Aggravating Circumstances

The aggravating circumstances are

based on the higher degree of
perversity
of
the
offender
manifested at the time of the
commission of the felony; the
place, the means, ways or methods
employed; his relationship with the
offended party; or other personal
circumstance and others.
Kinds
of
aggravating
circumstances:
1. Generic that which generally
applies to all crimes like recidivism.
2. Specific that which applies to
a particular felony like cruelty in
crimes against persons.
3. Qualifying
that
which
changes the nature of the felony,
as treachery in murder.
4. Inherent that which is part of
the felony committed, as unlawful
entry in robbery with force upon
things.
Distinction:
Generic

Qualifying

1. Can be
offset by
an
ordinary
mitigating.

1. Cannot be offset
by
an
ordinary
mitigating.

2. Maybe
proved
even
though
not
alleged.

2. Cannot be proved
as
such
unless
alleged
in
the
information.
However, it may be
proved as a generic
aggravating
circumstance.

3.

3. Changes not only

Not

offset
have the
effect
of
increasing
the
penalty to
the
maximum
but
not
beyond
that
provided
by law.

the nature but also

the name of the
offense.

The circumstances specifying an

offense or aggravating the penalty
thereof
must be
proved
as
conclusively as the act itself, mere
suppositions or presumptions being
insufficient to establish their
presence according to law. The
Supreme Court said that even if the
generic aggravating circumstance
is not alleged in the information,
the same may be proved even over
the objection of the adverse party.
(Q10, 1991 Bar)
Specific circumstances:
1. Taking advantage of Official
Position.
That advantage be taken by the
offender of his public position. (Art.
14, Par. 1)
It is not only necessary that the
person committing the crime be
a public officer; he must also use
the
influence,
prestige
or
ascendancy which such office gives
him as a means by which he
realizes his purpose. (People v.
Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534)
If the abuse of the office is an
integral element of the felony as in
falsification of public document by
a public officer who took advantage
of his official position, bribery or

malversation, the circumstances is

not considered. This means that
this aggravating circumstance is
inherent in the crime, since, it
cannot be committed except by
public officer. (People v. Teves, 44
Phil 275)
2. That the crime be committed in
contempt of or with insult to the
public authorities. (Art. 14, Par. 2)
Public authorities is a person in
authority, not an agent of a person
in authority, and that the person in
authority should be engaged in the
exercise of his public functions,
and that he should not be the
object of the crime. It is also
essential that the offender knows
of the identity of the public
authority.
The Chief of Police is a person in
authority for he is vested with
authority to maintain peace and
order and is duty bound to
prosecute
and
to
apprehend
violators of the laws. (People v.
Rodil, 109 SCRA 308) A Barangay
Chairman is a person in authority.
Teachers, professors, supervisors of
public and duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities,
as well as lawyers are persons in
authority only for the purposes of
Direct Assault (Art. 148) and
Simple
Resistance
and
Disobedience (Art. 151), but not for
the purpose of the aggravating
circumstance in this paragraph.
(People v. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601)
If the crime is committed against
the public authority, the crime
committed is direct assault and this
aggravating circumstance will be
considered
absorbed.
(US
v.
Rodriguez, 29 Phil. 150)

3. Act be committed with insult to

or in disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of
his rank, age, or sex, or that it be
committed in the dwelling of the
offended party, if the latter has not
given provocation. (Art. 14, Par. 3)
There
are
four
aggravating
circumstances in this paragraph,
which, if present in the commission
of the crime are considered as one
aggravating circumstance only.
There must, however, be proof
showing
that
the
accused
deliberately intended to offend or
insult the age or sex of the
offended
party.
(People
v.
Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548) So, these
circumstances was not considered
when the accused was drunk at the
time of the commission of the
offense.
This aggravating circumstance is
considered only in crimes against
persons, security or honor and not
in crimes against property such as
robbery with homicide. (People v.
Ang, 62833, Oct. 8, 1985) The
mere fact that the victim was a
woman is not itself sufficient to
support the contention that there
was insult of disrespect to sex. It
is necessary to prove the specific
fact or circumstance, other than
that the victim is a woman,
showing insult or disregard of sex
in order that it may be considered
as an aggravating circumstance,
such as compelling a woman to go
to the house of the accused against
her will. (US v. Quevengco, 2 Phil.
412)
Disregard of respect due to sex and
age may be included in treachery.
(People v. Limaco, 99 Phil. 35)

