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ntroduction.
For many reasons mainstreamHegel scholarship
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KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
more seriously than is often recognized, Russell's 1922 exhortation, 'I would take "Back to the 18th Century!"as my battle
cry, if I had any hopes that others would rally to it.'2 Russell's
return to Hume's first Enquiry rooted analytic epistemology
deeply in the Cartesiantradition that Kant, Hegel and Hume (in
the Treatise)identifiedas the key source of irresolvableepistemological difficulties.In 1966 Strawsondeclaredthat two of Kant's
key insights are 'so great and so novel that, nearly two hundred
years after they were made, they have still not been fully
absorbed into the philosophical consciousness'-a judgment he
still regards as true.3 Failure to appreciateKant's achievements
exacerbatesthe difficultiesin grasping Hegel's epistemology.
Though one essay cannot treat the entiretyof Hegel's epistemology, I hope to convey some of its most importantfeaturesand
insights by summarizing the main points of Hegel's critical
responses to scepticism in the Phenomenologyof Spirit.4These
points fall underfour headings:Pyrrhonian(Section I), empiricist
(Section II), Cartesian (Section III) and Kantian (Section IV)
scepticism.
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against 'self-justification'or 'self-evidence'.These further objections needn't detain us here; we need only focus on the problem
of circularity,because Hegel rejected the essentially deductivist
model of empiricaljustification which drives the regress argument and which has dominated mainstreamepistemology from
Descartes to Hume, and from Russell to William Alston (including, e.g., non-foundationalists such as Dretske).'2 Even more
than Kant, Hegel was anti-Cartesian.Hegel understood as well
as Kant that human empiricalknowledgeis not built on allegedly
basic bits of sensory knowledge, nor can empiricalknowledge be
derived from such bits of knowledge. Like Kant, Hegel rejected
the foundationalist model of empirical knowledge. Neither was
Hegel a coherentistin any standardsense of the term; he recognized that both models are inadequate.
1.2. Sextus Empiricusaverredthat for any positive thesis an equally compelling antithesis can be offered (equipollence),so that
we suspend judgment and achieve Epoche'.3 Hegel criticized
(among others) Sextus Empiricus for being satisfied with mere
refutation, with merely 'abstractnegation', i.e. finding sufficient
fault with a theory to reject it as inadequate, but stopping at
that.'4 In opposition to this Hegel maintains that a truly penetrating refutation consists in a strictly internal critique that
identifiesboth the insights and the defects of a philosophicaltheory, and through that critique derives grounds of proof for a
more adequate theory. This Hegel calls 'determinatenegation'.5
At this general, programmatic level one cannot determine
whether Sextus could respond to such an Hegelian 'determinate
negation' by offering mutually opposed 'determinatenegations'
of two competing theories. Determining who is correct (or at
least closer to the truth) about this issue instead requiresexamining carefully actual internal criticism of various theories of
knowledge. Elsewhere I have argued in detail that Hegel's
internal criticisms of the epistemologies of naive realism,
12. For discussion of Dretske, see Westphal (2003a), Ch. 9.
13. Pyrrhonian scepticism is summarized in Westphal (1989), 11-16.
14. PhdG, GW 9:57.7-14. Hegel's remark also applies, e.g., to Popper's
falsificationism.
15. PhdG, GW9:57.1-12; cf. Westphal (1989), 125-26, 135-36, 163. The term is misused by Brandom (1999), 174.
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Descartes, Hume, Kant, Carnap, Russell, Alston, Dretske, Putnam's 'internalrealism',and FrederickSchmitt's'social epistemology' provide their 'determinatenegations' and hence provide
considerable grounds of proof for Hegel's own epistemology.16
With all due respect to Wilfrid Sellars, no other epistemologist
has so acutely probed and exploited the views of his opponents.
Pace wide-spreadprejudiceto the contrary, Hegel was an acute
epistemologist. (Pardon my use of the term, but prejudiceit is
because it is based on ill-considered reputation rather than
knowledge of Hegel's views or texts.)
