ARTICLE 2

NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial

Facts:
Napocor questions the decision rendered bt RTC of
Mandaluyong City Branch 213 declaring items 3
and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional,
which allows only partnership or corporations that
directly use aluminum as the raw material to
participate in the bidding disposal of ACSR wires
for being violative of substantial due process, EPC,
and restraining competitive free trade and
commerce.
NPC Circular No. 99-75 set the guidelines in the
disposal of ACSRS to maintain good housekeeping
in NPC installations and to generate additional
income for NPC.
In April 2003, NPC invited bidders for public sale of
its scrap ACSR. Pinatubo submitted a prequalification form but was denied, and asked for
reconsideration and again was denied.
Pinatubo then filed a petition in RTC for the
annulment of NPC Circular No. 9975, with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order & or writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC upheld Pinatubos position:
Substantive due process: circular had not been
published
EPC: favored manufacturers and processors of
aluminum scrap
Free trade and commerce: it only allowed a certain
sector to participate in the bidding
NPC insists that there was no need to publish the
circular since it was not of general application and
was addressed only to particular persons or class
of persons, namely the disposal committees, head
of offices, regional and all other officials involved
in the disposition of ACSRs. It also contends that
there was a substantial distinction between
manufacturers and traders of aluminum scrap.
Issue: Whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be
published
Held:
NPC Circular No, 99-75 was merely an internal rule
or regulation. It did not affect the rights of the
public or any other persons not involved in the
bidding process. It was merely a directive issued
by the NPC President to his subordinates to
regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap
ACSRs to qualified bidders.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 dated June 30,
2006 and resolution dated November 20, 2006 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.MC-032179 for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75
is hereby DISMISSED.
Pimentel V. Senate Committee of the Whole
Facts: Before the Court is a petition for prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed
bySenators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator
Pimentel), ManuelB. Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P.
Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and
Alan Peter S. Cayetano (petitioners).
Petitioners seek to prompt the Senate Committee
of the Whole (respondent) from conducting further
hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria
Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal)
against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the
alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5
Road Extension Project in the 2008 General
Appropriations Act.
Petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules
of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out
of which three amendments were adopted. On 14
May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the
need to publish the proposed amended Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole.
Issue: Whether or not publication of the Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for
their effectivity
Held: The language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published
rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent
upon the Senate to publish the rules of its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise
make the published rules clearly state that the
same shall be effective in the subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed
to sufficiently put public on notice.
The Constitution does not require publication of
the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since
rules of the House or the Senate that affect only
their members are internal to the House or Senate,
such rules need not be published, unless such
rules expressly provide for their publication
before the rules can take effect.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate
Committee of the Whole affect only members of

the Senate since the proceedings involve the

Senates exercise of its disciplinary power over one
of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate.
However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole provides that the
Rules must be published before the Rules can take
effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their
publication. Respondent cannot dispense with the
publication requirement just because the Rules of
the Ethics Committee had already been published
in the Official Gazette. To comply with due process
requirements, the Senate must follow its own
internal rules if the rights of its own members are
affected.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered
into
a
contract
with
Zhong
Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to
the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high ve
officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project
by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in
one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11
hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions
on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and

Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order
for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject
three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive
privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because
this
concept
has
Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to
these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements
of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or
solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test
is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought likely contains
important evidence and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita
premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy
decision-making
process
and,
that
the

information sought to be disclosed might impair

our diplomatic as well as economic relations with
the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the
bases are presidential communications privilege
and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.

Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,

Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband
and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of
divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that,

indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications
privilege.
First,
the
communications relate to a quintessential and
non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J.

Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since
October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.

Respondent Committees further contend that the

grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right
of the people to information on matters of public
concern. We might have agreed with such
contention if petitioner did not appear before them
at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he
was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only
that, he expressly manifested his willingness to
answer more questions from the Senators, with
the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right,
is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.

