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case 1-429-053

March 15, 2010

Marvel Comics: From Stan Lee to Mickey

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X-Men is what Marvel was about: being different and misunderstood and yet still striving
to do good despite the world looking at you with doubt and suspicion.
-- Bob Harras (Marvel editor in chief, 1995-2000)

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Marvel Comics, the company of Stan Lee and Spider-Man, has created comic books with quirky characters
and gripping storylines for more than 70 years. Disney, home of several idealistic fairytale characters,
acquired Marvel at the end of 2009. This was certainly not the first time that a company had taken
an interest in Marvels creativity and resilience, but Disneys primary focus on entertainment, instead of
publishing, makes this partnership unique. How did Marvel come to attract Disney Corporation, and what
is at stake for Marvel and its devoted fans? A chronicle of Marvels long, strange history may lend some
insight into the companys future.

The 1940s and 1950s: The Golden Age of Comics and Upheaval
Figure 1

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In the Golden Age of the comic book industry, a comic


book cost ten cents and readership was high. Publisher Martin
Goodman recognized the market potential for comic books and
founded Timely Comics in 1939, which eventually became Marvel
Comics. An issue of Captain Marvel Adventures sold a record
14 million copies in 1944, even with relatively little advertising.
During World War II, Marvel comics had a patriotic slant, and
superheroes often fought Nazis and other national enemies (see
Figure 1). After the war, the popularity of superheroes faded
and Marvel began to publish a variety of other genres, including
romance, western, horror, and funny animal comics. The company
was renamed Atlas Comics in 1951 and revived the concept of the
superhero, this time to fight the Communists. In 1954, the peak
of the Golden Age, the comic book industry sold an estimated
one billion comics.1
In 1954, psychiatrist Fredric Wertham published Seduction
of the Innocents, which decried the pervasive violence and adult

Source: Copyright Marvel Comics, 1942

Research Associate Nilima Achwal developed this case under the supervision of Professor Scott A. Moore. 2010, The William Davidson Institute.

Unauthorized reproduction and distribution is an infringement of copyright. Please contact us for permissions: Permissions@GlobaLens.com or 734-763-5020

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themes across comic book genres. This sparked an upheaval against the comic book industry. Newsstand
operators and comics distributors were threatened with violence and boycotts, and the Comics Code
Authority was established in 1955 to monitor offensive content in comic books. In 1957, Marvels distributor
discontinued its business after an unrelated lawsuit, and Marvel was forced to sign a contract with rival DCs
distributor, National Periodicals. At the beginning of 1957, Marvel was still the nations largest publisher,
releasing 75 comics a month.2 However, the new contract forced the company to limit its releases to 8-12
comics per month and fire many artists and writers.3 Marvels monthly sales plummeted from 6 million copies
to about 2 million copies between 1956 and 1958, while DC continued selling almost 7 million copies
monthly (see Figure 2).4 The Golden Age of comics was over, in particular for Marvel.
Figure 2

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Comic Sales in Millions for Marvel and DC

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Source: Marvel and DC Sales Figures. EntertheStory.com. 25 Feb 2010. http://enterthestory.com/comic_sales.html

1960-1970: The Silver Age of Comics

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In 1960, Marvel started its turnaround and started increasing sales once more. In 1961, Stan Lee and
Jack Kirby invented the Fantastic Four, a milestone for Marvel. The next summer, they invented Spider-Man.
Marvel took a few decisions that separated it from rival DC Comics: Characters had human flaws and were
rejected by society, settings were real cities, and stories were written to keep fans for longer. DCs method
tended to cycle through a set of fans every three years. Over time, fans came to prefer Marvels complex
characters to DC Comics godlike superheroes. For the first time, Marvel introduced comics with continuity
between issues.5 Marvel sales began to pick up, finally surpassing DC sales in 1966.
In 1967, Spider-Man and Fantastic Four became television cartoons. In 1968, the height of the Silver
Age, Martin Ackerman of Perfect Film and Chemical Company bought Marvel. Perfect Film specialized in film
processing and mail-order drug and vitamin sales.6 Marvel was integrated into the companys newly formed
Magazine Management Company. That year, Marvel produced more than 50 million 12-cent comics a year,
producing gross sales of about $6 million.7 Sales spiked once more at the beginning of 1969, when Marvel
bought its own distributor and no longer had to abide by rules governing number of releases a month (see
Figure 2). However, the comics industry was no longer as strong as it had once been; overall industry sales
were around 300 million copies.8

