United States of America v. Impulse Media Group Inc - Document No. 48

United States of America v. Impulse Media Group Inc Doc.
48
Case 2:05-cv-01285-RSL Document 48 Filed 10/15/2007 Page 1 of 13
1 HON. JAMES P. DONOHUE

2
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
8
AT SEATTLE
9
10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

No. CV05 1285 L
11 Plaintiff,
12 v. DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST
13 REGARDING ATTENDANCE AT THE
IMPULSE MEDIA GROUP, INC.,
COURT ORDERED SETTLEMENT
14 CONFERENCE AND OBJECTIONS AND
a Washington corporation,
15 MOTIONS RELATED THERETO
Defendant.
16 NOTED ON MOTIONS CALENDAR:
OCTOBER 22, 2007
17
18 COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, Impulse Media Group, Inc., by and through its
19 counsel of record, Robert S. Apgood of CarpeLaw PLLC, and hereby respectfully submits this
20 DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST REGARDING
21 ATTENDANCE AT THE COURT ORDERED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE AND
22 OBJECTIONS AND MOTIONS RELATED THERETO and states as follows:
23 I. INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff brings this civil action in this venue and jurisdiction, the United
24
States District for the Western District of Washington, as it must, as a result of the of the
25
Defendant’s principal place of business residing in this district. In doing so, the Plaintiff, as the
26
DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO CARPELAW PLLC
PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST REGARDING 2400 NW 80th Street #130
ATTENDANCE AT THE COURT ORDERED Seattle, Washington 98117
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE” - 1 (206) 624-2379 - (206) 784-6305 (fax)
Dockets.Justia.com
1 master of its complaint, has agreed to abide by all the local rules of this Honorable Court. While
2 Plaintiff styles its pleading as a “Request,” it is filed as a “motion” and accompanied by a
3 Proposed Order. Accordingly, Defendant addresses it as a motion before this Honorable Court.
4 II. RELEVANT LOCAL RULES
5 Local Rule LR 7(d)(3) states, in its entirety,

6 (3) All other motions shall be noted for consideration for a Friday.
Unless otherwise specified in this rule, all discovery motions not using the
7
option under CR 37(a)(2)(B), and all other nondispositive motions shall be
8 noted for consideration no earlier than the third Friday after filing and
service of the motion; and all dispositive motions shall be noted for
9 consideration no earlier than the fourth Friday after filing and service of
the motion. Any opposition papers shall be filed and served not later than
10 the Monday before the noting date. If service is by mail, the opposition
papers shall be mailed not later than the Friday preceding the noting date.
11
Any reply papers shall be filed and served no later than the noting date.
12
Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E) states, in relevant part,
13
(4) Mediation Procedure. Promptly upon the designation of a
14 mediator, the plaintiff shall arrange a conference call among the mediator
and counsel for each party to discuss procedural aspects of the mediation.
15 Except to the extent the mediator directs otherwise, the following
procedures shall apply:
16 …
(E) Parties to Attend. In addition to counsel, parties and
17
insurers having authority to settle, and to adjust pre-existing
18 settlement authority if necessary, must attend the mediation in
person. The mediator may in his or her discretion, but only in
19 exceptional cases, excuse a party or insurer from personally
attending a mediation conference. If a party or representative
20 of an insurer is excused from personal attendance by the
21 mediator, the party or representative shall be on call by telephone
during the conference.
22 (Emphasis added).1
23
24
25 1
Defendant’s research on case law related to this rule yielded only one published case that addresses a
portion of Local Rule LR 39.1 that is not relevant to the instant motion.
26
1 III. OBJECTIONS AND MOTIONS

