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Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 76, Number 3, July 2015, pp.
417-439 (Article)
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http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jhi/summary/v076/76.3.elazar.html

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Liberty as a Caricature: Benthams Antidote


to Republicanism1

Yiftah Elazar

In 1776, Jeremy Bentham claimed title to a kind of discovery that he


thought he had made: that the idea of liberty was merely a negative one,
and that it should be defined as the absence of coercion.2 Benthams
definition was not quite as original as he suggested. Thomas Hobbes had
already defined liberty as the absence of external impediments to motion or
action, and the early utilitarian Abraham Tucker had already argued that
liberty was a negative term.3 But Benthams formulation exerted considerable influence on the career of the concept of liberty in the nineteenth and
1
I would like to thank David Armitage, Melissa Lane, Douglas Long, Michael Quinn,
Jan-Werner Muller, Philip Pettit, and Philip Schofield for suggestions made at different
stages of work on this article, as well as two referees for this journal, whose excellent
comments have led me to significantly revise and improve my argument. I am grateful to
the staff of the Bentham Project at University College London for hosting me while I was
working on the manuscripts, and to Douglas Long for generously sharing his transcripts
of some of the early manuscripts. Abbreviations used in the article: UCLBentham
Papers at University College London; CorrespondenceThe Correspondence of Jeremy
Bentham (London: Athlone Press and Oxford University Press, 1968 ); BowringThe
Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the superintendence of his executor, John
Bowring, 11 vols. (Edinburgh & London: William Tait, 183843).
2
Correspondence, 1:30111.
3
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), chap. 14:
2, chap. 21; Thomas Hobbes and John Bramhall, Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and
Necessity, ed. V. C. Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 34; Abraham Tucker, Freewill, Foreknowledge, and Fate: A Fragment. By Edward Search, Esq
(London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1763), 712. Cf. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human

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twentieth centuries. It laid the ground for Isaiah Berlins argument, in the
shadow of the Cold War, that the liberal tradition espouses an idea of individual, negative freedom against interference.4
This article revisits Benthams theory of liberty and reconsiders it in
relation to republican and democratic ideas in the Age of Revolution. In
particular, it situates Benthams jurisprudential definitions of personal and
constitutional liberty in the context of an ideological debate on the relation
between liberty and happiness, on one hand, and political self-government,
on the other. The core question in this debate is whether and to what extent
individuals in civil society can and should possess the power of selfgovernment through participation in government or resistance to it.
Benthams role in this discussion was that of a political moderate,
poised between Whiggism and Toryism, much like that of one of his primary sources of inspiration, David Hume.5 Later on in his career, Bentham
changed his views and became a radical and a democrat,6 but in the period
discussed in this article, the 1770s and 1780s, he was critical of the protodemocratic discourse generated by supporters of the American Revolution
on both sides of the Atlantic. This article argues that Bentham forged and
employed innovative and subversive definitions of individual and political
liberty as ideological weapons. His definitions were intended to cut the
throat of what he believed to be a false and dangerous popular rhetoric of
liberty and rights.7
Benthams involvement in the American controversy was discussed in
several important studies.8 Drawing on manuscript, epistolary, and newspaper sources, this article studies some previously unexamined texts and
Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Book II, chaps.
8 and 17.
4
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 8n.; Isaiah
Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1969),
123n.
5
Jeremy Bentham, The Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government,
ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 43941.
6
Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham
(Oxford Oxford University Press, 2006); David Lieberman, Benthams Democracy, in
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2008): 60526.
7
UCL, LXIX, 158.
8
See, in particular, H. L. A. Hart, Bentham and the United States of America, Journal
of Law and Economics 19 (1976): 54767; Douglas G. Long, Bentham on Liberty: Jeremy Benthams Idea of Liberty in Relation to His Utilitarianism (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1977), 5162; F. Rosen, Bentham, Byron, and Greece: Constitutionalism,
Nationalism, and Early Liberal Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992),
2539; Quentin Skinner, Political Liberty: The Enlightenment Debate, The Roy Porter
Lecture (University College London, May 26, 2010); Paola Rudan, Securing the Future:

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Elazar Benthams Antidote to Republicanism

reconsiders previously examined ones. Part I argues that Benthams formulation of the negative definition of liberty should be understood in the context of questions of submission and resistance arising out of the American
controversy. It also examines different ways in which Bentham and his close
associate John Lind employed the negative definition of liberty during their
involvement in a debate on liberty and self-government provoked by the
Dissenting minister, moral philosopher, and political economist Richard
Price in 177680, henceforth: the Price Debate.
Part II considers Benthams understanding of the relation between liberty and security. I distinguish between two phases in Benthams writings
on this topic. In an earlier phase, he stresses the distinction between liberty
and security, and sets them on two different courses, one leading, in perfection, to anarchy and misery, and the other leading, in perfection, to order
and happiness. In a later phase, he extends his reductio ad absurdum strategy from individual to political liberty, constructing caricatures of the
republican ideal of democratic and international self-government.
Alongside its primary aim of studying Benthams theory of liberty in
an ideological context, this article engages with two secondary dilemmas:
the jurisprudence/ideology dilemma, and the republican/liberal dilemma.
The jurisprudence/ideology dilemma is whether we should interpret Benthams concept of liberty as part of a political/ideological conversation, or
whether it should be understood primarily as a jurisprudential concept.
Bentham was the great architect of a system of jurisprudence,9 and he
describes his Definition of Liberty as an integral part of this system: one
of the corner stones of my system: and one that I know not how to do
without.10 Can we interpret his theory of liberty in an external, ideological
context without failing to appreciate its internal role as part of his system
of jurisprudence?
I argue that Benthams jurisprudence in this period should be understood as a coherent and independently meaningful system of ideas, irreducible to ideological concerns, but also inseparable from them. The
ideological issues of the period inspired and influenced Benthams thought
on fundamental questions of jurisprudence, and he believed himself to be
forging jurisprudential tools that would facilitate the resolution of ideologically contentious matters. The resolution of the present unfortunate disputes between Britain and the American colonies, he writes, depends on
Jeremy Benthams Fragment on Government and the American Revolution, History of
Political Thought 34 (2013): 479506.
9
Bowring, 1:xxi.
10
Correspondence, 1:311. See Long, Bentham on Liberty, 5.