1970s and 1980s: Changes in Leadership


For the next several years, Perfect Film had problems with profitability and cash-flow.9 As part of an
attempt to resolve these issues, the company was renamed Cadence Industries, after Sheldon Feinberg
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became Cadences chairman in late 1969.10 Furthermore, it sold off assets, cut debt and focused its efforts
on the mail order, drugs, and publishing industries.11
Comic books were changing they began to incorporate themes related to prevailing social issues,
such as pollution and civil rights.12 The company tried to stay at the forefront of these changes. Marvels
comics pushed traditional boundaries with quirky and very human superheroes, including Spider-Man and
the Fantastic Four.13 Then, in 1971, Marvel became the first company to defy the 16-year-old code governing
the content of comic books when it published an issue of Spider-Man that dealt with drug abuse.14 As a
result of these changes, Marvels audience began to shift; by 1975, half of all readers were 15 or older, while
in 1960, the over-15 market comprised less than 3% of readers.15

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In addition to these external changes, Marvels internal staff changed in the early 1970s, and a younger
generation of writers joined the company. Two of the most prominent artists, Kirby and Lee, left their
positions. Kirby went to rival DC Comics, while Lee became publisher of Marvel.16 Marvel sales declined until
1972. In 1972, Marvel lowered its sales price below DCs and offered a higher distributor discount, causing
DC sales to start falling in 1973 (see Figure 2).17 Marvel also started distributing its comics outside the US
for the first time.18

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At the end of the 1970s, print costs increased and newsstands decreased their comics sales; only 48
million comics were sold in the comic book industry.19 In 1978, Marvel was in crisis due to a decline in
sales and a lawsuit threatening to affect distributors.20 That year, Jim Shooter became editor-in-chief
and implemented new policies that improved performance through the 1980s. First, he granted rights and
royalties to writers, offering bonuses if an issue sold more than 100,000 copies. Then, to combat declining
newsstand sales, Shooter focused on penetrating the new direct market, comic book stores. Marvel published
more comics geared toward the dedicated readers that frequented comics stores. In 1979, sales through
the direct market accounted for only 6% of gross sales and there were only about 800 comics shops in the
world. In three years, 20% of sales were through the direct market.21 Both quality and sales improved under
Shooters leadership in the 80s.

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Marvel also started to rely increasingly on licensing income in the 80s. In the late 1970s, Marvel created
its own licensing division and assigned in-house artists to work on licensed products, such as sheets and
box tops.22 By 1978, Marvels licensing income, which came from consumer items, TV shows, and movies, was
larger than income from its comic book sales. One Marvel writer complained, Marvel seems to be becoming a
toy company rather than a publisher.23 Stan Lee reflected his companys commitment to increasing licensing
fees by spending much of his time on the West Coast, working on Hollywood deals.24 By 2008, Marvel had
accumulated more than 5,000 characters that could potentially become toys (see Figure 3).
Figure 3

Selection of Characters from the Marvel Universe

Spider-Man

X-Men

Wolverine

Captain America

Fantastic Four

The Incredible Hulk

Thor

Silver Surfer

The Punisher

Silver Surfer

Ant-Man

Iron Man

The Avengers

Blade

Namor the Sub-Mariner

Nick Fury

Daredevil

Ghost Rider

Dr. Strange

Source: Marvel Enterprises, Inc. 2008 Annual Report (p. 3)

