PIOUS OBLIGATION OF SON AND DAUGHTER

UNDER HINDU LAW

SUBMITTED TO
Mr. Sushil Goswami
ASSISTANT PROFFESOR
GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

Submitted By:
Submitted By:
Bandhan Seth
Basawa Prasad Kunale
Registration Number: 12A031
Registration Number: 12A032
VIth Semester, 3rd year
VIth Semester, 3rd Year

&

Gujarat National Law University

National Law University

Gujarat

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Abstract...03
2. Liability of Son to pay debt of Father under Dharmasastras......04
3. Nature of Pious Obligation ....06
4. Pious Obligation of Daughter.....08
5. Judicial Approach...10
6. Conclusion......13
7. Bibliography...14

ABSTACT
The modern approach of law has been that the individual can enjoy his right, so long that his act of enjoying
the right does not affect the third party. The law has no place in the private conduct of an individual, it
3

cannot interfere in the individuals choice of food, his dressing, his way of expressing the ideas, his way of
expressing his love, his obligation towards his relatives and friends etc. The individual is seen not as a part
of a group, but as a separate from the group having his own ideas and goals.
The ancient Indian perspective on law is completely different from the modern perspective. The law was
used to not govern an individual, but a community. It interfered in the lives of the individual, in order to
reach the objectives, of the community one belonged to. The conduct of one person towards others, his
choice of food, his ideas and goals, his relationships, were always kept within the ambit of the interests of
the community.
The pious obligation of the legal heirs, especially the sons, is one of the moral obligations imposed by the
ancient Indian law, which imposes the duty on the son to clear the debts of his father, after the death. It is
with the objective of not only fulfilling the duties of a father, but also to protect the interests of the creditor.

INTRODUCTION
The ancient Hindu law provided for the doctrine of pious obligation on the son, which entrusted the duty on
the son, after the death of the father, to pay off the debts incurred by the father during his life time. This duty
4

upon the son was considered to be the religious duty of the son. The ancient Hindu law has a very deep
understanding of the obligation on the son over the fathers debt. Which debts must be paid, which other
debts must not be paid; by whom, and in what form, it must be paid; and the rules of gift and receipt,
everything is comprised under the title of recovery of a debt. The father being dead, it is now obligation on
the sons to pay his debt, each according to his share of the inheritance, in case they are divided in interest.
Or, if they are not divided in interests, the debt must be discharged by that son who becomes manager of the
family estate. If a debt has been legitimately inherited by the sons, and left unpaid by them, such debt of the
grandfather must be discharged by his grandsons.
As under the Mitakakshara law, so under the Dayabhaga law, the separate property of a Hindu is liable for
the payment of his debts in his lifetime as well as after his death. As each coparcener under the Dayabhaga
law takes a defined interest in the coparcenary property, which on his death passes not by survivorship to his
coparceners, but to his legal heirs by succession, such interest is liable for the payment of his debts not only
in this lifetime but, also after the death, as assets in the hands of his heirs.
Since sons, grandsons, and great grandsons do not under the Dayabhaga law acquire the interests by birth in
the ancestral property, the father can sell or mortgage the whole of the ancestral property in his hands for the
payment of his debts, whatever maybe the character.
On the death of the Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga law, his separate property as well as his undivided
interest in the coparcenary property passes to his heirs and they become assets of the deceased in their
hands. Therefore, if he dies leaving behind debts, the heirs are bound to pay the debts not only out of the
separate property left by the deceased, but also put of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property. The
heirs, however are not personally liable to pay off the debts of the deceased, not even if they be the sons,
grandsons or great grandsons of the deceased.
In the present situation, so far as the liability of the specified heirs to satisfy the debt of ancestors on the
ground of a pious obligation is concerned, the recent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act in 2005 makes
a radical changes. Section 6(4) of the Act states that after the commencement of the amendment, no court
shall recognise the right of the creditor to proceed against the son, grandson, or great grandson of a debtor
for debts contracted by the father, grandfather or great grandfather solely on the ground of pious obligation.
The proviso to the subsection stipulates that the right of a creditor to proceed agagsint the specified heirs, or
any alienations made in respect of, or in satisfaction of any such debts or obligations, before coming into
force of the amendment, are protected.
The doctrine of pious obligation thus stands abrogated to the extent that the specified heirs are not liable to
satisfy such debts solely on the grounds of pious obligation. The consequence of the amendment is that, if
the specified ancestor has contracted a debt, the specified heirs are not under any obligation to satisfy the
5

