YRA V.

ABANO
PETITIONER Marcos Yra: the vice-president elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
who challenges the right of the respondent,
RESPONDENT Maximo Abano: the municipal president elect of Meycauayan
Facts:
Respondent Maximo Abano is a native of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the
proper age, he transferred to Manila to study. While temporarily residing in
Manila, Abano registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a
member of the bar and after the death of his father, Abano returned to
Meycauayan to live there. From May 10, 1927, up to present, Abano has
considered himself a resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections
were approaching, he made an application for cancellation of registration
in Manila dated April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected by the city
officials for the reason that it was not deposited in the mails on or before
April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano presented himself as a candidate for
municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was elected
by popular vote to that office. Petitioner Marcos Yra assails the eligibility of
Abano on the ground that he had not been a resident of Meycauayan for at
least one year previous to the election.
Issue:
Is the non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the
reason that he was not a qualified voter in his municipality, connoting
that he was not a qualified elector therein, sufficient to nullify his
election?
Held:
No.
Ratio Decidendi:
One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his
candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau
has held that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not
necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a
qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is
sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431
and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a
candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not
deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for.
Furthermore, the law of Kentucky provides that "No person shall be eligible
to any office who is not at time of his election a qualified voter of the city
and who has not resided therein three years preceding his election." It was
said that "The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is
not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One
may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering
does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of
the right."

The distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such,

and a registered qualified elector and the respondent is such although not
in his home municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. It should not be forgotten
that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to be their
local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be
respected.
AKBAYAN YOUTH V. COMELEC
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth
movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for the May
2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27,
2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the
petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are
about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now
disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which
provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the
regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of
Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and standby powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters
registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the
clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters
registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election.
The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters
registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the
exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard
and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet
generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly
manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing
order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189
prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the
prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be
reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration,
COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially
create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional
voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened,
entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified,
sealed, then entered into the computerized voters list; and then they will
have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it
by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot

because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it

will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that
youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYANYouths pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual
youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters
registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al
admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they
failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the
court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.
FRIVALDO V. COMELEC
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon
on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988,
the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its
President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity,
filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election
and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo
admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but
pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of
survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators
agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be
dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253
of the Omhibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held:
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and
city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already
been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who
categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is
assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and
with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself
that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on
19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District
Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul
Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States

similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk

than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been
coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really
wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of
our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts.
Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The
fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment
only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibilityQualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving
as governor of Sorsogon.
MERCADO V. MANZANO
Facts:
Petitioners filed for respondents disqualification for election alleging that
respondent is a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual
citizens cannot run for public office.
Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows
the principle of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well.
COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born
because of the vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners
assail this.
Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public
office?
Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual
allegiance.
Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
that follows jus saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence,
resulting to a concurrent application of different two laws or more.
On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person
simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states.
In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate
of candidacy tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship meaning he
forswears allegiance to the other country and thereby terminating their
status as dual.
The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express
renunciation of American citizenship.

VILLABER V. COMELEC

validity of the COMELEC resolution.

Facts:

Issue: Whether petitioners assumption of office from May 1995 to March

1, 1998 is considered full term of office for the purpose of three-term rule

Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival

candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur
during the May 14, 2001 elections. Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a
consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters
certificate of candidacy, alleging that Villaber was convicted for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves
moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code,
he is disqualified to run for any public office.
COMELEC issued the resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a
candidate. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude,
which would disqualify Villaber as a candidate for and from holding any
public office.
Held:
COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
that any person who has been sentenced by final judgment for any offense
for which he has been sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office.
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the
elements of the crime for which he was convicted. There was no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be considered a full term
of office for two reasons, he cannot be considered elected as the
proclamation was void and he also did not voluntary renounce office, but
was involuntary severance from office.
The petition is granted and the resolution of the COMELEC declaring
petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral
elections are hereby set aside.
ABUNDO V. COMELEC
FACTS:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007
and 2010 national and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr.
(Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and
2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the
2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed
the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004
mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office
starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007,
or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May
10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat
relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers disqualification
to run.
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to
run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as,
mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.

