7/18/2015

MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, petitioner,

vs.
ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor of Rizal, and the
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL, composed of ANDRES
GABRIEL, PEDRO MAGSALIN and CATALINO S.
CRUZ, respondents.
Gregorio Perfecto for petitioner.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this case, the suspended municipal president
of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by these proceedings inmandamus to
have the provincial governor and the provincial board of the
Province of Rizal temporarily restrained from going ahead with
investigation of the charges filed against him pending
resolution of the case, and to have an order issue directed to
the provincial governor commanding him to return the
petitioner to his position as municipal president of Pasay. The
members of the provincial board have interposed a demurrer
based on the ground that this court has no right to keep them
from complying with the provisions of the law. The provincial
governor has filed an answer to the petition, in which he
alleges as a special defense that numerous complaints have
been received by him against the conduct of Miguel R.
Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay; that these complaints
were investigated by him; that he came to the conclusion that
agreeable to the powers conferred upon provincial governors,
the municipal president should be temporarily suspended, and
that an investigation is now being conducted by the provincial
board.
Counsel for petitioner has argued, with much eloquence, that
his client has been deprived of an office, to which he was
elected by popular vote, without having an opportunity to be
heard in his own defense. The respondents reply that all that
the provincial governor and the provincial board have done in
this case is to comply with the requirements of the law which
they are sworn to enforce. Obviously, therefore, we should
first have before us the applicable provisions of the Philippine
law bearing on the subject of suspension of public officers.
Under the title of "Provincial supervision over municipal
officers," Article IV of Chapter 57 of the Administrative Code,
provides:
The provincial governor shall receive and investigate
complaints against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration in
office. for minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender;
and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he
shall submit written charges touching the matter to the
provincial board, and he may in such case suspend the officer
(not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the
board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus
effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed
with the board within ten days.
Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. When written
charges are preferred by a provincial governor against a
municipal officer, the provincial board shall, at its next
meeting, regular or special, furnish a copy of said charges to
the accused official, with a notification of the time and place
of hearing thereon; and at the time and place appointed, the
board shall proceed to hear and investigate the truth or falsity
of said charges, giving the accused official full opportunity to
be heard. The hearing shall occur as soon as may be
practicable, and in case suspension has been effected, not
later than fifteen days from the date the accused is furnished
a copy of the charges, unless the suspended official shall, on

sufficient grounds, request an extension of time to prepare his

defense.
Action by provincial board. If, upon due consideration, the
provincial board shall adjudge that the charges are not
sustained, the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall
adjudge that the accused has been guilty of misconduct which
would be sufficiently punished by reprimand, or further
reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to deliver
such reprimand in pursuance of its judgment; and in either
case the official, if previously suspended, shall be reinstated.
If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more
severe discipline, it shall without unnecessary delay forward
to the Chief of the Executive Bureau certified copies of the
record in the case, including the charges, the evidence, and
the findings of the board, to which shall be added the
recommendation of the board as to whether the official ought
to be suspended, further suspended, or finally dismissed from
office; and in such case the board may exercise its discretion
to reinstate the official, if already suspended, or to suspend
him or continue his suspension pending final action.
The trial of a suspended municipal official and the
proceedings incident thereto shall be given preference over
the current and routine business of the board.
Action by Chief of Executive Bureau. Upon receiving the
papers in any such proceeding the Chief of the Executive
Bureau shall review the case without unnecessary delay and
shall make such order for the reinstatement, dismissal,
suspension, or further suspension of the official, as the facts
shall warrant. Disciplinary suspension made upon order of the
chief of the Executive Bureau shall be without pay and in
duration shall not exceed two months. No final dismissal
hereinunder shall take effect until recommended by the
Department Head and approved by the Governor-General.
With the foregoing legal provisions in mind, certain aspects of
the case can be disposed of without difficulty. Thus it cannot
be seriously contended that the courts should interfere with
an orderly investigation which is about to be conducted by the
provincial board. Nor can there be any doubt as to the
meaning of the law. A very minute and extensive procedure is
provided by the Legislature for central and provincial
supervision of municipal officers. The provincial governor, in
receiving and investigating complaints against such officers,
may take three courses. For a minor delinquency he may
reprimand the offender; but if the maladministration in office
is more serious he may temporarily suspend the officer, and
thereafter may file written charges against the officer with the
provincial board. The procedure followed before the provincial
board and later on appeal to the Chief of the Executive
Bureau, while interesting, does not concern us. The important
fact is that the law, in permitting a provincial governor
temporarily to suspend a municipal officer, makes no mention
of a formal hearing of the charges.
In the exercise of this disciplinary power by the provincial
governor, all that he can do before the presentation of formal
charges is either to reprimand the officer or to suspend him
temporarily from office. In the latter case the provincial
governor's action is not a finality. The law is especially careful
to guard the rights of officer charged with maladministration
in office. But the point is made that, notwithstanding the
provisions of the law and notwithstanding long official
practice, the temporary suspension of a municipal officer,
without an opportunity to be heared in his own defense, is in
contravention of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights
concerning due process of law.
So much has been written on the subject of due process of
law that is would be futile to enter into its intricate mazes. It is

