North American Philosophical Publications

North American Philosophical Publications
Recent Work on Foundationalsim

Author(s): Timm Triplett
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 93-116
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American
Volume
Philosophical
Quarterly
27, Number 2, April
1990
RECENT WORK ON FOUNDATIONALISM

Timm Triplett
Even the more traditional, stronger form of foun?
dationalism has its contemporary advocates, and has
been further developed.
It would appear then that
I. Introduction
cannot rest upon past argu?

the antifoundationalist
ments but must at least survey contemporary
foun?
to determine whether
recent develop?
dationalism
prominent belief among contemporary philos?

is dead?that
ophers is that foundationalism
this account of the structure of justified empirical
relic that has been or ought
beliefs is a philosophical
to be discarded. Thus a survey of recent work on
strike some as necessarily
foundationalism
may
on the topic is
a lengthy bibliography
brief. Or?if
ments
in both strong and modest

foundationalism
a
more
to
present
challenge
currently
popular theo?
ries of epistemic
justification.
is flourishing;
foundationalism
can be touched upon here. But
course, quality. My intent here
categorize rather than evaluate,
argued that this renewed interest
establishes or reestablishes
it as
versus Coherentism
Foundationalism
presented?it
might be supposed that there are a
of contemporary
number
philosophers
surprising
who have a curious and unhealthy interest in philo?
sophical mold and must.
This survey of recent literature on the topic, con?
should at least
centrating on the period 1975-1987,
to
rest
In
fact work on
the
brevity hypothesis.
lay
is most
Foundationalism
contrasted
frequently
with coherentism.
The debate between
the two
theories centers on differing accounts of how those
empirical propositions which are epistemically
jus?
tified for a person are related to one another. The
are
foundationalist
claims that all such propositions
the highlights
quantity is not, of
is to describe and
only
in that they require no external or

or else they are justified
independent justification,
these
foundational
by
Justificatory
propositions.
relations are linear and one-directional.
Founda?
either foundational
and it remains to be
in foundationalism
a plausible alterna?
(or, in contemporary
"basic")
terminology,
nonfoundational
("nonbasic")
propositions
justify
tional
tive to competing theories of empirical justification.

The reader should at least be able to form some pre?
and to get some orientation
liminary judgments,
regarding the relationships not only between foun
dationalist and nonfoundationalist
theories but also
among the various theories that have been proposed
within
the foundationalist
framework.
Certainly,
given the prominence of the view that foundational?
ism is dead, such work as is surveyed here deserves
to become better known.
to take
One matter for the antifoundationalist
propositions,
and
not
vice-versa.
The
most
tradi?
state that basic

tional versions of foundationalism
are subjective propositions
propositions
concerning
that are given to a person. Stan?
sensory experiences
dard examples
include propositions
expressed by
"I seem to feel heat" and "I appear to see something
are traditionally said to be
red." Such propositions
or incorrigible
certain,
indubitable,
epistemically
for a person. They provide the necessary foundation
for every empirical proposition
that we know.
For the foundationalist,
basic propositions have a
special, independent epistemic status. They confer
since 1975 of
special note of is the emergence
versions of foundationalism
that make more modest
claims than the theory traditionally associated with
Descartes.
It is not clear that the standard arguments
will work against these
against foundationalism
more modest
theories.
these
newer,
Indeed,
theories were by and large designed with the pur?
standard objections.
pose of overcoming
them?
justification without
requiring justification
selves. The coherentist,
the
by contrast, denies
existence
of basic propositions.
All propositions,
even those about subjective
sensory experience,
require justificatory
within the subject's
support from other propositions

epistemic system. Any justified
93
94
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
it is
because
its justification
achieves
proposition
turn
to
in
the
and
other
support,
supported by,
helps
justified propositions within that system. Justifica?
and multi-direc?
tory relations are interdependent
tional. In the process of revising and correcting our
beliefs, we cannot stand outside our system of
in their different ways assumed that it was

impossible for the sensory impressions presented in
human experience to tell us anything about the world
of matter or of things-in-themselves.
The question,
which now seems an obvious one to ask, whether
we could justify external-world
on the
propositions
and critique them from some independent

can only come from
revision
standpoint. Belief
within that system, and no prior judgments can be
made about what beliefs will fail to cohere with the
system as a whole. Thus no belief or type of belief
basis of subjective sensory propositions

in a more
a
re?
direct way, without
Cartesian
detour
taking
a
of
God
and
the
quiring
proof
metaphysical
baggage
this in turn required, was not asked and systemati?
cally explored until the twentieth century.1
In the first half of the twentieth century, rather
beliefs
is in principle
immune
from revision.
tivism
foundationalist
undeveloped
Foundationalism
and Its Critics
Before
1975
as "the
has been recognized
Although Aristotle
of
foundationalism"
(Moser and
originator
epistemic
is the philoso?
vander Nat 1987, p. 26), Descartes
pher prior to the twentieth century who is most
Features
closely associated with foundationalism.
such as the subjectivity and indubitability of founda?
tional propositions are clearly apparent inDescartes'
role to
He also gives a prominent
epistemology.
that do not
about sensory experience
propositions
existence
of what one is
yet entail the objective
ostensibly experiencing. The standard interpretation
of Descartes
is that he seeks to establish epistemo
logical certainty or indubitability for specific empiri?
about the external world by means
cal propositions
from indubitable founda?
entailment
of deductive
tional propositions
(plus, as it turns out, various
and
theological
metaphysical
principles which no?
are
as
introduced
though they are unprob
toriously
lematic assertions that can be inserted into an argu?
ment at will). Schmitt (1986) has argued, however,
does not in fact or in intent regard
that Descartes
about the external world as
specific propositions
either indubitable or as deduced from any set of
prior propositions.
and meta?
injection of theological
an
at
his
of
epistemo
early stage
physical premises
logical ascent was criticized even by his contempo?
raries. In what appears to be the first of many subse?
itwas
quent similar moves against foundationalism,
from
Descartes'
specific fail?
apparently assumed,
to
about
that
ure,
any attempt
justify propositions
the world from subjective starting points was bound
to fail. Berkeleian
idealism and Kantian construe
epistemically
Descartes'
stances can be found in
Brentano (1966 [1930]),Russell (1926 [1914], 1940)

and some of the logical positivists
(e.g., Schlick
was
1959 [1934], Ayer 1940).2 But it
C. I. Lewis
the most
1946,
1952) who
(1929,
provided
of
and
articulate
defense
foundationalism
thorough
during this time.3 Lewis gave special attention to
non
the ideas of the sensory given?the
developing
was
to
of
which
element
conceptual
experience
serve as the basis for empirical knowledge?and
of positing
certain
of the necessity
epistemically
if an infinite regress of justification
propositions
was
to be avoided.
This revival of interest in foundationalism
was,
short-lived. One of the most prominent
however,
and of analytic
features of pragmatic philosophy
has been the
since the laterWittgenstein
philosophy
sustained attack on doctrines associated with if not
essential
to
Sellars
traditional
foundationalism.
of
that
the
element
sensory
(1956) charged
"given"
re?
experience which the traditional foundationalist
is amyth.
lies on as the source for basic propositions
Goodman
(1952) chal?
(1952) and Reichenbach
claim
that
of
Lewis'
the
bases
empirical
lenged
knowledge were epistemically certain. Quine (1969)
science on
that the project of founding
claimed
and called for a naturalized
sense-data was hopeless,
epistemology which would in essence reduce episte
to psychology.
Quine (1951), Wittgenstein
mology
of science such as
(1953, 1969), and philosophers
and
Kuhn
Hanson
(1962), shared an interest
(1958)
"forms of life"
in differing "conceptual
schemes,"
or "paradigms" and suggested
of a
the possibility
these concep?
radical incommensurability
between
would pre?
tual schemes. Such incommensurability
vent us from taking any proposition whatever
and
95
evaluating its epistemic status by deter?

objectively
the way "the world"
how
well it expressed
mining
was. This undercut an assumption
essential to the
that such objective evaluation was
foundationalist
If
these
philosophers were correct, founda?
possible.
tionalism seemed to rest on a fundamental mistake.
1981, 1986; Graybosch

1986; Harman
and
Cohen
Lehrer
Lehrer
1986;
1986;
1983;
1986; Rescher
1977, 1979, 1980).
Margolis
The most radical trend away from foundational?
ism has been the call to articulate and practice a
or "post-analytic"
new type of "post-modern"
phi?
applied these ideas to the

philosophers
to founda?
alternatives
coherentist
of
development
tionalism (Aune 1967; Harman 1973; Rescher 1973,
of "cultural hermeneutics"
losophy. Developments
and "epistemological
relativism" take much of their
that foundationalism
impetus from the perception
Several
1974; Lehrer 1974; Seilars 1973). These develop?

ments often included criticisms of foundationalism.
In comparative
isolation at the time, Chisholm
a Lewis-type
foundationalism.
revived
(1966)
Pollock (1974) joined him, only to reject "classical"
a few years later (1979).
forms of foundationalism
But Chisholm and, temporarily, Pollock, were foun?
dationalist voices crying in a coherentist wilder?
ness. By the early 1970's foundationalism
had gen?
erally come
to be regarded
as a defunct
theory.4
Since 1975
Davidson
is dead (Rorty 1979; Rajchman andWest
1985;
the philoso?
Wachterhauser
1986). Rorty?perhaps
most
of the
the
for
responsible
prominence
pher
is dead?specifically
view
discusses
the implications of this view for the prac?
He sees the alleged
tice of analytic philosophy.
as the starting point of
demise of foundationalism
his critique of contemporary
analytic philosophy.
Rorty would
likely see the efforts of even some
as misguided
to carry on
coherentists
attempts
by other means.
analytical philosophy
area of recent interest is considerably
Another
more
The years 1975 and 1976 saw the publication of

important articles by Pastin (1975a, 1975b), Alston
(1976a, 1976c), and Delaney
(1976). These articles
were the first of several claiming that foundational?
if at all, only
ism's critics had argued successfully,
against quite specific and perhaps implausible ver?
sions of foundationalism
that could readily be modi?
fied or rejected by working foundationalists.5
Sub?
sequently, many articles and monographs
appeared
in detail
calling for and in some cases developing
modifications
of foundationalism
that nonetheless
to the traditional
maintained
connections
theory
(e.g., Almeder 1983; Annis 1977,1978; Audi 1978,
1983; Chisholm
1977, 1980; Cornman
1977, 1979,
1980; Flor 1984;Foley 1987;Fumerton 1985;Alan

Goldman
1979, 1981, 1982, 1988;Haack
1982/83;
Moser
1985a; Pollock
1979; Sosa 1985).6
In spite of foundationalism's
being revived once
another
trend?and
the dominant one in the
again,
to assume that founda?
literature?has
continued
tionalism is no longer viable. Some philosophers,
most notably Laurence BonJour
(1978, 1985) and
Michael Williams
to press
have
continued
(1977),
detailed and extensive
criticisms of foundational?
ism. Several have further developed coherentist and
pragmatist alternatives (BonJour 1985; Dancy 1984;
a good deal of
amenable to foundationalism:
attention is being paid to forms of naturalized episte
mology,
particularly reliabilism (which, as we will
see, can be stated in a form compatible with modest
to have
Reliabilism
foundationalism).
appears
attracted more interest recently than foundationalism
(On reliabilism see, for example, Adams and
1987; Alston
1983, p. 74, 1986a; Armstrong
1973, pp. 159-61; Dretske
1985,
1981; Fumerton
Goldman
1986; Heil
1984;
pp. 68-70; Alvin
Kornblith
1981,
1980; Luper-Foy
1987; Nozick
Ch. 3; Pollock
1984; Schmitt
1981, 1983, 1984;
Swain 1981a, 1981b; also the articles appearing in
The Monist 68, 1985. On naturalized epistemology
in general see, for example, Annis
1982a; Alvin
itself.
Kline
Goldman 1985; Grandy 1987; Kekes 1977, pp. 106

07; Kornblith
1985; Lycan
1985, 1988; Papineau
1981/82; Sosa 1983.)

