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TAADA
V.
TUVERA
FACTS:
Petitioners
right
to
be
informed
on
matters
of
public
concern,
a
right
recognized
in
Sec.
6
of
Art.
6
of
the
1973
Philippine
Constitution
is
the
issue
in
this
case.
Presidential
decrees,
letter
of
instructions,
general
orders,
executive
orders,
letters
of
implementation
and
administrative
orders
were
passed
without
publication
as
required
under
Art.
2
of
the
Civil
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
publication
in
the
Official
Gazette
is
not
a
sine
qua
non
requirement
for
the
effective
of
laws
where
the
laws
themselves
provide
for
their
own
effectivity
dates.
PUBLICATION
IS
REQUIRED.
HELD:
Section
1
of
Commonwealth
Act
638
provides
as
follows:
Section
1.
There
shall
be
published
in
the
Official
Gazette
[1]
all
important
legisiative
acts
and
resolutions
of
a
public
nature
of
the,
Congress
of
the
Philippines;
[2]
all
executive
and
administrative
orders
and
proclamations,
except
such
as
have
no
general
applicability;
[3]
decisions
or
abstracts
of
decisions
of
the
Supreme
Court
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
as
may
be
deemed
by
said
courts
of
sufficient
importance
to
be
so
published;
[4]
such
documents
or
classes
of
documents
as
may
be
required
so
to
be
published
by
law;
and
[5]
such
documents
or
classes
of
documents
as
the
President
of
the
Philippines
shall
determine
from
time
to
time
to
have
general
applicability
and
legal
effect,
or
which
he
may
authorize
so
to
be
published.
The
clear
object
of
the
above-quoted
provision
is
to
give
the
general
public
adequate
notice
of
the
various
laws
which
are
to
regulate
their
actions
and
conduct
as
citizens.
Without
such
notice
and
publication,
there
would
be
no
basis
for
the
application
of
the
maxim
"ignorantia
legis
non
excusat."
It
would
be
the
height
of
injustice
to
punish
or
otherwise
burden
a
citizen
for
the
transgression
of
a
law
of
which
he
had
no
notice
whatsoever,
not
even
a
constructive
one.
It
is
needless
to
add
that
the
publication
of
presidential
issuances
"of
a
public
nature"
or
"of
general
applicability"
is
a
requirement
of
due
process.
It
is
a
rule
of
law
that
before
a
person
may
be
bound
by
law,
he
must
first
be
officially
and
specifically
informed
of
its
contents.
The
Court,
in
one
case,
said:
publication
is
necessary
to
apprise
the
public
of
the
contents
of
[penal]
regulations
and
make
the
said
penalties
binding
on
the
persons
affected
thereby.
"
The
cogency
of
this
holding
is
apparently
recognized
by
respondent
officials
considering
the
manifestation
in
their
comment
that
"the
government,
as
a
matter
of
policy,
refrains
from
prosecuting
violations
of
criminal
laws
until
the
same
shall
have
been
published
in
the
Official
Gazette
or
in
some
other
publication,
even
though
some
criminal
laws
provide
that
they
shall
take
effect
immediately.
JUDGE
DADOLE
V.
COMMISION
ON
AUDIT
FACTS:
The
RTC
and
MTC
judges
of
Mandaue
City
were
receiving
monthly
allowances
of
P1,260
each
year
and
later
the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod
increase
the
amount
to
P1,500
for
each
judge.
On
march
1994,
DBM
issued
local
budget
circular
no.
55
(LBC
55)
which
provided
that:
In
the
light
of
the
authority
granted
to
the
local
government
units
under
the
Local
Government
Code
to
provide
for
additional
allowances
and
other
benefits
to
national
government
officials
and
employees
assigned
in
their
locality,
such
additional
allowances
in
the
form
of
honorarium
at
rates
not
exceeding
P1,000.00
in
provinces
and
cities
and
P700.00
in
municipalities
may
be
granted
subject
to
the
following
conditions
the
said
circular
provided
for
its
immediate
effectivity
without
need
of
publication.
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
Acting
on
the
DBM
directive,
Mandaue
City
Auditor
issued
notices
of
disallowance
to
petitioners
in
excess
of
the
amount
authorized
by
LBC
55.
They
were
also
asked
to
reimburse
the
amount
they
received
in
excess
of
P1,000
from
April
to
September
1994.
ISSUE:
Whether
LBC
55
of
the
DBM
is
void
for
going
beyond
the
supervisory
powers
of
the
President
and
for
not
having
been
published?
YES!
HELD:
We
recognize
that,
although
our
Constitution
guarantees
autonomy
to
local
government
units,
the
exercise
of
local
autonomy
remains
subject
to
the
power
of
control
by
Congress
and
the
power
of
supervision
by
the
President.
Section
4
of
Article
X
of
the
1987
Philippine
Constitution
provides
that:
Sec.
4.
The
President
of
the
Philippines
shall
exercise
general
supervision
over
local
governments.
x
x
Supervision
means
overseeing
or
the
power
or
authority
of
an
officer
to
see
that
subordinate
officers
perform
their
duties.
If
the
latter
fail
or
neglect
to
fulfill
them,
the
former
may
take
such
action
or
step
as
prescribed
by
law
to
make
them
perform
their
duties.
Control,
on
the
other
hand,
means
the
power
of
an
officer
to
alter
or
modify
or
nullify
or
set
aside
what
a
subordinate
officer
ha[s]
done
in
the
performance
of
his
duties
and
to
substitute
the
judgment
of
the
former
for
that
of
the
latter.
In
Taule
v.
Santos,
we
further
stated
that
the
Chief
Executive
wielded
no
more
authority
than
that
of
checking
whether
local
governments
or
their
officials
were
performing
their
duties
as
provided
by
the
fundamental
law
and
by
statutes.
He
cannot
interfere
with
local
governments,
so
long
as
they
act
within
the
scope
of
their
authority.
"Supervisory
power,
when
contrasted
with
control,
is
the
power
of
mere
oversight
over
an
inferior
body;
it
does
not
include
any
restraining
authority
over
such
body,"
Clearly
then,
the
President
can
only
interfere
in
the
affairs
and
activities
of
a
local
government
unit
if
he
or
she
finds
that
the
latter
has
acted
contrary
to
law.
This
is
the
scope
of
the
President's
supervisory
powers
over
local
government
units.
Hence,
the
President
or
any
of
his
or
her
alter
egos
cannot
interfere
in
local
affairs
as
long
as
the
concerned
local
government
unit
acts
within
the
parameters
of
the
law
and
the
Constitution.
Any
directive
therefore
by
the
President
or
any
of
his
or
her
alter
egos
seeking
to
alter
the
wisdom
of
a
law-conforming
judgment
on
local
affairs
of
a
local
government
unit
is
a
patent
nullity
because
it
violates
the
principle
of
local
autonomy
and
separation
of
powers
of
the
executive
and
legislative
departments
in
governing
municipal
corporations.
Furthermore,
LBC
55
is
void
on
account
of
its
lack
of
publication,
in
violation
of
our
ruling
in
Taada
vs.
Tuvera
where
we
held
that:
xxx.
Administrative
rules
and
regulations
must
also
be
published
if
their
purpose
is
to
enforce
or
implement
existing
law
pursuant
to
a
valid
delegation.
Interpretative
regulations
and
those
merely
internal
in
nature,
that
is,
regulating
only
the
personnel
of
an
administrative
agency
and
the
public,
need
not
be
published.
Neither
is
publication
required
of
the
so-called
letters
of
instruction
issued
by
administrative
superiors
concerning
the
rules
or
guidelines
to
be
followed
by
their
subordinates
in
the
performance
of
their
duties.
At
the
very
least,
before
the
said
circular
under
attack
may
be
permitted
to
substantially
reduce
their
income,
the
government
officials
and
employees
concerned
should
be
apprised
and
alerted
by
the
publication
of
subject
circular
in
the
Official
Gazette
or
in
a
newspaper
of
general
circulation
in
the
Philippines
to
the
end
that
they
be
given
amplest
opportunity
to
voice
out
whatever
opposition
they
may
have,
and
to
ventilate
their
stance
on
the
matter.
This
approach
is
more
in
keeping
with
democratic
precepts
and
rudiments
of
fairness
and
transparency.
Even
if
the
administrative
order
has
been
re-issued
in
its
entirety
and
submitted
for
publication
in
the
Official
Gazetter,
the
publication
will
not
cure
the
defect
and
retroact
to
the
time
that
its
was
disallowed.
Publication
is
required
as
a
condition
precedent
to
the
effectivity
of
a
law
to
inform
the
ALYANNA R. CHANG
public
of
the
contents
of
the
law
or
rules
and
regulations
before
their
rights
and
interests
are
affected
by
the
same.
GARCILLANO
V.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEES
ON
PUBLIC
INFORMATION,
ET.
AL.
FACTS:
Tapes
ostensibly
containing
a
wiretapped
conversation
purportedly
between
the
President
and
a
high-ranking
official
of
the
COMELEC
surfaced.
Petitioner
Garcillano
filed
a
petition
for
prohibition
and
injunction
with
prayer
for
TRP
and/or
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
that
the
House
Committees
be
restrained
from
using
these
tape
recording
of
the
illegaly
obtained
wiretapped
conversations
in
their
committee
reports
and
for
any
other
purpose.
Later,
petitioners
in
G.R
no.
179275
filed
before
the
Court
a
Petition
for
Prohibition
with
Prayer
for
the
Issuance
of
a
RO
and/or
Writ
of
Preliminary
injunction
seeking
to
bar
the
Senate
from
conducting
its
scheduled
legislative
inquiry
because
it
violates
RA
4200
and
Sec.
3,
Art.
3
of
the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
Senate
can
continue
the
conduct
of
the
questioned
legislative
inquiry
without
duly
published
rules
of
procedure,
in
clear
derogation
of
the
constitutional
requirement?
NO!
HELD:
Section
21,
Article
VI
of
the
1987
Constitution
explicitly
provides
that
"the
Senate
or
the
House
of
Representatives,
or
any
of
its
respective
committees
may
conduct
inquiries
in
aid
of
legislation
in
accordance
with
its
duly
published
rules
of
procedure."
The
requisite
of
publication
of
the
rules
is
intended
to
satisfy
the
basic
requirements
of
due
process.
Publication
is
indeed
imperative,
for
it
will
be
the
height
of
injustice
to
punish
or
otherwise
burden
a
citizen
for
the
transgression
of
a
law
or
rule
of
which
he
had
no
notice
whatsoever,
not
even
a
constructive
one.
What
constitutes
publication
is
set
forth
in
Article
2
of
the
Civil
Code,
which
provides
that
"laws
shall
take
effect
after
15
days
following
the
completion
of
their
publication
either
in
the
Official
Gazette,
or
in
a
newspaper
of
general
circulation
in
the
Philippines."
Respondents
admit
in
their
pleading
and
in
oral
arguemnts
that
the
Senate
of
the
14th
Congress
did
not
publish
rules
when
they
first
opened
thei
session.
As
held
in
one
case,
The
phrase
"duly
published
rules
of
procedure"
requires
the
Senate
of
every
Congress
to
publish
its
rules
of
procedure
governing
inquiries
in
aid
of
legislation
because
every
Senate
is
distinct
from
the
one
before
it
or
after
it.
Since
Senatorial
elections
are
held
every
three
(3)
years
for
one-half
of
the
Senates
membership,
the
composition
of
the
Senate
also
changes
by
the
end
of
each
term.
Each
Senate
may
thus
enact
a
different
set
of
rules
as
it
may
deem
fit.
Not
having
published
its
Rules
of
Procedure,
the
subject
hearings
in
aid
of
legislation
conducted
by
the
14th
Senate,
are
therefore,
procedurally
infirm.
However,
it
is
evident
that
the
Senate
has
determined
that
its
main
rules
are
intended
to
be
valid
from
the
date
of
their
adoption
until
they
are
amended
or
repealed.
Such
language
is
conspicuously
absent
from
the
Rules.
The
Rules
simply
state
"(t)hese
Rules
shall
take
effect
seven
(7)
days
after
publication
in
two
(2)
newspapers
of
general
circulation."
The
latter
does
not
explicitly
provide
for
the
continued
effectivity
of
such
rules
until
they
are
amended
or
repealed.
In
view
of
the
difference
in
the
language
of
the
two
sets
of
Senate
rules,
it
cannot
be
presumed
that
the
Rules
(on
legislative
inquiries)
would
continue
into
the
next
Congress.
The
Senate
of
the
next
Congress
may
easily
adopt
different
rules
for
its
legislative
inquiries
which
come
within
the
rule
on
unfinished
business.
If
it
was
the
intention
of
the
Senate
for
its
present
rules
on
legislative
inquiries
to
be
effective
even
in
the
next
Congress,
it
could
have
easily
adopted
the
same
language
it
had
used
in
its
main
rules
regarding
effectivity.
Respondents
justify
their
non-observance
of
the
constitutionally
mandated
publication
by
arguing
that
the
rules
have
never
been
amended
since
1995
and,
despite
that,
they
are
published
in
booklet
form
available
to
anyone
for
free,
and
accessible
to
the
public
at
the
Senates
internet
web
page.
The
Court
does
not
agree.
