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95
/ Apprenticeship and Learnership
F: Capili (PR) is an employee of Nitto Enterprises. Capili, an apprentice
machinist accidentally injured the leg of the office secretary, on the same
day Capili also managed to injure himself on while working, he was
hospitalized and P incurred 1K-hospital bill. The day after, PR was asked to
resign, subject to payment of his salary and further medical requirement. PR
signed a quitclaim. Days later PRs family sued for illegal dismissal and
payment of monetary benefits. LA favored P. LA said PR acted w/ gross
negligence and that he does not have the proper attitude in such
employment. NLRC reversed. P argues that since PR is only an apprentice
and that he was signed a apprenticeship agreement. Hence this petition.
I: WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
R: Petitioners argument is erroneous.
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and
private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the
latter as an apprentice in the trade of "core maker/molder." On the same
date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted
to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship
Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of
approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship
agreement was enforced the day it was signed. Based on the evidence
before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. Article
57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national
apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and
government
and
non-government
agencies"
and
"to
establish
apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate
such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any
apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua
non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully
enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and
agreements cannot be debased.
Also, the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process.
LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild & CIR / GR L1258212598 / 1.28.61 / Employer-Employee Relationship - Importance /
Concepcion, J P:
F: LVN and Sampaguita (P) seeks to de-certify CIRs (PR) certification that
PFW as the sole and exclusive bargaining agency of all musicians working
with P. P also maintains that the certification cannot be granted since there
is no Employee-Employer relationship, PR argues otherwise.
I: (1) WON the musicians working for P are its employees; (2) WON
there could be any legal relationship between the P and the
musicians.
R: Affirmed.
The musical directors in the instant case have no control over the musicians
involved in the present case. Said directors control neither the music to be
played, nor the musicians playing it. The film companies summon the
musicians to work, through the musical directors. The film companies,
through the musical directors, provide the transportation to and from the
studio. The film companies furnish meal at dinner time. The motion picture
director who is an employee of the company not the musical director
supervises the recording of the musicians and tells them what to do in every
detail, and solely directs the performance of the musicians before the
camera. Held: An employer-employee relationship exists between
the musicians and the film companies. The relationship exists
where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a
right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means
to be used in reaching such end. (Alabama Highway Express Co. vs.
Local, 612, 108 S. 2d 350.)
212 E: "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or
any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.
Manila Golf v. IAC & Llamar / GR No. 64948 / 9.27.94 / EmployerEmployee Relationships Test to Determine / Narvasa, C.J p:
F: Caddies of P, are demanding that they be included in the coverage of the
Social Security System through the SSC, arguing that they are employees of
P. P on the other hand, they have no direct control over PR. SSC Dismissed
the Petition. IAC ruled for P, hence this petition.
I: WON there is EER.
R: As long as it is, the list made in the appealed decision detailing the
various matters of conduct, dress, language, etc. covered by the petitioner's
regulations, does not, in the mind of the Court, so circumscribe the actions
or judgment of the caddies concerned as to leave them little or no freedom
of choice whatsoever in the manner of carrying out their services. In the
very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of their
conduct while enjoying the privilege of pursuing their occupation within the
premises and grounds of whatever club they do their work in. For all that
is made to appear, they work for the club to which they attach
themselves on sufferance but, on the other hand, also without
having to observe any working hours, free to leave anytime they
please, to stay away for as long as they like. It is not pretended
that if found remiss in the observance of said rules, any discipline
may be meted them beyond barring them from the premises which,
it may be supposed, the Club may do in any case even absent any
breach of the rules, and without violating any right to work on their
part. All these considerations clash frontally with the concept of
employment. The IAC would point to the fact that the Club suggests the
rate of fees payable by the players to the caddies as still another indication
of the latter's status as employees. It seems to the Court, however, that
the intendment of such fact is to the contrary, showing that the
Club has not the measure of control over the incidents of the
caddies' work and compensation that an employer would possess.
The Court agrees with petitioner that the group rotation system socalled, is less a measure of employee control than an assurance
that the work is fairly distributed, a caddy who is absent when his
turn number is called simply losing his turn to serve and being
assigned instead the last number for the day.
separate line of business does not extinguish the equal fact that it
has provided California with workers to pursue the latter's own
business.
desirable in the usual business or trade of the respondent, and are therefore
regular employees.
Medina & Ong v. Judge Bartolome, Aboitiz and Pepsi Cola / GR No.
L-59825 / 9.11.82 / EER Jurisdiction / Abad Santos, J p:
F: Ps former employees of PRs company, alleging that PR Aboitiz dismissed
and publicly humiliated Ps w/o provocation. Ps sued. PR argues that CFI
Makati had no jurisdiction, w/c was denied, pending litigation the Labor
Code was amended, PR now re-raised their jurisdiction contention basing
from Art. 217(b), PR judge granted. Hence this petition.
I: WON the Labor Code has any relevance to the relief sought.
R: Granted. It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not
alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages
for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such
being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the
Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong
premise.
Where plaintiffs' complaint for damages arising from the alleged
disgraceful termination of employment does not allege any unfair
labor practice, theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious
acts allegedly committed by the defendants.
Yusen Air & Sea Services Phils, Inc. v. Villamor / GR No. 154060 /
8.16.05 / EER Jurisdiction / Garcia, J p:
F: PR is employed by P as a branch manager; w/c was later reclassified as a
Division Manager, w/c he held until he resigned in 2.1.02. PR then worked
for another company in the same line of business. P Sued, citing the
undertaking which PR agreed with P in lieu of his employment. On the other
hand P apparently sued through the NLRC P for illegal dismissal, PR also did
not answer the civil suit, instead he submitted a motion to dismiss, and
arguing that said court had no jurisdiction. RTC dismissed Ps complaint.
Hence this recourse.
I: WON RTC had the proper jurisdiction.
R: Remanded for Trial. Actually, the present case is not one of first
impression. In a kindred case, Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing vs.
Villarama, with a substantially similar factual backdrop, we held that an
action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute.
Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the
Philippines. It seeks to recover damages agreed upon in the
contract as redress for private respondent's breach of his
contractual obligation to its "damage and prejudice." Such cause of
action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the
controversy belongs to the regular courts. The cause of action is
based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable causal connection
with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the action
is with the regular courts.
The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money claims of
workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money claims
which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship,
or some aspect or incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that
money claims of workers which now fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some
reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.
(SMC v. NLRC)
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the
allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a
matter resolved only after and as a result of a trial. Neither can jurisdiction
of a court be made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in
his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.