It has been suggested that coherentism is currently
the dominant view about the structure of epistemic
justification
(Foley 1980, p. 53). But interest ap?
pears to be growing both in forms of naturalized
that see the foundationalist-coheren
epistemology
tist dispute as resting on a false presupposition
1980, p. 598), and in post-modernist
(Kornblith
moves away from any universal principles attempt?
ing to account for human knowledge?whether
96
or coherentist
foundationalist
in structure. The re?
of
traditional
does not entail
foundationalism
jection
of
coherentist
Indeed
acceptance
purely
principles.
the literature has not lacked for criticisms
of such
principles.7
Although
it is not clear what account of epistemic

if any, is embraced by a majority of
justification,
it is clear that a
contemporary
epistemologists,
do
foundationalism?at
least in the
majority
regard
more
and
traditional
versions
that
stronger
posit the
the subjective
given,
starting point for all
and
the
empirical justification,
certainty or indubi?
tability of basic propositions?as
having been re?
futed. A certain moral fervor is even to be noted in
the rejection of foundationalism:
'anti
"Suddenly
a
foundationalist'
is
good thing to be" (Simpson
to foundationalism
1987, p. 2); "opposition
ought
to be the philosophical
to
equivalent of resistance
sensory
sin" (Levi 1981, p. 590, characterizing

Rorty's
So many epistemologists
have echoed the
views).
refrain of the death of foundationalism
that itwould
for those less familiar with the
appear reasonable
literature to simply assume its falsity.8
At this point in time, however, we have to deal
not with a single foundationalist
theory but with a
the arguments
variety of related theories. Whether
are
that have been made against foundationalism
successful
all theories that might be appro?

as foundational
remains to be
priately
are to get clear on
seen. The necessary preliminaries
the tenets essential to any form of foundationalism
and to delineate
the various versions of founda?
in the recent
tionalism
that have been proposed
against
described
literature.
This
characterization
of foundationalism
leaves us
two obvious questions: What are basic propo?
relation they
sitions, and just what is the epistemic
with
bear to nonbasic propositions? Virtually all versions

of foundationalism
would agree with one elabora?
tion upon these essential tenets: Basic propositions
form a limited set of epistemically
privileged propo?
sitions. They are privileged
in that they are self
justified, or, in other formulations,
noninferentially
or immediately justified.10 A basic proposition is said
to be justified independently
of any other proposi?
tions that might be justified for a subject, although
on some accounts
the justification of a basic propo?

sition does depend on the nonconceptual
sensory
state the subject is in.
what
But, granting there are basic propositions,
are basic? How do we charac?
kinds of propositions
terize and explain their property of being epistem?
ically privileged? How do they confer justification
on nonbasic propositions?
It is in different answers
to these questions
that the different versions
of
foundationalism
Variations
Varieties
The Essence
of
Foundationalism
of Foundationalism
Most of those defining foundationalism

agree on
two tenets which are essential to any form of foun?
The following
formulations
dationalism.
capture
the intent of most authors:9
are basic
EF1:
There
EF2:
Any justified empirical proposition is either

basic or derives its justification, at least in part,
from the fact that it stands in an appropriate
relation
propositions.
to propositions
which
are basic.
on a Theme
have been made in the litera?

Many distinctions
to generate
ture since 1975 that can be applied
I will not
of foundationalism.
different versions
mention all such distinctions.n My aim is to provide
are
which
characterizations
of those distinctions
most
important
foundationalism
differences
II. The
are generated.
to the debate about the viability of

and to the clarification of the main
between
strong
and modest
forms
of
foundationalism.
The varieties of foundationalism
fall into two
tenets of
main classes, related to the two essential
foundationalist
foundationalism.
different
First,
of the nature
theories offer different specifications
there are different
Second,
the relation between basic and
ways of construing
nonbasic propositions.
As Display No. 1 shows,
tionalism may be presented
the varieties of founda?

in outline form in two
to the two essential
divisions
corresponding
major
follows the term
tenets of foundationalism.
what
(In
"basics"
is short for "basic propositions.")

1
Display No.
Varieties
I.
of Foundationalism
Specifications of theNature of B asic Propositions

A.
The Content of Basic Propositions
1. Psychological Foundationalism
2.
B.
The Epistemic
1.
Status of Basic Propositions
Basics
Superior
2. Modest
C.
Foundationalism
External-World
Foundationalism
Basics Foundationalism
The Status of "P is Basic" or of Founda?

tionalist Principles as Basic Propositions
1.
Iterative
Foundationalism
2.
D.
Simple Foundationalism
Belief Status of Basic Propositions
1. Belief Foundationalism
2.
E.
Foundationalism
Sensory
Context Dependence of Basic Propositions

1. Stable Basics Foundationalism
2.
Contextual
Foundationalism
II. Accounts of the Relation Between Basic and

Nonbasic Propositions
A.
Logical Relationships
1. Deductive Foundationalism
2.
Enumerative
Induction
Foundationalism
3.
4.
B.
Explanatory Induction Foundationalism

Epistemic Principles Foundationalism
Phenomenalist Relationships
1.
2.
C.
Phenomenalist
Nonphenomenalist
Foundationalism
Extent of Justification of Nonbasic

Basic Propositions
1.
Pure
External
Nonbasic
1.
2.
by
Foundationalism
vs.
Internal
Justification
of
by Basic Propositions
Externalist
Internalist
or entertaining beliefs about. Basic propositions

are
to
not
but
need
be
limited
include,
generally thought
to, propositions
expressing a person's belief states.
Examples: S believes there is an apple on the table.
S seems to feel heat. S seems to see something red.
S is appeared redly to.
include Descartes
Foundationalists
Psychological
Second
the
Chisholm
(see especially
Meditation),
Lewis
(1977, pp. 16-22),
(1946, pp. 172-75) and
Moser
(1985a, pp. 173-87). Audi uses the phrase
to refer to a quite
foundationalism"
"psychological
as an empirical
distinct view represented
thesis
about how an individual's beliefs are related to one
another in terms of the individual's disposition
to
or none at all, in support of a
cite other beliefs,
given belief (Audi 1978, pp. 592, 595-96, 604).
IA2. External-World
Foundationalism.
Ordinary
about the "external world" are basic.
propositions
For the Psychological
the proposi?
Foundationalist,
tion that there is an apple on the table is nonbasic
for any given subject S. It is justified perhaps by S's
belief that there is an apple on the table or by some
of psychological
propositions
detailing 5" s
The External-World
Founda?
sensory experiences.
that the proposition
tionalist, by contrast, maintains
that there is an apple on the table can itself be basic.
Such straightforward
about
singular propositions
are immediately justified, re?
ordinary observations
quiring no support from psychological
propositions
cluster
remain basic on the

(which themselves presumably
External-World
structure
account). A foundational
is retained because more theoretical propositions,
e.g.,
Foundationalism
2. Mixed
D.
Foundationalism
Foundationalism
Foundationalism
LAI. Psychological
Foundationalism.
This tra?
ditional view, going back at least to Descartes,
maintains
that only propositions
about a person's
states can be basic for that person. Such
mental
do not entail the existence
of the
propositions
which
the
is
objects
person
ostensibly experiencing
97
those
of
science,
require
these
ordinary
obser?
vational propositions
for justificatory
support.
The idea that we do not require further justifica?
tory support for ordinary observational propositions
is reminiscent of G. E. Moore's
argu?
antiskeptical
ments (Moore 1959 [1939], 1966 [1925]). But

does not talk in either of these essays about
the structure of known or justified propositions.
Thus it is difficult to assess from them whether he is
a foundationalist
of any sort, although Kekes ( 1977,
does
attribute External-World
Founda?
pp. 89-90)
tionalism toMoore. Clearer cases of External-World
are Kekes himself
Foundationalists
(1979), Foley
Moore
(1987, pp. 73-76), Quinton

