VII.

Bill of Rights
A. Fundamental powers of the state (police power, eminent domain,
taxation)
1. Concept, application and limits
2. Requisites for valid exercise
3. Similarities and differences
Due process v. eminent domain
Churchill v. Rafferty
Act 2339 Authorized the CIR to remove any sign or billboard that is
offensive to the sight or otherwise a nuisance, and collect an annual tax of
P4 per sqm. The SC upheld the provisions. What was being regulated was
the use of public thoroughfares, and the police power measure validly
protected the comfort and convenience of the public, particularly the
prevention of nuisance due to billboards which were offensive to the sight.
Thus, what was involved here was NOT taking that would require just
compensation, but regulation in accordance with due process.
U.S. v. Toribio
Toribio was charged for violation of Act no. 1147, because he had a carabao
slaughtered for human consumption. He claimed that the act constituted
taking without just compensation. The court held that it was not taking for
public use in the concept of eminent domain, but rather taking in the
exercise of the States police power.
4. Delegation
B. Private acts and the Bill of Rights
C. Due process the rights to life, liberty & property
1. Relativity of due process
2. Procedural and substantive due process
Procedural:
Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as
security to his debt. Palanca left for China and never returned until he died.
As Palanca was a non-resident, El Banco had to notify Engracio about the
suit for the foreclosure of his property by publication. The lower court
eventually allowed Banco to execute upon the property. 7 years later,
Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for
the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due
process as Engracio never received the summons.
The SC ruled against Palanca, holding that the requisites for judicial due
process had been met. The requisites are:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and decide the matter before it
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Ang Tibay v. CIR
Ang Tibay laid off workers belonging to the NLU. NLU protested this alleged
unfair labor practice to the CIR, which ruled in its favor despite the lack of
evidence. The SC in the instant case remanded the case to the CIR for a
new trial, finding that the NLU may have been deprived of some primary
rights when it tried to prove its case before the CIR. This case is considered
to have codified the 7 elements of Administrative Due Process, namely:
1. Hearing
2. Tribunal must have considered evidence presented.
3. Decision must find support in evidence.
4. Evidence must be substantial.
5. Decision must be rendered based on evidence presented at the
hearing.
6. Administrative agency must act on its own opinion on the law and
facts of the controversy, and
7. The decision must be made in such a manner that the parties know
the issues involved and the reasons behind the decision made.
De Bisschop v. Galang
Bisschop, an American citizen was allowed to stay in the Philippines for 3
years, until August 1, 1959. His application for extension of stay was by the
Board of Commissioners, which ordered him to depart within 5 days. No
decision was promulgated. The CFI ordered Commissioner Galang to desist

and refrain from arresting and deporting Bisschop, until proper and legal
proceedings are conducted by the Board in connection with his application
for extension of stay.
The SC overturned the CFI. A day in court is not a matter of right in
administrative proceedings. In certain administrative proceedings, the right
to notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.
David v. Aquilizan
David had a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato, which he left in the
care of Felomeno and Ricardo Jugar. David later withdrew the land from
the brothers and has not allowed them to return. Justice Aquilizan handled
the case filed by the brothers against David. He rendered a decision in favor
of the brothers without any hearing. J Aquilizan admitted that there was
indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become
final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed. The SC
ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and
void and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and
void for want of due process. And it has been held that a final and executory
judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when
the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it
is as if no judgment has been rendered at all.
Tanada v. Tuvera, Supra.
There can be no finding of a violation of a law if the law has not been
published, as that would be violative of procedural due process.
Substantive:
OldProtection of Property interests
People v. Pomar
An act was enacted by Congress, providing that employers should grant
pregnant female employees maternity leave. Pomar allowed his employee to
take a vacation for her delivery but refused to pay her the wages during
such period. The SCheld the pertinent provisions of the Act unconstitutional
for infringing on ones right to contract.
The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his
liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract. The law would

deprive Pomar and all other entities employing women of the said liberty,
without due process of law.
Rubi v Provincial Boad of Mindoro
Rubi filed a petition for habeas corpus after he and the rest of the
Mangyans of Mindoro were relocated by the Government. The SC did not
grant the petition. It held that the relocation of non-Christians was a valid
exercise of the police power.
NDC and AGRIX v. Phil. Veterans
PVB attempted to foreclose a mortgage of Agrix, but the latter company
invoked PD1717, rehabilitating Agrix and declaring all its obligations
cancelled and its mortgages extinguished. The SC struck down the PD.
There was not a sufficient public interest involved. The cancellation of the
obligations was violative of due process, because it extinguished property
rights and impaired contracts.
Balacuit v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (2 Bernas 41) C2
The Municipal Board of Butuan City issued Ordinance 640 to address the
complaint of parents that it is too financially burdensome for them to pay
the full admission price for their children. The Ordinance provided that
admission tickets for movies, public exhibitions, games, contests, and other
performances, should be sold at half the price for children between 7 and
12 years of age. Violators would be penalized with imprisonment and/or a
fine.
The SC ruled that Ordinance 640 is an invalid exercise of police power
and, as a consequence, it violates the due process clause of the constitution.
A valid exercise of police power requires that it should be for (a.) the
publics interest, (b.) the means employed should be reasonable and it
should not be oppressive. Here, the court did not find a tangible link
between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, security, morals,
or welfare. Furthermore, the means employed were judged to be unfair
since they unjustly prejudice the affected businesses by restraining their
right to trade and even violating their right to enter into contracts.
Agustin v. Edu, supra.