debt on the ground of pious obligation alone. If however, such heir has expressly agreed to bind himself to
fulfil the obligation, the provision will not be applicable. Debts contracted before the amendment came into
force, have been taken out of the purview of the amendment, with the stipulation that such debts are left
untouched and are enforceable as against the specified heirs, by virtue of the proviso to the sub section.
The explanation to the sub section states that a son, grandson or great grandson means and include
such specified heirs as born or adopted prior to the commencement of the amendment. Therefore, the
specified heirs born or adopted after commencement of amendment seem to have been impliedly excluded
from the liability of pious obligation, since the section is prospective and only protects the rights of the
creditors for debts contracted prior to the coming into force of the amendment and preserves the rights of
creditors to proceed against the specified heirs.

LIABILITY OF SON TO PAY DEBT OF FATHER

UNDER DHARMASASTRAS
6

The son under the ancient Hindu law was looked as an individual to fulfil the needs of parents. The son had
a duty towards their parents, from being a grown up man, till the last rituals of the parents. He has the
obligation to look after his parents. Many ancient Hindu texts, which entrusts duties on the son towards his
parents, shows that the son was not just desired for spiritual purposes, but also to be able to secure guarantee
to fulfil the liability of the parents.
The Manu sates that1,
when a son has paid the three debts, let him apply his mind to (the attainment of) final liberation; he who
seeks it without having paid (his debts) sinks downwards. Having studied the Vedas in accordance with the
rules, having begotten sons according to the sacred law, and having offered sacrifices according to his
ability, he may direct his mind to (the attainment of) final liberation. A twice-born man, who seeks final
liberation, without having studied the Vedas, without having begotten sons, and without having offered
sacrifices, sinks downwards. Because a son delivers (trayate) his father from the hell called put, he was
therefore called put-tra (a deliverer from put) by the self-existent (svayambhu) himself7 Between a son s
son and the son of a daughter there exists in this world no difference, for even the son of a daughter saves
him (who has no sons) in the next world, like the sons son.
These texts state that the son was desired not for the sake of spiritual reasons alone but one of the most
important reasons was the desire of the father to secure guarantee through the birth of a son for the discharge
of his secular liability also, most important of the liabilities being the liability to pay off ones debt. 2 The
reason for the imposition of the obligation is that according to the Hindu philosophy, the non payment of
debt would not only affect their birth in the next life, but also the life of the debtor would be miserable in the
present world also. This makes the son having a duty to pay off the debts of his father.
The ancient Hindu law has a very deep understanding of the obligation on the son over the fathers debt.
Which debts must be paid, which other debts must not be paid; by whom, and in what form, it must be paid;
and the rules of gift and receipt, everything is comprised under the title of recovery of a debt. The father
being dead, it is now obligation on the sons to pay his debt, each according to his share of the inheritance, in
case they are divided in interest. Or, if they are not divided in interests, the debt must be discharged by that

1 Basis and Nature of Son to Pay Fathers debt viv-a-vis Statutory Modification in Hindu Laws,
Academiaedu,
https://www.academia.edu/6488171/BASIS_AND_NATURE_OF_PIOUS_OBLIGATION_OF_SON_TO
_PAY_FATHERS_DEBT_VIS-%C3%80-VIS_STATUTORY_MODIFICATIONS_IN_HINDU_LAW (Accessed
on 20th March 2015)
2 Ibid.
7

