G.R. No.

92383 July 17, 1992

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NERISSA LIM, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner issued Personal Accident Policy No. 05687 to Felix Lim, Jr.
with a face value of P200,000.00. Two months later, he was dead with a
bullet wound in his head. As beneficiary, his wife Nerissa Lim sought
payment on the policy but her claim was rejected. The petitioner agreed
that there was no suicide. It argued, however that there was no accident
either.
Pilar Nalagon, Lim's secretary, was the only eyewitness to his death. It
happened on October 6, 1982, at about 10 o'clock in the evening, after his
mother's birthday party. According to Nalagon, Lim was in a happy mood
(but not drunk) and was playing with his handgun, from which he had
previously removed the magazine. As she watched television, he stood in
front of her and pointed the gun at her. She pushed it aside and said it
might he loaded. He assured her it was not and then pointed it to his
temple. The next moment there was an explosion and Lim slumped to the
floor. He was dead before he fell. 1
The widow sued the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
City and was sustained. 2 The petitioner was sentenced to pay her
P200,000.00, representing the face value of the policy, with interest at the
legal rate; P10,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P5,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages; and P5,000.00
as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit. This decision was affirmed on
appeal, and the motion for reconsideration was denied. 3 The petitioner
then came to this Court to fault the Court of Appeals for approving the
payment of the claim and the award of damages.
The term "accident" has been defined as follows:
The words "accident" and "accidental" have never acquired any technical
signification in law, and when used in an insurance contract are to be
construed and considered according to the ordinary understanding and
common usage and speech of people generally. In-substance, the courts
are practically agreed that the words "accident" and "accidental" mean
that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or design,
and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. The definition that has

usually been adopted by the courts is that an accident is an event that

takes place without one's foresight or expectation an event that
proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known case,
and therefore not expected. 4
An accident is an event which happens without any human agency or, if
happening through human agency, an event which, under the
circumstances, is unusual to and not expected by the person to whom it
happens. It has also been defined as an injury which happens by reason of
some violence or casualty to the injured without his design, consent, or
voluntary co-operation. 5
In light of these definitions, the Court is convinced that the incident that
resulted in Lim's death was indeed an accident. The petitioner, invoking
the case of De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance, 6 says that "there is no
accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional,
unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which
produces or brings about their injury or death." There was such a
happening. This was the firing of the gun, which was the additional
unexpected and independent and unforeseen occurrence that led to the
insured person's death.
The petitioner also cites one of the four exceptions provided for in the
insurance contract and contends that the private petitioner's claim is
barred by such provision. It is there stated:
Exceptions
The company shall not be liable in respect of
1.
xxx
b.

Bodily injury
xxx

xxx

consequent upon

i)
The insured person attempting to commit suicide or willfully
exposing himself to needless peril except in an attempt to save human life.
To repeat, the parties agree that Lim did not commit suicide. Nevertheless,
the petitioner contends that the insured willfully exposed himself to
needless peril and thus removed himself from the coverage of the
insurance policy.
It should be noted at the outset that suicide and willful exposure to
needless peril are in pari materia because they both signify a disregard for

one's life. The only difference is in degree, as suicide imports a positive act
of ending such life whereas the second act indicates a reckless risking of it
that is almost suicidal in intent. To illustrate, a person who walks a
tightrope one thousand meters above the ground and without any safety
device may not actually be intending to commit suicide, but his act is
nonetheless suicidal. He would thus be considered as "willfully exposing
himself to needless peril" within the meaning of the exception in question.
The petitioner maintains that by the mere act of pointing the gun to hip
temple, Lim had willfully exposed himself to needless peril and so came
under the exception. The theory is that a gun is per se dangerous and
should therefore be handled cautiously in every case.
That posture is arguable. But what is not is that, as the secretary testified,
Lim had removed the magazine from the gun and believed it was no longer
dangerous. He expressly assured her that the gun was not loaded. It is
submitted that Lim did not willfully expose himself to needless peril when
he pointed the gun to his temple because the fact is that he thought it was
not unsafe to do so. The act was precisely intended to assure Nalagon that
the gun was indeed harmless.
The contrary view is expressed by the petitioner thus:
Accident insurance policies were never intended to reward the insured for
his tendency to show off or for his miscalculations. They were intended to
provide for contingencies. Hence, when I miscalculate and jump from the
Quezon Bridge into the Pasig River in the belief that I can overcome the
current, I have wilfully exposed myself to peril and must accept the
consequences of my act. If I drown I cannot go to the insurance company
to ask them to compensate me for my failure to swim as well as I thought I
could. The insured in the case at bar deliberately put the gun to his head
and pulled the trigger. He wilfully exposed himself to peril.
The Court certainly agrees that a drowned man cannot go to the insurance
company to ask for compensation. That might frighten the insurance
people to death. We also agree that under the circumstances narrated, his
beneficiary would not be able to collect on the insurance policy for it is
clear that when he braved the currents below, he deliberately exposed
himself to a known peril.
The private respondent maintains that Lim did not. That is where she says
the analogy fails. The petitioner's hypothetical swimmer knew when he
dived off the Quezon Bridge that the currents below were dangerous. By
contrast, Lim did not know that the gun he put to his head was loaded.

