1

CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819

b.) YES.

*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

c.) NO.

A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the:

4. YES.
5. NO.

1. Right to life
6. NO.
2. Right to health
7. NO.
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
8. NO.
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which
contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners

B. NO.
C. NO.

b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by

compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care
providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions
despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be
included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local
Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)

* RATIO:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on
this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes
the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction),
the traditional meaning of conception according to reputable
dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to
refer to the moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn
child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy
the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive,
and thus constitutionally permissible.

* HELD:
A.
1. NO.
2. NO.
3.
a.) NO.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure
prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH
Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using
the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also
those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside
the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

2
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion
or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb
(Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives
under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must
be struck down.
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies in the National
Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and
supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per
se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be
maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA
4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure
that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep
in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure
shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered mandatory only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a)
is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to
ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious
sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes
a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use
is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical

practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of
the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and
penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as
compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH
procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion.
While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a
constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective
implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors
(under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause.
There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and
their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if
he/she is employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state
interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no
immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not
pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least
intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature
has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health
is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the
Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and
infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is
a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law
does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to
accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures
even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family
as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or
family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of

3
policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of
marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of
the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads
in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian
or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin
shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it
denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures)
about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental
guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of
the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department
of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the
term primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior
to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding
provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and
duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH
program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health
service provider. The private health care institution cited under

Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care

service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH
service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments
RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that
the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide
medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH
education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and nongovernment health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as
their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono
or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential
Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of
2009).

4
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local
governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU.

ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS?

In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services.

Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law
does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.

(4) MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the
ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the
regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare.
CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. CASE 2014-0041:
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER,- versus MARICELLE
M. CORTES, Respondent. (G.R. No. 200103, 23 APRIL 2014, ABAD
J.) SUBJECT/S: NEPOTISM (BRIEF TITLE: CIVIL SERVICE VS
CORTES)
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated January 10, 2012 of the Comi of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 115380 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated March 2, 2010
affirming the CSC-NCR Decision dated September 30, 2008
invalidating the appointment of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes for
being nepotistic is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
WHAT IS NEPOTISM?
NEPOTISM IS DEFINED IN SECTION 59 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE AS AN APPOINTMENT ISSUED IN FAVOR OF A RELATIVE
WITHIN THE THIRD CIVIL DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY OR
AFFINITY OF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:
(1) APPOINTING AUTHORITY;
(2) RECOMMENDING AUTHORITY;
(3) CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OR OFFICE; AND
(4) PERSON EXERCISING IMMEDIATE SUPERVISION OVER THE
APPOINTEE.

YES, AS FOLLOWS:
(1) PERSONS EMPLOYED IN A CONFIDENTIAL CAPACITY;
(2) TEACHERS;
(3) PHYSICIANS; AND

CORTEZ WAS APPOINTED AT CHR AS INFORMATION OFFICER. IS

HER APPOINTMENT COVERED BY THE PROHIBITION ON
NEPOTISM?
YES. SHE IS THE DAUGHTER OF CHR COMMISSIONER MALLARI.
AND SHE IS NOT COVERED BY THE EXCEPTIONS.
RESPONDENT CORTES ARGUES THAT THE APPOINTING
AUTHORITY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 59 OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IS THE COMMISSION EN BANC AND NOT
THE INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS WHO COMPOSE IT. IS HER
ARGUMENT CORRECT?
NO. TO RULE THAT THE PROHIBITION APPLIES ONLY TO THE
COMMISSION, AND NOT TO THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS WHO
COMPOSE IT, WILL RENDER THE PROHIBITION MEANINGLESS.
APPARENTLY, THE COMMISSION EN BANC, WHICH IS A BODY
CREATED BY FICTION OF LAW, CAN NEVER HAVE RELATIVES TO
SPEAK OF.
FURTHER, IF ACTS THAT CANNOT BE LEGALLY DONE DIRECTLY
CAN BE DONE INDIRECTLY, THEN ALL LAWS WOULD BE
ILLUSORY.
BUT COMMISSIONER MALLARI ABSTAINED FROM VOTING ON
HER APPOINTMENT. DID HIS ABSENTION NOT CURE THE
NEPOTISTIC CHARACTER OF THE APPOINTMENT?
NO BECAUSE THE EVIL SOUGHT TO BE AVOIDED BY THE
PROHIBITION STILL EXISTS. HIS MERE PRESENCE DURING THE
DELIBERATION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF IO V CREATED AN
IMPRESSION OF INFLUENCE AND CAST DOUBT ON THE
IMPARTIALITY AND NEUTRALITY OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC.
*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