son who becomes manager of the family estate. If a debt has been legitimately inherited by the sons, and left
unpaid by them, such debt of the grandfather must be discharged by his grandsons.3
Narad states that the liability to pay the debt does not die, with the death of the debtor, therefore the son has
a duty to fulfil the duty of his father. Further, he goes onto say that if a man fails to pay on demand what had
been borrowed or promised by him, that sum, together with the interest, goes on growing till it amounts to a
hundred crores and a hundred crores having been completed, he is born again, in every successive existence,
in creditors house as his slave, in order to repay the debt, through his labour.
According to Brihaspati, fathers debt must be paid, and after that mans own, however, a debt of a paternal
grandfather must also be paid, before these debts are paid off. The fathers debt, on being proved, must be
paid by his sons sons without interest; but the son of a grandson need not pay it at all. This view of the
Brihaspati is different from those of Narad and Manu, according to whom, debts of three ancestors are to be
paid, three ancestors are to be worshiped and the consequential liabilities of the three ancestors must be
discharged.4
The fulfilment of the obligation of paying the debt of the father arises as a religious duty, and therefore there
is religious injunction on the son to do his duty towards his father, therefore the non fulfilment of the
religious duty becomes a religious sin. We can also draw the conclusion from this that the debt of the father,
has to be fulfilled by the son, after fathers death, if only the debt is in the nature of religious, if the debt is
irreligious in nature, then son does not have obligation to fulfil the debt.
According to Indian legal literature the son is desired because of the reasons that he would pay the debts
spiritual and worldly of his father. Because of the reasons that the pious obligation of the son is based on the
authority of the religion, therefore, as a logical corollary it follows that the son is not to pay the debt of his
father which are irreligious in character, the reasons for this are: First, there are religious authorities
absolving the son from the liability to pay debts of the father which are irreligious in nature in the same way
as there are religious authorities which impose liability on sons to pay off the debt of their fathers. Second,
to make the son liable to pay irreligious debt would amount to the contribution and augmentation of
irreligious acts of the father. These types of debts incurred b father, which were not religious in nature, are
called as Avyavaharika debts. According to Vrihaspathi, sons shall not pay debts incurred by their fathers
3 Original research paper was published in the Journal of Indian Law Institute, New Delhi at 36 (1994)
JILI 339-355.

4 Dr. Saksena, P.P, Family law lectures, Family Law II, Lexis Nexis Student Series, 3rd Edition
2014, Pg. 195
8

for spirituous liquor, for idle gifts, for promises, made under influence of love or wrath or for suretyship, nor
the balance of fine or toll liquidated in party by their father.5

NATURE OF PIOUS OBLIGATION

As stated earlier, the son is having not a personal obligation to fulfil the obligation if his father to pay the
debt, but his duty is a religious duty, which has to be done. However, there is an exception to this duty, as
stated earlier, that in case the debt incurred by the father is in the nature of Avyavaharika debts, i.e. debts
which are irreligious in nature, then the son is not obligated to fulfil the debts. However, to examine whether
a debt is avyavaharika or not, the relevant time is the inception, when the loan was raised.
Where the debt was incurred for an illegal or immoral purpose, payment of will not be binding on the son.
But where receiving money was lawful at the time of the receipt, subsequent commission of an offence by
the father will not absolve the son form his obligation to pay debts, as held in Alapati Anandrao v. the
President of Co-operative Credit Society6. Therefore, where the receiving money was not criminal offence, a
subsequent misappropriation by the father would still bring the son, unless the misappropriation was done
under such circumstances that rendered the act criminal. For example, a father purchases a house subject to a
mortgage and later, removes materials, which act diminishes the security. In such cases, a personal decree
passed against the father would be binding on the son.
Venkat Subba J. in Ramasubramania v. Sivakami Ammal has, proposed the twin rules to determine whether a
debt contracted by the father would be binding on the sons, they are7:

If the debt, in its inception is not immoral, subsequent dishonesty of the father does not exempt the

son
It is not every impropriety or every lapse from the right conduct that stamps the debt as immoral. The
son can claim immunity only when the fathers conduct I utterly repugnant to good moral or is
grossly unjust or flagrantly dishonest.