Dwelling includes dependencies,

staircase, and enclosures under the
house. A place of sanctuary
worthy of respect. (People v.
Parazo,
May
14,
1997)
A
combination house and store is not
a dwelling. (People v. Magnaue,
3510, May 30, 1951) For dwelling
to be appreciated, it is not
necessary that the victim is the
owner of the dwelling. It is
enough that she has the right to
be in the dwelling and not only as
an incidental circumstance. (People
v. Sto. Tomas, 138 SCRA 206) It is
aggravating where the place is,
even for a brief moment, a home to
the offended party though he is not
the owner thereof, provided that he
did not provoke the commission of
the crime and the dwelling is not
that of the offender also. (People v.
Badilla, 185 SCRA 554)
Dwelling
is
an
aggravating
circumstance even if one does not
enter the house of the victim.
Such as when the assailant from
the outside shoots the victim
inside
his
house. (People v.
Bautista, 440, Nov. 29, 1947) This
circumstance is not considered
where provocation was given by
the offended party or where both
parties
reside
in
the
same
dwelling. In case of a boarding
house, each room of a boarder is
considered a separate dwelling.
(People v. Daniel, 75 OG 4834)
Dwelling is aggravating if adultery
is committed in the conjugal
dwelling because the respect due
the conjugal house is violated (US
v. Ibanez, 33 Phil. 611) if the

paramour is not residing in the

conjugal dwelling.
4. Acts be committed with abuse of
confidence
or
obvious
ungratefulness. (Art. 14, Par. 4)
The requisites are:
a. The offended party had trusted
the offender.
b. The offender abused such trust.
c. That such abuse of confidence
facilitated the commission of the
crime.
If the accused raped a girl who was
entrusted to his care by the
parents, there is betrayal of
confidence reposed upon him by
the parents but not an abuse of the
confidence of the offended party
(People v. Crumb, 46 OG 6162)
since the confidence between the
parties must be personal. But if
the offender was the servant of the
family and sometimes took care of
the child, whom she later killed,
there is present grave abuse of
confidence. (People v. Caliso, 58
Phil. 283)
5. Crime be committed in the (1)
Palace of the Chief Executive, or (2)
in his presence, or (3) where public
authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties, or in (4) a
place
dedicated
to
religious
worship. (Art. 14, Par. 5)
In crime committed
in
the
presence of the President, it is not
necessary that the latter be
exercising his functions.
With
respect to the first, third, and
fourth, the crime must have been
committed with full consciousness
of the place; in other words, the
offender must have intended to
commit the crime at the place,

knowing fully well that the place

deserves respect.
This circumstance is present when
the accused stabbed the victim in
the office of the Chief of Police who
was investigating a fist fight
between them. (People v. De
Ananias, 96 Phil. 979)
6. Nighttime, Uninhabited Place or
Band.
That the crime be committed at
night time, or in an uninhabited
place, or by a band, whenever
such circumstances may facilitate
the commission of the offense.
Whenever more than 3 armed
malefactors
shall have acted
together in the commission of an
offense, it shall be deemed to
have been committed by a band.
(Art. 14, Par. 6)
Nocturnity comprises the period
of the day between sunset and the
beginning of dawn. But for
nighttime to be appreciated, it is
not absolutely necessary that the
offender
purposely
sought
nighttime to commit the crime; it
is enough that it facilitated the
commission of the crime or his
escape or prevented identification.
(People v. Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71)
Where nocturnity is so interlocked
with the circumstance of treachery
as to become part of the latter,
nocturnity cannot be taken into
consideration as an aggravating
circumstance. (People v. Pardo, 79
Phil. 566) If the commission of the
crime was commenced at day time
and it was consummated at
nighttime, such is not aggravated.
(US v. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4) Chance
meeting between the accused and
the victim negates nighttime as an
aggravating circumstances. (People

v. Aquino, 124 SCRA 835) (Q9,

1994 Bar; Q3, 1997 Bar)
Uninhabited
place
(Despoblado) is determined not
by the distance of the nearest
house to the scene of the crime,
but whether or not in the place
where the crime was committed
there was a reasonable possibility
of the victim receiving some help.
(People v. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87)
Provided
that
solitude
was
purposely
sought
or
taken
advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the felony. (People v.
Coderes, 104 SCRA 255)
Band consists of at least four
armed malefactors organized with
the intention of carrying out any
unlawful design. They should have
acted together in the commission
of the crime. If one has no direct
participation in the commission of
the crime, like a principal by
inducement there is no band.
(Gamara v. Valero, 51 SCRA 322)
In a band, conspiracy is presumed,
it need not be proved.
Band is inherent in brigandage but
not in simple robbery committed by
band. It is not considered in the
crime of rape. (People v. Corpus, 43
OG 2249) Band and abuse of
superior strength have the same
essence which is the utilization of
the combined strength of the
assailants to overpower the victim
and
consummate
the
killing.
(People
v.
Medrano,
31871,
December 14, 1981)
7. Crime
committed
on
the
Occasion of Calamity.
That the crime be committed on
the occasion of a conflagration,
shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic,

or other calamity or misfortune.