self-evident, however, that, in ordinary cases, to condemn

without a hearing violates the due process of law clause of the
American Constitution and of the Philippine Bill of Rights. It is
for this reason that we can well understand the logic of those
who cling to this through and to whom a contemplated
violation of the Constitution is most repugnant. It is but fair, in
ordinary cases, that a public official should not be removed or
suspended without notice, charges, a trial, and an opportunity
for explanation. But not permitting our judgment to be unduly
swayed by sympathy for the petitioner's brave fight, and
recalling again that the courts have ordinarily to give effect to
legislative purposes, it is further only fair to mention certain
exceptions to the due process of law rule, which would seem
to include the instant case.
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an
administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding.
As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional
Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily
judicial process; much of the process by means of which the
Government is carried on, and the order of society
maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as
much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in
administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest
upon different principles. (Weimer vs. bunbury [1874], 30
Mich., 201; Den. vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.
[1856], 18 How., 272 followed in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco
[1910], 16 Phil., 534; Tan Te vs. Bell {1914], 27 Phil., 354;
U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus [1915], 31 Phil., 218 and other Philippine
cases). In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative
character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that
the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due
process of law. Examples of special or summary proceedings
affecting the life, liberty or property of the individual without
any hearing can easily be recalled. Among these are the
arrest of an offender pending the filing of charges; the
restraint of property in tax cases; the granting of preliminary
injunction ex parte; and the suspension of officers or
employees by the Governor-General or a Chief of a Bureau
pending an investigation. (See Weimer vs. Bunbury, supra; 12
C.J., 1224; Administrative Code, sec. 694.)
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law
prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as
"property." It is, however, well settled in the United States,
that a public office is not property within the sense of the
constitutional guaranties of due proces of law, but is a public
trust or agency. In the case of Taylorvs. Beckham ([1899], 178,
U. S., 548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said that: "Decisions are
numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies
or trust, and not property as such." The basic idea of
government in the Philippine Islands, as in the United States,
is that of a popular representative government, the officers
being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no
one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right
to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to
the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the
people whom he represents.
Coming now to the more specific consideration of the issue in
this case, we turn to the article by Prof. Frank J. Goodnow,
generally considered the leading authority in the United
States on the subject of Administration Law, in Vol. 29,
Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, and find the rules as to
suspension of public officers laid down very concisely as
follows: "Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to
the person suspended." (P. 1405.) The citation by Professor
Goodnow to support his conclusion is State of Florida, ex rel.
Attorney-General vs.Johnson ([1892], 30 Fla., 433; 18 L. R. A.,
410). It was here held by the Supreme Court of Florida that
the governor could, under section 15 of the executive article
of the Constitution, suspend an officer for neglect of duty in
office without giving previous notice to the officer of the
charge made against him.

A later compilation of the pertinent authorities is to be found

in 22 Ruling Case Law, pp. 564, 565. On the subject of
suspension of public officers it is heared said:
The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct,
so as to tie his hands for the time being, seems to be
universally accepted as fair, and often necessary. . . . Notice
and hearing are not prerequisite to suspension unless required
by statute and therefore suspension without such notice does
not deprive the officer of property without due process of law.
Nor is a suspension wanting in due process of law or a denial
of the equal protection of the laws because the evidence
against the officer is not produced and he is not given an
opportunity to confront his accusers and cross-examine the
witnesses.lawph!l.net
The case to support the first sentence in the above
enunciation of the rule is State vs. Megaarden (85 Minn., 41),
which in turn is predicated on State vs. Peterson ([1892], 50
Minn., 239). In a discussion of the subject more general than
specific, it was said:
The safety of the state, which is the highest law, imperatively
requires the suspension, pending his trial, of a public officer,
especially a custodian of public funds, charged with
malfeasance or nonfeasance in office. Suspension does not
remove the officer, but merely prevents him, for the time
being, from performing the functions of his office; and from
the very necessities of the case must precede a trial or
hearing. Such temporary suspension without previous hearing
is fully in accordance with the analogies of the law. It is a
constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of his
liberty or property except by due process of law, which
includes notice and a hearing, yet it was never claimed that in
criminal procedure a person could not be arrested and
deprived of his liberty until a trial could reasonably be had, or
that in civil actions ex parte and temporary injunctions might
not be issued and retained in proper case, until a trial could
be had, and the rights of the parties determined. We have no
doubt, therefore, of the authority of the legislature to vest the
governor with power to temporarily suspend a county
treasurer pending the investigation of the charges against
him, of official misconduct.
The case cited by the editors of Ruling Case Law as authority
for their second sentence is that of Griner vs.Thomas ([1907],
101 Texas, 36; 16 Ann. Cas., 944). The holding of the court
here was that it is within the power of the legislature to
authorize the temporary suspension of a public officer during
the pendency of valid proceedings to remove such officer and
as an incident to such proceedings, notwithstanding the fact
that the constitution has given power to remove such officer
only for cause and after a hearing. Notice and hearing are not
preprequisites to the suspension of a public officer under a
statute which does not provide for such notice and hearing.
The third case cited by Ruling Case Law comes from the
United States Supreme Court. (Wilson vs. North Carolina
[1897], 169 U.S, 586.) An examination of the decision,
however, shows that while it tends to substantiate the rule,
the facts are not exactly on all fours with those before us.
Without, therefore, stopping to set forth the facts, only the
following from the body of the decisioned be noted, viz.:
In speaking of the statute and the purpose of this particular
provision the Supreme Court of the State said: "The duty of
suspension was imposed upon the Governor from the highest
motives of public policy to prevent the danger to the public
interests which might arise from leaving such great powers
and responsibilities in the hands of men legally disqualified. To
leave them in full charge of their office until the next biennial
session of the legislature, or pending litigation which might be
continued for year, would destroy the very object of the law.
As the Governor was, therefore, by the very and spirit of the
law, required to act and act promptly, necessarily upon his

own findings of fact, we are compelled to hold that such

official action was, under the circumstances, due process of
law. Even if it were proper, the Governor would have no power
to direct an issue like a chancellor."
The highest court of the State has held that this statue was
not a violation of the constitution of the State; that the
hearing before the Governor was sufficient; that the office was
substantially an administrative one, although the commission
was designed by a statute subsequent to that which created
it, a court of record; that the officer taking office under the
statute was bound to take it on the terms provided for therein;
that he was lawfully suspended from office; and that he was
not entitled to a trial by jury upon the hearing of this case in
the trial court. As a result the court held that the defendant
had not been deprived of his property without due process of
law, nor had he been denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are of opinion the plaintiff in error was not deprived of any

