140021668

IR: 3059 Anglo-American Relations since 1939: The Special Relationship

Professor: Dr. Gavin Bailey
Friends with Benefits
'I hereby declare that the attached piece of written work is my own work and that I have not
reproduced, without acknowledgement, the work of another.
Word Count:4,862

Introduction
The Anglo-American special relationship is widely understood to have experienced a
series of strains following the Second World War. During the early 1960s to late 70s these
strains involved the weakened British economy, Americas war in Vietnam, Britains focus on
Europe, and the ultimate collapse of the Bretton Woods system.1 All of these strains were placed
against the backdrop of the Cold War and the divergent roles within this war that the two
countries sought respectively.
This essay attempts to explain these tumultuous years of transition within the Anglo-American
special relationship between 1963 and 1973. While the focus of discussion is framed between
these dates, it becomes obvious that one must establish exactly from whence any such changes
transitioned from. Accordingly, the first part of this paper will examine the Anglo-American
relationship as characterized by Eisenhower and Macmillan between 1957 and 1960. This period,
often referred to as the Golden Age2 of the Anglo-American relationship, is when a renewal of
the relationship occurred following what Britain considered to be a serious US betrayal in Suez.
This reconciliation is characterised by a renewed nuclear cooperation between the US and
Britain, through the repeal of the MacMahon Act and Eisenhowers offer of the Skybolt missiles
1 Dobson, Allen. The Years of Transition: Anglo-American Relations 1961-1967. Routledge, 1995.

2 Ashton, Nigel J. Harold Macmillan and the Golden Days of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 195763.
Diplomatic History 29, no. 4 (September 2005): 691723.

and Polaris options to Macmillan. Understanding the positive and renewed condition of the
Anglo-American relationship between Eisenhower and Macmillan, provides the contrast
necessary to explain the fractured relationship within the transition years between 1963 and
1973.
The second part of this paper will then explain the aforementioned strains which occurred within
the Anglo-American relationship during the 1960s and 1970s. Again, such strains are thought to
be an amalgamation of the Vietnam war, Britains entry into the European Economic Committee
(EEC), and the ending of the Bretton Woods system. This troubling combination during the
1960s and 1970s is summed up by Allen Dobson:
Much of the economic and defence framework, within which fruitful AngloAmerican co-operation had taken place in the twenty-five years since the end of the
Second World War, disappeared. The USA had turned more to the Far East and away
from Europe, because of the war in Vietnam, the growing economic importance of Japan,
and increasing irritation with her European allies.3
These tensions and strains within the Anglo-American relationship might also be considered
through the perspectives of realism. If a realist perspective is to be taken, this transition period of
Anglo-American relations is proof that any alliance which exists does so not because of a special
relationship, but rather because of utility and mutual threat. A central example of this utility
within the relationship would be the nuclear co-operation of the Polaris deal. While the key
examples of mutual threat were obviously the Cold War and Vietnam. The essay will therefore
conclude by considering whether or not this transition period from 1963 to 1973 is evidence of
an Anglo-American relationship built completely upon utility and mutual threat.
Eisenhower & Macmillan

3 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 138.

The Suez crisis of 1956 is acknowledged as a very low point in the Anglo-American relationship.
Anglo-Egyptian relations had been tense, with frustrations stemming from failed negotiations
over British withdrawal of troops from the Suez Canal Zone base.4 Matters were made worse
when Egyptian president Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. Prime Minister
Anthony Eden saw Nassers actions as being not only an affront on British prestige, but also an
attack on vital national interests.5 The British and French sought to put an end to Nassers
actions and leadership through negotiations and ultimately force if necessary. Eden sought
diplomatic and military support from the US, support that did not come.
Near the end of October in 1956 Britain and France attacked Egypt, removing the Saudis
occupying the Buraimi Oasis.6 This unilateral action was not well received by Eisenhower. This
tension brought upon the Anglo-American relationship was largely in part due to Britain not
having consulted America at all before attacking, as well as being the sort of gunboat diplomacy
that might ruin Western attempts at the containment of Communism within the Third World.7
Eisenhower was then determined to stop the British and French by demanding withdrawal. The
US placed pressure on Britain and France through the UN as well as selling sterling and blocking

4 Fain, W. Taylor. John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan: Managing the Special Relationship in the Persian Gulf
Region, 1961-63. Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 4 (October 1, 2002): 95122.

