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The Problem

of Induction

The Problem of Induction

According to a widely accepted view . . . the empirical sciences can be


characterized by the fact tliat they use 'inductive methods', as they are
called. According to tliis view, tlie logic of scientific discovery wor~ldbe
identical with inductive logic, 1.e. with the logical analysis of these inductive methods.
It is usual to call a n inference 'inductive' if it passes fro111 singular
statements (sometimes also called 'particular' statements), such as accounts
of the results of observations or experiments, to ul~iversulstdtemel~ts,sucli
as hypotheses or theories.
N o w it is far from obvious, from a logical point of view, t l ~ a twe are
justified in inferring universal statements from singhlar ones, n o matter
how numerous; for an): conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out
to be false: n o matter how many instances of white swans \ve may have
observed, this does not ji~stifythe conclusion that (111 stvans are white.
T h e question \\.l~etherinductive inferences are iustified, or under
what conditions, is known as the problem of inductiolz.
T h e problem of induction may also be formulated as the question of
how to establish the truth of universal statements \\diich are based on
experience, such as tlie hypotheses a n d theoretical systems of the empirical
sciences. For many people believe that the truth of these universal statements is 'known by experience'; yet it is clear that a n account of an
experience-of a n observation or the result of a n experiment-can in the
first place be only a singular statement and not a universal one. Accordingly, people \vho sav of a universal statement that \ve know its truth from
experience usually mean that the truth of this universal statement can

FROMKarl Popper, Tlle Logic of Scientific Disco~ze~~


(New York: Basic Books,
1'359). 27-34.

someliow be retluced to thc trutll of singular ones, ant1 tliat these singular
n experience to be true; \vhich amounts to saying that
ones are k ~ ~ o \ \by
the universal statement is based o n inductive inference. Thlis to ask
\vhetl~erthere are natural 1m.s known to be true appears to be only another
\vay of asking \vlietlier inducti\pe inferences are logically justified.
Yet if \\re 1va11t to find a \ira). of ~ustih.inginductive inferences, \j8e
nus st first of all try to establish a priizciple of ilzductiorl. A principle of
induction \\.otlld be a statement \\fit11 tlie help of which \ve could put
inductive inferences into a logically acceptable form. In tlie eyes of the
upholders of inductive logic, a principle of induction is of supreme importance for scie~itihcmcthotl: '. . . this principle', says Reichenl~ach,"
'deter~iiinest l ~ etrutli of scientific theories. T o eliminate i t from science
\vould Inean nothing less than to tleprive s c i e ~ ~ cofe the po\vcr to decide
the truth or falsit). of its tl~eories.\VitIiout it, clearl!., science \\,oultl no
i s ltheories
~
from the fanciful ant1 arlonger I~avethe right to d i s t i ~ ~ ~ uits
1)itrar)- creations of the poet's mind."
N o \ \ tliis pri~lcipleof induction cannot be a purcl!, logical truth like
a tautology or an a~ialyticstatcn~cnt.Indced, if there \\,ere such a thing as
a purcl!. logical prillciple of induction, there would be no problem of
illduction; for in tliis case, all inducti\:e inferences \\;auld lia\je to be regarded as purely logical or tautological transfor~nations,just like inferences
in deductive logic. 'Thus tlie principle of induction must be a synthetic
statement; that is, a statement \\,hose ~ ~ e g a t i oisn not self-contradicton but
logically possible. S o the question arises \\+I!. s u c l ~a principle shoultl I)e
accepted at all, and Iio\v 11.e can justifi. its acceptance O I I rational groi~nds.
Sonie \vho believe in indi~ctivclogic are anxious to point out, \vith
Reichenbach, that 'tile principle of induction is unresen~etllyaccepted I)!.
the u~holeof science and tliat n o man c a n seriously doubt tliis principle
in everyla!. life eitl~er'.?Yet even supposillg this \\!ere the case-for after
all, 'thc \\,hole of scicuce' rnight err-1 should still contend that a principle
s , that it must lead to logical inconsistencies.
of i~itluctionis s ~ ~ p e r f l u o uand
That inconsistencies may easily arise in connection \\.it11 the principle
of indr~ctiorishor~ld11at.e been clear f r o ~ nthe \\zork of H ~ l r n e ;also, tliat
they can be avoitled, if at all, onl!. \\,it11 difficulty. For the principle of
induction nir~stbe a universal statement in its turn. T h u s ifwe t n to regard
its truth as known from experience, then the \*cry same problems \vl~ich
occasionetl its introtlr~ction\\.ill arise all over again. T o justifi. it, \\le should