Lim was unquestionably negligent and that negligence cost him his own
life. But it should not prevent his widow from recovering from the insurance
policy he obtained precisely against accident. There is nothing in the policy
that relieves the insurer of the responsibility to pay the indemnity agreed
upon if the insured is shown to have contributed to his own accident.
Indeed, most accidents are caused by negligence. There are only four
exceptions expressly made in the contract to relieve the insurer from
liability, and none of these exceptions is applicable in the case at bar. **
It bears noting that insurance contracts are as a rule supposed to be
interpreted liberally in favor of the assured. There is no reason to deviate
from this rule, especially in view of the circumstances of this case as above
analyzed.
On the second assigned error, however, the Court must rule in favor of the
petitioner. The basic issue raised in this case is, as the petitioner correctly
observed, one of first impression. It is evident that the petitioner was
acting in good faith then it resisted the private respondent's claim on the
ground that the death of the insured was covered by the exception. The
issue was indeed debatable and was clearly not raised only for the purpose
of evading a legitimate obligation. We hold therefore that the award of
moral and exemplary damages and of attorney's fees is unjust and so must
be disapproved.
In order that a person may be made liable to the payment of moral
damages, the law requires that his act be wrongful. The adverse result of
an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the act or to
the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral
damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.
For these the law taxes costs. 7
The fact that the results of the trial were adverse to Barreto did not alone
make his act in bringing the action wrongful because in most cases one
party will lose; we would be imposing an unjust condition or limitation on
the right to litigate. We hold that the award of moral damages in the case
at bar is not justified by the facts had circumstances as well as the law.
If a party wins, he cannot, as a rule, recover attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, since it is not the fact of winning alone that entitles him to
recover such damages of the exceptional circumstances enumerated in
Art. 2208. Otherwise, every time a defendant wins, automatically the
plaintiff must pay attorney's fees thereby putting a premium on the right to
litigate which should not be so. For those expenses, the law deems the
award of costs as sufficient. 8

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

in so far as it holds the petitioner liable to the private respondent in the
sum of P200,000.00 representing the face value of the insurance contract,
with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint
until the full amount is paid, but MODIFIED with the deletion of all awards
for damages, including attorney's fees, except the costs of the suit.

denied, De la Cruz instituted the action in the Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan for specific performance. Defendant insurer set up the defense
that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing
contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance. After
due hearing the court rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff which is
the subject of the present appeal.

SO ORDERED.

It is not disputed that during the ring fight with another non-professional
boxer, Eduardo slipped, which was unintentional. At this opportunity, his
opponent landed on Eduardo's head a blow, which sent the latter to the
ropes. That must have caused the cranial injury that led to his death.
Eduardo was insured "against death or disability caused by accidental
means". Appellant insurer now contends that while the death of the
insured was due to head injury, said injury was sustained because of his
voluntary participation in the contest. It is claimed that the participation in
the boxing contest was the "means" that produced the injury which, in
turn, caused the death of the insured. And, since his inclusion in the boxing
card was voluntary on the part of the insured, he cannot be considered to
have met his death by "accidental means".1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-21574

June 30, 1966

SIMON DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff and appellee, vs.

