COQUILLA vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914

July 31, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and
resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S.
citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy.Otherwise, even
after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5,
2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on
Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as
a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and
Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000.

On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application
was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate
of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years."
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for
reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years
when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines.

The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile,
petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private respondents 5,752 votes,
or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. He subsequently took his oath of office.
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30,
2002. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. We
hold that it was

HELD:
The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two
years" at the time he filed such certificate is not true. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing
it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member
of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or
sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will
obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of
Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so or that the candidate was a "natural-born"
Filipino when in fact he had become an Australian citizen constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy. On the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC that a candidate who used her husbands family
name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case
at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioners
certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

SALCEDO II vs.COMELEC
G.R. No. 135886

August 16, 1999

FACTS:
On February 18, 1968, Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz. Without his first marriage having been dissolved,
Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony held on September 21, 1986. Two
days later, on September 23, 1986, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre.

Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of
the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective certificates of
candidacy on March 27, 1998. However, on April 17, 1998, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the
cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation
therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use
said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. On May 13, 1998, private respondent was
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.

On August 12, 1998, the Comelec's Second Division ruled, by a vote of 2 to 1, that since there is an existing valid
marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is
null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material
misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.

However, in its en banc Resolution dated October 6, 1998, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that
private respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation.

This last resolution of the Comelec prompted petitioner to repair to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, claiming that public respondent's ruling was issued in grave abuse of its discretion.

ISSUE:
whether the use of such surname constitutes a material misrepresentation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code (the "Code") so as to justify the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy

HELD:
Every person aspiring to hold any elective public office must file a sworn certificate of candidacy. One of the things
which should be stated therein is that the candidate is eligible for the office.

In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to deny due
course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to section 78 of the Code
which states that

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.

If the petition is filed within the statutory period and the candidate is subsequently declared by final judgment to be
disqualified before the election, he shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Comelec shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. The fifteen-day period in section 78 for deciding the petition is merely directory.

As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under section 78, it is essential
that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision
would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material representation,"
the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying section 78 of the Code.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office
for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
misrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

And

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz.:

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commissionwithin ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election.

The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective office are
misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a
petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1) ineligibility or (2)
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the
election results. Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is
disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

The material misrepresentation contemplated by section 78 of the Code refers to qualifications for elective office.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected,
from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake.

Petitioner has made no allegations concerning private respondent's qualifications to run for the office of mayor. Aside
from his contention that she made a misrepresentation in the use of the surname "Salcedo," petitioner does not claim
that private respondent lacks the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run
for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. Thus, petitioner has failed to discharge the
burden of proving that the misrepresentation allegedly made by private respondent in her certificate of candidacy
pertains to a material matter.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it
must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a
surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the
provision.

Thus, we hold that private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname
"Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy.