G.R. No.

86792 March 21, 1990

SPOUSES MARINO AND LINA JOEL
SAPUGAY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MOBIL
PHILIPPINES, INC. AND RICARDO
CARDENAS, respondents.
Cuesta, Bermudez & Associates for
petitioners.
Camacho & Associates for Mobil Phils., Inc.

return and redelivery of the

aforementioned properties; that
defendant refused to return
said equipments, and
demanded instead that
defendant be paid first the sum
of P15,000.00 daily as rental
and guard's fees from June 8,
1982 up to the day of actual
pull-out. Thus, plaintiff prays for
the return of said properties or
its value including damages,
attorney's fees and costs of
suit.
2. On October 12, 1982, the
lower court issued an order for
thdggfvb e issuance of a writ of
replevin upon the filing of
plaintiff's bond.
3. On November 29, 1982,
defendant filed her answer
alleging as affirmative defenses
that upon presentation of
defendant's application, plaintiff
and it's manager, R.P.
Cardenas, imposed upon them
as a condition for the approval
of their application defendant's
acquisition of the premises
where the business will be
conducted; that consequently
applicant-defendant purchased
the said land for seven hundred
thousand (P700,000.00) pesos;
that on June 21, 1982, a
preliminary agreement was
signed constituting defendant
as plaintiff's authorized dealer,
whereupon plaintiff turned over
to the defendant the equipment
to be used therefor; that
plaintiff instructed dependant
to commence operation
whereupon the latter made the
necessary preparations
amounting to P38,000.00; that
defendant commenced
operation on June 26, 1982,
pending execution of the formal
dealership agreement; that on
the last week of July, 1982, they
signed the formal dealership
agreement a copy of which was
withheld from them by the
plaintiff pending its
notarization; that as the formal
agreement had already been
signed, defendant and her
husband requested plaintiff that

REGALADO, J
For review in this petition is the decision 1 of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
07614 thereof, dated November 11, 1988,
deleting the award made by the court a
quo 2 for rental, storage and guarding fees
and unrealized profits, the reduction of the
other damages granted, and the exclusion
and exclupation from liability of respondent
Ricardo P. Cardenas, as well as the
resolution 3 of respondent court of January 30,
1989 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The following facts, culled from respondent
court's decision and sustained by the
evidence opf record, are adopted by us in our
adjudication:
1. On September 27, 1982,
plaintiff Mobil Philippines, Inc.
filed a complaint for replevin
with damages against
defendant Lina Joel Sapugay
before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Seventh
Judicial District, Pasig, Metro
Manila. The complaint,which
was duly amended on October
11, 1982 alleges the following:
that upon the termination of the
Dealership Agreement between
Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. and
Nemar Marketing Corporation,
defendant applied to the
plaintiff to become a dealer of
the latter's products; that
pending consideration of the
dealership application, plaintiff
loaned to the defendant the
properties installed in the
premises of Nemar at Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, valued at
P1,500,000.00; that for a period
of three (3) months from the
date of application, defendant
failed to secure and file the
required surety bond,
compelling plaintiff to reject
defendant's application and the

they be allowed to get gas even

on a cash basis, but plaintiff
denied the request claiming
that they still have to post a
surety bond which was initially
fixed at P200,000.00 then later
increased to P700,000.00; that
defendant and her husband
exerted their best effort to
secure a bond but the bonding
companies required a copy of
the dealership agreement
which was continiously withheld
from them by plaintiff, that
defendant discovered that
plaintiff and its manager
intended all along, to award
said dealership to Island Air
Product Corporation; that in
furtherance of said scheme
plaintiff caused all the LP-Gas
equipment to be publicly pulled
out from defendant's premises.
As counterclaim, defendant
prayed that plaintiff and its
manager be made liable for
their pre-operation expenses
rental, storage, and guarding
fees, unrealized profit including
damages and the return of the
LP-Gas equipment to the
premises.
4. On December 9, 1982, the
writ of replevin dated October
22, 1982 issued by Honorable
Eduardo C. Abaya of the Court
of First Instance, Rizal, Branch
XXIV was duly executed.
5. On September 8, 1983, the
pre-trial conference in Branch
132, Makati, Metro Manila was
terminated without any
amicable settlement, and trial
was set for November 3, 1983.
6. On November 3, 1983, the
trial court granted plaintiff's
Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint, alleging that plaintiff
Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. having
been taken over by Caltex
Philippines, Inc., and prior to
dissolution, assigned and
transferred all the rights,
interest, claim and cause of
action in favor of Mobil
Philippines, Inc.
7. On August 8, 1985, the trial
court, after finding that plaintiff
and its manager, R.P. Cardenas,

have reneged on its promise to

award the dealership to
defendant Sapugay, rendered
judgment in favor of the latter,
dismissing the complaint and
ordering plaintiff and its
manager to pay the preoperation expenses, rental,
storage, and guarding fees of
plaintiff's LPG equipment;
unrealized profits, moral
damages including litigation
expenses, attorney's fees and
costs of the suit.
8. On August 26, 1985,
defendant filed a motion for
application to have plaintiffs
bond posted by the Malayan
Surety Company liable for the
satisfaction of the judgment.
9. On August 29, 1985, the
plaintiff-corporation filed a
notice of appeal manifesting
that it was appealing to the
Court of Appeals from the
decision promulgated on
August 8, 1985.
10. On September 17, 1985,
the trial court issued an order
denying the defendant's motion
considering that the lower court
no longer had any jurisdiction
to act on the matter with the
perfection of plaintiffs appeal. 4
On November 11, 1988, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED in that the awards of
rental, storage and guarding
fees and the award of
unrealized profits, are hereby
DELETED, and the award of
damages REDUCED. The
decision is AFFIRMED in all
other aspects with Mobil
Philippines, lnc. being solely
liable. 5
The motion for reconsideration filed by herein
petitioners, praying that the bond posted by
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. in behalf of herein
private respondents be made liable for
damages suffered by petitioners, was denied
by respondent court in its resolution dated
January 30, 1989. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised by petitioners for resolution
are whether respondent court committed
serious errors of law amounting to grave

abuse of discretion and/or excess of

jurisdiction:
1. In excluding from the case and
exculpating from liability respondent
Ricardo P. Cardenas, an indispensable
party;
2. In deleting from the decision of the
court a quo the awards for guarding
fee and unrealized profits; and
3. In holding that Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc., is not liable on the bond.
In their comment, private respondents aver
that since the counterclaim of petitioners
against the former is permissive in nature and
since no docket fee was paid, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case,
hence the awards rendered on petioners'
counterclaim should be dismissed.
Under the first assigned error, petitioners
assert that respondent Court of Appeals erred
in exculpating Cardenas from liability and in
holding that said Cardenas, who is not a party
to the original action, may not be impleaded
by petitioners in their counterclaim on the
ground that a counterclaim cannot be filed
against a person who is not an actual party to
the litigation. In effect, what respondent court
is saying is that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Cardenas,
hence he cannot be held jointly liable with
Mobil Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, Mobil for
short). On the contrary, petitioners submit
that Cardenas is an indispensable party since
he was the one who negotiated with them in
transacting the dealership agreement.
A counterclaim is defined as any claim for
money or other relief which a defending party
may have against an opposing
party. 6 However, the general rule that a
defendant cannot by a counterclaim bring into
the action any claim against persons other
than the plaintiff admits of an exception under
Section 14, Rule 6 which provides that "when
the presence of parties other than those to
the original action is required for the granting
of complete relief in the determination of a
counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall
order them to be brought in as defendants, if
jurisdiction over them can be obtained." The
inclusion, therefore, of Cardenas in petioners'
counterclaim is sanctioned by the rules.
The next question to be resolved is whether
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Cardenas. It has been held that a
counterclaim stands on the same footing as,
and is to be tested by the same rules as if it
were, an independent action. 7 Hence, the
same rules on jurisdiction in an independent