right guaranteed to him by the Federal Constitution, by reason
of the proceedings before the Governor under the statute
above mentioned, and resulting in his suspension from office.
The procedure was in accordance with the constitution and
laws of the State. It was taken under a valid statute creating a
state office in a constitutional manner, as the state court has
held. What kind and how much of a hearing the officer should
have before suspension by the Governor was a matter for the
state legislature to determine, having regard to the
constitution of the State. (There can also be cited as
supporting authority State ex rel. Wendling vs. Board of Police
and Fire Commissioners [1915], 159 Wis., 295;
Sumpter vs. State {1906], 81 Ark., 60; Gray vs. McLendon
[1901], 134 Ga., 224; State vs. Police Commissioners, 16 Mo.
App., 947; Preston vs. City of Chicago [1910], 246 III., 26; and
People vs. Draper [1910], 124 N.Y.S., 758, where it was held
that the legislature has the right to authorize an officer to
remove an appointive or elective officer without notice or
hearing.)
Certain intimations have been made that under the procedure
prescribed by the law an injustice might be done municipal
officers. Such suppositions are not unusual even as to cases
before the courts, but in this as in all other instances, the
presumption always is that the law will be followed and that
the investigation and the hearing will be impartial. In the
language of Justice Trent in Severino vs. Governor-General
([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 402), "the presumption is just as
conclusive in favor of executive action, as to its correctness
and justness, as it is in favor of judicial action." We entertain
no doubt that the provincial governor, fully conscious of the
trust reposed in him by the law, will act only in cases where
strong reasons exist for exercising the power of suspension
and upon a high consideration of his duty.
The suggestion that an unfriendly governor might unduly
delay the hearing is also without much force. The same might
be said of any administrative officer, or in fact of any judicial
officer. The presumption, again, is that every officer will do his
duty promptly, and if he does not, certainly a remedy can be
found to make him do so. Not only this, but the law before us
expedites the proceedings by fixing a short period of ten days
within which the provincial governor must lay the charges
before the provincial board, which must be heard by the latter
body within fifteen days. Of more compelling force is the
suggestion from the other side that the public interest might
suffer detriment by postponing the temporary suspension
until after the hearing.
Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is that the
provisions of section 2188 of the Administrative Code are
clear and that they do not offend the due process of law

clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is our

duty to apply the law without fear or favor.
Petition denied with costs. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
This is an original action for the writ of mandamus to require
the respondents to reinstate the petitioner to his office as
president of the municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal.
The facts upon which the petition is based are not in dispute.
They are not only admitted by the demurrer of the respondent
Andres Gabriel buy were expressly admitted by him in open
court. They are:
(1) That the petitioner was duly elected by the people of the
municipality of Pasay as president for the period of three
years from the 16th day of October, 1919;
(2) That the petitioner was suspended from said office on the
13th day of September, 1920, by the respondent Andres
Gabriel, without notice, without a hearing, and without an
opportunity to present any proof whatsoever in his defense.
The facts having been admitted, we have only a question of
law to decide, to wit: Is the governor of a province authorized
under the law to suspend a municipal president from his
office, to which he has been legally elected for a period fixed
by the law, without notice, without a hearing and without an
opportunity to present proof in his defense?
Section 3 (first paragraph) of the Jones Law provides "that
no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the law."
Section 2188 of Act No. 2711 provides:
SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial governor over
municipal officers. The provincial governor shall receive the
investigate complaints against municipal officers for neglect
of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of
maladministration in office. For minor delinquency he may
reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment
seems to be desirable, he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board, and he may in
such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal
treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the
charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in
question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written
charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within
ten days.
It will be noted that while section 2188 provides for a
suspension, it makes no provision for the procedure in such
cases. In the absence of a procedure prescribed by the
statute, we are of the opinion that the procedure marked by
the Constitution (Jones Law) must be followed, to wit: That no
person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. "Due process of law" has
been defined many, many times, and simply means that
before a man can be deprived of his life, liberty or property,
he must be given an opportunity to defend himself.

The right to hold, occupy and exercise an office is as much as

species of property within the protection of the law, as any
other thing capable of possession; and, to wrongfully deprive
one of it or unjustly withhold it, is an injury which the law can
redress in as ample a manner as any other wrong. And that
right is regarded as a right within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which says: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall nay State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law."
(Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714; Dent vs. West Virginia, 129
U.S., 114, 124; Huling vs. Kaw, etc. Ry. Co., 130 U.S., 559;
Scott vs. Neal, 154 U.S., 34; New Orleans Waterworks vs. New
Orleans, 164 U.S., 471; Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U. S., 78,
110; Haddock vs. Haddock, 201 U.S., 562, 567, Michigan Trust
Co. vs. Ferry, 175 fed., 667; Bunton vs. Lyford, 37 N.H., 512
[75 Am. Dec., 144]; Foster vs. Kansas, 112 U.S., 201.)
The power to remove an officer who has been duly elected for
a specified period can be exercised only, and for just cause,
after the officer has had an opportunity for defense.
In the absence of express power, given in express words, the
presumption must be, in view of the provisions of the Jones
Law above quoted, that the legislature intended that every
officer duly elected for a fixed period should be entitled to
hold his office until the expiration of such period, unless
removed therefrom for cause, after a fair and impartial
investigation in which he has been given an opportunity to
defend himself. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corporations, sec. 250;
Fields vs. Commonwealth, 32 Pa., 478; Stadler vs. Detroit, 13
Mich., 346; State vs. Bryce, 7 Ohio St., 2; Bagg's Case, 11
Coke, 93; Hobokan vs. Gear, 27 H.J.L., 265; Dullan vs. Wilson,
53 Mich., 392; People vs. Therrien, 80 Mich., 187;
Robbinson vs. Miner, 68 Mich., 549.)
It seems to me that if the hero of the Filipino people, Jose
Rizal, could read the decision of the majority of this court and
thereby learn that one of the citizens of the Philippine Islands
has been deprived of his property andrights, without a
hearing, he would turn over in his grave and, with a wailing
cry, exclaim: "A social cancer of a new type is again in my
beloved land!"
The question presented is not a new one. It has been
discussed since long before the English people, in mass, met
upon the fields of Runnymede and demanded and obtained
from an unwilling king the Magna Charta, which has
constituted the chief stone in the political edifice of all the
civilized nations since that time (years 1215). In creating the
constitution for the Filipino people, the United States
Government expressly provided that no person, no Filipino, no
citizen of the Philippine Islands, shall be deprived of his life or
property without "due process of law."
The question has been presented to the courts many, many
times, and without exception the said provision of the
constitution has been sustained, except where the same
constitution contains other provisions authorizing the
suspension of officers without a hearing. In the Philippine
Islands there is no authority in the constitution (the Jones Law)
authorizing or justifying the statute in question. Not only is
such a statute not authorized but it isabsolutely prohibited by
the provisions of the Jones Law quoted above. The Jones Law
provides that no law shall be enacted, etc.
In a discussion of the subject before us we must bear in mind
the distinction between an appointive and an elected officer.
There are a few cases which hold that in case of an appointive
officer, where the appointment is at the pleasure of the
appointing power, his suspension or removal is exercisable at
the mere discretion of the appointing power. (State vs. St.