" Haus Reicllel~bacl~


(18'31-1953) \ras n le;lding tigure (along with Carl He~npel)
in the Berlin school of pl~ilosopl~!.of science in the 1920s and earl!. 1930s. Although closely associated \ritli the Vic~lllaCircle, Reicllenbacl~rejected tlie verifiability principle of ~liealiing all<\ adopted the pllrase logicdl crllpiricislll to
distinguish his \.ie\r,s from those of the logical positivists. His \\zorks on sllacc and
time, qualltum n~ccl~anics,
~)rohal~ilih.,
and induction lia\,e bee11 a n important
influence on hvenlieth-centi~npl~ilosophyof scie~lce.

have to employ inductive inferences; and to justify these we should have


to assume an inductive principle of a higher order; and so on. T h u s the
attempt to base the principle of induction o n experience breaks down,
since it must lead to a n infinite regress.
Kant tried to force his way out of this difficulty by taking the principle
of induction (which h e formulated as the 'principle of universal causation')
to be 'a priori valid'. But I d o not think that his ingenious attempt to
a n a priori justification for synthetic statements was successful.
M y own view is that the various difficulties of inductive logic here
sketched are insurmountable. So also, I fear, are those inherent in the
doctrine, so widely current today, that inductive inference, although not
'strictly valid', can attain some degree of 'reliabilip' or of 'probability'. According to this doctrine, inductive inferences are Iprobable inferences'.'
'We have described', says Reichenbach, 'the principle of induction as the
means whereby science decides up011 truth. T o be more exact, we should
say that it senres to decide upon probability. For it is not given to science
to reach either truth or falsity . . . but scientific statements can only attain
contincTUU3 degrees o i proba'b~i~ty
whose unatta~nableupper and lower
limits are truth and f a l ~ i t y ' . ~
At this stage I can disregard the fact that the believers in inductive
logic entertain a n idea of probabilih. . . . I can do so because the difficulties mentioned are not even touched by an appeal to probability. For
if a certain degree of probability is to be assigned to statements based on
inductive inference, then this will have to be justified by invoking a new
principle of induction, appropriately modified. And this new principle in
its turn will have to be justified, and so on. Nothi~jgis gained, moreover,
if the principle of induction, in its turn, is taken not as 'true' but only as
'probable'. In short, like every other form of inductive logic, the logic of
probable inference, or robab ability logic', leads either to a n infinite regress,
or to t h e doctrine of apriorism.
T h e theory to be developed in the followillg pages stands directly
opposed to all attempts to operate with the ideas of inductive logic. It
might be described as the theory of the deductive method of testing, or as
the view that a hypothesis can only be empirically tested-and only after
it has been advanced.
Before I can elaborate this view (which might be called 'deductivisrn',
in contrast to 'inductivism") I must first make clear the distinction behveen
the psychology of knowledge which deals with empirical facts, and the logic
of knowledge which is concerned only with logical relations. For the belief
in inductive logic is largely d u e to a confusion of psychological problems
with epistenlological ones. It may be worth noticil~g,by the way, that this
confusion spells trouble not only for the logic of knowledge but for its
psychology as well.