5
8. NO.
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which
contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners

B. NO.
C. NO.

b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by

compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care
providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions
despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be
included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local
Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)

* RATIO:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on
this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes
the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction),
the traditional meaning of conception according to reputable
dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to
refer to the moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn
child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy
the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive,
and thus constitutionally permissible.

* HELD:
A.
1. NO.
2. NO.
3.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure
prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH
Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using
the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also
those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside
the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

a.) NO.
b.) YES.
c.) NO.
4. YES.
5. NO.
6. NO.
7. NO.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion
or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb
(Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives
under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must
be struck down.

6
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies in the National
Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and
supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.

penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as

compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH
procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion.
While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a
constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective
implementation of the law.

Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per

se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be
maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.

Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors

(under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause.
There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and
their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if
he/she is employed in the government.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA
4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure
that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep
in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure
shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered mandatory only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a)
is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to
ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious
sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes
a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use
is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of
the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and

Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state

interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no
immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not
pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least
intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature
has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health
is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the
Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and
infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is
a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law
does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to
accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures
even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family
as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or
family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of
marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of
the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads
in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian

7
or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin
shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it
denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures)
about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental
guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of
the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department
of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the
term primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior
to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding
provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and
duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH
program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health
service provider. The private health care institution cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care
service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH
service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the

public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on

reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments
RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that
the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide
medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH
education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and nongovernment health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as
their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono
or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential
Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of
2009).
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local
governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services.
Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law

8
does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the
ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the
regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare.
92 SCRA 358 Political Law Constitutional Law Constitutional
Commissions The Commission on Elections COMELECs
Constitutional Independence
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to
create a fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario
Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship over the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate
commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then President
Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed
in an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such
appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case
shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should
not come from the President for such is an internal matter that should
be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates
the constitutional independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: Yes. Yoracs designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions
are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made by
the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on
the quote administrative expediency to present the functions of the
COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing
rules on statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC who should
choose whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence of
Davide (they normally do that by choosing the most senior member).
But even though the presidents appointment of Yorac as acting
president is void, the members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate
Yorac as their acting chairman the point here is that, it is the
members who should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the
principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies.
AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, March 26 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May 2001 General
Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around

four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000
deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No.
8189.
A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on
February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the
COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that
no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election
activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to
conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between
the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May
14, 2001 general elections.
HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special
registration of new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and
must be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the
Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance.
However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President issued
a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the
conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had been
filed in Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189. Read full text
Cagas vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012)
Facts: Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the
Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and
local elections. The fast transmission of the results led to the
completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for
Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the
winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes.
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of
election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest
on May 24, 2010. The Comelec issues orders stating that the
protestant paid the cash deposit for filing of the case, and his petition
set out specific acts complained of. Petitioner moved to reconsider,
which was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari directly with
the SC.
Issue: Whether the Comelec erred in no dismissing the petition for
insufficiency of form.
Held: A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest may
not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory
order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.
The court may have the power to review any decision, order or ruling of
the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has
no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final