THE CAPITAL INSURANCE and SURETY CO., INC., defendant and
appellant.
Achacoso, Nera and Ocampo for defendant and appellant.
Agustin M. Gramata for plaintiff and appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal by the Capital Insurance & Surety Company, Inc., from
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (in Civ Case No. U265), ordering it to indemnify therein plaintiff Simon de la Cruz for the
death of the latter's son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorney's fees.
Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a mucker in the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc.
in Baguio, was the holder of an accident insurance policy (No. ITO-BFE-170)
underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., for the period
beginning November 13, 1956 to November 12, 1957. On January 1, 1957,
in connection with the celebration of the New Year, the Itogon-Suyoc Mines,
Inc. sponsored a boxing contest for general entertainment wherein the
insured Eduardo de la Cruz, a non-professional boxer participated. In the
course of his bout with another person, likewise a non-professional, of the
same height, weight, and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his
opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall,
with his head hitting the rope of the ring. He was brought to the Baguio
General Hospital the following day. The cause of death was reported as
hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and who was named beneficiary
under the policy, thereupon filed a claim with the insurance company for
payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. As the claim was

The terms "accident" and "accidental", as used in insurance contracts,

have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts
in their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been
taken to mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without
intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.
An accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight or
expectation an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an
unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected.1
Appellant however, would like to make a distinction between "accident or
accidental" and "accidental means", which is the term used in the
insurance policy involved here. It is argued that to be considered within the
protection of the policy, what is required to be accidental is the means that
caused or brought the death and not the death itself. It may be mentioned
in this connection, that the tendency of court decisions in the United States
in recent years is to eliminate the fine distinction between the terms
"accidental" and "accidental means" and to consider them as legally
synonymous.2 But, even if we take appellant's theory, the death of the
insured in the case at bar would still be entitled to indemnification under
the policy. The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not
result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an
accident-policy if it is the natural result of the insured's voluntary act,
unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or injury.3 There
is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional,

unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which

produces or brings about the result of injury or death.4 In other words,
where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the
insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of
the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the
protection of policies insuring against death or injury from accident.
In the present case, while the participation of the insured in the boxing
contest is voluntary, the injury was sustained when he slid, giving occasion
to the infliction by his opponent of the blow that threw him to the ropes of
the ring. Without this unfortunate incident, that is, the unintentional
slipping of the deceased, perhaps he could not have received that blow in
the head and would not have died. The fact that boxing is attended with
some risks of external injuries does not make any injuries received in the
course of the game not accidental. In boxing as in other equally physically
rigorous sports, such as basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily
anticipated to result. If, therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can only
be accidental or produced by some unforeseen happening or event as what
occurred in this case.
Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically excluded from its
coverage
(e) Death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging in
football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any
kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling.
Death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was
not declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract. Failure of
the defendant insurance company to include death resulting from a boxing
match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the
conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for
such death.5
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. so ordered.

While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie
Surposa, died on October 18, 1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted by
one of the three (3) unidentified men without provocation and warning on
the part of the former as he and his cousin, Winston Surposa, were waiting
for a ride on their way home along Rizal-Locsin Streets, Bacolod City after
attending the celebration of the "Maskarra Annual Festival."
Thereafter, private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said
insurance policy filed a written notice of claim with the petitioner insurance
company which denied said claim contending that murder and assault are
not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy.
On February 24, 1989, private respondent filed a complaint with the
Insurance Commission which subsequently rendered a decision, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

G.R. No. 100970

September 2, 1992

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA,
respondents.
Aquino and Associates for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and preliminary mandatory injunction to annul and set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 11, 1991, 1 affirming
the decision dated March 20, 1990 of the Insurance Commission 2 in
ordering petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation to pay private
respondent Julia Surposa the proceeds of the personal accident Insurance
policy with interest.
It appears on record that on October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie Surposa
was insured with petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation under
Finman General Teachers Protection Plan Master Policy No. 2005 and
Individual Policy No. 08924 with his parents, spouses Julia and Carlos
Surposa, and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all
surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. 3