(1973, Part II) and
Swain (1981b, pp. 227-28).12 Annis' "contextualist
combines
(1977 and 1978) essentially
theory"
98
with Contextual
External-World
Foundationalism
Foundationalism.
Annis' view is that in appropriate
contexts
observational
(including nonproblematic
about the external
contexts) ordinary propositions
world can be basic for some observers,
but such
as
serve
not
to
able
basics
in
be
propositions may
other contexts
(Annis 1977, p. 351). Further dis?
cussions of this view are to be found, e.g., inAlston
(1983, p. 75) and Pappas (1982, pp. 91-96).
Cornman
suggests what could be classified as a
third type of foundationalism
under category IA.
This view might be called "Theoretical Basics Foun?
and would hold that the theoretical
dationalism,"
statements of science are basic, being epistemo
about subjective
logically prior both to propositions
states
to
and
ordinary singular propo?
psychological
I do not
sitions about the external world. However,
find any clear advocacy of such a view in the litera?
ture. Cornman
that
(1977, pp. 296-97)
suggests
that the further development
of
Sellars maintains
lead us to the point where
science will eventually
Theoretical
is the correct
account (making it a form of Contextual
Founda?
It is not clear, however,
that Sellars in
tionalism).
fact adopts the view that such an epistemic shift will
occur. He appears to consider the possibility with?
out evaluating
its likelihood (Sellars 1967, pp. 354,
358). In any case, Sellars explicitly rejects the view
that we should now regard the theoretical statements
of science as basic (1967, pp. 353-58).
In addi?
IB1. Superior Basics Foundationalism.
as
tion to being epistemically
privileged
justifiers
basic
that require no independent
justification,
to the Superior Basics
are, according
propositions
to
the
view, justified
highest possible
degree?a
status not shared by any other empirical proposi?
is
tions. This ultimate
of justification
degree
or
described variously as certainty,
incorrigibility,
is defined in a variety of
Certainty
indubitability.
in terms of
is often defined
ways.
Incorrigibility
the impossibility
of being mistaken,
indubitability
of doubt.13 For present
in terms of the impossibility
I shall disregard the distinctions between
purposes,
to the Superior
these concepts and refer generically
Basics
view.
include Lewis
Superior Basics Foundationalists
and
Chisholm
Ch.
10; 1946, p. 186)
(1980,
(1929,
of course is known for his
pp. 549-50). Descartes
on the certainty
and indubitability
of
emphasis
foundational
propositions.
IB2. Modest Basics Foundationalism.
No super?
ior justificatory
status for basics is required. On
most such accounts, basics must have some degree
of justification,
but need not be more highly justi?
fied than the propositions
they justify. The general
has
at
been
that
least the Superior Basics
perception
of
traditional
must be given
foundationalism
aspect
up.
Detailed
expositions
or defenses
of Modest
include those by Almeder
(1983,1987), Audi (1983), Cornman (1977,1980),

(1976), Alan Goldman
(1988, pp. 138-43)
Delaney
and Pastin (1975a,
1975b). Almeder
(1983) main?
are
tains that basic propositions
not themselves
justified.
ICI. Iterative Foundationalism.
On this view, if
an
for 5, then
p is
immediately justified proposition
the proposition
that/? is immediately
justified must
itself be immediately
justified for 5. That is, where
p is basic, the epistemological
proposition
asserting
that/? is basic must itself be basic. A broadened ver?
sion of this view would
require of other episte?
central to a foundationalist
mological
propositions
account?for
example,
stating founda?
principles
tionalist conditions under which nonbasic proposi?
tions are justified?that
they too be immediately
justified or basic.
This
version
IC2. Simple Foundationalism.
denies any iterative requirement
for propositions
of the form "/? is basic" or other epistemological
propositions.
Alston (1976c) introduced the distinction between
Iterative and Simple Foundationalism.
Iterative
is a problematic
that
would
Foundationalism
theory
to defend. Alston
be difficult
noted that several
criticisms of foundationalism
made the assumption
was iterative, and he was con?
to point out that Simple Foundationalism
to
presented an alternative that was not susceptible
these criticisms. The question is whether there have
actually ever been any Iterative Foundationalists.
cerned
inDescartes and Lewis do suggest Itera?

Passages
tive Foundationalism,
although it is not clear that
either finally adopts or requires that view. Alston
a
(1976c, pp. 181-82) argues that for Descartes
foundational belief B can only be identified as such
if the subject is immediately justified in thehigher

belief that B is immediately
level epistemological
to Alston
this commits
According
justified.
Van Cleve,
to Iterative Foundationalism.
Descartes
as
a
Descartes
however,
Simple Founda?
interprets
tionalist (Van Cleve 1979, see especially p. 73n43
he does not
for his response to Alston). Although
to
Alston's
it would
refer
distinction,
specifically
an
that
Schmitt
appear
presents
interpretation of
Descartes
as a Simple
Foundationalist
(Schmitt
1986).
and Valuation
In An Analysis
of Knowledge
(1946, p. 186), Lewis is clearly attempting to estab?
lish the certainty of "the data which
eventually
i.e., singular basic
support a genuine probability,"
and the World
in Mind
However,
propositions.
in a passage which
Order
(1929, pp. 311-12),
the same point, Lewis subtly
appears to be making
that his argument estab?
shifts from the conclusion
that
lishes the certainty of singular propositions
serve as the data supporting nonbasic propositions to
the conclusion
the certainty of
that it establishes
"antecedent general truths" (emphasis mine). Lewis
also speaks of "the knowledge
which depends on
as though the epistemic prin?
[these principles],"
determine which
singular proposi?
ciples which
tions are basic are themselves not only certain, but
and basic.
foundational
Even inAn Analysis of Knowledge
and Valuation
comments might be taken to imply
itself, Lewis'
iterativist assumptions.
In arguing that nothing can
be probable unless
is certain, Lewis
something
holds that a basic proposition
that is only probable
will allow us to say of nonbasic propositions
only
that they are probably probable. And this leads,
according to Lewis, to a circle or an infinite regress
(Lewis 1946, p. 186). This seems to assume that
the epistemic judgments of a foundationalist
theory
such as those expressed by "/?
(e.g., propositions
is probable," "q is basic," "r is evident," etc.) must
themselves be certain, and this might be taken to
imply Iterative Foundationalism.
Alston
also notes some "level confusions"
in
set of definitions
Chisholm's
and principles
that
could be taken to imply Iterative Foundationalism
in Chisholm's
system (Alston 1980, pp. 574-81).
It remains to be seen whether
these indications of
in the works of Lewis
Iterative Foundationalism
99
and Chisholm do indeed commit them to this view,

are essential
such commitments
and if so whether
of
their
foundationalist
systems.
components
ID1. Belief Foundationalism.
This version re?
quires that what is basic for a subject be a proposition
that is believed
by that subject. Many foundation?

to
appear
accept this requirement,
usually
quite implicitly by discussing foundational proposi?
tions only in the context of basic or immediately
alists
justified beliefs.
Lehrer (1974, p. 76), Pollock (1979, pp. 93-94),
and Williams
(1977, p. 61) seem to assume in their
statements
that any?
of basic propositions
defining
a
must
which
is
basic
be
subject's belief, or at
thing
rate
basics can epistemi?
that
such
believed
any
only
This
cally support nonbasics.
used against foundationalism,
writes (1979, p. 98):
assumption
e.g., when
is then
Pollock
According to [foundationalism], all epistemic support

derives ultimately from what epistemologically basic
propositions
one
believes.
Unfortunately,
one
rarely
believes any epistemologically basic propositions at all.

ID2. Sensory Foundationalism.
An alternative
account holds that that which functions as the basic
that is
need not itself be a proposition
proposition
believed
the
it
is
by
subject, though
necessarily
there are in principle
something true of her. While
of foundationalism
this
several varieties
fitting
one
most
the
description,
traditionally
important
maintains
that propositions
about the subject's sen?
of past
sory experiences
(plus perhaps memories
are
means
the
sensory experiences)
primary
by
which the bulk of that subject's nonbasic proposi?
tions come to be justified. For this reason I refer to
this alternative as Sensory Foundationalism.
Itmay
be associated with discussions
in
Lewis
particularly
of the "given," the doctrine that there is a noninter
that is
element in experience
preted, preconceptual
simply given or presented to the subject. According
to Sensory Foundationalism,
about the
propositions
a
of
elements
given
person's sensory experience are
of
basic
for that person.
capable
being
Annis (1978, p. 213), Cornman
(1977, p. 287),
Pastin (1975b, p. 147, reprinted in Pastin 1978,
p. 286), and Will
(1974, p. 144) do not impose a
belief
requirement upon their definitions

propositions,
although these philosophers
of basic
do not go
100
on to espouse Sensory Foundationalism.

Chisholm's
definition of basic or, in his terminology,
self-pre?
does not require that what is
senting, propositions
be a belief (Chisholm
1977, p. 22;
self-presenting
cf. Chisholm
when he
1980, p. 549). However,
formulates
his epistemic
principles
stating how
ones
basic propositions
nonbasic
he does so
justify
in terms of basic propositions
those
that are
being
believed
the
1977, p. 78,
by
subject (see e.g.,
principle C).
se appears in Lewis
Sensory Foundationalism/?er
see
Ch.
7,
(1946,
especially p. 174). I believe that
Moser may also be interpreted as a Sensory Foun?
dationalist
discussion
of Moser's
(see my
intuitionism
in Part III).
IE1. Stable Basics Foundationalism.
This ver?
sion assumes that only a certain type of proposition
can be basic. The Psychological
for
Foundationalist,
a
insists that only propositions
about
sub?
example,
to external-world
states, as opposed
ject's mental
statements or theoretical
observation
statements,
can ever be basic. This is a stable, objective
fact
about human knowledge,
not something
that can
change with a change in context, over time, or from
culture to culture. Note that the Stable Basics view
is about the stability of the type of proposition
that
can be basic, not about any supposed invariance in a
a
particular proposition's
being basic. Obviously,
particular proposition may be basic in some contexts
and not in others. Whether
the proposition expressed
seems
see
to
red" is basic for S
by "5
something
would presumably
depend on the sensory experi?
ences S is having. Also,
the proposition may be
basic for S and justified but not basic for others who
S or listening to her
are, for example,
observing
on
current
her
report
experiences.
to assume
It is reasonable
that Stable Basics
Foundationalism
is the view implicitly adopted in
who do not
the work of those foundationalists
a
as
counts
is
basic proposition
specify that what
epistemic
inquiry in question. The main point here
seems to be to allow external-world
propositions
to serve as basics in ordinary epistemic
contexts
a
to
role
for
preserve
yet
sensory prop?
subjective
ositions as basic in special cases, particularly when
or about ordinary
doubts about the external-world
are
claims
entertained. There is no sug?
knowledge
conditions as the
gestion of changing socio-cultural
force
behind
variation
in
what
constitutes
driving
a basic proposition. This modest form of Contextual
Foundationalism
to be held by Annis
appears
see
(1977,
especially p. 351) and Audi (1983, see
pp. 129-31).
especially
A more
influential
of Contextual
subcategory
Foundationalism
suggests that what functions as a
basic proposition varies with changing cultural, his?
torical or scientific
conditions.
A major tradition
from (but not including) Kant and
descending
asserting the cultural or historical relativity of cate?
gories is at least compatible with this version of
even though this compatibility
is
foundationalism,
often unrecognized
and even though in fact it has
generally been assumed that the theories within this
neo-Kantian
tradition are incompatible with founda?
tionalism. Most
those who assume
such
likely,
an incompatibility
have in mind more
traditional
versions
of
foundationalism.
But there is nothing in principle to keep theories

of this sort from being described as foundational.
They can retain the two essential tenets of founda?
tionalism and remain structurally identical to amore
traditional theory. Whether
they remain compatible
as conceived
with the spirit of foundationalism
by
as
such
Lewis and Chisholm
is quite
philosophers
another question.
It is unlikely
that these philoso?
were
would
feel
phers
they
making
only minor
alterna?
if they found themselves

forced to
concessions
adopt this sort of contextualism.
Sources for relatively broad statements of this
form of Contextual Foundationalism
socio-cultural
include Wittgenstein's
Philosophical
Investigations
of Empiricism"
"Two Dogmas
(1953), Quine's
tive to the Stable Basics view maintains

that dif?
in
ferent types of propositions
different
can,
epis?
serve as basics. One subcategory
temic contexts,
and the Philoso?