2 OBJECTION NO. 1: The Defendant OBJECTS to Plaintiff’s noting date for its
3 motion on the Court’s motions calendar for failure to comply with Local Rule LR 7(d)(3). The
4 Plaintiff filed its Request and lodged its Proposed Order on October 11, 2007, a scant 11 days
5 prior to the notice date of the hearing of Plaintiff’s Request on the Court’s Monday, October 22,
6 2007 calendar. As such, the requirements of Local Rule LR 7(d)(3) for noticing motions of this
7 type on a Friday and no earlier than the third Friday following the filing of the motion have been
8 entirely ignored by the Plaintiff. Rather, Plaintiff scoffs the plain-language requirements of
9 Local Rule LR 7(d)(3) and instead calendars its motion at its leisure and on a day that suits its
10 purpose without regard for local requirements and without so much as a by-your-leave of this
11 Honorable Court. Indeed, the Plaintiff has had since September 18, 2007, at a minimum, to file
12 its motion, but failed to do so until over three (3) full weeks later. In order to comply with Local
13 Rule LR 7(d)(3)’s requirement that “opposition papers shall be filed and served no later than
14 the Monday before the noting date,” the Defendant is forced to file this Opposition no later than
15 Monday, October 15, 2007, a mere four (4) calendar days after the Plaintiff filed its Request.
16 This clearly prejudices the Defendant in that it required its counsel to immediately
17 suspend attention to other pressing matters (including briefing ordered by this Honorable
18 Court, the appointed mediator in this matter, and matters affecting other parties
19 represented by counsel who have pending deadlines) and turn its full attention to this
20 Opposition. Declaration of Robert S. Apgood in Support of Defendant’s Response In
21 Opposition To Plaintiff’s Request Regarding Attendance At The Court Ordered Settlement
22 Conference And Objections And Motions Related Thereto (“Apgood Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-8 at 1-3. Had
23 Plaintiff properly noted its motion in compliance with Local Rule LR 7(d)(3), Defendant would
24 have had fifteen (15) full days (the bare minimum allowed by the rule) in which to consider,
25 research, compose and file its opposition. Arguably, Plaintiff implicitly acknowledges its clear
26 understanding of the Local Rules by the fact that it did not file a motion to shorten time. Local
1 Rule LR 6(e) states in its entirety, “Motions to shorten time are hereby abolished.”
2 Consequently, the Defendant hereby respectfully MOVES this Honorable Court to STRIKE
3 Plaintiff’s motion for failure to comply with Local Rule LR 7(d)(3) or, in the alternative, to re-
4 notice the motion for hearing on Friday, October 26, 2007, the appropriate date required by
5 Local Rule LR 7(d)(3), but in any event to ORDER the Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s costs,
6 including attorney’s fees, for being required to respond in a wholly unreasonable time period.
7 OBJECTION NO. 2: The Defendant OBJECTS to Plaintiff’s filing of this

8 motion for failure to comply with Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4). As noted, supra, LR 39.1(c)(4)
9 requires that “the plaintiff shall arrange a conference call among the mediator and counsel for
10 each party to discuss procedural aspects of the mediation.” (Emphasis added). This, Plaintiff has
11 utterly failed to do. Had Plaintiff complied with LR 39.1(c)(4), it could have raised as an issue
12 the substance of the instant motion, received a ruling by the magistrate, and thereby avoided
13 requiring Defendant to suffer the expense and necessity of responding to the instant motion.
14 Instead, on October 9, 2007, Plaintiff sent Defendant’s counsel an email with an attached draft of
15 a motion that was substantively the same as the instant motion and requested that Defendant
16 agree to the proposed motion as unopposed. Apgood Decl. ¶ 9 at 3. Lauren Hash, Plaintiff’s
17 counsel, and Robert Apgood, Defendant’s counsel, then exchanged brief electronic mail
18 messages related to a clarification sought by Defendant’s counsel was made. Id. ¶ 10 at 3. Upon
19 clarification, the Defendant notified the Plaintiff that it did not agree to consent to the motion as
20 unopposed. Id. ¶ 11 at 3. Therefore, the Defendant hereby respectfully MOVES this Honorable
21 Court to STRIKE Plaintiff’s motion for failure to comply with the Local Rule, ORDER Plaintiff
22 to fulfill its duty as required by LR 39.1(c)(4), and ORDER Plaintiff to pay the Defendant its
23 costs, including attorney’s fees, for having to unnecessarily respond to Plaintiff’s motion.
24 OBJECTION NO. 3: The Defendant OBJECTS to Plaintiff’s prayer for relief

