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2
ensure that the identity and integrity of
the seized drugs and other related articles
have been preserved from the time they
were confiscated from the accused until
their presentation as evidence in court.
The chain of custody requirement ensures
that doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed. In a long line of
cases, we have considered it fatal for the
prosecution when they fail to prove that
the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly
seized from the accused.
The chain of custody rule requires that
the marking of the seized items
to
truly ensure that they are the same items
that enter the chain and are eventually
the ones offered in evidence should be
done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately
upon confiscation. This step initiates the
process of protecting innocent persons
from dubious and concocted searches.
Marking means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer
of his/her initials and signature on the
item/s seized.
A perusal of the records will show that the
procedure of preserving the chain of
custody as laid down by jurisprudence was
not observed.
It is clear from the aforecited testimonies
that the evidence was not marked in
front of the accused or his representative.
Evidently, there was an irregularity in the
first link of the chain of custody.
Even assuming that the physical inventory
contemplated in R.A. No. 9165 subsumes
the marking of the items itself, the
belated marking of the seized items at the
police station sans the required presence
of the accused and the witnesses
enumerated under Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165, and absent a justifiable
ground to stand on, cannot be considered
a minor deviation from the procedures
3
chemist found positive for shabu.
Furthermore, most glaring is the fact that
the prosecution even stipulated that the
forensic chemist had no knowledge from
whom the alleged specimens were taken.
Ultimately, when the prosecution evidence
is wanting, deficient to the point of doubt
that the dangerous drug recovered from
the accused is the same drug presented to
the forensic chemist for review and
examination, or the same drug presented
to the court, an essential element in cases
of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is
absent.
Negation of Presumption of Regularity
The lower courts erred in giving weight to
the presumption of regularity in the
performance that a police officer enjoys in
the absence of any taint of irregularity and
of ill motive that would induce him to
falsify his testimony. The regularity of the
performance of the police officers duties
leaves much to be desired in this case
given the lapses in their handling of the
allegedly confiscated shabu. The totality of
all the aforementioned procedural lapses
effectively produced serious doubts on the
integrity and identity of the corpus delicti,
especially in the face of allegations of
frame- up.
We recognize that the evidence proffered
by the defense is far from strong; the
appellant merely denied the occurrence of
a buy-bust operation and failed to present
impartial witnesses who were not
interested in the case. In our jurisdiction,
the defense of denial or frame-up, like
alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it
can easily be concocted and is a common
defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. It
should be emphasized, however, that
these weaknesses do not add any strength
to the prosecution s cause. Thus, however
weak the defense evidence might be, the
prosecution s whole case still falls. As the
well- entrenched dictum goes, the
4
Text messages are to be proved by the
testimony of a person who was a party to
the same or has personal knowledge of
them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages
with the other accused in order to identify
and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile
phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and
was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were
arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.
But, assuming that this was so, it cannot
be a ground for acquitting them of the
crime charged but for rejecting any
evidence that may have been taken from
them after an unauthorized search as an
incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that
is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime
had been committed the killing of PO2
Pangilinan and the investigating police
officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the persons they were to
arrest had committed it. The text
messages to and from the mobile phone
left at the scene by accused Enojas
provided strong leads on the participation
and identities of the accused. Indeed, the
police caught them in an entrapment
using this knowledge.
5
complainant.
A judicious review of the records would
reveal that the aforementioned elements
of statutory rape are present. First, the
presentation of AAA s Certificate of Live
Birth showing that she was born on July
25, 1998 has proven that she was below
12 years of age when the three (3) rape
incidents happened on December 26 and
27, 1996, and in June 2000, respectively.
Second, the prosecution proved that
Cadano indeed had carnal knowledge of
AAA on three (3) separate occasions
through the latter s positive, categorical,
and spontaneous testimony, as
corroborated by the medico-legal report.
Given the foregoing, the Court finds no
cogent reason to reverse the RTC s
assessment of AAA s credibility, which was
affirmed by the CA.
6
interpreted to include those suffering from
mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation. Since AAA is mentally
deficient, she should properly be classified
as a person who is deprived of reason,
and not one who is demented. Hence,
carnal knowledge of a mentally deficient
individual is rape under subparagraph b
and not subparagraph d of Article 266A(1) of the RPC, as amended.
Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to
paragraph 1(d) in the Information will not
exonerate Ventura because he failed to
raise this as an objection, and the
particular facts stated in the Information
were protestation sufficient to inform him
of the nature of the charge against him
7
Respondent contends that by
reason of the death of Secretary
Enrile, there is no public officer
who was charged in the
Information and, as such,
prosecution against respondent
may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary
Enrile's death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can
be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It
does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can
no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only
thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did
it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death
of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly
violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In
fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause to indict
Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were
it not for his death, he should have been
charged.
The requirement before a private person
may be indicted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that
such private person must be alleged to
have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not
require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the
public officer. If circumstances exist where
the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case
where the public officer has already died,
the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all
alleged co-conspirators in an indictment
for conspiracy. If two or more persons
enter into a conspiracy, any act done by
any of them pursuant to the agreement is,
8
allegedly occurred." Thus, petitioners were
public officials holding positions in the PNP
on the questioned dates as clearly
stipulated in 'the Amended Information
filed by the Ombudsman. Indisputably,
the first element was met.