The proposed measure to compel each vehicle to supply reflective safety

devise is a valid exercise of police power, it having been issued in order to
protect public safety.
NewProtection for Liberty Interests in Privacy
Ople v. Torres, supra.
The proposed national ID system violates the right to privacy of each
individual, as it does not safeguard the information therein contained.
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra.
The prohibition against quick-time stays in hotels is unconstitutional, being
violative of due process and the right to privacy. While upholding morals is a
valid state purpose, there are other purposes for renting a hotel for less
than 5 hours. As an unreasonable means towards a valid end, the ordinance
is unconstitutional and void.
3. Constitutional and statutory due process
4. Hierarchy of rights
PBMEA v. PBM
The Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization carried out a mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police department, against the wishes of the PBM
management. PBMEO was found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and its
officers were ordered to be dismissed.
The SC did not agree. The demonstration was not a strike; it was an
exercise of their rights to engage in concerted activities for ... mutual aid
or protection." Thus, the companys action constituted as interference to
their right to engage in concerted activity. While it is true that PBMs right
to property was infringe, such rights must be weighed against the human
rights of the workers. In the hierarchy of rights, human rights outweigh
mere property rights.
5. Judicial standards of review
6. Void-for-vagueness doctrine
D. Equal protection

People v. Vera
Cu Unjieng applied for probation after being convicted by the trial court in
Manila. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon
another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221
which granted provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation
to convicted persons; nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable
to a city like Manila.
The SC struck down the law of being unconstitutional.. The provincial
boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution
and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of
equal protection so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of
Act No. 4221 means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a
probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This
would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is
instituted may not avail of their right to probation.
Onnoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on
any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum
(1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments for said
tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint
against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and
Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation.
The SC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, subject
to the Cayat requisites. A perusal of the requisites shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the
tax.

People v. Cayat
Cayat was fined for possessing A-1-1 gin in contravention of the statute
prohibiting non-Christian tribes from possessing liquors aside from native
wines and liquors. He challenged the statute on the ground of violation of
equal protection.
The SC held the Act constitutional, as there was a valid distinction. This
case laid down the classic requisites for reasonable classification, namely
1.
2.
3.
4.

It must rest on substantial distinctions,

It must be germane to the purpose of the law
Not limited to existing conditions only, and
Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

International School Alliance v. Quisumbing

A group of local teachers working at the International School of Manila
claim that the fact that they are paid less than their foreign counterparts
violates equal protection. The SC agreed, not on the ground that Filipinos
and foreigners should be treated similarly, in fact holding that the foreign
teachers were part of a different bargaining unit, but because it upheld the
principle of equal pay for equal work.
1. Concept
2. Requisites for valid classification
3. Standards of judicial review
a) Rational Basis Test
b) Strict Scrutiny Test
c) Intermediate Scrutiny Test
E. Searches and seizures
People v. Malmstedt
Malmstedt (defendant) entered the Philippines in 1988. In 7 May 1989,
defendant went to Baguio and the following day, went to Sagada and stayed
there for 2 days. The NARCOM set up checkpoints near Sagada.
Information was received that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs. Malmstedts bus was stopped and NARCOM
members conducted inspection. CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on defendants

waist and suspecting that it was a gun, he asked for defendants passport
and other documents but the latter failed to comply. Thereupon, Galutan
ordered defendant to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his
waist. It turned out to be a pouch bag, which contained 4 suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape. The wrapped object contained
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Malmstedy was thus convicted for a violation of Dangerous Drug Act of
1972. The SC upheld the search, and thus the conviction. There was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime, arising from
o

Persistent reports of drugs being transported from Sagada

o
Information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that day had
drugs
o
There was a bulge on the waist of defendant and he failed to present
his passport
Malmstedt, at the time of the arrest, was actually in possession of illegal
drugs, and thus in flagrante delicto. As there was a valid warrantless arrest,
there was a lawful search even without a search warrant.
People v. CFI
One week before February 9, 1974, an undisclosed informer told RASAC
(Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center) that dutiable (taxable) goods will
be transported from Angeles to Manila in a Blue Dodge car. As a result of
the information thus gathered, 4,441 wristwatches and 1,075 bracelets of
assorted brands were found in the car. Eventually, Hope and Medina were
found guilty of smuggling. On appeal, the SC upheld the warrantless search.
The Tariff and Customs Code grants persons duly commissioned to do
warrantless searches if there is reason to suspect that the code being
violated (i.e. suspecting the existence of smuggled items). The fact that the
search was made of a moving vehicle justified the finding of probable cause
all the more.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff

Roan v. Gonzales

Roan claimed to have been a victim of an illegal search and seizure

conducted by military authorities, evidence acquired thereby being used as
evidence in his case for illegal possession of firearms. While a warrant was
issued, none of the articles in the warrant were found. Rather, a Colt
Magnum and 18 live bullets were found, which are now the bases of the
charges against Roan.
The warrant was void for absence of examination of the applicant.
Even consent to the search cannot cure the invalidity of the warrant. As a
result, the evidence gathered thereby is inadmissible. The plain view rule
does not apply here. The weapon did not just appear. It was searched for by
the authorities.
Valmonte v. Villa
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part
of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Valmonte et al sought
the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional.
The SC upheld the LOI. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts
of each case.The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela
(and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
Aniag v. COMELEC

In preparation for the 1992 national elections, COMELEC issued a

resolution ordering a GUN BAN and the summary disqualification of
candidates found to be engaged in gunrunning, using/transporting firearms,
etc. Due to this, petitioner was asked by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House
of Reps to surrender the firearms issued to him by such office. Petitioner
ordered his driver, Arellano, to deliver the firearms to the Batasan Complex.
However, the PNP already set up a check-point about 20m. from the
Batasan entry. The car was searched, the firearms seized and Arellano was
detained (but later released for his meritorious sworn explanation.
Petitioner Congressman then went to the Office of the City Prosecutor to
explain that the driver was just returning the firearms and that Arellano was
neither a bodyguard/security officer. However, COMELEC still ordered the
filing of Information against petitioner and his driver. The SC ruled that the
search and seizure was invalid. It may be valid even if not authorized by
authority, provided that the search conducted at police or military
checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the
warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. Also,
a warrantless search could only be resorted to if the officers have probable
cause to believe BEFORE the search that either 1) the motorist was an
offender or that 2) the evidence related to the crime will be found in the
vehicle searched.
1. Concept
Guazon v. De Villa
Guazon and the other petitioners claimed to be victims of saturation
drives held by the military and police. The SC held that the saturation
drives were unconstitutional, for having infringed on the right of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
2. Warrant requirement
a) Requisites
PICOP v. Asuncion
A raid was conducted on the PICOP compound, pursuant to a search
warrant for that purpose. The raid yielded several illegally possessed
firearms, and resulted in the conviction of various officers of PICOP for
possession of illegal firearms. However, the SC found the issuance of the