In Hemraj v. Khem Chand8, where at the time of partition between the two brothers, one brother undertook
to hand over the promissory note to other, in exchange of a loan, but failed to do it deliberately and
wrongfuly, forcing the other to take the matter to the court, the court held that the former was liable to pay
the money due under the promissory note and passed a decree against him for the loss and damages. Such
5 Ibid.
6 Alapati Anandrao v. the President of Co-operative Credit Society AIR 1940 Mad 828
7 Ramasubramania v. Sivakami Ammal AIR 1925 Mad 841
8 Hemraj v. Khem Chand (1943) ILR ALL 727
9

decree was binding on his son also, as at the time when the amount was taken by him, it was lawful. His
subsequent act of wrongfully not returning the money was illegal and improper act, therefore the debt was
binding on the son. This case has to be distinguished from a situation where the receipt of money was at two
stages, one I in the official capacity and the other for its application. Where the taking of money, was proper,
as part of the duty of the father and its withdrawal later by a bank was also a part of the official routine, but
for the specific purpose only, a withdrawal for an authorised purpose would be the time of inception of debt
or liability.
The pious obligation the son or grandson or even great grandson, depend upon the nature of the debts
contracted by the Father. If they were avyavaharik, i.e., they were contracted for illegal or immoral
purposes or were improper, the sons cannot be compelled to repay them. Even in cases where the debts were
vyavaharik, i.e. lawful debts, and were contracted for a proper purpose, they will be binding only on the
undivided share of the sons in the family property and not on the separate property of the sons. However,
where the son inherits the property of the father, he can be compelled to pay the debts of the father from out
of the property and here, the nature of the debts that the father might have contracted, would be totally
immaterial.9
Even where the debts were tainted with immorality or illegality, the sons will be liable, but the liability
would extend only upto the assets that he has received from his father and not beyond that. Under
Dayabhaga law also, where the son does not have a right by birth and succeeds to the property of the father
as an heir, the rule is the same. The character of the debts is immaterial and the son is liable to the extent of
the property inherited by him and also, this liability would extend to whosoever inherited the property of the
person. Where in the absence of a male issue, collateral inherits the property; the liability to pay the debts is
fastened on him, to the extent of the inherited property, irrespective of whether the debts were for an illegal
or an immoral purpose.
The liability of the sons, to pay the debts of the father and grandfather, is not a personal liability, but it is a
liability that extends to the undivided interests in the coparcenary property.10 It cannot and does not does not
bind the separate property of the sons. These debts bind only the undivided share of the son in the
coparcenary property. Where the debts were contracted after the son had separated himself by a partition, the
share so obtained at the time of partition is not liable for the payment of the father debts.11
9 Dr. Saksena, P.P, Family law lectures, Family Law II, Lexis Nexis Student Series, 3rd Edition,
2014, Pg. 198
10 Ram Kirpal v. Bhura Mal (AIR 1941) Oudh 62
11 Dr. Saksena, P.P, Family law lectures, Family Law II, Lexis Nexis Student Series, 3rd Edition,
2014, Pg. 200
10

The undivided interest can be sold at the instance of the creditor, even to the extent of the whole of the
property, but the property is liable only where the debts were contracted for a purpose that was neither
immoral, nor illegal.12 In places where the son does not have the right to seek partition when the father is
alive, his interest can be attached and sold even during the lifetime of the father, for the latters debts. This
pious obligation the son to pay his father debts, exists despite the fact that the father himself may be alive ,
but does not extend beyond the undivided share of the son in the property.

