WW II Myth - The British 6-pounder Was More Powerful than the US 57-mm

By Copyright 2015, J.D. Neal, All Rights Reserved

The worst thing about this sort of myth is that it continues to be continues to crawl
around on the readily accessed internet.
This is one of those bizarre, convoluted myths that seem to circulate due to such
sources as a GI (in some interview or such) saying his men had the British 6-pounder and "
the muzzle velocity was about 6000, giving us a greater advantage over the 57-mm guns the
Americans usually used." (HINT: NO cannon used at the time had a velocity of 6000). Yet
another GI toned this down to 3000 that is 3000 rpm. Given that rpm usually stands for
revolutions per minute one wonders what they meant.
Being a GI using the equipment does not make one learned. The USA paratroopers
had the air-mobile version of the 6-pounder that the British developed for that use - lighter and
easier to use than the standard 57-mm/6-pounder. Otherwise there was no difference in their
gun and US guns.
The USA adopted the 57-mm gun as their main towed anti-tank gun for infantry units to
replace the feeble 37-mm. It was nothing but the British 6-pounder converted to USA
manufacturing techniques and a few other changes. The British had contracted the USA to
supply them with 6-pdrs and that is the gun the British received in return.
When British started buying 6-pounders from the USA, the British factories lacked
proper lathes to make long barrels with. As such, the British factories made cannon with
shorter barrels (43 calibers long; 96). The USA never had a shortage of lathes and the
weapons they manufactured always had long barrels (50 calibers long; 112). Thus, for a
period of time, US guns were MORE POWERFUL than British 6-pounders. The difference,
though, was very slight about 150 feet per second less, and given velocities of 2,650 to
2,950 f/s that was trivial.
Eventually British industry caught up and began making the cannon with the same
barrel length as the USA guns. At that point their ballistics were the same.
Except for two points: (1) The British developed a high velocity APDS sabot round that
could penetrate armor better than a standard AP round. You will find varying quotes but the
standard is around 4.5-inches (115-mm), which gave it the ability to penetrate the frontal armor
of a Panther tank with a good hit.
According to the web page at http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=74:6-pounder-anti-tank-gun&catid=40:antitank&Itemid=58
the British produced 217,000 rounds of APDS ammunition in 1944. In 1945 they produced
another 158,000 rounds. The USA helped out in this endeavor by producing 0 (zero; none)
rounds in 1944; and increased their contribution 1,000 fold by producing 0 (zero; none)
rounds in 1945.
USA units who wanted said shot had to acquire it some way.
The British seemed to be generous and some US gun units might have had as much
as 8 or so APDS shot.
(2) And the British issued a high explosive shell for the 6-pounder earlier than the USA
did. The USA issued HE rounds later in the war. Again, US units who wanted an HE shell had
to acquire one from the British.
Some of the British ammunition was better than US ammunition, but the guns were
otherwise ballistically the same.
GIs are particularly unreliable concerning technology. They were there and knew what
happened, but often hadn't a clue about why. GIs are often wrong when it comes to technical
details and people who quote them for technical "facts" are often wrong.

The USA adopted the 57-mm gun M1 as their main towed anti-tank gun for infantry
units to replace the feeble 37-mm. It was nothing but the British 6-pounder converted to USA
manufacturing techniques and a few other changes. The British had contracted the USA to
supply them with 6-pdrs and that is the gun the British received in return. So, the US began
using it too lacking as they did a ready-made design of their own. They did have a 57-mm
designed and prototyped; but it was not better at penetrating armor than the 6-pounder nor
was it in the production loop. Setting up any weapon for production can take months or a year;
the manufacturers have to make the tools needed and set up an assembly area, etc.
Looking at the basic facts, British ground forces had a good deal of success with the 6pounder. They often had fewer complaints than US forces. Or if they had them, they werent as
publicized as much.
There are two main factors here: (1) US Ground forces disliked towed anti-tank guns of
any type. The little 37-mm was acquired and issued far less as an anti-tank gun than as an
infantry gun, something easily pushed around by a squad of GIs for their use in immediate fire
against a target.
More effective guns were far more heavy. Thus, infantry commanders were want to
prefer the job of anti-tank gun to be filled by mobile weapons. In US Anti-Tank Artillery 194145 (Zaloga; Osprey; 2005) the author points out a report that was tendered by VII Corps
commander MajGen Manton Eddy to Washington on July 3, 1944 concerning conditions of the
Normandy hedgerow fighting:
towed 57mm guns were virtually useless in the close country encountered. Such
weapons assigned to the (regimental) anti-tank companies certainly should be some type
of self-propelled mount and probably those assigned to battalions. The present gun cannot
be placed in position sufficiently promptly, except along roads.
The Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes Offensive of 1944) highlit the failings of towed guns
in stark detail. Zaloga points out that:
LtCol McKinley, commander of the 1/9th Infantry, lost more than half his troops defending
the Lausdell crossroads on the approaches into Krinkelt-Rocherath, many when their
trenches were overrun by German tanks. He noted quite bluntly:
The 57mm guns have no place in the infantry battalion. You can't put them where you
need them. In the last operation, the 57mm guns could not be moved on the roads
available to me due to deep mud and direct observation by the enemy.
A regimental officer noted, "Our anti-tank company and our regiment have lost confidence
in the 57mm gun as an anti-tank weapon, but our people strongly favor the bazooka for
anti-tank work."
A regimental anti-tank company commander noted, I believe that the regimental anti-tank
company should have 90mm M36 SPMs {self-propelled mounts}. I want the self-propelled
guns rather than the towed 3in guns because the towed guns are too heavy and sluggish.
You can't get them up to the front. My orders have been in almost every case to get the
guns up to the front-line troops. I just couldn't do it in the daytime with the 3in towed gun. I
can get the 57s up pretty well, but you can always get self-propelled guns up better than
towed ones. I have to take an open truck up under small arms and artillery fire, which is
very rough.

