Civil Law Cases 3

Case Readings in Civil Law I - #3
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Table of Contents
Corpus v. Sto. Tomas .......................................................................................................................................................... 2
Van Dorn v. Romillo ......................................................................................................................................................... 12
Pilapil v. Ibay Somera .................................................................................................................................................... 15
Republic v. Iyoy ................................................................................................................................................................ 23
Republic v. Orbecido ...................................................................................................................................................... 35
Sy v. CA ............................................................................................................................................................................. 40

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Corpus v. Sto. Tomas

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571
August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January
8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of
the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must
first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer
to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

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Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case,
as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country

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Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law
this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the
alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

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SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with
the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will
allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

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Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded
the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and
status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires
the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books,
in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

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But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 both of
which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings
for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree
and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of
the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
*
Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
Id. at 3-20.
Id. at 27.
Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.
Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.
Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:
It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of
Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of execution of such
foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.

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7
Supra note 1.
Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.
Rollo, p. 31.
10
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.
11
Id. at 121.
Gerberts motion for reconsideration of the RTCs October 30, 2008 decision was denied in
an order dated February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.
12
13
Supra note 2.
14
Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53
in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.
15
16
The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.
17
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Volume One, with the Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.
18
19
Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
20
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
21
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
22
Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
23
Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign
divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
24
25
See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
xxxx
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be

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rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Parenthetically, we add that an aliens legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a
certificate issued by his or her respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or she
must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino spouse who
seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a declaration of authority to
remarry.
26
27
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.
28
Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448;
see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
29
30
Rollo, pp. 38-41.
The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn
was dissolved by the Canadian court. The full text of the courts judgment was not included.
31
Literally means "a thing adjudged," Blacks Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes
a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, on points and matters
determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.
32
See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997,
274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:
33
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several
cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for
this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the
foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big, bold
letters; rollo, p. 37.
34
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing
Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
35
36
Rollo, pp. 47-50.
37
Id. at 51.
38
Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
39

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40
When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule
108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No.
138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430
41

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Van Dorn v. Romillo

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders,
dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which
denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established
their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing
in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari
and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and
to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then
lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in
this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.

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Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of
the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community
of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce
of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared
in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who,
giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that
there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney
he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a

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penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
4 p. 98, Rollo.
5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga, Private
International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."

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Pilapil v. Ibay Somera

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a
decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April
20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de
facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil
Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted
to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for
the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

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On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the
other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434
went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution
of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James
Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor,
gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 8752434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 8752435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and
for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for
review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia.
The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner
being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not
guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant,
a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national
law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,

cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary
Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which
starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,

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abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since
criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private
crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre,
the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution
of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would
be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as
of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but
ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the
legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing
at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute
a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when
the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the

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prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle
him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the
unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in
the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when
the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering
our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here
alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting
and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows
to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond
had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that

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"the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even
though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void,
until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically
inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration
that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from
the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to
stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is
the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the
termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited,
must suffer the same fate

of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably
filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.
27
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also
in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that
their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of
the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to
a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the
National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned
but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation,"
where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the
undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the
husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign

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law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or
residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband
would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law,
it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988)
the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband
was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also
in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that
their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of
the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to
a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the
National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned
but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation,"
where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the
undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the
husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign
law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or
residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband
would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law,
it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988)
the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband
was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, 5, 29.
2 Ibid., 6, 29.
3 Ibid., 7.

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4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition.
5 Ibid., 7, 178.
6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id.
7 Ibid., 8-9, 178.
8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id.
9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id.
10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id.
11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id.
12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id.
13 Ibid., 10 Annex H, id.
14 Ibid, 105.
15 Ibid., 11.
16 Ibid., 311-313.
17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
18 People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934); People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565,
569 (1971); People vs. Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, 1988.
19 Valdepeas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672
(1980).
20 Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298 (1932); Donio-Teves,
et al. vs. Vamenta, et al., 133 SCRA 616 (1984).
21 Rollo, 289.
22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla.
153, 37 p. 1099; State vs. Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915.
23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956).
24 139 SCRA 139,140 (1985).
25 The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the Family Code of
the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227,
effective on August 3, 1988), Article 26 whereof provides that "(w)here marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

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thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to re under Philippine law.
26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911).
27 Footnote 20, ante.