5 Smith, Simon C. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1945
1973. Asian Affairs 45, no. 3 (November 2014): 42548.

6 Smith, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN, 433.

7 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 118.

any aid from the IMF.8 The financial pressures of a ruined pound left the British no choice but to
comply with Eisenhowers request for military withdrawal.
The Suez crisis left a very bitter taste in the mouth of the Anglo-American relationship. It seems
quite clear that the specialness of the relationship had no bearing on the behavior of the US in
regard to assumptive support of Britain. The Suez crisis is then a warning of what happens when
the Anglo-American alliance fails to maintain a unity of interests, common perception of threat,
and agreement on policy. Furthermore, the crisis seems to also be a clear example of the failure
to communicate. While the British did not consult the US when it chose to unilaterally attack,
Eden and Macmillan assumed that military and financial support would come from the US. In his
memoir Macmillan said this in respect to the assumption of US backing: I was confident that if
and when the moment for action arrived we should have, if not the overt, at least the covert
sympathy and support of the Government and people of the United States.9 Likewise the US did
not expect the unilateral military action of Britain, assuming that they would be consulted by
Britain first before any use of force within the Suez. This failure of communication is in fact
quite ironic. The irony comes from the fact that a special relationship is often qualified by tightknit and clear communication between political and military structures; however, in the case of
the Suez crisis the special relationship lent itself to many assumptions which ultimately resulted
in a breakdown of communication.

8 Ashton, Harold Macmillan, 693.

9 Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 19561959. London: Macmillan, 1971, p. 104.

While the Suez crisis was most certainly a very low point in the Anglo-American relationship, a
renewal was soon to come. This renewal came from the premiership of Macmillan in January
1957.10 It was at the Bermuda Conference in March of 1957 that Macmillan and Eisenhower
seemingly repaired the Anglo-American relationship. This reconciliation came from the mutual
utility of nuclear co-operation. Soviet nuclear threat during the Suez crisis left the US with a
desire to ensure a stronger Western nuclear presence. At the Bermuda Conference the US
proposed stationing intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Britain.11Meetings at the Bermuda
Conference allowed for the preemptive steps necessary for the Anglo-American nuclear cooperation that would culminate in response to the launch of Sputnik on October 4th 1957.12 The
threat of Sputnik prompted further nuclear co-operation between the US and Britain, ultimately
resulting in the repeal of the McMahon Act. An exchange of nuclear information and nuclear cooperation between the US and Britain of this magnitude had not occurred since the Second World
War. Included within the negotiations between Eisenhower and Macmillan over nuclear cooperation were the agreements to sell Skybolt missiles to Britain, as well as the option for Britain
to purchase Polaris missiles.13 In return, the US was able to secure the Holy Loch submarine base
and the Fylingdales spy station from the British. The launch of Sputnik realigned a mutual utility

10 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 118.

11 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 120.

12 Ashton, Harold Macmillan, 699.

13 Blackwell, Stephen. Pursuing Nasser: The Macmillan Government and the Management of British Policy
Towards the Middle East Cold War, 1957--63. Cold War History 4, no. 3 (April 2004): 85104.

and the mutual threat of Russian communism that was lost between the Anglo-American
relationship during the Suez. The freshly mended Anglo-American relationship leading into the
1960s would soon face the difficult transition years.
The Early 1960s
The early 1960s saw the young John F. Kennedy into the office of the US presidency. The
personal relationship shared between Macmillan and Kennedy was to be one of high sentiment
and mutual trust and support.14 Nuclear defence and the Skybolt missile crisis in particular, were
a testament to the personal relationship shared between Kennedy and Macmillan. The handling
of the Skybolt missile crisis and what would be the Nassau agreement, seemed to have been a
promising start to the Anglo-American relationship in the early 1960s.
The nuclear strategy of Kennedy and US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara was one of
Western nuclear consolidation.15 The central control of this multinational nuclear force was of
course to be under the US. McNamara sought to strip Western Europe of any nuclear
independence outside of American control; the thought being that a multinational nuclear force
headed by the US would prevent unwanted US involvement in Nuclear wars it disapproved of
but might nevertheless be drawn into as a member of the Western camp.16 McNamaras nuclear
policy was at odds with a British independent nuclear deterrent. So when McNamara set out to
end the Skybolt missile project, the British independent nuclear deterrent was directly threatened.