The
absence
of
any
amendment
to
the
rules
cannot
justify
the
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
Senates
defiance
of
the
clear
and
unambiguous
language
of
Section
21,
Article
VI
of
the
Constitution.
The
organic
law
instructs,
without
more,
that
the
Senate
or
its
committees
may
conduct
inquiries
in
aid
of
legislation
only
in
accordance
with
duly
published
rules
of
procedure,
and
does
not
make
any
distinction
whether
or
not
these
rules
have
undergone
amendments
or
revision.
The
constitutional
mandate
to
publish
the
said
rules
prevails
over
any
custom,
practice
or
tradition
followed
by
the
Senate.
The
publication
of
the
Rules
of
Procedure
in
the
website
of
the
Senate,
or
in
pamphlet
form
available
at
the
Senate,
is
not
sufficient
under
the
Taada
v.
Tuvera
ruling
which
requires
publication
either
in
the
Official
Gazette
or
in
a
newspaper
of
general
circulation.
The
Rules
of
Procedure
even
provide
that
the
rules
"shall
take
effect
seven
(7)
days
after
publication
in
two
(2)
newspapers
of
general
circulation,"
precluding
any
other
form
of
publication.
Publication
in
accordance
with
Taada
is
mandatory
to
comply
with
the
due
process
requirement
because
the
Rules
of
Procedure
put
a
persons
liberty
at
risk.
A
person
who
violates
the
Rules
of
Procedure
could
be
arrested
and
detained
by
the
Senate.
The
invocation
by
the
respondents
of
the
provisions
of
R.A.
No.
8792,
otherwise
known
as
the
Electronic
Commerce
Act
of
2000,
to
support
their
claim
of
valid
publication
through
the
internet
is
all
the
more
incorrect.
R.A.
8792
considers
an
electronic
data
message
or
an
electronic
document
as
the
functional
equivalent
of
a
written
document
only
for
evidentiary
purposes.
In
other
words,
the
law
merely
recognizes
the
admissibility
in
evidence
(for
their
being
the
original)
of
electronic
data
messages
and/or
electronic
documents.
It
does
not
make
the
internet
a
medium
for
publishing
laws,
rules
and
regulations.
Given
this
discussion,
the
respondent
Senate
Committees,
therefore,
could
not,
in
violation
of
the
Constitution,
use
its
unpublished
rules
in
the
legislative
inquiry
subject
of
these
consolidated
cases.
The
conduct
of
inquiries
in
aid
of
legislation
by
the
Senate
has
to
be
deferred
until
it
shall
have
caused
the
publication
of
the
rules,
because
it
can
do
so
only
"in
accordance
with
its
duly
published
rules
of
procedure."
Very
recently,
the
Senate
caused
the
publication
of
the
Senate
Rules
of
Procedure
Governing
Inquiries
in
Aid
of
Legislation
in
the
October
31,
2008
issues
of
Manila
Bulletin
and
Malaya.
While
we
take
judicial
notice
of
this
fact,
the
recent
publication
does
not
cure
the
infirmity
of
the
inquiry
sought
to
be
prohibited
by
the
instant
petitions.
Insofar
as
the
consolidated
cases
are
concerned,
the
legislative
investigation
subject
thereof
still
could
not
be
undertaken
by
the
respondent
Senate
Committees,
because
no
published
rules
governed
it,
in
clear
contravention
of
the
Constitution.
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
V.
GMA
NETWORK,
INC
FACTS:
GMA
filed
an
application
for
collective
approval
of
various
amendments
to
its
AOI
and
By-laws.
It
changed
its
corporate
name
and
extended
the
corporate
term
for
another
50
years.
Upon
filing,
the
SEC
assessed
the
filing
fee
at
1/10
of
1%
of
its
authorized
capital
stock
plus
20%
thereof
or
an
amount
of
P1,212,200.oo
The
CA
ruled
that
the
memorandum
circular
no.
2,
series
of
1994
is
legally
invalid
and
ineffective
for
not
having
been
published
in
accordance
with
law.
The
challenged
memorandum
circular,
according
to
the
appellate
court,
is
not
merely
an
internal
or
interpretative
rule,
but
affects
the
public
in
general.
Hence,
its
publication
is
required
for
its
effectivity.
It
should
be
mentioned
at
the
outset
that
the
authority
of
the
SEC
to
collect
and
receive
fees
as
authorized
by
law
is
not
in
question.
Its
power
to
collect
fees
for
examining
and
filing
articles
of
incorporation
and
by-laws
and
amendments
thereto,
certificates
of
increase
or
decrease
of
the
capital
stock,
among
others,
is
recognized.
Likewise
established
is
its
power
under
Sec.
7
of
P.D.
No.
902-A
to
recommend
to
the
President
the
revision,
alteration,
amendment
or
adjustment
of
the
charges
which
it
is
authorized
to
collect.
The
subject
of
the
present
inquiry
is
not
the
authority
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
of
the
SEC
to
collect
and
receive
fees
and
charges,
but
rather
the
validity
of
its
imposition
on
the
basis
of
a
memorandum
circular
which,
the
Court
of
Appeals
held,
is
ineffective.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
circular
is
valid.
NO!
HELD:
SEC
issued
memorandum
Circular
no.
1
imposing
maximum
fee
but
it
later
amended
and
deleted
the
maximum
amount
to
be
collected.
Sec.
circular
no.
1
refers
to
the
filing
fee
for
the
amendment
of
AOI
to
extend
corporate
life
while
no.
2
pertains
to
the
filing
fee
for
AOI.
Also,
R.A
no.
3531
provides
an
unmistakable
standard
which
should
guide
the
SEC
in
fixing
and
imposing
its
rates
and
fees.
However,
we
agree
with
the
Court
of
Appeals
that
the
questioned
memorandum
circular
is
invalid
as
it
does
not
appear
from
the
records
that
it
has
been
published
in
the
Official
Gazette
or
in
a
newspaper
of
general
circulation.
Executive
Order
No.
200,
which
repealed
Art.
2
of
the
Civil
Code,
provides
that
"laws
shall
take
effect
after
fifteen
days
following
the
completion
of
their
publication
either
in
the
Official
Gazette
or
in
a
newspaper
of
general
circulation
in
the
Philippines,
unless
it
is
otherwise
provided."
In
Taada
v.
Tuvera,
the
Court,
expounding
on
the
publication
requirement,
held:
We
hold
therefore
that
all
statutes,
including
those
of
local
application
and
private
laws,
shall
be
published
as
a
condition
for
their
effectivity,
which
shall
begin
fifteen
days
after
publication
unless
a
different
effectivity
date
is
fixed
by
the
legislature.
Covered
by
this
rule
are
presidential
decrees
and
executive
orders
promulgated
by
the
President
in
the
exercise
of
legislative
powers
whenever
the
same
are
validly
delegated
by
the
legislature,
or,
at
present,
directly
conferred
by
the
Constitution.
Administrative
rules
and
regulations
must
also
be
published
if
their
purpose
is
to
enforce
or
implement
existing
law
pursuant
also
to
a
valid
delegation.
Interpretative
regulations
and
those
merely
internal
in
nature,
that
is,
regulating
only
the
personnel
of
the
administrative
agency
and
not
the
public,
need
not
be
published.
Neither
is
publication
required
of
the
so-called
letters
of
instructions
issued
by
administrative
superiors
concerning
the
rules
or
guidelines
to
be
followed
by
their
subordinates
in
the
performance
of
their
duties.
The
questioned
memorandum
circular,
it
should
be
emphasized,
cannot
be
construed
as
simply
interpretative
of
R.A.
No.
3531.
This
administrative
issuance
is
an
implementation
of
the
mandate
of
R.A.
No.
3531
and
indubitably
regulates
and
affects
the
public
at
large.
It
cannot,
therefore,
be
considered
a
mere
internal
rule
or
regulation,
nor
an
interpretation
of
the
law,
but
a
rule
which
must
be
declared
ineffective
as
it
was
neither
published
nor
filed
with
the
Office
of
the
National
Administrative
Register.
LIAM
LAW
V.
OLYMPIC
SAWMILL
&
ELINO
LEE
CHI
FACTS:
Liam
Law,
plaintiff,
loaned
P10,000
without
interest
to
defendant
partnership
and
Elino
Lee
Chi
as
the
managing
partner.
The
loan
was
not
paid
when
it
became
due
and
asked
for
an
extension
of
3
months.
The
executed
another
loan
document
with
an
increase
of
P6,000
for
attorneys
fees,
legal
interest
and
other
cost
incident
thereto.
Defendants
failed
to
pay
again
on
april
30,
plaintiff
then
instituted
the
collection
case
and
admitted
the
obligation
but
claimed
that
the
additional
P6,000
constituted
usurious
interest.
The
trial
court
rendered
decision
ordering
defendants
to
pay
P10,000
plus
the
P6,000
by
way
of
liquidated
damages
with
legal
interest
from
April
30.
Defendant
argued
that
plaintiffs
usurious
interest
should
have
been
deemed
admitted
as
it
was
not
denied
specifically
and
under
oath.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
there
is
a
need
to
specifically
deny
with
the
non-existence
of
usurious
interest?
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
NO!
HELD:
Under
Article
1354
of
the
Civil
Code,
in
regards
to
the
agreement
of
the
parties
relative
to
the
P6,000.00
obligation,
"it
is
presumed
that
it
exists
and
is
lawful,
unless
the
debtor
proves
the
contrary".
No
evidentiary
hearing
having
been
held,
it
has
to
be
concluded
that
defendants
had
not
proven
that
the
P6,000.00
obligation
was
illegal.
Confirming
the
Trial
Court's
finding,
we
view
the
P6,000.00
obligation
as
liquidated
damages
suffered
by
plaintiff,
as
of
March
17,
1960,
representing
loss
of
interest
income,
attorney's
fees
and
incidentals.
Section
9
of
the
Usury
Law
(Act
2655)
provided:
SEC.
9.
The
person
or
corporation
sued
shall
file
its
answer
in
writing
under
oath
to
any
complaint
brought
or
filed
against
said
person
or
corporation
before
a
competent
court
to
recover
the
money
or
other
personal
or
real
property,
seeds
or
agricultural
products,
charged
or
received
in
violation
of
the
provisions
of
this
Act.
The
lack
of
taking
an
oath
to
an
answer
to
a
complaint
will
mean
the
admission
of
the
facts
contained
in
the
latter.
The
foregoing
provision
envisages
a
complaint
filed
against
an
entity
which
has
committed
usury,
for
the
recovery
of
the
usurious
interest
paid.
In
that
case,
if
the
entity
sued
shall
not
file
its
answer
under
oath
denying
the
allegation
of
usury,
the
defendant
shall
be
deemed
to
have
admitted
the
usury.
The
provision
does
not
apply
to
a
case,
as
in
the
present,
where
it
is
the
defendant,
not
the
plaintiff,
who
is
alleging
usury.
Moreover,
for
sometime
now,
usury
has
been
legally
non-existent.
Interest
can
now
be
charged
as
lender
and
borrower
may
agree
upon.
The
Rules
of
Court
in
regards
to
allegations
of
usury,
procedural
in
nature,
should
be
considered
repealed
with
retroactive
effect.
Statutes
regulating
the
procedure
of
the
courts
will
be
construed
as
applicable
to
actions
pending
and
undetermined
at
the
time
of
their
passage.
Procedural
laws
are
retrospective
in
that
sense
and
to
that
extent.
DE
ROY
V.
CA
FACTS:
The
firewall
of
a
burne-out
building
owned
by
petitioners
collapsed
and
destroyed
the
tailoring
shop
occupied
by
the
family
of
private
respondents
resulting
in
injuries
and
death
of
respondents
daughter.
RTC
judge
finds
petitioners
guilty
of
gross
negligence
and
awarding
damages
to
private
respondents.
CA
affirmed
its
decision
promulgated
on
August
17,
1987,
a
copy
of
which
was
received
by
petitioners
on
August
25,
1987.
On
September
9,
1987,
the
last
day
of
the
fifteen-day
period
to
file
an
appeal,
petitioners
filed
a
motion
for
extension
of
time
to
file
a
motion
for
reconsideration
which
was
denied
by
CA
in
the
resolution
of
September
30,
1987.
Petitioners
filed
their
motion
for
reconsideration
on
September
24,
1987
but
this
was
denied
in
the
resolution
of
October
27,
1987.
ISSUE:
Whether
CA
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion
when
it
denied
petitioners
motion
for
extension
of
time
to
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration?
NO!
HELD:
It
correctly
applied
the
rule
laid
down
in
Habaluyas
Enterprises,
Inc.
v.
Japzon,
[G.R.
No.
70895,
August
5,
1985,138
SCRA
461,
that
the
fifteen-day
period
for
appealing
or
for
filing
a
motion
for
reconsideration
cannot
be
extended.
In
its
Resolution
denying
the
motion
for
reconsideration,
promulgated
on
July
30,
1986
(142
SCRA
208),
this
Court
en
banc
restated
and
clarified
the
rule,
to
wit:
Beginning
one
month
after
the
promulgation
of
this
Resolution,
the
rule
shall
be
strictly
enforced
that
no
motion
for
extension
of
time
to
file
a
motion
for
reconsideration
may
be
filed
with
the
Metropolitan
or
Municipal
Trial
Courts,
the
Regional
Trial
Courts,
and
the
Intermediate
Appellate
Court.