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Republic v. Iyoy
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36
of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint 3 for declaration of nullity of
marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus
married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal
ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving
all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a
year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel
in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to
bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990,
for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert;
and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She
had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At
the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint
that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and
72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was
already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being

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previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations
made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any
normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because
of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough
money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and
what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family.
Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them,
as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for
one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent
Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce
papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired
American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an
American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that
respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain
operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the
P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the
opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony
on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; 7 (2) the Certification,
dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16
December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used
her American husbands surname, Micklus.9
Felys counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and
her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines
in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders 12 and Commissions13
issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the
witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into
account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed
to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely
to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed,
plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established
that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America
and married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE
nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the
wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.

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Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred
and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It
is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations,
such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been
satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal
Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are
her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus
L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence,
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001,
affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing
in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration
of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A
DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust
situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the
defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien as well.
This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose
spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married
to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to
remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage
which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by
affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. 16

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After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence
considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of
the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. 18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly
established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become
an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines
authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on
behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the
instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of
Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid
down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

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(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite
lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in
a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be

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quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be
easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted
only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December
1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave
mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the
rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root
cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven
to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v.
Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 31 No less than the Constitution
of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.32

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II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married
is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was
not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the
time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening
in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government
and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the
Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such
proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a

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proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually
responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable
and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the
case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at
213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v.
Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts
of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The
pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the
Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.

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(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the
decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the
action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment
shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to
what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answer to every individual problem. 39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

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Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos with Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia
and Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-31.
1
Penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos, Id., pp. 63-66.
Records, pp. 1-3.
Id., pp. 8-13.
Id., pp. 25-29, 30-32.
Id., 23-24.
TSN, 08 September 1997.

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8
Supra, note 6, p. 36.
Id., p. 37.
10
Id., pp. 40-45.
11
Id., pp. 48-49.
Penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos, dated 07 November 1997 (Id., p. 51) and 01 August 1998
(Id., p. 58).
12
13
Id., p. 52.
14
Id., p. 61.
15
Supra, note 2, pp. 65-66.
16
Supra, note 1, pp. 28-30.
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring; Rollo, p. 32.
17
18
Id., p. 13.
19
Id., pp. 36-41.
20
G.R. No. 112019, 04 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
21
Id., p. 34.
22
Id., pp. 33-34.
23
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
24
Id., pp. 209-213.
25
G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
26
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra, note 24, p. 211.
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422; Dedel v.
Court of Appeals and Corpuz-Dedel, G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 461; GuillenPesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588; Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25;
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, 08 December 1999, 320 SCRA 76.
27
28
Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25, p. 765.
29
Supra, note 25.
30
Supra, note 23.

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Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra, note 27; Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, 09 February
20001, 351 SCRA 425; Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra, note
27; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra, note 23.
31
32
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Philippine Constitution of 1987.
33
Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Section 34.
34
Id., Section 35.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda, G.R. No. 134436, 16 August 2000, 338 SCRA
254, 265.
35
36
G.R. No. 145370, 04 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725.
37
Id., pp. 738-739.
38
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra, note 27, p. 439; Dedel v. Court of Appeals and Corpuz-Dedel, supra,
note 27, p. 467; Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 20, p. 36.
39

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Republic v. Orbecido
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion
for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated
to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason
of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry
under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue,
San Gabriel, California.

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Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits
that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated
by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his
second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was
the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background

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On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the
U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can remarry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

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The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954
and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended
to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the
badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning
the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized
as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

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Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by
a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May
15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairman
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 20-22.

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2
Id. at 27-29.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106-110.
Id. at 110.
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
7
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281,
286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729,
737.
8
Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
10
No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
11
G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850,
855.
12
13
Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
14
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
15
Id. at 451
Sy v. CA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127263
April 12, 2000
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.