1.3. In Hegel's view, two important Pyrrhonian tropes, circularity and the Dilemma of the Criterion, share a common solution. Justificatorycircularityis a problem, not because a series
of grounds of proof mutually support each other, but because
such a series appears to offer no independentproof to convince
any dissenter. And so it seems when the circle consists solely in
affirmations.However, a circle of groundsof proof appearsquite
differentlyif following it out (or around) consists instead in persistent critical reconsiderationof each ground of proof. If this is
the procedure,there is at least the possibility that any particular
ground of proof or justificatory link within the circle may be
affirmed,denied, revised or replaced. In these ways, the circle of
grounds of proof can be improved, not merely reiterated.How
can such critical reconsiderationoccur? Such reconsiderationof
the chain of grounds of proof must be critical, but to avoid begging the question and to identify one's own errorsthe reconsideration must be self-critical as well. A few epistemologists have
noted in passing the importanceof self-criticism.'7Hegel, alone
among epistemologists, developed an exacting analysis of the
possibility of productive self-criticism."8
If constructiveself-criticism is possible, we are not locked into the forced options epitomized in the Five Modes of Agrippa.
How is a self-critical reconsiderationof one's own views, or
likewise the strictly internal criticism of others' views, possible?
As mentioned above, this question was posed to Hegel sharply
by G. E. Schulze, who drew Hegel's attention back to Sextus
16. Westphal (1989), (1998a), (2000a), (2002b), (2003a), Ch. 9, 10, (2003c).
17. E.g., Price (1932, 192), Sellars (1963, 170).
18. Westphal (1989, 1997a).
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KENNETHR. WESTPHAL
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The so-called 'Hegelian serpent'was invented by Hegel's expositors and critics, not Hegel. An exacting analysis of Hegel's epistemology reveals no such thing.29In effect, we begin with our
epistemologicalpredilections,whatever they may be, and determine the extent to which they can be developed into an adequate
epistemology that can withstand critical scrutiny-including
critical self-scrutiny. If we are thorough and scrupulous about
this, and if Hegel's accounts of constructive self-criticismand
'determinate negation' are sound, we can develop considered
convergenceby the fact that we epistemologists, all of us, share
the human cognitive constitution and engage through it with a
26. For Hegel's response to Kuhn, see Westphal (1989), 146-47; to Putnam, see
Westphal (2003c).
27. On Hegel's realism see Wartenberg (1993), Westphal (1989), 140-8.
28. Sellars (1963), 170.
29. See Westphal (1989), 56-7.
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HEGEL'SMANIFOLDRESPONSETO SCEPTICISM
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II
Empiricist Scepticism. The history of empiricism frequently
repeats a striking phenomenon: one begins with the plausible
assumptionthat knowledge of the world must be sensory knowledge, though ultimatelyone winds up espousing either subjective
30. PhdG, GW 9: 120-1/?205; Westphal (2000c).
31. PH I ??226, 236. The other factor supporting this (alleged) constant search after
truth is to avoid the incoherence of denying that knowledge is possible. If we were
demonstrably incapable of knowledge, the search for truth would be easy to rescind.
However, if we were demonstrablyincompetent in this way, we would know something after all. Pyrrhonists distinguished themselves from Academic Sceptics, who did
argue (paradoxically) that we are cognitively incompetent, over precisely this issue.
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KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
idealism or empirical scepticism. The grounds of this phenomenon are complex, and cannot be discussed here. It suffices to
recall this general tendency in order to frame Hegel's critical
rejectionof empiricism.Empiricismwas well representedin Germany around the turn of the Nineteenth Century, most prominently by G. E. Schulze.32Schulze responded to Kant's Critical
philosophy by re-deploying Hume's criticisms of induction and
of our very concept of causality, though he didn't recognize the
problemsbesettingempiricismthat Hume himself recognised(see
below, Section 2.2). In order to assess empiricism critically,
Hegel had to consider the paradigmaticempiricist, Hume, and
that he did.34
2.1. Characteristicof strong empiricist foundationalism is the
thesis that we enjoy concept-free knowledge of sensed particulars. Although this doctrine was not espoused by most of the
Scottish school-though Hume's official 'copy theory' of ideas
and impressions commits him to it-this thesis was commonplace among German empiricists, e.g. Hamann, Jacobi, G. E.