14 Ashton, Harold Macmillan, 707.

15 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 127.

16 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 127.

Macmillan saw the loss of Skybolt as the end of Britain as a nuclear power, and his only hope
would be to secure the Polaris missiles.17 Meeting with Kennedy at the Nassau conference in
December of 1962, Macmillan was able to argue that refusing to sell Polaris missiles to Britain
would most certainly be the end of British nuclear independence and would seriously rupture the
Anglo-American relationship. Macmillan also took pains to point out how loss of Britains
nuclear independence would threaten domestic politics of his government which would
ultimately threaten US desires to see the British join the EEC.18 Kennedy was convinced by
Macmillan, and the Nassau Agreement was reached.
The key point to be taken from the Skybolt crisis and the Nassau Agreement was that the AngloAmerican relationship survived not because of power threats or even mutual utility, both reasons
that any realist would assume necessary. Instead Macmillan was able to pursue and secure
British nuclear interests by way of an appeal to his sentiments toward Kennedy.19 The nuclear cooperation that was reinforced by the Nassau Agreement, indicated a reliance upon mutual trust
between the US and Britain.20 Mutual trust and sentiment are not acknowledged by realist to be
serious influences of a relationship between states. The Skybolt missile crisis and the relationship
between Macmillan and Kennedy seem to be an indication that the Anglo-American relationship

17 Ashton, Harold Macmillan, 720.

18 Ashton, Harold Macmillan, 720.

19 Melland, Claire. Britain and a New World Role: The Nassau Agreement 1962 and Its Effect on International and
Anglo-European Relations, and the Anglo-American Special Relationship, 2011.

20 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 130.

is not only built upon mutual utility and threat. Perhaps the Anglo-American relationship can
also involve the mutual trust and sentiment between political leaders. No doubt Kennedy and
Macmillan shared one of the highest relationships involving such trust and sentiment.
The Transition Years: 1963-1973
Having established where the Anglo-American relationship stood in the early years of Macmillan
as well as Kennedy, there can now be a contrast for understanding the transition years of the
relationship. The Anglo-American relationship found most of its strengthening, in the years of
Macmillan, in the efforts toward nuclear co-operation. We saw this strengthening begin with
Eisenhower and Macmillans agreement to repeal the MacMahon Act after the Suez crisis. Their
efforts toward a stronger Anglo-American relationship through nuclear co-operation was carried
on by Kennedy. Despite opposition within his own administration during the Skybolt missile
crisis, Kennedy agreed to sell the Polaris missiles to Britain by way of the Nassau Agreement. It
would seem that the late 1950s and early 1960s were a period of strong Anglo-American
relations.
One might have thought at the time that the Anglo-American relationship would only
continue to be fruitful, carrying on into 1960s and 70s. This was not to be the case. The transition
years of the Anglo-American relationship after Kennedys assassination proved to be
troublesome. As previously mentioned the change from what was a strong and determined
relationship entering into the early 1960s, hinged upon the interconnectedness of a British
financial crisis, the Vietnam war, and British membership of the EEC.
Economic struggles and the EEC: French Rejection
The early 60s were a time of continued economic difficulty for Britain. The British were
faced with an uncompetitive economy, large overseas debts and obligations, and the task of

maintaing confidence in sterling.21 These threats were the beginning of pressures that would
eventually undermine the Bretton Woods System. Allen Dobson points out that the British
considered membership of the European Economic Community as a means of escape from the
burdens of their struggling economy. One would assume that if the British were to transition into
the EEC their interests would naturally move away from the Atlantic, becoming primarily shaped
by a more Eurocentric influence. This no doubt would certainly strain the Anglo-American
relationship, and US policy makers would not encourage any such Europeanisation of Britain via
membership of the EEC. The Americans, however, saw Britains membership in the EEC as
something that would strengthen not weaken the Anglo-American relationship.
The Kennedy administration proposed British entry into the ECC in hopes of not only relieving
the monetary strains of supporting the British through their financial troubles, but also to secure a
pro-western influence within the ECC.22 The fear of Britain and the US was that General de
Gaulle of France would see through the British application into the EEC. The Anglo-American
relationship and British entrance into the EEC would have been perceived by de Gaulle as a
challenge to his leadership of Europe and be an American Trojan Horse that would influence
European policy on the basis of Atlantic rather than European interests.23 Despite Macmillans
attempts to persuade de Gaulle of British devotion to Europe in their meetings at the Champs

21 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 125.