Such
a
motion
may
be
filed
only
in
cases
pending
with
the
Supreme
Court
as
the
court
of
last
resort,
which
may
in
its
sound
discretion
either
grant
or
deny
the
extension
requested.
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
Bacaya
v.
Intermediate
Appellate
Court,
[G.R.
No.
74824,
Sept.
15,
1986,144
SCRA
161],stressed
the
prospective
application
of
said
rule,
and
explained
the
operation
of
the
grace
period,
to
wit:
In
other
words,
there
is
a
one-month
grace
period
from
the
promulgation
on
May
30,
1986
of
the
Court's
Resolution
in
the
clarificatory
Habaluyas
case,
or
up
to
June
30,
1986,
within
which
the
rule
barring
extensions
of
time
to
file
motions
for
new
trial
or
reconsideration
is,
as
yet,
not
strictly
enforceable.
Since
petitioners
herein
filed
their
motion
for
extension
on
February
27,
1986,
it
is
still
within
the
grace
period,
which
expired
on
June
30,
1986,
and
may
still
be
allowed.
In
the
instant
case,
however,
petitioners'
motion
for
extension
of
time
was
filed
on
September
9,
1987,
more
than
a
year
after
the
expiration
of
the
grace
period
on
June
30,
1986.
Hence,
it
is
no
longer
within
the
coverage
of
the
grace
period.
Considering
the
length
of
time
from
the
expiration
of
the
grace
period
to
the
promulgation
of
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
on
August
25,
1987,
petitioners
cannot
seek
refuge
in
the
ignorance
of
their
counsel
regarding
said
rule
for
their
failure
to
file
a
motion
for
reconsideration
within
the
reglementary
period.
Petitioners
contend
that
the
rule
enunciated
in
the
Habaluyas
case
should
not
be
made
to
apply
to
the
case
at
bar
owing
to
the
non-publication
of
the
Habaluyas
decision
in
the
Official
Gazette
as
of
the
time
the
subject
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
was
promulgated.
Contrary
to
petitioners'
view,
there
is
no
law
requiring
the
publication
of
Supreme
Court
decisions
in
the
Official
Gazette
before
they
can
be
binding
and
as
a
condition
to
their
becoming
effective.
It
is
the
bounden
duty
of
counsel
as
lawyer
in
active
law
practice
to
keep
abreast
of
decisions
of
the
Supreme
Court
particularly
where
issues
have
been
clarified,
consistently
reiterated,
and
published
in
the
advance
reports
of
Supreme
Court
decisions
(G.R.s)
and
in
such
publications as
the
Supreme
Court
Reports
Annotated
(SCRA)
and
law
journals.
QUIQUI
V.
BONCAROS
FACTS:
According
to
private
respondents,
they
owned
the
subject
lot
as
they
were
able
to
secure
a
free
patent
title.
On
the
other
hand,
petitioners
contend
that
said
lot
was
purchased
by
their
late
father
sometime
in
1920
and
that
ever
since,
they
have
been
in
actual
possession
thereof,
peacefully,
openly
continuously
and
adversely
for
a
period
of
56
years
already.
After
the
pre-trial
was
terminated,
private
respondents
filed
a
motion
to
dismiss
the
case
on
the
ground
of
lack
of
jurisdiction
on
the
part
of
the
trial
court.
Petitioners
opposed
on
the
motion
and
trial
court
dismissed
the
complaint
on
the
ground
that
it
had
no
jurisdiction
over
the
case.
Counsel
for
the
petitioners
received
a
copy
on
July
17,
1979.
On
august
17,
1979,
petitioners
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration
of
the
order
of
the
trial
court
dismissing
the
complaint.
Respondents
opposed
the
motion
for
reconsideration,
stating
that
the
same
had
been
filed
beyond
the
30
day
reglementary
period
under
the
Rules.
The
trial
court
denied
the
motion
for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
trial
court
erred
in
dismissing
the
motion
for
reconsideration?
NO!
HELD:
At
the
time
this
litigation
was
instituted
in
the
trial
court,
Section
3,
Rule
41
of
the
Rules
of
Court
was
the
provision
governing
the
period
within
which
an
Appeal
may
be
taken
to
the
Court
of
Appeals,
to
wit
SEC.
3.
How
appeal
is
taken.
Appeal
may
be
taken
by
serving
upon
the
adverse
party
and
filing
with
the
trial
court
within
thirty
(30)
days
from
notice
of
order
or
judgment,
a
notice
of
appeal,
an
appeal
bond,
and
a
record
on
appeal.
The
time
during
which
a
motion
to
set
aside
the
judgment
or
order
or
for
a
new
trial
has
been
pending
shall
be
deducted,
unless
such
motion
fails
to
satisfy
the
requirements
of
Rule
37.
But
where
such
a
motion
has
been
filed
during
office
hours
of
the
last
day
of
the
period
herein
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
provided,
the
appeal
must
be
perfected
within
the
day
following
that
in
which
the
party
appealing
received
notice
of
the
denial
of
said
motion.
The
petitioners
admit
that
they
received
their
copy
of
the
Order
of
dismissal
of
their
Complaint
on
July
17,
1979.
Under
Section
3,
Rule
41,
they
had
30
days
within
which
to
appeal
their
case
or
to
file
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration
of
the
judgment
or
order
of
the
trial
court.
In
computing
the
30-
day
period,
July
17,
1979
(the
first
day)
is
excluded,
pursuant
to
Article
13
of
the
New
Civil
Code.
Counting
30
days
thereafter,
beginning
on
July
18,
1979,
the
petitioners
had
up
to
August
16,
1979
to
file
their
Motion
for
Reconsideration.
Their
Motion
for
Reconsideration,
although
dated
August
16,
1979,
was
filed
with
the
trial
court
on
August
17,
1979
or
one
day
beyond
the
30-day
reglementary
period
prescribed
by
Section
3
of
Rule
41.
Under
these
circumstances,
the
order
of
the
trial
court
dismissing
the
Complaint
has
become
final
and
executory.
As
such,
it
is
beyond
the
reach
of
a
Motion
for
consideration.
The
Notice
of
Appeal,
therefore,
was
properly
denied.
Perfection
of
an
appeal
in
the
manner
and
within
the
period
laid
down
by
law
is
not
only
mandatory
but
also
jurisdictional
and
failure
to
perfect
an
appeal
as
required
by
the
rules
has
the
effect
of
rendering
the
judgment
final
and
executory.
A
strict
observance
of
the
reglementary
period
within
which
to
exercise
the
statutory
right
of
appeal
has
been
considered
as
absolutely
indispensable
to
the
prevention
of
needless
delays.
For
the
petitioners
to
seek
exception
for
their
failure
to
comply
strictly
with
the
requirements
for
perfecting
their
Appeal,
strong
compelling
reasons,
like
the
prevention
of
a
grave
miscarriage
of
justice,
must
be
shown
to
exist
in
order
to
warrant
this
Court
to
suspend
the
Rules.
No
such
reasons
have
been
shown
to
exist
in
this
case.
In
fact,
the
petitioners
did
not
even
offer
any
reasonable
explanation
for
their
delay.
PAULA
LLORENTE
V.
CA
&
ALICIA
LLORENTE
FACTS:
Deceased
Lorenzo
Llorente
was
an
enlisted
serviceman
of
the
US
and
was
married
to
Paula.
He
staued
in
the
US
and
was
given
citizenship.
When
he
came
back
to
the
Philippines,
he
discovered
that
his
wife
Paula
was
pregnant
and
was
living
in
and
having
an
adulterous
relationship
with
his
brother.
Paula
gave
birth
to
a
boy
and
registered
without
stating
the
name
of
the
father
and
as
not
legitimate.
He
did
not
forgive
Paula
and
they
executed
a
written
agreement
to
the
effect
that
Paula
will
not
have
any
right
over
Lorenzos
property
and
will
not
support
her
anymore.
Lorenzo
returned
to
the
US
and
filed
for
divorce
which
was
granted.
When
he
returned
to
the
Philippines,
he
married
Alicia
and
lived
together
as
husband
and
wife
for
25
years
and
had
3
children.
Lorenzo
then
executed
a
last
will
and
testament,
duly
executed
according
to
our
law.
During
the
proceeding
of
the
probate
of
his
will,
Lorenzo
dies.
Paula
filed
with
the
same
court
for
letters
of
administration
over
Lorenzos
estate
in
her
favor.
Alicia
filed
in
the
testate
proceeding
a
petition
for
the
issuance
of
letters
testamentary.
The
RTC
found
the
divorce
decree
to
be
void
and
inapplicable
in
the
Philippines,
and
his
marriage
with
Alicia
is
likewise
void.
This
being
so
the
petition
of
Alicia
F.
Llorente
for
the
issuance
of
letters
testamentary
is
denied.
Likewise,
she
is
not
entitled
to
receive
any
share
from
the
estate
even
if
the
will
especially
said
so
her
relationship
with
Lorenzo
having
gained
the
status
of
paramour
which
is
under
Art.
739
(1).
"On
the
other
hand,
the
court
finds
the
petition
of
Paula
Titular
Llorente,
meritorious,
and
so
declares
the
intrinsic
disposition
of
the
will
of
Lorenzo
Llorente
dated
March
13,
1981
as
void
and
declares
her
entitled
as
conjugal
partner
and
entitled
to
one-half
of
their
conjugal
properties,
and
as
primary
compulsory
heir,
Paula
T.
Llorente
is
also
entitled
to
one-third
of
the
estate
and
then
one-third
should
go
to
the
illegitimate
children,
Raul,
Luz
and
Beverly,
all
surname
(sic)
Llorente,
for
them
to
partition
in
equal
shares
and
also
entitled
to
the
remaining
free
portion
in
equal
shares.
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
CA
affirmed
RTCs
decision
except
that
it
declared
that
the
two
children
of
Lorenzo
with
Alica
are
not
his
children,
legitimate
or
otherwise
since
they
were
not
legally
adopted
by
him.
ISSUE:
Who
are
entitled
to
inherit
from
the
late
Lorenzo?
HELD:
The
fact
that
the
late
Lorenzo
N.
Llorente
became
an
American
citizen
long
before
and
at
the
time
of:
(1)
his
divorce
from
Paula;
(2)
marriage
to
Alicia;
(3)
execution
of
his
will;
and
(4)
death,
is
duly
established,
admitted
and
undisputed.
Thus,
as
a
rule,
issues
arising
from
these
incidents
are
necessarily
governed
by
foreign
law.
The
Civil
Code
clearly
provides:
"Art.
15.
Laws
relating
to
family
rights
and
duties,
or
to
the
status,
condition
and
legal
capacity
of
persons
are
binding
upon
citizens
of
the
Philippines,
even
though
living
abroad.
"Art.
16.
Real
property
as
well
as
personal
property
is
subject
to
the
law
of
the
country
where
it
is
situated.
"However,
intestate
and
testamentary
succession,
both
with
respect
to
the
order
of
succession
and
to
the
amount
of
successional
rights
and
to
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary
provisions,
shall
be
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
whatever
may
be
the
nature
of
the
property
and
regardless
of
the
country
wherein
said
property
may
be
found."
In
Van
Dorn
v.
Romillo,
Jr.
we
held
that
owing
to
the
nationality
principle
embodied
in
Article
15
of
the
Civil
Code,
only
Philippine
nationals
are
covered
by
the
policy
against
absolute
divorces,
the
same
being
considered
contrary
to
our
concept
of
public
policy
and
morality.
In
the
same
case,
the
Court
ruled
that
aliens
may
obtain
divorces
abroad,
provided
they
are
valid
according
to
their
national
law.
Citing
this
landmark
case,
the
Court
held
in
Quita
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
that
once
proven
that
respondent
was
no
longer
a
Filipino
citizen
when
he
obtained
the
divorce
from
petitioner,
the
ruling
in
Van
Dorn
would
become
applicable
and
petitioner
could
"very
well
lose
her
right
to
inherit"
from
him.
In
Pilapil
v.
Ibay-Somera,
we
recognized
the
divorce
obtained
by
the
respondent
in
his
country,
the
Federal
Republic
of
Germany.
There,
we
stated
that
divorce
and
its
legal
effects
may
be
recognized
in
the
Philippines
insofar
as
respondent
is
concerned
in
view
of
the
nationality
principle
in
our
civil
law
on
the
status
of
persons.
For
failing
to
apply
these
doctrines,
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
must
be
reversed.
We
hold
that
the
divorce
obtained
by
Lorenzo
H.
Llorente
from
his
first
wife
Paula
was
valid
and
recognized
in
this
jurisdiction
as
a
matter
of
comity.
Now,
the
effects
of
this
divorce
(as
to
the
succession
to
the
estate
of
the
decedent)
are
matters
best
left
to
the
determination
of
the
trial
court.
The
Civil
Code
provides:
"Art.
17.
The
forms
and
solemnities
of
contracts,
wills,
and
other
public
instruments
shall
be
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
country
in
which
they
are
executed.
