DANTE LIBAN, ET AL. V.

RICHARD GORDON,
G.R. NO. 175352, JANUARY 18, 2011
FACTS: Quezon City Red Cross Board of Directors Liban petitioned the Supreme Co
urt to declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Gord
on was elected as Red Cross national chairman during his incumbency as senator.
Petitioners cited Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution which holds that no se
nator may accept office in any government owned or controlled corporation withou
t forfeiting his seat.
The Court has formerly ruled in July 15, 2009 that the Red Cross is not governme
nt controlled nor owned and thus Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat whe
n he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator. The Court ho
wever held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 164
3, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section
7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that [t]he Congress shall not, ex
cept by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of p
rivate corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Gov
ernment or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed th
e PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securitie
s and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Gordon and the Red Cross on its own questioned the second part of the decision w
ith regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutional
ity of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
ISSUES: Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issu
e of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature
of the PNRC?
HELD: NO. It was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional
issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis
in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the
parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus,
it was not the very lis mota of the case. This Court should not have declared
void certain sections of the Red Cross charter. Furthermore, the Red Cross, whic
h was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a conseq
uence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporat
ion Code, after more than 60 years of existence in this country.
The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC s corporate existence notwithstan
ding the affectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of priva
te corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nat
ure of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it (s
ui generis.) It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that
R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in
March 22, 1947 to the present. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not
been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case
before the Court now.
By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other
private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC s speci
al status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Convent
ions. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Cre

scent Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so

as not to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor stric
tly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian
law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
* * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
G.R. NO. 134577. NOVEMBER 18, 1998.
FACTS: On July 31, 1998,
d instituted an original
es of Court, seeking the
leader of the Senate and
ty leader.

Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tata

petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rul
ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority
the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minori

The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. He explained that those who had vote
d for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted fo
r him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan
M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party n
umbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority
had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader.
The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators S
antiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the S
enate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subje
ct petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had bee
n usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority le
ader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUE: From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues fo
r resolution:
1.
Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2.
Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3.
Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising t
he position of Senate minority leader?
4.
Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizi
ng Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
HELD: Petition is dismissed.
Based on the Constitutional concept of separation of powers, courts may not inte
rvene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province
of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Where no specific, operable no
rms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real
and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them
, before the courts may intervene. Being merely matters of procedure, their obse
rvance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregar
ded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the Court s jurisdiction
The Court rules that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Elec
toral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these
members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was
subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not o

nly was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sele
ction proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether in
deed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gr
avely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
In view of constitutional violation
There was no constitutional violation as the Constitution does not prescribe the
that loosing candidate in the race for senate president shall become the minori
ty.
Definition of minority and majority
Save for the Senate President and the House Speaker, the Constitution does not p
rescribe rules to govern the selection or election of other offices. The Rules o
f the Senate is also silent as how the majority and minority floor leaders are t
o be selected. The manner by which these offices are filled are is based on trad
ition.
In view of usurpation
The petitioners did not present sufficient proof for their case that Tatad is th
e rightful minority leader,
In view of Fernan s recognition of Guingona
There was no grave abuse of discretion when Fernan recognized Guingona as the mi
nority leader given the fact that such recognition came after standard process o
f the Senate: Guingona was unanimously declared by his party to be the minority
leader and he was recognized as such after two sessions.
* * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DATU KIDA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES.,
GR 196271
FACTS: A case on Constitutionality of RA 10153
The Constitution mandates for the formation of ARMM, in which RA 6734 was passed
in compliance thereof. However, it failed to stipulate the exact date for the
ARMM Elections. Laws were then enacted to provide for the exact dates of the ele
ctions: RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140 November 26, 2001, RA 93
33 2nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but s
ometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchroniza
tion of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.
ISSUE/S:
1.
W/N ARMM is distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefor
e should not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandate
d in the constitution.
2.
W/N RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the preside
nt the power to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions
be filled during the May 2013 elections.
HELD: 1. No. ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from th
e synchronization of election. SC does not make a distinction between local gover
nment and regional government. Autonomous regions are therefore under the heading lo
cal government and is regarded as a local form of government. Autonomous regions
therefore, while enjoying more powers and attributes than other government units

, is still classified as local governments and it therefore follows that electio

ns on autonomous regions are considered as local elections.
SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political
subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government indicates quite clea
rly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms
of local governments.
2. Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that
there is no incompatibility between the President s power of supervision over loc
al governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, w
ithin the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to
it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is di
stinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modi
fy or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his du
ties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the President s alleged power of control ove
r the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President s appointment power includ
es the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners for
esee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as repre
sentatives of the President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The
provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge.
The President shall appoint office
rs-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pe
rtaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 el
ections shall have qualified and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for t
he offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislativ
e Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced b
y the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provisio
n even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he alre
ady made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than re
al.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMELEC,

SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN
G.R. NO. 148334. JANUARY 21, 2004
FACTS: Regular and Special election were held simultaneously in 2001. 13 senator
s were proclaimed winners, where the 13th placer was to serve the remaining term
of Sen. Teofisto Guingona, who vacated his seat for vice-presidency. Petitioner
assailed the manner by which the elections were held, contending that one elect
ion must be distinguished from the other in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of results. Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special e
lection and, consequently, the declaration of the 13th elected senator.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
3.

Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.

Whether or not the petition was moot.
Whether or not petitioners had locus standi.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat

was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petiti
oners were questioning was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 i
n which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasan s right in the exercise o
f his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwi
se moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing
and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the rig
ht of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to
arise again
On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election w
as valid.
The Court held that COMELEC s Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special El
ection as required under RA 6645, as amended, did not negate the calling of such
Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in
the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneou
sly with the next succeeding regular election. The law charges the voters with
knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC s failure to give the additional n
otice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate
it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELEC s Failure to Give Notice of the Offic
e to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election
Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since ther
e had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that
unless there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court w
ill not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.

FARIAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. 147387 December 10 2003
FACTS: SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective o
ffice. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for Presi
dent and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the H
olding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair El
ections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI
of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should b
e in expressed in its title.
The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the eliminati
on of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of offic
ials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capac
ity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the cert
ificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in th
e title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
HELD: No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 ar

e comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Electi

on Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67
of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete
index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and
the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." Thi
s Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the t
itle, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, s
o long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress sh
all embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill sh
ould be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matte
rs which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and t
he public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not appr
ised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehen
sively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as
members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding
its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aw
are of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Electi
on Code.