(Art. 14, Par. 7)
This is aggravating because the
offender who in the midst of a
great calamity, instead of lending
aid to the afflicted, adds to their
suffering by taking advantage of
their misfortune to despoil them.
(US v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150)
The development of engine trouble
at sea is a misfortune but it does
not come within the meaning of
other calamity or misfortune.
(People v. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037)
8. Aid of Armed Men who insure or
afford impunity.
That the crime be committed with
the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity. (Art.
14, Par. 8)
It should be borne in mind, that
the armed men should not
participate in the execution of the
felony. Otherwise, they become
co-principals. Casual presence is
not aggravating if the offender did
not avail himself of any of their aid
nor did he knowingly count upon
their assistance in the commission
of the crime. (US v. Abaigar, 2 Phil.
417) If used as a means to insure
its execution in the killing of a
person, such is absorbed in
treachery.
9. Recidivism (Art. 14, Par. 9)
Recidivist is one who, at the time
of his trial for one crime, shall have
been previously convicted by final
judgment
of
another
crime
embraced in the same title of this
Code. Recidivism involves at least
two conviction, and hence, it is a
form of plurality of crimes like
reiteration, habitual delinquency
and quasi-recidivism. The first
conviction must be by final

judgment and must take place prior

to the second conviction. (People v.
Baldera, 86 Phil. 189) The number
of years intervening between the
convictions
is
immaterial.
Recidivism is likewise considered
even if the offender has been given
absolute pardon for the first
conviction, since pardon merely
extinguishes the penalty (US v.
Sotelo, 28 Phil. 147) but not in the
case
of
amnesty
as
such
extinguishes all the effects in law
of the crime committed. (US v.
Francisco, 10 Phil. 185)
Habitual delinquent is a person
who within a period of ten (10)
years from the date of his release
or last conviction of the crime of
serious or less serious physical
injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or
falsification, has been found guilty
of any said crimes a third time or
oftener. (Art. 62, Par. 5)
Distinction:
Recidivism

Habitual
Delinquency

1.
Applicable
only
to
1. Applies to all
robbery, theft,
offenses
estafa,
embraced
in
falsification,
the same title
serious
and
of the Code.
less
serious
injuries.
2. Need not be
alleged in the
complaint
or
information.

2.
Must
alleged
charged.

3. If not offset,
merely
raises

3. Carries with
it an additional

be
or

the imposition
of
the
prescribed
penalty.
penalty to its
maximum
period.
4.
Between
each
4. Intervening
conviction
period between
there
should
convictions
is
not be a lapse
immaterial.
of time of more
than 10 years.
May the offender be a recidivist
and a habitual delinquent at the
same time? Yes, if the offender was
convicted for the third time of theft
within the conditions prescribed by
law,
the
first
and
second
convictions referring to robbery
and estafa, recidivism will be
aggravating in the imposition of
the principal penalty for the crime
of theft. At the same time, by
reason of such recidivism, he is
also a habitual delinquent, and is
sentenced to the additional penalty
provided by law, although in the
imposition of the said additional
penalty, recidivism is no longer
considered as an aggravating
circumstance as it is inherent in
this form of habitual delinquency.
(People v. Manalo, 8586, May 25,
1956) May the offender be a
habitual delinquent without being a
recidivist?
Yes, if the three
convictions refer to the specific
felonies not embraced in the same
title of the Code like robbery,
falsification and serious physical
injuries.
Quasi-recidivism arises when the
offender shall commit a felony after

having been convicted by final

judgment, before beginning to
serve the sentence, or while
serving the same, he shall be
punished by the maximum period
of the penalty prescribed by law for
the new felony, besides being
penalized as a habitual delinquent,
if applicable. (Art. 160) This is not
a separate crime by itself.
It is necessary to allege recidivism
in the information and to attach
thereto certified copies of the
previous
sentence
rendered
against
the
accused
to
be
presented during the trial. (People
v. Martinada, 194 SCRA 36) (Q18,
1993 Bar)
10. Reiteracion or Habituality.
That the offender has been
previously punished for an offense
to which the law attaches an equal
or greater penalty or for 2 or more
crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty. (Art. 14, Par. 10)
In reiteracion (habituality), it is
essential that the offender must
have been previously punished,
i.e., he must have served, partially
or totally, the penalty imposed
upon him; that the penalty for the
crime for which he was previously
punished, must
be equal or
greater than the penalty for the
crime for which he is on trial, or
that he had previously been
punished for 2 or more offenses the
penalty for which is lighter than
the penalty prescribed for the
offenses for which he is on trial.
Reiteracion is discretionary on the
court. In reiteracion, the offenses
are not embraced in the same title
of the Code.
To be appreciated, it is necessary
to present as evidence certified