action ordinarily apply equally to a

counterclaim.
In her answer, filed on November 29, 1982, to
the amended complaint, petitioner Lina
Sapugay impleaded Cardenas as a defendant
in her counterclaim therein, and prayed that
judgment be rendered holding specifically
Mobil and Cardenas jointly and severally liable
to herein petitioners. 8 Thereafter, petitioner
filed a "Motion to Declare Plaintiff and its
Manager, Ricardo P. Cardenas, in Default on
Defendant's Counterclaim" for failure of
private respondents to answer the
counterclaim. 9 Cardenas was furnished
copies of both the answer and the motion to
declare herein private respondents in
default. 10 Respondent Mobil filed an
opposition to the motion to declare them in
default, alleging that they, the private
respondents herein, may not be so
declared. 11 The court below agreed with
private respondents' reasoning therein that a
compulsory counterclaim being involved, the
issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed
automatically joined by the allegations of the
complaint, hence the complaint itself stood as
the answer to defendant's counterclaim.
Consequently, the trial court denied the
motion to declare the herein private
respondents in default. 12
It is noteworthy that Cardenas did not file a
motion to dismiss the counterclaim against
him on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
While it is a settled rule that the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised even for the first
time on appeal, this does not obtain in the
instant case. Although it was only Mobil which
filed an opposition to the motion to declare in
default, the fact that the trial court denied
said motion, both as to Mobil and Cardenas on
the ground that Mobil's complaint should be
considered as the answer to petioners'
compulsory counterclaim, leads us to the
inescapable conclusion that the trial court
treated the opposition as having been filed in
behalf of both Mobil and Cardenas and that
the latter had adopted as his answer the
allegations raised in the complaint of Mobil.
Obviously, it was this ratiocination which led
the trial court to deny the motion to declare
Mobil and Cardenas in default. Furthermore,
Cardenas was not unaware of said incidents
and the proceedings therein as he testified
and was present during the trial, not to speak
of the fact that as manager of Mobil he would
necessarily be interested in the case and
could readily have access to the records and
pleadings filed therein.

By adopting as his answer the allegations in

the complaint which seeks affirmative relief,
Cardenas is deemed to have recognized the
jurisdiction of the trial court over his person
and submitted thereto. He may not now be
heard to repudiate or question that
jurisdiction. 13
Mobil likewise questions the jurisdiction of the
trial court in entertaining the counterclaim
since no docket fee was paid. It avers that
since it is a permissive counterclaim,
petitioners should have paid the necessary
docket fee. On the contrary, we find and so
hold that the counterclaim of petitioners is
compulsory in nature since both the complaint
and counterclaim involve the same
transaction and arose from the same
occurrence. Besides, as earlier discussed, in
Mobil's opposition to the motion for a default
order, it categorically stated that petitioners'
counterclaim is compulsory in nature, 14 which
was likewise the view of the trial court and the
precise reason why it denied said motion.
Private respondents are now estopped from
claiming otherwise. In the recent case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., et
al. vs. Hon. Asuncion, et al. 15 involving the
rule on payment of docket fees in ordinary
actions, the rule was affirmed and made to
apply specifically to permissive counterclaims
only, thereby excluding compulsory
counterclaims from its purview.
As to the second assigned error, the finding of
the Court of Appeals that no sufficient and
substantial evidence exists to warrant an
award of guarding fees and unearned profits
is conclusively binding on this Court, for
failure of private respondents to show that the
appellate court acted with grave abuse of
discretion or erred in making such finding.
Fundamental is the rule that findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed
unless shown to have been rendered with
arbitrariness, nor are any of the
jurisprudentially accepted exceptions thereto
present in this case.
Anent the issue on the surety's liability upon
the replevin bond, we do not believe that
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. should be made
liable thereon. As correctly observed by
respondent court, "the damages awarded by
the trial court were based on Articles 19 and
20 of the New Civil Code and not on the
deprivation of personal properties subject of
the replevin bond. Moreover, no judgment
was entered for the return of the properties
subject of the replevin bond to the defendant,
the latter never having raised the issue of
rightful possession to the said properties." 16

A replevin bond is simply intended to

indemnify the defendant against any loss that
he may suffer by being compelled to
surrender the possession of the disputed
property pending the trial of the action. He
cannot recover on the bond as for a
reconversion when he has failed to have the
judgment entered for the return of the
property. Nor is the surety liable for payment
of the judgment for damages rendered
against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or
punitive damages for fraudulent or wrongful
acts committed by the plaintiffs and
unconnected with the defendant's deprivation
of possession by the plaintiff. Indeed, even
where the judgment was that the defendant
was entitled to the property, but no order was
made requiring the plaintiff to return it or
assessing damages in default of a return, it
was declared that until judgment was entered
that the property should be restored, there
could be no liability on the part of the
sureties. 17
There is no denying the active participation of
Cardenas in the anomalous transactions had
with petitioner Lina Sapugay as found by the
Court of Appeals, to wit:
Indeed, a perusal of the letters
referred to show that plaintiff
corporation, particularly its
manager, gave cause for
defendant Sapugay to believe
that she is the authorized
supplier and refiller of Mobil
Philippines, to wit, plaintiff's
letter to defendant signed by its
Manager R.P. Cardenas dated
July 2, 1982 (Exhibit "2"),
referred to defendant "as a
major supplier of LPG and as
the authorized refiller of Mobil
Oil Philippines . . . committed to
the government as well as to all
Mobil LP-Gas customers to
uphold the highest standard in
respect to marketing as well as
safety (Exhibit "2-b")." This
belief is further bolstered by the
Memorandum dated July 12,
1982 signed by Cardenas and
sent to defendant by registered
mail (Exhibit "5") attaching a
copy of Ministry Order No. 8206-08 (Exhibit "3-b") prohibiting
LPG cylinder exchange and the
refilling of other brands of
cylinder without the brand
owner's authority.