22 Melland, Britain and a New World Role, 70.

23 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 126.

summit of 1962, de Gaulle was not convinced.24 At this meeting Macmillan even proposed the
uniting of Anglo-French nuclear power. This of course was just before the Skybolt crisis, which
would reveal the weakness of British nuclear force. The Skybolt crisis had ultimately
demonstrated the British dependence upon America. This dependence was perceived by de
Gaulle to be anti-European, and is considered by some historians to be the final straw that led to
de Gaulles veto of Britains application into the ECC.25 The Anglo-American relationship had
tainted de Gaulles perception of British intentions of EEC membership, and ultimately caused
the first French veto of British application to the EEC. This would be the first instance of the
Anglo-American special relationships negative influence over British application to the EEC.
The second instance of a French veto would come under the premiership of Harold Wilson and
the presidency of Lyndon Johnson.
The Second ECC Rejection & Vietnam
The looming economic troubles of Britain continued into the premiership of Harold Wilson in
October of 1964. The sterling continued to weaken as the tremendous balance of payments
deficit worsened; this ultimately would continue to pressure Britain's defence programmes and
military commitments east of the Suez as well as destabilise Bretton Woods.26 The AngloAmerican relationship continued to weaken as the US began its engagement of the war in
Vietnam. Despite US assistance in propping up the ever weakening sterling, through the

24 Ashton, Harold Macmillan, 717.

25 Melland, Britain and a New World Role, 76.

26 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 131.

acquiring of Western Bank loans and encouraged support from the IMF, the British refused to
send troops into Vietnam.27 Johnsons desire for British military support in Vietnam was based on
the assumption that it would have bestowed a kind of Western consensus and legitimacy over US
action in Vietnam.28 He also appealed to the very nature of the Anglo-American relationship,
assuming that British support of troops was expected if US financial support of the British were
to continue.
Why were the British seemingly so unwilling to provide the military support of troops to their
Atlantic cousins? Wilsons refusal to send British troops to Vietnam was mainly due to his
heading of a Labour Party who were adamantly opposed to the pro-war foreign policy of the
previous Conservative government. The Labour Party pushed a foreign policy that would be antiimperialist with an ultimate aim at serious attempts to ease Cold War tensions. The potential
escalation of this war caused Labour leaders to fear the direct Soviet or Chinese involvement in
supporting the Northern Vietnamese; any such involvement would certainly not serve in the
relaxing of the Cold War.29 Wilson also was faced with Britains commitment of 54,000 troops in
their Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation, claiming to be overstretched as it were when
pressured by Johnson for troops.30

27 Vickers, Rhiannon. Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party, and the War in Vietnam. Journal of Cold War
Studies, no. 2 (2008): 41.

28 Vickers, Harold Wilson, 7.

29 Spelling, Alex. A Reputation for Parsimony to Uphold: Harold Wilson, Richard Nixon and the Re-Valued
Special Relationship 19691970. Contemporary British History 27, no. 2 (June 2013): 192213.

As Wilson continued to provided public support of the US involvement in Vietnam, whilst never
providing military support of troops, the economic troubles of sterling continued to plague the
Anglo-American relationship. The fear of both the British and Johnson, was that the economic
struggle would lead to a devaluation of sterling ultimately damaging the British defence
commitments east of Suez and Bretton Woods.31 Therefore despite Johnsons frustrations at what
was perceived to be a failing in the special relationship, in regard to British provision of troops,
aid was given to relieve the pressure on sterling. In fact from 1965 to 1966 the US bilaterally
had put over $1.7 billion at Britains disposal.32
These attempts by the US to support sterling in hopes of preventing British defence cuts east of
Suez were done in vain. In July of 1967 British Secretary of Defence Denis Healey announced
the planned withdrawal of all troops in its military bases east of Suez by the mid-1970s.33 Britain
felt it could no longer sacrifice the economic stability of its domestic interests for the sake of its
foreign military commitments east of Suez. To make matters worse Healey announced the
devaluation of sterling in November of the same year. This devaluation would lead to increased
pressures on the US dollar, unsustainable overseas defence in Vietnam. and the ultimate collapse

30 Spelling, A Reputation for Parsimony, 193.

31 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 132.