Somehow these men expected the Army, backed up by the vaunted US military
industrial complex, to do better for them. GIs were there to fight, not shove over-weight antitank guns around. There were self-propelled guns the M10, M18, and M36 gun motor
carriages of the tank destroyer units and tanks were often assigned to support infantry units.
What they wanted, then, was to replace the towed guns with motorized weapons.
Someone might chime in with the idea that self-propelled weapons are far too
expensive. The opposite is true: a single towed gun is cheaper than a tracked mount, but the
towed gun requires more crew; prime movers and ammunition carriers; and more shipping
space. The ground forces had learned this early on and had pressed for towed AT guns (or
simply more tanks) but the only such weapons were tank destroyer units.
And the Army Chief of Staff General Lesley McNair an artilleryman had ordered
motorized 3-inch M10 units disbanded and replaced by towed 3-inch guns because for some
out of touch with reality reason he thought a 2 ton gun was much better than a motorized
gun. While some of the men handling the towed 3-inch guns fought heroically in the Battle of
The Bulge, many were slaughtered due to the lack of mobility of the gun.
(2) A second issue was ammunition supply. US troops were not very happy with the 57mm because the US Army neutered it. It was a fine weapon for close range shots against even
some of the heavily armored German vehicles in the side or rear. But when the Germans were
attacking, shots were often against the front faces. The standard armor piercing shot was hard
pressed to cope with tanks such as the Tiger or Panther from the front US crews simply
watched the rounds bounce off. They could break a track on the vehicle, which did not stop the
crew from shooting them up.
Picking a good defensive position could help some weapons get in aide shots, but then
again the Germans were not stupid and scattering weapons out led to them being gobbled up
piece meal.
Range was another bugaboo. It helped little to know that a 57-mm could pierce a Tiger
or Panthers armor from the side or rear at 500 yards or less if the Germans stood out at 1,000
to 3,000 yards and called in artillery and pelted them with HE rounds. The Germans werent
stupid and they did that when they could. As did US ground forces faced by German anti-tank
guns.
It wasnt that a better round was not available. The British had it an Armor Piercing
Discarding Shot (APDS) which could handle a Panther or Tigers frontal armor at close
range. It was adept at defeating Tigers at longer range. The US Army did not develop nor field
such ammunition. US ground forces had to acquire this ammo from the British.
Nor did the US Army issue high explosive ammunition in a timely fashion. Although
referred to as an anti-tank gun, any anti-tank gun was also a field gun. It was expected and
used to support the infantry forces by firing at bunkers, houses, enemy soldiers whatever
target was found. High explosive rounds were very useful for this. The Germans typically did
not have enough tanks to swarm the US lines; they often scattered them out and used them
judiciously. Thus anti-tank forces often had nothing to do but fire in support. A lack of an HE
shell hindered this. An AP round worked to some degree, but was decidedly inferior for the job.
During the Normandy campaign, US forces had to acquire this ammo from the British.
Later the US Army began manufacturing it and supplying it.
Thus: some of the US ground units dissatisfaction with the 57-mm originated from a
mishandling of the ground forces by the upper level USA commanders, who neither issued
proper weapons in a timely fashion nor supplied them with proper ammunition. Which was a
slap in the face for men fighting and dieing on the front lines.