"When
the
acts
referred
to
are
executed
before
the
diplomatic
or
consular
officials
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
in
a
foreign
country,
the
solemnities
established
by
Philippine
laws
shall
be
observed
in
their
execution."
The
clear
intent
of
Lorenzo
to
bequeath
his
property
to
his
second
wife
and
children
by
her
is
glaringly
shown
in
the
will
he
executed.
We
do
not
wish
to
frustrate
his
wishes,
since
he
was
a
foreigner,
not
covered
by
our
laws
on
"family
rights
and
duties,
status,
condition
and
legal
capacity."
Whether
the
will
is
intrinsically
valid
and
who
shall
inherit
from
Lorenzo
are
issues
best
proved
by
foreign
law
which
must
be
pleaded
and
proved.
Whether
the
will
was
executed
in
accordance
with
the
formalities
required
is
answered
by
referring
to
Philippine
law.
In
fact,
the
will
was
duly
probated.
As
a
guide
however,
the
trial
court
should
note
that
whatever
public
policy
or
good
customs
may
be
involved
in
our
system
of
legitimes,
Congress
did
not
intend
to
extend
the
same
to
the
ALYANNA R. CHANG
succession
of
foreign
nationals.
Congress
specifically
left
the
amount
of
successional
rights
to
the
decedent's
national
law.
TAVERA
V.
PHILIPPINE
TUBERCULOSIS
SOCIETY,
INC.
FACTS:
Plaintiff
is
a
doctor
of
Medicine
and
is
practicing.
She
is
a
member
of
the
Board
of
Directors
of
the
defendant
society
and
was
then
appointed
as
Executive
Secretary.
However,
she
was
alleging
that
she
was
removed
from
her
post
without
informing
her
of
the
lawful
cause
and
thereafter,
Romulo
was
appointed
as
her
replacement.
She
was
claiming
that
4
members
of
the
Board
were
not
members
of
the
Society
and
hence,
they
did
not
have
the
power
to
be
appointed
in
the
Board
and
to
vote.
She
filed
a
case
against
them,
claiming
that
they
violated
the
Human
Rights
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code.
Defendants
were
claiming
that
the
position
of
petitioner
is
held
at
the
pleasure
of
the
Board
and
hence,
she
may
be
removed
at
anytime.
ISSUE:
Can
petitioner
invoke
the
human
relations
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code?
HELD:
Petitioner
cannot
likewise
seek
relief
from
the
general
provisions
of
the
New
Civil
Code
on
Human
Relations
nor
from
the
fundamental
principles
of
the
New
Constitution
on
preservation
of
human
dignity.
While
these
provisions
present
some
basic
principles
that
are
to
be
observed
for
the
rightful
relationship
between
human
beings
and
the
stability
of
social
order,
these
are
merely
guides
for
human
conduct
in
the
absence
of
specific
legal
provisions
and
definite
contractual
stipulations.
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
Code
of
By-Laws
of
the
Society
contains
a
specific
provision
governing
the
term
of
office
of
petitioner.
The
same
necessarily
limits
her
rights
under
the
New
Civil
Code
and
the
New
Constitution
upon
acceptance
of
the
appointment.
Moreover,
the
act
of
the
Board
in
declaring
her
position
as
vacant
is
not
only
in
accordance
with
the
Code
of
By-Laws
of
the
Society
but
also
meets
the
exacting
standards
of
honesty
and
good
faith.
The
meeting
of
May
29,
1974,
at
which
petitioner
,petitioner's
position
was
declared
vacant,
was
caged
specifically
to
take
up
the
unfinished
business
of
the
Reorganizational
Meeting
of
the
Board
of
April
30,
1974.
Hence,
and
act
cannot
be
said
to
impart
a
dishonest
purpose
or
some
moral
obliquity
and
conscious
doing
to
wrong
but
rather
emanates
from
the
desire
of
the
Board
to
reorganize
itself.
CHATO
V.
FORTUNE
TOBACCO
CORPORATION
FACTS:
Petitioner
was
then
the
CIR
while
respondent
is
an
entity
engaged
in
the
manufacture
of
different
brands
of
cigarettes.
Legislature
enacted
RA
7654
which
considered
respondents
products
as
local
brands.
However,
two
days
before
it
took
effect,
petitioner
issued
RMC
reclassifying
its
products
as
locally
manufactured
cigarettes
bearing
a
foreign
brand
subject
to
higher
ad
valorem
tax.
In
effect,
the
RMC
subjected
the
cigarette
brands
to
the
RA
even
before
it
took
effect.
In
a
separate
case
(CIR
v.
CA),
RMC
37-93
was
held
to
be
not
valid
for
having
fallen
short
of
the
requirements
for
a
valid
admin
issuance.
Fortune
(the
cigarette
manufacturer)
filed
a
complaint
for
damages
against
Chato
in
her
private
capacity.
It
contended
that
Chato
violated
Art.
32
of
the
CC
by
depriving
it
of
its
property
without
due
process
of
the
law
and
in
violation
of
equal
protection.
To
this,
Chato
argued
that
she
issued
the
RMC
in
the
performance
of
her
official
functions
and
within
the
scope
of
her
authority
so
she
cant
be
liable.
She
filed
motion
to
dismiss.
Via
petition
for
certiorari,
the
denial
of
the
motion
to
dismiss
reached
the
SC.
In
its
June
19,
2007
decision
it
ordered
the
trial
court
to
proceed
with
the
case.
Chato
moved
for
the
reconsideration
of
that
decision.
ISSUE:
May
a
public
officer
be
validly
sued
in
his/her
private
capacity
for
acts
done
in
connection
with
the
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
discharge of the functions of his/her office?
HELD:
The general rules is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.
An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads
is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge
against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where
there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, that a public officer who directly or
indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said
public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which
has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another
receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation. There are cases in
which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the
mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is,
liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature
of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.
This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code
pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have
intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie
of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for
impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically
with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers
are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically,
the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and
specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of
wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the
performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied
in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that
bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure
ALYANNA R. CHANG
to
specifically
allege
the
same
will
not
amount
to
failure
to
state
a
cause
of
action.
The
courts
below
therefore
correctly
denied
the
motion
to
dismiss
on
the
ground
of
failure
to
state
a
cause
of
action,
since
it
is
enough
that
the
complaint
avers
a
violation
of
a
constitutional
right
of
the
plaintiff.
LLORENTE
V.
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Llorente,
then
municipal
mayor
of
Zamboanga
del
Norte
was
charged
with
violation
of
Sec.
3[e]
of
Republic
Act
No.
3019,
otherwise
known
as
the
Anti-Graft
and
Corrupt
Practices
Act.
According
to
the
information:
he
did
then
and
there,
wilfully,
unlawfully
and
criminally
with
evident
bad
faith
refuse
to
sign
and
approve
the
payrolls
and
vouchers
representing
the
payments
of
the
salaries
and
other
emoluments
of
Leticia
G.
Fuertes,
without
just
valid
cause
and
without
due
process
of
law,
thereby
causing
undue
injury
to
the
said
Leticia
G.
Fuertes.
While
admitting
some
delays
in
the
payment
of
the
complainants
claims,
petitioner
sought
to
prove
the
defense
of
good
faith
--
that
the
withholding
of
payment
was
due
to
her
failure
to
submit
the
required
money
and
property
clearance,
and
to
the
Sangguniang
Bayans
delayed
enactment
of
a
supplemental
budget
to
cover
the
claims.
He
adds
that
such
delays
did
not
result
in
undue
injury
to
complainant.
Respondent
Court
held
that
the
delay
or
withholding
of
complainants
salaries
and
emoluments
was
unreasonable
and
caused
complainant
undue
injury.
Being
then
the
sole
breadwinner
in
their
family,
the
withholding
of
her
salaries
caused
her
difficulties
in
meeting
her
familys
financial
obligations
like
paying
for
the
tuition
fees
of
her
four
children.
ISSUE:
Did
the
prosecution
failed
to
establish
the
elements
of
undue
injury
and
bad
faith?
YES!
HELD:
Petitioner
was
charged
with
violation
of
Sec.
3(e)
of
R.A
No.
3019,
which
states:
Sec.
3.
Corrupt
practices
of
public
officers.
In
addition
to
acts
or
omissions
of
public
officers
already
penalized
by
existing
law,
the
following
shall
constitute
corrupt
practices
of
any
public
officer
and
are
hereby
declared
to
be
unlawful:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
(e)
Causing
any
undue
injury
to
any
party,
including
the
Government,
or
giving
any
private
party
any
unwarranted
benefits,
advantage
or
preference
in
the
discharge
of
his
official,
administrative
or
judicial
functions
through
manifest
partiality,
evident
bad
faith
or
gross
inexcusable
negligence.
This
provision
shall
apply
to
officers
and
employees
of
offices
or
government
corporations
charged
with
the
grant
of
licenses
or
permits
or
other
concessions.
To
hold
a
person
liable
under
this
section,
the
concurrence
of
the
following
elements
must
be
established
beyond
reasonable
doubt
by
the
prosecution:
(1)
that
the
accused
is
a
public
officer
or
a
private
person
charged
in
conspiracy
with
the
former;
(2)
that
said
public
officer
commits
the
prohibited
acts
during
the
performance
of
his
or
her
official
duties
or
in
relation
to
his
or
her
public
positions;
(3)
that
he
or
she
causes
undue
injury
to
any
party,
whether
the
government
or
a
private
party;
and
(4)
that
the
public
officer
has
acted
with
manifest
partiality,
evident
bad
faith
or
gross
inexcusable
negligence.
Undue
injury
in
this
case
requires
proof
of
actual
injury
or
damage.
Unlike
in
actions
for
torts,
undue
injury
cannot
be
presumed
even
after
a
wrong
or
a
violation
of
aright
has
been
established.
Its
existence
must
be
proven
as
one
of
the
elements
of
the
crime.
It
is
required
that
the
undue
injury
be
specified,
quantified
and
proven
to
the
point
of
moral
certainty.
Undue
injury
is
consistently
interpreted
as
actual
damage.
Undue
has
been
defined
as
more
than
necessary,
not
proper,
or
illegal;
and
injury
as
any
wrong
or
damage
done
to
another,
either
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
in
his
person,
rights,
reputation
or
property.
Actual
damage,
in
the
context
of
these
definitions,
is
akin
to
that
in
civil
law.
Complainant's
testimony
regarding
her
family's
financial
stress
was
inadequate
and
largely
speculative.
Without
giving
specific
details,
she
made
only
vague
references
to
the
fact
that
her
four
children
were
all
going
to
school
and
that
she
was
the
breadwinner
in
the
family.
She,
however,
did
not
say
that
she
was
unable
to
pay
their
tuition
fees
and
the
specific
damage
brought
by
such
nonpayment.
The
fact
that
the
"injury"
to
her
family
was
unspecified
or
unquantified
does
not
satisfy
the
element
of
undue
injury,
as
akin
to
actual
damages.
As
in
civil
cases,
actual
damages,
if
not
supported
by
evidence
on
record,
cannot
be
considered.
Respondent
Court
cannot
shift
the
blame
on
the
petitioner,
when
it
was
the
complainant
who
failed
to
submit
the
required
clearance.
This
requirement,
which
the
complainant
disregarded,
was
even
printed
at
the
back
of
the
very
vouchers
sought
to
be
approved.
For
her
own
failure
to
submit
the
required
clearance,
complainant
is
not
entirely
blameless
for
the
delay
in
the
approval
of
her
claims.
Bad
faith
does
not
simply
connote
bad
judgment
or
negligence;
it
imputes
a
dishonest
purpose
or
some
moral
obliquity
and
conscious
doing
of
a
wrong;
a
breach
of
sworn
duty
through
some
motive
or
intent
or
ill
will;
it
partakes
of
the
nature
of
fraud.
It
contemplates
a
state
of
mind
affirmatively
operating
with
furtive
design
or
some
motive
of
self
interest
or
ill
will
for
ulterior
purposes.
Evident
bad
faith
connotes
a
manifest
deliberate
intent
on
the
part
of
the
accused
to
do
wrong
or
cause
damage.
BUNAG
V.
CA
&
CIRILO
FACTS:
Conrado
Bunag,
Jr.
brought
Zenaida
Cirilo
to
a
motel
where
they
had
sexual
intercourse.
Later
that
evening,
said
Bunag
brought
Cirilo
to
the
house
of
his
grandmother
in
Las
Pias,
Metro
Manila,
where
they
lived
together
as
husband
and
wife
for
21
days.
Soon,
Bunag
and
Cirilo
filed
their
respective
applications
for
a
marriage
license
with
the
Office
of
the
Local
Civil
Registrar
of
Bacoor,
Cavite.
However,
Bunag
left
Cirilo
and
soon
filed
an
affidavit
withdrawing
his
application
for
a
marriage
license.
Cirilo
claims
that
she
was
abducted
and
raped.
One
of
the
cases
she
filed
was
a
suit
for
damages
based
on
a
breach
of
a
promise
to
marry.
The
trial
court
decided
in
her
favor.
This
was
affirmed
by
the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether
defendant
can
file
an
action
for
breach
of
promise
to
marry?
YES!