Louis, 90 Mo., 19; Field vs. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. St., 478;

State vs. Johnson, 18 L. R. A., 410.)
Where a person is appointed to an office and is a mere
employee, whose position does not have the dignity of an
office, and, by virtue of his appointment, may be removed or
suspended at the will of the appointing power, then, of course,
the rule is different. Such persons are not officers but mere
employees. (Thorpp vs. Langdon, 40 Mich., 673;
People vs. McDill, 15 Mich., 182; Portman vs. State Board, etc.
50 Mich., 258; Attorney-General vs. Cain, 84 Mich., 223.)
On the other hand the authorities are practically unanimous,
where the appointment or election is made for a definite term
and the removal is to be for cause, that the power of removal
or suspension cannot be exercised without due notice and
hearing. (Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 454;
Dullan vs. Wilson, 53 Mich., 392 [51 Am. Rep., 128]; Bagg's
Case, 11 Coke, 99; King vs. Gaskin, 8 Term Rep., 209;
Ramshay's Case, Ad. & E. [N.S.], 190; Williams vs. Bagot, 3 B.
& C., 786; Queen vs. Archbishop, 1 Ell. & El., 545;
Page vs. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. [Ky.], 672; Willard's Appeal, 4 R. I.,
601; Field vs. Commonwealth, 32 Pa., St., 478;
State vs. Bryce, 7 Ohio, 82; Foster vs.Kansas, 112 U. S., 201;
Kenard vs. Louisiana, 92 U.S., 480.)
The constitution and laws of the Philippine Islands having
created the office of president of the different municipalities
and having fixed definitely the tenure of said office, the
legislature, by virtue of the provisions of the Jones Law, is
prohibited from enacting any law which would justify any
individual in the state in removing him from office without first
presenting charges against him and giving him an opportunity
to be heard. (Removal of Public Officer, 25 Am. Law Rev., 201;
State vs. Commonwealth, 3 Metcalf [Ky.], 237; Page vs. Hardin
[supra]; Brown vs.Grover, 6 Bush [Ky.], 1;
Commonwealth vs. Gamble, 62 Pa., 342; State vs. Draper, 50
Mo., 353; State vs.Thoman, 10 Kansas, 191;
State vs. McMeely, 24 La. Ann., 19; Cooley, Const. Lim., 6th
ed., p. 78; People vs.Draper, 15 N.Y., 532; State vs. Williams, 5
Wis., 308; State vs. Baker, 38 Wis., 71; State vs. Hewitt, 16 L.
R. A., 413.)
In the case of State vs. Hewitt (16 L. R. A., 413) the attorneygeneral of the State of South Dakota admitted in open court
"that it is true, as contended by the relator, that the
preponderance of authorities is against the removal of the
officer for cause, whose term of office is fixed by law, without
formal charges and a hearingthereon on timely notice."
Mr. Justice Bailey of the English Court, in the case of
Williams vs. Bagot (3 Barn and C., 785), said: "It is contrary to
common sense of justice that any party could be deprived of
his rights and be concluded unheard."
Every officer in the Philippine Government who has been
legally elected for a fixed period has a right to be heard under
the provisions of the Jones Law before he can be deprived of
his rights. He has a right to be heard and to explain.
In the absence of express constitutional authority, the
Philippine Legislature is prohibited from enacting a law by
which any officer elected by the people for a definite period
may be suspended or removed from his office without first
having been given an opportunity to be heard and to present
whatever defense he may have. (Jones Law, sec. 3;
Dullan vs. Wilson, 51 Mich., 128; Hallgreen vs. Campbell, 82
Mich., 255; Jacques vs. Little, 51 Kansas, 300.)
In the case of Dullan vs. Wilson (53 Mich., 392) the Supreme
Court of the State of Michigan, with whom Mr. Justice Cooley
agreed, said: "We have examined carefully the authorities
cited upon the brief of the learned counsel for relator in

support of the position that no notice is required to be given,

and that the action of the Executive is final and conclusive. It
is sufficient to say, without commenting specially upon them,
that the reasoning of those cases does not commend itself to
our judgment. They appear to us to be opposed, not only to
the decided weight of authority, but also to the fundamental
principles of justice."
In the case of Hallgreen vs. Campbell (82 Mich., 255), the
Supreme Court of the State of Michigan said: "We have not
found any case where an officer who is appointed for a fixed
term has been held to be removable except for cause, and,
wherever cause must be assigned for the removal of the
officer, he is entitled to notice and a chance to defend
himself."
In the case of Han vs. Boston (142 Mass., 90) it was held that
no power to remove or suspend an officer could be exercised
until after notice and an opportunity by the official in question
to be heard in his own defense.
In the case of State vs. St. Louis (90 Mo., 19) the Supreme
Court said: "When the removal is not discretionary, but must
be for a cause, . . . and nothing is said as to the procedure, a
specification of the charges, notice, and an opportunity to be
heard are essential."
Mr. Dillon, in his valuable work on Municipal Corporations (sec.
250) says: "Where the right of removal or suspension is
confined to specific causes, such power cannot be exercised
until there have been formulated charges against the officer,
notice thereof, and an opportunity for defense."
(Biggs vs. McBride, 17 Ore., 640; State vs. Hawkins, 44 Ohio
St., 98.)
In the case of State vs. Hastings (16 L. R. A., 791, 797) the
Supreme Court of Nebraska, after citing and commenting not
only upon the cases cited above but also upon other cases,
said: "It seems plain to us that the doctrine of these cases is
in accord with the weight of authority and is supported by the
soundest reasons."
It is true that a few cases can be found which hold that an
officer may be suspended under a statute, without notice and
without a hearing. But it is believed that an examinations of
each of such cases will show that such statues are authorized
by the constitution of the particular state. (Grines vs. District
Judge, 101 Tex., 36 Poe vs.State, 72 Tex., 625,
State vs. Johnson, 18 L. R. A., 410.)
All that has been said above relates only to the petition
for mandamus against the respondent the provincial governor
of Rizal. I am fully convinced that a great preponderance of
the jurisprudence upon the question which I have here
discussed shows clearly that the petitioner herein was
suspended in a manner not authorized by law, and that the
writ of mandamus prayed for should be issued, directing the
reinstatement of the petitioner.
With reference to the respondent provincial board, the record
shows that it was not a party to the acts complained of in the
petition in the present case. The petition, therefore, as against
the provincial board should be denied.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
Section 2188 of the Administrative Code which empowers the
provincial governor to investigate complaints against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, corruption or other form
of maladministration in office does not, as may be seen from
the text itself of said section, empower the provincial
governor to suspend the officer against whom the complaint