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the interpretation of concepts such as liberty. A sober and accurate apprehension of the import of these fundamental words, he adds in discussing
the idea of liberty, is not only a true key to Jurisprudence, but also the
only effectual antidote against the fascinations of political enthusiasm.11
The second dilemma is the republican/liberal one, and it is the product
of strikingly divergent readings of Benthams theory of liberty. While Douglas Longs Bentham on Liberty remains the most comprehensive and
nuanced treatment of Benthams theory of liberty, neo-republican scholars
have built on his account to portray Bentham as an archrival of the republican understanding of liberty,12 while liberal scholars have built on Longs
work in insisting on the continuity of Benthams theory of liberty with the
republican tradition.13
This article aims to reconcile the neo-republican and the liberal
accounts. Each has called our attention to a different aspect of Benthams
work and enhanced our understanding of it: the neo-republican account
has focused on the negative definition of liberty (discussed in Part I of the
article), and the liberal account has focused on Benthams definitions of
personal and constitutional liberty in terms of security (Part II). I argue that
the different aspects of Benthams theory of liberty gain greater coherence
when we look at what he was doing with his words in this period: developing jurisprudential strategies that would serve as an antidote against the
UCL, LXIX, 60, 62.
Douglas G. Long, Bentham on Liberty: Jeremy Benthams Idea of Liberty in Relation
to His Utilitarianism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 9698; Quentin
Skinner, States and the Freedom of Citizens, in States and Citizens: History, Theory,
Prospects, ed. Quentin Skinner and Bo Strath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 1819; Skinner, Political Liberty: The Enlightenment Debate; Philip Pettit,
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), 4150; Philip Pettit, Law and Liberty, in Legal Republicanism: National
and International Perspectives, ed. Samantha Besson and Jose Luis Mart (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 3947.
13
Frederick Rosen, Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy: A Study of the Constitutional Code (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 6875; Rosen, Elie Halevy and Benthams Authoritarian Liberalism, Enlightenment and Dissent 6 (1987): 5976; Rosen,
Thinking About Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at University College London,
29 November 1990 (London: University College London, 1990); Rosen, The Origin of
Liberal Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham and Liberty, in Victorian Liberalism:
Nineteenth-Century Political Thought and Practice, ed. Richard Bellamy (London and
New York: Routledge, 1990); Rosen, Bentham, Byron, and Greece, 2539; Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 24550;
Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: Jeremy Bentham and the Civil Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 71103; P. J. Kelly, Classical Utilitarianism and the
Concept of Freedom: A Response to the Republican Critique, Journal of Political Ideolo11
12

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Elazar Benthams Antidote to Republicanism

republican account of the free state as internally and externally selfgoverning.14

I. LIBERTY, SUBMISSION, AND SELF-GOVERNMENT


The first part of this article examines the ideological dimension of Benthams negative definition of liberty. It addresses Benthams formulation of
the negative definition of liberty and his subsequent employment of it as an
antidote to the ideal of liberty as self-government. This leads, in Part II, to
a consideration of the ideological dimensions of Benthams reflections on
the relation between liberty and security and on the nature of political liberty.

British Superiority and American Liberty


According to Benthams own account, he discovered the negative definition
of liberty in 177475.15 During this period, he was engaged in several interrelated projects. He was working on his unpublished Comment on the
Commentaries and on A Fragment on Government (1776). He was amassing a body of preparatory materials for his projected treatise of universal
jurisprudence, provisionally entitled Elements of Critical Jurisprudence.
And he was involved in the propaganda war against the American Revolution, particularly by composing with Lind the pro-government pamphlet
Remarks on the Principal Acts of the 13th Parliament of Great Britain
(1775).16
In Benthams preparatory notes for the Elements of Critical Jurisprudence, particularly in the group of manuscripts headed PPI (Preparatory
PrinciplesInserenda), we find his earliest written comments on liberty,
probably dating from 1775.17 This is the only text in which he uses his
initial formulation of the negative definition as the absence of restraint.
gies 6 (2001): 1331. See also Doug Long, Review of Liberty before Liberalism, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 32 (1999): 615.
14
Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, History and
Theory 8 (1969): 353, esp. 4546; J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed.
James O. Urmson (London: Clarendon Press, 1962).
15
Correspondence, 1:310.
16
Correspondence, 1:235.
17
UCL, LXIX, 159, reference to Burkes Speech on American Taxation, 3rd ed., published
in early 1775; see Lloyds Evening Post (January 30, 1775February 1, 1775).

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By March 1776, at the latest, he replaces restraint with coercion,