As to the existence of a Formal

Dealership Agreement, this
Court failed to find any other
evidence other than
defendant's testimony to
substantiate the allegation that
plaintiff and defendant had
already signed a dealership
agreement in July 1982 which
the former withheld from the
latter, causing defendant's
failure to submit the requisite
bond. Moreover, this Court
notes that the blank standard
dealership agreement form
presented by plaintiff (Exhibit
"L"), shows no requirement for
the filing of a bond. Further,
Manager Cardenas himself
testified that this standard
agreement contained all the
terms and conditions of a
dealership, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the lower court found that
the requirement of posting a
bond, initially fixed at
P200,000.00 then raised to
P700,000.00 was a preplanned
scheme of plaintiff and/or
R.. Cardenas to put every
hindrance before the defendant
so that the latter could not get
the dealership agreement . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As found by the trial court, all
these acts of plaintiff and its
manager, R.. Cardenas, are
contrary to Articles 19 and 20
of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 19. Every
person must, in
the exercise of
his rights and in
the performance
of his duties act
with justice, give
everyone his due
and observe
honesty and
good faith.
Art. 20. Every
person who,
contrary to law,
wilfully or
negligently
causes damage
to another, shall
indemnify the

latter for the

same.
for which plaintiff must be
made to recompense the
damages the defendant
suffered. (Emphasis supplied) 19
We, therefore, find and so hold that private
respondent Ricardo P. Cardenas should be
held jointly and severally liable with his corespondent Mobil Philippines, Inc. for having
acted in bad faith by impeding and preventing
the award of the dealership to petitioners
through fraudulent means.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
respondents Mobil Philipines, Inc. and Ricardo
P. Cardenas are held jointly and severally
liable to herein petitioners Marino and Lina
Joel Sapugay.
ALIBSAR
ADOMA, complainant,
vs.
ROMEO GATCHECO, Sheriff III,
and EUGENIO TAGUBA, Process
Server, of Branches 1 and 2,
respectively, of the Municipal Trial
Court
in
Cities
of
Santiago
City, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant administrative complaint filed
against respondents for violation of Republic
Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) and conduct unbecoming a court
employee, arose from the execution of a writ
of replevin in Adoma v. Spouses Edmundo
Andres and Luzviminda Andres, docketed as
Civil Case No. 1404-1-669, for recovery of
possession of motor vehicle with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of replevin before
Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Santiago City, presided by Judge
Ruben Plata.
Complainant Alibsar Adoma claimed that
on August 16, 2003 a writ of replevin [1] for the
recovery of an L-300 van was issued in his
favor. On the same day, respondent sheriff
Romeo Gatcheco implemented the writ. He
was accompanied by respondent Eugenio
Taguba, a process server of Branch 2 of MTCC,
Santiago City, who volunteered to assist
respondent sheriff. After the two respondents
seized the vehicle, they demanded payment
of
P8,000.00,
allegedly
promised
by
complainant but the latter was able to give
only P1,000.00 and another P1,000.00 the
following day.[2]
The writ of replevin stated that the
vehicle will be delivered to complainant after
5 days from the implementation thereof. With
the vehicle still undelivered on the 7th day,

complainant
threatened
to
file
an
administrative
case
against
respondent
sheriff. Finally, on August 29, 2003, the latter
was forced to release the vehicle to
complainant.
Respondents,
however,
continued to demand P6,000.00, hence
complainant filed the instant administrative
case.[3]
Respondents, on the other hand, denied
soliciting and receiving any amount from the
complainant. Respondent sheriff admitted,
however, that complainant promised to give
him P10,000.00 if the vehicle will be sold.[4]
On September 10, 2003, the Court
referred the instant administrative complaint
to Judge Fe Albano Madrid, Executive Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela, for
investigation, report and recommendation.[5]
In her investigation report, Judge Madrid
found the testimony of complainant which
was corroborated by two witnesses, to be
more credible. She refused to believe the
claim of respondent sheriff that he did not
release the vehicle to complainant after 5
days from the implementation of the writ on
August 16, 2003, because he was awaiting
instructions from Judge Plata. However, she
found that respondent sheriff did not actually
demand money for the implementation of the
writ because it was complainant who
promised to give money in exchange for the
implementation of the writ of replevin.
Nevertheless, she concluded that respondent
sheriff is guilty of misconduct considering that
he accepted partial payment and insisted on
its full payment.
As to respondent Taguba, Judge Madrid
recommended that he be reprimanded for
trying to abet the misconduct of respondent
sheriff.
Upon receipt of the report of Judge
Madrid, the Court referred the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.[6]
In its Memorandum dated June 4, 2004,
the OCA affirmed the investigating Judges
report. It recommended that respondent
sheriff be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for
conduct unbecoming a court employee and
that respondent Taguba be reprimanded for
trying to abet the misconduct of a fellow
employee of another court.
On July 5, 2004, the Court required the
parties to manifest whether they are willing to
submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed. However, to date, the parties
have yet to file their manifestation. Hence, we
are constrained to dispense the filing of such
manifestation.

The Court agrees with the findings of the

investigating Judge and the OCA that
respondents
received
the
amount
of
P2,000.00 and that they demanded the
payment of an additional P6,000.00 from
complainant. The testimony of complainant
before the investigating Judge is worthy of
belief because the same was not only candid
and direct but also corroborated by two
witnesses who attested to the veracity of
complainants accusations. The writ of replevin
has been implemented and the vehicle is now
in complainants possession.
Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, the procedure for the execution of writs
and other processes are: first, the sheriff must
make an estimate of the expenses to be
incurred by him; second, he must obtain court
approval
for
such
estimated
expenses; third, the
approved
estimated
expenses shall be deposited by the interested
party with the Clerk of Court and exoficio sheriff; fourth, the Clerk of Court shall
disburse the amount to the executing sheriff;
and fifth, the executing sheriff shall liquidate
his expenses within the same period for
rendering a return on the writ. Any amount
received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful
fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an
unlawful exaction which renders him liable for
grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.[7]
In the instant case, respondent sheriff
totally disregarded the aforecited procedure.
He failed to make and submit estimate of the
sheriffs expenses. The amounts received and
demanded by him are therefore unauthorized
fees. His acts of accepting and soliciting said
monetary considerations make him liable not
only for conduct unbecoming a court
employee but also for grave misconduct and
dishonesty.
As correctly found
by the OCA,
respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place
complainant in possession of the vehicle after
five days from the implementation of the writ
because the latter failed to give the whole
amount he promised. Since the adverse party
did not object to the complainants bond nor
posted a redelivery bond to recover
possession of the vehicle taken under the writ
of replevin, respondent sheriff is under
obligation to deliver the van to complainant.
However, it took respondent sheriff 13 days
before he released the vehicle to complainant,
a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by
sheriff.If within five (5) days after the taking

of the property by the sheriff, the adverse

party does not object to the sufficiency of the
bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if
the adverse party so objects and the court
affirms its approval of the applicants bond or
approves a new bond, or if the adverse party
requires the return of the property but his
bond is objected to and found insufficient and
he does not forthwith file an approved bond,
the property shall be delivered to the
applicant. If for any reason the property is not
delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must
return it to the adverse party. (6a)
In Apuyan,
Jr.
v.
Sta
Isabel,
[8]
citing Alvarez, Jr. v. Martin,[9] a sheriff was
similarly found guilty of grave misconduct,
dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to
the best interest of the service for receiving
and soliciting money from the complainant
and for deliberately ignoring the rules for the
implementation of a writ of attachment, thus
Furthermore, respondents act of demanding
money and receiving P1,500.00 from the
complainant for the lunch and merienda of
the policemen who will accompany him in
executing the decision of the Court is a clear
violation of section 9, Rule 141. The Rules
require the sheriff to estimate his expenses in
the execution of the decision. The prevailing
party will then deposit the said amount to the
Clerk of Court who will disburse the amount to
the sheriff, subject to liquidation. Any unspent
amount will have to be returned to the
prevailing party. In this case, no estimate of
sheriffs expenses was submitted to the court
by respondent. In fact, the money which
respondent deputy sheriff had demanded and
received from complainant was not among
those prescribed and authorized by the Rules
of Court. This Court has ruled that any
amount received by the sheriff in excess of
the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court
is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable
for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.
Finally, the procedure for execution of a final
judgment is the same as that in carrying out a
writ of preliminary attachment, as set forth in
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
Clearly, in this case, respondent not only
utterly failed to live up to the high ethical
standards required of a sheriff, but also, he
totally ignored Section 9, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court. Respondent failed to
demonstrate that he followed the procedure
laid down by Rule 141.
The OCAs recommendation that respondent
be found guilty of grave misconduct,
dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to