(1951), and Sellars' "Empiricism
(1956). These authors probably did
phy of Mind"
even of a
as foundationalists,
not see themselves
of Contextual Foundationalism
that dif?
emphasizes
as
of
function
basic
ferent
types
propositions
on
the
and
of
the
type
depth
particular
depending
moderate
at least,
to be understood
contextually.
IE2. Contextual Foundationalism.
The
sort, and only recently have the latter two,

so interpreted
been
1977,
(Cornman
see
also
Johnsen 1986, pp. 598-99 on
pp. 296-97;

Quine). But now that the distinction between mod?
has
erate foundationalism
and pure coherentism
it has been argued that such philoso?
been made,
phers as Quine and Sellars should be placed within
I think that any
the former category. However,
as
a
of
will
foundationalist
Quine
interpretation
come from his sketchy remarks relevant to this in
rather than from his
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism"
more developed
account in "Epistemology
Natur?
alized" (Quine 1969). Cornman's
interpretation of
Sellars as a Theoretical Basics Foundationalist
has
above. The view that theoretical
been discussed
will come to be basic given further
propositions
scientific developments
is of course also a version
of Contextual Foundationalism.
As noted, I do not
101
A basic prop?
IIAl. Deductive Foundationalism.
entail the nonbasic prop?
osition must deductively
osition it justifies.
IIA2. Enumerative
Induction Foundationalism.
Basic propositions
justify nonbasic propositions by
enumerative
induction: After a series of observa?
In the
tions one arrives at a probable conclusion.
a
case of Psychological
series
of
Foundationalism,
sensory experiences would presumably make prob?
about the external world.
able a conclusion
Unless one is a phenomenalist,
neither Deductive
nor Enumerative
Foundationalism
Induction Foun?
dationalism appears very plausible. Chisholm
indi?
cates the difficulties
with both views
(Chisholm
1977, pp. 64-67). Some critics of foundationalism
believe that Sellars maintains

this view in spite of
attribution of it to him.
Cornman's
his metaphilosophical
conclusions
Although
and have appar?

have also noted these difficulties,
that a foundationalist
theory must
ently assumed
to one or the other of these views
be committed
imply the rejection of any positive theory of knowl?

edge, Rorty's specific comments on and criticisms
seem to imply
of traditional theories of knowledge
one sort of Contextual
Foundationalist
account,
are whatever
according to which basic propositions
fundamental assumptions
remain accepted and un?
1969, p. 74; Harman

1973, pp. 164
1973, pp. 207-10).
has been interpreted as requiring a
deductive
and non
relation between foundational
foundational knowledge.
Perhaps this interpretation
is due to Descartes'
comparison of his method, with
in a given social or even conversational

challenged
context (see Rorty 1979, pp. 159, 170, 174, 178).
Sosa notes that this "salon account of knowledge"
is identifiable as a species of foundationalism
(Sosa
1983, pp. 56-57).
Works which are less directly tied to epistemol?
ogy, but which nonetheless have been closely allied
with and perhaps influenced by the epistemological
views of Wittgenstein,
Quine, and Sellars, include
studies in the philosophy of science such as Hanson's
Patterns of Discovery
(1958), Kuhn's The Structure
Revolutions
(1962), andFeyerabend's
of Scientific
(1975). Kuhn's book in particular
Against Method
has in turn had its influence in epistemology,
helping
to make contextualist orientations?in
this case the
concept of paradigm shifts in the scientific commun?
ity over time?more
popular and accepted.
are to be
Additional
discussions
of contextualism
found in Airaksinen
(1982, with a reply by Annis
1982b),Almeder (1983),Duran (1986), Flor (1984),
Haack (1982/83), McGinn

and a series
(1981/82),
of articles on social knowledge
in Synthese
73
(1987). These more recent writings generally recog?
nize the compatibility
of contextualist
assumptions
with versions of foundationalism.
(e.g., Quine
67; Rescher
Descartes
to that of
its insistence on "exact demonstrations,"
the geometers
(Haldane and Ross edition, Volume
that Descartes
I, p. 140). Schmitt argues, however,
granted that many ordinary empirical propositions
were known only with probability,
and that his
comparison with the geometers' method applied to
second-order
not to
epistemological
principles,
first-order knowledge.
See, for
merely probabilistic
in
discussion
of the passage
Schmitt's
example,
the Sixth Meditation
in which Descartes writes, "I
that body does exist"
conjecture with probability
Haldane and
(Schmitt 1986, p. 493; cf. Descartes,
Ross edition, Volume
I, p. 187).
It is possible for a phenomenalist
such as Ayer to
a
be considered
Foundationalist.
Deductive
Ayer
asserts a linguistic equivalence
between sense-data
propositions
and
physical-object
propositions:
are ordinarily
which
"Propositions
expressed
by
sentences which refer to material
things could also
be expressed
referred exclu?
by sentences which
sively
Ayer
entails
there
to sense-data," (Ayer 1940, p. 232). But even

insists that no sense-data statement formally
a physical-object
statement (p. 239). Perhaps
is a tension between
these two claims. But
102
Ayer, at any rate, would not consider himself to be a

in terms of the relationship in question.
deductivist
Induction Foundationalism.
IIA3. Explanatory
A basic proposition
justifies a nonbasic proposition
because the latter provides the best explanation
for
are justified as inductive
the former. Nonbasics
inferences to the best explanation given those prop?
ositions which are basic for the subject.
IIA4. Epistemic Principles Foundationalism.
The
conditions
under which basic propositions
justify
are stated by special episte?
nonbasic propositions
mological
synthetic and a
principles,
presumably
are
priori truths which
independent of the deductive
and inductive inference rules of logic and science.
IIA3 and IIA4 illustrate that founda?
Categories
tionalists need not require that basics justify non
basics by means of deduction or enumerative
induc?
of Explanatory Induction Foun?
is developed by Cornman (1980), Moser
tion. The alternative

dationalism
(1985a) and Alan Goldman (1988). Chisholm is

critical of this alternative
(1978, pp. 605-06) and
Principles
approach (1966;
prefers the Epistemic
1977, Ch. 4; 1980) as does Pollock in his early work
on foundationalism
these episte?
(1974). Although
mic principles themselves are presumably necessar?
ily true, they dictate only that a basic proposition
render a nonbasic proposition
probably true or in?
crease its degree of justification
by a particular
degree.
Foundationalism.
Phen?
Phenomenalist
a
and of the
is
omenalism
theory of perception,
that is of?
of
propositions,
meaning
physical-object
ten associated with foundationalism.
As combined
it is the view that a
with Sensory Foundationalism
IIB1.
about ordinary external-world

proposition
in some
is
to?or,
equivalent
definitionally
objects
from?a
basic
formulations,
logically constructed
about
(or series of such propositions)
proposition
sense-data or sensory experiences. Ayer (1940) and
Phen?
Lewis
(1946) can be considered
possibly
to
Both attempted
omenalist
Foundationalists.14
nonbasic
in detail how ordinary external-world

prop?
in terms of sense-data
could be analyzed
or conditionals
stating what appear?
propositions
ances would follow from what perceptual actions.
a version of
More recently, Dicker has developed
to
that
be
claimed
nonreductionist
phenomenalism
to
to
to
Chisholm's
attempts
objections
respond
explain
ositions
(Dicker 1980, see especially

pp.
phenomenalism
see
also
Chisholm
167-69;
1977, p. 127).
IIB2. Nonphenomenalist
This
Foundationalism.
includes
any form of foundationalism
category
which does not make phenomenalist
assumptions. At
least one criticism of foundationalism
is in fact en?
that foundation?
tirely dependent on the assumption
alism
to phenomenalism
is committed
(Dilman
and meaning
1975).15 But theories of perception
are logically distinct from theories of epistemic
and it is difficult to see why a theory
justification,
about the structure of justified empirical proposi?
to a particular theory of
be committed
or
of
There does not appear
perception
meaning.
to be any reason why an epistemologist
who main?
an
or even
tains
adverbial
theory of perception,
direct realism, cannot still maintain
that proposi?
tions achieve justification
through a foundational
tions must
structure. Chisholm
in particular has
a foundationalist
to develop
theory
commitments
(e.g.,
phenomenalist
taken pains
that avoids
Chisholm
1977, p. 30).
IIC1. Pure Foundationalism.
Basic propositions
justify all nonbasic
justified proposi?
completely
relations or princi?
tions. No additional epistemic
ples are required to explain how nonbasic proposi?
tions acquire their justification.
are
Foundationalism.
Nonbasics
IIC2. Mixed
some
in
in
of
their
basics
that
part by
justified only
can derive
from other nonbasics.
justification
that
Theories of this type may hold, for example,
are necessary but not sufficient
basic propositions
conditions for the justification of at least some types
of nonbasic propositions.
They may hold, in addi?
relations
that
coherence
tion,
provide an additional
source
of nonbasic
for
the
justification
possible
tenets of
The second of the essential
propositions.
a
nonbasic
foundationalism
proposi?
only prohibits
tion from deriving all of its justification from coher?
ence relations or some other relations
that have
to
Basic
with
do
basic
prop?
propositions.
nothing
ositions must have something to do with the justifi?
cation of every empirical proposition.
Those who advocate amixture of foundationalist
and coherentist principles,
though with very differ?
ent degrees of import attached to the coherentist prin?
include Chisholm
1980), Cornman
(1977,
ciples,
(1977,1980), Haack (1982/83) andPollock (1979).
103
Dauer
(1980) argues that coherentist principles are

required and prevent at least the stronger forms of
from being viable. I am not aware
foundationalism
of any foundationalist
who explicitly
advocates
Pure Foundationalism,
but Foley (1980) criticizes
use
as
Chisholm's
of
coherentist
principles
current evidence. Causal theories of justification or

are also externalist (e.g., Dretske
1981,
knowledge
Ch. 4). Although advocates of these theories empha?
size the definition and sources of justification over
the structural relations between justified proposi?
tions, the theories are quite easily allied with foun?
inAn
Pastin notes Lewis' recognition
unnecessary.
and
Valuation
of
the
"fact
Analysis of Knowledge
of congruence,"
i.e., of the role coherence relations
(Pastin 1975a, p.
justification
play in enhancing
409; cf. Lewis
1946, pp. 171, 187, 338-53).
IID1. Externalist Foundationalism.
An important
dationalist approaches. Basic propositions may be

seen as those stating the reliability conditions
for
or
the
noninferential
perceptual experiences
stating
beliefs caused by such conditions,
with all other
beliefs
to
these basics.
relation
empirical
justified by
Externalist Foundationalism,
is
then,
any version
distinction between two concepts of epistemic justi?