I,

I'

1
Y.

E l i m i n a t i o n of P s y c h o l o g i s m

1 said abo\:e t l ~ a tthe work of the scientist consists in putting for\vard and
testing theories.
T h e initial stagc, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems
to me llcither to call for logical anal!.sis nor to be susceptible of it. T h e
cluestion \lo\\ it happens that a He\\. idea occurs to a man-\\.hether it is
a musical themc, a dra~naticconflict, or a scientific theory-may be of
great intercst to empirical ps!.chology; but it is irrelevant to the logical
anal!sis of scien~itickno\vledge. This latter is concerned not with questiolls
of fact (Kant's quid fircti?), but only \\fitli questions of j~~stificution
or vulidity (Kant's quid juris?). Its questions are of tlie follo\ving kind. C a n a
statenlent be iustified? i\nd if so. I~o\v?Is it testable? Is it logically tlepentlent on certain other statements? O r does it perhaps contradict them?
In order that a statement may be logicall!. examined in this \\.a),, it mr~st
alread! have 11ec11presented to us. Somcone must 11a1.e formulatetl it, and
submitted it to logical examination.
Accordingl!, I shall distinguish sharl)ly behvcen the process of conceiving a nen. idca, and the methods and resr~ltsof examining it logicall!.
As to tlle task of the logic of krlo\\dedgc-in contradistinction to tlle ps!.chology of kno\\,letlge-I shall proceed o n the assumption that it consists
solely in in\.cstigating the metl~odsemployetl in those systematic tests to
\vhich c \ . e n ne\\. idea lnust be subiected if it is to be seriously entertained.
Some might object that it \\,otild be Inore to the purpose to regard it
as the br~sinessof epistemology to prodnce what has been called a 'rcitiollul
recoizstructiol~'of the steps tliat ha\.c led the scientist to a cliscoven-to
the finding of sonle Ile\v truth. Rut the cluestion is: \\rhat, precisely, d o \ve
want to reconstruct? If it is the processes involved in the stimulation and
release of a n inspiration \\~hichare to be reconstructed, then I shoultl
refuse to take it as the task of the logic of knowledge. Such processes are
the concern of cml)irical ps!.chology but hartlly of logic. It is another
matter if 1I.e wallt to reconstruct rationally tlie suhsequeizt tests \vhereb~.
the inspiration may be disco\,ered to I)e a discovery, or become knonn to
be knowledge. J n so far as the scientist critically judges, alters, or rejects
his own inspiration \\.e may, if we like, regard the n ~ e t l ~ o d o l o ~ ianalysis
cal
undertakcn hcre as a kind of 'rational reconstruction' of the corresponding
thought-l)rocesses. But this reconstruction would not describe these processes as tlicy a c t ~ ~ a l lhappen:
jit can gi\.e only a logical skeleton of the
procedure of testing. Still, this is perhaps all that is meant by those who
speak of a 'rational reconstruction' of the ways in which we gain knowledge.
. . . Mly vie\\, of the matter, for \\.hat it is ~vorth,is that there is no
such thing as a logical metllod of ha\.ing nenl ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My v i e s nlay be expressed by saying tliat ever,

are easily testable or applicable. From among these statements, those are
selected \vhich are not derivable from the current theory, and more especially those which the current theory contradicts. Next we seek a decision as regards these (and other) derived statements by comparing them
with the results of practical applications a n d experiments. If this decision
is positive, tliat is, if tlie singular conclusions turn out to be acceptable,
or verified, then tlie theory has, for the time being, passed its test: we have
found no reason lo discard it. B I I if
~ the decision is negative, or in other
words, if the conclusions have been falsified, then their falsificatiorl also
falsifies the theory from which they \\,ere logically deduced.
It should be noticed that a positive decision can only temporarily
support the theory, for subseql~entnegative decisions may always overthro\v it. So long as a theory withstands detailed and severe tests and is
not superseded by another theory in the course of scientific progress, we
may say tliat it has 'proved its mettle' or that it is 'corroborated'.
Nothing resembling inductive logic appears in the procedure here
outlined. I never a s s ~ l m ethat we can argue from the truth of singular
statements to the t r ~ ~ tof
l i theories. 1 never assume that by force of 'verified'
conclusions, theories can be established as 'true', or even as merely 'probable'. . . .