25 requesting that this Honorable Court issue an “Order noting the government’s compliance with
26 the Settlement Conference Order in this matter” as vague and ambiguous on the bases that no
1 Settlement Conference Order has issued in this case, and the order proposed by the Plaintiff and
2 attached to Plaintiff’s Request does not match the order referenced in Plaintiff’s prayer for relief
3 in the Request at 2:6-8. Moreover, Plaintiff refers to the “Court Ordered Settlement Conference”
4 in the caption of its Request and a “Court-ordered Settlement Conference” in the introductory
5 paragraph of its Request (Request at 1:15). Defendant knows of no “Court Ordered Settlement
6 Conference” nor “Court-ordered Settlement Conference” orders having issued forth in this
7 matter. Consequently, the Defendant cannot ascertain with certainty what relief Plaintiff is
8 seeking. However, for the purposes of this Opposition only, Defendant shall assume that the
9 Plaintiff is referring to the mandatory mediation required by Local Rule LR 39.1 and thereby
10 couches this response in opposition on that assumption.2
11 IV. DISCUSSION
12 Plaintiff argues in its United States’ Request Regarding Attendance at the Court
13 Ordered Settlement Conference (the “Request”) that the “Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’ or
14 ‘Commission’), [] will review and ultimately accept or reject any settlement” and that “no
15 individual has binding settlement authority for the Commission.” This, the government
16 appears to imply, is a result of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b, discussed
17 more fully, infra. Request at 1:21-25. Moreover, without providing any evidentiary support
18 whatsoever, the government offers as justification for its request that the Local Rule LR
19 39.1(4)(1)(E) requirement for the presence and participation of an entity with “authority to
20 settle … must attend the mediation in person” that similar requirements have been satisfied
21 “[i]n other cases in which court orders require personal attendance by someone with full
22 settlement authority” where “the FTC has sent an official from the Commission who is familiar
23
24
2
The Defendant observes the distinction between a Settlement Conference envisioned by a court order (purely at
25 the discretion of the court) and mediations mandated by court rules (applicable to all cases and not subject to the
discretion of the court).
26
1 with Commission policies and can speak authoritatively about Commission practice and policy
2 regarding settlement of the case in question.” Request at 1:26 – 2:1-3.
3 Defendant cannot offer any meaningful response to Plaintiff’s conclusory statement for
4 the simple reason that Plaintiff’s statement is not supported by citations to specific alleged
5 cases, the jurisdiction and venue of those alleged cases, the substance of the alleged court
6 orders, nor any affidavits or other pleadings whatsoever that would lend evidentiary value to the
7 Plaintiff’s averments. Neither can this Honorable Court contrast and compare the language in
8 those alleged court orders with the unambiguous requirements of Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E)
9 to see if even a hint of arguable similarity exists.
10 In any event, Plaintiff’s averment is of no moment since all this Honorable Court must
11 consider are the plain-language requirements of Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E) and the arguments
12 of Plaintiff in the instant motion. As noted supra, Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E) requires that a
13 party having authority to settle “must attend the mediation in person.” (Emphasis added). The
14 only exception to this rule is where “[t]he mediator may in his or her discretion, but only in
15 exceptional cases, excuse a party … from personally attending a mediation conference.” Local
16 Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E). (Emphasis added). In Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff does not provide any
17 argument whatsoever that it is entitled to relief under the “exceptional” provision of Local Rule
18 LR 39.1(c)(4)(E). In fact, aside from its reference to 5 U.S.C. § 552b, the only justification that
19 Plaintiff appears to argue is that it should be granted the exceptional relief sought because the
20 attendance of an agent with binding authority for a settlement participating in such a conference
21 “is just not the way we do things over here.”
22 As noted, supra, Plaintiff implies that the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.
23 § 552b, somehow excuses the Plaintiff from personal participation in the mandatory settlement
24 discussions demanded by Local Rule LR 39.1. As such, an examination of that statute is
25 implicated to ascertain the validity of Plaintiff’s assertion.
26
1 Plaintiff argues “[t]he decisions of the FTC are made collectively by five
2 Commissioners. Only the Commissioners have ‘binding authority’ to accept or reject a
3 settlement on the Commission’s behalf, and meetings of the Commissioners are governed by
4 the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b. Thus, no individual has binding authority
5 for the Commission.” Request at 1:22-25.
6 Title 5, section 552b(b) of the United States Code requires, in the context of agency
7 action,
8 (b) Members shall not jointly conduct or dispose of agency

business other than in accordance with this section. Except as
9 provided in subsection (c), every portion of every meeting of an
agency shall be open to public observation.
10
A fair read of Plaintiff’s motion leads to the reasonable conclusion that it is upon this
11
subsection that Plaintiff basis its argument that the Act precludes the Plaintiff from providing a
12
representative with full settlement authority. However, what Plaintiff fails, in candor, to inform
13
this Honorable Court is that the statute goes on to read,
14 (c) Except in a case where the agency finds that the public
interest requires otherwise, the second sentence of subsection (b)
15 shall not apply to any portion of an agency meeting, and the
requirements of subsections (d) and (e) shall not apply to any
16 information pertaining to such meeting otherwise required by this
section to be disclosed to the public, where the agency properly
17 determines that such portion or portions of its meeting or the
disclosure of such information is likely to –
18 …
(10) specifically concern the agency's issuance of a subpena
19 [sic], or the agency's participation in a civil action or
proceeding, an action in a foreign court or international
20 tribunal, or an arbitration, or the initiation, conduct, or
disposition by the agency of a particular case of formal
21 agency adjudication pursuant to the procedures in section
554 of this title or otherwise involving a determination on
22 the record after opportunity for a hearing.
23
5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) (Emphasis added). Inarguably, the very statute upon which Plaintiff
24
relies as the sole legal authority in its motion specifically provides an exception to what is
25
required of the Plaintiff in this matter, to wit: Plaintiff may dispose of the Commission’s
26
1 business without the necessity of conducting a meeting open to public observation in order to
2 participate in the mediation mandated by Local Rule LR 39.1.
3 Moreover, there is nothing in the Government in the Sunshine Act that precludes the
4 Plaintiff from authorizing an agent with full settlement authority to participate in the LR 39.1
5 mediation. Plaintiff has been aware of the requirements of the rule since at least July 20, 2005
6 (in excess of 2 years and 2 months prior to filing the instant motion). To now argue that it
7 had no opportunity to authorize an agent for this purpose, and that the Government in the
8 Sunshine Act precludes the FTC from fully participating in the mediation at this late date, is
9 completely disingenuous.
10 While the Defendant makes no objection to the attendance at the mediation of Mr.
11 Charles Harwood, Federal Trade Commission Regional Director for the Northwest Region,
12 Defendant unequivocally OBJECTS to Plaintiff’s proposed Order holding that Mr. Harwood’s
13 attendance satisfies the plain-language requirement of Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E) that a
14 “part[y] having authority to settle … attend the mediation in person” when, in fact, the Plaintiff
15 fully admits that Mr. Harwood does not have that authority. Moreover, Plaintiff does not
16 provide any indication that such a person shall attend the mediation as inarguably required by
17 the rule. As such, Plaintiff’s motion, if granted, would completely obviate the intent of Local
18 Rule LR 39.1 which is to put the parties face-to-face with representatives of each party having
19 the full authority to settle the dispute in an aggressive manner that is conducive to facilitating a
20 settlement without incurring the onerous cost of litigation and without burdening the resources
21 of the court.
22 No, Plaintiff’s Request appears to contemplate that the Defendant only shall be required
23 to make an offer of settlement that the Plaintiff may then consider at its leisure and then reject
24 on a whim without the settlement pressures inherent in negotiations before a mediator.
25 Moreover, Plaintiff’s Request, if granted, would violate Defendant’s constitutionally mandated
26 equal protection rights by requiring that a Defendant representative with full settlement
1 authority attend the mediation while Plaintiff does not, thereby subjecting the Defendant to the
2 (reasonably expected) pressures of settlement inherent in mediation that the Plaintiff would not
3 suffer.
4 Defendant submits that, if Plaintiff is afforded the luxury of not fully participating in the
5 mediation, then the Defendant should be allowed to send its representative who can then “speak
6 authoritatively about [Defendant’s] practice and policy regarding settling the case in question,”
7 but not be empowered to settle the matter, and then take whatever settlement offer the Plaintiff
8 may extend back to its Board of Directors for consideration at their luxury, all because it is
9 Defendant’s “policy” to consider and accept settlement offers only during regularly scheduled
10 meetings of its Board. This hypothetical scenario is, of course, patently absurd and scoffs the
11 well-reasoned intent of Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E)’s requirement that settlement empowered
12 representatives attend the mediation in person or that, in exceptional cases, the party be excused
13 from personal attendance but nevertheless be available by telephone during the conference.
14 Plaintiff has not prayed for this particular relief. However, if Plaintiff’s internal policy
15 precludes the physical attendance of the Commissioners, Defendant has no objection to having
16 the Commission convene and “be on call by telephone during the conference” as is permitted at
17 the mediator’s sole discretion. Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E).
18 V. CONCLUSION
19 Since Plaintiff has utterly failed to comply with Local Rule LR 7(d)(3), Defendant’s
20 Objection No. 1 should be sustained and Plaintiff’s “Request” should be stricken, or in the
21 alternative, re-noticed for hearing on October 26, 2007, the appropriate date dictated by the
22 rule. Plaintiff’s disregard of the Local Rule has prejudiced Defendant by requiring Defendant
23 and its counsel to respond to the instant motion in an inordinately and unreasonably short period
24 of time. As such, Defendant should be awarded its costs, including attorney’s fees, against
25 Plaintiff.
26
