositivism-neo-Thomism. Medieval scholasticism,although wrong in many details, was essentiallyon the right tract
in its emphasisupon ends ratherthan means. The neo-Thomists,
however,have failed modernman by caring about the usefulness
of theirteachings. "Like the Germanneo-pagans,the neo-Thomists
are streamliningold ideologies,tryingto adapt them to modern
purposes. By doing so they compromisewith existing evil....
[They] are little concernedwith belief in the Mater dolorosa . . .
[and concentrate]on belief in belief as a good remedyfor today's
social and psychologicaldifficulties." Thus the neo-Thomistsolution is corruptedby pragmatism,a species of positivism,and consequentlyloses its position as an avenue of salvation. It has become mere ideology and "a servant of profane aims."
The basic difficultywith positivism and neo-Thomism,and
seeminglythe definitionof any panacea, is found in the attemptto
make "truth and goodness identical with reality," and fromthis
concludethat the adaptation to reality is man's highestgoal. "It
can be said that this doubtfulprinciple of adapting humanityto
what theoryrecognizesas reality is one root cause of the present

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605

BOOK REVIEWS

intellectualdecay. . . In our day the hectic desire of people to

adapt themselves. . . has led to a state of irrationalrationality."
That Professor Horkheimerappears ignorant of some of the
most importantwork done by contemporarynaturalistic philosophers is apparent from the quotations already given. His own
ratherthinlydisguised left-wingHegelianism allows him to lump
all who disagree into categories called either positivismor neopositivism. The refusal to recognizethe close interconnectionbetween ends and means; the self-criticaland expansive nature of
the scientificmethod; the meaning of "organized social intelligence" and its ability to criticizesociety; and the possibilityof a
coherentpluralistic metaphysicall conspire to weaken both his
account of and his attack on modernphilosophy. It is possible to
criticizecontemporarynaturalismfairlyby saying that it has not
yet developed theoriesof value which satisfythe cryingneeds of
our time. But this is hardly the same as saying,"It is an empty
promisethat some day positivism [here he is writingof Dewey]
will solve the essentialproblemsit has been too busy to solve up to
now." Such criticismis particularlyinappropriatewhen directed
social philosophy,
towardDewey whenone remembershis forthright
based on an ethic of self-realization,and issuing in his concept of
a "new individualism."
In spite of the excesses of ProfessorHorkheimer'sattacks upon
naturalism,his final chapteron the task of philosophyattemptsto
achieve a balance. He recognizesthat "objective reason displays
an inclinationto romanticism"and that it (objective reason) often
asserts "meaning that proves to be an illusion" and aids in the
constructionof "reactionary ideologies." In effecthe asks for
philosophywhat most balanced philosophershave always asked: a
mutual critique which takes the best from rationalism and the
best from empiricism. I doubt, however,that Professor Horkheimer'sown treatmentof empiricalphilosophiesadds much to the
reconciliation. To place all the ills of the present world on the
doorstepof empiricismis a ratherjaundiced peace-offering.
JOHN R. EVERETT
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Basis and Structure of Knowledge. W. H. WERKMEISTER.

New York and London: Harper & Brothers. 1948. ix + 451
pp. $5.00.
This book is an expansion and systematicreformulationof the
conceptionsconcerningthe nature of knowledgecontained in the
author's earlierA Philosophyof Science. ProfessorWerkmeister's
interpretationof science draws its inspirationfromKant and the

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