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The links between toy makers and companies with casts of known cartoon characters, like Marvel,
were strengthening. Licensing deals for cartoon characters were becoming increasingly important to the
toy makers. Television characters from weekly shows and cartoons were traditionally the source of most
licensing deals,25 but toy makers were also interested in characters from movies like Star Wars26 (1977) and
Superman27 (1978), demonstrating that this media could also have a major effect on toy sales. In 1978,
licensing royalties for all cartoon characters were $65.3 million (on $2.1 billion of goods).28 Toy makers
indicated that toys with cartoon characters sold about 10-20% better than those without;29 thus, Hasbro
relied on a strategy of focusing on toys licensed with characters from Marvel, Disney, Warner Brothers, and
Looney Tunes.30 Marvel even helped Hasbro develop a cast of original characters in the G.I. Joe line of toys
in 1982.31

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Animated shows also created some earnings. The Marvel Productions animation studio, bought
from Looney Tunes director Fiz Freleng in 1981, created various animated series, including Spider-Man,
Transformers, and Muppet Babies. By 1983, in addition to developing film projects, this studio was producing
and developing both Saturday morning and prime-time syndicated cartoon programs, along with animated
TV commercials with and without Marvel characters.32 The cartoon business was extremely competitive
in the mid-1980s, and the cartoon producers that had the best chance of surviving, according to an
investment banker who followed the industry, were the diversified ones that have the best relationships
with toy companies, the advertisers, the syndicators, and the networks.33

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By 1985, the direct market held half of Marvel sales, and this number rose to 70% in 1987.34 Marvel
and DC together still dominated newsstand sales in 1987, with 85% market share there.35 As time went on,
the direct market ruled Marvel sales, as Marvel shifted attention from bringing in new readers to pleasing
dedicated readers and collectors, who profited from back issues. Issue prices rose from 69 cents in 1986 to
$1.00 in 1989, discouraging new readers.36
Marvel was a profitable company in the mid-1980s; in 1985, Marvels overall revenue (from comic book
sales, licensing, and production of animations) was over $100 million.37 In November 1986, New World
Pictures, a low-budget film maker and distributor, bought Marvel for $46 million.38 This sale was part of the
liquidation of Cadence Industries.39 Harry Evans Sloan, the co-chairman of New World, commented, What
Marvel really is to us is an idea factory.40 The New World goal was to use Marvels cast of characters as the
basis for movies, TV shows, and cartoons. Marvel was attracted to the deal; as Lee explained, We will be
able to produce more of our own product instead of just licensing to other people.41

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1990-1997: Perelman, the Bubble Bursts, then Bankruptcy


Though New World valued Marvel, it experienced cash problems in late 1988 and was forced to sell some
assets; in January 1989, it sold Marvels comic books, childrens books, and licensing groups to financier Ron
Perelmans Andrews Group for $82.5 million.42 Perelman promised Marvel extensive merchandising, movies,
and fame, but decisions made over the next decade ignited a downward spiral.
Marvels funding choices were a major issue. Perelman used Marvel assets to raise a large amount of
money for use in his other businesses. In mid-1991, Marvel had an initial stock offering that raised $48
million,43 and about 75% of this amount went to Revlon, another company owned by Perelman.44 By 1995,
Perelman had issued $620 million in debt that was secured by his holdings in Marvel in order to buy other
companies.45
In the first few years of the 1990s, Marvel relied on selling showy issues to collectors to drive sales in
the direct market. Foil covers, giveaways, multiple covers for one issue, and cross-over issues with many
intersecting, confusing storylines and characters became the norm. Marvel began to publish more titles

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because first issues sell more copies, and soon there was less continuity between issues. The rise in comics
prices coupled with the increase in titles caused the price of an entire sequence to rise from $24 per month
in 1986 to $150 per month in 1993.46
Marvels new tactics drove away both remaining fans and new readers. New readers could not follow
the complex storylines or afford to buy whole sequences. The company culture became profit-centered,
stifled creativity, and granted less autonomy to the artists. In 1992, seven key artists, including Lee, left
Marvel to form their own Image Comics. The remaining creative talent was dissipated across issues, and
dedicated readers later organized boycotts to decry the decline in quality. In an equally troubling sign for
Marvel, Disney soon entered the comic book market directly instead of licensing its characters to other
publishers.47