fication
that has recently been made bears on the
one constructs.
sort of foundationalist
principles
of foundationalism
which
of
nonbasic
justification
requires only external

by basic
propositions
propositions.
IID2. Internalist Foundationalism.
This form of
foundationalism
that
internalist
requires
justifica?
of non
tory conditions
apply to the justification
The literature contains various formulations of this

distinction?most
often referred to as the distinction
between external and internal justification?and
it
is clear that various authors do not always have
the same distinction
in mind.16 Indeed, I
precisely
believe
like
the
foundationalist-coherentist
that,
basics by basics. Nonbasic

do not be?
propositions
come justified for the subject just because external
conditions which are in some sense out of the sub?
distinction
distinc?
itself, the internalist-externalist
tion is not a clear-cut dichotomy but rather a set of
views varying by degrees and forming a continuum.
ject's current epistemic reach happen to apply. The

to the subject given
justification must be accessible
the evidence currently available to her.
An
extreme
internalist conception would
require
a
if
belief
that,
p is to be justified for 5, S must have
reasoned through a justification
pro?
consciously
is generally
Although Chisholm
regarded as an
Internalist Foundationalist
1986b,
(e.g., Alston
I believe
there is a tension between
p. 205),
cedure forp or, in cases of simpler and more obvious

propositions where steps of reasoning are presum?
ably not needed or appropriate, S must have in some
sense cognitively
grasped or directly apprehended
or
true
is
that/?
likely to be true. A less strict form of
internalism would require not that 5 go through an
actual process of reasoning or direct apprehension,
but that S could do so by reflecting upon whether
that
p is likely to be true in light of the evidence
constitutes her current epistemic
system.
On externalist accounts,
the full conditions
for
not
need
to
be
accessible
in
5
the
justification
ways
Chisholm's
of his approach
general explication
1977, p. 17; 1986, pp. 91-92) and
(e.g., Chisholm
the actual epistemic definitions
and principles he
puts forward (Chisholm 1977, Chs. 1 and 4; 1980).
The general remarks suggest internalism, but the
themselves
appear to be externalist.
principles
Moser's
"intuitionism"
is a form of Internalist
Foundationalism
(Moser 1985a).
Note that I have only characterized Internalist and
Externalist
Foundationalism
with respect to how
are
nonbasic
justified. The question
propositions
are internally or extern?
whether basic propositions
required by internalism. The conditions for proper

of p may obtain even if 5 would not
justification
be able to discover this upon reflection. Reliabilist
theories of justification
(e.g., Swain 1981b; Alvin
Goldman
theories. The relia?
1986) are externalist
bility of the process by which S came to believe p
is external
to S's epistemic
in that the
system
process can be reliable whether or not 5 knows this
or could come to know this
by reflection upon
the
ally justified is distinct. For the foundationalist,
senses inwhich basic and nonbasic propositions
are
and it would appear
justified are quite different,
possible
fication
to advocate, for example, externalist justi?

of basics and internalist justification
of
nonbasics.
Relations
Between
Commitment
These Categories
to one version
of foundationalism
104
in one of these categories does not as a rule imply

to a particular version in another cat?
commitment
to this (e.g.,
egory. There are some exceptions
as formulated can apply
Sensory Foundationalism
to Psychological
But a
Foundationalism).
only
to Psychological
commitment
for
Foundationalism,
does not commit one to the Superior
example,
Basics view, or to Phenomenalist
Foundationalism,
or
Pure
Iterative
Found?
Foundationalism
It is possible,
ationalism.
that certain
however,
nonobvious
connections may be shown to exist such
that one variety of foundationalism
here identified
in fact entails another variety in a different cate?
gory. Indeed it is my hope that the present outline
as might exist
may serve tomake such connections
more easily discernible.
III. Strong
those that have been proposed.

This discussion of specific theories must be highly
theor?
selective given the number of foundationalist
ies of one sort or another that are to be found in the
literature. Iwill continue on strong forms of founda?
tionalism and on some of the more modest forms of
foundationalism
that avoid the radical contextualism
to
that allows cultural or scientific developments
a
The
basic
what
constitutes
determine
proposition.
such as Rorty
of philosophers
radical contextualism
stands quite far from the traditional anti-relativist
of most
spirit that has been one of the motivations
case
and is in any
better known
foundationalists,
founda?
noncontextualist
than the contemporary
tionalist theories I wish to draw attention to.
'
s Epistemic
Principles
Foundationalism
has continued to develop and refine a

in the tradition of
form
of
foundationalsim
strong
insisted on Psycholog?
Lewis. He has, for example,
over External-World
Founda?
ical Foundationalism
Chisholm
tionalism
Psychological
(e.g.,
Chisholm
1977,
is
Foundationalism
World
assumes
Foundationalism
we already
knowledge
of many
since the latter

cannot,
have unproblematic
basic
about
the
external
propositions
world.
Chisholm
also carries on the Lewis
tradition of
Basics
Foundationalism.
Lewis
maintained
Superior
that if anything is to be probable,
something must
be certain (Lewis 1946, p. 186). Chisholm
is one of
the few contemporary
who main?
foundationalists
are
tains that basic or self-presenting
propositions
Foundationalism
In discussing
I have cited
the above categories,
authors only insofar as their views correspond with
those of a particular category. But no one category
makes for a full-fledged
theory. To get a sense of
what
such a theory looks like, and to compare
it is useful to consider at least a few of
theories,
Chisholm
theory because a more limited class of basic prop?

ositions must carry the load of justifying all other
Foun?
Also, Psychological
empirical propositions.
answer
dationalism
to
the
attempts
skeptical chal?
lenge that asks how our subjective mental experi?
ences can tell us anything about the world external
to our experiences.
If it is successful,
it provides
an answer to this challenge
in a way that External
pp.
the
20-22).
stronger
certain (e.g., Chisholm

1980, pp. 549-50).
Chisholm's
foundationalism
is perhaps most
elaborate and detailed in its formulation of epistemic
that attempt to explain how propositions
principles
essential
for a
acquire justification.
Particularly
are
foundationalist
those
program
stating
principles
the conditions under which basic propositions
jus?
Such principles attempt
tify nonbasic propositions.
to bridge the epistemic
gap that exists in strong
foundationalist
theories between
subjective propo?
sitions about sensations or beliefs and propositions
about the world external to the subject.
In an early version of Chisholm's
theory, such
were
of
the
form:
bridge principles
If p, then q is justified for S
and q a nonbasic
p is a basic proposition
1966, pp. 45-50).17 After
(Chisholm
proposition
(1969) criticized principles of this form,
Heidelberger
Chisholm
restated his principles in revised form:
where
If p and q, then r is justified for S

r a nonbasic proposi?
where p is a basic proposition,
tion, and q a set of independent conditions (Chisholm
1977, pp. 75-81; 1980, pp. 555-56). These indepen?
dent conditions require, roughly, that S must not have
any grounds for doubting r.
It would not appear that the propositions
stating
independent conditions q can themselves be basic.
In Chisholm's
formulations
they contain complex

relations which may not even be under?
to the subject, let alone
and accessible
could have basic or
for
which
she
propositions
If they are not accessible
immediate justification.
would
to the subject, it
appear that Chisholm's
must
since they would
be
externalist,
principles
for
state conditions
necessary
justification which
to
what
the
obtain external
subject is aware of or
access
to given the evidence
has
what she
epistemic
available to her at the time. Even if they are acces?
epistemic
standable
105
immediate
It is the subject's
experience.
of
that
the
provides her with
given
apprehension
a
reason
to
think
that
"given
particular
good
her belief that she seems to see a
belief?e.g.,
true
blue book or her belief that she feels pain?is
sensory
(Moser 1985a, pp. 121, 170).

that it is the given-belief
Moser
does maintain
to
about
the
related proposition
itself?as
opposed
is
what the subject immediately
apprehends?that
immediately justified for the subject (p. 173). This
sible, questions may be raised about whether prin?

recent form proposed
in the more
by
ciples
are truly foundational,
since nonbasic
Chisholm
conditions q appear to be as essential as basic prop?
osition p to the justification of r. Chisholm provides
is presumably because the act of immediate appre?

of conceptualization
hension occurs independently
an infant can im?
(p. 166). As I understand Moser,
mediately apprehend redness without possessing any
concepts or the capacity to entertain beliefs. But
to such questions
least a partial response
1980, pp. 557-59). More discussion on
(Chisholm
both sides of this issue would I believe be useful.
and critiques of other aspects of
(For discussions
see Alston
Chisholm's
1980;
epistemic principles
sophistication
being justified requires conceptual
on the part of the subject?especially
given Moser's
it is not
Hence
internalist sense of justification.
appropriate to attribute any degree of justification
to the infant simply for being in this nonconceptual
as "founda?
state. Moser
speaks of given-beliefs
at
Foley
1980,
1983; Fumerton
1985, pp. 26-27; Hall
1976; Shirley 1980; Triple? 1980. See also the

articles on Chisholm's
epistemology
Hall's
article
inPhilosophia
and pp. 605-10
7, 1978, especially
for Chisholm's
reply to Hall.)
has achieved some
Once a nonbasic proposition
via
from
basic
of
justification
propositions
degree
can
be
enhanced
its
justification
bridge principles,
by its coherence with other nonbasic propositions
in the subject's epistemic system. Chisholm's
epis?
temic principles
also spell out such coherence
in detail (Chisholm
enhancement
1977, pp. 82-84;
In this, Chisholm
is advocating
1980, p. 556).
as
to Pure Foundationalism,
and
Mixed
opposed
he is in company
I am
aware
Moser's
with
every other foundationalist
of.
Intuitionism
in
theory as presented
some
in
is
(1985a)
respects
Empirical Justification
like Chisholm,
Moser,
stronger than Chisholm's.
is a Psychological
But Moser fol?
Foundationalist.
in
lows Lewis more closely
than does Chisholm
the important matter of the sensory given and its
role in the justification
of nonbasic propositions.
Moser
all
in the "immediate
grounds
justification
of
what
is
given to the subject in
apprehension"
Moser's
foundationalist
tional," and would probably therefore classify him?