1 Since Plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)’s unambiguous
2 mandate that “plaintiff shall arrange a conference call among the mediator and counsel for each
3 party to discuss procedural aspects of the mediation,” and instead has made this formal motion
4 seeking an exception to the unambiguous mandate of that rule that “parties … having authority
5 to settle … must attend the mediation in person” (emphasis added), which request could have
6 been efficiently and inexpensively decided by the Honorable Magistrate Judge James P.
7 Donohue during the requisite conference, Defendant’s objection should be sustained, Plaintiff’s
8 motion stricken, and costs, including attorney’s fees, should be awarded in favor of Defendant
9 and against Plaintiff since Defendant is prejudiced by Plaintiff’s motion requiring Defendant
10 and its counsel to respond to the instant motion in an inordinately and unreasonably short period
11 of time.
12 Since Plaintiff’s motion references orders that have not issued in this matter, and since
13 Plaintiff’s proposed order accompanying its motion seeks relief for which no relief was prayed
14 by Plaintiff in its motion, Defendant’s objection should be sustained, Plaintiff’s motion should
15 be stricken as ambiguous, and an award of costs, including attorney’s fees, should be granted in
16 favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff as a result of Defendant’s prejudice suffered by
17 Defendant and its counsel by having to respond to the instant motion in an inordinately and
18 unreasonably short period of time.
19 Since Plaintiff has offered no admissible evidence justifying excusing it from
20 participating in the mediation conference mandated by Local Rule 39.1(c)(4)(E), and since the
21 only legal authority Plaintiff offers purporting to excuse its participation in the conference by
22 the personal appearance of a party having full authority to enter into a binding settlement
23 agreement is purportedly embodied in the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b, and
24 since 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) specifically provides an exception allowing the FTC’s
25 participation in the conference by a party with full authority to enter into a binding settlement
26 agreement (a fact not revealed in Plaintiff’s Request), then Plaintiff offers no authority
1 permitting its ability to not fully participate in the conference by personally appearing. Rather,
2 just as it read more into the CAN-SPAM Act 3 more than what is there because it suited
3 Plaintiff’s purpose, Plaintiff reads out of the Government in the Sunshine Act those portions that
4 do not serve Plaintiff’s purpose. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s representations that it “can
5 confirm that the United States will participate in person through the lead attorney from the
6 Department of Justice … and through the FTC’s Regional Director for the Northwest Region,
7 Charles Harwood,” [Request at 2:4-6] whether it “can” or “cannot” so confirm is of no moment
8 to Plaintiff’s Request. Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E) requires the attendance of counsel. All
9 Plaintiff has represented in this regard is that it does not also seek the non-attendance of counsel
10 at the conference. Moreover, Plaintiff has already fully argued that “[o]nly the Commissioners
11 have ‘binding authority’ to accept or reject a settlement on the Commission’s behalf” and that
12 “no individual has binding authority for the Commission.” Request at 1:22-25. As such,
13 Plaintiff has impliedly admitted that Mr. Harwood has no authority to bind the Commission.
14 Further, Plaintiff offers absolutely no argument whatsoever why it could not have authorized an
15 individual to have the authority to bind the FTC in this matter sometime in the past two-plus
16 years.
17 The Plaintiff is the master of its complaint. Plaintiff could well have determined that it
18 did not desire to comply with the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
19 Western District of Washington prior to the commencement of its action, as must every other
20 Plaintiff decide prior to filing suit in this jurisdiction. This lawsuit is just another civil lawsuit,
21 and the FTC is just another civil Plaintiff. As such, the fact that the Plaintiff is an agency of the
22 United States Government affords it no special consideration with respect to the Laws of the
23 Land, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the Local Rules of this district.
24
3
Plaintiff pleaded that the CAN-SPAM Act is a strict-liability statute, a contention that has been rejected by
25 all courts that have ruled on the issue. See Judge Lasnik’s Order Denying Motions For Summary Judgment
at 6:7-10 in this matter. See also United States v. Cyberheat, Inc., Case No. CV05-0457, 2007 WL 686678
26 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2007) at 11:6-8.
1 While, on the one hand, Plaintiff claims that “[t]he government is prepared to engage in
2 meaningful settlement talks at the Conference on October 25th,” [Request at 1:16-17] those
3 representations are belied that the very substance of the Plaintiff’s Request, which is seeking an
4 order that would permit the Plaintiff to participate, but not fully, and not in compliance with the
5 well-reasoned goals mandated by Local Rule LR 39.1. As such, the Plaintiff’s own language
6 and representations in its very Request cast serious doubts on the Plaintiff’s veracity.
7 For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s “Request” should be denied and a representative of
8 the Commission with full authority to bind the Commission in a settlement agreement, or the
9 Commission itself, must be required to attend the conference as mandated by Local Rule
10 LR 39.1(c)(4)(E).
11 DATED this 14th day of October 2007.
12 Respectfully submitted,
13 CARPELAW PLLC
14 s/ Robert S. Apgood
Robert S. Apgood, WSBA #31023
15 Attorney for Defendant
CarpeLaw PLLC
16
2400 NW 80th Street #130
17 Seattle, WA 98117-4449
Telephone: (206) 624-2379
18 Facsimile: (206) 784-6305
Email: rob@carpelaw.com
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I, Robert S. Apgood, do hereby certify that on the 14th day of October 2007, I caused
3 true and correct copies of the following:
4 1. Defendant’s Response In Opposition To Plaintiff’s Request Regarding