LONZANIDA V. COMELEC
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive
terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995
elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office
and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation was contested and
resulted to declaring his opponent winning the election and ordered
Lonzanida to vacate the office. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida
again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for
disqualification on the grounds that it is a violation of the three-term rule.
COMELEC granted the petition. Petitioner filed a petition challenging the

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of Service

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 20042007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due
proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of
the electorate.

The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily,
while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the
actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual
involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be
considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the
mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the
pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or
authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving
as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service
because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos
opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then
valid proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
MARQUEZ V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed
a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution
which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez,
for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance
fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles,
State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is
claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his
alleged flight from that country.

fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is,
therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible
from holding on to, an elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in
criminal cases here and abroad are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in
charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181).
However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling
law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative
rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain
congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a
person who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and
undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether
or not private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term
must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The
omission is understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the
petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not
being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the
COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.
DE LA CRUZ V. COMELEC
ATTY. RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC AND ESTRADA
MAQUILING V. COMELEC
MIRANDA V. ABAYA

Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs
May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the
filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding
against private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC for cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the
candidates disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May
1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 9228) against private respondent before the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate
of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a
foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term

ARATEA V. COMELEC
JALOSJOS V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to
Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at
age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in
Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he
took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced
his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration

as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the

Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually
granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then
filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then
appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor
of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel
said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one
year residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency
requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of
a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to
present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of
provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year
before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not
only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal
presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid
down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them
that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may
be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon
City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired
Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia
became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother
in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to

change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian
citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his
acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that
he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga
Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his
domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the
settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in
Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this
circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has
repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a
community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the
house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What
matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in
Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same
village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga
Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local
and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a
registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative
bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review
powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or
irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to
establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for
Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of
that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor
to breathe life to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC.
QUINTO V. COMELEC
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election

laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a
public appointive office or position including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be
considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy
for the same or any other elective office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the
moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who
intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also
contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed
COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be
harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a
declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon
the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned
from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it
is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied
with, namely:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

It
It
It
It

must
must
must
must

be based upon substantial distinctions;

be germane to the purposes of the law;
not be limited to existing conditions only; and
apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial
differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the
fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real
and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor
vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from
plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala twowheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a fourwheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply
with the second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the
law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced
not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected
continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated
similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that
the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed
to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use
of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further
aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would
be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the
assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must
be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by
the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member
of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the VicePresident who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the
recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of
national housing, social welfare development, interior and local
government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head
executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently
when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our
law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for

President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still
use the resources of his office to support his campaign.

13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of

the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and
compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would
be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his
fitness for the position aspired for.

Held: No

There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials

differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet
the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
QUINTO V. COMELEC
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections.
The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court
declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides
that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and other officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA
9369 provides that
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate
in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees
in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate
of candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section

To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is
that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

It is germane to the purposes of the law;
It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned

provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It,
however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose
of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective
one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected
officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest
expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or
selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it
may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the
deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of
the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the
term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation
insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore
germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to
preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also
thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and
the intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this
Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this
Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of

COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive
municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the
civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled
corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the
filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation
rule, under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply
the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any
election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth
challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.
MENDOZA V. COMELEC
SOCRATES V. COMELEC
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition.
Victorio Socrates is the mayor of Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Incumbent
barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a
preparatory recall assembly (PRA) to initiate the recall of Socrates. The
COMELEC gave due course to the recall resolution and scheduled the recall
election. Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for the recall

election. Adovo and Gilo filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify
Hagedorn on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a
fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor
of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the
instant recall election for the same post.
Issue: WON Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of
Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
Held: Yes, Hagedorn is qualified to run for the recall election. After three
consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after
three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. In the case of
Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is
not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended
on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred
Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn
did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections. From June 30, 2001 until the
recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was
Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen.
This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service
as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001.
Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is
not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as
mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with
his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term
because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June
30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive
character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.