With regard to the second element, that
the public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, the case of Albert
v. Sandiganbayan explained the different
modes by which the crime may be
committed:
. The second element provides the
different modes by which the crime may
be committed, that is, through "manifest
partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross
inexcusable negligence." In Uriarte v.
People, this Court explained that Section
3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either
by dolo, as when the accused acted with
evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or
by culpa, as when the accused committed
gross inexcusable negligence. There is
"manifest partiality" when there is a clear,
notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another. "Evident bad faith"
connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith"
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some
motive or self-interest or ill will or for
ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable
negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the
slightest care, acting or omitting to act in
a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference
to consequences insofar as other persons
may be affected.
In this case, the Amended Information
filed by the Ombudsman specifically.
states "evident bad faith" as the mode by
which the crime has been committed. As
9
Thus, petitioners should be made liable for
their deceit and misrepresentation and
should compensate the government for
the actual damage the government has
suffered.
10
considering the positive
testimony of the victim that the
accused abused her.
It is therefore quite clear that the
pregnancy of
the victim is not required. For the
conviction of an accused, it is
sufficient that the prosecution
establish beyond reasonable doubt
that he had carnal knowledge of the
offended party and that he had
committed such act under any of the
circumstances enumerated above.
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of
a man having sexual bodily connections
with a woman[.] (Citations
omitted, emphases supplied).
11
conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide is for the prosecution to firmly
establish the offender s intent to take
personal property before the killing,
regardless of the time when the homicide
is actually carried out. In this case, there
was no showing of the appellant s
intention, determined by their acts prior
to, contemporaneous with, and
subsequent to the commission of the
crime, to commit robbery. No shred of
evidence is on record that could support
the conclusion that appellant s primary
motive was to rob Januario and that he
was able to accomplish it.
To establish the fact that appellant and his
co-accused killed the victim by stabbing
him with a bladed weapon, the
prosecution presented Umali as an
eyewitness to the mauling incident. It was
this same witness who identified the
perpetrators. The trial and appellate
courts also relied on the statement of
Januario as to the circumstances of his
death, testified to by PO1 Coronel and
SPO3 Mendoza as dying declaration and
as part of res gestae.
A dying declaration, although generally
inadmissible as evidence due to its
hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admitted when the following requisites
concur, namely: (a) the declaration
concerns the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) it is made when death appears to be
imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the
declarant would have been competent to
testify had he or she survived; and (d) the
dying declaration is offered in a case in
which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.
In the case at bar, it appears that not all
the requisites of a dying declaration are
present. From the records, no questions
relative to the second requisite was
propounded to Januario. It does not
appear that the declarant was under the
consciousness of his impending death
12
Verily, the killing of Januario, perpetrated
by appellant, is adequately proven by the
prosecution.
From the evidence presented, we find that
as alleged in the information, abuse of
superior strength attended the
commission of the crime, and thus,
qualifies the offense to murder. Abuse of
superior strength is considered whenever
there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor,
assessing a superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor which the latter selected or took
advantage of in the commission of the
crime.
It is clear from the records of the case
that Januario was then fifty-four (54)
years old. Appellant, on the other hand,
was then forty (40) years old. Appellant
committed the crime with his co-accused,
his nephew. Clearly, assailants are
younger than the victim. These two
accused were seen by Umali as the
persons who mauled Januario. Moreover,
assailants were armed with a bladed
weapon, while Januario was unarmed. To
be sure, with two assailants younger than
the victim, armed with a bladed weapon
and inflicting multiple mortal wounds on
the victim, there is definitely abuse of
superior strength deliberately taken
advantage of by appellant and his coaccused in order to consummate the
offense.
13
without her consent or against her will
commits sexual violence upon her, and
the Philippines, as a State Party to the
CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration,
defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattelantiquated practices labeled her to be. A
husband who has sexual intercourse with
his wife is not merely using a property, he
is fulfilling a marital consortium with a
fellow human being with dignity equal to
that he accords himself. He cannot be
permitted to violate this dignity by
coercing her to engage in a sexual act
without her full and free consent. Surely,
the Philippines cannot renege on its
international commitments and
accommodate conservative yet irrational
notions on marital activities that have lost
their relevance in a progressive society.
As above discussed, the definition of rape
in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to:
(a) rape, as traditionally known; (b)
sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or
that where the victim is the perpetrator s
own spouse. The single definition for all
three forms of the crime shows that the
law does not distinguish between rape
committed in wedlock and those
committed without a marriage. Hence, the
law affords protection to women raped by
their husband and those raped by any
other man alike.
All told, the presumption of innocence
endowed an accused-appellant was
sufficiently overcome by KKK s clear,
straightforward, credible, and truthful
declaration that on two separate
occasions, he succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her, without her consent
and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to
consummate rape is extant from KKK s
narration as believably corroborated by
the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the
physical evidence of KKK s torn panties
and short pants. Based thereon, the
reason and conscience of the Court is
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
14
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts
which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties.