the best interest of the service is firmly

supported by the records of this case.
Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(Resolution No. 991936, effective September
27, 1999), provides
Section 52. Classification of Offenses.
- Administrative offenses with corresponding
penalties are classified into grave, less grave
or light, depending on their gravity or
depravity and effects on the government
service.
A. The following are grave offenses with their
corresponding penalties:
1. Dishonesty
1st Offense
Dismissal
3. Grave Misconduct
1st Offense
Dismissal
20. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service
1st offense Suspension (6 mos. 1 day to 1
year)
2nd offense Dismissal
The imposable penalty for commission of
the first offense of grave misconduct and
dishonesty is dismissal. In the cases
of Apuyan, Jr. v. Sta Isabel,[10] and Albello v.
Galvez,[11] however,
the
fact
that
the
respondent sheriffs were first time offenders
was considered a mitigating circumstance,
hence they were meted the penalty of 1 year
suspension instead of dismissal. Accordingly,
since this is respondent sheriffs first offense,
the penalty of 1 year suspension will suffice.
With respect to respondent Taguba, we
find the sanction of reprimand too light a
penalty for his transgression. Although it was
not him who deliberately delayed the delivery
of the vehicle to force complainant to yield to
the sheriffs demand, and that complainant did
not point to him as the one who received the
amount of P2,000.00, respondent Taguba
assisted respondent sheriff in soliciting money
from complainant. Note that respondent
Taguba is a process server of another branch
of the MTCC of Santiago City but he
volunteered to aid respondent sheriff in the
implementation of the writ. He not only
demanded P8,000.00 from complainant after
the implementation of the writ but also
tagged along with respondent sheriff when
the latter tried to exact P6,000.00 from
complainant before the vehicle was released
to the latter. Furthermore, respondent Taguba
had been previously suspended for 1 month
in Albano-Madrid v. Apolonio,[12] for simple
misconduct in playing cards with other court

personnel inside the Judges chambers during

office hours. Indeed, reprimand is not
commensurate to his incorrigible conduct.
Under the circumstances, the penalty of 6
months suspension is appropriate.
At the grassroots of our judicial
machinery, sheriffs are indispensably in close
contact with the litigants, hence, their
conduct
should
be
geared
towards
maintaining the prestige and integrity of the
court, for the image of a court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work
thereat, from the judge to the least and
lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the
imperative sacred duty of each and everyone
in the court to maintain its good name and
standing as a temple of justice.[13]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, respondent Romeo Gatcheco,
Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 1, Santiago City is found GUILTY of
Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and Conduct
Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and is SUSPENDED for one (1) year,
without pay. Respondent Eugenio Taguba,
Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 2, Santiago City is found GUILTY of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and is SUSPENDED for six (6) months
without pay.
Respondents are warned that a repetition
of the same or any other act of infraction in
the future shall be dealt with most severely.
ADVENT CAPITAL AND G.R. No. 183018
FINANCE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,.

The Antecedents
The present controversy stemmed from
a replevin suit instituted by petitioner Advent
Capital and Finance Corporation (Advent)
against respondent Roland Young (Young) to
recover the possession of a 1996 Mercedes
Benz E230 with plate number UMN-168, which
is registered in Advents name.5
Prior to the replevin case, or on 16 July 2001,
Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
142 (rehabilitation court).6
On 27 August 2001, the rehabilitation court
issued an Order (stay order) which states that
the enforcement of all claims whether for
money or otherwise, and whether such
enforcement is by court action or otherwise,
against the petitioner (Advent), its guarantors
and sureties not solidarily liable with it, is
stayed.7
On 5 November 2001, Young filed his
Comment to the Petition for Rehabilitation,
claiming, among others, several employee
benefits allegedly due him as Advents former
president and chief executive officer.
On 6 November 2002, the rehabilitation court
approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by
Advent. Included in the inventory of Advents
assets was the subject car which remained in
Youngs possession at the time.
Youngs obstinate refusal to return the subject
car, after repeated demands, prompted
Advent to file the replevin case on 8 July
2003. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 03-776, was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 147 (trial court).

ROLAND YOUNG, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 3, 2011
CARPIO, J.:

After Advents posting

of P3,000,000 replevin bond, which was
double the value of the subject car at the
time, through Stronghold Insurance Company,
Incorporated (Stronghold), the trial court
issued a Writ of Seizure8 directing the Sheriff
to seize the subject car from Young. Upon
receipt of the Writ of Seizure, Young turned
over the car to Advent,9 which delivered the
same to the rehabilitation receiver.10

The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 28
December 2007 Decision2 and 15 May 2008
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 96266. The Court of Appeals set aside
the 24 March 2006 and 5 July 2006 Orders4 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
147, and directed petitioner Advent Capital
and Finance Corporation to return the seized
vehicle to respondent Roland Young. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration.

Thereafter, Young filed an Answer alleging

that as a former employee of Advent, he had
the option to purchase the subject car at book
value pursuant to the company car plan and

to offset the value of the car with the

proceeds of his retirement pay and stock
option plan. Young sought the (1) execution of
a deed of sale over the subject car; and (2)
determination and payment of the net
amount due him as retirement benefits under
the stock option plan.

incident in that claim. Said claim is

properly ventilated, as it is resolvable
by, the Rehabilitation Court which has
jurisdiction and has acquired
jurisdiction, to the exclusion of this
Court. Accordingly, plaintiffs
Motion To Dismiss defendant Youngs
counterclaim is granted. 11

Advent filed a Reply with a motion to dismiss

Youngs counterclaim, alleging that the
counterclaim did not arise from or has no
logical relationship with the issue of
ownership of the subject car.

On 10 June 2005, Young filed a motion for

partial reconsideration of the dismissal order
with respect to his counterclaim.

After issues have been joined, the parties

entered into pre-trial on 2 April 2004, which
resulted in the issuance of a pre-trial order of
even date reciting the facts and the issues to
be resolved during the trial.

On 8 July 2005, Young filed an omnibus

motion, praying that Advent return the
subject car and pay him P1.2 million in
damages (f)or the improper and irregular
seizure of the subject car, to be charged
against the replevin bond posted by Advent
through Stronghold.

On 28 April 2005, the trial court issued an

Order dismissing the replevin case without
prejudice for Advents failure to prosecute. In
the same order, the trial court dismissed
Youngs counterclaim against Advent for lack
of jurisdiction. The order pertinently reads:

On 24 March 2006, the trial court issued an

Order denying Youngs motion for partial
reconsideration, viz:
In the instant case, defendant, in his
counterclaim anchored her [sic] right
of possession to the subject vehicle on
his alleged right to purchase the same
under the company car plan. However,
considering that the Court has already
declared that it no longer has
jurisdiction to try defendants
counterclaim as it is now part of the
rehabilitation proceedings before the
corporate court concerned, the
assertions in the Motion for
Reconsiderations (sic) will no longer
stand.

It appears that as of July 28, 2003,

subject motor vehicle has been turned
over to the plaintiff, thru its authorized
representative, and adknowledged by
the parties respective counsels in
separate Manifestations filed. To date,
no action had been taken by the
plaintiff in the further prosecution of
this case. Accordingly, this case is
ordered dismissed without prejudice on
the ground of failure to prosecute.
Anent plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss
defendant Youngs counterclaim for
benefits under the retirement and
stock purchase plan, the Court rules as
follows: The only issue in this case is
who is entitled to the possession of the
subject motor vehicle. This issue may
have a connection, but not a necessary
connection with defendants rights
under the retirement plan and stock
purchase plan as to be considered a
compulsory counterclaim.