copies of the sentence rendered

against the accused, except when
the accused pleads guilty to an
information alleging reiteracion.
(People v. Monterey, Sept. 3, 1996)
11. Crime
be
committed
in
consideration of a price, reward, or
promise. (Art. 14, Par. 11)
It is not enough that the one
committed the crime received a
gift or a reward; it is essential that
such price or reward or promise
must
have been the prime
consideration in the commission
of the crime. Thus, if the money
was given, without any previous
promise, after the commission of
the crime as an expression of
sympathy,
this
circumstance
cannot be present. (US v. Flores, 28
Phil. 29) The offender who induced
others to commit the crime for a
price, promise or reward is a
principal by inducement. (People v.
Otero, 51 Phil. 201)
12. Crime be committed by means
of
inundation,
fire,
poison,
explosion, stranding of a vessel or
intentional
damage
thereto,
derailment of a locomotive, or by
the use of any other artifice
involving great waste and ruin.
(Art. 14, Par. 12)
It is essential that any of the
means mentioned must
have
been used by such offender in the
commission of the crime. Thus, if
the building is burned as a means
to kill the occupant, the crime will
be murder, not murder with arson.
(People v. Villarega, 54 OG 3482)
This is the only aggravating
circumstance that could be a

crime in itself. Such that if a hand

grenade was thrown into a house
and as a result of the explosion,
the house was damaged but no
one was injured, the crime
committed is the crime involving
destruction.
(People
v.
Comporedondo, 47 OG 779)
13. That the act be committed with
evident premeditation. (Art. 14,
Par. 13)
The 3 requisites of evident
premeditation are:
a. The time when the accused
determined to commit the crime.
b. An act manifestly indicating that
the accused has clung to his
determination.
c. A sufficient lapse of time
between such determination and
execution, to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his acts.
(Q3, 1997 Bar)
In order that premeditation may be
considered
either
as
an
aggravating circumstance or as a
qualifying circumstance, it must
be evident, that is, the intention to
kill must be manifest and it must
have been planned in the mind of
the
offender
and
carefully
meditated. Conspiracy does not
necessarily
imply
evident
premeditation
although
premeditation can co-exist with
price or reward. (US v. Nabor, 7
Phil. 267) This circumstance is
inherent in the crime of robbery,
especially committed by several
persons, since there must be an
agreement and the persons have
to meditate and reflect on the
manner of carrying out the crime
and they have to act immediately
in order to succeed. (People Carillo,

supra) But it may be considered in

robbery with homicide (People v.
Valeriano, 1259, Sept. 19, 1955), if
there is evident premeditation to
kill besides stealing.
Mere threats to kill without
evidence of sufficient time for
meditation and reflection do not
constitute evident premeditation.
(People v. Apao Moro, 6771,May 18,
1957) An attack made in the heat
of
anger
negates
evident
premeditation. (People v. Amin,
39046, June 30, 1975)
14. Craft, fraud, or disguise is
employed. (Art. 14, Par. 14)
These are intellectual means in the
commission of a crime and are
separate
aggravating
circumstances.
By the employment of craft and
fraud, the offender resorts more to
intellectual rather than material
means in order to attain his
objective. Craft is
cunning
or
intellectual trickery or chicanery
resorted to by the accused to carry
out his evil design. (People v. Zea,
130 SCRA 77) There is craft when
the accused assumed a position of
authority to gain entrance in a
house to enable him to be alone
with the offended party to commit
acts of lasciviousness upon her.
(People v. Timbol, 47 OG 1859)
Also,
this
circumstance
is
aggravating where the offenders
pretended
to
be
bona
fide
passengers of a jeepney in order
not to arouse suspicion, but once
inside the jeepney, they robbed the
passengers and the driver. (People
v. Lee, 66848, Dec. 20, 1991) If
the craft is used to insure the
commission of the crime without