ARTICLE 3
Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3,
1998, claiming that she learned only in November
1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was proven;
Whether or not the decree of divorce submitted by
Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove
his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved
him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as
shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and
recognized in the Philippines since the respondent
is a naturalized Australian. However, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondents
legal capacity to marry petitioner though the
former presented a divorce decree. The said
decree,
being
a
foreign
document
was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily
because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive
or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner
and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

(1) Yes. The divorce decree has to be admitted in

evidence with the registration requirements under
Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code in order
to prove the divorce as a fact and prove its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it for our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
However, compliance with the registration
requirements is no longer binding to respondent
for he has acquired Australian Citizenship and
therefore, he is no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws. Respondent submitted the divorce
decree and was rendered admissible by the trial
court as a written act of the Family Court of
Sydney, Autralia and accorded weight by the
judge.
(2) No. The court held that respondents
presentation of a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree-a conditional or provisional judgment of
divorce showed that the divorce obtained may
have been restricted; it did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
national law. Respondent also failed to submit a
Certificate of Legal Capacity together with the
application for a marriage license required by
Article 21 of the Family Code which would have
been admitted as a prima facie evidence of his
legal capacity to marry. The Court finds no
absolute evidence that proves that respondent,
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January
12, 1994.

ARTICLE 4
Valeroso v. People
Facts: On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of
the Criminal Investigation Section Division, Central
Police District Command received a dispatch order,
which directed him and three (3), other personnel
to serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner in a
case for kidnapping with ransom. After briefing,
team conducted necessary surveillance on
petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite,
Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded
to the Integrated National Police Central Station in
Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as
he was about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco
and his team approached petitioner. They put him
under arrest, informed him of his constitutional
rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in
his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial
Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition.
Petitioner was brought to the police station for
questioning. A verification of the subject firearm at
the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp

Crame revealed that it was not issued to the

petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was
then charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.
On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitioner guilty
as charged and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus
fine. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion
was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May 4,
2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC
disposition. SC affirmed CAs decision.
Issue: Whether or not retroactive application of the
law is valid taken into account that the
commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996
wherein the governing law was PD 1866, which
provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997,
during the pendency of the case with the trial
court. The law looks forward, never backward
(prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new
law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect.
However, penal laws that favor a guilty person,
who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given
retroactive effect.(Exception and exception to the
exception on effectivity of laws
ABS CBN v. Court of Tax Appeals
Facts: During the period pertinent to this case,
petitioner corporation was engaged in the
business of telecasting local as well as foreign
films acquired from foreign corporations not
engaged in trade or business within the Philippines
for which petitioner paid rentals after withholding
income tax of 30% of one-half of the film rentals.
In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the
Commissioner issued General Circular V-334.
Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp.
dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR 30%
of of the film rentals paid by it to foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business in
the Philippines. The last year that the company
withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in
1968. On 27 June 1968, RA 5431 amended Section
24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from
30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from such
amount referring to rents, etc. to gross income.
In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of
assessment
and
demand
for
deficiency
withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968.
The company requested for reconsideration; where
the Commissioner did not act upon.
Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 471, revoking General Circular V-334, may be
retroactively applied.

Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the

Commissioner have no retroactive application
where to so apply them would be prejudicial to
taxpayers. Herein, the prejudice the company of
the retroactive application of Memorandum
Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued
only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last
year that petitioner had withheld taxes under
General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and
demand on petitioner to pay deficiencywithholding income tax was also made three years
after 1968 for a period of time commencing in
1965. The company was no longer in a position to
withhold taxes due from foreign corporations
because it had already remitted all film rentals and
had no longer control over them when the new
circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated
exceptions are concerned, the company does not
fall under any of them.

Whether or not the contract between Cui and the

respondent university, whereby the former waives
his right to transfer to another school without
having refunded to the defendant the equivalent
of the scholarship cash valid or not?
Held:
The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and
respondent on September 10, 1951, is a direct
violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null
and void. The contract was contrary to sound
policy and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in
Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy.
When students are given full or partial
scholarships,
it
is
understood
that
such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount
in tuition and other fees corresponding to these
scholarships should not be subsequently charged
to the recipient students when they decide to quit
school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to
attract and keep students in a school.