On the other hand, the plaintiff did not

file a Motion for Reconsideration of the
same Order, dismissing the complaint
for failure to prosecute, within
the reglementary period. Hence, the
same has attained finality.
Defendant alleged that the dismissal of
the case resulted in the dissolution of
the writ. Nonetheless, the Court deems
it proper to suspend the resolution of
the return of the subject vehicle. In this
case, the subject vehicle was turned
over to plaintiff by virtue of a writ
of replevin validly issued, the latter
having sufficiently shown that it is the
absolute/registered owner thereof. This
was not denied by the defendant.

xxx
Notably, defendants claim is basically
one for benefits under and by virtue of
his employment with the plaintiff, and
the subject vehicle is merely an

Plaintiffs ownership includes its right of

possession. The case has been
dismissed without a decision on the
merits having been rendered. Thus, to
order the return of the vehicle to one
who is yet to prove his right of
possession would not be proper.

In his petition before the Court of Appeals,

Young argued mainly that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
(1) not directing the return of the subject
vehicle to him; (2) refusing to hold a hearing
to determine the damages to be recovered
against the replevin bond; and (3) dismissing
his counterclaim.

Accordingly, the Motion for Partial

Reconsideration is denied.12

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Young

and annulled the assailed rulings of the trial
court. The Court of Appeals held:

On 8 June 2006, Young filed a motion to

resolve his omnibus motion.
In an Order dated 5 July 2006, the trial court
denied the motion to resolve, to wit:

It is noteworthy that the case was

dismissed by the court a quo for failure
of Advent to prosecute the same. Upon
dismissal of the case, the writ of
seizure issued as an incident of the
main action (forreplevin)
became functus officio and should
have been recalled or lifted. Since
there was no adjudication on the
merits of the case, the issue of who
between Advent and petitioner has the
better right to possess the subject car
was not determined. As such, the
parties should be restored to their
status immediately before the
institution of the case.

In the instant case, the Court

suspended the resolution of the return
of the vehicle to defendant Roland
Young. It should be noted that the writ
of replevin was validly issued
in favor of the plaintiff and that it has
sufficiently established ownership over
the subject vehicle which includes its
right to possess. On the other hand,
the case (Olympia International vs.
Court of Appeals) cited by defendant
finds no application to this case,
inasmuch as in the former the Court
has not rendered judgment affirming
plaintiffs (Olympia) right of possession
on the property seized. Moreover, the
Court, in the Order dated April 28,
2005, has already denied defendants
counterclaim upon which he based his
right of possession on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
Court reiterates its previous ruling that
to order the return of the subject
vehicle to defendant Young, who is yet
to prove his right of possession before
the Rehabilitation Court would not be
proper.

The Supreme Courts ruling in Olympia

International, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals (supra) squarely applies to
the present controversy, to wit:
Indeed, logic and equity demand that
the writ of replevin be cancelled. Being
provisional and ancillary in character,
its existence and efficacy depended on
the outcome of the case. The case
having been dismissed, so must the
writs existence and efficacy
be dissolved. To let the writ stand even
after the dismissal of the case would
be adjudging Olympia as the prevailing
party, when precisely, no decision on
the merits had been rendered. The
case having been dismissed, it is as if
no case was filed at all and the parties
must revert to their status before the
litigation.

WHEREFORE, there being no new and

substantial arguments raised, the
Motion to Resolve is denied.13

Young filed a petition for certiorari and

mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking
to annul the trial courts Orders of 24 March
2006 and 5 July 2006.

Indeed, as an eminent commentator

on Remedial Law expounds:

The Court of Appeals Ruling

10

as they suspended resolution of

petitioners motion for, and/or
disallowed, the return of the subject
car to petitioner. Accordingly,
respondent Advent Capital and Finance
Corporation is directed to return the
subject car to petitioner.

The plaintiff who obtains possession of

the personal property by a writ
of replevin does not acquire absolute
title thereto, nor does the defendant
acquire such title by rebonding the
property, as they only hold the
property subject to the final judgment
in the action. (I Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, Eighth Revised
Edition, p. 686)

The Regional Trial Court of Makati City

(Branch 147) is directed to conduct a
hearing on, and determine, petitioners
claim for damages against
the replevin bond posted by
Stronghold Insurance Co.

Reversion of the parties to the status

quo ante is the
consequence ex proprio vigore of the
dismissal of the case. Thus,
in Laureano vs. Court of Appeals (324
SCRA 414), it was held:

SO ORDERED.15
Advent filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 15 May 2008.
The Issue

(A)lthough the commencement of a

civil action stops the running of the
statute of prescription or limitations,
its dismissal or voluntary
abandonment by plaintiff leaves the
parties in exactly the same position as
though no action had been
commenced at all.

The main issue in this case is whether the

Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
(1) directing the return of the seized car to
Young; and (2) ordering the trial court to set a
hearing for the determination of damages
against the replevin bond.

By the same token, return of the

subject car to petitioner pending
rehabilitation of Advent does not
constitute enforcement of claims
against it, much more adjudication on
the merits of petitioners counterclaim.
In other words, an order for such return
is not a violation of the stay order,
which was issued by the rehabilitation
court on August 27, 2001. x x x

The Courts Ruling

The petition is partially meritorious.
On returning the seized vehicle to Young

Corollarily, petitioners claim against

the replevin bond has no connection at
all with the rehabilitation proceedings.
The claim is not against the insolvent
debtor (Advent) but against
bondsman, Stronghold. Such claim is
expressly authorized by Sec. 10, Rule
60, in relation to Sec. 20, Rule 57,
id., x x x14

We agree with the Court of Appeals in

directing the trial court to return the seized
car to Young since this is the necessary
consequence of the dismissal of
the replevin case for failure to prosecute
without prejudice. Upon the dismissal of
the replevin case for failure to prosecute, the
writ of seizure, which is merely ancillary in
nature, becamefunctus officio and should
have been lifted. There was no adjudication
on the merits, which means that there was no
determination of the issue who has the better
right to possess the subject car. Advent
cannot therefore retain possession of the
subject car considering that it was not
adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to
the remedy ofreplevin.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals

decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court
dated March 24, 2006 and July 5, 2006
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE in so far

11

Contrary to Advents view, Olympia

International Inc. v. Court of Appeals16 applies
to this case. The dismissal of
the replevin case for failure to prosecute
results in the restoration of the parties status
prior to litigation, as if no complaint was filed
at all. To let the writ of seizure stand after the
dismissal of the complaint would be adjudging
Advent as the prevailing party, when precisely
no decision on the merits had been rendered.
Accordingly, the parties must be reverted to
their status quo ante. Since Young possessed
the subject car before the filing of
the replevin case, the same must be returned
to him, as if no complaint was filed at all.