search warrant invalid, because the judge did not personally examine the
complainant and other deponents, the policeman who testified during the
hearing had no personal knowledge that there were illegal firearms, and the
warrants failed to describe the place to be searched with particularity.
3. Warrantless searches
Manalili v. CA
Manalili was charged with Illegal Possession of Marijuana. He was arrested
after being stopped and frisked, because he had reddish eyes and was
walking in a swaying manner. He was convicted.
Ruling on the validity of his arrest due to stop-and-frisk, the SC upheld
the arrest. When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal
situation where there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant,
policemen should employ limited, flexible responses like "stop-and-frisk"
which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they
possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to
treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable
arrest, search and seizure.
People v. Marti
Marti was convicted of possession of marijuana. The marijuana had been
found by the proprietor of a shipping company where he attempted to have
4 packages of marijuana delivered abroad. The proprietor opened the
packages, leading Marti to challenge the search as illegal. However, the SC
upheld the conviction. The bill of rights, particularly the prohibition against
warrantless searches does not bind parties other than the government.
Stonehill v. Diokno
42 search warrants were issued, ordering police officers to search for
documents, articles, etc, which could be used to violate the laws. The
evidence found via the searches led to convictions for violations of Custom
Laws, Tax Laws, and the Revised Penal Codes. The SC ruled that the
warrants, being general warrants, were void.
4. Warrantless arrests
Umil v. Ramos

The petitioners were arrested for various offenses without warrants. They
all filed petitions for habeas corpus. The SC denied the petitions. All the
petitioners were arrested for continuing offenses like rebellion or inciting to
sedition. Thus, an arrest of an NPA member while being treated for injuries
at hospital was valid even without a warrant, as the offense of rebellion
continued to be committed. The arrest was thus in flagrante delicto.
People v. Chua Ho San
Chua Ho San was convicted of possession of shabu. He was arrested after
landing on the shore in a motorboat. Upon landing, he fled the scene until
the police caught him. He was searched and a bag containing 28.7 kg of
shabu was found on his person. The SC reversed, and acquitted Chua. While
a valid warrantless search may follow as a consequence of a valid
warrantless arrest, here, the warrantless arrest, not being based on
probable cause that an offense was committed, was void. As a result, the
search and seizure was also void, and the bag of shabu was inadmissible as
evidence.
People v. Aminnudin
The PC officers received a tip from an informant that Amminnudin was
bound for Iloilo onboard MV WILCOM 9 carrying marijuana. Aminnudin was
searched and arrested after disembarking from the vessel. The PC officers
found 3 kilos of marijuana in his bag. He was charged and found guilty of
illegally transporting marijuana by the CFI of Iloilo. The decision was
appealed to the SC. The SC ruled that there was no valid search and arrest
so the evidence against him was inadmissible. He was acquitted.
People v. Burgos
Ruben Burgos was convicted by the Davao del Sur RTC for Illegal
Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. He was arrested while
plowing his field. The Philippine Constabulary did not have a warrant. They
based their operation on the sole testimony of Cesar Masamlok who
allegedly was coerced by accused to join the NPA using his gun. SC ruled
that the arrest and subsequent search was illegal because it did not fall
under the warrantless arrests covered by Rule 113, Sec. 6. Personal
knowledge on the part of the arresting officer is important. Applying the
Stonehill doctrine, the evidence was inadmissible. Burgos was thus
acquitted.
5. Administrative arrests

6. Drug, alcohol and blood tests

F. Privacy of communications and correspondence
1. Private and public communications
2. Intrusion, when allowed
3. Writ of habeas data
G. Freedom of expression
1. Concept and scope
People v. Nabong
Nabong, lawyer of Feleo, gave a speech to a gathering of communists say
ing that they should
overthrow the government, establish their own government of the poor a
nd that they should use whips on the Constabulary men, who were corru
pt. The SC ruled that Nabongs language
advocated an overthrow of the government through violent means, and
was therefore seditious.
National Press Club v. COMELEC
Three cases were filed, in the hopes of rendering void Section 11 of the
RA 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Act, which prohibits the sale or
donation of print space and air time "for campaign or other political
purposes," except to the Commission on Elections, on the ground of
violation of the freedom of the press. The SC held that since the said
section does not restrict news reporting by the mass media companies,
nor does it reach commentaries and opinions of broadcasters and
writers, the petition must be dismissed. The controversial provision has
not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods, which is granted to the
COMELEC by the Constitution under Art IX-C.
Adiong v. COMELEC
Comelec Resolution No. 2347 was promulgated providing that campaign
materials (stickers, printed materials, decals, leaflets etc.. ) may be
posted only in authorized posting areas, as well as prohibiting the display

of election propaganda in any places including mobile or stationary

private/public except those in the allowable areas.
The SC declared the resolution void on the grounds, that the
prohibition of posting of stickers etc... on an individuals property does
not only deprive the said individual from the use of his property -since
owner is not allowed to place campaign materials on his property- but
also deprive him of his right to free speech and information - since
posting/placing such material or property reflects/expresses his political
views or the candidates he believes in.
US v. Bustos
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga
assembled, then prepared and signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga,
with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The complainants
charged that the justice of the peace solicited bribe money in
consideration of favorable decisions. The judge of first instance, after
investigation, recommended to the Governor-General that the justice of
the peace be removed from office. After filing a motion for new trial, the
judge of first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and
acquitted the justice of the peace of the same. Criminal action was then
begun against the petitioners, now become the defendants, charging that
portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were
libelous. The trial court found thirty-two of the defendants guilty and
sentenced each of them to pay a nominal fine.
The SC acquitted Bustos et al. Express malice was not proved by the
prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their
ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the petition were
transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary. The
defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest
endeavour to improve the public service, they should rather be
commended for their good citizenship.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand
a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public
life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can

be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must

not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of
course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the
individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for
the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the
Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary -- to any or all the
agencies of Government -- public opinion should be the constant source
of liberty and democracy.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize
a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
In Re: Jurado
Emil Jurado is a columnist-lawyer who wrote several articles about
improper transactions in the judiciary. CJ Narvasa issued an administrative
order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate corruption in the
judiciary. Jurado was one of those invited to appear before the committee
and to testify as to his knowledge as he had a lot to say about the topic in
his columns. He refused. Some of the subjects of his writings also wrote to
the SC saying that what he wrote were lies and asked the Court to take
appropriate action.
False reports about a public official or other person are not shielded
from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the
Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never
countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and
unmitigated dissemination of patent lies.