It is possible, how?
self as a Belief Foundationalist.
as those about
ever, to think of basic propositions
since
what the subject immediately
apprehends,
such propo?
Moser stresses the sensory experiences
source of justifi?
sitions describe as the ultimate
as a
cation. We may in that case describe Moser
Under
this construal,
Foundationalist.
Sensory
are nonjustified
basic propositions
justifiers. As
about what the subject immediately
propositions
they serve as the source for given
apprehends,
beliefs which are immediately
justified and in turn
mediately
justify nonbasic propositions.
Moser explicitly rejects externalism and attempts
to construct a theory of foundationalism
based
on
an
account
of
internalist
primarily
justification
(see pp. 143-47 for his rejection of Chisholm's
on the grounds of its alleged exter?
foundationalism
nalism and pp. 147-50,
157-206 for his develop?
ment of an Internalist Foundationalism
he calls "in
means by
Moser's
of
the
tuitionism").
explication
in the
which basics justify nonbasics
him
places
of
Foundationalists
Induction
category
Explanatory
(pp. 198-205).
Moser
rejects Superior Basics Foundationalism
In this he departs from both Lewis
(pp. 150-57).
and Chisholm. Many would on this basis classify
106
as a modest
To
form of foundationalism.
Moser's
some extent the classification of a theory as strong or
is a matter of convention. My own view
modest
in
though is that, in light of the variety of ways
which foundationalist
theories may differ, it is best
not tomake the choice between the Superior Basics
view and theModest Basics view the sole criterion
a foundationalist
for classifying
theory as strong or
I believe thatMoser's
combination of Psy?
modest.
and Internalist Foundationalism,
chological
together
doc?
with his reintroduction
of the much-maligned
trine of the sensory given as the source of all empiri?
cal justification, make itmore accurate to describe
his theory as a form of strong foundationalism.
The following
survey of some recent modest
clear that
from the
significant
departures
of strong foundationalists
such as Lewis
foundationalist
there are more
theories
theories
should
and Chisholm
than the simple
Basics Foundationalism.
IV. Modest
Pollock's
Direct
Negative
Realism
make
denial
of Superior
Foundationalism
Coherence
Theories
and
as we have
seen in the discussion

of Belief Foun?
on the idea that
his
is
based
dationalism,
rejection
we do not normally have beliefs about epistemolog?
Pollock maintains
that
ically basic propositions.
basics are not generally believed because they are
about
the content
of perceptual
and
experience,
our
are
beliefs
about
ordinarily
physical
objects
and not the contents of our experience
(1979, pp.
98-99).
This particular move does not in fact dispose of
classical or strong forms of foundationalism.
Even
if it were true that we do not have beliefs directly
about the content of our experiences
that do not
make covert reference to physical objects (a point
is here assuming
disputed by Firth 1964), Pollock
a
Belief
and not considering
Foundationalism
Foundationalism.
in
Pollock
Lewis-type
Sensory
effect defines away the latter as a possibility
by
incorporating Belief Foundationalism
requirements
into his general definition of foundations
theories
But
Foundationalism
(1979, p. 93).
surely Sensory
tenet of founda?
does not violate either essential
will neces?
tionalism.
Foundationalism
Sensory
a
version
of Psychological
Founda?
sarily be
and if combined
tionalism,
as
Basics Foundationalism,
In a 1979 article, Pollock came to reject "classi?

cal foundationalism"
(including his own earlier posi?
tion of 1974) in favor of theories intermediate be?
tween foundations theories and coherence theories.
between
that the continuum
Pollock
suggests
is
and pure coherentism
classical foundationalism
of
the
variable
the
by
single
simply generated
degree of epistemic privilege attached to the set of
have
a form
of
strong
also with Superior

in Lewis, we surely
foundationalism.
One gets a better sense of versions of founda?

tionalism that truly move away from strong founda?
tionalism by considering
the other theories dis?
cussed by Pollock. These theories are in fact con?
than those which
siderably more
sophisticated
on the
from traditional
theories merely
differ
classical foundationalism
(presum?
degree of privilege
discusses
for
issue.
Pollock
Basics
Superior
a
terms
of
he
class
theories
"negative
example
coherence
theories." Such theories assume that any
the various
theories between
p. 101). However,
and
forms
of
foundationalism
the strongest
as straightfor?
cannot be generated
coherentism
of
wardly as this. Indeed, in his own development
factors
additional
he
theories
brings many
specific
into play. For example, one would expect Pollock
given belief is prima facie justified just by the fact

function nega?
that the subject holds it. Reasons
a
is
belief
automatically
justified unless there
tively:
is some reason to question it (p. 101). Such a theory
sees no epistemological
problem with accepting the
system of beliefs as a whole as
subject's epistemic
it currently exists. Individual beliefs are examined
and abandoned only if specific reasons are found
for doing so.
on the grounds
to reject classical foundationalism
that basics have only a small degree of epistemic
privilege and are not certain or indubitable. In fact,
But can such coherence

theories be allied with
at all? Pollock recognizes
that they
foundationalism
can (1979, p. 105):
basic
with
propositions,
attributing the highest
ably a property like certainty) to basic propositions
no
intrinsic
coherentism
and pure
attaching
to
of
(Pollock 1979,
any type
proposition
privilege

Given
any
classical
foundations
theory,
we
can
con?
struct a negative coherence theory by saying that a

person S is justified in believing a proposition P iff
he does believe P and he has no reason to think that
his belief in P could not be justified in accordance
with the foundations theory if he were sufficiently
reflective about those states of himself which are
reported by the propositions considered epistemolog?
ically basic by the foundations theory.
if a foundations
for example:
theory takes
an
individual's
about
sensory experi?
propositions
then the
ences to be basic for that individual,
assert
would
associated negative coherence
theory
Thus
is jus?
that an ordinary physical-object
proposition
reason
no
has
if
and
the
if
believed
tified
subject
would be rendered
to think that the proposition
were
on
about
to
he
reflect
doubtful
propositions
his current
sensory experiences.
one prefers to consider this a modest
Whether
with
form of foundationalism
strong coherence
or
a
with
form
of
coherentism
modest
leanings,
a
matter
strong foundationalist
leanings, is perhaps
of semantics, perhaps a matter of how the interpre?
tation of the theory is worked out in detail. What?

ever category is chosen for it, it is notable as an
example of a theory that stands between more con?
and coheren?
ventional
elements of both in more or
tism, incorporating
less equally significant degrees.
Pollock does not himself appear
theory that so combines negative
The question of how
foundations.
own preferred theory is
Pollock's
1986), direct realism is represented as

Knowledge,
norms must license
the view that "our epistemic
states to phys?
inference directly from perceptual
beliefs without mediation
by beliefs
ical-object
about the perceptual states" (1986, p. 175). In the
1979 article, direct realism and negative coherence
are not combined
into one unified theory but refer
to different senses of justification.
like Sensory
very much
I
believe
is Sensory
it
Foundationalism.
Indeed,
Pollock
So
Foundationalism.
when, by 1986,
jetti?
sons the negative coherence aspect of his account of
(1986, pp. 85-87) and em?
justification
epistemic
as
the best available account
braces direct realism
I
believe that this in effect re?
(1986, pp. 175-79),
Direct
especially since he has continued tomodify his views

since his 1979 article. In that article he appears to
coherence
endorse a general negative
theory for
direct
what
he
and
calls
"subjective"
justification
realism for a theory of "objective"
justification
and
(The terms "objective"
(1979, pp. 108-11).
a
"what
should
here
person
"subjective"
distinguish
believe given what are in fact good reasons for be?
lieving things, and what a person should believe
given his possibly mistaken beliefs about reasons,"
(1979, p. 110.) Direct realism is represented in 1979
as the view that S is justified in believing p iff the
set of basic propositions
that are true relative to S
to
(as opposed
believedby S) support/?. In Pollock's
most
recent account
Theories
(Contemporary
of
realism
turns Pollock
sounds
to a strong
foundationalist
theory,
to Psychological
and
Foundationalism
specifically
Pollock himself would
Sensory Foundationalism.
not in fact
not accept such a description?would
as a foundationalist
at all?
himself
describe
as
assumes
that any theory prop?
noted, he
because,
erly described as foundational will be some form
But this seems to me
of Belief Foundationalism.
mistaken
for reasons noted above.
Inwhatever way Pollock, in his latest incarnation,
the variety of views he has
is to be best categorized,
if not endorsed, gives a useful picture
described,
of some ways in which stronger and more modest
versions
to endorse any
coherence with
best to classify
a difficult one,
107
Haack's
of foundationalism
may be distinguished.
Foundherentism
Like Pollock, Haack recognizes a continuum of

to "Pure
theories from "Pure Foundationalism"
to
It
is
instructive
Coherentism"
(Haack 1982/83).
an
like
with
the
hers
intermediate
compare
theory
others here discussed. Hers is far enough toward the
side of the spectrum that I believe it is best described
as amodified
coherence theory that is incompatible
labels her intermediate
a
view that, like founda?
theory "Foundherentism,"
some
allows
"beliefs"
tionalism,
(her description
of foundationalism
here appears to assume Belief
secure
to be intrinsically more
Foundationalism)
not
than
others
certain)
(though
epistemically
with
foundationalism.
She
that the justifica?

allows
but, like coherentism,
secure beliefs
tion of these more
"may depend
upon the support of less secure beliefs"
(p. 149).
108
Foundherentism
would appear to be incompatible
with any variety of foundationalism,
since the justi?
of more secure beliefs on less
ficatory dependence
secure ones would not allow the former to qualify as
a founda?
in any sense which
basic propositions
tionalist could accept.
Foley's
Subjective
Foundationalism
In The Theory of Epistemic Rationality