Attendance At The Court Ordered Settlement Conference” And Objections And
5 Motions Related Thereto;
6
2. Declaration of Robert S. Apgood In Support of Defendant’s Response In
7 Opposition To Plaintiff’s Request Regarding Attendance At The Court Ordered
Settlement Conference” And Objections And Motions Related Thereto,
8 accompanied by the Exhibits thereto; and
9 3. this Certificate Of Service
10 to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system. In accordance with their
11 CM/ECF registration agreements and the court’s rules, the Clerk of the Court will send e-mail
12 notification of such filing to the following attorneys:
13 Brian C. Kipnis Jeffrey I. Steger
Asst. U.S. Attorney Lauren Hash
14
District of the Western District of Washington Office of Consumer Litigation
15 700 Stewart Street U.S. Dept. of Justice
Seattle, WA 98101-1271 P.O. Box 386
16 Washington, D.C. 20044
17 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
18 that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Seattle, Washington,
19 DATED this 14th day of October 2007.
20 CARPELAW PLLC
21 s/ Robert S. Apgood
Robert S. Apgood, WSBA # 31023
22 CARPELAW PLLC
2400 NW 80th Street #130
23 Seattle, WA 98117-4449
Telephone: (206) 624-2379
24
Facsimile: (206) 784-6305
25 E-mail: rob@carpelaw.com
26