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Marvel also focused on expanding into new industries, because readership had dropped from fifteen
million in the Golden Age to less than one million in the early 1990s. In 1992, Perelman financed the
purchase of Fleer Corporation, a trading card company, through Marvel bonds worth $286 million. Then
Marvel entered into a partnership with Toy Biz executives Ike Perlmutter and Avi Arad, in which Marvel
released rights to all Marvel characters in return for almost half of Toy Biz. Between 1991 and 1993, an
investment bubble caused the stock price to rise from $2 to $34.48 1993 was the only year that Marvel sales
passed $1 billion, and there was a high of 10,000 comics shops.49

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In 1995, the collecting bubble burst and only the readers remained. The price of paper and ink jumped,
and Marvel had close to zero profit. At this time, Marvel used a variety of independent distributors. Marvel
decided to purchase Heroes World Distribution for its exclusive use. Consequently, comics stores could no
longer qualify for volume discounts for purchasing many different brands of comics from one distributor.
Other distributors were also adversely affected; they compensated for the loss of Marvel business by signing
exclusive contracts with other publishers or went bankrupt. Because of the lack of competition among
distributors, comics shops could not afford distributors costs and were forced to close.

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Soon after, in 1995, Perelman bought another trading card company, Skybox International, and Italian
sticker manufacturer Panini group. He spent several more million dollars for the rights to feature NBA players
and Disney characters on trading cards and stickers, respectively. That year, Marvel borrowed a total of $700
million from banks and $1 billion from bondholders in order to finance expansion. In addition, the highrisk bonds had interest rates as high as 12%. Perelman persuaded Perlmutter and Arad to make an initial
public offering of Toy Biz shares on the New York Stock Exchange, reaping $10 million for Marvel. However,
there had been a major league baseball players strike before the purchase of Skybox, and the trading card
industry collapsed. Soon after, two Disney movies performed poorly in the box office, pushing Panini, and
consequently Marvel, into a crisis. Marvel stock plummeted to $15. By the end of the year, Marvel had 35%
market share and losses totaling $48 million.50
By 1996, one in six comic book stores had closed as compared to 1993, and Marvel sales had dropped
by a fourth. Marvel fired 275 employees, including one-third of the publishing staff of the New York City
office.51 Comics prices climbed to $2 per copy.52 Marvel offered more Toy Biz shares on the New York Stock
Exchange, yielding about $35 million for Marvel. Still, Marvel claimed only 25% of the market and suffered
losses of $464 million. By the end of 1996, Marvels stock price was a meager $4.50.53
Marvel filed for bankruptcy in January 1997. An investor in Marvels IPO would have seen a $1,000
investment dwindle to $2 by the time the company emerged from bankruptcy.54 Also in 1997, Marvel broke
its exclusive contract with Heroes World Distribution to switch to DCs Diamond Distributors, which now
had a monopoly over comics distribution. After bankruptcy, there was a protracted legal battle over Marvel
ownership. After more than a year of court proceedings, Perlmutter and Arad of Toy Biz finally took control
of the company, leaving Perelman (and Carl Icahn, another potential suitor55) on the outside looking in.56

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1998-present: A Reinvented Marvel


In October 1998, Marvel, now merged with Toy Biz, opened on the stock market at $7 a share. The stock
price did not increase much more for five more years (see Figure 4).
Figure 4

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Marvel Stocks Weekly Closing Price

Source: Google Finance historical prices for Marvel Entertainment, http://www.google.com/finance/historical?q=NYSE:MVL

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Table 1 shows the precarious position that Marvel was in from 1996 to 2001. Net sales were unstable,
operating income was small or a loss, working capital was negligible or negative, and shareholders equity
was unstable. At one point in 2000, the company only had $3 million in the bank.57
Table 1

