Public Corporations (AY 2015-16)

by Atty. Randolph A. Pascasio

I.

General Principles
1.

A.
Corporation
Definition. An artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession
and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its
existence.

2.

Classification.
a) Public: Organized for the government of a portion of the State.
b) Private: Formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end.
c) Quasi-public: A private corporation that renders public service or supplies public
wants.

3.

Criterion to determine Public Corporation . The relationship of the corporation to the State,
i.e., if created by the State as its own agency to help the State in carrying out its
governmental functions, then it is public; otherwise, it is private.

4.

Classes of Public Corporations

a) Quasi-corporation. Created by the State for a narrow or limited purpose. b)
Municipal corporation. A body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation
of the inhabitants for the purpose of local government.

Pimentel v. Aguirre, et al. (G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000), in relation
to Secs. 284-294, LGC.
FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the
Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator
Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate
President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to
the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the
Ethics Committee.
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and
not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved
that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the
Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to
the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also
questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on
the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against SenatorVillar, is an indispensable
party in this petition;
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or
prior resort;
3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against SenatorVillarfrom the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole is violativeof SenatorVillarsright to equal protection;

Case:
Liban v. Gordon (G.R. No. 175352, 18 January 2011, 654 PHIL 680-738)
Boy Scouts of the Phil. v. COA (G.R. No. 177131, [June 7, 2011], 666 PHIL 140224)
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commission on Audit,
et al. (G.R. No. 169752, 25 September 2007)
The Province of North Cotabato v. the Gov. of the Republic of the Phils. Peace
Panel (G.R. No. 183591, 14 October 2008)

4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole is aviolativeof Senator Villarsright to due process and of the majority quorum
requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and

Read: GPH-MILF Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

Proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)

The petition is partially granted.

5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for
theireffectivity.
HELD:

REMEDIAL LAW: Indispensable parties; doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

B.
1.

Principles of Local Autonomy

Principle of Local Authority (Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
a) Sec. 25, Art. II: The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
b) Sec. 2, Art. X: The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Cases:
Basco v. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991)
Lina v. Pano (G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001)
Limbona v. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989)
Disomangcop v. Datumanong (G.R. No. 149848, 25 November 2004)
Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 138810, 29 September
2004)

2.

Power of the President over LGUs (Sec. 4, Art. X 1987 Constitution)

Cases:
Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 125350, December 3,
2002)
FACTS: Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly
allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the
amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.
ISSUE: Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of
the President.
RULING: Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of
local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power
of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As
such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by
statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions
changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only
interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law.
This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs

First issue: An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In this
case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be
true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues
in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole
which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigals interest.
Second issue: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented
here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On
the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction
of the Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:Internal rules of the Senate.
Third issue: While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical
conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from
pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. The
referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by
the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate, and notviolative of the
right to equal protection.
Fourth issue: The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
does not violate SenatorVillarsright to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate
its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI
of the Philippine Constitution, which states:"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
Fifth: The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since
rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate,
such rules need not be published,unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the
rules can take effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if
publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of
the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication.
Province of Batangas v. Romulo (G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004)
ACORD v. Zamora (G.R. No. 144256, 08 June 2005)
FACTS:In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution
Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and
services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for
funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the
DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void

certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF)
& imposed conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:Yes.The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively encroach on the
fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local autonomy
of local governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution
confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from
control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to
order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees
to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to
modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes.
Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any
act to receive the just share it shall be released to them without need of further action. To
subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as
sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would
violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the
national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections
of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to
supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate law and not
through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations
bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified
sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein
which is intended to amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general &
substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs
would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy
they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are
based.
Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (G.R. No. 196271, 18 October
2011; and Resolution dated 28 February 2012)
FACTS: On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces
were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular
elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than
90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A.
6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the
second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734
and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held onAugust 8,
2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153
was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national
and local elections of the country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties arose as
a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of
said laws.
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term

onSeptember 30, 2011.

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws
amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as
well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials
until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed
office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the
power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the

synchronization of elections
Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution

HELD: Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The
Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective
can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms
of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among
others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of
votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every
three years.This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas
to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in
August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections
(fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
InOsme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the
Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June
30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term
ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common
termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials
(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice
President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings
in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections
to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and
regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the
perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local
Government."Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of
this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional
mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty
nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local
elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling
as the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage;
synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term
suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be
discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way

arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective
in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted
norms.Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to
congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in executive
and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress
could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the
case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing
no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness
that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover
by Congress.
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No. 9054)
sets outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to"appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office."This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections. It must be therefore emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim
measure to synchronize elections and must not be interpreted otherwise.
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr. and Prov. Of Camsur v. Robredo, G.R. No.
195390, 10 December 2014
C. Municipal Corporations (aka Local Government Units [LGUs])
1. Elements
a) Legal creation or incorporation. The law creating or authorizing the creation or
incorporation of a municipal corporation.
b) Corporate name. The name by which the corporation shall be known.
i) The sangguniang panlalawigan may, in consultation with the
Philippine Historical Institute, change the name of component cities
and municipalities, upon the recommendation of the sanggunian
concerned; provided that the same shall be effective only upon
ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political
unit directly affected [Sec. 13, R.A. 7160].
c) Inhabitants. The people residing in the territory of the corporation.
d) Territory. The land mass where the inhabitants reside, together with the internal
and external waters, and the air space above the land and waters.
2.

Dual Nature and Functions. Every local government unit created or organized
[under the Local Government Code] is a body politic and corporate endowed with
powers,to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise
powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate
entity representing the inhabitants of its territory [Sec. 15, R.A. 7160]. Accordingly,
it has dual functions, namely:
a) Public or governmental. It acts as an agent of the State for the government of
the territory and the inhabitants.
b) Private or proprietary. It acts as an agent of the community in the
administration of local affairs. As such, it acts as a separate entity, for its own
purposes, and not as a subdivision of the State [Bara Lidasan v. Comelec, 21
SCRA 496].
OR

3. Municipal Corporations/LGUs in the Philippines (Section 1, Article X,

Constitution). The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras [Sec. 1, Art. X,
Constitution],
a) Province. The province, composed of a cluster of municipalities, or
municipalities and component cities, and as a political and corporate unit of
government, serves as a dynamic mechanism for developmental processes and
effective governance of local government units within its territorial jurisdiction
[Sec. 459, R.A. 7160],
b) City. The city, composed of more urbanized and developed barangays, serves
as a general-purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic,
regular and direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its
territorial jurisdiction [Sec. 448, R.A. 7160].
c) Municipality. The municipality, consisting of a group of barangays, serves
primarily as a general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of
basic, regular and direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants
within its jurisdiction [Sec. 440, R.A. 7160],
d) Barangav. As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary
planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects
and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the
people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may
be amicably settled [Sec. 384, R.A. 7160].

e) Autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras [Sec. 1, Art. X,

Constitution], In Limbonas v. Mangelin, supra., relative to the establishment of the
autonomous regional governments in Regions IX and XII under the 1973
Constitution, it was held that autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. The second is abdication by the national government
of political power in favor of the local government; the first consists merely in the
delegation of administrative powers to broaden the base of governmental power.
The regional governments in Regions IX and XII are of the first variety. In Datu
Firdausi Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287, RA 6734, the organic act establishing
the Autonomous Regional Government of Muslim Mindanao was held valid. It was
passed pursuant to the mandate in Art. X, Constitution. In Cordillera Broad
Coalition v. Commission on Audit, 181 SCRA 495, Executive Order No. 220,
issued by President Aquino in the exercise of legislative powers, creating the
Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR] was held valid. It prepared the
groundwork for autonomy and the adoption of the organic law. In Ordillo v.
Comelec, 192 SCRA 100, the sole province of Ifugao which, in the plebiscite,
alone voted in favor of RA 6766, cannot validly constitute the Autonomous Region
of the Cordilleras.
f) Special metropolitan political subdivisions. Pursuant to Sec. 11, Art. X,
Constitution, Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions subject to a plebiscite set forth in Sec. 10, (but) the component cities
and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their
own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the
metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic
services requiring coordination.
D.
Creation and Alteration of Municipal Corporations/LGUs
Sec. 6, LGC: Authority to create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be
created divided, merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered either by law
enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality or any other political
subdivision of by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction,
subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.
1. Authority to create. A local government unit may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress
in the case of a province, city, municipality or any other political subdivision, or by
ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to
such limitations and requirements prescribed in the Local Government Code [Sec. 6,
R.A. 7160],
a) In Section 19, R.A. 9054, Congress delegated to the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays within the ARMM. Challenged as unconstitutional in Serna v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008, the Supreme Court said: There is no
provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of
provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member (in the House of Representatives). Pursuant to these
provisions, a province cannot be created without creating a legislative district; nor
can a city with a population of 250,000 or more be created without a legislative
district. Thus, the power to create a province or a city with a population of 250,000
or more requires the power to create a legislative district. Accordingly, the
delegation granted by Congress to the ARMM to create provinces and cities is
unconstitutional, because Congress cannot validly delegate the power to create
legislative districts for the House of Representatives, since the power to increase
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
2. Requisites!Limitations on creation or conversion.
a) Sec. 10. Art. X. Constitution: No province, city, municipality or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
i) Plebiscite requirement: No creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose
in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted
by the Comelec within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or
ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date [Sec. 10, R.A. 7160].
ia) In Tan v. Comelec, 142 SCRA 727, it was held that a plebiscite for
creating a new province should include the participation of the residents of
the mother province in order to conform to the constitutional requirement, x
x x BP 885, creating the Province of Negros del Norte, is declared