(1987),
a theory of "subjective
founda?
Foley develops
tionalism." Foley's overarching aim is to determine
what it is for a person to be epistemically
rational in
a
that
1).
(p.
believing
Foley recognizes
proposition
this aim is different from at least some of the aims
(discussed below) that have traditionally motivated
in aims is
foundationalist
theories. This difference
a
to
to
lead
notes,
theory importantly
likely, Foley
different from traditional foundationalism.
view is that there are "properly basic"
Foley's
but that there is no essential connec?
propositions,
tion between such a proposition's
being true and its
a
for
rational
(Contrast Chisholm's
person.
being
definition of basic or self-presenting
propositions,
to Foley, properly
Chisholm
1977, p. 22.) According
are those that are uncontroversial
basic propositions
is
for the subject to assume. To say a proposition/?
for S to assume is to say that no
uncontroversial
proposition which S believes with more confidence
than p can be used to argue against p (see Foley,
Itmust also be the
pp. 63-64 for the full definition).
case that S would, on reflection, believe that inmost
relevant possible situations in which she believes p,
be true (p. 68).
as must any founda?
maintains,
theory
Foley's
are
that
nonbasic
tionalist
propositions
theory,
at
in
least
part
by proposi?
supported
epistemically
the epis?
tions that are properly basic. However,
are
temic relations between basics and nonbasics
her belief
that p would
as subjective as are Foley's criteria for proper bas

icality. Suppose basic proposition p in fact makes
nonbasic
q likely, and S rationally
proposition
believes p. This is not enough to make q rational
for S. It will not do so if, for example, S would
not even on reflection come to realize the support
a proposition p that
p provides for q. Conversely,
does not in fact make q likely may nonetheless
make q rational for S, if S would believe "given
ideal reflection"
that p does make q likely (pp.
rational belief is a function of
71-72). For Foley,
set of beliefs and her
the subject's own existing
standards.
epistemic
This theory raises the specter that any belief
no matter how bizarre, might count as
whatever,
rational if a person's other beliefs and methods
of
reflection were, from our point of view, quite unac?
such
ceptable epistemically.
Foley acknowledges
a possibility. He does move tomitigate
this concern
the concept of ideal epistemic
reflec?
by clarifying
tion (pp. 33-39) and noting that, under his theory,
standards for attaining epistemic
rationality are in
fact relatively
strict (pp. 102-14). He also points
to environmental
and biological
factors that will
tend tomake epistemic standards similar from indi?
vidual to individual (p. 113). Finally, he notes that
"not every failure is a failure of rationality"
(p.
that bizarre beliefs
114). We should acknowledge
some
for
be
individuals,
rational, and look
might,
for a different sort of explanation
for what has gone
than the alleged irrationality of such beliefs.
that while his theory is structur?
Foley recognizes
it
has many points of contact
foundational,
ally
with coherentism
(pp. 93-102).
In terms of its foundationalist
structure, Foley's
as
a
to
is
be
classed
Modest
Basics, External
theory
wrong
Foundationalism.
Foley thinks that, for the
that
the
external-world
person,
proposition
typical
that person sees a cat on the mat will be properly
World
basic. No proposition
that the person believes with
equal confidence would be likely to be useful in
arguing against it (p. 74). As for a Superior Basics
a person might have what
property like infallibility,
is in fact an infallible belief with respect to a par?
but if she would not even on
ticular proposition,
the
reflection realize the infallibility of her belief,
in question might not even be rational
proposition
for her, much less properly basic (p. 71).
Foley's
theory is a form of Internalist Founda?
it is the result of the
tionalism.
Indeed, I believe
thoroughgoing
application of the internalist concept
structured
to a foundationally
of justification
it can be argued that other Inter?
theory. I believe
are not as
such as Moser
nalist Foundationalists
of internalism.
in their applications
thoroughgoing
to external stan?
ties justification
Ultimately Moser
his doctrine that all
what is true?with
dards?to
109
justification is grounded in that which is given to the

This does not mean
subject in sensory experience.
or otherwise unac?
is
inconsistent
Moser's
theory
such as Moser,
Strong foundationalists
ceptable.
and Lewis have very good reasons for
Chisholm
to truth at some point in the justi?
tying justification
and insofar as our

constitute a skeptical challenge,
to be addres?
to
is
need
refute
goal
they
skepticism,
sed. But Foley appears to be right in maintaining
ficatory process. They are likely to regard Foley's

even with its acceptance of basic
foundationalism,
as
straying too close to coherentism.
propositions,
Like coherentism,
Foley's
theory allows no exit
from the circle of the subject's beliefs. How then
can such beliefs be properly grounded?
irrational (pp. 72-73).

Indeed, it would
tional of us to suspend belief about ordinary matters
of fact on the grounds that there might be an evil
demon systematically
deceiving us. Barring a refu?
tation of the skeptic, our ordinary beliefs might
in a sense that has
lack some ultimate justification
I believe that the difference between Foley and the

is based on two broadly dif?
strong foundationalists
we might call
ferent concepts of justification?what
versus Foley's
traditional epistemic
justification
to
from
Descartes
philosophers
be entirely
Chisholm,
yet such beliefs might
sense.
rational in Foley's
concept of epistemic rationality. And I believe

stem from different motives
these differences
that
and
has been
interests. Traditionally,
foundationalism
advocated with the aim of solving several philo?
sophical problems, perhaps chief among them the
traditional
of skepticism.
And
given
problem
one of the specific skeptical problems
assumptions,
to be solved has been to explain how knowledge
of
the objective world is acquired from subjective ex?
and to properly connect up a person's
periences,
about the
justified beliefs with true propositions
invite theories
way the world is. These concerns
which are at least at some point externalist?they
require that justified beliefs be explained ultimately
in terms of what is true independently
of what the
subject believes.
By contrast, the problem which Foley's
theory
from
attempts to resolve is a subjective one: What,
the subject's point of view, ought she to believe
insofar as her goal is to be rational? Since Foley's
interest is not in solving the traditional problem of
he can use as his reference point the
skepticism,
individual's epistemic system as it currently exists,
that since we have no positive evidence

they are too weak to constitute arguments
typically make ordinary beliefs about
for them,
that could
the world
seem irra?
concerned
to address the skeptical challenge

is
Attempting
a worthy
as is
goal nonetheless,
presumably
a theory of rational belief. As Foley
developing
insofar as traditional foundationalism
and
observes,
own
are
his
theory of subjective foundationalism
operating with different goals and different con?
cepts of justification,
they may both be right (p. 69).
V. Concluding
Remarks
My primary concern has been to describe and

theories, not to evaluate
categorize foundationalist
them. It is possible
that none of them are true, or
even on the right track. All the same, there is a
sense in which the very existence and extent of the
literature here surveyed makes
profoundationalist
to claim that foundationalism
it inappropriate
is
dead. Nor does it appear likely that foundationalist
theories will fade from the scene in the immediate
future. It is worth noting that many of the most
foundationalist
theories (e.g.,
recently developed
something outside that epistemic system. And since

his concern is with what should and should not be
reasonable
for the typical subject in typical cir?
those of Foley
1987, Fumerton
1985, Alan
Goldman
1988, Moser
1985a) are products of the
younger generation of philosophers whose work is
to be recognized.
just beginning
Of course vigorous
of nonfoun
discussion
dationalist accounts of epistemic justification
is also
to be expected.
Indeed the current scene in epis?
is particularly vital and rich.
temology as a whole
Itmay well be, as some critics of foundationalism
cumstances, Foley need not be concerned with evil

demon hypotheses
and other outlandish-seeming
Such possibilities
do
epistemological
possibilities.
was for
assert, that foundationalist
epistemology
too long the dominant paradigm, and that it is good
so
that it has been dislodged
from such a position,
without worrying about how that epistemic system

as awhole, or critical parts of it such as that person's
own epistemic
standards, come to be justified by
110
in epistemology
that a variety of approaches
may
flourish. But it appears that the eagerness of some
to remove
from
foundationalism
philosophers
cation especially
given the new concepts and dis?
tinctions
that have recently been introduced,
to
or
be assured
that a particular
of
type
theory
such a dominating
it,
turely dismiss
temporary debates.
onstrated, my own
theory is correct or the obviously

ap?
preferred
If that is the situation,
then it is best
proach.
that a diversity
of views be debated,
and foun?
dationalism
should
be
included
among
surely
position has led them to prema?

as though it has no role in con?
it remains to be dem?
Although
view is that we do not yet know
the structure of empirical
justifi
about
enough
them.18
of New Hampshire
University
Received
September
11, 1989
NOTES
1. This
claim may
broad
well
little has been written
article,
2. But
the coherentist
the structure
3. Gowans
Lewis'
views
of epistemic
book Mind
earlier
for a response
197-98)
of Otto
by
historical
subsequent
research.
the notable
With
exception
of Schmitt's
of foundationalism.
the history
Neurath
indicate
tenets
that the central
of
logical
did not dictate
positivism
a view
about
justification.
that while
maintains
(1984)
require modification
about
and
Lewis
the World
to Gowans'
does
Order
defend
(1929)
in An Analysis
of Knowledge
a critique
of foundationalism.
foundationalism
contains
actually
and Valuation
See Moser
(1946),
(1988,
pp.
argument.
were
and Pollock
in publishing
4. Although
this period Chisholm
alone
theories
foundationalist
that retained
during
developed
wrote sympathetically
of Lewis'
the relatively
about foundationalism
foundationalist
system, other philosophers
strong requirements
or began to suggest ways
theories could be developed.
in which more moderate
foundationalist
Firth (1964) noted several
Roderick
a coherence
of foundationalism
without
in which
the Lewis
be moderated
version
ways
yet becoming
might
theory. Panayot
Butchvarov
not,
a foundationalist
assumed
however,
develop
or defend
for nonbasic
justification
of knowledge
account
of how
(see, e.g.,
propositions
version of foundationalism
nontraditional
modified,
account
a specific
in The Concept
basic
pp. 204-05).
which maintained
(or "primary
see especially
p. 202). He did
can provide
a
defended
Quinton
perceptual
knowledge")
(1973), Anthony
of Things
were as a rule corrigible
propositions
propositions
a view
as an early articulation
of modest
foundationalism,
that basic
is significant
(see, e.g., pp. 10, 213). His work
objects
to be adopted by several other epistemologists
in subsequent
not a foundationalist
of any sort, based on an earlier work of Quinton's
of uses there are no 'basic sentences'"
of multiplicity
"because
(Quinton
about material
was
which
(1970,
of Knowledge
propositions
In The Nature
years.
(1982,
Pappas
p.
81)
1955,
was
that Quinton
say there that
implies
does
1955). Although
Quinton
p. 49), he also speaks of "the
(Quinton
sin of the coherence
to me
to support a post-Wittgensteinian,
this type of found?
contextualist
foundationalism.
(I discuss
theory"
(p. 51) and seems
in Belief,
D. M. Armstrong's
Truth and Knowledge
in the text following.)
defense of reliabilism
ationalism
(1973) is also compatible
of his reasons for departing
from the traditional Cartesian
and includes a discussion
with modest
concept
of
the foundations
of knowledge
Philosophers
such as Pastin's
and Alston's
foundationalism.
See,
167-69)
pp.
156-57).
that philosophers
began
Pastin
(1975a,
pp.
directly
418-19)
as any
our survey of
for beginning
foundationalism
(see note 4). But
the assumptions
challenging
on Reichenbach,
Goodman
these
it was
and arguments
of
and Rescher;
Alston
recent
trends.
with
articles
the critics
of
(1976c,
pp.
on Aune.
7. Significant
72-84;
criticisms
Pollock
1979,
statements
8. The many
or mentioned
discussed
1973,
for example,
Dicker
6. Georges
does
to be a defense
of modest
pp.
(Armstrong
as good a date
1975 marks
somewhat
inevitably
arbitrary,
to modest
did anticipate
the move
such as Firth and Quinton
5. Although
not
of pure
pp.
as such,
of a phenomenalistic
to foundationalism
refer
foundationalism
coherentism
101-05;
to this effect
in the text)
Sosa
are
to be found
1980b,
in the literature
including
those
pp.
18-20,
but his approach
in Perceptual
Knowledge
would
appear
p. 61; Moser
1985a,
(1980)
type.
in Cornman
1985,
pp.
(in addition
to those
by Airaksinen
1978,
1980,
pp.
145-51;
Foley
1980,
13-19.
that can be found
p. 263,
1981,
in the works
p. 403;
Clark
of foundationalism
critical
1977,
p.
143; Dancy
1985