In the light of the foregoing. we find respondent liable to pay complainant

the sum of P15,000.00 representing the proceeds of the policy with
interest. As no evidence was submitted to prove the claim for mortuary aid
in the sum of P1,000.00, the same cannot be entertained.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent to pay
complainant the sum of P15,000.00 with legal interest from the date of the
filing of the complaint until fully satisfied. With costs. 4
On July 11, 1991, the appellate court affirmed said decision.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition alleging grove abuse of discretion on
the part of the appellate court in applying the principle of "expresso unius
exclusio alterius" in a personal accident insurance policy since death
resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said
insurance policy considering that the cause of death of the insured was not
accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act of the assailant in
killing the former as indicated by the location of the lone stab wound on
the insured. Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent
which, by the very nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot
be indemnified.
We do not agree.
The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance contracts have
not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in
their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken
to mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention
and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An
accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation

 an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect

of a known cause and, therefore, not expected.

prohibited risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to
limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

. . . The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not result from
accident or accidental means within the terms of an accident-policy if it is
the natural result of the insured's voluntary act, unaccompanied by
anything unforeseen except the death or injury. There is no accident when
a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected,
independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings
about the result of injury or death. In other words, where the death or
injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or
if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the
injury, the resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuring
against death or injury from accident. 5

Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:

As correctly pointed out by the respondent appellate court in its decision:

In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa died in the
course of an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary act considering
the very nature of these crimes. In the first place, the insured and his
companion were on their way home from attending a festival. They were
confronted by unidentified persons. The record is barren of any
circumstance showing how the stab wound was inflicted. Nor can it be
pretended that the malefactor aimed at the insured precisely because the
killer wanted to take his life. In any event, while the act may not exempt
the unknown perpetrator from criminal liability, the fact remains that the
happening was a pure accident on the part of the victim. The insured died
from an event that took place without his foresight or expectation, an
event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a known cause and,
therefore, not expected. Neither can it be said that where was a capricious
desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to danger considering
that he was just going home after attending a festival. 6
Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy involved herein
specifically enumerated only ten (10) circumstances wherein no liability
attaches to petitioner insurance company for any injury, disability or loss
suffered by the insured as a result of any of the stimulated causes. The
principle of " expresso unius exclusio alterius" the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing is therefore applicable in the
instant case since murder and assault, not having been expressly included
in the enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said
insurance policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the
petitioner insurance company from liability for, any injury, disability or loss
suffered by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner insurance
company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the

The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not

favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Moreover,
it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in
favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the
words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its
beneficiary. 7
WHEREFORE, finding no irreversible error in the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals, the petition for certiorari with restraining order and
preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

shall exist which shall bear the same proportion to the moneys, benefits,
privileges, and annuities so accruing or growing out of such insurance that
said five hundred pesos bears to the whole annual premiums paid.

G.R. No. L-12189

April 29, 1960

FRANCISCA GALLARDO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

HERMENEGILDA S. MORALES, defendant-appellant.
Cajulis and Dolorfino for appellee.
Filemon Cajator for appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
The issue before us is whether a personal accident insurance which
"insures for injuries and/or death as a result of murder or assault or
attempt thereat" is a life insurance, within the purview of Rule 39, section
12, subdivision (k) of the Rules of Court, exempting from execution.
All moneys, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner
growing out of any life insurance, if the annual premiums paid do not
exceed five hundred pesos, and if they exceed that sum a like exemption

In accordance with a compromise agreement between the parties in the

above-entitled case, a decision was rendered therein by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, on February 3, 1956, sentencing defendant
Hermenegilda S. Morales to pay to plaintiff Francisca Gallardo the sum of
Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00). In due course, the corresponding writ
of execution was issued and delivered to the Sheriff of Manila, who, on
August 8, 1956, garnished and levied execution on the sum of P7,000.00,
out of the P30,000.00 a due from the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.,
to said defendant, as beneficiary under a personal accident policy issued
by said company to defendant's husband, Luis Morales, who died, on
August 26, 1950, by assassination. Invoking the above-quoted provision of
the Rules of Court, defendant asked the sheriff to quash and lift said
garnishment or levy on execution. Upon denial of this request by the
sheriff, defendant filed a motion praying that the aforementioned sum of
P7,000.00 be declared exempt from execution under said provision of the
Rules of Court, and that the Sheriff of Manila be ordered to quash or lift
said garnishment or levy on execution. This motion was denied by an order
dated October 18, 1956. Hence, the present appeal by the defendant, who
maintains that the policy in question is a life insurance policy, within the
purview of the aforementioned exemption, for it insured her husband ". . .
for injuries and/or death as a result of murder or assault or attempt
thereat."
In its order denying the claim for exemption set up by the defendant, the
lower court expressed itself as follows:
Upon a perusal of the authorities cited by the parties, this Court is fully
convinced that there is a fundamental distinction between life insurance,
and accident insurance, and the insurance policy issued to Luis G. Morales,
husband of herein defendant, was undoubtedly an accident insurance, as
distinguished from a life insurance. As conceded by the facts appearing in
the pleadings, the personal accident policy, part of the proceeds of which
is under garnishment, was for P50,000.00 and yet the annual premium was
for P15.00. If it were an ordinary life insurance policy, taking into account
that the insured, Luis G. Morales, was 38 years of age and the amount of
the policy was for P50,000.00 the annual premium would have been
around P1,206.00. Besides, the period for the policy was stipulated for one
year, and considerations as to age, health, occupation and other personal
circumstances were not taken into account in an accident insurance policy.
Even the certification issued by the insurance commissioner on August 23,
1956, marked as Annex "1" of the opposition, shows that the Capital