risk to the accused, it is absorbed

by treachery. (People v. Malig, 46
OG Sup. 11, 255)
Fraud which constitutes deceit and
manifested by insidious words or
machination is illustrated in the
case of the step-father of the
offended
party,
who
taking
advantage of the absence of the
her mother, took the young girl
away and told her she was to be
taken to the house of her
godmother but instead she was
taken to another house where she
was raped. (People v. De Leon, 50
Phil. 539)
The
term disguise refers
to
anything that the offender may use
to prevent recognition. If in spite
of the disguise, the offender was
recognized,
such
cannot
be
aggravating. (People v. Sonsona,
8966, May 25, 1955)
15. That advantage be taken of
superior strength, or means be
employed to weaken the defense.
(Art. 14, Par. 15)
There
must
be
a
notorious
inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, and to
appreciate it, it is necessary to
evaluate the physical conditions of
the protagonists and the arms
employed by each side. (People v.
Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285) There must
be deliberate intent to take
advantage of the same. (People v.
Bello,
10
SCRA
298)
Mere
numerical superiority does not
necessarily involve superiority in
strength. It is necessary to prove,
besides, that attackers cooperated
in such a way as to secure
advantage from superiority in
strength. (People v. Elizaga, 47 OG
38)

Abuse of superior strength is

inherent in parricide when the
husband
killed
his
wife,
as
generally the husband is physically
stronger than the wife. (People v.
Galapia, supra) Also, it is inherent
in rape or is absorbed in the
element of force. (People v. Saylan,
130 SCRA 159)
Intoxication a victim with intention
to kill him is characterized by
means employed to weaken the
defense. (People v. Ducusin, 53
Phil. 280)
16. Treachery
That the act be committed with
treachery (alevosia).
There is
treachery
when
the
offender
commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing
means,
methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended
party might make. (Art. 14, Par. 16)
In parricide, treachery is a generic
aggravating circumstance as well
as in homicide, if it is not alleged in
the information.
Even a frontal attack may be
considered as such if it was sudden
and unexpected so that the victim
had
no chance
to
defend
himself or evade the blow.
However, suddenness
of the
attack itself does not indicate
treachery. It must be sought as a
means to insure the execution of
the crime and to insure the
attacker
from
the
defense
forthcoming from the offended
party. (People v. Bongo, 26909,
Feb. 22, 1974) Treachery must
exist at the commencement of
the execution of the felony. (US v.

Balagtas, 19 Phil. 164) Thus, if the

attack begun without treachery but
the
same
continued,
and
consummated with treachery, it will
not be considered. (Q6, 1995 Bar;
Q6, 1993 Bar)
Treachery
absorbs
nighttime,
abuse
of
superior
strength,
uninhabited place, by band, aid of
armed men, as well as means to
weaken
the
defense.
When
treachery rests upon a separate
fact, nighttime is not absorbed by
treachery. Treachery may co-exist
with evident premeditation, as
when the accused quarreled with
the deceased, threatened to kill
him and on the following day did
so, when he surreptitiously entered
the house of the deceased and
without warning, fired at the
deceased who was shot unaware.
(People v. Mutya, 11255, Sept. 30,
1959) Treachery is inherent in
murder by poisoning. (People v.
Caliso, 58 Phil. 283) (Q10, 1991
Bar)
Any
sudden
and unexpected
attack from behind is clearly
treacherous. However, an attack
from behind or shooting at a
fleeing victim is not necessarily
treacherous unless it appears that
the method of attack was adopted
by the accused deliberately with a
special view to the accomplishment
of the act without any risk to the
assailant from any defense that the
party assaulted may make. (People
v. Canete, 44 Phil. 478) A shot in
the back of the victims head is not
conclusive proof of treachery; the
manner of aggression or how the
act which resulted in the death of
the
victim
had
began
and

developed,
must
be
proved.
(People v. Ablao, 183 SCRA 658)
But where the persons killed are
children of tender years, being 1
year old, 6 years old and 12 years
old, the killing is murder even if the
manner of the attack was not
shown. (People v. Ganohon, 74670,
April 30, 1991)
In sum, the following requisites
must concur for treachery to be
present:
a. The culprit employed means,
methods or forms of execution
which directly and specially tend to
insure the offenders safety from
any retaliatory act on the part of
the offended party.
b. That such means, method or
manner
of
execution
was
deliberately or consciously shown.
(People v. Clemente, 21 SCRA 261)
(Q3, 1997 Bar)
17. That the means be employed
or circumstances brought about
which add ignominy (shame or
disgrace) to the natural effects of
the act.(Art. 14, Par. 17)
It is, as the saying goes, adding
insult to injury; for instance,
raping a married woman in the
presence of her husband who
was helpless to render any
assistance, much less to defend
her as he was bound. Ignominy to
be appreciated must be inflicted
on the victim while he is still alive.
Thus, there is no ignominy when
the accused sliced and took the
flesh from the thighs, legs and
shoulder of the victim after killing
her with a knife. (People v.
Balondo, 27401, Oct. 31, 1969)
There is ignominy where the
accused in committing the rape