Section 10, Rule 60 of the Rules of

Court19 governs claims for damages on
account of improper or irregular seizure
in replevin cases. It provides that
in replevin cases, as in receivership and
injunction cases, the damages to be awarded
upon the bond shall be claimed, ascertained,
and granted in accordance with Section 20 of
Rule 57 which reads:
Sec. 20. Claim for damages on account
of improper, irregular or excessive
attachment. - An application for
damages on account of improper,
irregular or excessive attachment must
be filed before the trial or before
appeal is perfected or before the
judgment becomes executory, with
due notice to the attaching obligee or
his surety or sureties, setting forth the
facts showing his right to damages and
the amount thereof. Such damages
may be awarded only after proper
hearing and shall be included in the
judgment on the main case. e

Advents contention that returning the subject

car to Young would constitute a violation of
the stay order issued by the rehabilitation
court is untenable. As the Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, returning the seized
vehicle to Young is not an enforcement of a
claim against Advent which must be
suspended by virtue of the stay order issued
by the rehabilitation court pursuant to Section
6 of the Interim Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Interim Rules).17 The issue in
the replevin case is who has better right to
possession of the car, and it was Advent that
claimed a better right in filing
the replevin case against Young. In defense,
Young claimed a better right to possession of
the car arising from Advents car plan to its
executives, which he asserts entitles him to
offset the value of the car against the
proceeds of his retirement pay and stock
option plan.

If the judgment of the appellate court

be favorable to the party against
whom the attachment was issued, he
must claim damages sustained during
the pendency of the appeal by filing an
application in the appellate court with
notice to the party in whose favor the
attachment was issued or his surety or
sureties, before the judgment of the
appellate court becomes executory.
The appellate court may allow the
application to be heard and decided by
the trial court.

Young cannot collect a money claim against

Advent within the contemplation of the
Interim Rules. The term claim has been
construed to refer to debts or demands of a
pecuniary nature, or the assertion to have
money paid by the company under
rehabilitation to its creditors.18 In
the replevin case, Young cannot demand that
Advent pay him money because such
payment, even if valid, has been stayed by
order of the rehabilitation court. However, in
the replevin case, Young can raise Advents car
plan, coupled with his retirement pay and
stock option plan, as giving him a better right
to possession of the car. To repeat, Young is
entitled to recover the subject car as a
necessary consequence of the dismissal of
the replevin case for failure to prosecute
without prejudice.

Nothing herein contained shall prevent

the party against whom the
attachment was issued from
recovering in the same action the
damages awarded to him from any
property of the attaching obligee not
exempt from execution should the
bond or deposit given by the latter be
insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the
award.
The above provision essentially allows the
application to be filed at any time before the
judgment becomes executory.20 It should be
filed in the same case that is the main
action,21 and with the court having jurisdiction
over the case at the time of the application. 22
e remed

On the damages against the replevin bond

12

In this case, there was no application for

damages against Stronghold resulting from
the issuance of the writ of seizure before the
finality of the dismissal of the complaint for
failure to prosecute. It appears that Young
filed his omnibus motion claiming damages
against Stronghold after the dismissal order
issued by the trial court on 28 April 2005 had
attained finality. While Young filed a motion
for partial reconsideration on 10 June 2005, it
only concerned the dismissal of his
counterclaim, without any claim for damages
against the replevin bond. It was only on 8
July 2005 that Young filed an omnibus motion
seeking damages against the replevin bond,
after the dismissal order had already become
final for Advents non-appeal of such order. In
fact, in his omnibus motion, Young stressed
the finality of the dismissal order.23 Thus,
Young is barred from claiming damages
against the replevin bond.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the

petition IN PART. The Court SETS ASIDE the
portion in the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96266 ordering the
trial court to set a hearing for the
determination of damages against
the replevin bond.

G.R. No. 204528

2013

February 19,

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR

NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY
DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0.
ESMERALDA, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

24

In Jao v. Royal Financing Corporation, the

Court held that defendant therein was
precluded from claiming damages against the
surety bond since defendant failed to file the
application for damages before the
termination of the case, thus:

LEONEN, J.:
Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
"the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Manila
from implementing its Decision x x x in Civil
Case No. 12-127405 granting respondent's
application for the issuance of inspection and
production orders x x x."1 This is raised
through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 from
the "Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial
Court dated 20 March 2012.

The dismissal of the case filed by the

plaintiffs-appellees on July 11, 1959,
had become final and executory before
the defendant-appellee corporation
filed its motion for judgment on the
bond on September 7, 1959. In the
order of the trial court, dismissing the
complaint, there appears no
pronouncement whatsoever against
the surety bond. The appelleecorporation failed to file its proper
application for damages prior to the
termination of the case against it. It is
barred to do so now. The prevailing
party, if such would be the proper term
for the appellee-corporation, having
failed to file its application for
damages against the bond prior to the
entry of final judgment, the bondsmanappellant is relieved of further
liability thereunder.

From the records, it appears that on 27

February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B.
Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.2 This case was docketed as In the
Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP
No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of
Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director
Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director
Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau
of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity).
Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and
desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for
the fake ambush incident by filing bogus
charges of Frustrated Murder against
Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged
ambush incident."3

Since Young is time-barred from claiming

damages against the replevin bond, the
dismissal order having attained finality after
the application for damages, the Court of
Appeals erred in ordering the trial court to set
a hearing for the determination of damages
against the replevin bond.

13

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ

of Amparo, the judge issued summons and
ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. 4 He
also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012.
The hearing was held allegedly for
determining whether a temporary protection
order may be issued. During that hearing,
counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a
Return, not an Answer, is appropriate
for Amparo cases.5

SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from

the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise
questions of fact or law or both. x x x
(Emphasis supplied).
It is the Courts view that the "Decision" dated
20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is
not the judgment or final order contemplated
under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review
under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper
remedy at this time.

In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge

Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading but
answer".7 The judge noted that the Rules of
Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases.8 He
opined that the Revised Rules of Summary
Procedure applied and thus required an
Answer.9

The RTC and the Parties must understand the

nature of the remedy of Amparo to put its
procedures in the proper context.
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an
equitable and extraordinary remedy to
safeguard the right of the people to life,
liberty12 and security13 as enshrined in the
1987 Constitution.14 The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights.15 It aims to address
concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. 16

Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a

hearing on the main case on 7 March
2012.10 Even without a Return nor an Answer,
he ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda within five (5) working days after
that hearing. Since the period to file an
Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge
also decided that the memorandum of De
Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their
Answer.11

Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these

controversies, the procedure was devised to
afford swift but decisive relief. 17 It is initiated
through a petition18 to be filed in a Regional
Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Appeals, or the Supreme Court.19 The judge or
justice then makes an "immediate"
evaluation20 of the facts as alleged in the
petition and the affidavits submitted "with the
attendant circumstances detailed".21 After
evaluation, the judge has the option to issue
the Writ of Amparo22 or immediately dismiss
the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition
and the supporting affidavits do not show that
the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security
is under threat or the acts complained of are
not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance
of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive
judicial protection for the petitioner. The court
compels the respondents to appear before a
court of law to show whether the grounds for
more permanent protection and interim reliefs
are necessary.