which includes both restraint and constraint,18 reasoning that being constrained to do something abridges liberty no less than being restrained from
doing something.19
Ostensibly, the negative definition is formulated in two jurisprudential
contexts. The first is the role of the law in establishing property rights.
Legal possession, argues Bentham, is the liberty to use an object, or not
being restrained from using it, while others are being at the same time
restrained from using it by fear of punishment appointed by the Law. In
this context, Bentham opposes liberty to restraint, physical and legal. His
point is that legal right, as distinguished from mere opinion of right, is the
product of legal restraint; it is the child of law, as he would later put it.20
The second, related context is Benthams reformist argument against the
multiplicity of the Laws, or excessive legislation, which imposes on individuals unnecessary, burthensome restrictions.21
Underlying these two jurisprudential contexts, I argue, is the more fundamental challenge of reconciling the liberty of the subject with the authority of government. Bentham poses this challenge to Edmund Burke in the
Remarks: teach us to reconcile British superiority with American liberty.22 This is a response to Burkes argument, in his October 1774 speech
to the electors of Bristol, that the just, wise, and necessary constitutional
superiority of Great-Britain . . . is consistent with all the liberties a sober
and spirited American ought to desire.23 Bentham agrees with Burkes
assertion: the superiority of Great Britain is consistent with American liberty. Yet he believes that Burke, the rhetorician, is unequal to the task of
Correspondence, 1:31011.
UCL, LXIX, 5768.
20
UCL, LXIX, 9293, 140, 147, 153, and see also 9495, 1012, 1089, 11617, 145,
16970, 21011. Jeremy Bentham, Rights, Representation, and Reform: Nonsense Upon
Stilts and Other Writings on the French Revolution, ed. Catherine Pease-Watkin, Philip
Schofield, and Cyprian Blamires, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2002), 34951, 398400; Schofield, Utility and Democracy, 70.
21
UCL, LXIX, 148. Cf. the critique of multiplicite de Loix in Helvetius, De Lhomme,
De Ses Facultes Intellectuelles Et De Son Education (Londres [The Hague]: chez la Societe
Typographique, 1773), 235. See also the Multiplicity of Laws in Francis Bacon, Resuscitatio, or, Bringing into Publick Light Severall Pieces of the Works, Civil, Historical,
Philosophical & Theological, Hitherto Sleeping; of the Right Honourable Francis Bacon,
ed. William Rawley (London: W. Lee, 1657), 9798; James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and a System of Politics, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 288.
22
Jeremy Bentham, The Design, in John Lind, Remarks on the Principal Acts of the
Thirteenth Parliament of Great Britain (London: T. Payne, 1775), xi.
23
Edmund Burke, Mr. Edmund Burkes Speeches at His Arrival at Bristol and at the
Conclusion of the Poll, 2nd ed. (London: J. Dodsley, 1775), 1314.
18
19

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demonstrating how the two can be combined, and that only a metaphysician such as himself can teach the difference between slavery and that
equally unconditional submission which is the necessary foundation of all
Government.24
The challenge of reconciling the authority of the British government
with the liberty of its subjects stood at the core of Benthams early work.
His friend and literary executor, John Bowring, recounts that the circumstance that seems to have given the first impulse to the inquiries which
engrossed his future life, was the dispute between Great Britain and her
colonies, which, during his law-studentship, was the universal topic of conversation.25 Benthams own account of his intellectual development
implies that he discovered the principle of utility while searching for satisfactory grounds for the authority of government, a question heatedly
debated in the American context. Bentham found these grounds in the third
book of David Humes Treatise of Human Nature, where he learnt to see
that utility was the test and measure of all virtue; of loyalty as much as
any.26 Notice his emphasis on the question of loyalty to the government.
Paula Rudan has recently offered an unorthodox interpretation of the
Fragment as a systematic intervention in the American controversy, which
addresses constitutional questions underlying the imperial relationship,
particularly the question of sovereignty and obedience.27 The preparatory
manuscripts, in which Bentham first formulates the negative definition of
liberty, can be read along similar lines. The jurisprudential concepts discussed in these manuscripts, including the powers of government, property,
taxation, consent, and representation are the same concepts discussed in
Linds and Benthams political pamphlet, the Remarks, composed around
the same time.28 Bentham is explicit on the political import of his jurisprudential definitions in the manuscripts: A great part of the merits of the
American controversy as far as concerns the matter of right, centers on the
signification of the words Give, grant, consent, representation, taxation,
legislation, constitution, he writes.29 Incredibly sanguine about the power
of his conceptual analysis, he adds: If I explain these matters clearly I may
be a means of giving perpetuity to the constitution of my country, I may
UCL, XXVII, 102.
Bowring, 10:vii.
26
Bentham, Comment and Fragment, 43941, note. See David Hume, A Treatise of
Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 3.2.10.
27
Rudan, Securing the Future, 479506.
28
Lind, Remarks, esp. Part I, Sect. III.
29
UCL, LXIX, 177.
24
25

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stifle in embryo or rather intercept the conception of all manner of political


disputes, prevent civil wars, fix the peace of empires, and save the lives of
millions.30
In his attempt to redefine the fundamental concepts related to the
American controversy, Bentham offers an innovative definition of the state.
This is where the concept of liberty is first mentioned in the preparatory
manuscripts. The state is described as the collection of individuals accustomed to obey the supreme power. In a footnote, Bentham comments that
those whose affections are warm on the side of liberty, may consider his
definition of the state in terms of obedience as a definition of a slavish
state. His own view, however, is that what is called Liberty in a state,
does not depend upon any circumstance that will take it out of this definition.31 In other words, Bentham suggests that the liberty of the subjects is
consistent with obedience to the supreme power of the state.
How is Benthams negative definition of liberty consistent with his
definition of the state in terms of obedience? Understanding liberty as the
absence of legal coercion cuts both ways: it creates a presumption against
excessive, inexpedient legislation, but also against the immoderate and irrational pursuit of liberty at the expense of law and government. It encourages us to employ a utilitarian calculus in adjusting the claims of those
two jealous antagonists, Liberty and Government, as Bentham writes in
the Fragment.32
Applied to the American controversy, the fundamental antagonism
between law and liberty underscores the need to institute the debate . . .
on the footing of utility, rather than on the ambiguous and sophistical
discourse of natural rights, which distracts and eludes the apprehension,
stimulates and inflames the passions. Benthams utilitarian calculus of
authority and resistance, which draws on the negative definition of liberty,
is meant to pave the plain and open road . . . to present reconcilement
between Great Britain and its colonies.33
Benthams concern with radical claims against the authority of government is a likely basis for his rejection of the associated doctrines of natural
law and natural rights. These doctrines could not be more favourable to
the enterprizes of fanatics, including the clamorous menaces of democratic fanaticism, he says.34 Famously, he goes on to develop this line of
UCL, LXIX, 156.
UCL, LXIX, 86.
32
Bentham, Comment and Fragment, 480.
33
Ibid., 49192.
34
UCL, XCVI, 63, 110.
30
31

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argument in his comments on the American Revolutionary War, the American Declaration of Independence, the declarations of rights adopted by
North Carolina and proposed by Virginia in 1788, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.35
We see, then, that Benthams critical jurisprudence in the 1770s,
including the negative definition of liberty, can be understood as an intervention in ideological questions arising out of the American controversy.
This reading of his work does not assume that he understood himself to be
a partisan writer. On the contrary, he believed himself to be an anti-partisan
writer. He expected his critical jurisprudence to incur the displeasure of
all parties that divide the state, both the man warm on the popular side
and the men of the ruling party. The mortal foes of his metaphysics, he
writes, are all Bigots and listed partizans, all Sophists and Rhetoricians.
Whenever a member of either party, he states, through artifice or through
passion should seek by sophistry and the abuse of words to carry a point at
the expense of truth . . . he will ever find in genuine metaphysics that sharpness that shall cut the throat of his designs.36
Notwithstanding his anti-partisan aspirations in this period, however,
Bentham admits in retrospect that his judgment . . . was ranked on the
government-side, due to the badness of the arguments used on behalf of
the Americans.37 While he may have believed himself at the time to be
forging an impartial and anti-partisan science of jurisprudence, his definitions of liberty were primarily intended to cut the throat of pro-American
and proto-democratic political discourse.

The Liberty of Robinson Crusoe


About a year after Bentham formulated the negative definition of liberty in
his PPI manuscripts, the perfect opportunity came for employing it in a
public debate. This was the controversy following the publication of Richard Prices Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty in February 1776.
Though largely forgotten today, Prices pamphlet made a great sensation
Bentham, Comment and Fragment, 5258, 49192. Short Review of the Declaration, in John Lind, An Answer to the Declaration of the American Congress, 3rd ed.
(London: printed for T. Cadell; J. Walter; and T. Sewell, 1776); Jeremy Bentham, An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A.
Hart (London: The Athlone Press, 1970), 30810; Nonsense upon Stilts, in Bentham,
Rights, Representation, and Reform, 317401.
36
UCL, LXIX, 155, 158, 177.
37
Bowring, 10:viii.
35

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upon its publication,38 became an international seller, and provoked the


most extensive exchange of pamphlets inspired by any single work during
the years of the American controversy.39
Prior to the Price Debate, the champion of the American cause who
attracted Benthams criticism was Edmund Burke, whom he described as
the most consummate, most enchanting rhetorician perhaps the world
ever has yet seen.40 Bentham repeatedly refers in his manuscripts to
Burkes statement that he hates the very sound of metaphysical distinctions of right,41 describing him as one of those who choose rather to chatter like parrots, than to discourse like men, and comparing him to the
mythological cave-dwelling monster Cacus, who hated day-light.42 Such
mortal foes of metaphysics, says Bentham, love darkness better than light,
because their minds eye is weak, or because their deeds are evil. They hate
the light, and tremble as they hate.43
Prices approach was the opposite of Burkes, as Lind astutely
observed. Price approached the American controversy as a metaphysician.44
An accomplished moral philosopher, he declared his intention to judge the
dispute by the general principles of Civil Liberty. The first part of his
Observations offers correct ideas of Liberty in general, and of the nature,
limits, and principles of Civil Liberty in particular. The principle of liberty,
according to Price, is self-government, or the power of agents to exercise
their own will without being subject to an alien power. He goes on to
develop this premise into a proto-democratic theory of civil liberty and free
government, which assumes the ability of all free agents to choose and control their representatives.45
Despite Prices philosophical approach, Bentham argues that the Dissenting minister failed the cause of metaphysics by offering metaphorical
38
Horace Walpole, Journal of the Reign of King George the Third, from the Year 1771
to 1783, ed. John Doran (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1859), 2:22.
39
Thomas Randolph Adams, The American Controversy: A Bibliographical Study of the
British Pamphlets About the American Disputes, 17641783, 2 vols. (Providence: Brown
University Press; Bibliographical Society of America, 1980), 2:90934.
40
UCL, LXIX, 159.
41
UCL, LXIX, 137, 152, 155, 159, 161, 17677; Edmund Burke, Speech of Edmund
Burke, Esq. On American Taxation, April 19, 1774, 3rd ed. (London: J. Dodsley, 1775),
89.
42
UCL, LXIX, 137. Virgil, The Aeneid, Book VIII, verses 184305.
43
UCL, LXIX, 155.
44
John Lind, Three Letters to Dr. Price, Containing Remarks on His Observations on the
Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the
War with America (London: T. Payne, J. Sewell, and P. Elmsly, 1776), 15.
45
Richard Price, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Govern-

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phrases instead of genuine metaphysical distinctions.46 He describes the


Observations as not written to be understood; not worthy to be detested;
a hash of nonsense and contradictions, seasoned by spleen, tossed up for
quick consumption, doomed to precipitate decay, and suited only to the
vitiated palate of a party.47 In a later manuscript, he goes as far as claiming: Dr Price with his self-government made me an anti-American.48 The
statement appears to be hyperbolic, since Bentham was already assisting
Linds pamphleteering before the publication of the Observations. It illustrates, however, the intensity of Benthams antagonistic reaction to Prices
theory of liberty as self-government.
Bentham and Lind had a more prosaic reason to engage with Price:
he criticized their Remarks, describing their principles of government as
mortifying.49 In March and April of 1776, Lind published an attack on
Price in a series of letters to the newspaper, written under the pseudonym
Attilius. Price considered the uncivil style of these letters to be inexcusable, yet regarded Lind as the ablest of all the writers who published
virulent invectives against him.50
In the letter published on March 27, 1776, Lind employed Benthams
definitions of liberty and right without proper credit,51 provoking Bentham
to write to him and claim credit for both definitions.52 The next Attilius
letter attributes the definitions to an unnamed friend.53 By July 1776, Linds
letters were revised and printed in a pamphlet entitled Three Letters to Dr.
Price. A long footnote attributes the negative definition of liberty to Linds
very worthy and ingenious friend.54
Linds well-articulated and published critique of Price is helpful in
reconstructing Benthams arguments in his fragmentary manuscripts. Lind
does not object to Prices definition of liberty as self-government in itself.
Prices capital mistake, according to his view, is to suppose liberty and
self-government to be any thing positive.55 He argues that the terms
ment, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America (London: T. Cadell, 1776),
134.
46
UCL, XXVII, 102.
47
Hermes, Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, July 26, 1776.
48
UCL, CLXX, 175.
49
Price, Observations, 4243.
50
Richard Price, Additional Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty and
the War with America (London: T. Cadell, 1777), xivxv.
51
Attilius, The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, March 27, 1776.
52
Correspondence, 1:31011.
53
Attilius, The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, March 29, 1776.
54
Lind, Three Letters, 1617.
55
Ibid., 14.