32 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 133.

33 Spelling, A Reputation for Parsimony, 194.

of the Bretton Woods System.34 Furthermore, the second attempt at British application of the
EEC had been denied by de Gaulle once again in May earlier that same year.35 Gaulle still had
suspicions of the Anglo-American special relationship and was unwilling to allow Atlantic
interests to interfere with his leadership of Europe. This second rejection of British entrance into
the EEC by France would be the reasoning behind Britains alienation from the Anglo-American
special relationship during the premiership of Heath.
Heath, Nixon, and EEC Success
The election of Edward Heath in 1970 brought the reinstatement of the British Conservative
Party. This was assumed as what would be a promising relationship between Heath and the
conservative Nixon administration. Of course this was not the case, as many have noted the
Nixon-Heath era to be one of the lowest points of the Anglo-American special relationship. This
in part was due to Heaths distant attitude toward America in a pursuit of successful acceptance
into the EEC.36
The first meeting between Heath and Nixon at Chequers set the tone for what would be a
revitalised Europeanism, through the gradual detachment of Britain from the special relationship.
During this initial meeting between the two leaders, Heath was unwilling to accept any American
support with the application into the EEC. Heath was determined that Britain was not to be

34 Spelling, A Reputation for Parsimony, 195.

35 Melland, Britain and a New World Role, 116.

36 Spelling, Alex. Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations 1970-1974: A Reappraisal. Diplomacy &
Statecraft 20, no. 4 (December 2009): 63858.

Americas Trojan Horse in Europe.37 It would seem that Heaths disregard for the AngloAmerican special relationship, instead preferring the natural relationship, was founded on the
economic constraints of Britain and the devaluing of sterling.38 Indeed, Heaths main priority was
to promote British interests. Heath seemed to have believed that turning to the EEC would best
serve these interests through an assumed strengthening of the British economy.
It was in May of 1971 that Heath was able to meet with French President Georges Pompidou,
ensuring him that Britain was fully committed to Europe.39 Heath revealed to Pompidou that
there could be no special partnership between Britain and the United States, even if Britain
wanted it, because one was barely a quarter size of the other. But such a partnership was possible
in Europe.40 Heaths distance from the Anglo-American special relationship successfully secured
the French Presidents approval of British entry into the EEC; and in January of 1973 Britain was
a part of the EEC.41
The Anglo-American special relationship had completely moved into a new direction during the
premiership of Heath. Never before had a prime minister made such careful intentions to

37 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 141.

38 Spelling, Edward Heath, 641.

39 Melland, Britain and a New World Role, 115.

40 Spelling, Edward Heath, 643.

41 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 142.

distance Britain from the special relationship. Heath seemed to have abandoned the previously
established dependence upon the US, reaching out instead toward the promise of europeanisation
and the economic stability of the EEC.42 This of course was a strain on American interest
regarding European policy since Heaths detachment from the special relationship implied a
disregard for the concerns of the Atlantic.

Conclusion
It would appear that the Anglo-American relationship was weakened greatly from 1964 to 1973.
It most certainly would not be considered special, and was in fact moving further and further
away from the special relationship enjoyed in the late 1950s into the early 60s. The AngloAmerican relationship had seen a recovery after the bitter Suez crisis in 1957. Eisenhower and
Macmillan were able to foster nuclear co-operation between the US and Britain. They worked
together on an agreement to repeal the McMahon Act and secured agreements to place Skybolt
and Polaris missiles in the hands of the British.
Similarly, Kennedy also was able to work with Macmillan towards strengthening AngloAmerican relations through nuclear co-operation. As with the Suez crisis, the Anglo-American
relationship was once again threatened in the early 1960s. McNamaras desire to end the Skybolt
missile program would consequentially also be the end of a British independent nuclear
deterrent. This threat to the Anglo-American relationship was avoided through the Nassau

42 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 143.