used not only the missionary

position, but also, the dog position
as dogs do, i.e., entry from behind.
Ignominy produces moral suffering,
while cruelty produces physical
suffering.
18. Crime be committed after an
unlawful entry. (Art. 14, Par. 18)
There is unlawful entry when an
entrance is effected by a way not
intended for the purpose. Entering
through the window is unlawful
entry. The unlawful entrance must
be made for the purpose of
committing a crime like rape or
murder. But it is inherent in the
crime of trespass to dwelling (US v.
Barberan, 17 Phil. 509) and in
robbery with force upon things
although it may be considered in
robbery
with
violence
or
intimidation against persons. (Q3,
1997 Bar)
Unlawful entry to be aggravating
must be for the purpose of
entrance and not for the purpose of
escape. It must be alleged in the
information to qualify the crime to
robbery; otherwise, the crime will
be theft. (People v. Sunga, 43 Phil.
205)
19. As a means to the commission
of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door,
or window be broken.(Art. 14, Par.
19)
This means is for the purpose of
committing a crime. It is inherent in
robbery with force upon things.
20. That the crime be committed
with the aid of persons under 15
years of age or by means of motor
vehicles,
motorized
watercraft,
airships,
or
other
similar
means. (Art. 14, Par. 20, as
amended by RA 5438)

There are two distinct aggravating

circumstances. The first shows the
greater perversity of the offender
in
taking
advantage of
the
youthfulness of those persons for
criminal purposes. The second is
intended to meet the problem
created by modern criminal in
resorting to faster means of
conveyance to commit the crime.
The
use
of
motor
vehicles
facilitates the commission of the
crime. If the vehicle is used to
facilitate only the escape of the
offender it is not aggravating. A
scooter and a motorcycle are
included under similar means.
21. That the wrong done in the
commission of the crime be
deliberately
augmented
by
causing
other
wrong
not
necessary for its commission. (Art.
14, Par. 21)
It is essential that the offender
inflicted the wounds not necessary
for the crime but for the purpose of
making the victim suffer more.
For cruelty to exist, there must be
proof
that
the
acts
were
perpetrated while the victim was
still alive. This circumstance is
distinguished
from
that
of
ignominy in that cruelty refers
to physical suffering, whereas,
ignominy is circumscribed to moral
suffering. Gagging of the mouth of
a 3-year old child with stockings,
dumping him with head downward
into a box, and covering the box
with sacks and other boxes,
causing slow suffocation, and as a
result the child died, constitutes
cruelty. (People v. Lara, 113 SCRA
316) Also, in the crime of rape,
where the offender tied the victim
to a bed and burnt her face with a

lighted cigarette while raping her.

(People v. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316)
(Q8, 1994 Bar)
The fact that 13 stabs wounds were
inflicted upon the victim does not
constitute cruelty, absent proof
that such wounds were inflicted
sadistically in a way that made the
victim agonize before the fatal
blow which snuffed out his life was
delivered. (People v. Ferrer, 255
SCRA 19)
22. Under influence of dangerous
drugs. (RA 6425, as amended)
When a crime is committed by an
offender who is under the influence
of dangerous drugs, such state
shall be considered as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the
definition of a crime and the
application of the penalty provided
in the Revised Penal Code. (People
v. Belgar, 92155, March 11, 1991)
23. Syndicate or Organized Crime
Group.
This is a special aggravating
circumstance, contemplates of a
group
purposely
formed
or
organized to engage in criminal
activities for gain, not merely the
commission of a particular crime by
two
or
more
persons
who
confederated and mutually helped
one another in its commission. The
existence of a conspiracy does not
necessarily imply or carry with it
this
aggravating
circumstance.
(People v. Alberca, June 26, 1996)
Alternative Circumstances
Alternative
circumstances are
those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or
mitigating
according
to
the

nature and effects of the crime

and other conditions attending its
commission.
Specific circumstances:
1. Relationship
It shall be taken into consideration
when the offended party is the
spouse, ascendant, descendant,
legitimate, natural, or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by
affinity in the same degree of
the offender. (Art. 15)
Relationship
of
stepfather
or
stepmother
and
stepson
or
stepdaughter
is
included
by
analogy as similar to ascendant or
descendant. (People v. Bersabal, 48
Phil. 439) But relationship between
uncle and niece is not included. (US
v. Incierto, 15 Phil. 358)
Relationship is mitigating in crimes
against property. But in theft,
estafa and malicious mischief,
relationship is exempting.
It is considered as an aggravating
circumstance in crimes against
persons if the offended party is of a
higher level than the offender, or
when the offender and the
offended party are relatives of the
same level. (People v. Mercado, 51
Phil. 99) As a rule, relationship is
mitigating if the offended party is
of a lower level than that of the
offender or even exempting if
committed by a parent in excessive
chastisement.
In
crimes
against
chastity,
relationship is aggravating whether
the offender is of a higher or lower
degree than that of the offended
party. It is due to the nature of the
crime. (People v. Porras, 58 Phil.
578)
2. Intoxication