unconstitutional because it excluded the voters of the mother province

from participating in the plebiscite (and it did not comply with the area
criterion prescribed in the Local Government Code), x x x Where the law
authorizing the holding of a plebiscite is unconstitutional, the Court cannot
authorize the holding of a new one. x x x The fact that the plebiscite which
the petition sought to stop had already been held and officials of the new
province appointed does not make the petition moot and academic, as the
petition raises an issue of constitutional dimension, x x x
ib) Padilla v. Comelec, 214 SCRA 735, reiterates Tan v. Comelec, and
rejects the proposition that the 1987 Constitution has revived the ruling in
Paredes v. Executive Secretary. Thus, even under the 1987 Constitution,
the plebiscite shall include all the voters of the mother province or the
mother municipality.
ic) In Grino v. Comelec, 213 SCRA 672, it was held that the ballots in the
plebiscite for the conversion of the sub-province of Guimaras into a
province should have contained spaces to allow voting for Governor, Vice
Governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Iloilo (in the
event of rejection by the voters of the proposed conversion). However,
since the great majority of the votes turned out to be in favor of converting
Guimaras into a province, the petition was dismissed for being moot and
academic.
id) In Lopez v. Comelec, 136 SCRA 633, the Supreme Court held that the
creation of Metropolitan Manila is valid. The referendum of February 27,
1975 authorized the President to restructure local governments in the four
cities and 13 municipalities, x x x The President had authority to issue
decrees in 1975. x x x The 1984 amendments to the 1973 Constitution
impliedly recognized the existence of Metropolitan Manila by providing
representation of Metro Manila in the Batasan Pambansa.
b) Sec. 7. R.A, 7160: Based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services, to wit:
i) Income - must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for
all essential government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local
government unit concerned. Average annual income for the last two
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices should be at least:
ia) Municipality: P2,500,000.00
ib) City: P100,000,000.00 (Yr. 2000 constant prices, amended by R.A.
9009)
ic) Highly urbanized city: P50,000,000.00
id) Province : P20,000,000.00
In Alvarez v. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695, it was held that the Internal Revenue Allotments
(IRAs) should be included in the computation of the average annual income of the
municipality (for purposes of determining whether the municipality may be validly converted
into a city), but under RA 9009, it is specifically provided that for conversion to cities, the
municipalitys income should not include the IRA.
ii) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned. Required minimum
population for:
iia) Barangay : 2,000 inhabitants [except in Metro Manila and other
metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities, where the
requirement is 5,000 inhabitants]
iib) Municipality: 25,000
iic) City : 150,000
iid) Highly urbanized city: 200,000
iie) Province: 250,000
iii) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace. Area requirements are:
iiia) Municipality: 50 square kilometers
iiib) City : 100 square kilometers
iiic) Province: 2,000 square kilometers
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance,
the National Statistics Office and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. In Mariano v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211, the Supreme
Court said that the requirement that the territory of newly- created local government units be
identified by metes and bounds is intended to provide the means by which the area of the
local government unit may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., as a tool in the establishment of
the local government unit. As long as the territorial jurisdiction of the newly created city may
be reasonably ascertained by referring to common boundaries with neighboring
municipalities then, the legislative intent has been sufficiently served. [NOTE: R.A. 7854,
which converted Makati into a city, did not define the boundaries of the new city by metes
and bounds, because of a territorial dispute between Makati and Taguig, which was best left
for the courts to decide.]
c) Other constitutional limitations, e.g., provisions of the Bill of Rights affording
protection to rights, property and contracts of inhabitants.
3. Beginning of corporate existence. Upon the election and qualification of its chief
executive and a majority of the members of its sanggunian, unless some other time is
fixed therefor by the law or ordinance creating it [Sec. 14, R.A. 7160].