DM Consunji V. CA
FACTS:
ARTICLE 6
Cui v. Arellano University
Facts:
Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university
where plaintiff finished his law studies in the up to
and including the first semester of the fourth year.
During all the school years in which plaintiff was
studying law in defendant Law College, he was
awarded scholarship grants and his semestral
tuition fees were returned to him after ends of the
semester. Plaintiff left the defendant's law college
and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth
year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos
University graduating from the college of law of
the latter university. He applied to take the bar
examination in which he needed the transcripts of
his records in defendant Arellano University. The
defendant refused until after he had paid back the
P1,033 87, noting the contract that he signed
which stated that in consideration of the
scholarship granted to him by the University, he
waives his right to transfer to another school
without having refunded to the defendant the
equivalent of the scholarship cash and followed by
Memorandum No. 38 that the Director of Private
Schools issued.
Issue:

Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo,

a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He
was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in
Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de
Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at
around 2:15PM.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso
Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the
elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building were on board a
platform. Jose was crushed to death when the
platform fell due to removal or looseness of the
pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting
points of the chain block and platform but without
a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out
of safety.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police
District investigated the tragedy and filed report
dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Joses widow
filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in
the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to
receive support from DM Consunji amounting to
P644,000.
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim

damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

"Sec. 3. Notice shall be given

by posting notices of the sale
for not less than twenty days
in at least three public places
of the municipality or city
where the property is situated,
and if such property is worth
more than four hundred
pesos, such notice shall also
be published once a week for
at least three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the
municipality or city."

HELD:
The respondent is not precluded from recovering
damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was
unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed
her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for
damages after she received a copy of the police
investigation
report
and
the
Prosecutors
Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint
against petitioners personnel.
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City
to determine whether the award decreed in its
decision is more than that of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC).
Should the
award decreed by the trial court be greater than
that awarded by the ECC, payments already made
to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code
shall be deducted therefrom.
PNB v. Nepomuceno
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted
respondents a 4 Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00)
credit line to finance the filming of the movie
Pacific Connection. The loan was secured by
mortgages on respondents real and personal
properties. Respondents defaulted in their
obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties. The auction sale was
rescheduled several times without publication, but
proceeded on December 20, 1976, with petitioner
as the highest bidder.
Subsequently, the respondents filed an action for
annulment of the foreclosure sale claiming that
such was void because, among others, there was
lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure sale.
The trail court ordered the annulment and set
aside the foreclosure proceedings. Upon appeal,
the CA affirmed the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of foreclosure
sale can be validly waived by agreement of the
parties.
HELD:
Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgages on real property is
specific with regard to the posting and publication
requirements of the notice of sale, to wit:

It is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is:

(1) the posting of notices of sale in three public
places; and, (2) the publication of the same in a
newspaper of general circulation. Failure to publish
the notice of sale constitutes a jurisdictional
defect, which invalidates the sale.
Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and
publication requirements can be dispensed with
since the parties agreed in writing that the auction
sale may proceed without need of re-publication
and re-posting of the notice of sale.
The Supreme Court is not convinced. Petitioner
and respondents have absolutely no right to waive
the posting and publication requirements of Act
No. 3135. While it is established that rights may be
waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that such waiver is subject to the
condition that it is not contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law.
The principal object of a notice of sale in a
foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify
the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of
the nature and condition of the property to be
sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale.
Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a
sacrifice of the property.
Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and
publication are mandated, not for the mortgagors
benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact,
personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary,
unless stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public
policy considerations and any waiver thereon
would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of
Act No. 3135.
People v. Serzo
FACTS: Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of
murder by the lower court for stabbing Alfredo

Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held

by the former. Pre-trial was waived and the case
proceeded to trial on the merits. The accused
alleged that he was denied the right to counsel.

Courts are not required to await indefinitely the

pleasure and convenience of the accused as they
are also mandated to promote the speedy and
orderly administration of justice.

During the arraignment he appeared without

counsel, so the court appointed a counsel de
officio (Atty. Linaac). Thereafter, he moved that the
arraignment be reset so he can engage the
services of his own counsel. However, during the
arraignment, he still appeared without one. The
arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by
the counsel de officio. Come date of trial, it was
again cancelled as appellant appeared without
counsel. The presentation of evidence for the
defense was reset as appellant was not ready to
testify and again he manifested his intention to
secure the services of a counsel de parte. Atty.
Linaac was relieved as counsel de oficio in view of
appellants refusal to cooperate.

The assailed decision is affirmed, but the award of

moral damages is deleted. Instead, appellant is
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and actual damages of P2,000.00 as
burial expenses.