may be presented pending the investigation. There is even no

word whatever in said section from which such power may be
inferred.
The suspension of the officer against whom the complaint
may have been presented (when he is not a municipal
treasurer) may, according to said section, be ordered by the
provincial governor when written charges are submitted by
the latter to the provincial board after the investigation has
been made, if he thinks it desirable to impose a more severe
punishment, or if, in his opinion, the charge is one affecting
the official integrity of the officer in question; and, in this
case, that is, when the suspension is effected after the
investigation is held, such written charge against said official
must be presented by the governor to the provincial board
within the period of ten days. Therefore, it is clear and
evident, according to the text of said section, that during the
investigation that the provincial governor may hold, in view of
a charge presented against a municipal officer, the latter
cannot be suspended from his office for the simple reason
that such investigation may end in a reprimand of the officer,
which is the only punishment that the provincial governor may
impose in such case upon the municipal officer, and the law
does not empower the governor to order said suspension at
that time, except only when a complaint is presented against
the municipal officer to the provincial board.
If, as has been said, the investigation which the provincial
governor may hold against a municipal officer may end either
in the imposition of a punishment, such as a reprimand of the
officer or in a complaint against the municipal officer which
the provincial governor may submit to the provincial board,
in the latter case suspending said municipal officer from that
time, that is, from the time the complaint is made and
submitted to the board within the period of ten days, a period
determined and fixed, which the law grants for said purposes,
it is evident that the municipal officer should be notified of
the complaint and therefore should be heard in said
investigation; otherwise, in holding the investigation without
the presence of the officer against whom the complaint may
have been presented, and, in holding, at most, a summary
trial against him without first hearing him or giving him an
opportunity to defend himself, the reprimand imposed upon
him as the result of the investigation in the first case to which
said article 2188 refers, would be a penalty imposed upon the
officer without due process of law.
If this is true, it is also true that the officer subjected to
investigation should be notified of the complaint and should
be heard in said investigation for, if such investigation should
end in a charge which the provincial governor may consider
proper to present against him to the provincial board, such
investigation would be the basis of the charge against the
officer and the provincial board should take cognizance of
such investigation in the corresponding proceeding. If the
most vulgar criminal is notified of the complaint presented
against him before a justice of the peace and is heard in the
preliminary investigation which this judicial officer must hold
before the corresponding information is filed by the fiscal in a
court of first instance, and if in that investigation he is given
the opportunity to plead guilty or not guilty as well as to
defend himself in order that the justice of peace holding the
investigation may consider the merits of the complaint and
the result thereof, so that he may determine whether or not
reasonable motives exist for him to believe that the accused
is guilty and also to determine, as a consequence, whether
sufficient motives exist to present against the accused the
corresponding information in the Court of First Instance
these being facts which the fiscal in turn should consider
before filing the corresponding information it is
unreasonable, unjust and illegal that, in a preliminary
investigation such as that held by the provincial governor in
the second case referred to in section 2188 by virtue of the
complaint presented to him against a municipal officer, such
municipal officer should not be notified of the complaint or

head or given the opportunity to defend himself in order that

the provincial governor may duly determine whether it is
proper to impose upon said officer a more severe punishment
or whether the abuse or neglect of duty imputed to him is
among those that affect the official integrity of said officer.
When a complaint charging the commission of
a delito (felony) is laid before a magistrate, the accused is
entitled as of right to a preliminary investigation as to
"probable cause" before being committed to stand trial for the
crime charged therein. (U.S. vs. M'Govern, 6 Phil., 621)
When a preliminary examination, under the provisions of
General Orders, No. 58, is conducted by a judge or by a
justice of the peace in this jurisdiction, either within or without
the city of Manila, the accused has a right to be present and
to be heard by himself and by counsel and to present
witnesses in his behalf. . . . . (U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18
Phil., 122.)
The object of a preliminary investigation, or a previous inquiry
of some kind, before an accused person is placed upon trial, is
to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and
oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from an open and
public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from
useless and expensive prosecutions. (U.S. vs. Grant and
Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122.)
The doctrine established by this court in the cases above
mentioned, and in many others that need not be cited, is
applicable also to the case where an investigation is held,
according to said section 2188 of the Administrative Code, by
the provincial governor by virtue of a complaint presented
against a municipal officer, because without an investigation
held in legal form, that is, by hearing the person accused of a
crime in a judicial complaint or the municipal officer accused
in a complaint presented to the provincial governor, and
giving him the opportunity to defend himself, the information
against the accused in the first case, can not be filed in the
Court of First Instance and, in the second case, the complaint
against the municipal officer, which may result in his
discharge, can not be presented to the provincial board; and
as the right to be present at the investigation, and be heard
by himself or through an attorney and present witnesses in his
favor, which are what constitute due process of law, is an
essential right of the accused in either case, then, if in the
investigation by the provincial governor of Rizal, of the
complaint received by him against Miguel Cornejo, municipal
president of Pasay, and referred to in his answer, said
governor, without previously notifying the accused municipal
president of said charges, held a preliminary investigation in
his absence, without hearing him and without giving him an
opportunity to defend himself, the complaint against said
municipal officer filed by said provincial governor or Rizal with
the provincial board is without foundation and is illegal for
want of due proces of law in said investigation. Therefore, the
administrative proceeding instituted against said municipal
officer by virtue of that complaint is for that reason affected
with a radical vice and it is evident that the provincial
governor has not acted in accordance with the clear and
conclusive provisions of the section of the Administrative
Code already cited and that he has acted in excess of his
powers, not only in ordering the suspension of the municipal
president, petitioner herein, but also in presenting to the
provincial board, as a result of said investigation, the
complaint against him. Hence the proceeding instituted before
said provincial board by virtue of said complaint, is illegal and
void.
For the reasons above stated, in dissenting from the
respectable opinion of the majority, I am of the opinion that
the petition presented by Miguel Cornejo, municipal president
of Pasay, against Andres Gabriel, provincial governor of Rizal

as well as against the provincial board of Rizal, composed of

Andres Gabriel, Pedro Magsalin, and Catalino S. Cruz, is well
taken, and the respondents should be, as they not are,
ordered to pay the costs.
Francisco Jr vs House of Representatives
GR 160261
10 November 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House

of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice
ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the
same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and
have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of
filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented
before it.
Held: The courts power of judicial review, like almost all
powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as
far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. The Court found the existence in full of all the
requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally
vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue
whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the
land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional
material which only this Court can properly and competently
address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut
allocation of powers under our system of government.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the

Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed oneyear time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming
jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because
it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the
government.
Political questions are those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a
Constitutional Commissioner: The powers of government
are generally considered divided into three branches: the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of
justice courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only
a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of the political law doctrine.
The determination of a truly political question from a
non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to
the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are dutybound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted
within such limits.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that
goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint.
More importantly, any discussion of this would require this
Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation.
GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE 415 SCRA 44
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of
Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two impeachment complaints against the
petitioner, simultaneously referred to the House Committee on Justice,
sufficient in form and substance on grounds that she was denied due
process and that the said resolutions violated the one-year bar rule on
initiating impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers. Court
dismissed the petition.
Facts:

22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first

session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and
spouses Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint
against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao

27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House

Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business

3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary

John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James
Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta
herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casio,
Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on

Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen
transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on
August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business

11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints

to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found

both complaints sufficient in form

2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment

Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found

the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance

Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition

challenging Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was
denied due process and that these violated the one-year bar rule on
initiating impeachment proceedings
Issue/s:
1.

Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

2.

Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of

Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due
process to the Petitioner

3.

Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints

violated the Constitution

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

Ratio:
1.

1.

NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of
the judiciary
the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,
provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and
the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to
the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, judicially
discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review
1.
2.
DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a
mode of promulgation the Rules of Procedure of
Impeachment Proceedings?

(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and

substance of the impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the
Chairman of the HCOJs, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending case with
her at the Sandiganbayan


Presumption of regularity

The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the

express grant of rule-making power in the HOR

the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the

constitutional requirements and providing that there must be
a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the committee

The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of

promulgating the Rules.

impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a

body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender
3.
THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits
that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with

Congress taking initial action of said complaint (referral of the
complaint to the Committee on Justice)

IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

Rationale of the one-year bar: that the purpose of the oneyear bar is two-fold: 1)to prevent undue or too frequent harassment;
and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year,
such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can
no longer rekindle the candle. (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q.
RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in
Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners
Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated
items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second
Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its
Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of
this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further
proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation
of its evidence.

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various

reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the
AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner
of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon
City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu
City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be
estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were
found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were
confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas
were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT.
EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items
could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if
not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of
the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications
equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate
money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military
Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano
is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes
and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth
Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when
he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses
respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in
a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4)
attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth
Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by
respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have
used the military equipment/items seized in her house on
March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being
the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also
impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns
the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no
visible source of income.

Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the
successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO
No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation
as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the
purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then
Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board
("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the
active service or retired.2

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets

and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover
the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten
and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the
members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of
these money would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were
also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Boards
consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed
that respondent has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie

case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend

the complaint in order "to charge the delinquent properties
with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully
acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x." 8

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the

Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners presentation of
evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend
complaint did not state when petitioner would file the
amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that
the subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face
vague and not related to the existing complaint. The
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case
had been pending in court, petitioner should proceed to
present its evidence.

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q.

Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as
"The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 3
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No.
1379") 4against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor
General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint
naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"),
represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as
defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth
Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On
the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the
Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerktypist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February
1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas
"acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other
income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue
advantage of his public office and/or using his power,
authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of
the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after
a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that
respondents have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of
respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the
State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative
Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended
Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property
consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision,
Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He
denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from
the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint.
Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of
Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed
ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry
and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine
Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for
trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the
hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence
of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The
court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a

postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial because
of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence
to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend
the complaint to conform to the evidence already presented
or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone
unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of the
forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed
the case for over a year mainly because of its many
postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to
revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case had long
been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to
prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted
its inability to present further evidence. Giving petitioner one
more chance to present further evidence or to amend the
complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan
reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however,
hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action
that private respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its
inability to proceed to trial because it had no further evidence
to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan
granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate
pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner
that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic
action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based
on Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court held in Migrino that the
PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
military officers by reason of mere position held without a
showing that they are "subordinates" of former President
Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The
counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth
Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to
the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the
forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate
action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to

the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a

determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth
Dimaano in connection herewith.

presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before

the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest
its case;

SO ORDERED.

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY,
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO
WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS
EVIDENCE.12

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for

Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private
respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which
petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the
following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with
the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the
same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in
criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute
a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR
FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF
CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY
CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT
RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED
AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE
COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE
FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO,
189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic
v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived by respondents
with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim;
and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper
considering that they were filed after commencement of the

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private
Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided
by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v.
Migrino.14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the
jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture
petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth
under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired. 15 The PCGG tasked
the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to
appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken
based on its findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP
Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO
No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order
to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order." EO
No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of
assisting the President in regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located
in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as
the President may assign to the Commission from time to
time.
x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel
who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in
Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have
accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of
former President Marcos by being the latters immediate
family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers,
influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases
of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their
cases to the PCGG.18

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President

assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case
should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before
the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner
argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former
President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas
position enabled him to receive orders directly from his
commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of
former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1
and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically
make him a "subordinate" as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close
association with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed
this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will
readily show what is contemplated within the term
subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the
urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in
which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda
Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business
associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest
or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis that is[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or
things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent,
but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith,
Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58,
citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to
one who enjoys a close association with former President
Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family
member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the
close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee
in EO No. 2.

wealth by the deposed President or by former President

Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of illgotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from
Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in
Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states
that the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to
EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner
asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting
within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of
graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate
of the former President. However, the same AFP Board
Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution
begins with such statement, it ends with the following
recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q.
Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as
"The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 20
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute
private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the
result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019
and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments
proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG
for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers
must be construed to address such specific and limited
purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the
Amended Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas
allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a
"subordinate" of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely
enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and
suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his
salary and other legitimate income without showing that
Ramas amassed them because of his close association with
former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the
AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas
accumulated his wealth because of his close association with
former President Marcos, thus:

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or

was a government official or employee during the
administration of former President Marcos. There must be a
prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis
supplied)

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft

Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did
not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing
that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth
by virtue of his close association or relation with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is
submitted that such omission was not fatal. The
resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the
context of the law creating the same and the objective of the
investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to
Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21(Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the

Philippine Army with the rank of Major General19 does not
suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President
Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The
PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a
close associate of former President Marcos, in the same
manner that business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such
close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity
with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a

prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was
accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos
that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 122 clearly premises
the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all illgotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal
is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the
PCGG.