THE PIOUS OBLIGATION OF

DAUGHTER
The ancient Hindu society, being patriarchal in nature, rejected the female as a property holder. The ancient
laws did not give any right to women to hold the property, even if the property was earned by her, it would
be under the control of her father or husband or her son, and she cannot enjoy the property herself. This
system continued even after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act in the year 1956, however the
legislation recognized the daughter to inherit her fathers self acquired property, but not the coparcenary
property and she herself was not recognised as the copacenary in the Joint Hindu family.
The 2002 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act was a greatest achievement by the Indian society, which
recognised the complete rights of women over her property. The 2002 amendment, recognised daughter as a
coparcenary to the Joint Hindu family and also her, self acquired property, new mechanism was provided for
the division of the females property. This breakthrough in the legislation was historic.
With the recognition of womens property, the duty of her under the principal of the pious obligation arises.
The doctrine of pious obligation has caused difficulties in the context of codified law and more so in the
context of women. In Keshav Nandan Sahay v. The Bank of Bihar 13, the Court held that sons were liable to
for pre-partition debts incurred by theier deceased father with respect to some bank loans while the widow
was not. The Court felt that on partition between the coparcenary and his sons, the widow is allotted a share
in her own right and not as a representative of her deceased husband. The Court said,
The doctrine of pious obligation cannot apply to the wife and she, therefore, cannot be liable to the
creditors on the principles applicable to the sons. On a partition between a coparcener and his sons, a share
is allotted to the wife in her own right and she cannot be treated as mere representative of the husband. The

12 Ibid.
13 Keshav Nandan Sahay v. The Bank of Bihar AIR 1977 Pat 185
11

principle is based upon ancient Hindu texts which do not mention the wife in the category of the sons and
there is no statutory enactment extending that doctrine so as to include her.
In Padminibai v. Arvind Purandhar Murabatte14, the Karnataka High Court observed that because a wife not
being a person entitled to a share in the Mitakshara coparcenary by birth is not bound by the doctrine of
pious obligation.
Applying this reason of these tow judgments in the post amendment scenario, the question arises, since now
the daughter is recognised coparcenary, will she be entitled to under the doctrine of pious obligation and will
she be bound to fulfil the debts of her father, just like a son.
The history of the pious obligation of the daughter dates back to 1924, when the Privy Council first time
herd the case of pious obligation over daughter towards her deceased father. In Pondicherry Kokilambal v.
Pondicherry Sundarammal and Ors.15, the Privy Council observed,
the entire law of the joint family, including right by birth,' has to be applied, the only difference being that
daughters took the place of sons and are entitled to such rights, as the sons would have in a joint family. If
this view is correct the position will be that the plaintiff would have all the rights and liabilities of sons in a
joint family. If you corcede the right by birth, and apply the law of the ordinary Mitakshara joint family, you
must also concede pious obligation of the daughter to discharge her mother's debts.
In the case of ITO v. K. Krishnamachari 16, were the deceased two daughters, some property and debt.
Immdeialtely after the death, the daughters being under the Class 1 of the heirs, they inherited the property
of the father, with the obligation to discharge the debts due from him. Unlike the case of the sns, the
daughters have no obligation to pay off the debts of their father. However, the daughters would be
responsible to pay the debts of the father only to the extent of the value of the assets inherited by them
thorough their father. Therefore the Court held that the daughters were not liable to pay the debts of their
father.
As per section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, after the amendment the daughters shall have the same rights
and liabilities as compared to the sons. Therefore, the doctrine of pious obligation has been deleted after the
amendment in 2005 to the Hindu Succession act but the liability to pay the of the deceased father will be the
same upon daughters as they would be on sons before the commencement of 2005 amendment, therefore the

14 Padminibai v. Arvind Purandhar Murabatte AIR 1989 Kant 120

15 Pondicherry Kokilambal v. Pondicherry Sundarammal and Ors.AIR 1925 Mad 902
16 ITO v. K. Krishnamachari 1985 11 ITD 194 Hyd
12

creditors, who had given the amount before the amendment have their rights secured, under the doctrine of
pious obligation, and both, the son and daughters are bound to pay the debts.