Agreement reached by Kennedy and Macmillan. The Nassau Agreement secured Polaris missile
options for the British, alleviating any threat to an independent nuclear deterrent.
When considering these periods of the Anglo-American relationship, it seems evident that
both the US and British governments shared the mutual utility and threat that a realist would
deem essential to an Anglo-American alliance. It is this mutual utility and common threat that
sustained the recovery of the Anglo-American relationship after both the Suez and Skybolt
crises. Both the US and Britain held what they believed to be similar Cold War roles, sharing
ultimately in the common threat of Communism. This common threat is what allowed them to
find a mutual utility through nuclear co-operation .
In the transition years that followed the successful Anglo-American relationship during
the late 1950s into the early 1960s, it might be argued that the Cold war roles changed due to a
shift in perceived common threat. The strain experienced by the Anglo-American relationship in
these transition years from 1963 to 1973 was certainly a mixture of the British financial crisis,
British entrance into the EEC, the war in Vietnam, and the eventual collapse of the Bretton
Woods System. The two most impactful strains were no doubt Vietnam and British entrance into
the EEC. From the perspective of realism, both served to greatly explain the fracturing of the
Anglo-American relationship when considering mutual utility and common threat.
Vietnam was a war that premier Wilson continuously refused to participate in militarily.
This indicated a movement away from the united front against Communism that had been
present between the US and UK since after the Second World War. It can be argued that because
Britain was unable to share in the mutual threat of Vietnam, a breakdown of perceived mutual
utility would naturally ensue. This did in fact happen, as frustrations continued to build over US
financial support of Britain. This support seemed unwarranted if the British were not willing to

send troops to Vietnam or even uphold military commitments east of the Suez. Without the
required mutual threat,Vietnam, the Anglo-American relationship suffered greatly. The British
economic struggles only served to worsen the situation, ultimately providing the foundation for
Britains desire to enter the EEC.
Britains failed attempts at entering the EEC during this time period were thought to be a
result of the Anglo-American special relationship. The French suspicion of such specialness
was behind the veto which blocked British entrance twice. Economic pressures continued as the
sterling was devalued and the Bretton Woods began to crumble. It seems that primer Heath, in
his desire for British economic stability, made entrance into the EEC the utmost priority. Heath
would not let the association of a special Anglo-American relationship give rise to a third veto.
His premiership was then one of distance from the US, ushering in a europeanisation of Britain
that had not been seen before.
This detachment from the Anglo-American special relationship ultimately secured
Heaths approval by French President Pompidou, securing Britains successful acceptance into
the EEC. It is evident then that Heath no longer saw a mutual utility in the Anglo-American
relationship. This lack of perceived mutual utility could be thought to have supported Heaths
distancing from the US. Indeed it would seem that Heath had transferred the mutual utility
traditionally enjoyed by Britain and the US, to the French and the other EEC members.
The transition years from 1963 to 1973 were obviously a low point in the AngloAmerican special relationship. This period was a movement away from the successful nuclear
co-operation that had occurred in the late 1950s and early 60s. It is evident that due to a lack of
common threat during the war in Vietnam, Anglo-American relations were unable to clearly

identify mutual utility. This frustration at the lack of mutual utility manifest itself on both sides
of the Atlantic. The US was growing disinterested in financially supporting a Britain who failed
to meet her military obligations; while Britain became more and more anxious to alleviate
economic pressures through the disassociation of the special relationship in favour of EEC
acceptance.
In conclusion, it is apparent that the failed Anglo-American alliance was the result of an
inability to maintain common threat and mutual utility. This is clearly the case when comparing
the period of the Anglo-American relationship in 1963 to 1973 with that of the late 1950s and
early 60s. The later was united under the common threat of the Soviets and fear of Communist
expansion, while maintaining mutual utility through nuclear co-operation. This was not the case
during the transition period. The once deeply shared mutual threat of Communism was fractured
by Britains inability to participate in Vietnam. Economic strains and the devaluation of sterling
served only to push the British further away from America, ultimately seeking refuge in the arms
of the EEC. The transition period from 1963 to 1973 is then a clear example of an AngloAmerican relationship that was once built upon mutual utility and common threat. It was during
these years that the absence of such utility and threat was revealed.

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MIDDLE EAST 19451973. Asian Affairs 45, no. 3 (November 2014): 42548.
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(June 2013): 192213.
. Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations 1970-1974: A Reappraisal. Diplomacy
& Statecraft 20, no. 4 (December 2009): 63858.
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of Cold War Studies, no. 2 (2008): 41.