Marvel Financial Figures

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

221.6

150.8

232.1

319.6

231.7

181.2

299.0

347.6

513.5

390.5

351.8

485.8

676.2

Operating income

27.2

(49.3)

(19.5)

0.6

(59.0)

1.3

80.5

167.2

224.4

171.2

112.6

274.4

368.0

Working capital

102.2

74.0

(133.4)

91.9

41.7

30.0

32.6

214.2

142.2

2.5

(58.6)

(108.5)

(26.3)

Assets

171.7

150.9

689.9

654.6

554.0

517.6

517.5

741.9

714.8

573.5

623.9

817.4

937.6

Equity

137.5

108.0

183.6

135.8

31.4

41.9

242.9

469.5

546.5

360.6

254.9

181.5

396.7

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1996
Net sales

Sources: Marvel annual reports 2000-2007

Table 2 shows the distribution of Marvels sales and profits across its separate segments. The companys
mix of sales and income changed significantly over the years.

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Table 2

Marvel Financial Distribution by Segment


Segment sales
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Toys

212.4

245.8

167.3

91.7

155.0

85.2

212.8

68.0

116.1

2007
87.4

Publishing

14.7

43.0

45.2

49.5

64.5

73.3

86.0

92.4

108.5

125.7

Licensing

4.9

30.9

19.2

40.0

79.6

189.2

214.7

230.1

127.2

272.7

Segment operating income


1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

1.3

30.3

(13.8)

(5.8)

8.9

21.7

58.1

15.5

21.1

54.7

Publishing

1.4

8.3

12.3

14.5

19.6

25.4

37.3

36.4

44.1

53.5

Licensing

4.3

19.9

4.5

5.2

69.4

139.4

152.7

143.4

77.6

196.1

Sources: Marvel annual reports 2000-2007

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1998
Toys

Marvel started an independent imprint called Marvel Knights. The artists involved in this endeavor
released their creativity; they made radical changes to traditional characters, and it was well received. They
revealed the origin of Wolverine, created a black Captain America, and banned smoking from books. The new
generation of readers raved over Marvels fresh, new look.58
In July 1999 Marvel named Peter Cuneo president and CEO.59 He came to Marvel and implemented a
strategy that had many skeptics:

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I view Marvel as having the potential to be the leading entertainment company in the
world built around fantasy characters. I view all of our characters as brands, and what
were doing is brand management. I view our characters as celebrities only they dont
get old or misbehave. Were going to place them in as many mediums and entertainment
venues as possible, and were building the business for the long term.60
Cuneo believed that Marvel was not getting enough value out of the 5,000+ characters that it had
developed, and he planned to look for ways to change that state of affairs.

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In 1998, 77% of Marvels revenues came from toy sales, 19% from comics, and 4% from licensing Marvel
characters.61 Marvel focused on increasing revenues from licensing, the smallest driver of revenue at the
time, by selling rights to Hollywood studios. However, Marvel received only a small percentage of revenues
from its first movies.62 In 1999, Columbia Pictures paid Marvel $10 million for rights to produce SpiderMan, though Columbia brought in $403.7 million from this picture. X-Men: The Movie was a great success in
2000, with ticket sales of $160 million worldwide; unfortunately, Marvel made a mere $1.3 million from the
movie, since it had sold its rights to the characters during Perelmans time.63 Though it did make money from
licensing deals for merchandise related to the movie, it kept only about 75% of the sales of merchandise
because it had to share the rest with the studio.64 (See Table 3 for a more extensive list of Marvel movies.)
Finally, Foxs Fantastic Four had a worldwide gross of $624 million, but Marvel received only $13 million
from this film.65 Cuneos strategy for the future was to participate in the profits from the movie itself. Some
market analysts speculated that a company such as Disney, Fox, or Viacom who all already had their own
production studios might one day be interested in buying Marvel.66