Trial court appointed another counsel de oficio

(Atty. Antonano). Hearing was reset for the last
time as appellant was still looking. For the 3 rd time,
appellant appeared without counsel; thus, the trial
court appointed (Atty. Garcia). Again, trial was
postponed. Appellant refused to cooperate with
Atty. Garcia by declining to take the witness stand,
forcing the defense to rest its case.
Thereafter, the assailed decision convicting
appellant of murder was promulgated (August 23,
1994). RTC: noted that appellant simply refused to
secure the services of a counsel de parte and to
present evidence in his defense despite ample
opportunity accorded to him. Consequently, the
trial court convicted appellant on the basis of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. Not
satisfied with the trial courts Decision, appellant
through counsel Atty. Arcilla appealed to this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused was denied of his right to
counsel
HELD: NO. The right to counsel of an accused is
guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and our
Rules of Court. During custodial investigation,
arraignment, trial, and even on appeal, the
accused is given the option to be represented by a
counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or
refuses to exercise this option during arraignment
and trial, the court shall appoint one for him. For
almost 2 years since appellant first invoked his
right to be represented by counsel de parte, he
still could not find one. Neither did he cooperate
with his court-named lawyers. While the right to be
represented by counsel is absolute, the accuseds
option to hire one of his own choice is limited.

Gongon v. CA
The intendment of Commonwealth Act No. 539,
governing the acquisition and disposition of landed
estates is to award lots to those who may apply,
the first choice to the bona fide "tenants," the
second to the "occupants," and the last, to
"private individuals," if the parties affected
thereby stand on equal footing or under equal
circumstances.
FACTS:
Matias Gongon filed an application with the
defunct Rural Progress Administration for the
purchase of Lot 18B, Block 23, with an area of 274
square meters, as bona fide occupant. The lot was
originally leased by the Roman Catholic Church to
Amada Aquino, who in turn sublet it in 1934 to
Matias Gongon for a term of 15 years at a nominal
monthly
rental
of
P6.00.
The
sublessee
constructed his residential house on the property
and since then has been living there, together with
his family.
The application was opposed by Amada Aquino,
who also filed her own application, alleging that as
bona fide tenant or lessee she had the preferential
right to purchase the lot. The Director of Lands
the Bureau of approved Gongons application, he
being the actual occupant. On appeal to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
Aquinos application was given due course.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Land
Tenure Administration denied his motion. Gongon
then appealed to the Office of the President, which
thereafter affirmed the decision of the Land Tenure
Administration. Accordingly, the Land Tenure
Administration executed a deed of sale of Lot 18B
in favor of Amada Aquino, as a result of which she
obtained, on March 10, 19761, TCT No. 84738 in
her name.
Petitioner then filed the instant case in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to annul the decisions of
the Land Tenure Administration and of not in
question to him; to cancel its registration in the
name of Amada Aquino and to have it registered in

his name instead. The complaint likewise

contained a prayer for attorneys fees and costs.

People v Licera
FACTS:

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner has the
preferential right to purchase the lot in question
Whether or not the alleged waiver of
whatever right he might have had over said lot is
valid
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE - The order of preference should be
observed if the parties affected stand on an equal
footing or under equal circumstances, for only in
that way can the provision of the law be
implemented with equity, justice and fairness to all
and in keeping with the spirit of giving land to the
landless so that he may have a land of his own.
But the order need not be rigidly followed when a
party, say a bona fide tenant, has already in his
name other lots more than what he needs for his
family, for certainly to give him the preference
would work injustice to the occupants. Respondent
spouses have their house on another lot (lot No.
34, block No. 7) in the Tambobong Estate.
Furthermore, respondent Rufino Rivera is the
registered bona fide tenant of still another lot, also
in Tambobong, with an area of 2,761 square
meters, which is considerably bigger than the lot
in question, where petitioner and his family
constructed their residence and where they have
been living since 1934. It cannot be said,
therefore, that the parties herein stand on an
equal footing or under equal circumstances.
Justice and equity command that petitioner be
given the preferential right to purchase in order to
carry out the avowed policy of the law to give land
to the landless.
SECOND ISSUE - On the second issue petitioners
position is that his preferential right could not be
validly waived, such waiver being against public
policy. Under Article 6 of the new Civil Code "rights
may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs,
or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law." Being contrary to public policy,
the alleged waiver of his right made by herein
petitioner should be considered null and void.]
The decision appealed from is reversed. The award
of the lot in question to respondent Amada Aquino is
set aside; transfer certificate of title No. 84738 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal is ordered cancelled;
and petitioner is declared to have the preferential
right to purchase the said lot. Costs against
respondents.
ARTICLE 8