Insurance and Surety Company Inc. is a non-life insurance company and

that the only authority granted to it to transact business covers fire,
marine, surety, fidelity, accident, motor car, and miscellaneous insurance,
except life insurance. From this circumstance alone, not to mention many
others, there are abundant indications that there exists a fundamental
distinction between life insurance and accident insurance. As counsel for
oppositor has clearly pointed out, an accident policy merely insures the
person from injury and or death resulting from murder, assault, or an
attempt thereat, while in life insurance policy, what is insured is the life of
the subject for a definite number of years. From the authorities quoted by
the oppositor, this Court is fully convinced that an accident policy is
fundamentally different from a life insurance policy, especially if this Court
takes into account that accident insurance is an indemnity or casualty
contract, while life insurance is an investment contract.
It is not disputed that a life insurance is, generally speaking, distinct and
different from an accident insurance. However, when one of the risks
insured in the latter is the death of the insured by accident, then there are
authorities to the effect that such accident insurance may, also, be
regarded as a life insurance.
"Life insurance" is a contract whereby one party insures a person against
loss by the death of another. Petition of Robbins, 140 A. 366, 367, 126 Me.
555.
An insurance on life is a contract by which the insurer, for a stipulated sum,
engages to pay a certain amount of money if another dies within the time
limited by the policy. Cason vs. Owens, 26 S. E. 75, 76, 100 Ga. 142.
Life insurance includes in which the payment of the insurance money is
contingent upon the loss of life. Bowless vs. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident
Ass'n, C.C.A. Va. 99F. 2d 44. 48, 49.
A contract for life insurance is really a contract for insurance for one year
in consideration of an advanced premium, with the right of assured to
continue it from year to year upon payment of a premium as stipulated.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. 100 Pa 172, 180.

In its broader sense, "life insurance" includes accident insurance, since life
is insured under either contract. American Trust & Banking Co. vs. Lessly,
106 S.W. 2d. 551, 552, 171 Tenn. 561, 111 A.L.R. 59.
Under statute providing that 'any life insurance' on life of husband shall
insure to benefit of widow and children exempt from husband's debt,