Whenever a court has knowledge
of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law,
it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
15
P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature
lowered it to P50,000,000.00. In the same way,
the legislature lowered the threshold amount
upon which the Anti Money Laundering Act may
apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
conviction
pieces
a
the
the author
16
there is unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim;
the means employed to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression is not
reasonably necessary; and
there is lack of provocation on the part
of the person defending himself.
individually or as a group.21
17
prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se
where the criminal intent of the accused is
crucial for conviction. Conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not
bar conviction for offenses punishable by
other laws. Conversely, conviction for
estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code does not bar a
conviction for illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code. It follows that one s acquittal
of the crime of estafa will not necessarily
result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
18
information do not constitute the
offense of libel; and (e) the CA
committed reversible error in
ordering the outright dismissal of
Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802 on
the putative ground that the
allegedly libelous text messages
were privileged communication.30
Prescription had set in.
19
Supreme Court. The philosophy behind
this ruling was aptly stated as follows:
Although the general rule is that the
defense of prescription is not available
unless expressly set up in the lower court,
as in that case it is presumed to have
been waived and cannot be taken
advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is
not always of absolute application in
criminal cases, such as that in which
prescription of the crime is expressly
provided by law, for the State not having
then the right to prosecute, or continue
prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue
punishing, the offense, or to continue
holding the defendant subject to its action
through the imposition of the penalty, the
court must so declare. And elaborating
on this proposition, the Court went on to
state as follows:
As prescription of the crime is the loss by
the State of the right to prosecute and
punish the same, it is absolutely
indisputable that from the moment the
State has lost or waived such right, the
defendant may, at any stage of the
proceeding, demand and ask that the
same be finally dismissed and he be
acquitted from the complaint, and such
petition is proper and effective even if the
court taking cognizance of the case has
already rendered judgment and said
judgment is merely in suspense, pending
the resolution of a motion for a
reconsideration and new trial, and this is
the more so since in such a case there is
not yet any final and irrevocable
judgment.
The ruling above adverted to squarely
applies to the present case. Here, the rule
provides that the plea of prescription
should be set up before arraignment, or
before the accused pleads to the charge,
as otherwise the defense would be
deemed waived; but, as was well said in
the Moran case, this rule is not of absolute
application, especially when it conflicts
with a substantive provisions of the law,
such as that which refers to prescription of
crimes. Since, under the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has only the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure, and the admission
20
The rule on privileged communication
means that a communication made in
good faith on any subject matter in which
the communicator has an interest, or
concerning which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person having a
corresponding duty. 43
June 4, 2014
Illegal Recruitment In Large Scale
21
from them for the plane ticket, hotel
accommodation, processing of visa
and placement fees. Notably, the
prosecution presented a Certification
dated January 10, 2003 issued by
Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II of the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA) Licensing Branch,
showing that the appellant had no
authority or license to lawfully engage
in the recruitment and placement of
workers. These acts, to our mind,
constitute illegal recruitment. There is
illegal recruitment when one who does
not possess the necessary authority or
license gives the impression of having
the ability to send a worker abroad.
Corollarily, where the offense is
committed against three or more
persons, as in this case, it is qualified
to illegal recruitment in large scale
which provides a higher penalty under
Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.
Estafa
22
licensed to recruit workers for overseas
employment. It is also clear from the
evidence presented that the crime of
illegal recruitment was committed by
appellant against five persons.
We likewise agree with the appellate court
that appellant may also be held liable for
estafa. The very same evidence proving
appellant s criminal liability for illegal
recruitment also established her criminal
liability for estafa.24 The elements of
estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation
is caused to the offended party or third
person.25cralawred
23
The circumstantial evidence relied upon
by the Court of Appeals sufficiently
support
petitioner s conviction.
24
admitted was the fact that Reyes made
such narration of facts in his sworn
statement and not necessarily to prove
the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of
NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an
independently relevant statement where
what is relevant is the fact that Reyes
made such statement and the truth and
falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a
case, the statement of the witness is
admissible as evidence and the hearsay
rule does not apply.38 Moreover, the
written statement of Reyes is a notarized
document having been duly subscribed
and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani,
a supervising agent of the NBI. As such,
it may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being a prima facie
evidence of the due execution of this
instrument or document involved pursuant
to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. As held in Gutierrez v. MendozaPlaza,39 a notarized document enjoys a
prima facie presumption of authenticity
and due execution which must be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence. Here,
no clear and convincing evidence was
presented by petitioner to overcome such
presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA
did not err in its appreciation of Reyes
sworn statement as testified to by NBI
Agent Segunial.
25
The following are exempt from
criminal
liability:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. An imbecile or an insane person,
unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane
person has committed an act which
the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals
or asylums established for persons
thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the
same court.
x x x x
As case law instructs, the defense
of insanity is in the nature of
confession and avoidance
because an accused invoking
the same admits to have
committed the crime but claims
that he or she is not guilty
because of such insanity. As
there is a presumption in favor of
sanity, anyone who pleads the
said defense bears the burden
of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence.
Accordingly, the evidence on this
matter must relate to the time
immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission
of the offense/s with which he is
charged.16
Insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence
while committing the act, i.e.,
when the accused is deprived of
reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is a
complete absence of power to
discern, or there is total
deprivation of freedom of the will.
Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties is not enough, especially if
the offender has not lost
26
shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any
of the following attendant
circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x x
27
confidence;
2) by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts; or
3) through fraudulent means.
The first way of committing estafa
is known as estafa with abuse of
confidence, while the second and
the third ways cover estafa by
means of deceit.
This Court finds that the present
case does not constitute estafa in
either form.
1) That the accused defrauded
another
(a) by abuse of confidence, or
(b) by means of deceit
As regards the first element, we
find that there was neither abuse
of confidence nor deceit in this
case.
It is the main contention of
petitioner that she was defrauded
through the use of her signature in
blank and through the use of the
first set of document she signed,
which has supposedly been
abandoned. Petitioner is being
held personally liable for the loan
of MTI by virtue of the
Comprehensive Surety Agreement
(CSA) she signed in her personal
capacity for the initial application
for the USD10.5 million loan from
FEBTC. Petitioner alleges that
since the second application for
USD 10 million loans was the one
granted by FEBTC, the second set
of documents supporting that loan
should be controlling. In that
second application, petitioner
28
committed abuse of confidence in
dealing with petitioner.
First, a perusal of the evidence
reveals that petitioner did not sign
a blank document nor was she
deceived by respondents regarding
the terms of the CSA. On its face,
the CSA was a standard preprinted
form. A plain reading thereof
shows that the signatory
guarantees the punctual payment
of indebtedness that may have
been due or owed by the
borrower. Petitioner ought to have
read the terms of the CSA before
she signed it.
Second, considering the
accountability of the signatory
upon signing the CSA, petitioner
must have observed prudence in
order to protect her
interests. Hence, she should have
personally indicated her own terms
in the CSA ? whether she was
signing as a representative, a
surety, or a witness. It is unlikely
that FEBTC officers would make it
appear that she was personally
liable as surety of a loan without
her knowledge and
authority. Petitioner failed to
overcome the presumption in favor
of respondents that the ordinary
course of business has been
followed.
On the contrary, considering
further that the loan of USD10
million was approved and released
to petitioner prior to the execution
of the second set of documents, it
is more sensible to believe that given her financial status and
capability to recompense the loan the bank approved the loan upon
her personal guarantee and
execution of the first CSA.
The existence of two (2)
documents is irrelevant in this case
as the original intention of the
parties is evident - that petitioner
and Luis P. Lorenzo, in their
As a consequence, even if
petitioner paid the amount of
Php5,903,172.30, we find that it
was legally paid pursuant to a valid
and existing agreement which
petitioner voluntarily entered
into. Therefore, the payment did
not constitute damage or prejudice
to petitioner.
29
by Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The elements of the crime of
bigamy are as follows: (1) that the
offender has been legally married;
(2) that the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage;
and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for
validity.27cralawred
Based on the findings of the CA, this case
has all the foregoing elements attendant.
30
June 23, 2014
The law enforcement agents who conduct
buy-bust operations against persons
suspected of drug trafficking in violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 (RA No. 9165),
otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, should
comply with the statutory requirements
for preserving the chain of custody of the
seized evidence. Failing this, they are
required to render sufficient reasons for
their non-compliance during the trial;
otherwise, the presumption that they have
regularly performed their official duties
cannot obtain, and the persons they
charge should be acquitted on the ground
of reasonable doubt.
31
CA, the law sets the minimum
requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there
should be the personal appearance
of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second,
their declaration in the presence of
not less than two witnesses that
they take each other as husband
and wife.
As to the first requirement, the
petitioner admitted that the parties
appeared before him and this fact
was testified to by witnesses. On
the second requirement, we find
that, contrary to the petitioner s
allegation, the prosecution has
proven, through the testimony of
Florida, that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take
each other as husband and wife.
We also do not agree with the petitioner
that the principle of separation of church
and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church blessing into a
marriage ceremony. Contrary to the
petitioner s allegation, this principle has
been duly preserved by Article 6 of the
Family Code when it provides that no
prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This
pronouncement gives any religion or sect
the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to
the requirement that the core
requirements of law be observed.
mockery of marriage.
32
make this an element of the crime.
33
law.
suffer:
34
(1)
That the accused is a public officer or a former;
(2)
That said public officer commits the prohibited official duties or in relation t
o his or her public
(3)
That he or she causes undue injury to any party;
(4)
That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted parties; and
(5)
That the public officer has acted with manifest inexcusable negligence. 17
(1)
That the offender is a public officer whether
(2)
That he must be an accountable officer for public
(3)
That he is required by law or regulation to auditor; and,
35
(4)
That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account should be r
endered.18
36
37
The prosecution was able to prove
all these elements in this case. The
victim, AAA was a seven (7) yearold girl who was taken against her
will by appellant who told her that
he knew her mother and that he
would bring her home.10 At her
tender age, AAA could have easily
been deceived by appellant. The
employment of deception suffices
to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an
unsuspecting young girl. It is the
taking advantage of their
innocence that makes them easy
culprits of deceiving minds.11 The
presence of lewd designs in forcible
abduction is established by the
actual rape of the victim.12
illegal detention.