9
resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Where the
Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative
to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any
of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer
the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible
under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Gonzales v Comelec G.R No. 192856 March 18, 2011
Facts: Petitioner Fernando Gonzales and Reno Lim both filed
certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd
district of Albay in the May 10, 2010 election. Lim was the incumbent
Congressman while Gonzales was the former Governor of Albay. On
March 30, 2010 a petiton for disqualification and cancellation of
certificate of candidacy was filed by Stephen Bichara on the ground
that Gonzales is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a
spanish father and a filipino mother, and that failed to elect Philippines
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act no. 625. And that his certificate of
candidacy contains misleading information. The Comelec second
division division disqualified Gonzales in the forthcoming National and
Local elections. Gonzales thru counsel, received a copy of the
aforesaid resolution on May 11, 2010. Lim petitioned the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to consider the votes cast for Gonzales as stray
or not counted and/or suspend his proclamation, citing the second
divisions May 8, 2010 resolution disqualifying Gonzales as a
candidate. PBOC dismissed the petition stating that the period for filing
the of a motion for reconsideration of the comelec resolution has not
yet elapsed, and hence, the same is not yet final and executory. Based
on the results of the counting, Gonzales emerged as the winner having
garnered a total vote of 96000 while Lim ranked second with a vote of
68701 votes. On May 12, 2010, PBOC officially proclaimed Gonzales
as the duly elected Representative of the 3rd district of Albay.
Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over a Representative which
was officially proclaimed as a winner.
Held: We have constantly held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the
house of rep. the comelecs jurisdiction over election, returns, and
qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. We
declared that the court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the
eligibility of the private respondent who was already a member of the
house at the time of the filing of the petition for cerctiorari.
G.R. NO. 191771,
MAY 06, 2010
LIBERAL PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL A.
ROXAS II AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOSEPH EMILIO A.
ABAYA,PETITIONERVS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
NACIONALISTA PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
MANUEL B. VILLAR AND NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION,
ALLEGEDLY REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN FAUSTINO S. DY,
JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for
accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date, the
Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC)
filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it
be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for
purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was docketed as an SPP
(DM) case, indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 that it was an accreditation case
On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for
accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date, the
Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC)
filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it
be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for
purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was docketed as an SPP
(DM) case, indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 that it was an accreditation case.
ISSUES:
I.

Preliminary Issues:

A. Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and

technical infirmities?
B. Is the present petition premature since its object is to foreclose a
ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC issue?
C. Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition
for registration, time-barred?
D. Is the NP-NPC an "operative fact" that the COMELEC simply has
to note and recognize without need of registration?

II.
Does the en banc have jurisdiction at the first instance to
entertain the petition?
III.
On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction,
did it gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed the registration of the
NP-NPC?
A. Was due process observed in granting the registration?
B. Did the coalition take place as required by law:
i. in terms of compliance with internal rules of the NP and the NPC?
ii.in terms of the consent to or support for, and the lack of objection to,
the
coalition?

RULING:
The court see every reason to be liberal in the present case in view of
interests involved which are indisputably important to the coming
electoral exercise now fast approaching. The registration of political
parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefits these
recognitions provide - particularly, the on-line real time electronic
transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors

10
(BEI) through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the
immediate access to official election results; the per diems from the
government that watchers of accredited parties enjoy; and the
representation at the printing, storage and distribution of ballots that the
dominant-party status brings - constitute distinct advantages to any
party and its candidates, if only in terms of the ready information
enabling them to react faster to developing situations. The value of
these advantages exponentially rises in an election under an
automated system whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this late
stage, are question marks to some. To the public, the proper
registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of
equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and
translate in no small measure to transparency and to the election's
credibility, by-passing the technical and procedural questions raised
that do not anyway affect the integrity of the petition before us or
prejudice the parties involved, and concentrating as well on the issues
that would resolve the case soonest so that the parties involved and the
COMELEC can move on to their assigned time-sensitive roles and
tasks in the coming elections.
The respondents placed in issue defects in the attachments to the
petition, their objection is a formal one as they do not deny the
existence and basic correctness of these attachments. We see no
resulting harm or prejudice therefore if we overrule the objection raised,
given the weight of the counterbalancing factors we considered above.
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable
through the original civil action of certiorari."
The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the
COMELEC for registration as a coalition and accreditation as the
dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it had
jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and in fact decreed the
NP-NPC's registration, it strangely did not rule on the accreditation
aspect of the petition.
The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant
minority party are two separate matters that are substantively distinct
from each other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical
personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on the other
hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant
to qualified registered parties.
Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave
abuse of discretion, as alleged in the petition, the filing of a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be
expected as a logical remedial move; otherwise, accreditation, unless
restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of view of prohibition, there
is absolutely no prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an
event - the accreditation - that according to the assailed Resolution
shall soon take place. From the point of view of the petition for certiorari

questioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as

the nullification of a past and accomplished act is prayed for. From
these perspectives, the OSG objection based on prematurity is shown
to be completely groundless.
In fact, no substantial distinction exists among these entities germane
to the act of registration that would justify creating distinctions among
them in terms of deadlines. Such distinctions in the deadlines for the
registration of political organizations and coalitions, if allowed, may
even wreak havoc on the procedural orderliness of elections by
allowing these registrations to introduce late and confusing signals to
the electorate, not to mention their possible adverse effects on election
systems and procedures. This, the en banc very well knows, and their
lack of unanimity on the disputed point of timeliness shows how
unusual the majority's reading has been.
We note in this regard that the registration of parties is the first in a list
of election-related activities that peaks in the voting on May 10, 2010.
This list takes into account the close step-by-step procedure the
COMELEC has to undertake in implementing the automated election
system (AES). We note, too, that a closely related activity is the holding
of political conventions to select and nominate official party candidates
for all election positions, scheduled on October 21, 2009, and
November 20, 2009 was the deadline for the filing of the certificates of
candidacy for all elective positions - an undertaking that required the
candidates' manifestation of their official party affiliation. There is also a
host of election activities in which officially registered parties have to
participate, principally: the examination and testing of equipment or
devices for the AES and the opening of source codes for review; the
nomination of official watchers; and the printing, storage and
distribution of official ballots wherein accredited political parties may
assign watchers. Of course, registered political parties have very
significant participation on election day, during the voting and
thereafter; the COMELEC needs to receive advance information and
make arrangements on which ones are the registered political parties,
organizations and coalitions.
All these are related to show that the COMELEC deadline cannot but
be mandatory; the whole electoral exercise may fail or at least suffer
disruptions, if the deadlines are not observed. For this reason, the
COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected applications for registration
for having been filed out of time. A case in point is the application of the
political party Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc., where the
COMELEC denied the plea for registration for having been filed out of
time,among other grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood might not
have been the only political party whose application for registration was
denied at the COMELEC level for late filing. We are sure that all these
other organizations would now cry foul - and rightly so - because of the
denial of their applications on the ground of late filing, when the NPNPC has been made an exception without rhyme or reason.
Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic
change the en banc acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted
the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond the deadline the
COMELEC itself had set; the authority to register political parties under
mandatory terms is only up to the deadline. Effectively, the mandatory

11
deadline is a jurisdictional matter that should have been satisfied and
was not.
Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established
norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be
given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered
political parties carry a different legal personality from that of the
coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered
parties. If they want to coalesce with one another without the formal
registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise
of their and their members' democratic freedom of choice, but they
cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose
to secure the registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the
privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be
accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There are no ifs
and buts about these constitutional terms.
The court solely rule for now that the en banc gravely abused its
discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the
registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize
that the matter of party registration raises critical election concerns that
should be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance
of elections to our democratic system. The COMELEC should be at its
most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and
procedures the Constitution and our laws impose.
the court grants the petition and nullify and set aside the Resolution of
the Commission on Elections dated April 12, 2010 in the application for
registration of the Nacionalista Party-Nationalist People's Coalition as a
political coalition, docketed as SPP-10-(DM). The Commission on
Elections is DECLARED BARRED from granting accreditation to the
proposed NP-NPC Coalition in the May 10, 2010 elections for lack of
the requisite registration as a political coalition. This Decision is
declared immediately executory.

[ G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009 ]

H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R.
BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T. ANDRES,
IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO, FRANCISCO A.
ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P. MACEDA, AND ALVIN A. PETERS,
PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED
BY HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS AND
AWARDS COMMITTEE, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN HON.
FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, REPRESENTED BY HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA,
TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION AND
SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MOVANT-INTERVENOR.