proceeds of policy insuring against death by accident insured to widow's

benefit free from husband's debts. Code 1932, B 8456. American Trust &
Banking Co. vs. Lessly, 106 S.W. 2d 551, 171 Tenn. 511 III A.L.R. 59.
Insurance policy, providing for payment in case of accidental death, is "life
insurance policy" to such extent within state statue prescribing incontestable period for policies. Code S.C. 1932 ss 7986, 7987. Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. of California vs. Parker, C.C.A.S.C., 71 F. 2d 872, 875.
"Life insurance" includes all policies of insurance in which payment of
insurance money is contingent upon loss of life. . . . Smith vs. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of U.S., 89 S.W. 2d 165, 167, 169 Tenn. 477.
Insurance policy including a death benefit and a health or accident
disability benefit constituted a "life insurance policy" within meaning of
laws 1926, c. 118, S. 134, imposing privilege tax on insurance companies
with different rates as between life insurance companies and other
companies, in view of provisions of Code 1906, ss 2576, 2598
(Hemingway's Code 1927, ss 5830, 5856), and Law 1924, c. 191, s I
(Hemingway's Code 1927, s 5995); it being immaterial that in some policy
forms the health and disability feature was more valuable asent a showing
that death provision was inserted to avoid the higher tax. Universal Life
Ins. Co. vs. State, 121 So. 849, 850, 155 Miss. 358." (25 Words & Phrases
260, 261, 262.)
When the application was made, Harris W. Rimmer carried life insurance
with the Equitable Life Assurance Society, for $10,000, payable upon proof
of death, with a provision that upon death by accident the amount of
insurance payable would be increased to $20,000. The plaintiff insisted
that this was life insurance, a disclosure of which was not called for in
question 10, while the defendant insisted it was accident insurance that
should have been disclosed and further insisted that, it being a fact
material to the risk the failure to disclose the policy in the Equitable Life
Assurance Society rendered the policy issued to the applicant void. . . .
The court might have gone further and held that the failure of the
applicant to characterize the insurance in the Equitable Life Assurance
Society as accident insurance did not constitute a false answer to the
inquiry of what accident or health insurance he was carrying. The policy in
the Equitable Life Assurance Society covered loss of life from natural as
well as external and accidental causes, and was life insurance. The mere
addition of the double indemnity clause providing for increased insurance
upon proof of death by accident did not divest the policy of its character of
insurance on life, or make the contract other than life insurance, for
insurance on life includes all policies of insurance in which the payment of

the insurance money is contingent upon the loss of life. Logan vs. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 146 Mo. 114, 47 S.W. 948. See also Johnson vs. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 148 Mich. 406, 151 N.W. 593, L.R.A. 1916A, 475; Zimmer vs.
Central Accidental Co., 207 Pa. 472, 56 A. 1003; Wright vs. Fraternities
Health & Accident Ass'n. 107 Me. 418, 78A. 475, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.)461;
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. vs. Ins. Com'r 208 Mass. 386, 94 N.E. 477;
Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. vs. Caroll, 86 F. 567, 41 L.R.A. 194; Wahl
vs. Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n 201 Iowa; 1355, 207 N.W. 395,
50 A.L.R. 1377." (Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. vs. Rimmer, 12 S. W. 2d
Series, 365, 367.)
For this reason, and because the above-quoted provision of the Rules of
Court makes reference to "any life insurance," we are inclined to believe
that the exemption there established applies to ordinary life insurance
contracts, as well as to those which, although intended primarily to
indemnify for risks arising from accident, likewise, insure against loss of life
due, either to accidental causes, or to the willful and criminal act of
another, which, as such, is not strictly accidental in nature. Indeed, it has
been held that statutes of this nature seek to enable the head of the family
to secure his widow and children from becoming a burden upon the
community and, accordingly, should merit a liberal interpretation.
The object of this statue was to enable a husband, when death deprived
wife and children of his support, to secure them from want and to prevent
them from becoming a charge upon the public. Necessities of the wife and
children and the public interest are none the less if the death of the
husband be brought about by accident rather than by disease. The intent
of the legislature in the enactment of this statute would not be advanced
by the construction of the law upon which the petitioners insist. (American

Trust & Banking Co. vs. Lessly et al., Supreme Court of Tenn., 106 S.W. 2d,
551, 552.)

Under statutes providing to that effect, the proceeds of life insurance are
exempt from the claims of creditors, a limitation being sometimes imposed
as to amount, see infra Sec. 40, or as to the beneficiaries entitled to the
exemption, see infra subdivision of this section. Statutes exempting life
insurance are regarded as exemption laws, and not as part of the
insurance from law of the state, nor as designed simply to protect insurer
from harassing litigation. Such statutes should be construed liberally and in
the light of, and to give effect to, their purpose of enabling an individual to
provide a fund after his death for his family which will be free from the
claims of creditors. The exemption privilege is created not by contract but
by legislative grant, and grounds for the exemption of the proceeds of
insurance policies must be found in the statutes. (35 C.J.S. pp. 53-54.)
By weight of authority, exemption statutes or rules should be liberally
construed with a view to giving effect to their beneficent and humane
purpose. To this end, every reasonable doubt as to whether a given
property is or is not exempt should be resolved in favor of exemption.
(Comments on the Rules of Court by Moran [1957 ed.] Vol. 1, p. 564.)
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the garnishment in
dispute hereby set aside and quashed, with the costs of this instance
against plaintiff Francisca Gallardo. It is so ordered.