JUDICIAL APPROACH
Illegal, immoral and Avyavaharika debts are the debts which are not payable by the son under the doctrine of
pious obligation. Avyavaharika are not separate category of debts, they do not fall in separate category from
those known as immoral or illegal debts, they compromise only residuary one which are ejusdem generis
with illegal and immoral debts. 17
The question of avyavaharika debt came before court in the case of Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh18 , in
this case the decree was made against a Hindu governed by Mitakshara school. He had criminally
misappropriated some money. The transferee by sale of the decree brought to execution thereof the judgment
debtors right of occupancy in certain land as a tenant at fixed rates. Two sons of judgment debtor brought
suit against the purchaser to recover two third of the holdings. The right of occupancy in such land was held
to be ancestral property. Under Hindu law son had vested interest in such property by birth. The sons were
not bound by that debt for which decree was obtained because decree was for the money which the father
had embezzled. The court relied on the principal laid down by Privy Council in the case of Girdharee Lall v.

17Basis and Nature of Son to Pay Fathers debt viv-a-vis Statutory Modification in Hindu Laws,
Academiaedu
http://www.academia.edu/6488171/BASIS_AND_NATURE_OF_PIOUS_OBLIGATION_OF_SON_TO_
PAY_FATHERS_DEBT_VIS-%C3%80-VIS_STATUTORY_MODIFICATIONS_IN_HINDU_LAW (Accessed
on 20th March 2015)
18Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo (1884) ILR 6 ALL 234
13

Kantoo Lal19 and held that the respondent was not entitled to be protected as a purchaser at an execution sale
without notice. In Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lal 20 case the decree was a mere money decree against the father
of the plaintiffs personally, and the family property was not liable to be taken in execution of the decree and
the respondent was to satisfy himself on these points by examining the decree. The point was further
explained in case of Suraj Bunsi koer v. Sheo Prasad21.
Durbar v. Khachar22 is another important case in this case the plaintiff obtained a decree against the
defendants father for damages caused by a dam to the plaintiffs property and obstructed the passage of
water thereto. After the death of father the decree was sought to be enforced against the son and the decree
was with respect to the ancestral property in the hands of son. The text of Usanas was referred by the court
which reads:
A fine, or the balance of a fine likewise a bribe or a toll or the balance of it, are not to be paid by the son,
neither shall he discharge improper debts.23
By applying this court observed that the son is not liable. The act of father in obstructing the water passage
to the decree holders property may not have been illegal in the usual sense of the term that is to say, it may
not have been created in contravention of any express provision of the law; but the results of the suit shows
that it was wrongful, and for a liability so incurred the son cannot be held answerable when the estate that
has come to his hands has derived no benefit from the act.24
The obligation to pay off fathers personal debt is a religious obligation on son and if the son wants to
wriggle out of the debt then they can do it but only if the debts are tainted. The son will also have to show
that the creditor had the knowledge about the tainted debts.
In Luhar Amrit Lal Nagji v. Doshi Jayantilal Jetralal25 the Supreme Court relied upon the judgement of
Privy Council and enunciated the principle that the son who challenge the alienation made by father have to
19 Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lal (1874) I IA 321
20 Ibid.
21 Suraj Bunsi koer v. Sheo Prasad (1879) 6 IA 88
22 Durbar v. Khachar (1908) 32 Bom 348
23 Mitakshara, II, 48, Vide Bhattacharya, Hindu Law, 2 nd ed., p. 247.
24 Ibid.
25 Luhar Amrit Lal Nagji v. Doshi Jayantilal Jetralal 1960 AIR 964
14