United States of America v. Impulse Media Group Inc - Document No. 48

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

United States of America v. Impulse Media Group Inc - Document No. 48

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

United States of America v. Impulse Media Group Inc Doc.

1 HON. JAMES P. DONOHUE

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

20 DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST REGARDING

21 ATTENDANCE AT THE COURT ORDERED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE AND

22 OBJECTIONS AND MOTIONS RELATED THERETO and states as follows:

2 Plaintiff styles its pleading as a “Request,” it is filed as a “motion” and accompanied by a

4 II. RELEVANT LOCAL RULES

5 Local Rule LR 7(d)(3) states, in its entirety,

1 III. OBJECTIONS AND MOTIONS

7 OBJECTION NO. 2: The Defendant OBJECTS to Plaintiff’s filing of this

24 OBJECTION NO. 3: The Defendant OBJECTS to Plaintiff’s prayer for relief

10 couches this response in opposition on that assumption.2

2 regarding settlement of the case in question.” Request at 1:26 – 2:1-3.

9 to see if even a hint of arguable similarity exists.

21 “is just not the way we do things over here.”

24 discussions demanded by Local Rule LR 39.1. As such, an examination of that statute is

25 implicated to ascertain the validity of Plaintiff’s assertion.

2 Commissioners. Only the Commissioners have ‘binding authority’ to accept or reject a

5 for the Commission.” Request at 1:22-25.

8 (b) Members shall not jointly conduct or dispose of agency

2 participate in the mediation mandated by Local Rule LR 39.1.

13 attendance satisfies the plain-language requirement of Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E) that a

24 on a whim without the settlement pressures inherent in negotiations before a mediator.

25 Moreover, Plaintiff’s Request, if granted, would violate Defendant’s constitutionally mandated

11 well-reasoned intent of Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E)’s requirement that settlement empowered

17 the mediator’s sole discretion. Local Rule LR 39.1(c)(4)(E).

16 favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff as a result of Defendant’s prejudice suffered by

18 unreasonably short period of time.

19 Since Plaintiff has offered no admissible evidence justifying excusing it from

24 since 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10) specifically provides an exception allowing the FTC’s

4 do not serve Plaintiff’s purpose. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s representations that it “can

7 Charles Harwood,” [Request at 2:4-6] whether it “can” or “cannot” so confirm is of no moment

11 DATED this 14th day of October 2007.

3 true and correct copies of the following:

4 1. Defendant’s Response In Opposition To Plaintiff’s Request Regarding

18 that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Seattle, Washington,

19 DATED this 14th day of October 2007.

Вам также может понравиться