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Liberty, Self-determination, Self-direction, Self-government, convey only


negative ideas, and that in saying that a man is free, that he enjoys the
power of Self-direction or Self-government, all we mean is that no other
agent whatever has, or means to exercise the power of constraining him to
do, or to forbear that act.56
According to Lind, Prices failure to pay heed to the negative meaning
of self-government leads to a second, arguably more dangerous mistake:
assuming the existence of a natural and unalienable right to full and
perfect liberty.57 Lind portrays Prices ideal of perfect liberty as a maximalist ideal of complete absence of coercion, fit for savages, barbarians, and
wild animals, not for civilized nations. He argues that Price is inflaming
the passions of the multitude by railing against malades imaginaires
and promoting his impossible scheme of ideal democracy.58 In fact, Price
meant no such thing: he distinguishes his idea of liberty from licentiousness,
and identifies complete and perfect political liberty with fair and adequate representation in a free constitutional state.59 Linds refutation
involves caricaturing Prices constitutional self-government as the absence
of government.
Similarly to Lind, Bentham employs two strategies against Price: 1)
unmaskingdemonstrating the love of liberty to be an irrational and
immoderate passion for a fictitious entity; 2) reductio ad absurdumusing
the negative definition to draw to absurdity the ideal of liberty as selfgovernment.
Bentham addressed the Price Debate at some length on two separate
occasions. The first is a manuscript entitled Hey, which was addressed to
Lind and originally intended for publication as an appendix to the Three
Letters. The Hey manuscript is a comment on the negative definition of
liberty formulated by the lawyer, essayist, and mathematician Richard Hey,
in a pamphlet that the latter published in response to Price in June 1776.60
Hey defines liberty in negative terms, but opposes it to restraint and not to
coercion.61 Bentham defends his own definition of liberty as the absence of
coercion. In the course of doing so, he elaborates on the metaphorical and
Ibid., 1416.
Price, Observations, 1.
58
Lind, Three Letters, 2065, esp. 20, 2324, 2627, 63, 65.
59
Price, Observations, 1.
60
The Daily Advertiser, June 8, 1776; The General Evening Post, June 8, 1776.
61
Richard Hey, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, and the Principles of Government (London and Cambridge: T. Cadell and T. & J. Merrill, 1776), 610.
56
57

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fictitious nature of liberty.62 In addition, he fleshes out the subversive political implications of Prices particular construction of the concept of liberty:
it is not uncommon for questions of the first practical importance
to depend for their decision upon questions concerning the import
of these words. This is what in particular may be seen in the
instance of the present unfortunate disputes. Tis from a particular
construction put upon the word liberty and a few others that the
popular divine whom you combat with so much force has inferred
the impropriety of waging the war against America: with a degree
of justice equal to that with which as it seems to you he might
have inferred the propriety of a war of the governed of every other
country that is or has been upon their governors.63
Bentham is suggesting here that Prices idea of liberty as selfgovernment is subversive of any government. This is the line of argument
that he goes on to develop in his critique of the American Declaration of
Independence, where he says that by adding liberty and the pursuit of happiness to the list of inalienable rights, the Americans have outdone the
utmost extravagance of all former fanatics, and formulated principles
subversive of every actual or imaginable kind of Government. 64 In his
critique of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, he
identifies this position with that of the anarchist and the man of violence, contrasting it with that of the the moderate man and the good
subject, who serves as the rational censor of the laws.65
In addition to the Hey manuscript, Bentham addressed the Price
Debate in two letters printed in the Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser.
These letters, published in JulyAugust 1776 under the pseudonym
Hermes, constitute Benthams only published intervention in the Price
Debate, and surprisingly, apart from brief mention, they have not been discussed in the scholarly literature.66 According to Bentham, he wrote the
letters after Lind begged him to reply to an anonymous critic of Linds
UCL, LXIX, 6263.
UCL, LXIX, 60.
64
Short Review of the Declaration, in Lind, Answer to the Declaration, 11922.
65
Nonsense upon Stilts, in Bentham, Rights, Representation, and Reform, 317401,
esp. 32325.
66
Correspondence, 1:33536; Rudan, Securing the Future, 481.
62
63

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letters.67 In his reply, Bentham defends the negative definition of liberty