a) Prior restraint (censorship)

Franciso Chavez v. Secretary Raul Gonzalez
After the 2004 National Elections, a controversy came out after cassette
tapes that allegedly recorded conversations involving PGMA and Garcillano
went on air. Given that such conversations were being aired all over

broadcast media, Pres. Secretary Ignacio Bunye and the NTC, on separate
occasions, issued warnings against broadcast companies to stop airing such
information. Chavez asked that such warnings be declared null and void for
violating freedom of speech, expression, and the press. The court agreed
with the petitioner given that the warnings which were content-based
restrictions failed to pass the strict scrutiny standard and the clear and
present danger test. The evidence of the respondents fell short of satisfying
such standards required.
People v. Perez
Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, met with Ludovice, and
during their discussion said The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for
cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the
Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Leonard Wood was the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. He was convicted of Sedition.
The SC upheld the conviction.A seditious attack on the GovernorGeneral is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty. Perezs words were seditious. Criticism, no matter how severe,
on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of
liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the
intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to
punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence
of the State.
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans
Radio station DYRE, owned by Eastern Broadcasting, filed a petition to
compel the respondents to reopen the station after it was summarily closed
on grounds of national security. It was allegedly closed on the charge that it
was used to incite sedition. No hearing was held and no proof was
submitted to establish the factual basis for closure.
While the case became moot and academic upon the withdrawal of
EBC, The SC issued certain guidelines for similar circumstances:
1.
The seven requisites of administrative proceedings in Ang Tibay v. CIR
should be followed before a broadcast station is closed or its operations
curtailed.

2.
While there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it
furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must
conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each
appropriate case, may be valid.
3.
Media is entitled to the broad protection of freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression is the
clear and present danger rule that words are used in such
circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker
has a right to prevent.
4.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. The freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than print media. This is because
(1) broadcast media is more pervasive, and (2) easily accessible to children.
Because of its pervasiveness, the impact of inflammatory or offensive
speech on people would be difficult to monitor or predict. Unlike readers of
the printed work, the radio (and television) audience has lesser opportunity
to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance.
5.
The clear and present danger test must take the particular
circumstance of broadcast media into account. There has to be a balance
between the governments right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite listeners to overthrow it, and the peoples right to be informed.
6.
The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of
a representative democracy.
7.
Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of
media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the
Constitution. (Sec. 1 and Sec. 4, Art. III).
SWS v. COMELEC
SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing
Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of
election surveys 15 days before the election of national candidates and 7
days before the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish
surveys covering the entire election period and argue that the resolution
violates their right to free speech and expression. COMELEC on the other
hand argues that the resolution is in pursuit of governmental interest, and
that the impairment is minimal. It was held that the resolution is invalid as
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it

is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though

such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
b) Subsequent punishment
2. Content-based and content-neutral regulations
a) Tests
b) Applications
Osmena v. COMELEC
This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of
11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving
free of charge print space or airtime for campaign or other political
purposes, except to the COMELEC. Petitioners are candidates for public
office in the upcoming elections, who contend that the events after the NPC
v. Comelec have shown undesirable effects because the ban on political ads
has failed to level the playing field and has worked against the poor
candidates. The petitioners seek for the re-argument of the issues already
settled in NPC v. Comelec. The SC ruled that RA 6646 is a valid exercise of
the power of the state to regulate media of communication to ensure equal
opportunity. It merely regulates the time, place and manner of advertising
of political ads and it does not abridge freedom of speech and of the press.
Hence, the dismissal of the petition.
Policarpio v. Manila Times
Policarpio, executive secretary of the UNESCO National Commission, was
charged with malversation of public funds and estafa through falsification of
public documents.the Manila times ran a story exaggerating the charges
against her. The Manila Times claimed immunity because of the freedom of
the press. The SC ruled that damages should be awarded to POlicarpio. The
freedom of speech and press immunity presuppose that the derogatory
information they publish are both true and fair and made in good faith,
without comments or remarks.
Ayer Production v. Judge Capulong
Ayer Productions wanted to make a film about the EDSA Revolution,
entitled The Four-Day Revolution. Sen. Enrile did not want to appear in

the movie and sought to have the continued production enjoined. The SC
did not grant the injunction. The subject matter of the film is of public
interest. Even the right of privacy must yield to the freedom of expression,
notwithstanding the fact that the film was made primarily for profit.
Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak
Gonzales, on behalf of Malaya Films, assails the Boards classification of
their production Kapit sa Patalim as For Adults Only and its resolution to
issue a permit only if the petitioner makes certain changes and deletions. It
was held that the Board did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
because its resolution was supported by the fact that a number of scenes in
the movie are not fit for public viewing. Hence the court restated the test to
determine obscenity: Whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
Pita v. CA
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by
the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the
Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police
District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading
materials, including Pitas Pinoy Playboy magainzes, believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials
in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various
student organizations.Pita thus filed a case for injunction against Mayor
Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police
District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their
agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale
or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication
is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of
the press.
The SC dismissed the petition. Freedom of the press is not without
restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic
literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications.