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Table 3

Gross Domestic Revenues in Millions


Date

Gross

Movie

8/1/86

16.3

Howard the Duck

8/21/98

70.1

Blade

7/14/00

157.3

X-Men

3/22/02

82.3

5/3/02

403.7

Spider-Man

2/14/03

102.5

Daredevil

5/2/03

214.9

X2: X-Men United

6/20/03

132.2

Hulk

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Blade II

33.8

The Punisher

6/30/04

373.5

Spider-Man 2

12/8/04

52.4

Blade: Trinity

1/14/05

24.4

Elektra

7/8/05

154.7

Fantastic Four

5/26/06

234.4

X-Men: The Last Stand

2/16/07

115.8

Ghost Rider

5/4/07

336.5

Spider-Man 3

6/15/07

131.9

Fantastic Four: Rise of the Silver Surfer

5/2/08

318.4

Iron Man

6/13/08

134.8

The Incredible Hulk

12/5/08

8.1

Punisher: War Zone

5/1/09

179.9

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4/16/04

X-Men Origins: Wolverine

Source: Marvel Comics movies at the Box Office, Box Office Mojo, http://boxofficemojo.com/franchises/chart/?id=marvelcomics.htm
downloaded on March 6, 2010.

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Then, Marvel rid itself of Fleer Corporation, Skybox International, and Panini for a loss of $400 million.
However, the $30-million-per-year interest on the junk bonds that had financed their purchase proved to
be a key problem for Marvel. Marvel bought back some of its own bonds and cancelled them at half price,
since they were valued at 40 or 50 cents on the dollar. In addition, Marvel did not overprint for the direct
market, only printing books that were pre-ordered, which was popular with back issue sellers. In 2001,
Marvel posted its first profit in many years, half of it from buying back its own bonds.67 That year, Marvel
overtook DC in both sales and market share (see Figure 5).
Over the next seven years, Marvel sold rights to various characters and gradually increased both comic
book sales and market share, reaching a market share of 45% in 2008 (again, see Figure 5). The comic book
business was highly profitable and maintained its position as a research and development function for all
of Marvel, according to Cuneo.68 Marvel broke off its licensing deal with Toy Biz and sold the rights for five
years to Hasbro for $205 million.69 This markedly reduced Marvels direct workings in the toy manufacturing
business.

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Figure 5

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Publisher Market Share: 1997-2010

Source: Market Share. The Comics Chronicles. Comichron.com Note: TPB=trade paperbacks

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Hollywood produced more than 20 Marvel films, with most activity starting in 2000 (see Table 3). Soon,
Marvel found it more profitable to produce its own films (as Marvel Studios) and distribute them through
Paramount Pictures. Marvel raised $525 million to build this studio.70 The first Marvel-produced movie,
Iron Man in 2008, was a great success, earning $318 million in the domestic box office and $260 million
overseas.71 Of course, Marvel got to keep a much larger portion of these revenues than it had under any
licensing scheme.

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After Marvels revival, a likely partnership emerged in 2009, when Walt Disney Company acquired Marvel
Entertainment for $4 billion. This partnership will not only give Disney more content that appeals to boys,
but will also help Marvel produce and market its rich characters to become successful franchises.72 Marvels
stock price jumped from $28 to $50 between January and September 2009.73

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Endnotes
1


Lavine,
Michael L. Comic Books and Graphic Novels for Libraries: What to Buy. Serials Review Volume 24, No. 2. Summer 1998: p 34.

Marvel and DC Sales Figures. EntertheStory.com. 25 Feb. 2010. http://enterthestory.com/comic_sales.html.

C ooke, Jon. Stan the Man and Roy the Boy. A Conversation between Stan Lee and Roy Thomas. TwoMorrows Publishing 2003.
http://www.twomorrows.com/comicbookartist/articles/02stanroy.html.
Marvel and DC Sales Figures. EntertheStory.com. 25 Feb. 2010. http://enterthestory.com/comic_sales.html

Collins, Sean. The Amazing! Incredible! Uncanny Oral History of Marvel Comics Maxim.com. 12 Aug. 2009.