Schulze and W. T. Krug.35Later, of course, it was espoused by
Russell. Such concept-freebasic knowledgeis supposedto justify
any and all derivedknowledge. Such knowledgeis also supposed
to enable us to avoid both the Dilemma of the Criterionas well
as Hegel's highly sophisticatedresponse to it: if we enjoyed concept-freesensory knowledge of particulars,we could just look to
see what are the relevant facts and thereby settle any disputes
about claims to empiricalknowledge. This strategypreservesthe
basic model of epistemological foundationalism(the distinction
between basic and derived knowledge), which attempts to
respond directly to the sceptical (classically, Pyrrhonist)regress
argument.
Against this strong empiricist foundationalism, Hegel argued
that foundationalismcannot answer scepticism because there is
no such concept-free basic knowledge, and because the foundationalist model of our empirical knowledge is seriously misleading. It is misleading because it views the justification of
32.
33.
34.
35.
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KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
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KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
To resolve these 'contradictions',Hume introduced psychological propensitiesby which we produce a 'medium'between 'unity'
and 'plurality',namely the concept of 'identity'.44
42. See Beck (1978), esp. 121-25.
43. Treatise, L.iv.3:219;bold added.
44. Treatise I.iv.2:201.
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2.4. Before turning to these criticisms, some key points of Hegel's critical response to Hume's problem of induction should be
mentioned. Hegel criticises several key assumptions of Hume's
problem, namely Hume's justificatoryinfallibilism, deductivism
and internalism.Hegel also notes that future events simply are
not objects of knowledge because they do not presently exist.
Hegel regards'inductivereasoning'as an importantform of analogical reasoning that enables us to 'anticipate' future events.
Hegel's term for this is 'Ahnen',which has extremelyweak cognitive connotations (Enz. ?190 and Zusatz). On Hegel's view,
empirical knowledge requires both predication and singular
demonstrativereferenceto the object of knowledge.Ex hypothesi
this latter condition is not fullfilled in the case of future events
or observations.Hence induction cannot be a case of knowledge.
Thinking otherwise is the problem. The thought that, due to the
universal claims at issue in inductive arguments, our predictive
fallibility precludes present knowledge of the alleged universal
characteristics of things; or the thought that on a fallibilist
account of justification the truth condition of knowledge may
not be satisfied-these are both infalliblistthoughts. Any sober
fallibilistaccount of justificationrequiresthat the truth condition
of knowledgeis satisfied,even if sufficient(fallibilist)justification
does not entail that this condition is satisfied.
III
CartesianScepticism.Descarteswas no sceptic.The problem,and
the common name for this kind of scepticism, stem from the
fact that the only philosopherever convinced by Descartes' antisceptical arguments was their author.47Thereafter 'Cartesian
Scepticism'means more or less the combination of dream scepticism and the problem of the evil deceiver, developed in the first
two Meditations. The refutation, or at least the dissolution, of
Cartesianscepticismhas been a centralpreoccupationof epistemology, especially in the Twentieth Century. Unfortunately,most
attempted refutationshave tried to develop a direct response to
Cartesian scepticism, accepting the sceptical argumentsas legitimate and trying to answer them, rather than criticallyto assess
47. Elsewhere (Westphal, 1987-88) I have argued that Descartes' argument suffers
not one, but five distinct vicious circularities.
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KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
that is, our power of judgment-can and do detect both regularities and differenceswithin the contentof our manifold of sensory intuition. Such regularitiesand differences constitutewhat
Kant calls 'the transcendentalaffinity of the manifold of [sensory] intuition'. Any world containing human beings but (somehow) lackinghumanlydetectableregularitiesand varietiesamong
the contents of our manifold sensations is a world in which we
may be flooded with sensations, but these would be to us 'even
less than a dream' (KdrV Al 12), Kant notes. The ratio cognoscendi, the ground of proof, that this affinity is a necessarytranscendentalcondition for possible self-consciousexperiencelies in
the argumentjust sketched, to the effect that we could not be
self-conscious,we could have no self-consciousexperienceat all,
unless such 'affinity' (regularityand variety) obtains among the
contents of our sensations. Conversely,the ratio cognoscendithat
such 'affinity' does obtain (if and when it does) is that we are
self-conscious.
