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Facts: Formilleza was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in
Tacloban City, Leyte. Her duties include in the processing of the appointment papers of employees. A certain Mrs.
Mutia was employed with NIA on a project basis and she was terminated. Pursuant to the verbal instructions of the
regional director of the administration, she continued working. According to Mrs. Mutia, she took steps to obtain either
a permanent or at least a renewed appointment. She was advised by the regional director to see the petitioner but the
latter refused to her appointment unless given some money. Mrs. Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine
Constabulary and those PC officials were colleagues of her husband. They arranged for an entrapment with marked
money bills worth P100. Petitioner and Mrs. Mutia agreed to meet at the canteen and the latter notified the PC
authorities about the arrangement. At the canteen, petitioner and Mrs. Mutia occupied a table and were joined by
some officemates while the PC officials occupied separate tables. After they took the snacks, Mrs. Mutia handed the
marked money bills under the table to the petitioner who received the money. At that moment, the PC officials
approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the money. The petitioner was arrested.
The respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery. The petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme
Court for Instant Petition for Review.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner accepted the supposed bribe money
Ruling: The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the
public officer concerned must have accepted the gift of material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the
part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as
putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstances or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect
bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame ip public officers by
simply putting with their physical custody some gift, money or other property.
In case at the bar, if the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner
would not have invited her officemates to join them. According to Mrs. Sevilla she did not see the alleged passing of the
money under the table. What she was sure was that when they were about to leave the canteen, two men approached
petitioner, one of whom took pictures and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, What are you trying to do to me? The
reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty conscience. Without the standard of certainty, it may not be said that the
guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Therefore, petitioner is acquitted.


Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of
public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government
auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture. The bureau of treasury and the
teachers camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the non-existent
obligations of the teachers camp resulting damage to the government of several millions. The first 32 cases were filed
while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected. The Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision
convicting the accused together with his other co-accused. However, Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending
RA 3019 that provides for the suspension and loss of benefits of a public officer who was convicted of criminal offense.
The respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of all the accused including the petitioner from their
public positions or from any other public office that they may be holding. On the other hand, petitioner contended that
he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners contention is correct.

Ruling: The petitioners contention is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense
involving fraud upon he government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the
use of the word office the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the
particular office under which he was charged.

Facts: This is a two criminal cases under RA 3019 were filed against Mayor Acharon. The first case pertains to Mayor
Acharon of General Santos denied application for renewal of license and permit to operate cockpit to a certain Emilio
Evangelista while the said mayor approved or granted the application of license or permit of his uncle, Luis Acharon to
operate a new cockpit and it is contrary to Sec.3 of RA 3019. The second case is about Mayor Acharon and Vice Mayor
Bernabe were charged with the violation of Sec.1 (A,E,H,J) of RA 3019 when they allegedly fraudulently procured and
purchased 1,635 sack of rice in bulk using the names of 327 employees of City Government of General Santos with the
rice and corn administration office. They used their own money in purchasing said sacks of rice at a very low price and
later disposed to the public at the prevailing price. They directly or indirectly received pecuniary interest in such
fraudulent procurement of rice.
Prosecution filed an urgent motion for issuance of suspension against the accused. Before pre-suspension hearings,
accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The case was redocketed then later an investigation ensued. There
were several postponement until the case was raffled to Judge Albano. The case was set for hearing but later on, Judge
Albano found the two informations invalid ab initio and consequently dismissed the said cases. Prosecution moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the acts for which both accused are charged do not
constitute violations of RA 3019 by taking into consideration matters not alleged in the informations.
Ruling: Yes, Judge Albano erred in its decision of finding the informations invalid ab initio and in dismissing the cases.
Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that the suspension of public officer is mandatory but not automatic. Before a
suspension order issued, a hearing on the validity of the informations must first be had to determine the basis of the
court to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case or withhold suspension of the
accused and dismiss the case or correct part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. The far-reaching consequence
of a suspension of public official even before conviction is the reason why the accused can challenge the validity of an
information and the validity of the criminal proceedings. But if the right of the accused does not divest the prosecution
of its right to prove guilt of the accused in a trial on the merits, pre-suspension hearing should not substitute trial
Considering the mandatory suspension of the accused under a valid information, the law does not contemplate a
proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence, so that a court can have a valid basis in evaluating the advisability of his
suspension pending the trial proper of the case filed against him.
In any event, when the contending parties in both cases agreed to submit the question of the validity of the
informations on the basis of the records of the cases, among others,


to determine whether accused Acharon can be

mandatorily suspended, the trial court was competent to inquire only whether or not (1) accused Acharon had been
afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the informations against him, (2) the acts for which he was
charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code, or (3) the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, not deemed waived in view of the previous arraignment of the accused.