against the claim made by the critic that the term Liberty conveys positive
ideas.68
The Hermes letters offer helpful insight into Benthams understanding
of the linguistic and psychological errors that he associated with the positive idea of liberty as self-government. He traces the popular passion for
liberty to the creative power assumed by language, especially where the
imagination which sets it to work is prompted and enlivened by the
affections. Thanks to this creative power, the metaphor of liberty assumes
a life of its own, and it is turned . . . into a reality . . . ripened into a
tangible substance. The rhetoric of political writers makes this fictitious
entity appear to be desirable: It becomes the object of love and rapturous
elogium to impassioned politicians. It is a treasure, in short a jewel. . . .
It is sacred, unalienable, inestimable.69 Thus, language, imagination, and
passion combine to produce the irrational and immoderate desire for liberty.70
As an antidote to this dangerous delusion, Bentham offers an imaginary scenario involving Robinson Crusoe. On his uninhabited and
unclaimed island, Crusoe would be with reference to all mankind (for
liberty is a term of reference) at perfect liberty. However, once a savage
lands on the island and turns Crusoe into his slave, perfect liberty comes to
an end. What makes liberty disappear is this savage; whom (punning
apart) you doubtless cannot but allow to have been something positive.
The savage embodies the positive coercion that necessarily comes with
social relations, and makes it visible to us: Comes the savage, comes coercion: no savage, no coercion; but perfect liberty.71
One implication of the Crusoe scenario is that perfect liberty can only
exist away from civil society, on an uninhabited island. In civil society, we
must settle for imperfect liberty. Lind makes the implication explicit by
arguing that Prices ideal of self-legislation is fit only for Crusoes island.
He relates Crusoes ideal of self-government to Benthams argument that
democracy, understood as the government of all, is no Government at
all, and its members live in a state of nature.72 For Bentham and Lind,
Robinson Crusoe, perfect liberty, and democracy all belong to the world of
fiction.
Correspondence, 1:33536.
Ignoramus, The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, July 13, 1776.
69
Hermes, The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, August 1, 1776.
70
On real and fictitious entities, see Schofield, Utility and Democracy, chap. 1.
71
Ibid.
72
Lind, Three Letters, 39; Bentham, Comment and Fragment, 45859.
67
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To summarize the discussion thus far, I have been arguing that Benthams negative definition of liberty can be understood in the context of his
attempt to establish the authority of government on new grounds and to
undermine revolutionary and proto-democratic arguments for legitimate
resistance and popular self-government. Benthams innovative theory of liberty serves, in this way, not only as a cornerstone of his emerging system of
jurisprudence, but also as an antidote against republican and protodemocratic discourse.

II. SECURITY, THE FREE STATE, AND DEMOCRACY


Part I of this article reconstructed the ideological context in which Bentham
formulated the negative definition of liberty: the context of a moderate
political defense against democratic radicalism. In Part II, I take a broader
look at Benthams theory of liberty and consider its relation to personal and
political security. This part also addresses the contentious relation between
Benthams utilitarianism and the neo-Roman republican understanding of
liberty.

Liberty and Security in Perfection


Benthams earliest comments on the relation between liberty and security
are found in the Key and Crit. Jurisp. Crim. manuscripts, which Long
tentatively dates to a period beginning in Autumn 1776.73 Bentham opens
the Key manuscripts by discussing the coercive nature of the law, and this
leads to his definition of liberty as the absence of coercion. In this context,
he attacks the improper use of the term liberty to indicate security under
the law. The genuine, original, and proper sense of liberty, he argues, is
not anything that is produced by positive Law. It exists without Law, and
not by means of Law. According to this text, That which under the name
of Liberty is so much magnified, as the invaluable the unrivalled work of
law, is not Liberty but Security, and it is pernicious, most exemplarily
pernicious to confound under one and the same name things in themselves
so different from one another, and which have such frequent & such important occasion to be distinguished and contrasted.74
73
74

Long, Bentham on Liberty, xixiv.


UCL, LXIX, 44.

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For an account of security, Bentham refers his readers to another fragment, in which he discusses the way in which Liberty came to be confounded with Security. Here it turns out that liberty, in fact, can be
produced by the law, or be the work of Law, but only indirectly. The law
produces the liberty of one individual not by directly acting on that individual, but rather by imposing restrictions on other individuals.75 In this context, Bentham refers to that Liberty that is produced by Law, and
contrasts this Liberty by security, whose perfection . . . is the pride of
Englishmen, with the Liberty without security . . . which is possessed in
perfection by Hottentots and Patagonians.76
Rosen and Kelly have treated Benthams Liberty by security as the
equivalent of the Whig / republican idea of liberty as security.77 Arguably,
liberty by security is not precisely liberty as security. Liberty as security
suggests that liberty is conceptually inseparable from security. Liberty by
security is the security of liberty under the law, the absence of coercion
enjoyed by one individual secured by the coercion of other individuals. It
maintains the conceptual separation between the absence of coercion and
its security under the law. Bentham emphasizes that liberty can exist without law and security, just as security can exist without liberty.78
In Benthams later work on the civil and constitutional law, however,
he tends to conflate liberty with security under the law. In his manuscripts
on the Civil Code, liberty is a branch of security, or else, it is of no
value.79 In the Principles of the Civil Code, personal liberty is security
against a certain species of injury which affects the person; whilst, as to
political liberty, it is another branch of securitysecurity against the injustice of the members of the Government.80
But if in his work on the Civil Code, Bentham conflates liberty and
security, why does he insist on the distinction in his earlier work? Why does
he claim that it is most exemplarily pernicious to confound liberty and
security?81 The key to understanding Benthams varying positions on liberty
and security, I argue, is at least partly ideological.
A note prefaced to the Key manuscripts, and listing Benthams objections to different authors, points us in this direction. Next to Prices name,
75
Cf. Jeremy Bentham, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. Philip
Schofield, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010),
7879.
76
UCL, LXIX, 5556.
77
Rosen, Bentham, Byron, and Greece, 3337; Kelly, Classical Utilitarianism, 1331.
78
UCL, LXIX, 44, 55.
79
UCL, C, 153, 156, 167.
80
Bowring, 2:302.
81
UCL, LXIX, 44.