Any private
individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to
death:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
38
in our criminal statutes the concept
of special complex crime? of
kidnapping with murder or
homicide. It effectively eliminated
the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the
killing of the kidnapped victim was
purposely sought by the accused,
and those where the killing of the
victim was not deliberately
resorted to but was merely an
afterthought. Consequently, the
rule now is: Where the person
kidnapped is killed in the
course of the detention,
regardless of whether the
killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a
special complex crime under
the last paragraph of Art. 267,
as amended by RA No. 7659.33
(Emphases supplied; citations
omitted)
Thus, further taking into account
the fact that the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, accusedappellants conviction must be
modified from Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention to the
special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide, which carries the
penalty of death.
39
40
of Qualified Theft, must be the result of
the relation by reason of dependence,
guardianship, or vigilance, between the
appellant and the offended party that
might create a high degree of confidence
between them which the appellant
abused. 9
41
Tangian, Jr. Vs. People of the
Philippines G.R. No. 209373/G.R. No.
209414. July 30, 2014
There is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an
agreement concerning a felony and
decide to commit it.7 Well-settled is
the rule that in conspiracy, direct
proof of a previous agreement is
not necessary as it may be
deduced from the mode, method,
and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated.8 It may be
inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during, or after the
commission of the crime which,
when taken together, would be
enough to reveal a community of
criminal design, as the proof of
conspiracy is frequently made by
evidence of a chain of
circumstances.9
In the case at bar, even though
there is no showing of a prior
agreement among the accused,
their separate acts taken and
viewed together are actually
connected and complemented each
other indicating a unity of criminal
design and purpose.10
Tangian s complicity in the illicit
deed was manifest from the fact,
as he himself admitted, that he
was the one who personally
transported the stolen items from
the CEO to the junkshop. His claim
that he was not aware of any
irregularity in the act he performed
is rendered dubious by his 16 years
of service as truck driver for the
City of Iligan. To be sure, his
record of service argues against his
claim of ignorance of the standard
protocol that a gate pass to be
issued by the CEO property
custodian should first be secured
before taking out items from the
CEO compound, including alleged
waste materials. He should also
know better than to assume that
Laojan can authorize the
42
against the accused should be
excluded consistent with Article III,
Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution. There being no
possible admissible evidence, the
accused should be acquitted
43
the operation of the penal law. This is
because a conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct is all that is
required from the standpoint of the frame
of mind of the accused.24 Quasi-offenses
penalize the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, the lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible, unlike willful
offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act.25 This is precisely where this
Court found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his
seemingly indifference to the deteriorating
condition of JR that he as a consequence,
failed to exercise lack of precaution which
eventually led to JR's death.
AS TO DR. CABUGAO'S LIABILITY:
Both the trial court and the appellate court
bewail the failure to perform
appendectomy on JR, or the failure to
determine the source of infection which
caused the deterioration of JR's condition.
However, a review of the records fail to
show that Dr. Cabugao is in any position
to perform the required appendectomy.
44
Procedure, we
quote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
45
the same in trust or for administration for
the bank s benefit. From this, it may be
inferred that when such bank president
makes it appear through falsification that
an individual or entity applied for a loan
when in fact such individual or entity did
not, and the bank president obtains the
loan proceeds and converts the same,
estafa is committed.
46
utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another
is estafa. But the damage is caused by
the commission of Estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. Therefore,
the falsification of the public, official or
commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit the
estafa.59chanrobleslaw
47
imprudence notwithstanding that
the charge against him in the
Information was for the intentional
felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of
the RPC.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the
Sandiganbayan s designation of the felony
supposedly committed by Sevilla is
inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted
Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished
under Article 365 of the RPC, which
resulted into the falsification of a public
document. However, the Sandiganbayan
designated the felony committed as
falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence. The foregoing
designation implies that reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a modality of committing it. Quasioffenses under Article 365 of the RPC are
distinct and separate crimes and not a
mere modality in the commission of a
crime.
48
untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public
documents is an offense that is
necessarily included in the willful act of
falsification of public documents, the latter
being the greater offense. As such, he
can be convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public
documents notwithstanding that the
Information only charged the willful act of
falsification of public documents.
49
moral support when a crime is
being committed make a person
responsible as an accomplice in the
crime committed.26 As keenly
observed by the RTC, the act of
giving food by Susana to the victim
was not essential and
indispensable for the perpetration
of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom but merely an expression
of sympathy or feeling of support
to her husband.27 Moreover, this
Court is guided by the ruling
in People v. De Vera,28 where it
was stressed that in case of doubt,
the participation of the offender
will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather than that of a
principal.
50
breached her legal duty under the
consignment contract to return or remit
the sale proceeds of ALL of such items
when she was able to return only half of
them while the other eleven (11) pieces
remained unreturned and unaccounted
for, to the damage and prejudice of the
consignor.