prove not only that the antecedent debts were immoral but also that the purchaser had notice that the debts
were tainted. The learned judge pointed out that through judicial decisions the doctrine in the original texts
has been modified. Now the obligation of the son is limited to the share he receives in the assets of the joint
hindu property or the interest, it is no more a personal obligation and not liable to pay beyond the interest
received. The obligation exists irrespective of son being major or minor or whether the father is dead or
alive. The son is liable to pay rest all debts of the father which are not immoral, illegal or irreligious from the
coparcener property.
As per the proposition laid down in the case of Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad26 there is a pious obligation on
the son to pay all the debts of the father whether secured or unsecured but the liability is limited to the
interest which son gets from the joint Hindu property. By incurring the debt the father enables creditors to
sell the property in execution of a decree against him for payment of the debt.
Further in the case of Venkatesh Dhonddev Deshpande v. Sou. Kusum Dattatraya Kulkarni27 also the Apex
Court had held that when father being the karta of a Joint Hindu Family had contracted in his capacity of
Karta for the family purpose the son being member of the family is bound to pay all the debts to the extent
of their interest in the property. Even if the debts are the debts which the father had contracted for his
personal benefit the sons are liable to pay provided they are not incurred for immoral or illegal purpose.
A full bench of High Court in a case where a mortgage was created by the father gave following answer
when the mortgage has been created of the Joint Hindu Family property by the father in the Joint Hindu
Family, and a decree has been obtained on the basis of the mortgage, the only grounds on which the sons can
challenge the decree and the mortgage is that the debt was incurred for immoral or illegal purpose and for
this purpose it is immaterial whether the mortgaged property has actually been brought to sale in execution
of the decree or not.28
There is a distinction between debt incurred by the father manager and the brother manager, the debt
incurred by the father manager is liable to be paid by the son irrespective of the fact that the debt was
incurred for the Joint Hindu Family purpose or not but in case of brother manager the members of the family
are liable to pay only those debts which were incurred for the purpose and benefit of the family.

26 Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad (1924) 26 BOMLR 500

27 Venkatesh Dhonddev Deshpande v. Sou. Kusum Dattatraya Kulkarni 1978 AIR 1791, 1979
SCR (1) 955
28 Family Laws Sons Pious Obligation, http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/sons_p.htm
(Accessed on 27th March 2015)
15

In case of Pannalal and Another v. Mst. Naraini and Others 29 the court held that the son is liable to pay
fathers debt even after the partition if the debt were incurred before the partition and that a decree passed
against the separated son as legal representative of the deceased father in respect of the debt incurred before
the partition can be executed against the shares obtained by such son at the partition and this can be done in
execution proceedings and it is not necessary to bring a separate suit for the purpose.
The court in the case of Keshav Nandan Sahay vs The Bank of Bihar30 held that the doctrine of pious
obligation cannot be extended to the wife and therefore wife is not liable to pay to creditors on the principles
applicable to sons. Wife is allotted with share on partition in the family, the share which she gets is in her
own capacity and therefore she cannot be treated as the representative of the husband.
Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar31 the court said that in the cases even if the mortgage is not for legal
necessity or for payment of antecedent debt, the creditor can in execution of mortgage decree for realization
of a debt which the father is liable personally; sell the estate without obtaining separate personal decree
against him. Unless the son shows that the debt was tainted or was nonexistent he is bound by the sale.
Pentala Raghavaiah V. Boggawarapu Peda Ammayya 32 in this case the plaintiffs father was doing business
of tobacco with the respondent and became indebted to the respondent in the course of business. The
respondent contested that the tobacco business done by the father was for the benefit of the Joint Hindu
Family and the debt contracted by the father is not illegal or immoral so the plaintiff is liable to pay. The
court held in favor of the respondent and held plaintiff liable to pay. After the Amendment of 2005 in Hindu
Succession Act no court recognizes any right to proceed against a son or grandson for recovery of debt due
from his father or grandfather solely on the basis of pious obligation.