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QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which
affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition3 for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at
the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with
two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,
respectively.5
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San
Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. 6
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and
their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's
residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father. 7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later
amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just
cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and
approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the
spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May
15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by
his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the
boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away
from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and
punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when
she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma
and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a
Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando
maltreated her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of
the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent
against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year.
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated December 4, 1991, granted the
petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to
respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the

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Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical
injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's
psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her
part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act
only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from
the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. 15
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the
petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the
alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may
warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the decision 17 of
the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's
purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage
celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital
problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And
prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated
November 21, 1996. 20
Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE
FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER
15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE
ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE
TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS
A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH
RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS
APPLICABLE HERETO. 22
In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

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1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack
of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration
to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at
the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage
and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of
procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote
substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by
so doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. 25 In our
view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Filipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at
a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the
pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to existing
law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the
trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself
would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that
these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the
marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which
was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court,
and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. 26 The date of celebration of their marriage at
Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. 27 This fact was also affirmed by
petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's
birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the
trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519,
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. 30
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not
expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she
presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took
place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil
Code 31 is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported
marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in

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Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage
between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates
of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits
during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial
court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection
was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration
of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in
evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof
of the facts contained therein. 33
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted
by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at
the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and
its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on
November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
CA Records, at 51-59.
Records, at 136-143.
Id. at 1-5.
Exh. A; Id. at 6.
Exhs. B & C; Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 136.
Ibid.
Id. at 10-11.
Exh. E, Id. at 10-18.
10
Id. at 18.
11
Id. at 23-24.
12
Exh. G; Id. at 23-26.

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13
Exh, H; Id. at 27-46.
14
Id. at 1-5.
15
Id. at 3.
16
Id. at 136-143.
17
Supra, note 1.
18
Id. at 59.
19
Id. at 60-64.
20
Id. at 76.
21
Rollo, pp. 10-55.
22
Id. at 31.
Sumbad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106060, June 21, 1999, p. 23; Modina vs. CA, G.R.
No. 109355, October 29, 1999, p. 13; citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court
of Appeals, 269 SCRA 145 (1997).
23
Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187, 198 (1997);
Mauna vs. Civil Service Commission, 232 SCRA 388, 398 (1994).
24
25
GSIS vs. CA, at 198, citing Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 371 (1995).
26
Exhibit A, Records, p. 6; Rollo, p. 72.
27
Records, at 1 and 53.
28
TSN, 22 January 1993, p. 4.
29
Records pp. 7 & 8; Exh. A, Rollo, p. 72.
30
Rollo, at 20.
31
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits
acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved
party; may apply to the court for relief.
32

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Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious,
and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not.
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If
the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained
consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good
faith.
Art. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the
following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local customs.
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime
of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of
property, or any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as
established in this Code shall govern.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it
must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing,
signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They
shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry
where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of
property.
Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also enter into
marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article
14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the
provisions of Title IX of this Code.
1wphi1.nt
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a person upon
whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any
other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent
court to be made a party thereto.
See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA
353 (1996).
33

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Civil Law Cases 3

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Case Readings in Civil Law I - #3

Case Readings in Civil Law I - #3

Corpus v. Sto. Tomas

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

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Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.

Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.

Case Readings in Civil Law I - #3

Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.

Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.

Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.

G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.

Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.

See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:

Case Readings in Civil Law I - #3

Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.

Rollo, pp. 38-41.

Rollo, pp. 47-50.

Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

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Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

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Van Dorn v. Romillo

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xxx xxx xxx

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Case Readings in Civil Law I - #3

Pilapil v. Ibay Somera

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17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,

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Case Readings in Civil Law I - #3

Case Readings in Civil Law I - #3

must suffer the same fate

PARAS, J., concurring:

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Case Readings in Civil Law I - #3

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

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Sec. 20. Appeal.

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Penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos, Id., pp. 63-66.

Records, pp. 1-3.

Id., pp. 8-13.

Id., pp. 25-29, 30-32.