However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in
question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial
purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of
the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or
other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it
shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately
"whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the
"judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
3. Facial challenges and the overbreadth doctrine
4. Tests
5. State regulation of different types of mass media
6. Commercial speech
7. Private vs. government speech
8. Hecklers veto
H. Freedom of religion
1. Non-establishment clause
Aglipay v. Ruiz
Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
filed for a writ of prohibition against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop
him from selling postage stamps which commemorated the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in
Manila. Petitioner alleges that this violates the Constitutional provision
prohibitting the use of public money for the benefit of any religious
denomination. The Court denied the petition. The Director of Posts acted by
virtue of Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of
printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps themselves featured a map
of the Philippines. The governments goal was to promote the Philippines.
There was no religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also
went to the government and no to any church.
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

The officers of a civic organizationSamahang katandaan ng Nayon ng

Tikaylaunched a fund drive to renovate the chapel of Bgy Tikay in
Malolos, Bulacan. Chairman Martin Centeno and Vicente Yco approached
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles and solicited P1500 from her. This was done
without a license from the DSWD. Angeles filed a complaint, and because of
that an information sa filed against Centeno, Yco, and Religio Evaristo for
violating Presidential Decree 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law.
As to the infringement of religious freedoms, the SC discussed the dual
nature of legislation on the subject of religion. On one hand, it prevents the
compulsion by law if the acceptance of any creed. On the other, it protects
the free exercise of any chosen form of religion. Thus, there are two
constitutional freedoms regarding religionthe freedom to believe and the
freedom to act. While the former is absolute, the latter can be subject to
regulation for the protection of society.
In this case, the state may protect the public from fraudulent solicitation by
requiring those who solicit to establish identity and authority to solicit.
Even though the regulation resulting from such a policy may infringe
religious acts, it is not invalid because the general regulation protecting
citizens from unjust solicitation is not open to any constitutional objection.
Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union
Victoriano is a member of Iglesia ni Cristo who is an employee at the
Elizalde Rope Factory, and a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union.
The company and the union are in a closed shop agreement where all
employees must be a member of the collective bargaining union in order to
maintain employment. RA 3350 was passed which states that CBAs shall no
longer cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation in any
labor organization. The union assails the constitutionality of RA 3350
because it infringes on the right of association, impairs contracts and
discriminates in favor of such members of religious sects. The court upheld
the constitutionality of RA 3350 because (1) the Union misread the law,
which actually does not prohibit association, but only reinforces a persons
right to refrain from association, (2) the right to religion is superior over
contractual rights, (3) the government may pass laws in pursuit of a valid
secular cause even though this may be beneficial to some religions.
American Bible Society v. City

American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary

corporation distributing and selling bibles/gospel portions in the
Philippines. ABS was informed that it has to comply with ORD 3000 (obtain
a mayors permit) and ORD 2529 (pay municipal license fee for the period
covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid in protest and
filed a case to declare said ORD void and a refund. Trial court dismissed
case. SC ruled that ORD 3000 is valid as it merely requires a mayors
permit. ORD 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS because
such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of religion. The
constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent.
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent
Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary
students from Cebu who were expelled for not participating in the flag
ceremony of their schools. They are represented by their parents. As
Jehovahs Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to
their religion, should not be worshipped. They believe that the flag
ceremony is a form of worship which is prohibited by their religion.
Respondents counter by invoking RA 1265, DO 8 and the ruling of Gerona v.
Secretary of Education which upheld that all students should participate in
the flag ceremony. The Court reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor
of the petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious beliefs would be a
curtailment of their right to religious profession and worship and their right
to free education.
Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA
The Iglesia ni Cristo operates a TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.
The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television classified such
program as rated X, being not fit for public viewing as it offends and
constitutes an attack against other religions. The Supreme Court held that
INC is protected by section 4 of the Bill of Rights. The Board failed to show
any imminent or grave danger that would be brought about by the telecast
of the show. Also, the show itself is not an attack against, but rather a
criticism of, other religions. Such ground (criticism) is not a valid ground in

order to prohibit the broadcasting of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCBs

power to regulate these types of tv programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v
Ruiz regarding Director of Posts power to check w/n publications are of a
libelous character.
German v. Barangan
German and company converged at JP Laurel Street in Manila to hear mass
at the St. Jude Chapel, which is near Malacaang. Respondents Barangan
and Lariosa blocked them, saying that (1) their actions show that they are
not there to hear mass, but to stage a demonstration, and (2) the security of
President Marcos is of utmost concern. Petitioners filed a case, saying that
Barangan and Lariosa impaired their constitutional freedom to exercise
religion. The SC held that this freedom is not absolute. Good faith is
required to validly exercise this freedom, and the facts show that the
petitioners are not exercising good faith. Also, if the freedom clashes with a
social or national interest, which in this case is the safety of the President,
then the former must yield to the latter. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
a) Concept and basis
b) Acts permitted and not permitted by the clause
c) Test
2. Free exercise clause
3. Tests
a) Clear and Present Danger Test
b) Compelling State Interest Test
c) Conscientious Objector Test
I. Liberty of abode and freedom of movement
Villavicencio v. Lukban
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the
city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of
October 25 without their consent and knowledge and shipped them to
Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the
houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of
Sampaloc.

Villavicencio thus filed for habeas corpus. The SC granted the

petition. If the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could
forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his
official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was
under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this
other municipality. Public officials, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change
her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse.
Lorenzo v. Dir. Of Health
In accordance with the Revised Administrative Code, Lorenzo was confined
for having leprosy. He filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that his
right to abode and freedom of movement was infringed. The SC denied the
petition. The Director of Health was empowered to order lepers
confinement in order to secure public health.
1. Limitations
2. Right to travel
Rubi v. Provincial Board, supra.
The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police
power.
Manotok v. CA
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was not allowed to depart for the States pending a case
filed with the SEC.
He was later charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Even though released on bail, he was not allowed to leave the country. He
thus filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the prior orders and the
SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad, alleging
that his right to travel had been violated.
The SC held that it had not. The court has power to prohibit persons
admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his

constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country

without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.
a) Watch-list and hold departure orders
3. Return to ones country
Marcos v. Manglapus, supra.
The right to return to ones country is separate from the right to travel and
to abode. As such, it may be suspended by the President in the exercise of
residual powers.
J. Right to information
1. Limitations
Valmonte v. Belmonte, supra.
While the people have the right to information, including court records, and
they may access the said records, they cannot compel judicial officers to
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern
2. Publication of laws and regulations
Tanada v. Tuvera, supra
3. Access to court records
Baldora v. Dimaano
In a verified letter-complaint, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas,
charged Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano with abuse of authority in
refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal
docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with
their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said
municipality. The court ruled that the respondent did not act arbitrarily
since he allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of
respondent under certain conditions and under his command and
supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by
the respondent were unreasonable.
4. Right to information relative to:
a) Government contract negotiations

b) Diplomatic negotiations
Akbayan v. Aquino, supra.
The right to information does not include the records of diplomatic
negotiations.
K. Right of association
People v. Ferrer
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared
RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. The Anti
Subversive Act of 1957 outlawed the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party as an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government,
not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means. It declared that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the
security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full
knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that
due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be
made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty
for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open
court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the
renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section
9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under
freedom if thought, assembly and association.
The SC upheld the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.A bill of attainder is solely a
legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination with a legislative determination of
guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following
requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the
statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder
relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of the Act.
The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having
the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct
not the person.

Membership of these organizations to be unlawful, must be shown to have

been acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by
overt acts. Thus it is the element of membership with knowledge that is
punishable. Further, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4
prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the
subversive organizations before the passing of this Act are given an
opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance
with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that
the necessary changes having been made.
The declaration of that the cpp is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
philippine government should not be the basis of guilt. this declaration is
only a basis of section 4 of the act. the existence of substantive evil justifies
the limitation to the exercise of freedom of expression and association in
this matter.
PBM Employees v. PBM, supra.
A demonstration against the abuses of police is protected as an exercise of
the right to peaceably assemble to petition the government for redress of
grievances.
JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing
JBL Reyes, in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a
permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy.
Manila Mayor Bagatsing denied the petition. The mayor claimed that there
had been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be
infiltrated by lawless elements. He thus issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to
prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 meter radius of the US
embassy.
The SC struck down the ordinance. While under international law, the
receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any
lawless element, and while Vienna Convention is a restatement of the
generally accepted principles of international law, the same cannot prevail
over the Constitutional rights to free speech and peacable assembly.
L. Eminent domain
People v. Fajardo

Fajardo was convicted for violating an ordinance, which penalized

constructing a building that destroys the view of the public plaza. The SC
struck down the ordinance, ruling that it is unreasonable and oppressive, in
that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their
own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts
to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
Republic v. PLDT
The BOT is a government arm engaged in the operation of
telecommunication services in the country by utilizing such facilities as may
be available in the area. After its creation, the BOT set up its own
Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT.
BOT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications (a
telecommunications company in the US with a domestic station in the
Philippines), associate of PLDT, for joint overseas telephone service
whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local
residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it violated their agreement
since the trunk lines were used not only for the use of government offices
but even to serve the general public in competition with the business of
PLDT. When plaintiff failed to reply, PLDT disconnected lines rented by
plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT to execute a contract
for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephones system under such
conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered
judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such
agreement. Both parties appealed and it was held that: The state, may, in
the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state may not
require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided
just compensation is paid.
Republic v. Castellvi
Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) leased property of
respondent Castellvi near Basa airbase on a yearly basis. On 1956
respondent decided to terminate the lease contract and asked the petitioner
to vacate the place. Petitioner did not as such respondent filed an ejectment
suit against petitioner. Respondent however filed expropriation proceedings
warranting the dismissal of the ejectment suit. For the other respondent
Gozun, her land was also being expropriated but there was no prior lease
agreement with petitioner unlike the case of Castellvi.

SC said that prices of 1959 will apply since in 1947), they did not possess
the property with a permanent characteristic seeing that they were just
leasing on a yearly basis. Their possession did not also deprived the owner
of the benefits of the land since they were paying rent. It was only in 1959
when they filed the expropriation proceedings that they gained possession
of a permanent characteristic when the lower court granted them such
possession. The price of Php 10.00 however was quite high taking in
consideration that the said properties could be sold on a range of Php 2.50
4.00 per sq meters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. The
proper price is now at Php5.00 per square meters.
This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to
wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The expropriator must enter a private property

For more than a momentary period
Under warrant or color of legal authority
The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected
5. The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Ortigas v. Feati, supra.
Takings" under Eminent Domain versus Takings" under the Social Justice
Clause
De Knecht v. Bautista
Aquino, as the Minister of Public Highways, made a plan for the extension
of EDSA. The original plan was that the extension would cut through Cuneta
Avenue. He changed this plan to a new one, wherein the extension would
cut through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Petitioner De Knecht is a
resident that will be affected of the new plan. She went to Pasay CFI to file
a case, in order to enjoin Aquino and the Republic to go through with the
new plan. Respondent Judge Bautista issued a writ of possession in favor of
the Republic. The SC set aside the writ saying that respondent judge acted
with GADALEJ in issuing the writ. To justify its decision, the SC used the
recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission as basis. The
Commission said that although the original plan was more expensive, it was
a better choice, taking into consideration the progress and development of
the country.
Republic v. De Knecht