51
funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.11cralawlawlibrary
The presence of the first and third
elements is undisputed. An issue
being advanced by Campos
through the present petition
concerns her alleged failure to
receive a written demand letter
from FWCC, the entity in whose
favor the dishonored checks were
issued. In a line of cases, the Court
has emphasized the importance of
proof of receipt of such notice of
dishonor,12 although not as an
element of the offense, but as a
means to establish that the issuer
of a check was aware of
insufficiency of funds when he
issued the check and the bank
dishonored it, in relation to the
second element of the offense and
Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering
that the second element involves a
state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22
creates a presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of
funds,13
The Court has in truth repeatedly held
that the mere presentation of registry
return receipts that cover registered mail
was not sufficient to establish that written
notices of dishonor had been sent to or
served on issuers of checks. The
authentication by affidavit of the mailers
was necessary in order for service by
registered mail to be regarded as clear
proof of the giving of notices of dishonor
and to predicate the existence of the
second element of the
offense.14cralawlawlibrary
52
or her client. Given the
circumstances, the Court finds no
cogent reason to reverse the ruling
of the CA which affirmed the
conviction of Campos.
53
weapons used in the stabbing of Espino
were not presented. In other words, he
asserts that it was improper to convict
him because the corpus delicti had not
been established.
We disagree.
[C]orpus delicti refers to
the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the
crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer
to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of
the person murdered or, in this case, [the
weapons used in the commission of
robbery with homicide]. Since the corpus
delicti is the fact of the commission of the
crime, this Court has ruled that even a
single witness uncorroborated testimony,
if credible may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus
delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence. 32cralawred
54
Barbie s personal property.
heinous crime.
55
invitation to a person who is investigated
in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the inviting
officer for any violation of law. 97cralawred
(a)
that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trus
t or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the d
uty to make
delivery of or to return the same[;]
(b)
56
This argument fails to persuade.
57
causing undue injury to any party, has a
meaning akin to that civil law concept of
actual damage. Actual damage, in the
context of these definitions, is akin to that
in civil law.14cralawlawlibrary
58
another without consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.44
The elements of the crime of carnapping
are that: (1) there is an actual taking of
the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to
gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3)
the vehicle belongs to a person other than
the offender himself; and (4) the taking is
without the consent of the owner thereof,
or it was committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things.45cralawlawlibrary
59
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was
charged with and found guilty of child
abuse, a violation of Republic Act No.
7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1
pupil whom she physically maltreated for
having accidentally bumped her knee
while she was drowsing off on a bamboo
sofa as he entered the classroom. Her
maltreatment left him with physical
injuries, as duly certified by a physician.
Although the petitioner, as a
schoolteacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of
the physical injuries on him was
unnecessary, violent and excessive. The
boy even fainted from the violence
suffered at her hands.13 She could not
justifiably claim that she acted only for the
sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely
prohibited by no less than the Family
Code, which has expressly banned the
infliction of corporal punishment by a
school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis),
viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x x
x x x x
60
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner was guilty of child abuse by
deeds that degraded and demeaned the
intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan
as a human being.
61
the entire banking system; (4) violations
of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
are mala in se, while those of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala
prohibita.25chanrobleslaw
62
Carlos, Sr. ordered them to leave.
Treachery also attended the killing of
Floro. For treachery to be present, two
elements must concur: (1) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods, or forms of
attack employed by him. The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate
and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. In this case,
accused-appellant Nonoy and accused
Negro successively fired at Floro about
seven times
and the victim sustained 13
gunshot wounds all found to have been
inflicted at close range giving the latter no
chance at all to evade the attack and
defend himself from the unexpected
onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and
Nonong were on standby also holding their
firearms to insure the success of their
mission without risk to themselves; and
three others served as lookouts. Hence,
there is no denying that their collective
acts point to a clear case of treachery.
On the offense committed by accusedappellants, the RTC correctly concluded
that they should be held accountable for
the complex crime of direct assault with
murder. There are two modes of
committing atentados contra la autoridad
o sus agentes under Article 148 of the
Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants
committed the second form of assault, the
elements of which are that there must be
an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in
authority or his agent; the assault was
made when the said person was
performing his duties or on the occasion of
such performance; and the accused knew
that the victim is a person in authority or
his agent, that is, that the accused must
have the intention to offend, injure or
assault the offended party as a person in
authority or an agent of a person in
authority.
63
Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or
omission:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
Law
Contracts
Quasi-contracts
xxx
Quasi-delicts
64
6, 2003 on the ground of
prescription.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Our Ruling
65
prescription period would both begin and
be interrupted by the same occurrence;
the net effect would be that the
prescription period would not have
effectively begun, having been rendered
academic by the simultaneous interruption
of that same period."14 Additionally, this
interpretation is consistent with the
second paragraph of the same provision
which states that "prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, [and
shall] begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy."
66
67
been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, that is, whether or not he has
made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The determination of probable cause to
hold a person for trial must be
distinguished from the determination of
probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest, which is a judicial function. The
judicial determination of probable cause,
is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is a necessity to
place the accused under custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice.27 If the
judge finds no probable cause, the judge
cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant.28chanrobleslaw
understood.32chanrobleslaw
68
People of the Philippines Vs. Enrique
Quintos y Badilla G.R. No. 199402.