On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a

"Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim
reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary
protection, production and inspection orders.
The production and inspection orders were in
relation to the evidence and reports involving
an on-going investigation of the attempted
assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It
is not clear from the records how these pieces
of evidence may be related to the alleged
threat to the life, liberty or security of the
respondent Gatdula.
In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC
denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated
23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to
this Court assailing the RTC "Decision" dated
20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review
on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule
45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo(A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25
September 2007), viz:

The respondents are required to file

a Return23 after the issuance of the writ
through the clerk of court. The Return serves
as the responsive pleading to the
petition.24 Unlike an Answer, the Return has

14

other purposes aside from identifying the

issues in the case. Respondents are also
required to detail the actions they had taken
to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.

to ensure the protection of constitutional

rights.
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed
by the petitioners could not be the judgment
or final order that is appealable under Section
19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is
clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion
of the "Decision", to wit:

If the respondents are public officials or

employees, they are also required to state the
actions they had taken to: (i) verify the
identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover
and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the
petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain
statements concerning the death or
disappearance; (iv) determine the cause,
manner, location, and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the
death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the
suspected offenders before a competent
court.25 Clearly these matters are important to
the judge so that s/he can calibrate the
means and methods that will be required to
further the protections, if any, that will be due
to the petitioner.

The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is

hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ of Amparo.
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
DIRECTED to effect the service of the Writ
of Amparo in an expeditious manner upon all
concerned, and for this purpose may call upon
the assistance of any military or civilian
agency of the government.
This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of
the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, not thejudgment under
Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an
interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact
that temporary protection, production and
inspection orders were given together with
the decision. The temporary protection,
production and inspection orders are interim
reliefs that may be granted by the court
upon filing of the petition but before final
judgment is rendered. 32

There will be a summary hearing26 only after

the Return is filed to determine the merits of
the petition and whether interim reliefs are
warranted. If the Return is not filed, the
hearing will be done ex parte.27 After the
hearing, the court will render
the judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision.28

The confusion of the parties arose due to the

procedural irregularities in the RTC.

If the allegations are proven with substantial

evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of
the writ and such reliefs as may be proper
and appropriate.29 The judgment should
contain measures which the judge views as
essential for the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case. These
measures must be detailed enough so that
the judge may be able to verify and monitor
the actions taken by the respondents. It is this
judgment that could be subject to appeal to
the Supreme Court via Rule 45.30 After the
measures have served their purpose, the
judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases,
this is when the threats to the petitioners life,
liberty and security cease to exist as
evaluated by the court that renders the
judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also
be terminated through consolidation should a
subsequent case be filed either criminal or
civil.31 Until the full satisfaction of the
judgment, the extraordinary remedy
of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring

First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was

inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as
the responsive pleading for petitions for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement
to file an Answer is contrary to the intention
of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to
those whose right to life, liberty and security
are violated or are threatened to be violated.
In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing
summons and requiring an Answer.
Judge Pampilos basis for requiring an Answer
was mentioned in his Order dated 2 March
2012:
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the
Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent
with the said rule.

15

Considering the summary nature of the

petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure shall apply.

MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how

this rule could possibly apply to proceedings
in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited
the application of summary procedure to
certain civil and criminal cases. A writ
of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or particular fact.34 It is not a
civil nor a criminal action, hence, the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced.

Section 5. Answer Within ten (10) days from

service of summons, the defendant shall file
his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy
thereof on the plaintiff. x x x
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the
respondents are required to file their Answer
ten (days) from receipt of this Order.33
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary
Procedure is a special rule that the Court has
devised for the following circumstances:

The second irregularity was the holding of a

hearing on the main case prior to the
issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return.
Without a Return, the issues could not have
been properly joined.

SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern

the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following
cases falling within their jurisdiction:

Worse, is the trial courts third irregularity: it

required a memorandum in lieu of a
responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et
al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the
respondents to frame the issues subject to a
hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the
hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the
other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the
party litigants and is a final pleading usually
required before the case is submitted for
decision. One cannot substitute for the other
since these submissions have different
functions in facilitating the suit.

A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, x x x.
(2) All other cases, except
probate proceedings, where the
total amount of the plaintiffs
claim does not exceed x x x.

More importantly, a memorandum is a

prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.35

B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws,
rules and regulations;

The fourth irregularity was in the

"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the
body of its decision, the RTC stated:

(2) Violations of the rental law;

"Accordingly this court GRANTS the

privilege of the writ and
the interim reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).

(3) Violations of municipal or

city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases
where the penalty prescribed
by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding
six months, or a fine not
exceeding one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, x x x.

This gives the impression that the decision

was the judgment since the phraseology is
similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render
judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision. If the
allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant

xxxx
It is clear from this rule that this type of
summary procedure only applies to

16

the privilege of the writ and such

reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied."
(Emphasis supplied).

the following grounds: (1) matters of life,

liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, (3) the
merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(5) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and
(6) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.38

The privilege of the Writ

of Amparo should be distinguished from
the actual order called the Writ of Amparo.
The privilege includes availment of the entire
procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the
Rule on the Writ ofAmparo. After examining
the petition and its attached affidavits, the
Return and the evidence presented in the
summary hearing, the judgment should detail
the required acts from the respondents that
will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the
violation of or the threat to the petitioner's
life, liberty or security.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a

prophylactic to the irregularities committed by
the trial court judge, and by virtue of its
powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the
Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject
of this Resolution issued by Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent
Gatdula filed the Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege

of the writ" cannot be executed.1wphi1 It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to
intervene and grant judicial succor to the
petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the
privilege of the Writ ofAmparo arise out of
very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial
responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or
ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo."

(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to

determine within forty-eight (48) hours
from his receipt of
this Resolutionwhether the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo is proper on the
basis of the petition and its attached
affidavits.

The procedural irregularities in the RTC

affected the mode of appeal that petitioners
used in elevating the matter to this Court.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the

personal service of this Resolution on Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper
guidance together with a WARNING that
further deviation or improvisation from the
procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be
meted with severe consequences.

It is the responsibility of counsels for the

parties to raise issues using the proper
procedure at the right time. Procedural rules
are meant to assist the parties and courts
efficiently deal with the substantive issues
pertaining to a case. When it is the judge
himself who disregards the rules of
procedure, delay and confusion result.

G.R. No. 193652

August 5, 2014

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM,

represented by his mother, MA.
CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D.
ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA
C. YANGCO,Respondents.

The Petition for Review is not the proper

remedy to assail the interlocutory order
denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March
2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other
hand, is prohibited.36 Simply dismissing the
present petition, however, will cause grave
injustice to the parties involved. It undermines
the salutary purposes for which the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In many instances, the Court adopted a policy

of liberally construing its rules in order to
promote a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and
proceeding.37 The rules can be suspended on

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, and Section 191 of

17

the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 2 seeking to set

aside the August 17, 20103 and September 6,
20104 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case
No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed
petitioners petition for the issuance ofa writ
of amparo which petitioner filed in order for
her to regain parental authority and custody
of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her
biological child, from the respondent officers
of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). The factual
antecedents as gleaned from the records
follow:

Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial

custody then commenced.11
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed
her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to
the DSWDasking for the suspension of Baby
Julians adoption proceedings. She alsosaid
she wanted her family back together.12
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through
respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a
Memorandum13 to DSWD Assistant Secretary
Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the
certificate declaring Baby Julian legally
available for adoption had attained finality on
November 13, 2009, or three months after
Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment which terminated her parental
authority and effectively made Baby Julian a
ward of the State. The said Memorandum was
noted by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin,
Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay

Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship
with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III
(Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant
with the latters child without the benefit of
marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina
mislead Marcelino into believing that she had
an abortion when in fact she proceeded to
complete the term of her pregnancy. During
this time, she intended to have the child
adopted through Sun and Moon Home for
Children (Sun and Moon) in Paraaque City to
avoid placing her family ina potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second
illegitimate son.5