Perfect Film seeking to acquire publisher. The Wall Street Journal. 21 Jun 1968: p. 11.


Raviv,
Dan. Comic Wars: How Two Tycoons Battled Over the Marvel Comics EmpireAnd Both Lost. New York: Broadway Books, 2002.

Updating Superman: Comic book heroes are being modernized. The Wall Street Journal. 15 Aug. 1970: p. 1.

Cadence Industries says its rebounding from 1969 troubles. The Wall Street Journal. 27 Jan. 1972: p. 20.

10

Cadence Industries says its rebounding from 1969 troubles. The Wall Street Journal. 27 Jan. 1972: p. 20.

11

Cadence Industries says its rebounding from 1969 troubles. The Wall Street Journal. 27 Jan. 1972: p. 20.

12

Updating Superman: Comic book heroes are being modernized. The Wall Street Journal. 15 Aug. 1970: p. 1.

13

Heinzel, Ron S. Like characters, comic creator imperfect hero. Los Angeles Times. 13 March 1975: p. E12.

14

Van Gelder, Lawrence. A comics magazine defies code ban on drug stories. The New York Times. 4 Feb. 1971: p. 37.

15

Heinzel, Ron S. Like characters, comic creator imperfect hero. Los Angeles Times. 13 March 1975: p. E12.

16

Collins, Sean. The Amazing! Incredible! Uncanny Oral History of Marvel Comics Maxim.com. 12 Aug. 2009.

17

Marvel and DC Sales Figures. EntertheStory.com. 25 Feb. 2010. http://enterthestory.com/comic_sales.html.

18

Borrowing costs head higher in Japan; Mexican policies stir investor concern. The Wall Street Journal. 30 July 1973: p. 6.

19

Lavine, Michael L. Comic Books And Graphic Novels For Libraries: What To Buy. Serials Review Volume 24, No. 2. Summer 1998:
p 34. http://www.ugr.es/~alozano/Translations/ComicBooksinLibraries.pdf

20

Raviv, Dan. Comic Wars: How Two Tycoons Battled Over the Marvel Comics EmpireAnd Both Lost. New York: Broadway Books, 2002.

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Marvel and DC Sales Figures. EntertheStory.com. 25 Feb. 2010. http://enterthestory.com/comic_sales.html.

22

Kleinfield, N.R. Superheroes creators wrangle. The New York Times. 13 Oct. 1979: p. 25.

23

Kleinfield, N.R. Superheroes creators wrangle. The New York Times. 13 Oct. 1979: p. 25.

24

Beller, Miles. Hollywood is banking on the comics. The New York Times. 9 Dec. 1979: p. D1.

25

Winter, Christine. Tempo; Toy company technique hitch your wagon to a star. Chicago Tribune. 28 Feb. 1979: p. B1.

26

Weingarten, Paul. If you liked the film, youll love the paraphernalia. Chicago Tribune. 24 June 1977: p. A3.

27

Johnson, Sharon. The cartoon creature as salesman: Better than ever. The New York Times. 11 Feb. 1979: p. F3.

28

Johnson, Sharon. The cartoon creature as salesman: Better than ever. The New York Times. 11 Feb. 1979: p. F3.

29

Johnson, Sharon. The cartoon creature as salesman: Better than ever. The New York Times. 11 Feb. 1979: p. F3.

30

Winter, Christine. Tempo; Toy company technique hitch your wagon to a star. Chicago Tribune. 28 Feb. 1979: p. B1.

31

Davis, Bob. Hasbro Bradley scores with its terror toys, adroit licensing plans. The Wall Street Journal. 13 Dec. 1984: p. 1.

32

Rea, Steven X. Caped crusaders bound for screen. Philadelphia Inquirer. 21 Sept. 1983: p. C5.

33

L andro, Laura. Glut of cartoon shows prompts producers to search for new markets and partners. The Wall Street Journal. 12 May
1987: p. 35.

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