As a general rule, intoxication is a

mitigating circumstance. It must be
shown that at the time of the
commission of the criminal act, the
accused has taken such quantity of
alcoholic drinks to blur his reason
and deprive him of certain degree
of control. (People v. Boduso, 450,
Sept. 30, 1974) Intoxication to be
mitigating must be proved to the
satisfaction of the Court. (People v,
Noble,
77
Phil.
93)
It
is
aggravating only in two cases:
a. Where intoxication is habitual.
b. When it is intentional, that is, it
is subsequent to the plan of the
commission of a felony.
For intoxication to be habitual, it is
not necessary that the offender
should be drunk 7 days a week. It
is enough that the offender has
acquired the habit of getting drunk,
or drinking to excess. If one who
had plotted to kill the victim, had
drunk wine in order to embolden
him in carrying out with his evil
plan,
drunkenness
is
not
mitigating. (People v. Hernandez,
3391, May 23, 1952)
3. Degree
of
instruction
or
education of offender.
As a rule, lack of instruction or a
low degree of intelligence is
considered
as
a
mitigating
circumstance in all crimes except
in offenses against chastity and
property. And also, in the crime of
murder, for a man as a rational
being, has always been forbidden
to kill. (People v. Tabian, 126 SCRA
571) It should be borne in mind
that this circumstance is not
dependent
on the matter of
schooling; it depends more on the
alertness of the mind, the ability to
observe
and
grasp
the

significance of happenings around

him. If one is unable to write but is
highly and exceptionally intelligent
or mentally alert that he easily
realizes the significance of his act,
there
is
no
mitigating
circumstance. (People v. Gorospe,
105 Phil. 184)
High degree of instruction is
aggravating if the offender availed
himself or took advantage of it in
committing a crime as in the case
of
a
lawyer
who
commits
falsification or a doctor who kills his
victim by means of poison.
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
The following are criminally
liable for grave
and
less
grave felonies:
1. Principals
The
following
are
considered
principals:
a. Those who take direct part in the
execution of the act.
They are those who, participating
in the criminal design, personally
take part in the execution of the
felony by acts tending to the
same end. As a general rule, all
those who participated in a felony
are liable as principal when a
conspiracy between or among
them is established. (People v.
Nierra, 96 SCRA 335)
b. Those
who directly force or
induce others to
commit
the
offense.
Generally, the induction is done by
means
of promises or reward or price,
sometimes, by the utterance of
words. It is necessary that the
person uttering the encouraging
words must have such a moral
influence over the person induced
that the words of the other would

practically amount to a command;

and the words uttered must have
been the moving factor that made
the actor commit the offense, and
that the words uttered were used
to procure the commission of the
offense.
There is a principal by induction or
by inducement only if it is shown
that the crime was actually
committed by another who was
induced. (People v. Ong Chiat Lay,
60 Phil. 788)
Regarding the induction, it is
essential that (1) it be made
directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the
crime,
and
(2)
that
such
inducement be the determining
cause of the said commission by
the one induced. (People v. De la
Cruz, 97 SCRA 385)
c. Those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by
another act without which it would
not have been accomplished. (Art.
17)
These are persons who, without
personally participating in the
execution
of
the
felony,
nevertheless cooperate with the
principals by direct participation by
performing another act. The act
performed
by
him
must
be absolutely
essential
or
indispensable to the extent that
without the act performed by him,
the crime could not have been
committed. It is only when the
evidence
fails
to
show
the
existence of conspiracy when the
act of the alleged principals by
cooperation
must
be
indispensable.
An example of
which is the act of lending the
boat for the purpose of robbing a