xxx

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases

that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO
Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No.
1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No.
14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1379,
accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority and
influence, connections or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses
committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as
contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing
categories, require a previous authority of the
President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and
prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive
Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is
vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city
prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State
Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should
investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under
EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation
of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February
1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the
authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with
the Solicitor General.27 The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act
No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman the power
to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture
proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25
February 1986.28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still
pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding
that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos.
The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should
be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate
respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No.
1 and its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board
Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there
are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG
should have recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman
who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in
Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to
investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent
for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must
also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without
prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper
prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency
of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted
to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived
any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting

their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit

as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus,
there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG
cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never
granted to it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless
given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole
task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses,
their relatives and cronies.29 Without these elements, the
PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction
of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing
their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the
pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided
on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents
only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990.
Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of
jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.30 Thus, we hold
that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case.
Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an
action.31
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper
preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if
warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition
with the Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit
unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to
prescription, laches or estoppel.33
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in
dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of
petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records
of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for
non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this
case has been pending for four years before the
Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended
Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its
evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to
prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its
evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and
extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its
evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave
to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion sought "to charge the
delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners
evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been
unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the
presentation of petitioners evidence since petitioner did not
state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April
1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the
presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its
evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested
its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence.
The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on
the matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration
of the above events because this case has been ready for trial

for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to
the inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates
for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly
upon the failure of the military to supply them for the
preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal
interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in
public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one
beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the
developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced
with a situation where a case already in progress will revert
back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause
where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the
plaintiff Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was
conducting a preliminary investigation on the unexplained
wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No.
1379.36 The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to
conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan
granted this request and scheduled the presentation of
evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled
date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the
preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted.
Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990
to continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform
the court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case
is concerned x x x."37 Still on the date set, petitioner failed to
present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed
its Re-Amended Complaint.38 The Sandiganbayan correctly
observed that a case already pending for years would revert
to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the ReAmended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only
itself to blame for failure to complete the presentation of its
evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than
sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet
petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a
Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more
the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and
Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since
the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the
case against private respondents. This alone would have been
sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of
petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring
the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally
seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue
bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these
properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against
private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to
support its case against private respondents if these
properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at
Dimaanos residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not
present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the
raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search
warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one baby
armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56
ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications

equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000,

jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the
raiding team conducted the search and seizure "on March 3,
1986 or five days after the successful EDSA
revolution."39 Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice
President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the
will of the Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the
revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation
of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising
from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987,
the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already
reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and
items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As
succinctly stated in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3
dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in
defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The
resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations
except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government,
as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary
government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual
and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist
forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption
of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in
effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule
that the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the
interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives
and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by
the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno:42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of
the established government in any country or state by those
who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system,
usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State,

it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal order of

a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a
way not prescribed by the first order itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively
peaceful one, and more popularly known as the "people power
revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from
an existing regime. This revolution also saw the
unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has
been defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their
rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their
system of government or institutions by force or a general
uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making
such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as
to be unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of positive
law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from
there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform
and to alter any existing form of government without regard
to the existing constitution."
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the
presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in
fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the
winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be
said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which
was met by little resistance and her control of the state
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key
officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos
Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military
signaled the point where the legal system then in effect,
had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis
supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
remained operative during the interregnum would render void
all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission
on Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct
the freezing and even the take-over of private property by
mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate
the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of
Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was
concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration
orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no
Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered
companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to
the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential
Commission on Good Government,43 petitioner Baseco, while
conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders
upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due
process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the
Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution,
expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders,
thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing
considerations as to the validity and propriety of
sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be
dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the
authority of the PCGG to issue them have received

constitutional approbation and sanction. As already

mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact
"measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . .
(r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of
the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of
assets or accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section
26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies
the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987
Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders
would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both
constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the
validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse
by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something
schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the present
amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas
lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of
which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he
argues that everything the Commission is doing is
traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo
also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture
developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as an
afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the
results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the
PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts,
another word for niceties or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking
the CONCOM for special protection? The answer is clear. What
they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process,
hence they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes
malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us
not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not
an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the
exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three
reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the
work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization.
Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is
the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one
breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same
time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is
at the heart of constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical;
that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due
process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is
"backsliding." It is tragic when we begin to backslide even
before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to
become ingrained. The committee report asks for
extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months
after the convening of Congress, and Congress may even
extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated
become vice. What the committee report is asking for is that
we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of
disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed.
The practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a
vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to

keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of

consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not
the legal niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When
it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga,
a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch
Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly
disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes
the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the
auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure
clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account to us and
we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep
it in your private safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government
as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will
release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the
ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process
in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something
positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights
is not for sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to
ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow
strong, only if it would become convinced of the values
enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond
monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional
Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee
report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full
vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First,
it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that
what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within
the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and
should be able to go on, even without the support of Section
8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable
option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch
Christians. Let me conclude with what another Christian
replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison
cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for
my nations safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the
devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we should
delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas
against the amendment excepting sequestration orders from
the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted
the amendment as Section 26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware
that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand
the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution
remained in force during the interregnum, absent a
constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from
such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration
orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during
the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under
the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de
jure government, assumed responsibility for the States good
faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is
a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each
signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article
17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the

duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or

unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,
provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the
Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document,
being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.46 Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights47 of individuals under
the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant
or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its
obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another
matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the
Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in
the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did
not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same
way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure
government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its
treaty obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution
on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government became subject to a higher
municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives
and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted
verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. 48 The
Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the
revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights
existed, directives and orders issued by government officers
were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the
authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The
directives and orders should not have also violated the
Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items
to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with
respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not
included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses,
the raiding team confiscated items not included in the
warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize
only for weapons. What else, aside from the weapons, were
seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine
currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be
seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the
reason why your team also seized other properties not
mentioned in said search warrant?

A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid,

I was informed that the reason why they also brought the
other items not included in the search warrant was because
the money and other jewelries were contained in attach
cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think
three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach
cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they
forced open these containers only to find out that they
contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you
know the reason why your team seized this money instead of
weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers
assisting him decided to bring along also the money because
at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if
they will bring that because they might be suspected also of
taking money out of those items, your Honor. 49
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag

Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had

reason to believe that only weapons were in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.50
xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with
one armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the
issuing Court, with the fiscals office who charged Elizabeth
Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection

with this case was applied before the Municipal Trial Court of
Batangas, Branch 1?

A. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45

caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the name of
Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?

Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the
search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and
five (5) boxes of ammunition?

A. I think that was the reason, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in

the search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did you
seize the jewelries?

xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct
surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance
together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in
the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the
search warrant, any other properties or contraband which
could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some
hidden items, for instance, the communications equipment
and money. However, I did not include that in the application
for search warrant considering that we have not established
concrete evidence about that. So when

A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his
assistant to bring along also the jewelries and other items, sir.
I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along
also these articles. I do not really know their reason for
bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken
because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they
were not also included in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that
the money was discovered to be contained in attach
cases.1wphi1 These attach cases were suspected to be
containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the
course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So
the team leader also decided to take this considering that
they believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it
might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that
were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of
Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that
were opened.51
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the
warrant did not include the monies, communications

equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team

confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe
these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these
items without showing that these items could be the subject
of warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team
exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless
these items are contraband per se,53 and they are not, they
must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized
them. However, we do not declare that such person is the
lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and
seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that
these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The
questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18
November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037,
remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for
such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employee vs Phil Blooming Corp
Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO)
decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang
to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration,
Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the
leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against
the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers
inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it
would interrupt the normal course of their business which may
result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the
threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs
if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated
their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to
participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not
absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally
took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the
officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two
days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the CBA.
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and
the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation

only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can

be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
are absolute when directed against public officials or "when
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
J. Fernando
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one
of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition
of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the
city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of
the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels
were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional
and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee
per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests
would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of
such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be
violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required
the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class
motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack
of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic
cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the
ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative
of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However,
the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in
the scope of police power. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing
the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance
set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution.
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to
discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for

purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase

"the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
has a standard to which the governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard
ofdue process which must exist both as a procedural and a
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from
legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"
decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
processrequirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may
be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in
fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations
are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than
in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the
states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee
of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed
purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration
of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due
process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license;
it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint
by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of
liberty and authority in his mind through education and
personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a
living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The
policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention
even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved
were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information,
the maintenance of establishments, and the full rate of
payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."

application for registration was made at Cebu at the Collector

of Customs---denied. Becausethey were not citizens of
the US/Phils.-Act 2671, Sec. 1172. Certificate ofPhilippine
Register.upon registration of a vessel of domesticownership,
and of more than 15 tons gross, a certificate of Philippine
register shall be issued forit. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the taking of the
certificateof Philippine register shall be optional with the
owner.-domestic ownership, as used in this section, means
ownership vested in the (a) citizens ornative inhabitants of the
Phil Islands; (b) citizens of the US residing in the Phil. Islands;
(c) anycorporation or company composed wholly of citizen
of Phils./US or both-plaintiffs contention: Act No. 2671
deprives the corp. of its property without due process of
lawbecause by the passage of the law, the company was
automatically deprived of every beneficialattribute of
ownership of the Bato and that they are left with a naked title
they could not use.Issue: WON Smith, Bell & Co. were denied
of the due process of law by the Phil. Legislature in
itsenactment of Act 2761.Ruling: No. (judgment affirmed
plaintiff cant be granted registry.)RD: Act No. 2761, in
denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the
right to registervessels in the Phils. Coastwide trade, falls
within the authorized exceptions. Specifically withinthe
purview of the police power. Literally and absolutely,
steamship lines are the arteries of thecommerce in the Phils.
If one be severed, the lifeblood of the nation is lost. If these
areprotected, security of the country and general welfare is
sustained

SMITH, BELL & CO. vs NATIVIDAD (Malcolm, J.)40 Phil

136, 144-145 (1919)
Facts:-Smith, Bell & Co. is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippine Islands;majority of the
stockholders are British; owner of a motor vessel known as
the Batobrought toCebu for the purpose of transporting
Smith, Bell & Co.s merchandise between ports in theislands.-

(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since

its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.

Tanada vs Tuvera 146 SCRA 446

Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due
process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when
it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in
affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees.
The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official
gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of
general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there
should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
and those which are not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be made in the official
gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he
claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause unless
otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil code meant
that the publication required therein was not always
imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have
to be made in the official gazette.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official
gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be
in full.
Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local
application shall be published as condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations

69 Phil. 635 Political Law Constitutional Law Due Process

in Administrative Bodies

People vs Cayat
FACTS: Cayat is a native of a nonchristian tribe in Baguio. He
was found guilty of act 1639 which prohibits natives of non
Christian tribes from acquiring wines and liquors other than
those native wines which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed to. Cayat said it violates equal protection,
due process, improper exercise of police power.

Remedial Law Civil Procedure Motion For New Trial;

Grounds
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of
his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the
said employees laid off were members of NLU while no
members of the rival labor union (National Workers
Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company
dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

HELD: Equal protection not violated by legislation based on

reasonable classification. Classification to be reasonable (1)
must rest on substantial distinctions (2) germane to the
purpose of the law (3) not limited to existing conditions only
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class. In (1), not
based on accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree
of civilization and culture. Non Christian refers not to religious
belief but to geographical area. In (2), unquestionable
because it is designed to insure peace and order in and
among Non Christian tribes. In (3), it applies for all times as
long as those conditions exist. In (4), its not an argument
here. The government raise their culture and civilization and
secure for them the benefits of their progress with the
ultimate view of placing them with Christians on the basis of
true equality.chong vs Hernandez

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where

Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme
Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU.
The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is
entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered
evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached
to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such farreaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include
books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which
were not previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR,
although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also
make sure that they comply to the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be
complied with by observing the following:

(1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.

(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.

(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)
The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The administrative body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.

FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the
peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not
wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly
in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May
15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death
or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years
after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were
exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in
the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization,
economic control weights and measures and labor and other
laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act,
filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff:
reasons:
1.
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without
due process
2.
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3.
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4.
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal
protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does
not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are
real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between
an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all

persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise
of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance
and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination
and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of
the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction
between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is
naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for
the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The
alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State
cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property
subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the
potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit.
Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and
practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the
nations economy endangering the national security in times
of crisis and emergency