Facts: Petitioner Oliveros was charged of violation of Section 3 (a) and 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act 3019). It was alleged that petitioner as municipal mayor of Antipolo, Rizal in conspiracy with other
persons unknown, and in bad faith and with intent to defraud the government, he appointed his brother, Simplicio to
the position of confidential agent to the office of the mayor knowing the appointee to be an employee of the Far East
Bank & Trust Company and caused the salary as confidential agent in the sum of P1,080 to be charged to the general
funds of the Municipality of Antipolo, without the appointee rendering service nor presenting proof of service as
required by the applicable regulations.
Respondent, Judge Villaluz issued an order suspending the accused without previous hearing. Petitioner filed a writ of
certiorari and prohibition, pleading grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction in that (a) the prosecutors who
filed the information had no authority to do and without giving him proper preliminary investigation; (b) that he was
ordered suspended without giving him opportunity to contest the sufficiency of the information
Issue: Whether the contentions of petitioner (accused) are correct
Ruling: On the issue of lack of preliminary investigation, it has no merit. Annexes to the petition and the answer
plainly show that a preliminary investigation was conducted.
While on the issue of suspension, it has merit. The order of suspension issued by respondent, Jude Villaluz was
premature and in grave abuse of discretion, being contrary to the doctrine set by Court in Luciano vs Wilson. The
Court held that before an order of suspension should be issued a hearing on the validity of the information appears
conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of
an elected public official even before his conviction.
Therefore, the writ of certiorari was granted and the order of respondent Judge suspending petitioner is set aside and
said respondent is ordered to hold a preliminary hearing on the validity of the information.


Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition on the ground that it violates the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the petitioner from suspending him from public office. Petitioner Layno is the duly elected Municipal
Mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. He was accused in an information filed by respondent Tanodbayan of grave abuse of
authority and evident bad faith in the exercise of his official and/or administrative duties. He suspended and
prohibited Vice Mayor Bernardita Resus and three Sangguniang Bayan members from participating and exercising
their official functions and their salaries were not received by them. Petitioner was charged of violation of paragraph (e),
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019.
However, respondent contends that the said suspension does not violate the petitioners constitutional right to be
presumed innocent because the suspension is merely a precautionary or preventive measure issued before the case is
tried on its merits to ensure the fair and just trial of the case.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners suspension should be lifted
Ruling: The suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan to the petitioner, he would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the
right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or
malfeasance, any of them could be proceeded against administratively or criminally. In either case, culpability must be
established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A
preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due
process question. For even if thereafter acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office has been nullified. Clearly,
there would be in such case an injustice suffered by him. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga.

They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. A denial of due process is quite
manifested. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
The mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different
rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.
Therefore, the certiorari petition is granted and the preventive suspension imposed on petitioner is set aside.


Facts: Deloso was an elected governor of Zambales. However, he was suspended from performing his duties as
governor by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of criminal charged filed against him which he was committed during his
tenure as the Mayor of Botolan, Zambales for first, awarding licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipality waters
and second, the issuance of five tractors to certain individuals without any agreement to pay rentals. The complaint
with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As regards the other complaint, the
Tanodbayan filed five separate informations accusing the petitioner of violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Law
with the Sandiganbayan. The suspension order did not have a definite period so that Deloso may be suspended for the
rest of his term unless his case is terminated sooner. Deloso filed a petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside
the resolution of the Sandiganbayan. He also questioned the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13
of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic No. 3019).
In the case of Garcia vs Executive Secretary (6 SCRA 1 [1962]), he was suspended by the Executive Secretary by
authority of the President on the ground of electioneering and dishonesty in office. He was the Chairman of the
National Science Development Board appointed by the President. In view of his indefinite suspension, he opposed the
said suspension on the ground that he is a presidential appointee and therefore not covered by 60-day preventive
suspension limit under Section 35 of Civil Service Act. The court ruled that an officer appointed by the President facing
administrative charges can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to the countenance a situation where the
preventive suspension can be the penalty itself without a finding a guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express
mandate of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the ruling in Garcia case is applicable to an elective official facing criminal charges under the
Anti-Graft Law and suspended under Section 13
Ruling: The application of the Garcia case injunction preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period of time
applies with greater force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is a relatively short one. It
would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their
command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case simply because
the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of public funds and other more serious
A preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to ninety
(90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) which period also appears reasonable
and appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the instant petition is granted. The preventive
suspension imposed on petitioner should be limited only to ninety (90) days after which Deloso will assume once again
the functions of governor of Zambales.