Republic wanted to extend EDSA to Roxas blvd and also construct an outfall
for flood waters. Along the planned extension route is De Knechts property
who does not want to sell her property. Lower court granted writ of
possession of said property to Petitioner after it deposited the required
amount. De Knecht filed a case titled De Knecht v Bautista which she won in
1980. Court cited social impact factor making expropriation of the land
arbitrary. 1983, Batasang Pambansa Passed BP340 expropriating said
property. Lower Court granted Petitioners petition of dismissing
expropriation proceeding citing said law. SC affirmed said ruling stating
that since residents have moved already the social impact factor which was
the basis in De Knecht v Bautista have already disappeared making the
expropriation proceedings not arbitrary anymore. The court also said that
expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by
voluntary negotiation with the land owner but also by taking appropriate
court action or by legislation.
1. Concept
2. Expansive concept of public use
Assoc, of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA
343 (2 Bernas 990) I0i7
These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No.
27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A.
No. 6657.
The SC ruled that agrarian reform under the Constitution is an exercise of
the power of eminent domain. There are traditional distinctions between the
police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the
application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property
is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the
owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the

measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners,

there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands
they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent
domain
Sumulong v. Guerrero
NHA filed an expropriation complaint for petitioners land, which was
granted by Buenaventura. Petitioners said that socialized housing was not
public use, and that PD 1224, the law which the NHA used was
unconstitutional. The SC held that the expanded notion of public use,
supported by Constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform
include the concept of socialized housing. They also held that eminent
domain cannot be restricted just because the property is small individual
interests must be subordinated to state/public interest. However, SC said
that just compensation must take into account ALL factors the NHAs
valuations did not take into account individual factors. Also, to deny
petitioners the opportunity to challenge the correctness of the valuations of
just compensation is a denial of due process. The SC remanded the case
back to the court of origin in order to determine the proper compensation.
City Government v. Judge Ericta
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ordinance regulating the
establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial type
cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of quezon city and
providing penalties for the violation thereof. The law basically provides
that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law
by invoking police power.

The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no

reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.
3. Just compensation
EPZA v. Dulay
The case concerns the land Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in
Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. San claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to
the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It
was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio
would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter
contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair
and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower.
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining
just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under
the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation
in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination
but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights
that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the courts findings.
NHA v. Reyes

The NHA expropriated the Reyes land, for the purpose of relocating
squatters from Metro Manila. However, it instead planned to build low cost
housing units. Reyes thus challenged the expropriation, claiming that the
judgment of expropriation was forfeited when the NHA used the land for
another purpose.
The SC disagreed. Reyes cannot insist on a restrictive view of the
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is
now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to
traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be
synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and
"public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and
urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is
later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and
service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution
itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land
reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and
basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers
and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the
purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance
of social justice.
a) Determination
Ansaldo v. CA
Ansaldos land was taken by the Dept. of Pubic Wokrs, Transportation and
Communication. 26 years later, Ansaldo moved to be compensated for the
taking. The SC held that the determination of the value should be
determined at the time of taking, not at the time of the filing of the suit.
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
Supra.
b) Effect of delay
4. Abandonment of intended use and right of repurchase

5. Miscellaneous application
M. Contract clause
Rutter v. Esteban
Esteban bought 2 pieces of land on Aug. 20, 1941. He was able to pay the
first 2 installments, but was not able to pay the next 2 installments, leading
Rutter to file a suit to recover a sum of money. Esteban claimed that the
enforcement of the payment was barred by RA 342, Sec. 2 of which provides
that all debts and obligations contracted before Dec. 8 1941 shall not be
due and demandable for 8 years after settlement of the war damage claim
of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission. The next section
provided that if Sec. 2 was made void and unenforceable, then the
moratoriums would be revived and continue.
The SC struck down the RA and the related moratorium for impairing
contracts. The determination of the constitutionality of the moratorium
statute is the determination of a period for the suspension of the remedy.
Further, laws altering contracts impair the obligation thereof when they are
unreasonable in light of the circumstances. Finally,
1. Impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive
right, and
2. Propriety of the remedy.
Here, the RA, in effect, gives 12 years before creditors could enforce their
obligations. This is unreasonable and oppressive under the circumstances.
Ortigas v. Bel-Air
Jupiter Street was reclassified into a commercial zone (C3) from its former
designation as a residential zone (R1). Presley, who leases the property
owned by the Almendrases in Jupiter street, operates a pandesal store in
that address. BAVA notified them to shut it down pursuant to their
agreement annotated in the TCT that the property would be used for
residential purposes only. The Court, pursuant to its ruling in the Sangalang
case, held that there was no violation. Although the contract is binding
between the parties, this may be impaired by a lawful exercise of police
powerin this case, the reclassification of Jupiter into a commercial zone.
Ortigas v. Feati

Ortigas sold two lots in a subdivision along EDSA to Emma Chavez. These
lots were supposed to only be used for residential purposes, and this
stipulation was annotated on the TCT. Chavez sold the lots to Feati, who
wanted to use the lots for commercial purposes. Their basis was
Mandaluyong Municipal Councils Resolution 27, classifying that area as
commercial/industrial. The SC said that the non-impairment clause must be
balanced with the proper exercise of police power, and that the stipulations
should be subordinate to the resolution. If the exercise of police power is
done properly, the individual interests must be subordinate to the general
welfare.
1. Contemporary application of the contract clause
N. Legal assistance and free access to courts
O. Rights of suspects
1. Availability
2. Requisites
3. Waiver
P. Rights of the accused
1. Criminal due process
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
Former President Joseph Estrada was charged with Plunder under RA 7080,
the Plunder Law. He challenged the provision that For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. While
not every act needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, there is no
violation of criminal due process, as it must still be prove that there is an
unlawful scheme or conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.
US v Ling Su Fan
Ling Su Fan was convicted of exporting Philippine silver coins, pursuant to
Act 1411. Ling Su Fan challenged the said act for being violative of due

process. The SC upheld the Act, laying down the ff. requirements for due
process of statutes:
First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the Government;
Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
Third. That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and
Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to
all of a class.
2. Bail
3. Presumption of innocence
4. Right to be heard
5. Assistance of counsel
People v. Espiritu
Espiritu made an extra-judicial confession, assisted by Atty. Mangallay, who
he did not retain personally, but who was retained by his uncle. He thus
challenged the validity of the confession. The SC upheld the confession. The
right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personallyhire his
own counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is
(1)engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation or
(2) appointed bythe court upon petition of the said person or by someone on
his behalf.
People v. Continente
The trial court convicted the accused of murder. Among the evidence the
trial court relied upon were the confessions of the accused. The accused
argued that their confession were inadmissible in evidence, since they were
not informed of their constitutional right.
The written statements contained an explanation that the investigation
dealt with the participation of the accused who chose not to give any
statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement obtained
from the accused might be used against them in court. They contained
advice that the accused might engage the service of a lawyer of their own