CONCLUSION
The pious obligation of the legal heirs, especially the sons, is one of the moral obligations imposed by the
ancient Indian law, which imposes the duty on the son to clear the debts of his father, after the death. It is
with the objective of not only fulfilling the duties of a father, but also to protect the interests of the creditor.
29Pannalal and Another v. Mst. Naraini and Others 1952 AIR 170
30 Keshav Nandan Sahay vs The Bank of Bihar AIR 1977 Pat 185, 1977 (25) BLJR 543
31 Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar (1898) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 222
32 Pentala Raghavaiah V. Boggawarapu Peda Ammayya 1998 (1) ALD 11, 1997 (5) ALT 405
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The fulfilment of the obligation of paying the debt of the father arises as a religious duty, and therefore there
is religious injunction on the son to do his duty towards his father, therefore the non fulfilment of the
religious duty becomes a religious sin. We can also draw the conclusion from this that the debt of the father,
has to be fulfilled by the son, after fathers death, if only the debt is in the nature of religious, if the debt is
irreligious in nature, then son does not have obligation to fulfil the debt.
As per section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, after the amendment the daughters shall have the same rights
and liabilities as compared to the sons. Therefore, the doctrine of pious obligation has been deleted after the
amendment in 2005 to the Hindu Succession act but the liability to pay the of the deceased father will be the
same upon daughters as they would be on sons before the commencement of 2005 amendment, therefore the
creditors, who had given the amount before the amendment have their rights secured, under the doctrine of
pious obligation, and both, the son and daughters are bound to pay the debts.
The doctrine of pious obligation thus stands abrogated to the extent that the specified heirs are not liable to
satisfy such debts solely on the grounds of pious obligation. The consequence of the amendment is that, if
the specified ancestor has contracted a debt, the specified heirs are not under any obligation to satisfy the
debt on the ground of pious obligation alone. If however, such heir has expressly agreed to bind himself to
fulfil the obligation, the provision will not be applicable. Debts contracted before the amendment came into
force, have been taken out of the purview of the amendment, with the stipulation that such debts are left
untouched and are enforceable as against the specified heirs, by virtue of the proviso to the sub section.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acts:
17

1. Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Articles referred:
1.

Priyanka

Tiwari

and

Ritu

Sharma,

Family

Laws

Sons

Pious

Obligation,

http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/sons_p.html
2. Vijendra Kumar, Basis and Nature of Pious Obligation of Son to Pay Fathers Debt Vis-A- Vis Statutory
Modification

in

Hindu

Law,

https://www.academia.edu/6488171/BASIS_AND_NATURE_OF_PIOUS_OBLIGATION_OF_SON_TO_P
AY_FATHERS_DEBT_VIS-%C3%80-VIS_STATUTORY_MODIFICATIONS_IN_HINDU_LAW
3.

Anshuman,

Pious

of

Daughters

the

Modern

Perspective,

http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/article/pious-obligation-of-daughters-the-modern-perspective696-1.html
Books:
1. Mulla Hindu Law by Satyajeet A. Desai, 21st Edition, 2010, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur,
ISBN: 978-81-8038-599-5
2. Family Law II by Poonam Pradhan Saxena, 3 rd Edition, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur,
ISBN: 9788180386763
Cases referred:
1. Alapati Anandrao v. the President of Co-operative Credit Society AIR 1940 Mad 828
2. Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad (1924) 26 BOMLR 500
3. Durbar v. Khachar (1908) 32 Bom 348
4. Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lal (1874) I IA 321
5. Hemraj v. Khem Chand (1943) ILR ALL 727
6. ITO v. K. Krishnamachari 1985 11 ITD 194 Hyd
7. Keshav Nandan Sahay v. The Bank of Bihar AIR 1977 Pat 185
8. Keshav Nandan Sahay vs The Bank of Bihar AIR 1977 Pat 185, 1977 (25) BLJR 543
9. Luhar Amrit Lal Nagji v. Doshi Jayantilal Jetralal 1960 AIR 964
10. Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo (1884) ILR 6 ALL 234
11. Padminibai v. Arvind Purandhar Murabatte AIR 1989 Kant 120
12. Pannalal and Another v. Mst. Naraini and Others 1952 AIR 170
13. Pentala Raghavaiah V. Boggawarapu Peda Ammayya 1998 (1) ALD 11, 1997 (5) ALT 405
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14. Pondicherry Kokilambal v. Pondicherry Sundarammal and Ors.AIR 1925 Mad 902
15. Ram Kirpal v. Bhura Mal (AIR 1941) Oudh 62
16. Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar (1898) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 222
17. Ramasubramania v. Sivakami Ammal AIR 1925 Mad 841
18. Suraj Bunsi koer v. Sheo Prasad (1879) 6 IA 88
19. Venkatesh

Dhonddev Deshpande v. Sou. Kusum Dattatraya Kulkarni 1978 AIR 1791, 1979 SCR (1)

955

19