1987,
p. 62; Frankenberry
Nielsen
1986,
cases
the theory
(see e.g.,
Delaney
Johnson
586;
p.
1978,
Kekes
71-72;
pp.
1982; McGinn
1981/82,
pp. 97-98;
and Verges
1987, pp. 309, 311. In many
It is often not clear in such cases whether
1985, pp. 84-95; Schenck

1986, p. 238;
17; Sayers
been refuted is referred to simply as "foundationalism."
to include
modest
advocating
1986,
to have
thought
is meant
the criticism
1980,
p. 77; Hacking
Pols
p. 277;
111
p.
recent modest
of foundationalism
as a rule do
1975,
p. 8; Pastin
p. 419).
1975a,
as well
of foundationalism
versions
forms
so because
as stronger formulations
of the theory. Those
of the theory are not viable
versions
they believe
stronger
Annis
9. Compare,
for example,
1977, p. 345; BonJour
1985, p. 17; Chisholm
1964, p. 263 (reprinted
1977, pp. 17-18; Moser
1985a, p. 117; Pollock
1979, p. 93; Sosa
1984, p. 241; Lehrer
126-27); Gowans
see Stiffler
of the definition
of foundationalism
discussion
1984.
1979, p. 74. For a more extended
10. For
of basic
characterizations
specific
Butchvarov
p. 62; Chisholm
1970,
1977,
see Alston
propositions
pp.
20-22,
1976b,
Annis
257-58;
pp.
p. 549; Cornman
1980,
1977,
1982,
p. 5; Van
p. 213; Aune
1978,
p. 287; Lehrer
in Chisholm
1980b,
1967,
p. 76; Lewis
1974,
pp.
Cleve
p. 41;
1946,
pp.
28, 182; Pastin 1975b, p. 147 (reprinted in Pastin 1978, p. 286); Pollock 1979, pp. 93-94; Quinton 1966, p. 58; Sellars 1979,
171-72; Will
pp.
1974,
144; Williams
p.
For more
p. 61.
1977,
extensive
discussions
of basic
see Chisholm
propositions
1979,
pp. 337-41; Feldman 1977; Heidelberger 1979; Pastin 1975b and 1977.
Almeder
are not themselves

that basic propositions
without
confer
themselves
justified.
They
justification
are nonjustified
On this view basic propositions
In what follows
I will talk of basic
justification.
justifiers.
If Almeder
is right,
will have to be made
in how we talk about basic
adjustments
justified.
appropriate
our
in
nature
also
revisions
of
the
and
may
require
understanding
position
strength
maintains
(1983)
or possessing
as being
propositions
Almeder's
propositions.
requiring
See also Johnsen (1985) andMoser (1985b) on Almeder.

11. Additional
are to be found
distinctions
theoretical
own
12. Kekes'
rejection
in Sosa
(1980a,
on a strong
is an attack
of foundationalism
1981,
1980b,
and Haack
1983)
form of foundationalism
(1982/83).
that basic
propositions
in the context of a discussion

of what
concepts
of
and
definitions
non-inferential
provides
incorrigible
propositions
that requires
be incorrigible (Kekes 1982, p. 273).

13. Alston
a subject
(1971,
1976b)
have
might
careful
provides
distinctions
"privileged
among
to. Pappas
access"
(1982)
these
knowledge.
See also Lehrer's definition of incorrigibility (1974, p. 83) and definitions of certainty in Firth (1967), Chisholm (1977, p. 10)
and Klein
Ch.
(1981,
14. Pollock
(1986,
3).
attributes
p. 41)
Lewis
explicitly
repudiates
of phenomenalism
elements
(Lewis
to Lewis.
phenomenalism
1946,
(1988,
pp. 200-02)
Lewis maintains
182-200).
pp.
Moser
1946,
(Lewis
phenomenalism
pp.
more
notes that
and correctly
carefully
a theory that does
some
incorporate
conditional
propositions
(specifically,
198-200)
while
developing
that phenomenal
are quite different

in reference
from "non-terminating
but
about ordinary physical
judgments")
"terminating
judgments"
objects,
an
that a particular
is
to
infinite
series
of
related
Since
non-terminating
judgment
intentionally
equivalent
terminating
judgments.
no finite set of phenomenal
the series is infinite, however,
entails the truth of a particular physical-object
propositions
proposition.
as an Explanatory
Moser
Induction Foundationalist
in terms of the means
do
interprets Lewis
phenomenal
by which
propositions
on this score, he clearly
the best interpretation
of Lewis
1988, pp. 199-200). Whatever
(Moser
physical-object
propositions
are merely
or indubitability
that physical-object
and do not partake of the certainty
of phenomenal
propositions
probable
and he explicitly
Foundationalism
1946, pp. 184-86),
propositions
(e.g., Lewis
rejects what I have called Deductive
(e.g., p. 191).
justify
insists
15. Although
Dilman
does not mention
foundationalism
when he criticizes
the view that ordinary physical
1975,
pp.
16. For
1986b;
88,
BonJour
1985a,
17. Chisholm
degrees
of
120-38;
pp.
internalist
1986,
91-92;
pp.
Pollock
p. 22;
to thank
for
were
suggestions
Johnsen, William
I am particularly
terms
different
employs
of justification
research
propositions
sense
in
(Dilman
1979,
concepts
Firth
pp.
of justification
103-04,
(not always
Goldman
p. 218; Alvin
1978,
1987,
p. 62;
especially
using
this
see Alston
terminology)
1980; Graybosch
Simson
1986; Swain
1986/87;
1985,
Montmarquet
p. 37; Walker
1981b,
1987.
1966,
18.1 wish
vs.
of externalist
1980; Chisholm
1986; Yourgrau
(Chisholm
object
94-95).
discussions
1987; Moser
he clearly has Psychological

in our
Foundationalism
cannot be known directly
and noninferentially
by name,
mind
1977,
pp. 7-12).
and refer
simply
the University
this project.
provided
Lycan,
grateful
Woody
by Timo
for degrees
of justification:
etc.
reasonable
"reasonable,"
doubt,"
"evident,"
"beyond
In this general discussion
of his epistemic
I suppress reference
to these differing
principles
to a nonbasic
proposition's
being justified.
of New
Dugan
Hampshire
Faculty Development
and Michael
Patten
assisted
Airaksinen,
Joseph Margolis
to Robert Almeder,
David
Annis,
and Frederick
Hilary
David
Schmitt.
Kornblith,
Committee
with
Austin,
For detailed
Paul Moser
Dan
and Dean
bibliographical
Crawford,
Stuart
Palmer
research.
Useful
Alan
and helpful comments

and Ernest Sosa.
in aid
bibliographical
Richard Hall, Bredo
Goldman,
on earlier
for grants
drafts
of this paper
112
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Recent Work on Foundationalsim

27, Number 2, April

RECENT WORK ON FOUNDATIONALISM

cannot rest upon past argu?

prominent belief among contemporary philos?

in both strong and modest

in that they require no external or

tive to competing theories of empirical justification.

state that basic

support from other propositions

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

in their different ways assumed that it was

and critique them from some independent

basis of subjective sensory propositions

and Its Critics

stances can be found in

Brentano (1966 [1930]),Russell (1926 [1914], 1940)

RECENT WORK ON FOUNDATIONALISM

evaluating its epistemic status by deter?

1981, 1986; Graybosch

applied these ideas to the

1974; Lehrer 1974; Seilars 1973). These develop?

is dead (Rorty 1979; Rajchman andWest

The years 1975 and 1976 saw the publication of

1980; Flor 1984;Foley 1987;Fumerton 1985;Alan

Goldman 1985; Grandy 1987; Kekes 1977, pp. 106

1981/82; Sosa 1983.)

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

it is not clear what account of epistemic

sin" (Levi 1981, p. 590, characterizing

all theories that might be appro?

bear to nonbasic propositions? Virtually all versions

the justification of a basic propo?

Most of those defining foundationalism

Any justified empirical proposition is either

have been made in the litera?

to the debate about the viability of

the varieties of founda?

is short for "basic propositions.")

RECENT WORK ON FOUNDATIONALISM

Specifications of theNature of B asic Propositions

Status of Basic Propositions

The Status of "P is Basic" or of Founda?

Context Dependence of Basic Propositions

II. Accounts of the Relation Between Basic and

Explanatory Induction Foundationalism

Extent of Justification of Nonbasic

or entertaining beliefs about. Basic propositions

remain basic on the

ments (Moore 1959 [1939], 1966 [1925]). But

(1987, pp. 73-76), Quinton

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

(1983,1987), Audi (1983), Cornman (1977,1980),

inDescartes and Lewis do suggest Itera?

RECENT WORK ON FOUNDATIONALISM

if the subject is immediately justified in thehigher

and Chisholm do indeed commit them to this view,

by that subject. Many foundation?

According to [foundationalism], all epistemic support

believes any epistemologically basic propositions at all.

requirement upon their definitions