However, Hegel noticed that the ratio essendi, the ground of
existence, for this affinity is quite distinct from its ratio cognoscendi. Because the manifold content of sensation is given us ab
extra, whatever ground or reason for there being 'affinity'
(humanlydetectibleregularityand variety)among the contents of
our sensationsmust also lie outside us; it must lie in those sensory
contents and their source (whateverthat may turn out to be).
Hegel argues (see below, Section 4.3) that the ground of the
regularityand variety among the contents of our sensations lies
in our experiencinga regular, natural spatio-temporalworld. If
that is correct, then Hegel's reconstructionof Kant's doctrine of
the 'transcendentalaffinityof the manifold of (sensory)intuition'
powerfully supports the conclusion to Kant's 'Refutation of
Empirical Idealism'. The conclusion of Hegel's combined and
reconstructedKantian proof is that we can be self-consciousonly
if we are conscious of a detectably regular, though changing
natural world. If this is true, then we are only able to pose, to
consider, even to formulate sceptical hypotheses regarding
empirical knowledge, whether Pyrrhonian, Cartesian or
Humean, if we in fact alreadyhave at least some genuineempirical knowledge, and so are able to reject those sceptical challenges. This is one of Hegel's main justificationsof his semantic
and mental content externalisms.
If sound, this argumentdirectly blocks the common sceptical
argument that first adduces admitted perceptual misjudgments,
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KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
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60.
61.
62.
63.
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The Persistence of Infallibilism. The details of Hegel's transcendental proof of realism cannot be discussed further here.64
However, a word can be said about the bevy of objections likely
to have occurred to the reader, who may have considered such
things as reneweddream scepticism,brains in vats, perhaps 'narrow' construals of mental content or even a 'grand coincidence
on a cosmic scale', among other contemporary philosophical
commonplaces, none of which may be discussed in detail here.
However, there is a common nerve running through these
examples, taken as sceptical counter-examples,as disproofs of
alleged genuinecases of perceptualknowledge.We'reprofessionally trainedto spot many kinds of logical gaps and defects in our
positions and those of others. This is an important and instructive philosophicaltechnique.However, a dangerlurks in its unrestricted use in epistemology: it strongly encourages the implicit
assumptionthat genuinejustificationmust be deductivelysound,
even in the case of empiricaljustification.This assumptionmade
Descartes into the father of Cartesianism,this assumptiondrives
scepticism, and this assumption has been used to undermine
analyses of knowledge ever since. The pervasivenessand apparent persuasivenessof this assumption is indicated by the widespreadconviction among epistemologiststhat 'fallible(empirical)
justification'is an oxymoron and that 'fallibilism'is incoherent.65
It is indicated too by the wide-spreaduse of the lottery paradox
to argue against fallibilismand for 100%conclusivejustification.
It is also indicated by the deeply deductivistorientation of 'analytic transcendentalarguments', which, interesting as they are,
have systematicallyfailed to answer scepticism.66
It would not be too much to say that this infallibilistassumption has played a role in TwentiethCenturyepistemologydirectly
analogous to the role played in Pyrrhonian scepticism by the
64. In Westphal (1998b) I develop the argument independently of Hegel's texts, and
argue inter alia that it provides a much stronger basis than Wright's (1992) 'cognitive
command' and 'cosmological scope' for rescinding a minimalist and adopting a
strong correspondence analysis of truth.
65. See, e.g., Kim & Lehrer (1990). Their key argument against fallibilism is validon one (strongly internalist) interpretation, though this interpretation is one that no
fallibilist need or should accept.
66. See Grundmann (1994), Bell (2000), Westphal (2003b).
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