In 1961, Rafael Licera was granted an appointment

as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965,
accused was charged with illegal possession of
firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his
appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was
applicable, which held that the appointment of a
civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even
to a member of the municipal police" whom
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
exempts from the requirements relating to firearm
licenses. Later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided
and revoked the Macarandang rule, the earlier
case should be held applicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial decision in
People v. Macarandang have the force and effect
of law?
HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal
system. These decisions, although in themselves
not law, constitute evidence of what the laws
mean. The application or interpretation placed by
the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the
date of the enactment of the said law since the
Court's application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the construed law purports to carry into
effect. The Macarandang rule the Courts
interpretation of section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code
formed part of our
jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's
legal system.
A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates
prospectively and should not adversely affect
those favored by the old rule.
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not
only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret
agent, which appointment included a grant of
authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as
well at the time as of his apprehension, Licera
incurred no criminal liability for possession of the
said rifle, notwithstanding his non compliance with
the legal requirements relating to firearm
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed,
and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de
oficio.

Chu Juan v. Bernas

FACTS:
People v. Jabinal
FACTS:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment
of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the
accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
The validity of the
conviction was based upon a retroactive
application of the Supreme Courts ruling in People
vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the
accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he
was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint was
without the requisite license a permit. He however,
contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise
subsequently appended as Confidential Agent,
which granted him the authority to possess fire
arm in the performance of his official duties as
peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts
decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero, the accused sought for his acquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by
the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided
otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and
People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently
abandoned in people vs. mapa.

Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant

when on their cockfight match, defendant Lucio
Bernas was declared the winner. Each had put up a
wager of P160 before the cockfight. Justice of
peace court decided that bout was a draw.
Defendant appealed to Court of First Instance
praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide
and comply with rules and regulations governing
cockfights to pay P160 and return the other
amount which s in safekeeping of Cockpit owner
Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and
moved to dismiss cost against plaintiff. Court of
First Instance dismissed the appeal without special
findings. On plaintiff's motion, an order ordering
provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal
Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160
and return to plaintiff Chu Jan. Proceedings was
forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the
proper bill of exceptions
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance
ere in dismissing the case without findings since
grounds for dismissal pronounced by lower court
appealed from ere that court has always dismissed
cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the
rules governing cockfights and duties of referees;
that he does not know where to find the law and
that he knows of no law that governs the right to
plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights.
HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant be acquitted

on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in
Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the completer reversal of
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
HELD:
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the
appellant was acquitted.
The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang
was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at
the time appellant was found in possession of fire
arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in
Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the
Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.

Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge

regarding law applicable to a case submitted to
him for decision are not reasons that can serve to
excuse the court for terminating the proceedings
by dismissing them without deciding on the issue.
Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing
that a case may arise to which no law would be
applicable, the Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of Art
6, provides that Customs of the place shall be
observed and in absence thereof, the general
principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and
order appealed from are reversed and to record of
the proceedings shall remanded to court from
when they came for due trial and judgment as
provided by law. No special finding is made with
regard to costs

People v. Lorenzo Veneracion

FACTS:

ARTICLE 9

In August 1994, four accused were found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide

committed against a seven-year-old girl. The

Presiding judge was Lorenzo Veneracion.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which
treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide, the
penalty imposable shall be death. However, Judge
Veneracion refused to impose the death penalty
but instead he sentenced the four accused to
reclusion perpetua. The city prosecutor filed a
motion for reconsideration praying that the
penalty of death be imposed upon the four
accused but the judge refused to act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the
discretion to impose a lesser penalty than that
imposed by law.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law
mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the

judge should impose the proper penalty provided

for by the law on the accused regardless of his
own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the
judge must impose the death penalty. This is
consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code
(Article 9 thereof), which provides that no judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
Instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the
imposition of the penalty of death upon private
respondents in consonance with respondent
judge's finding that the private respondents in the
instant case had committed the crime of Rape with
Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659.