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Bentham writes: Liberty not the Child of Law. Security not destroyd by
unlimited Supremacy.82 The note invites us to consider the discussion of
liberty and security in the context of the Price Debate.
Benthams insistence that liberty is not the Child of Law and must
not be confounded with security has implications for his discussion of liberty as a political ideal, and more precisely, in his discussion of the perfection of liberty. By distinguishing between liberty and security, he sets these
two political ideals on two different courses, the first leading, in perfection,
to anarchy and misery, and the second leading, in perfection, to order and
happiness.
In the Crit. Jurisp. Crim. manuscripts, Bentham develops this line of
argument by distinguishing between political liberty entire and political
liberty in perfection. Political liberty entire is the complete absence of
coercion whether by the Laws or institutions of any society whatever. It
is the perfection of self-government caricatured as the complete absence of
coercion.83 By contrast, political liberty in perfection is the state in which
the laws and institutions subject the individual to no other coercion than
the good of the society required him to be subjected to. It is the state of
appropriate balance between the absence of coercion and the rule of law,
based on utilitarian considerations. When the greatest extent is given to
legal coercion, liberty in general is in great danger, just as when liberty is
used to attack coercion, government is almost elbowd off the stage.84
This account of liberty and security is strikingly similar to Heys
account of civil liberty. Bentham credits Hey with exposing in his ingenious work the confusion and impropriety that results from speaking of
liberty, under the appellation of a power.85 Hey criticizes Montesquieu for
confusing liberty with security. According to his reductionist account of
civil liberty, it is merely a special case of negative liberty, the Absence of
Civil Restraints.86 The difference between freedom and oppression, in
Heys view, lies both in the existence of a rule of law, and in the law expressing the happy medium between individual liberty and restraint in the
name of the public good. This is the point of Perfection in Civil Liberty
that legislators should seek, and it resembles Benthams idea of liberty in
perfection.87
UCL, LXIX, 43.
UCL, LXIX, 25.
84
UCL, LXIX, 25, 5556.
85
Letter from Hermes to the Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, August 1, 1776. See
Hey, Observations, 19.
86
Ibid., 3335, 55.
87
Ibid., 3234, 4145.
82
83

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Some scholars have contrasted Benthams utilitarianism with the crude


maximizing position they attribute to Hey, arguing that the latter confused
civil liberty with social utility.88 On my reading, however, both Bentham
and Hey distinguish between the nature of liberty, understood as the
absence of restraint or coercion, and the degree of freedom from civil
restraints, whose perfection, they think, should be determined by the principle of utility. They both offer an account of the ideal of perfect liberty as a
utilitarian balance between liberty and legal restraint. The difference
between them lies in the fact that liberty, for Hey, has nothing to do with
the form of government, nor even with the distribution of power in society
and its being lodged in proper or improper hands.89 Bentham, on the
other hand, grapples with different ideas of political liberty, and develops a
richer account of the modern free state.

Democracy as a Caricature
In Benthams early writings, we find several alternative interpretations of
political liberty and free government. In one sense, the terms a Free government, a Free constitution could refer to the freedom of the political
body from external restraint or coercion.90 This is the only sense of the
classical idea of the free commonwealth that Hobbes was willing to
acknowledge.91
According to Bentham, political liberty and free government also refer,
improperly and metonymically, to the security of the governed against the
governors, as established by constitutional law.92 In this prevalent,
improper sense, Bentham identifies free government with a Government
to some degree popular, whose powers are fixed and clearly known to the
subjects, so that their condition is secure.93 The institutions of free government include the appropriate distribution of political power, the responsibility of government to publicize the reasons for its actions, the liberty of
the press, and the liberty of association for the purpose of opposing the
Rosen, Bentham, Byron, and Greece, 3137; Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism, 13942;
G. I. Molivas, A Right, Utility and the Definition of Liberty as a Negative Idea: Richard
Hey and the Benthamite Conception of Liberty, History of European Ideas 25 (1999):
7592.
89
Hey, Observations, 3234, 4145.
90
UCL, LXIX, 153.
91
Hobbes, Leviathan, XXI.8.
92
UCL, LXIX, 148, 153, 158.
93
UCL, LXIX, 152, 158.
88

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government.94 As already discussed, free government, for Bentham, implies,


under all normal circumstances, unconditional submission to the government, coupled with rational censorship of the laws. Prices argument that
liberty is inconsistent with the omnipotence of Parliament provokes Benthams protest that Security is not destroyd by unlimited Supremacy.95
In Benthams work on the Civil Code, political liberty becomes more
strongly identified with constitutional security. Constitutional security comprehends security in all its branches in as far as the security of the individual depends upon the texture of the constitution . . . or form of
government. It signifies the absence of danger to individuals from abuse
of power on the part of persons exercising the powers of government.96 In
this account of liberty as the absence of danger from the abuse of power,
we see the continuity that Kelly and Rosen have pointed out between Benthams constitutionalism and the neo-Roman republican idea of liberty.
In addition to these two definitions of political libertyas absence of
restraints on the political body, and as constitutional security against misrulewe find in Benthams work a third idea of political liberty, as internal
and external self-government. This sense can be found particularly in his
manuscripts on the Civil Code from 1780.
In these manuscripts, political liberty as self-government assumes two
forms. In its internal, democratic form, political liberty is the absence of
all government other than democratical according to the purest that is the
most thorough sense of democratical government conceivable. According
to Benthams account:
I am deprived of constitutional liberty in as far as the government
of the state under which I live deviates from one [/the sort of government] in which every act of government is exercised by an
assembly into which every member of the community [/individual
in the country] without exception, male and female, adult, and
minor, sane and insane, convicts and unconvicted, has a vote.97
On my reading, the proposal to enfranchise every member of the community without exception is meant to be satirical. Bentham believed that
minors, criminals, and the insane were incapable of political judgment, and
Bentham, Comment and Fragment, 47492, esp. 48485.
Price, Observations, 1416; UCL LXIX, 43.
96
UCL, C, 15354, 167. Cf. Lind, Three Letters, 6972.
97
UCL, C, 168.
94
95