HELD:
It
is
true
that
in
this
jurisdiction,
we
adhere
to
the
time-honored
rule
that
an
action
for
breach
of
promise
to
marry
has
no
standing
in
the
civil
law,
apart
from
the
right
to
recover
money
or
property
advanced
by
the
plaintiff
upon
the
faith
of
such
promise.
Generally,
therefore,
a
breach
of
promise
to
marry
per
se
is
not
actionable,
except
where
the
plaintiff
has
actually
incurred
expenses
for
the
wedding
and
the
necessary
incidents
thereof.
However,
the
award
of
moral
damages
is
allowed
in
cases
specified
in
or
analogous
to
those
provided
in
Article
2219
of
the
Civil
Code.
Correlatively,
under
Article
21
of
said
Code,
in
relation
to
paragraph
10
of
said
Article
2219,
any
person
who
wilfully
causes
loss
or
injury
to
another
in
a
manner
that
is
contrary
to
morals,
good
customs
or
public
policy
shall
compensate
the
latter
for
moral
damages.
Article
21
was
adopted
to
remedy
the
countless
gaps
in
the
statutes
which
leave
so
many
victims
of
moral
wrongs
helpless
even
though
they
have
actually
suffered
material
and
moral
injury,
and
is
intended
to
vouchsafe
adequate
legal
remedy
for
that
untold
number
of
moral
wrongs
which
is
impossible
for
human
foresight
to
specifically
provide
for
in
the
statutes.
Under
the
circumstances
obtaining
in
the
case
at
bar,
the
acts
of
petitioner
in
forcibly
abducting
private
respondent
and
having
carnal
knowledge
with
her
against
her
will,
and
thereafter
promising
to
marry
her
in
order
to
escape
criminal
liability,
only
to
thereafter
renege
on
such
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
promise
after
cohabiting
with
her
for
twenty-one
days,
irremissibly
constitute
acts
contrary
to
morals
and
good
customs.
These
are
grossly
insensate
and
reprehensible
transgressions
which
indisputably
warrant
and
abundantly
justify
the
award
of
moral
and
exemplary
damages,
pursuant
to
Article
21
in
relation
to
paragraphs
3
and
10,
Article
2219,
and
Article
2229
and
2234
of
Civil
Code.
Generally,
the
basis
of
civil
liability
from
crime
is
the
fundamental
postulate
of
our
law
that
every
person
criminally
liable
for
a
felony
is
also
civilly
liable.
In
other
words,
criminal
liability
will
give
rise
to
civil
liability
ex
delicto
only
if
the
same
felonious
act
or
omission
results
in
damage
or
injury
to
another
and
is
the
direct
and
proximate
cause
thereof.
Hence,
extinction
of
the
penal
action
does
not
carry
with
it
the
extinction
of
civil
liability
unless
the
extinction
proceeds
from
a
declaration
in
a
final
judgment
that
the
fact
from
which
the
civil
might
arise
did
not
exist.
In
the
instant
case,
the
dismissal
of
the
complaint
for
forcible
abduction
with
rape
was
by
mere
resolution
of
the
fiscal
at
the
preliminary
investigation
stage.
There
is
no
declaration
in
a
final
judgment
that
the
fact
from
which
the
civil
case
might
arise
did
not
exist.
Consequently,
the
dismissal
did
not
in
any
way
affect
the
right
of
herein
private
respondent
to
institute
a
civil
action
arising
from
the
offense
because
such
preliminary
dismissal
of
the
penal
action
did
not
carry
with
it
the
extinction
of
the
civil
action.
BAKSH
V.
CA
&
GONZALES
FACTS:
Baksh
(29
years
old),
an
Iranian
citizen,
courted
respondent
Gonzales
(21
years
old,
highschool
graduate,
barrio
lass
and
a
waitress).
She
accepted
his
love
on
the
condition
that
they
will
get
married,
so
he
promised
her
that
he
will
marry
her.
Gonzales
parents
made
preparations
by
looking
for
pigs
and
chickens,
inviting
friends
and
relatives
and
contracting
sponsors.
Without
getting
married,
Baksh
and
Gonzales
lived
together.
Gonzales
cherry
got
popped.
Thereafter,
Baksh
began
maltreating
Gonzales
and
eventually
told
her
that
he
no
longer
wanted
to
marry
her
and
that
he
was
already
married
to
another
woman.
Gonzales
filed
a
complaint
for
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Gozanles
can
claim
damages?
YES!
HELD:
The
existing
rule
is
that
a
breach
of
promise
to
marry
per
se
is
not
an
actionable
wrong.
This
notwithstanding,
the
said
Code
contains
a
provision,
Article
21,
which
is
designed
to
expand
the
concept
of
torts
or
quasi-delict
in
this
jurisdiction
by
granting
adequate
legal
remedy
for
the
untold
number
of
moral
wrongs
which
is
impossible
for
human
foresight
to
specifically
enumerate
and
punish
in
the
statute
books.
Article
2176
of
the
Civil
Code,
which
defines
a
quasi-delict
thus:
Whoever
by
act
or
omission
causes
damage
to
another,
there
being
fault
or
negligence,
is
obliged
to
pay
for
the
damage
done.
Such
fault
or
negligence,
if
there
is
no
pre-existing
contractual
relation
between
the
parties,
is
called
a
quasi-delict
and
is
governed
by
the
provisions
of
this
Chapter
is
limited
to
negligent
acts
or
omissions
and
excludes
the
notion
of
willfulness
or
intent.
In
the
light
of
the
above
laudable
purpose
of
Article
21,
We
are
of
the
opinion,
and
so
hold,
that
where
a
man's
promise
to
marry
is
in
fact
the
proximate
cause
of
the
acceptance
of
his
love
by
a
woman
and
his
representation
to
fulfill
that
promise
thereafter
becomes
the
proximate
cause
of
the
giving
of
herself
unto
him
in
a
sexual
congress,
proof
that
he
had,
in
reality,
no
intention
of
marrying
her
and
that
the
promise
was
only
a
subtle
scheme
or
deceptive
device
to
entice
or
inveigle
her
to
accept
him
and
to
obtain
her
consent
to
the
sexual
act,
could
justify
the
award
of
damages
pursuant
to
Article
21
not
because
of
such
promise
to
marry
but
because
of
the
fraud
and
deceit
behind
it
and
the
willful
injury
to
her
honor
and
reputation
which
followed
thereafter.
It
is
essential,
however,
that
such
injury
should
have
been
committed
in
a
manner
contrary
to
morals,
good
customs
or
public
policy.
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
In
the
instant
case,
respondent
Court
found
that
it
was
the
petitioner's
"fraudulent
and
deceptive
protestations
of
love
for
and
promise
to
marry
plaintiff
that
made
her
surrender
her
virtue
and
womanhood
to
him
and
to
live
with
him
on
the
honest
and
sincere
belief
that
he
would
keep
said
promise,
and
it
was
likewise
these
fraud
and
deception
on
appellant's
part
that
made
plaintiff's
parents
agree
to
their
daughter's
living-in
with
him
preparatory
to
their
supposed
marriage."
Petitioners
contended
that
respondent
is
also
at
fault
as
she
is
also
interested
in
the
petitioner
as
the
latter
will
become
a
doctor
sooner
or
later.
Take
notice
that
she
is
a
plain
high
school
graduate
and
a
mere
employee
.
.
.
or
a
waitress
in
a
luncheonette
and
without
doubt,
is
in
need
of
a
man
who
can
give
her
economic
security.
Her
family
is
in
dire
need
of
financial
assistance.
And
this
predicament
prompted
her
to
accept
a
proposition
that
may
have
been
offered
by
the
petitioner.
The
statements
reveal
the
true
character
and
motive
of
the
petitioner.
from
the
very
beginning,
he
was
not
at
all
moved
by
good
faith
and
an
honest
motive.
Marrying
with
a
woman
so
circumstances
could
not
have
even
remotely
occurred
to
him.
Thus,
his
profession
of
love
and
promise
to
marry
were
empty
words
directly
intended
to
fool,
dupe,
entice,
beguile
and
deceive
the
poor
woman
into
believing
that
indeed,
he
loved
her
and
would
want
her
to
be
his
life's
partner.
His
was
nothing
but
pure
lust
which
he
wanted
satisfied
by
a
Filipina
who
honestly
believed
that
by
accepting
his
proffer
of
love
and
proposal
of
marriage,
she
would
be
able
to
enjoy
a
life
of
ease
and
security.
Petitioner
clearly
violated
the
Filipino's
concept
of
morality
and
brazenly
defied
the
traditional
respect
Filipinos
have
for
their
women.
It
can
even
be
said
that
the
petitioner
committed
such
deplorable
acts
in
blatant
disregard
of
Article
19
of
the
Civil
Code
which
directs
every
person
to
act
with
justice,
give
everyone
his
due
and
observe
honesty
and
good
faith
in
the
exercise
of
his
rights
and
in
the
performance
of
his
obligations.
GARCIA
V.
PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES
FACTS:
Petitioners
Juanito
Garcia
and
Alberto
Dumago
are
employees
of
PAL
who
have
been
dismissed
after
being
caught
in
the
act
of
sniffing
shabu
in
the
tool
room.
Garcia
et
al
filed
an
illegal
dismissal
case
against
PAL
before
the
Labor
Arbiter
(LA).
The
LA
ruled
in
favor
of
Garcia
et
al
and
ordered
PAL
to
immediately
reinstate
petitioners.
On
appeal
to
the
NLRC
by
PAL,
the
decision
of
the
LA
was
reversed.
Meanwhile,
the
LA
issued
a
Notice
of
Garnishment
the
Writ
of
Execution
for
the
reinstatement
aspect
of
its
decision.
When
PAL
tried
to
enjoin
the
reinstatement
and
garnishment,
NLRC
affirmed
such
Notice
and
Writ
but
suspended
and
referred
the
action
to
the
Rehabilitation
Receiver
of
PAL
which
at
that
time
was
undergoing
rehabilitation
receivership.
However,
when
PAL
manifested
that
SEC
had
approved
its
exit
from
the
rehabilitation,
SC
resolved
to
entertain
the
issue
of
whether
PAL
should
pay
back
wages
to
the
Garcia
et
al
from
the
time
the
LA
ordered
their
reinstatement
up
to
the
time
the
NLRC
reversed
the
findings
of
the
LA..
ISSUE:
Whether
petitioners
may
collect
their
wages
during
the
period
between
the
Labor
Arbiters
order
of
reinstatement
pending
appeal
and
the
NLRC
decision
overturning
that
of
the
Labor
Arbiter,
now
that
PAL
has
exited
from
rehabilitation
proceedings.
HELD:
Paragraph
3
of
Article
223
of
the
Labor
Code
reads:
In
any
event,
the
decision
of
the
Labor
Arbiter
reinstating
a
dismissed
or
separated
employee,
insofar
as
the
reinstatement
aspect
is
concerned,
shall
immediately
be
executory,
pending
appeal.
The
employee
shall
either
be
admitted
back
to
work
under
the
same
terms
and
conditions
prevailing
prior
to
his
dismissal
or
separation
or,
at
the
option
of
the
employer,
merely
reinstated
in
the
payroll.
The
posting
of
a
bond
by
the
employer
shall
not
stay
the
execution
for
reinstatement
provided
herein.
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
It
was
held
in
a
number
of
cases
that
when
the
order
of
reinstatement
of
the
Labor
Arbiter
is
reversed
on
appeal,
it
is
obligatory
on
the
part
of
the
employer
to
reinstate
and
pay
the
wages
of
the
dismissed
employee
during
the
period
of
appeal
until
reversal
by
the
higher
court.
If
the
employee
has
been
reinstated
during
the
appeal
period
and
such
reinstatement
order
is
reversed
with
finality,
the
employee
is
not
required
to
reimburse
whatever
salary
he
received
for
he
is
entitled
to
such,
more
so
if
he
actually
rendered
services
during
the
period.
Hence,
it
immaterial
whether
an
employee
is
actually
reinstated
or
on
payroll
reinstatement,
he/she
would
still
be
entitled
for
wages
during
the
pendency
period.
However
in
the
case
of
Genuino
the
opposite
view
was
articulated.
In
this
case,
it
was
held
that
when
LAs
decision
is
later
reversed
on
appeal
upon
finding
that
the
ground
for
dismissal
is
valid,
then
the
employer
has
the
right
to
require
the
dismissed
employee
on
payroll
reinstatement
to
refund
the
salaries
s/he
received
while
the
case
was
pending
appeal,
or
it
can
be
deducted
from
the
accrued
benefits
that
the
dismissed
employee
was
entitled
to
receive
from
his/her
employer
under
existing
laws,
collective
bargaining
agreement
provisions,
and
company
practices.
However,
if
the
employee
was
reinstated
to
work
during
the
pendency
of
the
appeal,
then
the
employee
is
entitled
to
the
compensation
received
for
actual
services
rendered
without
need
of
refund.
SC
does
not
agree
with
the
ruling
in
the
Genuino
case
on
the
ff
reasons:
o refund
doctrine
easily
demonstrates
how
a
favorable
decision
by
the
Labor
Arbiter
could
harm,
more
than
help,
a
dismissed
employee.
The
employee,
to
make
both
ends
meet,
would
necessarily
have
to
use
up
the
salaries
received
during
the
pendency
of
the
appeal,
only
to
end
up
having
to
refund
the
sum
in
case
of
a
final
unfavorable
decision.