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino,

Marcelinos brother, sent a letter to Atty.
Escutin informing her that a DNA testing was
scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA
Analysis Laboratory at the University of the
Philippines.14
On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera
sent a letter15 to Noel Constantino stating that
it would not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA
testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed
Noel Constantino that the procedures followed
relative to the certification on the availability
of the child for adoption and the childs
subsequent placement to prospective
adoptive parents were proper, and that the
DSWD was no longer in the position to stop
the adoption process. Assistant Secretary
Cabrera further stated that should Christina
wish to reacquire her parental authority over
Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she
may bring the matter to the regular courts as
the reglementary period for her to regain her
parental rights had already lapsed under
Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523.16

On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby

Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial
MedicalCenter, Marikina City.6Sun and Moon
shouldered all the hospital and medical
expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina
voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of
a Deed of Voluntary Commitment7 to the
DSWD.
On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a
heart attack and died8 without knowing about
the birth of his son. Thereafter, during the
wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelinos family
that she and the deceased had a son that she
gave up for adoption due to financial distress
and initial embarrassment. Marcelinos family
was taken aback by the revelation and
sympathized with Christina. After the
emotional revelation, they vowed to help her
recover and raise the baby.9 On November 27,
2009, the DSWD, through Secretary
Esperanza I. Cabral issued a
certificate10 declaring Baby Julian as "Legally
Available for Adoption." A local matching
conference was held on January 27, 2010 and
on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was
"matched" with the spouses Vergel and
Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition 17 for

the issuance of a writ of amparo before the
RTC of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody
of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin,
Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting
Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents
of "blackmailing" her into surrendering

18

custody of her childto the DSWD utilizing what

she claims to be an invalid certificate of
availability for adoption which respondents
allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that
all legal requisites for adoption of the minor
child had been complied with.

manifestations made by the counsels, the

court enjoined the parties to file their
respective position papers on the following
issues:
1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction
over the instant case;

Christina argued that by making these

misrepresentations, the respondents had
acted beyond the scope of their legal
authority thereby causing the enforced
disappearance of the said child and depriving
her of her custodial rights and parental
authority over him.

2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper

remedy based on the facts of the case and
prayer in the petition; and
3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition
should be granted and custody of the child be
given to his biological mother.

On the basis of the said petition,the RTC,

Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its
Presiding Judge, the Honorable Angelene Mary
W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo 18 on
July 28, 2010 commanding the four
respondents to produce the body of Baby
Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4,
2010. Respondents were alsorequired to file
their verified written return to the writ
pursuant to Section 919 of the Amparo Rule,
within five working days from the service of
the writ.

The parties were given five (5) days from

today to file their respective position papers
based on these three main issues. They may
include other related issues they deem
essential for the resolution of this case. Set
this case for further hearing, if necessary, on
August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.21
In the same order, Judge Sale
alsoacknowledged that the child subject of
the case was brought before the court and the
petitioner was allowed to see him and take
photographs of him.

The respondents complied with the writ and

filed their Return20 on August 2, 2010 praying
that the petition be denied for being the
improper remedy to avail of in a case relating
toa biological parents custodial rights over
her child.

On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the

petition for issuance of a writ of amparo
without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action in court. The RTC held that
Christina availed of the wrong remedy to
regain custody of her child Baby Julian.22 The
RTC further stated that Christina should have
filed a civil case for custody of her child as
laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus
in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is
extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor
who has been illegallydetained by another, a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus may be availed of, either as a principal
or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus
inRelation to Custody of Minors.23

On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared

before the RTC but respondents did not bring
the child, stating that threats of kidnapping
were made on the child and his caregivers. To
give respondents another chance, the RTC
reset the hearing to August 5, 2010.
At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance as representative of the State and
prayed that its lawyers be given time to file
their memorandum or position paper in this
case. In turn, the RTC acknowledged the
appearance of the OSG and allowed its
representatives to actively participate in the
arguments raised during the said hearing.
Relative to the matter of the parties
submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale
narrowed the issues to be discussed by
providing for the following guidelines, thus:

On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion

for reconsideration24 arguing that since the
RTC assumed jurisdiction of the petition for
the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is
duty-bound to dispose the case on the
merits.25The RTC, however, deniedChristinas
motion for reconsideration on September 6,
2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the
wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court

To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all

the manifestations and counter-

19

intended the writ of amparo to address the

problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.26

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of

amparois a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful actor omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

On September 28, 2010, Christina directly

elevated the case before this Court, via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo. In her petition,
Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside
the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010
Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523
unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC,27 which was promulgated by the
Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine
of separation of powers, (3) declare the
"enforced separation" between her and Baby
Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty
and security, and (4) grant her the privilege of
availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so
she could be reunited with her son.28

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and

enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National
Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,31 this Court
held:
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address
the intractable problem of "extralegal killings"
and "enforced disappearances," its coverage,
in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards
or judicial proceedings." On the other hand,
"enforced disappearances" are "attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groupsor
private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.

The only relevant issue presented before the

Court worthy of attention is whether a petition
for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for
obtaining parental authority and custody of a
minor child. This Court will not belabor to
discuss Christinas argumentsrelating to the
supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523
as Congress has the plenary power to repeal,
alter and modify existing laws29 and A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to
enforce the provisions of all adoption and
adoption-related statutes before the courts.

This pronouncement on the coverage of the

writ was further cemented in the latter case of
Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo32 where this
Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the
writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to
what constitutes "enforced disappearance,"
the Court in Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the
elementsconstituting "enforced
disappearances" as the term is statutorily
defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to
wit:

Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the

life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being
violated or threatened by the respondent
DSWD officers enforcement of an illegal Deed
of Voluntary Commitment between her and
Sun and Moon. She claims thatshe had been
"blackmailed" through the said Deed by the
DSWD officers and Sun and Moons
representatives into surrendering her child
thereby causing the "forced separation" of the
said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she
also reiterates that the respondent DSWD
officers acted beyond the scope of their
authority when they deprived her of Baby
Julians custody.30

(a) that there be an arrest, detention,

abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;

The Court rejects petitioners contentions and

denies the petition.

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the

authorization, support or acquiescence
of, the State ora political organization;

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

provides as follows:

(c) that it be followed by the State or

political organizations refusal to

20

acknowledge or give information on

the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparopetition; and,

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106,
Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604
are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's
right to avail of proper legal remedies
afforded to her by law and related rules.

(d) that the intention for such refusal

isto remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.1wphi1
In this case, Christina alleged that the
respondent DSWD officers caused her
"enforced separation" from Baby Julian and
that their action amounted to an "enforced
disappearance" within the context of the
Amparo rule. Contrary to her position,
however, the respondent DSWD officers never
concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May
28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly stating that
Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina
Spouses when she filed her petition before the
RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her
petition for review on certiorari that the
respondent DSWD officers presented Baby
Julian before the RTC during the hearing held
in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is
therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as
used in the context of the Amparo rule as the
third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents
of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly
without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption,
clearly indicates that she is not searching for
a lost child but asserting her parental
authority over the child and contesting
custody over him.37 Since it is extant from the
pleadings filed that what is involved is the
issue of child custody and the exercise of
parental rights over a child, who, for all
intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo
rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of
amparo is a remedy available to victims of
extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature,
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the
unlawful act or omission is a public official or
employee or a private individual. It is
envisioned basically to protect and guarantee
the right to life, liberty and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of life.

21