3

................................................ Hospital Site

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,

................................................ Leprosarium

vs.

................................................ Curuan School

CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER

OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendants-appellants.

................................................ Trade School

................................................ Burleigh School

G.R. No. L-24440

March 28, 1968

Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associates for plaintiffappellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.

2
................................................
Playground

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the

Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital
of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936,
Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the
Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of
the Act also provided that

1
................................................
(Magay)

High

School

................................................ Burleighs
Hydro-Electric

................................................ San Roque

23

................................................ vacant

Site

Buildings and properties which the province shall

abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place
will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a
price to be fixed by the Auditor General.

It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga

Province was transferred to Dipolog. 2 Subsequently, or on
June 16, 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved creating the
municipality of Molave and making it the capital of
Zamboanga Province.

The properties and buildings referred to consisted of

50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in
the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens
certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. As
far as can be gleaned from the records, 1 said properties
were being utilized as follows

On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by

the Auditor General, pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39,
fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question
left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
P1,294,244.00. 3

No. of Lots

On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved

dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2):
Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how
the assets and obligations of the old province were to be
divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law
provided:

Use

................................................ Capitol Site

................................................ School Site

Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and

other properties and the obligations of the province of
Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the
Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines,
upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.
Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11,
1955, apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct
Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga
del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga
del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of
P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in
question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.
On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order
of the President, issued a ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga
del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner
pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof,
payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the
previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying all
the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City
for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital
of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to
Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount
equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for
the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending March 31,
1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again
for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The
deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to the
province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the
P764,220.05 due it.

However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was

approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by
providing that
All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the
former province of Zamboanga and located within the City
of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in
favor of the said City of Zamboanga. (Stressed for
emphasis).
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12,
1961, ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del
Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of
P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue
allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits
that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11
of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del
Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint entitled
"Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction"
in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte
against
defendants-appellants
Zamboanga
City,
the
Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be
declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of
property without due process and just compensation; (b)
Plaintiff's rights and obligations under said law be declared;
(c) The Secretary of Finance and the Internal Revenue
Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of
P57,373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered
to continue paying the balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly
installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.
On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance
of preliminary injunction as prayed for. After defendants
filed their respective answers, trial was held. On August 12,

1963, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of

which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Republic Act No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar as it
deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private
properties, consisting of 50 parcels of land and the
improvements thereon under certificates of title (Exhibits
"A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct province of
Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of Zamboanga to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05 payment thereof to
be deducted from its regular quarterly internal revenue
allotment equivalent to 25% thereof every quarter until
said amount shall have been fully paid; ordering defendant
Secretary of Finance to direct defendant Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to deduct 25% from the regular quarterly
internal revenue
allotment
for defendant
City
of
Zamboanga and to remit the same to plaintiff Zamboanga
del Norte until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have been
fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte to
execute through its proper officials the corresponding
public instrument deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga
the 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under
the certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") upon
payment by the latter of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05
in full; dismissing the counterclaim of defendant City of
Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the preliminary
mandatory injunction issued on June 8, 1962, pursuant to
the order of the Court dated June 4, 1962. No costs are
assessed against the defendants.
It is SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of
defendants' appeal, plaintiff province filed a motion to
reconsider praying that Zamboanga City be ordered instead
to pay the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per
annum. Over defendants' opposition, the lower court
granted plaintiff province's motion.

The defendants then brought the case before Us on

appeal.
Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the
property of declaratory relief filed in the lower court on the
assertion that the law had already been violated and that
plaintiff sought to give it coercive effect, since assuming
the same to be true, the Rules anyway authorize the
conversion of the proceedings to an ordinary action, 5 We
proceed to the more important and principal question of the
validity of Republic Act 3039.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the
nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For,
the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control
over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a
province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the
property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal
corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the
property is public and Congress has absolute control over
it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary
capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no
absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just compensation. 6
The capacity in which the property is held is,
however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and
devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil
Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal
Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties in
question?
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts.
423 and 424 which provide:
ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and
municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property.

ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces,

cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the

rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered
public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted
for governmental purposes like local administration, public
education, public health, etc. 10

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial

and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws. (Stressed for emphasis).

Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following

cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 11 where it
was stated that "... where the municipality has occupied
lands distinctly for public purposes, such as for the
municipal court house, the public school, the public market,
or other necessary municipal building, we will, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the
States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the
wording, that rule may be invoked only as to property
which is used distinctly for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA
DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO 12 held that
municipal properties necessary for governmental purposes
are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the
municipality for street sprinkling, the police patrol
automobile, police stations and concrete structures with
the corresponding lots used as markets were declared
exempt from execution and attachment since they were not
patrimonial properties. (3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS.
CANTOS 13 held squarely that a municipal lot which had
always been devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to
public use and is not patrimonial property of a municipality.

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in

question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties
of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site,
the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will
be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use.
They would fall under the phrase "public works for public
service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis
rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate
use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated
properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The
playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it
cannot
be
said
that
its
actuation
was
without
jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan
v. Director of Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v.
Director of Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol site and the
school sites in municipalities constitute their patrimonial
properties. This result is understandable because, unlike in
the classification regarding State properties, properties for
public service in the municipalities are not classified as
public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the
chosen norm, the lower court must be affirmed except with
regard to the two (2) lots used as playgrounds.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining
under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question

Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is

valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site,
school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites
and the high school playground sites a total of 24 lots
since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in
its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the
absolute control of Congress. Said lots considered as public
property are the following:

TCT Number Lot Number U s e

2200 ......................................
......................................

4-B
Capitol Site

2816 ......................................
......................................

149
School Site

3281 ......................................
......................................

1224
Hospital Site

3282 ......................................
......................................

1226
Hospital Site

3283 ......................................
......................................

1225
Hospital Site

3748 ......................................
......................................

434-A-1
School Site

5406 ......................................
......................................

171
School Site

5564 ......................................
......................................
ground

168
High

5567 ......................................
......................................

157
&
Trade School

5583 ......................................
......................................
ground

167
High

6181 ......................................
......................................

(O.C.T.)
Curuan School

11942 ......................................
......................................

926
Leprosarium

School

School

11943 ......................................
......................................

927
Leprosarium

11944 ......................................
......................................

925
Leprosarium

5557 ......................................
......................................

170
Burleigh School

5562 ......................................
......................................

180
Burleigh School

5565 ......................................
......................................

172-B
Burleigh

5570 ......................................
......................................

171-A
Burleigh

5571 ......................................
......................................

172-C
Burleigh

5572 ......................................
......................................

174
Burleigh

Play-

5573 ......................................
......................................

178
Burleigh

158

5585 ......................................
......................................

171-B
Burleigh

5586 ......................................
......................................

173
Burleigh

5587 ......................................
......................................

172-A
Burleigh

Play-

We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above

described are adjoining each other and in turn are between
the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools are built, as per
records appearing herein and in the Bureau of Lands.
Hence, there is sufficient basis for holding that said eight

lots constitute the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh

schools, and partake of the nature of the same.

Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots

above-mentioned, the records do not disclose whether they
were constructed at the expense of the former Province of
Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said
buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when
Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact
that provinces then had no power to authorize construction
of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own
expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were
erected by the National Government, using national funds.
Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in
the same manner that it did with the lots in question.
But even assuming that provincial funds were used,
still the buildings constitute mere accessories to the lands,
which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of
said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though
located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and
benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by
the provincial residents. The province then and its
successors-in-interest are not really deprived of the
benefits thereof.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied
Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of
the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial
since
they are
not
being
utilized for
governmental purposes. Said lots are:

to deprive
the rest of
properties
distinctly,

TCT Number Lot Number U s e

5577 ......................................
......................................

177
Mydro, Magay

13198 ......................................
......................................

127-0
San Roque

5569 ......................................
......................................

169
Burleigh 15

5558 ......................................
......................................

175
Vacant

5559 ......................................
......................................

188
"

5560 ......................................
......................................

183
"

5561 ......................................
......................................

186
"

5563 ......................................
......................................

191
"

5566 ......................................
......................................

176
"

5568 ......................................
......................................

179
"

5574 ......................................
......................................

196
"

5575 ......................................
......................................

181-A
"

5576 ......................................
......................................

181-B
"

5578 ......................................
......................................

182
"

5579 ......................................
......................................

197
"

5580 ......................................
......................................

195
"

5581 ......................................
......................................

159-B
"

5582 ......................................
......................................

194
"

5584 ......................................
......................................

190
"

5588 ......................................
......................................