It
is
mirage
of
a
stop-gap
leading
the
employee
to
a
risky
cliff
of
insolvency.
o Not
only
does
it
disregard
the
social
justice
principles
behind
the
rule,
but
also
institutes
a
scheme
unduly
favorable
to
management.
Under
such
scheme,
the
salaries
dispensed
pendente
lite
merely
serve
as
a
bond
posted
in
installment
by
the
employer.
For
in
the
event
of
a
reversal
of
the
Labor
Arbiters
decision
ordering
reinstatement,
the
employer
gets
back
the
same
amount
without
having
to
spend
ordinarily
for
bond
premiums.
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter
is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. However this rule is
not without exception, the employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages when:
o there
is
actual
delay
or
the
fact
that
the
order
of
reinstatement
pending
appeal
was
not
executed
prior
to
its
reversal;
and
o delay
must
not
be
due
to
the
employers
unjustified
act
or
omission.
In
the
case
at
bar,
petitioners
exerted
to
execute
the
Labor
Arbiters
order
of
reinstatement
until
they
were
able
to
secure
a
writ
of
execution,
albeit
issued
on
October
5,
2000
after
the
reversal
by
the
NLRC
of
the
Labor
Arbiters
decision.
Technically,
there
was
still
actual
delay
which
brings
to
the
question
of
whether
the
delay
was
due
to
respondent.
It
is
apparent
that
there
was
inaction
on
the
part
of
respondent
to
reinstate
them,
but
whether
such
omission
was
justified
depends
on
the
onset
of
the
exigency
of
corporate
rehabilitation.
Respondents
failure
to
exercise
the
alternative
options
of
actual
reinstatement
and
payroll
reinstatement
was
justified.
While
reinstatement
pending
appeal
aims
to
avert
the
continuing
threat
or
danger
to
the
survival
or
even
the
life
of
the
dismissed
employee
and
his
family,
it
does
not
contemplate
the
period
when
the
employer-corporation
itself
is
similarly
in
a
judicially
monitored
state
of
being
resuscitated
in
order
to
survive.
PAL,
during
the
period
material
to
the
case,
was
effectively
deprived
of
the
alternative
choices
under
Article
223
of
the
Labor
Code,
not
only
by
virtue
of
the
statutory
injunction
but
also
in
view
ALYANNA R. CHANG
of
the
interim
relinquishment
of
management
control
to
give
way
to
the
full
exercise
of
the
powers
of
the
rehabilitation
receiver.
Had
there
been
no
need
to
rehabilitate,
respondent
may
have
opted
for
actual
physical
reinstatement
pending
appeal
to
optimize
the
utilization
of
resources.
Then
again,
though
the
management
may
think
this
wise,
the
rehabilitation
receiver
may
decide
otherwise,
not
to
mention
the
subsistence
of
the
injunction
on
claims.
In
sum,
the
obligation
to
pay
the
employees
salaries
upon
the
employers
failure
to
exercise
the
alternative
options
under
Article
223
of
the
Labor
Code
is
not
a
hard
and
fast
rule,
considering
the
inherent
constraints
of
corporate
rehabilitation.
Separate
opinion:
Clearly,
the
principle
of
unjust
enrichment
does
not
apply.
First,
the
provision
on
reinstatement
pending
appeal
is
in
accord
with
the
social
justice
philosophy
of
our
Constitution.
It
is
meant
to
afford
full
protection
to
labor
as
it
aims
to
stop
(albeit
temporarily,
since
the
appeal
may
be
decided
in
favor
of
employer)
a
continuing
threat
or
danger
to
the
survival
or
even
the
life
of
the
dismissed
employee
and
his
family.
Second,
the
provision
on
reinstatement
pending
appeal
paratakes
of
a
special
law
that
must
govern
the
instant
case.
The
provision
of
the
Civil
Code
on
unjust
enrichment,
being
of
general
application,
must
give
way.
In
any
case,
Justice
Velasco
points
out
that
the
writ
of
execution
in
the
instant
case
was
issued
after
the
promulgation
of
the
NLRC
resolution.
As
petitioner
failed
to
act
on
their
rights
and
seek
enforcement
of
the
reinstatement
pending
appeal,
PAL
is
not
liable
to
pay
their
accrued
salaries
for
the
period
in
question.
ABERCA
V.
VER
FACTS:
Sometime
in
the
early
1980s,
various
Intelligence
units
of
the
AFP
known
as
Task
Force
Makabansa
(TFM)
were
ordered
by
respondents
then
Maj.
Gen.
Fabian
Ver
to
conduct
pre-emptive
strikes
against
known
communist-terrorist
(CT)
underground
houses
in
view
of
increasing
reports
about
CT
plans
to
sow
disturbances
in
Metro
Manila.
In
compliance
thereof,
the
TFM
raided
several
places,
employing
in
most
cases
defectively
issued
judicial
search
warrants.
During
these
raids,
certain
members
of
the
raiding
TFM
confiscated
a
number
of
purely
personal
items
belonging
to
the
20
petitioners.
Petitioners
were
arrested
without
proper
arrest
warrants
issued
by
the
courts.
For
some
period
after
their
arrest,
they
were
arrested
without
denied
visits
of
relatives
and
lawyers;
interrogated
in
violation
of
their
rights
to
silence
and
counsel,
through
threats,
torture
and
other
forms
of
violence
in
order
to
obtain
incriminatory
information
or
confessions
and
in
order
to
punish
them.
Plaintiffs
then
filed
an
action
for
damages
before
the
RTC
of
Quezon
City
against
respondents-
officers
of
the
AFP
headed
by
Ver.
Respondents,
in
their
motion
to
dismiss,
claimed
that
(1)
the
wrti
of
habeas
corpus
was
suspended,
thus
giving
credence
to
petitioners
detention;
(2)
respondents
were
immune
from
liability
for
acts
done
in
the
performance
of
their
official
duties,
and
that
(3)
the
complaint
did
not
state
a
cause
of
action
against
respondents.
On
November
8,
1983,
the
RTC
granted
the
motion
to
dismiss
the
case.
A
motion
to
set
aside
the
order
dismissing
the
complaint,
and
a
supplemental
motion
for
reconsideration
were
filed
by
petitioners.
On
May
11,
1984,
the
trial
court,
without
acting
on
the
motion
to
set
aside
the
Order
of
Nov.
8,
1983,
declared
the
finality
of
said
Order
against
petitioners.
After
their
motion
for
reconsideration
was
denied
by
the
RTC,
petitioners
then
filed
the
instant
petition
for
certiorari,
on
March
15,
1985,
seeking
to
annul
and
set
aside
the
respondent
courts
resolutions
and
order.
ISSUES:
1. Whether
or
not
the
suspension
of
the
privilege
of
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus
bars
a
civil
action
for
damages
for
illegal
searches
conducted
by
military
personnel
and
other
violations
of
rights
and
liberties
guaranteed
under
the
Constitution;
2. Whether
or
not
respondents
may
invoke
state
immunity
from
suit
for
acts
done
in
the
performance
of
official
duties
and
functions;
3. Whether
or
not
a
superior
officer,
under
the
notion
of
respondeat
superior,
be
answerable
for
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
damages
jointly
and
severally
with
his
subordinates,
to
the
person
whose
constitutional
rights
and
liberties
have
been
violated.
HELD:
(1)
The
suspension
of
the
privilege
of
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus
(PWHC)
does
not
destroy
petitioners
right
and
cause
of
action
for
damages
for
illegal
arrest
and
detention
and
other
violations
of
their
constitutional
rights.
The
suspension
does
not
render
valid
an
otherwise
illegal
arrest
or
detention.
What
is
suspended
is
merely
the
right
of
the
individual
to
seek
release
from
detention
through
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus
as
a
speedy
means
of
obtaining
his
liberty.
Moreover,
as
pointed
out
by
petitioners,
their
right
and
cause
of
action
for
damages
are
explicitly
recognized
in
PD
1755
which
amended
Art.
1146
of
the
Civil
Code
by
adding
the
following
text:
However,
when
the
action
(for
injury
to
the
rights
of
the
plaintiff
or
for
quasi-delict)
arises
from
or
out
of
any
act,
activity
or
conduct
of
any
public
officer
involving
the
exercise
of
powers
or
authority
arising
from
martial
law
including
the
arrest,
detention
and/or
trial
of
the
plaintiff,
the
same
must
be
brought
within
one
year.
Even
assuming
that
the
suspension
of
the
PWHC
suspends
petitioners
right
of
action
for
damages
for
illegal
arrest
and
detention,
it
does
not
and
cannot
suspend
their
rights
and
causes
of
action
for
injuries
suffered
because
of
respondents
confiscation
of
their
private
belongings,
the
violation
of
their
right
to
remain
silent
and
to
counsel
and
their
right
to
protection
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
and
against
torture
and
other
cruel
and
inhuman
treatment.
The
question
became
moot
and
academic
since
the
suspension
of
the
PWHC
had
been
lifted
with
the
issuance
of
then
Pres.
Corazon
Aquino
of
Proclamation
No.
2
on
March
25,
1986.
(2)
It
may
be
that
the
respondents,
as
members
of
the
AFP,
were
merely
responding
to
their
duties,
as
they
claim,
to
prevent
or
suppress
lawless
violence,
insurrection,
rebellion
and
subversion
in
accordance
with
Proclamation
No.
2054
of
Pres.
Marcos,
despite
the
lifting
of
Martial
Law
on
January
27,
1981,
and
in
pursuance
of
such
objective,
to
launch
pre-emptive
strikes
against
alleged
CT
underground
houses.
But
this
cannot
be
construed
as
a
blanket
license
or
roving
commission
untrammeled
by
any
constitutional
restraint,
to
disregard
or
transgress
upon
the
rights
and
liberties
of
the
individual
citizen
enshrined
and
protected
by
the
Constitution.
Article
32
of
the
Civil
Code,
which
renders
any
public
officer
or
employees,
or
any
private
individual,
liable
in
damages
for
violating
the
constitutional
rights
and
liberties
of
another,
does
not
exempt
the
respondents
from
responsibility.
Only
judges
are
excluded
from
liability
under
the
said
article,
provided
their
acts
or
omissions
do
not
constitute
a
violation
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code
or
other
penal
statute.
This
is
not
say
that
military
authorities
are
restrained
from
pursuing
their
assigned
task
or
carrying
out
their
mission
with
vigor,
to
protect
the
Philippines
from
its
enemies,
whether
of
the
left
or
of
the
right,
or
from
within
or
without,
seeking
to
destroy
or
subvert
our
democratic
institutions
and
imperil
their
very
existence.
What
is
meant
is
that
in
carrying
out
their
task
and
mission,
constitutional
and
legal
safeguards
must
be
observed;
otherwise,
the
very
fabric
of
our
faith
will
start
to
unravel.
In
the
battle
of
competing
ideologies,
the
struggle
of
mind
is
just
as
vital
as
the
struggle
of
arms.
The
linchpin
in
that
psychological
struggle
is
faith
in
the
rule
of
law.
Once
that
faith
is
lost
or
compromised,
the
struggle
may
well
be
abandoned.
(3)
The
doctrine
of
respondeat
superior
is
not
applicable
in
this
case.
It
has
been
generally
limited
in
its
application
to
principal
and
agent
or
to
master
and
servant
relationships.
No
such
relationship
exists
superiors
of
the
military
and
their
subordinates.
However,
the
decisive
factor
in
this
case
is
the
language
of
Art.
32,
Civil
Code;
the
law
speaks
of
an
officer
or
employee
or
person
directly
or
indirectly
responsible
for
the
violation
of
the
constitutional
rights
and
liberties
of
another.
Thus,
it
is
not
the
actor
alone
who
must
answer
for
damages
under
Art.
32;
the
person
indirectly
responsible
has
also
to
answer
for
the
damages
or
injury
caused
to
the
aggrieved
party.
Art.
32
makes
the
persons
who
are
directly
as
well
as
indirectly
responsible
for
the
transgression
joint
tortfeasors.
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
In
any
of
the
cases
referred
to
in
this
article,
whether
or
not
the
defendant's
act
or
omission
constitutes
a
criminal
offense,
the
against
grieved
party
has
a
right
to
commence
an
entirely
separate
and
distinct
civil
action
for
damages,
and
for
other
relief.
Such
civil
action
shall
proceed
independently
of
any
criminal
prosecution
(if
the
latter
be
instituted),
and
may
be
proved
by
a
preponderance
of
evidence.
It
is
obvious
that
the
purpose
of
the
above
codal
provision
is
to
provide
a
sanction
to
the
deeply
cherished
rights
and
freedoms
enshrined
in
the
Constitution.
Its
message
is
clear;
no
man
may
seek
to
violate
those
sacred
rights
with
impunity.
In
times
of
great
upheaval
or
of
social
and
political
stress,
when
the
temptation
is
strongest
to
yield
borrowing
the
words
of
Chief
Justice
Claudio
Teehankee
to
the
law
of
force
rather
than
the
force
of
law,
it
is
necessary
to
remind
ourselves
that
certain
basic
rights
and
liberties
are
immutable
and
cannot
be
sacrificed
to
the
transient
needs
or
imperious
demands
of
the
ruling
power.