choice and that if they could not afford the service of a lawyer, they would
be provided with one for free. Despite the manifestation of the accused that
they intended to give their statements, the investigator requested two
lawyers to act as counsel for the accused. The lawyers conferred with the
accused before their investigation. The accused were informed of their
constitutional rights in the presence of their counsel. The confessions are
admissible in evidence.
People v. Obrero
At Obreros custodial investigation, he was assigned a lawyer who was the
station commander of another precinct. The SC held that his right to
counsel was infringed, as the said lawyer could not be considered
independent.s
6. Right to be informed
Pecho v. People
Pecho was convicted of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document. The decision was assailed on the ground that the
accused may not be convicted of that crime because the information was for
a violation of RA 3019. He thus alleged violation of his right to be informed
of this charge against him in the filing of the information.
The SC upheld the conviction. The objectives of the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the crime of which he is
charged are as follows:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable him to make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not
conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines
the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual
recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of

law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which

although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has
been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for
two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he
can be convicted for both or either of the charges.
7. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
8. Right of confrontation
9. Compulsory process
10. Trials in absentia
Q. Writ of habeas corpus
Lansang v. Garcia, Supra.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has 2 requisites:
1. Invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof
2. Public safety requires the suspension.
Here, the existence of the New People's Army is proof of rebellion
regardless of how small it is. The absence of any other incident after the
bombing is not proof of lack of rebellion.
R. Writs of amparo , habeas data , and kalikasan
S. Self-incrimination clause
Chavez v CA
Chavez was convicted of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. During the trial,
Fiscal Grecia asked Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused
opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an
ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will
only incriminate his client. The testimony was permitted.
The SC ruled that Chavez was forced to testify to incriminate himself,
in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said
now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and
in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness. Juxtaposed with
the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his

guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again,
is a rampart that gives protection even to the guilty
Beltran v. Samson and Jose
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a
sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge, claiming a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such
examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the
latter should have procured in the first place. He also argued that such an
act will make him furnish evidence against himself.
The SC agreed. Writing is something more than moving the body, or
the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal
clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is
similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We
say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, supra.
The right against self-incrimination may be invoked by other witnesses only
as questions are asked of them.
Galman v. Pamaran
Galman was made to testify before the Agrava board following the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. He invoked his right to self-incrimination.
The SC held that it applied even in non-criminal proceedings, as the word
criminal had been deleted from the Constitutional provision.
Villaflor v. Summers
In a criminal case before the CFI of Manila, Villaflor was charged with
adultery. Upon petition by the fiscal, the court ordered Villaflor to submit
her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if
she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused, claiming that it amounted to selfincrimination.

The SC disagreed. Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that

under the due process of law clause of theConstitution every person has a
natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It
is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to
decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be
invaded by exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a
woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without
lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However,
between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations,
between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy,
law and justice cannot hesitate. Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a
most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's
sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this
jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by
merely sentimental influences. Once again the Court lays down the rule that
the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the
proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial
court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The
proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided.
1. Scope and coverage
a) Foreign laws
2. Application
3. Immunity statutes
T. Involuntary servitude and political prisoners
Rubi v. Provincial Board, supra.
US v. Pompeya
An ordinance was passed, in accordance with Act 1309, requiring every able
bodied male resident of the municipality of Iloilo to render service on patrol
duty. Pompeya was convicted for refusing to render such service. The SC
upheld Act 1309 and the ordinance, holding that he power exercised under
the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and
that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon
the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the

provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in
derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby, in accordance with
the time-honored obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of
the peace and good order of his community.
U. Excessive fines and cruel and inhuman punishments
People v. Echegaray and Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice
Echegaray was sentenced to death. The imposition of the death penalty was
challenged on the ground that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The SC ruled that the imposition of the death penalty, per se, is not cruel
and unusual punishment. In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is
calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or
suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But
of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted
man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary
suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
People v. Dionisio
Dionisio was fined for taking bets on a horse race without authority. He
complained that the imposition of the fine was excessive, and constituted
cruel and unusual punishment.
Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual
punishment, for the Constitutional structure has been interpreted as
referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous, or shocking to the
conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor
does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
V. Non-imprisonment for debts
Lozano v. Martinez
The constitutionality of BP 22 was challenged, as it was alleged that it
violated the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for nonpayment of debts. The SC upheld the law, ruling that the law punishes the
act of issuing unfunded checks, not the non-payment of the debts which
they represent.
Serafin v. Lindayag

Serafin failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500. Thus, an case was
filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a
case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a
warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since
elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person
should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.
The court held that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
Serafin did not commit any offense as his debt is considered a simple loan
granted by her friends to her. Under the Constitution she is protected from
imprisonment.
W. Double jeopardy
1. Requisites
People v. Obsania
Obsania was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of
Balungao, His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to
allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of
dismissal the prosecution appealed.
The SC held that there was no double jeopardy here. In order that the
accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution
a) valid complaint,
b) competent court,
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge,
d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Here, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not
apply when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant.
the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of
his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the
Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment
of conviction against him.

People v. Relova
The People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent
Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr.
Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.. Opulencia was charged under a Batangas
ordinance for installing illegal electric wiring devices. The case was
dismissed.
2 months later, he was charged for theft of electricity under the RPC.
The Court dismissd the complaint on the ground of double jeopardy.
The SC held that double jeopardy had attached in this case. The bill of
rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be
that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law
or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution
for the same act. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges
filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double
jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the
same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and
the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact
that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution
under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact
that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd
complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st
offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
2. Motions for reconsideration and appeals
3. Dismissal with consent of accused
X. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder
Republic v. Fernandez
Fernandez was assessed War Profits Taxes. He challenged the tax for being
an ex post facto law. However, the SC ruled that the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws does not apply to tax statutes.
People v. Ferrer, supra.

The Anti-Subversive Act Law is not a bill of attainder. It was prospective in

application, and does not single out persons, but conduct.