discovery contains 'an irrational element', or 'a creative intuition', in Bergson's sense.* In a similar way Einstein speaks of the 'searcli for those highly
universal laws . . . from which a picture of the world can be obtained by
pure deduction. T h e r e is n o logical path', he says, 'leading to these . . .
laws. T h e y can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like
an intellectual love ('Eillfihlung') of the obiects of esperience'."

Deductive Testing of Theories

According to the view that will be put fonvard here, the method of critically testing theories, and selecting them according to the results of tests,
always proceeds o n the following lines. From a new idea, put u p tentatively, a n d not yet justified in any way-an anticipation, a hypothesis, a
theoretical system, or what you will-conclusions are drawn by means of
logical deduction. These conclusions are then compared with o n e another
and with other relevant statements, so as to find \\hat logical relations
(such as equivalence, derivability, conipatibility, or incompatibility) exist
between them.
W e may if we like distinguish four different lines along which the
testing of a theory could be carried out. First there is the logical comparison of the conclusions among themselves, by u.Iiich the internal consistency of the system is tested. Secondly, there is the investigation of the
logical form of the theory, with the object of determining whether it has
the character of an empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for
example, tautological. Thirdly, there is the comparison with other theories,
chiefly with the aim of determining whether the theory would constitute
a scientific advance should it survive our various tests. And finally, there
is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it.
T h e purpose of this last kind of test is to find o u t how far the new
consequences of the theory-whatever may be new in \\.hat it assertsstand u p to the demands of practice, whether raised by purely scientific
experiments, or by practical technological applications. Here too the procedure of testing turns o u t to be deductive. With the help of other statements, previously accepted, certain singular statements-which we may
call 'predictions1-are deduced from the theory; especially predictions that
* The French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941) attacked materialism and
mechanism, rejected science as a complete account of reality, and advocated vitalism, a worldview based on creative forces and intuition. His writings on memory
and our subjective experience of time were quite influential, especially on authors
such as Marcel Proust, but his postulation of the e'laiz vital, a spiritual force that
drives biological evolution, discredited Bergson's vitalism in the eyes of most scientists and philosophers.

Notes

1. H. Keichenbach. Erkei~ntnis1, 1930, 11. 186 (cf. also p. 64 f.)


2. Ke~chenbachibid , p. 67.

3. C f J. M. Kevr~es,A 7'reatise on Probability (1921); 0. Kiilpe, Vorlesui~gei~


iiber
Logic (ed. by Selz, 1923); Reichenbach (who uses the tern1 'probability implications'). Arioinatik der Wahrscheinlicl~keitrecI~nui~g,
Mathefn. Leitscbr. 34 (1912);
and in many other places.

4. Reichenbach, Erkeniztnis 1, 1930, 11. 186.

5. Liebig (in Induktion uizd Deduktion, 1865) was probably the first to reject the
inductive method from the str~ndpointof natural science; his attack is directed
against Bacon. Duhem (in La Thdorie physique, son objet et sa structure, 1906;
English translation by P. P. Wiener: The Aiin and Structure of Physical Theory,
Princeton, 1954) held pronounced deductivist views. (Rut there are also inductivist
views to be found in Duhem's book, for example in the third chapter, Part One,
where we are told that only experiment, induction, and generalization have produced Descartes's law of refraction; cf the E~iglishtranslation, p. 34.) See also
V. Kraft, Die Grundformen der Wisse~~schaftlichen
Methoden, 1925; and Carnap,
; Erkenntnis 2, 1932, p. 440.
'
6. Address on Max Planck's 60th b ~ r t h d ~ The
y . passage quoted beg~nswith the
words. 'The supreme task of the ph)sic~stis to search for those li~ghlyuniversal
t

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