The
rule
of
law
must
prevail,
or
else
liberty
will
perish.
Our
commitment
to
democratic
principles
and
to
the
rule
of
law
compels
us
to
reject
the
view
which
reduces
law
to
nothing
but
the
expression
of
the
will
of
the
predominant
power
in
the
community.
"Democracy
cannot
be
a
reign
of
progress,
of
liberty,
of
justice,
unless
the
law
is
respected
by
him
who
makes
it
and
by
him
for
whom
it
is
made.
Now
this
respect
implies
a
maximum
of
faith,
a
minimum
of
Idealism.
On
going
to
the
bottom
of
the
matter,
we
discover
that
life
demands
of
us
a
certain
residuum
of
sentiment
which
is
not
derived
from
reason,
but
which
reason
nevertheless
controls.
Article
32
of
the
Civil
Code
which
renders
any
public
officer
or
employee
or
any
private
individual
liable
in
damages
for
violating
the
Constitutional
rights
and
liberties
of
another,
as
enumerated
therein,
does
not
exempt
the
respondents
from
responsibility.
Only
judges
are
excluded
from
liability
under
the
said
article,
provided
their
acts
or
omissions
do
not
constitute
a
violation
of
the
Penal
Code
or
other
penal
statute.
This
is
not
to
say
that
military
authorities
are
restrained
from
pursuing
their
assigned
task
or
carrying
out
their
mission
with
vigor.
We
have
no
quarrel
with
their
duty
to
protect
the
Republic
from
its
enemies,
whether
of
the
left
or
of
the
right,
or
from
within
or
without,
seeking
to
destroy
or
subvert
our
democratic
institutions
and
imperil
their
very
existence.
What
we
are
merely
trying
to
say
is
that
in
carrying
out
this
task
and
mission,
constitutional
and
legal
safeguards
must
be
observed,
otherwise,
the
very
fabric
of
our
faith
will
start
to
unravel.
In
the
battle
of
competing
Ideologies,
the
struggle
for
the
mind
is
just
as
vital
as
the
struggle
of
arms.
The
linchpin
in
that
psychological
struggle
is
faith
in
the
rule
of
law.
Once
that
faith
is
lost
or
compromised,
the
struggle
may
well
be
abandoned.
Respondents
contend
that
the
doctrine
of
respondent
superior
is
applicable
to
the
case.
We
agree.
The
doctrine
of
respondent
superior
has
been
generally
limited
in
its
application
to
principal
and
agent
or
to
master
and
servant
(i.e.
employer
and
employee)
relationship.
No
such
relationship
exists
between
superior
officers
of
the
military
and
their
subordinates.
Be
that
as
it
may,
however,
the
decisive
factor
in
this
case,
in
our
view,
is
the
language
of
Article
32.
The
law
speaks
of
an
officer
or
employee
or
person
'directly'
or
"indirectly"
responsible
for
the
violation
of
the
constitutional
rights
and
liberties
of
another.
Thus,
it
is
not
the
actor
alone
(i.e.
the
one
directly
responsible)
who
must
answer
for
damages
under
Article
32;
the
person
indirectly
responsible
has
also
to
answer
for
the
damages
or
injury
caused
to
the
aggrieved
party.
TABUENA
V.
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Then
President
Marcos
instructed
Luis
Tabuena
over
the
phone
to
pay
directly
to
the
president's
office
and
in
cash
what
the
Manila
International
Airport
Authority
(MIAA)
owes
the
Philippine
National
Construction
Corporation
(PNCC),
pursuant
to
the
7
January
1985
memorandum
of
then
Minister
Trade
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
and
Industry
Roberto
Ongpin.
Tabuena
agreed.
About
a
week
later,
Tabuena
received
from
Mrs.
Fe
Roa-
Gimenez,
then
private
secretary
of
Marcos,
a
Presidential
Memorandum
dated
8
January
1986
reiterating
in
black
and
white
such
verbal
instruction.
In
obedience
to
President
Marcos'
verbal
instruction
and
memorandum,
Tabuena,
with
the
help
of
Gerardo
G.
Dabao
and
Adolfo
Peralta,
caused
the
release
of
P55
Million
of
MIAA
funds
by
means
of
three
(3)
withdrawals.
On
10
January
1986,
the
first
withdrawal
was
made
for
P25
Million,
following
a
letter
of
even
date
signed
by
Tabuena
and
Dabao
requesting
the
PNB
extension
office
at
the
MIAA
the
depository
branch
of
MIAA
funds,
to
issue
a
manager's
check
for
said
amount
payable
to
Tabuena.
The
check
was
encashed,
however,
at
the
PNB
Villamor
Branch.
Dabao
and
the
cashier
of
the
PNB
Villamor
branch
counted
the
money
after
which,
Tabuena
took
delivery
thereof.
The
P25
Million
in
cash
was
delivered
on
the
same
day
to
the
office
of
Mrs.
Gimenez.
Mrs.
Gimenez
did
not
issue
any
receipt
for
the
money
received.
Similar
circumstances
surrounded
the
second
withdrawal/encashment
and
delivery
of
another
P25
Million,
made
on
16
January
1986.
The
third
and
last
withdrawal
was
made
on
31
January
1986
for
P5
Million.
Peralta
was
Tabuena's
co-signatory
to
the
letter-
request
for
a
manager's
check
for
this
amount.
Peralta
accompanied
Tabuena
to
the
PNB
Villamor
branch
as
Tabuena
requested
him
to
do
the
counting
of
the
P5
Million.
After
the
counting,
the
money
was
loaded
in
the
trunk
of
Tabuena's
car.
Peralta
did
not
go
with
Tabuena
to
deliver
the
money
to
Mrs.
Gimenez'
office.
It
was
only
upon
delivery
of
the
P5
Million
that
Mrs.
Gimenez
issued
a
receipt
for
all
the
amounts
she
received
from
Tabuena.
The
receipt
was
dated
January
30,
1986.
Tabuena
and
Peralta
were
charged
for
malversation
of
funds,
while
Dabao
remained
at
large.
One
of
the
justices
of
the
Sandiganbayan
actively
took
part
in
the
questioning
of
a
defense
witness
and
of
the
accused
themselves;
the
volume
of
the
questions
asked
were
more
the
combined
questions
of
the
counsels.
On
12
October
1990,
they
were
found
guilty
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
Tabuena
and
Peralta
filed
separate
petitions
for
review,
appealing
the
Sandiganbayan
decision
dated
12
October
19990
and
the
Resolution
of
20
December
1991.
Issue:
Whether
Tabuena
and
Peralta
were
denied
due
process
by
the
active
participation
of
a
Sandiganbayan
justice
in
the
questioning
witnesses
in
the
trial.
Held:
Due
process
requires
no
less
than
the
cold
neutrality
of
an
impartial
judge.
Bolstering
this
requirement,
we
have
added
that
the
judge
must
not
only
be
impartial
but
must
also
appear
to
be
impartial,
to
give
added
assurance
to
the
parties
that
his
decision
will
be
just.
The
parties
are
entitled
to
no
less
than
this,
as
a
minimum
guaranty
of
due
process.
Our
courts
should
refrain
from
showing
any
semblance
of
one-sided
or
more
or
less
partial
attitude
in
order
not
to
create
any
false
impression
in
the
minds
of
the
litigants.
For
obvious
reasons,
it
is
the
bounden
duty
of
all
to
strive
for
the
preservation
of
the
people's
faith
in
our
courts.
Respect
for
the
Constitution
is
more
important
than
securing
a
conviction
based
on
a
violation
of
the
rights
of
the
accused.
The
Court
was
struck
by
the
way
the
Sandiganbayan
actively
took
part
in
the
questioning
of
a
defense
witness
and
of
the
accused
themselves,
as
shown
in
the
records.
The
volume
of
questions
hurled
by
the
Sandiganbayan
was
more
the
combined
questions
of
the
counsels.
More
importantly,
the
questions
of
the
court
were
in
the
nature
of
cross
examinations
characteristic
of
confrontation,
probing
and
insinuation.
We
have
not
adopted
in
this
country
the
practice
of
making
the
presiding
judge
the
chief
inquisitor.
It
is
better
to
observe
our
time-honored
custom
of
orderly
judicial
procedure,
even
at
the
expense
of
occasional
delays.
The
impartiality
of
the
judge;
his
avoidance
of
the
appearance
of
becoming
the
advocate
of
either
one
side
or
the
other
of
the
pending
controversy
is
a
fundamental
and
essential
rule
of
special
importance
in
criminal
cases.
Good
faith
is
a
valid
defense
in
a
prosecution
for
malversation
for
it
would
negate
criminal
intent
on
the
part
of
the
accused.
To
constitute
a
crime,
the
act
must,
except
in
certain
crimes
made
such
by
statute,
be
accompanied
by
a
criminal
intent,
or
by
such
negligence
or
indifference
to
duty
or
to
consequences
as,
in
law,
is
equivalent
to
criminal
intent.
The
maxim
is
actus
non
facit
reum,
nisi
mens
sit
rea
a
crime
is
not
committed
if
the
mind
of
the
person
performing
the
act
complained
of
is
innocent.
American
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
jurisprudence
echoes
the
same
principle.
It
adheres
to
the
view
that
criminal
intent
in
embezzlement
is
not
based
on
technical
mistakes
as
to
the
legal
effect
of
a
transaction
honestly
entered
into,
and
there
can
be
no
embezzlement
if
the
mind
of
the
person
doing
the
act
is
innocent
or
if
there
is
no
wrongful
purpose.
The
accused
may
thus
always
introduce
evidence
to
show
he
acted
in
good
faith
and
that
he
had
no
intention
to
convert.
And
this,
to
our
mind,
Tabuena
and
Peralta
had
meritoriously
shown.
First,
Tabuena
had
no
other
choice
but
to
make
the
withdrawals,
for
that
was
what
the
MARCOS
memorandum
required
him
to
do.
Tabuena
therefore
is
entitled
to
the
justifying
circumstance
of
"Any
person
who
acts
in
obedience
to
an
order
issued
by
a
superior
for
some
lawful
purpose."
The
subordinate-
superior
relationship
between
Tabuena
and
Marcos
is
clear.
And
so
too,
is
the
lawfulness
of
the
order
contained
in
the
MARCOS
Memorandum,
as
it
has
for
its
purpose
partial
payment
of
the
liability
of
one
government
agency
(MIAA)
to
another
(PNCC).
More
so,
MARCOS
memorandum
is
patently
legal
and
that
Tabuena
acted
under
the
honest
belief
that
the
55million
was
a
due
and
demandable
debt
and
that
it
was
just
a
portion
of
a
bigger
liability
to
PNCC.
Had
he
known
or
suspected
that
his
principal
was
committing
an
improper
act
of
falsification,
he
would
be
liable
either
as
a
co-principal
or
as
an
accomplice.
However,
there
being
no
malice
on
his
part,
he
was
exempted
from
criminal
liability
as
he
was
a
mere
employee
following
the
orders
of
his
principal.
JARILLO
V.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Victoria
and
Rafael
were
married.
Thereafter,
Victoria
contracted
a
subsequent
marriage
with
Emmanuel.
And
then
Emmanuel
filed
against
Victoria
for
annulment
of
marriage.
Also,
Victoria
filed
against
Rafael
a
declaration
of
nullity
of
their
marriage
and
finds
Victoria
guilty
of
the
crime
of
bigamy
and
sentenced
to
an
inderterminate
penalty
of
6
years
to
10
years.
HELD:
It
is
true
that
right
after
the
presentation
of
the
prosecution
evidence,
petitioner
moved
for
suspension
of
the
proceedings
on
the
ground
of
the
pendency
of
the
petition
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
petitioners
marriages
to
Alocillo,
which,
petitioner
claimed
involved
a
prejudicial
question.
In
her
appeal,
she
also
asserted
that
the
petition
for
declaration
of
nullity
of
her
marriage
to
Uy,
initiated
by
the
latter,
was
a
ground
for
suspension
of
the
proceedings.
as
ruled
in
Landicho
v.
Relova,
he
who
contracts
a
second
marriage
before
the
judicial
declaration
of
nullity
of
the
first
marriage
assumes
the
risk
of
being
prosecuted
for
bigamy,
and
in
such
a
case
the
criminal
case
may
not
be
suspended
on
the
ground
of
the
pendency
of
a
civil
case
for
declaration
of
nullity.
The
reason
is
that,
without
a
judicial
declaration
of
its
nullity,
the
first
marriage
is
presumed
to
be
subsisting.
In
the
case
at
bar,
respondent
was
for
all
legal
intents
and
purposes
regarded
as
a
married
man
at
the
time
he
contracted
his
second
marriage
with
petitioner.
Against
this
legal
backdrop,
any
decision
in
the
civil
action
for
nullity
would
not
erase
the
fact
that
respondent
entered
into
a
second
marriage
during
the
subsistence
of
a
first
marriage.
Thus,
a
decision
in
the
civil
case
is
not
essential
to
the
determination
of
the
criminal
charge.
It
is,
therefore,
not
a
prejudicial
question.