November 12, 2014
A person commits rape when he sexually
assaults another who does not consent or
is incapable of giving consent to a sexual
act. Children, either in chronological or
mental age, are incapable of giving
consent to a sexual act.
x x x x
69
70
principles of restorative justice in all laws,
policies and programs applicable to
children in conflict with the law.2 The
mandate notwithstanding, the Court will
not hesitate or halt to impose the penalty
of imprisonment whenever warranted on a
child in conflict with the law.chanrobleslaw
A review of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9344 reveals, however, that
imprisonment of children in conflict with
the law is by no means prohibited. While
Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344
bestows on children in conflict with the
law the right not to be unlawfully or
arbitrarily deprived of their liberty;
imprisonment as a proper disposition of a
case is duly recognized, subject to certain
restrictions on the imposition of
imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention
or imprisonment is a disposition of last
resort, and (b) the detention or
imprisonment shall be for the shortest
appropriate period of time. Thereby, the
trial and appellate courts did not violate
the letter and spirit of Republic Act No.
9344 by imposing the penalty of
imprisonment on the petitioner simply
because the penalty was imposed as a last
recourse after holding him to be
disqualified from probation and from the
suspension of his sentence, and the term
of his imprisonment was for the shortest
duration permitted by the law.
71
orders of a court that allegedly had
no jurisdiction over the case.
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar
the state from seeking the annulment
of
the judgment via a Rule 65 petition.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
speaks of the finality of a criminal
judgment once the accused applies for
probation, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
72
sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction. x x x x
(Emphases supplied)
judgment of conviction.
73
of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.
2014
Chicks mo dong? 1
With this sadly familiar question
being used on the streets of many
of our cities, the fate of many
desperate women is sealed and
their futures vanquished. This case
resulted in the rescue of two
minors from this pernicious
practice. Hopefully, there will be
more rescues. Trafficking in
persons is a deplorable crime. It is
committed even though the minor
knew about or consented to the act
of trafficking.
74
This case involves Republic Act No.
9208,2 otherwise known as the
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003. 3
75
injury to the government through their
continuing and manifest partiality towards
PAL Boat.
76
77
recognized by our law and their
concomitant effects on the civil liability of
the accused, as follows:
78
Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva 38
and that there is no competent evidence
on hand which proves that the accused
was the person responsible for the death
of Marina Oliva. 39
x x x x
By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts
79
swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and
316 of the RPC,, is committed; (b) the
Estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and
(c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed
by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperative, samahang nayon(s),
or farmers associations, or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations from
the general
public.42chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
80
Almendras G.R. No. 179491. January 14,
2015
THE ISSUES
From the foregoing, we reduce the
issues to the following:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was
deprived due process;
(2) Whether or not the letters are
libelous in nature;
(3) Whether or not the letters fall
within the purview of
privileged communication; and
(4) Whether or not respondent is
entitled to moral and exemplary
damages, attorney s fees and
litigation expenses.
OUR RULING
81
Were petitioner s letters defamatory in
nature? We believe so.
respondent s
reputation.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lastly, having duly proved that all the
elements of libel are present in this case,
we rule that the damages awarded by
the trial court and affirmed by the
appellate court must be modified and
equitably reduced.
82
liability for the negligent operation
of a vehicle, it must be shown that
there was a direct causal
connection between such
negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. To
constitute the offense of reckless
driving, the act must be something
more than a mere negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle
a willful and wanton disregard of
the consequences is required.41
Willful, wanton or reckless
disregard for the safety of others
within the meaning of reckless
driving statutes has been held to
involve a conscious choice of a
course of action which injures
another, either with knowledge of
serious danger to others involved,
or with knowledge of facts which
would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person. Verily, it is
the inexcusable lack of
precaution or conscious
indifference to the
consequences of the conduct
which supplies the criminal
intent and brings an act of
mere negligence and
imprudence under the
operation of the penal law,
without regard to whether the
private offended party may himself
be considered likewise at
fault.42chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the present case, the RTC and
the CA uniformly found that
Rogelio s act of driving very fast
on the wrong side of the road
was the proximate cause of the
collision, resulting to the death of
Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical
injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry.
Notably, the road where the
incident occurred was a curve
sloping upwards towards Brgy.
Bocboc where the Inguitos were
bound and descending towards the
opposite direction where Rogelio
was going. Indeed, the very fact of
speeding, under such
circumstances, is indicative of
imprudent behavior.As a motorist,
Rogelio was bound to exercise
ordinary care in such affair by
driving at a reasonable rate of
speed commensurate with the
conditions encountered, as this
would enable him to keep the
vehicle under control and avoid
injury to others using the
highway.43] Moreover, it is
elementary in traffic school that a
driver slows down before
negotiating a curve as it may be
reasonably anticipated that another
vehicle may appear from the
opposite direction at any moment.
Hence, excessive speed, combined
with other circumstances such as
the occurrence of the accident on
or near a curve, as in this case,
constitutes
negligence.44 Consequently, the
Court finds that Rogelio acted
recklessly and imprudently in
driving at a fast speed on the
wrong side of the road while
approaching the curve where the
incident happened, thereby
rendering him criminally liable, as
well as civilly accountable for the
material damages resulting
therefrom.
83
based on compromise as prayed for by
BBB due to reasons discussed below.