VELASCO JR., J.:

Facts
On 23 January 2007, Congress passed RA 9369 amending the first
automated election law, RA 8436.[2] Section 5 of RA 8436, as

amended by RA 9369, which amendment took effect on 10 February

2007, authorized the COMELEC to:
Use an automated election system or systems in the same election in
different provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording
automated election system as it may deem appropriate and practical for
the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation
and transmittal of results of electoral exercises: Provided, that for the
regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately
after effectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly
urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao, to be chosen by the Commission x x x x In succeeding
regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented
nationwide. (Emphasis supplied)
The COMELEC did not use any automated election system in the 14
May 2007 elections, the national and local elections held after RA 9369
took effect.
On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, on the one hand, and TIM and
Smartmatic (Provider), on the other, signed the Contract for the
automated tallying and recording of votes cast nationwide in the 10 May
2010 elections. For P7,191,484,739.48, the COMELEC leased for use
in the 10 May 2010 elections 82,200 optical scanners (and related
equipment) and hired ancillary services of the Provider.
On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, filed this
petition[4] to enjoin the signing of the Contract or its implementation
and to compel disclosure of the terms of the Contract and other
agreements between the Provider and its subcontractors.[5] Petitioners
sought the Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with the
requirement in Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended, mandating the
partial use of an automated election system before deploying it
nationwide. To further support their claim on the Contract's invalidity,
petitioners alleged that (1) the optical scanners leased by the
COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum systems capabilities" under RA
8436, as amended and (2) the Provider not only failed to submit
relevant documents during the bidding but also failed to show
"community of interest" among its constituent corporations as required
in Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC
(Infotech).
Issue

Whether or not, the COMELECgravely abuse its discretion when it

entered to contract with Smartmatic TIM Corporation and assailing to
an automated election.
Ruling
Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling
automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even
the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the
Court finds the project award to have complied with legal prescriptions,
and the terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract
in question to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be
laid on the doorsteps of respondent COMELEC. And surely, the

12
winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign
company as partner.
The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a distinct
and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its
awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead
implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be
stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of
an organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It should be afforded
ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and
initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for
which it was created--to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful
elections. This is as it should be for, too often, COMELEC has to make
decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen events to
preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the
people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering
with the COMELECs exercise of its power which, by law and by the
nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion on comelecs part, as here, the
Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to
review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.

forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department) the

names of candidates who were not registered voters therein. The list
included Ibrahims name. cjuris
Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated
December 22, 2009 disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered
voter of the municipality where he seeks to be elected without prejudice
to his filing of an opposition. It prompted Ibrahim to file
Petition/Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC en banc through
a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC
declared that the Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was anchored
on the certification, which was issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial
Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase, stating that
Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the municipality where he seeks
to be elected. cjuris
On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May
6, 2010 had not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest
number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas,
suspended Ibrahims proclamation. Thus, this petition. cjuris

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time

and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the
ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the
laws relative to the conduct of elections, x x x we must not by any
excessive zeal take away from the comelec the initiative which by
constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to
the independent character of the Commission x x x requires that the
power of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a general
proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. cjuris

.This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses

extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the
discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards successful 2010
automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The
comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly
need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all
men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist comelec
personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the
system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated
elections to succeed, credibly.

In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed
resolutions, ordered Ibrahims disqualification even when no complaint
or petition was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before
the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate
petition which should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering
that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his municipality
disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed
misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the
purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to
assume that a proper petition had been filed, the COMELEC en banc
still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a
matter, which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential
declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions. cjuris

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

IBRAHIM VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192289, JANUARY 8, 2013
KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, Respondents.
REYES, J.

HELD: The petition is meritorious. cjuris

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Comelec
The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a
candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor. cjuris

REMEDIAL LAW: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64

Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court to assail the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009
and May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc. cjuris

FACTS:
Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy
to run as municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G.
Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election Officer in the said municipality,

Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can
be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. What the
instant Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend
Ibrahims proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the

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assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not qualify as
one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.