184
"

5589 ......................................
......................................

187
"

5590 ......................................
......................................

189
"

5591 ......................................
......................................

192
"

5592 ......................................
......................................

193
"

5593 ......................................
......................................

185
"

7379 ......................................
......................................

4147
"

Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered

strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in
nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for
governmental purposes are also registered is of no
significance since registration cannot convert public
property to private.

We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The

controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of
Municipal Corporations State vs. Province than along
that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold
that municipal property held and devoted to public service
is in the same category as ordinary private property. The
consequences are dire. As ordinary private properties, they
can be levied upon and attached. They can even be
acquired thru adverse possession all these to the
detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification
of properties other than those for public use in the
municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil
Code is "... without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws." For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining
under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered
as "special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal
property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as
public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in
this particular case.
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessorin-interest are "guilty of laches is without merit. Under
Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor
of the defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in 1949 after
the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in
question. While in 1951, the Cabinet resolved transfer said
properties practically for free to Zamboanga City, a
reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. In 1952,
the old province was dissolved. As successor-in-interest to
more than half of the properties involved, Zamboanga del
Norte was able to get a reconsideration of the Cabinet
Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were effected
subsequently and it was only after the passage of Republic
Act 3039 in 1961 that the present controversy arose.
Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative
laches.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still
entitled to collect from the City of Zamboanga the former's

54.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in

nature, said share to computed on the basis of the
valuation of said 26 properties as contained in Resolution
No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of the Appraisal Committee
formed by the Auditor General.

(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to

return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the
amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the
latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the
latter; and

Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump

sum, except as to the P43,030.11 already returned to
defendant City. The return of said amount to defendant was
without legal basis. Republic Act 3039 took effect only on
June 17, 1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had
already been made. Since the law did not provide for
retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed
act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be
immediately returned by defendant City to plaintiff
province. The remaining balance, if any, in the amount of
plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should then be paid
by defendant City in the same manner originally adopted by
the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's prayer,
particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and
11 of the first cause of action recited in the complaint 17
clearly shows that the relief sought was merely the
continuance of the quarterly payments from the internal
revenue allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil
Code on reciprocal obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify
lump sum payment is inapplicable since there has been so
far in legal contemplation no complete delivery of the lots
in question. The titles to the registered lots are not yet in
the name of defendant Zamboanga City.

(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments

in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of
plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties,
after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the
basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the
Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way
of quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant
City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No
costs. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as
follows:.

G.R. No. 74761

November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:

The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built through its
agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its
land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land,
can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case
can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite
which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our
Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young
man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed
away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and
other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as

Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein
respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another
action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the
complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on
the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on
respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil
action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case
No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No.
TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June
22, 1984, the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed
order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as
the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was
still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of
Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that
"criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate
Court.
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases
Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming the questioned order
of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners

was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19,
1986.
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No.
TG-748 in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate
Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is
predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument
or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily
determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the
pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial
justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial
laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have
ample opportunity to prove their respective claims.
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners'
complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4)
That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga
(Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid
land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from
the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening,
also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its
concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its
cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected by
defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts which
were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath
the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said interconnected culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or
opening thru the lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks
fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth

of a big canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs northward

towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant
thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which
separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which
serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of
defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same
floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or
stormy seasons.
5)
That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just
beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial
lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being
channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected
galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water
during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it
seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates, portions of the
adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6)
That as a result of the inundation brought about by
defendant's aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and
manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein
plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a)
Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted
to deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b)
Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several
occasions, washed away.
c)
During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and
their laborers are always in danger.
d)
Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land
of plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the
civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the

10

defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;

and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of
a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths
and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article
1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person
who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the
flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river,
thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the
rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for
loss and damages to the injured party.

rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.

Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on
his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an
adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for
damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public
domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately
owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently
alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the
alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission
of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or
negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the
damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the
parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not

only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
(if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. 13

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without

limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of
a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil

Code, which states:

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plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing
provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a
"culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and
"culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under
the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that
is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and
the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an
acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the

civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the
criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasidelicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal
case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can
be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal
prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the
clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal
of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City)
dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled
"Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the
case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs
against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.

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