Alleging psychological violence and
economic abuse, AAA anchored her
application for the issuance of a TPO and a
PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A.
No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is
essentially being assailed is the PPO
issued by the RTC and which was affirmed
by the CA. The rules, however, intend that
cases filed under the provisions of R.A.
No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise
agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of AM
04-10-11-2C, explicitly prohibits
compromise on any act constituting the
crime of violence. In Garcia v. Drilon,21
the Court declared that:
Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence
implies that the victim is somehow at
fault. x x x.22(Emphasis deleted)
AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand,
directs the referral to mediation of all
issues under the Family Code and other
laws in relation to support, custody,
visitation, property relations and
guardianship of minor children,
exceptingtherefrom those covered by R.A.
No. 9262.
While AAA filed her application for a TPO
and a PPO as anindependent action and
not as an incidental relief prayed for in a
criminal suit, the instant petition cannot
be taken outside the ambit of cases falling
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262.
Perforce, the prohibition against
subjecting the instant petition to
compromise applies.
The courts a quo committed no error
in issuing a PPO against BBB.
the choices of the children as with whom
they would prefer to stay would alter the
effects of the PPO. Hence, this Court
84
voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC
as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil
Code pertinently provides:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission
or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved
as against the person relying thereon.
At least for the purpose of resolving the
instant petition, the principle of estoppel
finds application and it now bars BBB from
making an assertion contrary to his
previous representations. He should not
be allowed to evade a responsibility
arising from his own misrepresentations.
He is bound by the effects of the
legitimation process. CCC remains to be
BBB s son, and pursuant to Article 179 of
the Family Code, the former is entitled to
the same rights as those of a legitimate
child, including the receipt of his father s
support.
Notwithstanding the above, there is no
absolute preclusion for BBB from raising
before the proper court the issue of CCC s
status and filiation. However, BBB cannot
do the same in the instant petition before
this Court now. In Tison v. CA, the Court
held that the civil status [of a child]
cannot be attacked collaterally. The
child s legitimacy
cannot be contested by
way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. The
instant petition sprang out of AAA s
application for a PPO before the RTC.
Hence, BBB s claim that CCC is not his
biological son is a collateral issue, which
this Court has no authority to
resolve now.
All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB s
petition, but there exists a necessity to
remand the case for the RTC to resolve
matters relative to who shall be granted
custody over the three children, how the
spouses shall exercise visitation rights,
and the amount and manner of providing
financial support.
85
Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262,
hand, provides that [a] PPO
effective until revoked by a
application of the person in
the order was issued.
on the other
shall be
court upon
whose favor
86
OUR RULING
With regard to the first issue, we agree
with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan
erred when it dismissed outright the case
against respondents, on the sole ground
that the case against the purported
principals had already been dismissed. It
is a settled rule that the case against
those charged as accomplices is not ipso
facto dismissed in the absence of trial of
the purported principals; the dismissal of
the case against the latter; or even the
latter s acquittal, especially when the
occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established.
In People v. Rafael, the Supreme Court En
Banc reasoned thus: The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice, and accessory are distinct
from each other. As long as the
commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence, the determination
of the liability of the accomplice or
accessory can proceed independently of
that of the principal. Accordingly, so long
as the commission of the crime can be
duly proven, the trial of those charged as
accomplices to determine their criminal
liability can proceed independently of that
of the alleged principal.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below,
we affirm the quashal of the Information
against respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution,
recognizes the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. As a
manifestation of this constitutional right,
the Rules of Court requires that the
information charging persons with an
offense be sufficient. One of the key
components of a sufficient information is
the statement of the acts or omissions
constituting the offense charged, subject
of the complaint.
The information must also be crafted in a
language ordinary and concise enough to
enable persons of common understanding
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PMMA is a government-owned educational
institution established for the primary
purpose of producing efficient and welltrained merchant marine officers. Clearly,
it is included in the term organization
within the meaning of the law.
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan
ruling that the quashal of the Information
was warranted for failure to allege that
the purported acts were not covered by
the exemption relating to the duly
recommended and approved testing and
training procedure and practices for
prospective regular members of the AFP
and the PNP. This exemption is an
affirmative defense in, not an essential
element of, the crime of accomplice to
hazing. It is an assertion that must be
properly claimed by the accused, not by
the prosecution. The reason for this rule is
that the accused carry the burden of proof
in establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that they have satisfied the
requirements thereof. Thus, the
prosecution s failure to point out in the
Information that the exception is
inapplicable would not justify the quashal
of that Information.
Nevertheless, we find
albeit for a
different reason that the Motion to
Quash must be granted, as the
Information does not include all the
material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing.
As can be gleaned from the above, the
indictment merely states that
psychological pain and physical injuries
were inflicted on the victim. There is no
allegation that the purported acts were
employed as a prerequisite for admission
or entry into the organization. Failure to
aver this crucial ingredient would prevent
the successful prosecution of the criminal
responsibility of the accused, either as
principal or as accomplice, for the crime of
hazing. Plain reference to a technical term
in this case, hazing
is insufficient and
incomplete, as it is but a characterization
of the acts allegedly committed and thus a
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jeopardy has already attached.