Also,
in
another
case:
The
subsequent
judicial
declaration
of
the
nullity
of
the
first
marriage
was
immaterial
because
prior
to
the
declaration
of
nullity,
the
crime
had
already
been
consummated.
Moreover,
petitioners
assertion
would
only
delay
the
prosecution
of
bigamy
cases
considering
that
an
accused
could
simply
file
a
petition
to
declare
his
previous
marriage
void
and
invoke
the
pendency
of
that
action
as
a
prejudicial
question
in
the
criminal
case.
We
cannot
allow
that.
The
outcome
of
the
civil
case
for
annulment
of
petitioners
marriage
to
[private
ALYANNA R. CHANG
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in
the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
For
the
very
same
reasons
elucidated
in
the
above-quoted
cases,
petitioners
conviction
of
the
crime
of
bigamy
must
be
affirmed.
The
subsequent
judicial
declaration
of
nullity
of
petitioners
two
marriages
to
Alocillo
cannot
be
considered
a
valid
defense
in
the
crime
of
bigamy.
The
moment
petitioner
contracted
a
second
marriage
without
the
previous
one
having
been
judicially
declared
null
and
void,
the
crime
of
bigamy
was
already
consummated
because
at
the
time
of
the
celebration
of
the
second
marriage,
petitioners
marriage
to
Alocillo,
which
had
not
yet
been
declared
null
and
void
by
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction,
was
deemed
valid
and
subsisting.
Neither
would
a
judicial
declaration
of
the
nullity
of
petitioners
marriage
to
Uy
make
any
difference.
COJUANGCO vs. PALMA
FACTS:
The complainant Eduardo Cojuangco is a client of ACCRA, w h o a s s i g n e d t h e c a s e t o
A t t y . P a l m a , t h e r e s p o n d e n t . T h e f o r m e r h i r e d t h e l a t t e r a s h i s
p e r s o n a l c o u n s e l f o r h i s business. Atty. Palma becomes very close to the
family of Cojuangco, and he dines and goes with them abroad. He even tutored,
complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa).
On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong without the knowledge of
the complainant and despite the facts that the former is already m a r r i e d a n d
w i t h t h r e e ( 3 ) c h i l d r e n . C o m p l a i n a n t s e n d s h i s t w o s o n s t o persuade Lisa
to go home with them, which she did. In the celebration of respondents marriage with
Lisa he misrepresented himself as a bachelor. On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the
Court of First Instance, a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage and which
was granted. Subsequently complainant filed a disbarment complaint on the
ground of grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. As he contends that
complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his
lawyers oath.
ISSUE: W O N r e s p o n d e n t s a c t s c o n s t i t u t e d e c e i t , m a l p r a c t i c e , gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer that would warrant his disbarment.
YES!
RULING:
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer, is well versed in the law, fully well that in
marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him
by complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed g r o s s l y
i m m o r a l c o n d u c t a n d v i o l a t i o n o f h i s o a t h a s a l a w y e r , a n d i t
i s recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years and which later lessen to one (1) year. According to IBP:At the outset, it
must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may
ALYANNA R. CHANG
not
divide
his
personality
so
as
to
be
an
attorney
at
one
time
and
a
mere
citizen
at
another.
Thus,
not
only
his
professional
activities
but
even
his
private
life,
insofar
as
the
latter
may
reflect
unfavorably
upon
the
good
name
and
prestige
of
the
profession
and
the
courts,
may
at
any
time
be
the
subject
of
inquiry
on
the
part
of
the
proper
authorities.P r o f e s s i o n a l
c o m p e t e n c y
a l o n e
d o e s
n o t
m a k e
a
l a w y e r
a
w o r t h y
m e m b e r
o f
t h e
B a r .
G o o d
m o r a l
c h a r a c t e r
i s
a l w a y s
a n
i n d i s p e n s a b l e
requirement.
T h e
i n t e r d i c t
u p o n
l a w y e r s ,
a s
i n s c r i b e d
i n
R u l e
1 . 0 1
o f
t h e
C o d e
o f
P r o f e s s i o n a l
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
i s
t h a t
t h e y
s h a l l
n o t
e n g a g e
i n
u n l a w f u l ,
d i s h o n e s t ,
i m m o r a l
o r
d e c e i t f u l
c o n d u c t .
Reyes
v.
Pearlbank
Securities
-
July
30,
2008
Facts:
Reyes
is
the
Vice-President
of
Wincorp,
a
corporation
that
arranges
and
brokers
loans
of
its
clients,
one
of
whom
is
Pearlbank
Securities.
Sometime
before
this
case,
investors
or
lenders
made
demands
on
Pearlbank
to
pay
several
loans
that
were
brokered
by
Wincorp.
The
investors
alleged
that
they
werent
able
to
collect
on
their
outstanding
credits
with
Wincorp
because
Pearlbank
didnt
pay.
Apparently,
Pearlbank
alleges
that
it
did
not
have
any
outstanding
loans
that
WINCORP
brokered.
Thus
Pearlbank
investigated
on
these
alleged
debts.
Pearlbank
demanded
from
Wincorp
a
full
and
accurate
accounting
of
the
identities
and
investments
of
the
lenders
and
the
alleged
debts
of
Pearlbank
with
supporting
records
and
documents.
Wincorp
did
not
respond
to
this
demand.
Pearlbank
instituted
a
case
with
the
SEC,
now
pending
with
the
RTC
(bec.
of
that
law
which
transferred
jurisdiction
with
the
RTCs,
for
full
and
accurate
accounting
of
investments
and
alleged
loan
obligations
of
Pearlbank.
Pearlbank,
through
its
treasurer,
also
filed
complaints
with
the
DOJ
against
officers
of
Wincorp,
one
of
them
was
Reyes,
for
falsification
of
commercial
and
private
documents.
The
DOJ
filed
the
criminal
case
with
the
MTC.
Later,
however,
DOJ
uSec
Merciditas
Gutierrez
ordered
the
withdrawal
of
the
Informations.
This
decision
was
reversed
by
the
DOJ
Sec.,
thus
the
case
proceeded.
Reyes
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
with
the
CA,
where
he
raised,
among
others,
that
the
SEC
case
is
a
prejudicial
question
to
the
criminal
case
for
falsification.
CA
denied
certiorari
thus
criminal
case
proceeds.
Issue:
Is
the
SEC
case
a
prejudicial
question
that
has
to
be
resolved
before
the
criminal
case
for
falsification
may
proceed?
NO.
Ruling:
SC
affirms
CA.
Case
proceeds.
A
prejudicial
question
is
defined
as
one
which
arises
in
a
case
the
resolution
of
which
is
a
logical
antecedent
of
the
issue
involved
therein,
and
the
cognizance
of
which
pertains
to
another
tribunal.
The
prejudicial
question
must
be
determinative
of
the
case
before
the
court,
but
the
jurisdiction
to
try
and
resolve
the
question
must
be
lodged
in
another
court
or
tribunal.
It
is
a
question
based
on
a
fact
distinct
and
separate
from
the
crime,
but
so
intimately
connected
with
it
that
it
determines
the
guilt
or
innocence
of
the
accused;
and
for
it
to
suspend
the
criminal
action,
it
must
appear
not
only
that
said
case
involves
facts
intimately
related
to
those
upon
which
the
criminal
prosecution
would
be
based,
but
also
that
in
the
resolution
of
the
issue
or
issues
raised
in
the
civil
case,
the
guilt
or
innocence
of
the
accused
would
necessarily
be
determined.
It
comes
into
play
generally
in
a
situation
in
which
a
civil
action
and
a
criminal
action
are
both
pending
and
there
exists
in
the
former
an
issue
which
must
be
preemptively
resolved
before
the
criminal
action
may
proceed,
because
howsoever
the
issue
raised
in
the
civil
action
is
resolved
would
be
determinative
juris
et
de
jure
of
the
guilt
or
innocence
of
the
accused
in
the
criminal
case.
The
rationale
behind
the
principle
of
prejudicial
question
is
to
avoid
two
conflicting
decisions.
The
elements
of
a
prejudicial
question
are:
(a)
the
previously
instituted
civil
action
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
involves
an
issue
similar
or
intimately
related
to
the
issue
raised
in
the
subsequent
criminal
action,
and
(b)
the
resolution
of
such
issue
determines
whether
or
not
the
criminal
action
may
proceed.
If
the
resolution
of
the
issue
in
the
civil
action
will
not
determine
the
criminal
responsibility
of
the
accused
in
the
criminal
action
based
on
the
same
facts,
or
there
is
no
necessity
that
the
civil
case
be
determined
first
before
taking
up
the
criminal
case,
therefore,
the
civil
case
does
not
involve
a
prejudicial
question.
Neither
is
there
a
prejudicial
question
if
the
civil
and
the
criminal
action
can,
according
to
law,
proceed
independently
of
each
other.
One
of
the
issues
taken
in
the
SEC
case
is
whether
Pearlbank
has
outstanding
loans
with
Wincorp.
However,
a
finding
that
Pearlbank
indeed
has
outstanding
debts
will
not
totally
absolve
Reyes
of
any
criminal
liability,
in
other
words,
its
not
an
absolute
defense.
Since,
what
is
determinative
in
the
Falsification
case
is
whether
there
really
were
falsified
documents.
PIMENTEL
V
PIMENTEL
FACTS
Maria
Chrysantine
Pimentel
(private
respondent)
filed
an
action
for
frustrated
parricide
against
Joselito
R.
Pimentel
(petitioner)
before
the
RTC
QC.
Petitioner
received
summons
to
appear
before
the
RTC
Antipolo,
for
Declaration
of
Nullity
of
Marriage
under
Section
36
of
the
Family
Code
on
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner
filed
an
urgent
motion
to
suspend
the
proceedings
before
the
RTC
QC
on
the
ground
of
the
existence
of
a
prejudicial
question.
Petitioner
asserted
that
since
the
relationship
between
the
offender
and
the
victim
is
a
key
element
in
parricide,
the
outcome
of
the
case
filed
in
RTC
Antipolo
would
have
a
bearing
in
the
criminal
case
filed
against
him
before
the
RTC
QC.
The
RTC
QC
held
that
the
pendency
of
the
case
before
the
RTC
Antipolo
is
not
a
prejudicial
question.
Petitioner
filed
a
MR.
RTC
QC
denied
the
motion.
Petitioner
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
before
the
CA.
CA
dismissed
the
petition.
Petitioner
filed
a
petition
for
review
before
the
SC.
ISSUE
W/N
the
resolution
of
the
action
for
annulment
of
marriage
is
a
prejudicial
question
that
warrants
the
suspension
of
the
criminal
case
for
frustrated
parricide
against
petitioner?
HELD
The
petition
has
no
merit.
Annulment
of
Marriage
is
not
a
Prejudicial
Question
in
Criminal
Case
for
Parricide.
There
is
a
prejudicial
question
when
a
civil
action
and
a
criminal
action
are
both
pending,
and
there
exists
in
the
civil
action
an
issue
which
must
be
preemptively
resolved
before
the
criminal
action
may
proceed
because
howsoever
the
issue
raised
in
the
civil
action
is
resolved
would
be
determinative
of
the
guilt
or
innocence
of
the
accused
in
the
criminal
case.
The
issue
in
the
civil
case
for
annulment
of
marriage
under
Article
36
of
the
Family
Code
is
whether
petitioner
is
psychologically
incapacitated
to
comply
with
the
essential
marital
obligations.
The
issue
in
parricide
is
whether
the
accused
killed
the
victim.
In
this
case,
since
petitioner
was
charged
with
frustrated
parricide,
the
issue
is
whether
he
performed
all
the
acts
of
execution
which
would
have
killed
respondent
as
a
consequence
but
which,
nevertheless,
did
not
produce
it
by
reason
of
causes
independent
of
petitioners
will.
At
the
time
of
the
commission
of
the
alleged
crime,
petitioner
and
respondent
were
married.
Thus,
even
if
the
marriage
between
petitioner
and
respondent
is
annulled
by
RTC
Antipolo,
petitioner
could
still
be
held
criminally
liable,
since
at
the
time
of
the
commission
of
the
alleged
crime,
he
was
still
married
to
respondent.
We
cannot
accept
petitioners
reliance
on
Tenebro
v.
Court
of
Appeals
that
the
judicial
declaration
of
the
nullity
of
a
marriage
on
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity
retroacts
to
the
date
of
the
ALYANNA
R.
CHANG
celebration
of
the
marriage
insofar
as
the
vinculum
between
the
spouses
is
concerned.
First,
the
issue
in
Tenebro
is
the
effect
of
the
judicial
declaration
of
nullity
of
a
second
or
subsequent
marriage
on
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity
on
a
criminal
liability
for
bigamy.
There
was
no
issue
of
prejudicial
question
in
that
case.
Second,
the
Court
ruled
in
Tenebro
that
there
is
a
recognition
written
into
the
law
itself
that
such
a
marriage,
although
void
ab
initio,
may
still
produce
legal
consequences.
In
fact,
the
Court
declared
in
that
case
that
a
declaration
of
the
nullity
of
the
second
marriage
on
the
ground
of
psychological
incapacity
is
of
absolutely
no
moment
insofar
as
the
States
penal
laws
are
concerned.
ALYANNA R. CHANG
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