person who lived in an islet

separated from the mainland by
a wide and deep river and
accessible only by a water craft.
The lender becomes principal by
indispensable cooperation. Also,
the act of initialing the check is
indispensable to the act of
defraudation of the depositor as
without it the check would not be
cashed. (US v. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil.
484)
But any cooperation, even done
with knowledge of the criminal
intent of the accused, if not
indispensable to the commission of
the crime, will make one liable as
an accomplice. So, if the accused
knowingly aided the killers by
casting stones at the victim (People
v. Tatlonghari, 27 SCRA 726) or the
act of giving the victim a fist blow
after he was stabbed by the other
accused (People v. Vistido, 79 SCRA
719) the liability will be that of an
accomplice.
2. Accomplices
Those persons, who, not being
principals, cooperate in
the
execution of the offense
by
previous or simultaneous acts.
(Art. 18)
The acts performed while material
must not be indispensable. Thus,
where the accused is proven to
have merely assisted in guarding
the detained persons to prevent
their escape, the accused should
be held as an accomplice only
since the act performed by him
was
not
indispensable.
However, if the person takes part
in the conspiracy, he can never be
an accomplice.
An accomplice has knowledge of
the criminal design of the principal

and all that he does is to concur

with the latter in his purpose, by
cooperating in the execution of the
crime by previous or simultaneous
acts, for the purpose of supplying
material or moral aid to the
principal in an efficacious way.
(People v. Tanzo, 44 Phil. 18)
It is also necessary that any wound
inflicted by the accomplice must
not be the cause of death; if the
wound is mortal, the offender
would be a principal by direct
participation. (People v. Aplegido,
76 Phil. 571)
Accomplices
are
also
known
as accessories before the fact.
Any doubt as to the participation of
an individual in the commission of
the crime, is always resolved in
favor
of
lesser
responsibility.
(People v. Abiog, 15310, Oct. 31,
1961)
Supposing, while A is choking B, C
suddenly appears and stabs B
mortally. If A continues choking B
after the mortal wound is inflicted,
A will be an accomplice. His act is
a concurrence in the criminal
design of C to kill B. (People v.
Tamayo, supra) If, however, he
does not do any act after B is
stabbed, A has no liability in the
killing of B by C. The liability of A
and C will then be individual. If
there is conspiracy between A and
C to kill B, both will be collectively
liable as principals for the death of
B.
A person who assaults a victim
already fatally wounded by another
is only regarded as an accomplice,
unless
there
was
anterior
conspiracy. (People v. Cagalingan,
188 SCRA 313)
3. Accessories

Those who, having knowledge of

the commission of the crime, and
without
having
participated
therein, either as principals or
accomplices,
take
part subsequent to its commission
in any of the following manners:
a. By profiting themselves
or
assisting the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime.
Buying
a
gold
watch from
another, knowing that it was
stolen property, the accessory
assists the thief to profit by the
effects of the crime. The accessory
should materially benefit from the
act. Riding in a stolen vehicle is
not profiting since it does not
improve his economic position.
Profiting is not synonymous to
intent to gain as an element of
theft. (People v. Morales, 71 OG
529)
b. By concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery.
In the crime of homicide, the body
of the
crime
or
the corpus
delicti is the fact of the killing, that
is, a specific offense in fact
committed by someone. (People v.
Marquez, 43 OG No. 5) A person
who place in one of the hands of
the deceased after he was killed to
show that he was armed and it was
necessary to kill him for having
offered
resistance
to
the
authorities, is an accessory. (People
v. Saladino, 3634, May 30, 1961)
This is similar to concealing the
body of the crime to prevent its
discovery.
c. By harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided the

accessory acts with abuse of his

public functions or whenever the
author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt at the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other
crime. (Art. 19)
If the one assisted is the
accomplice, there is no accessory.
The public officer is an accessory
irrespective
of
the
crime
committed
by
the
principal
provided it is not a light felony. On
the other hand, in case of private
person, the author of the crime
must be guilty of treason, parricide,
murder or attempt against the life
of the President or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other
crime. Thus, if a private person
assists another who has been
guilty of robbery, he cannot be an
accessory.
An accessory does not participate
in
the
criminal
design
nor
cooperate in the commission of the
crime. (People v. Verzola, 80 SCRA
600) If the principal is acquitted
because the facts alleged to have
been committed are not proved or
do not constitute a crime, the
accessory is not liable. (US v.
Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194) But if the
principal is acquitted because of an
exempting
circumstance,
the
accessory may be held liable as the
crime has been committed. As
long as the crime has been
committed, even if the principal
has
not
been
arrested
and
convicted, the accessory may be
held liable. (People v. Billon, 48 OG
1391)
The following are criminally
liable for light felonies:

1. Principals
2. Accomplices
The
penalties
prescribed
for
accessories shall not be imposed
upon those who are such with
respect
to
their
spouses,
ascendants,
descendants,
legitimate, natural, and adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives
by affinity within
the
same
degrees,
with
the
exception

where the accessory profits or

assists in the principal to profit
from the effects of the crime. (Art.
20)
The reason therefor is that if the
accessory himself profited or
assisted to profit from the effects of
the crime the motivating power
was not his relationship with the
principal but his love for money.