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he was unprepared, at that point, to admit women into the vote.98 His democratic definition of political liberty follows the outline of a reductio ad
absurdum argument made by several critics of the American demand for
representation and the English campaign for parliamentary reform. The
argument suggests that the principles of pro-Americans and constitutional
reformers, consistently applied, would lead to the absurd enfranchisement
of individuals who were manifestly incapable of exercising political power.
Lind employs this argument against Price, mockingly suggesting that
according to the logic of the Observations, not only every man is his own
legislator, but Every woman too is her own legislatrix.99
Bentham constructs a satirical model of political liberty not only in its
internal, democratic aspect, but also in its external, international one. The
concept of international liberty, according to Bentham, is the same
thing as individual liberty but on the part of a nation in relation to another
national [nation]. We might expect international liberty to be defined as
the absence of coercion by another nation, but Bentham adopts the language of republicanism and defines it as national independence, or the
absence of dependence on the government of a foreign nation. Moreover,
he suggests that international liberty refers not only to the political body,
but also to individuals, who would be deprived of their international liberty
when their government was under the controuling agency of another government, even if their own government was allowed to be competent to
all or many purposes of government.100 Bentham, in my reading, is adopting the language of republican liberty only in order to draw it to absurdity.
The republican idea of international liberty is absurd, in Benthams
eyes, for roughly the same reason as the idea of democratic liberty: individuals can enjoy personal liberty under a monarchic and dependent government, and they can suffer from the absence of personal liberty under a
democratic and independent government. His caricatures of democratic
and international liberty are intended to undermine the fusion of personal
and political liberty characteristic of the republican tradition. The connection between the two senses of liberty, personal and political, is not a
necessary one, nor even so close, he argues. In a clear critique of Roman
republicanism, he mocks Cicero for presumably preferring the perfect political liberty of a prisoner in Paris over the personal liberty of an Irish Lord,
or a Russian or Danish Senator, whose international or constitutional liberty may not be as perfect.101 The upshot of this satirical, subversive critique
Schofield, Utility and Democracy, 8591.
Lind, Three Letters, 40.
100
UCL, C, 155, 168.
101
UCL, C, 16970.
98
99

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is that personal and constitutional security should be distinguished and distanced from the republican impulse to maximize the power and independence of the people.

Bentham and Republican Liberty


There is no consensus on the idea of liberty associated with the classical
republican tradition. One influential account, primarily developed by Philip
Pettit and Quentin Skinner, identifies neo-Roman republicanism with three
core ideas: (1) the conception of individual liberty as the status of the free
citizen, who lives in a condition of freedom from mastery, dependence, or
arbitrary power; (2) the associated idea of the free state, whose institutional
forms, including popular participation in government and a constitutional
balance of power, secure the individual against domination; (3) the idea of
civic virtue as an essential condition for the constitution and preservation
of the free state.102
Skinner and Pettit have portrayed Bentham as an opponent of republican liberty on conceptual and historical grounds. They argue that Bentham
did not allow for the role of the law in creating freedom, and that he
rejected the neoclassical conviction that freedom could be lost to a dominating power without coercive interference. According to their narrative, Benthams neo-Hobbesian analysis of the concept of liberty contributed to
the decline and fall of the neo-Roman theory of liberty and the corresponding triumph of freedom as non-interference.103
Several Bentham scholars have proposed a different interpretation.
Long argues that in an earlier phase, corresponding to his work on the
penal law, Bentham vitiated the idea of liberty, but in his subsequent work
on liberty as an object of the civil law, he incorporated individual liberty
into his system of security.104 Frederick Rosen and Paul Kelly have built on
See, in particular, Pettit, Republicanism; Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism; Quentin
Skinner, A Third Concept of Liberty, Proceedings of the British Academy 117 (2002):
23768; Quentin Skinner, Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power, in Republicanism and Political Theory, ed. Cecile Laborde and John Maynor (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2008), 83101; Frank Lovett and Philip Pettit, Neorepublicanism: A Normative
and Institutional Research Program, in Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009):
1129; Philip Pettit, On the Peoples Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
103
See the references in footnote 12 above.
104
Long, Bentham on Liberty, chap. 10, esp. p. 169. See also Lea Campos Boralevi, Bentham and the Oppressed (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1984), 18283.
102

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this insight in developing a revisionist, liberal interpretation of Benthams


work, which vindicates the value of individual liberty in his utilitarianism.
In this context, they argue that Bentham reconstructed the ideal of liberty
within his utilitarian system, tracking the substantive concerns of the neoRoman republicans, and particularly their concern with personal and constitutional security.105
The interpretation developed here has benefitted from the important
insights of Long, Rosen, and Kelly about Benthams incorporation of individual liberty into his system of security. At the same time, I agree with
Skinner and Pettit in seeing Bentham as a critic of republicanism. The article
interprets Bentham as a subversive critic of the republican tradition, who
adopts its characteristic concern with the security of rights under the rule
of law, while simultaneously developing strategies for challenging the
republican account of the free state as internally and externally selfgoverning.
This interpretation differs from Pettits account in identifying the core
issue for republican writers and their critics in this period as the issue of
political self-government, and not as the issue of non-domination, or the
security of non-interference under a free government.106 The relation
between the modern free state and the power of the people to govern themselves became highly contentious in the Age of Revolution. Bentham follows Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Jean-Louis de Lolme in trying to
separate the free state from the legacy of classical republicanism. His comments on the relation between liberty and security should be understood
not only as part of his broadening field of vision and shift from working on
penal law to working on civil and constitutional law, but also as political
arguments undermining the ideal of self-government.107
Ironically, it is precisely on the issue of popular government that Bentham came to make a significant shift in his later years, turning from a
critic of democracy into its radical advocate.108 The irony deepens when we
consider that his democratic ideal in the nineteenth century is not far apart
from the caricature of democratic liberty that he constructed in the
1780s.109
See the references in footnote 13 above.
Pettit, Republicanism, 2425; Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, Republican Liberty and Resilience, The Monist 84 (2001): 4559.
107
Long, Bentham on Liberty, 5, 15076.
108
See footnote 6 above.
109
See Jeremy Bentham, Plan of Parliamentary Reform, in the Form of a Catechism (London: R. Hunter, 1817), esp. 49.
105
106

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And yet, even in his later years, and notwithstanding his democratic
conversion, Bentham remained suspicious of the language of liberty. While
his analysis of the concept of liberty arguably remained a cornerstone of his
system, his growing frustration with subversive uses of the term led him in
the 1780s to formulate a conclusion that he never seems to have reversed:
Liberty therefore not being more fit than other words in some of
the instances in which it has been used, and not so fit in others, the
less the use is made of it the better. I would no more use the word
liberty in my conversation when I could get another that would
answer the purpose, than I would Brandy in my diet, if my physician did not order me: both cloud the understanding and inflame
the passions.110
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

110

UCL, C, 170.

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