4. Division and merger, abolition of local government units.

a) Division and merger. Shall comply with the same requirements,provided that
such division shall not reduce the income, population or land area of the local
government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed; provided further that the inpome classification of the original local
government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior
to the division [Sec. 8, R.A. 7160].
b) Abolition. A local government unit may be abolished when its income,
population or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum
standards prescribed for its creation, as certified by the national agencies
mentioned. The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify
the province, city, municipality or barangay with which the local government unit
sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged [Sec. 9, R.A. 7160].
5. De facto municipal corporations. See Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533.
Requisites:
a) Valid law authorizing incorporation.
b) Attempt in good faith to organize under it.
c) Colorable compliance with the law.
d) Assumption of corporate powers.
In Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional
Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which authorized the President to create
municipalities through Executive Order. With this declaration, municipalities created by
Executive Order could not claim to be de facto municipal corporations, because there was
no valid law authorizing incorporation.
6. Attack against invalidity of incorporation. No collateral attack shall lie; an inquiry
into the legal existence of a municipal corporation is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding [Malabang v. Benito, supra.].
But this rule applies only when the municipal corporation is, at least, a de facto
municipal corporation.
a) However, where the challenge was made nearly thirty years after the executive
order creating the municipality was issued [Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v.
Mendez, 239 SCRA 11], or where the municipality has been in existence for all of
16 years before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated
[Municipality of Candihay, Bohol v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 530], and various
government acts throughout the years of all indicate the Statess recognition and
acknowledgment of the existence of the municipal corporation, then the municipal
corporation should be considered as a regular, de jure municipality. The same
conclusion was reached in Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental v. Borja,
265 SCRA 182, where the Supreme Court said that the Municipality of Sinacaban
had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided;
that the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez had recognized Sinacabans
corporate existence (by entering into an agreement concerning common
boundaries); and that Sinacaban had attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioning legislative districts
throughout the country which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2 nd district of
Misamis Occidental.
Cases:
Sema v. Comelec (G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008)
Facts: On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
(MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on October
29, 2006. On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of
the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao. However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections,
the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative
district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On
May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of
votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative
in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such province.
Held:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 of

Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU must
follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of
the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create
LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power
to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established in the
LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an Act of
Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of
the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1
representative in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least
1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces
and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress
can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution.
2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the
Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives,
and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers
through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local legislative
bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of
Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242
SCRA 415 (1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative
body which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership
through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress
but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes
this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely
in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because
Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional
assemblies are limited only within its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative districts for
Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws
relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is
elected in national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces. Thus, MMA Act 201
enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec (GR No. 176951, 18
November 2008; 21 December 2009; 24 August 2010; and 15
February 2011)
FACTS: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas,
assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered
thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the
petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6,
Article X, and the equal protection clause. In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the
Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional. On August 24,
2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution
HELD: The petition is meritorious. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws
First issue: The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative
power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to
alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws
was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the
LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local
government unitsincome, population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly
imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and
blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy,
especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective
provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the
exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also
amendments to the LGC itself.
Second Issue: Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting
the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to
become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial
regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.
The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are
declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. 180050, 10 February 2010 and Resolution
dated 12 April 2011; Min. Res., GR No. 180050, Navarro v.
Executive Secretary Ermita, September 11, 2012
FACTS: The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands population is 120,813. Its
land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual income is P82,696,433.23, as
certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President
approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006,
the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the
province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With
the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province
of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who
took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on
July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other
former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that
the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of
Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the
provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area.
ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?
HELD:
February 10, 2010 Ruling- No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local
Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did
Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC
minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that
paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area
requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC.
There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and
regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law, held the Court. (GR No. 180050,
Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat
filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12,
2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.
April 12, 2011 Ruling- Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12,
2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and

CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of
the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is
not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities,
component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1)
or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section
442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should
apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of
islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC,
but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when
the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended
to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR.
xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local government units
genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired
results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be
counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended
province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also
consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt
from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the
LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000
square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean
that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous
land area over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of
self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency.
This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-squarekilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of
water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking
into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of
its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more
than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of
basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking
at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli
circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be
seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
Miranda v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133064, 16 September 1999)
FACTS: 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into
an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago
in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law
for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely
reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It
allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that
the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
RULING: Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue,
and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is
unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor
of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other
petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the
conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of
their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Samson v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133076, 22 September 1999)
Facts: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in
Quezon City. Quezon City councilor Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said
R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to income, land area and population of Novaliches were
not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 8535 2) a certification
attesting to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the
creation of Novaliches city in terms of income, land area and population, was also not presented
3) a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling or the creation of City of Novaliches
was not presented to the Quezon City Council, as mandated by the Implementing Rules of the
LGC, 1991 and 4) R.A. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of
Novaliches as mandated by Sec. 11 (a) of the LGC, 1991.
Held: Samson is wrong. Reasons:
1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case,
meaning that Samson has burden of proof to show that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional.
Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were presented during the deliberations.
And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the representatives of the DOF,
NSO, DENR and even Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the
deliberations. The official statements attesting to the income, land area and population of
Novaliches could serve the certifications contemplated by law
2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to
the creation of the City of Novaliches, he would be the first representative to do so. But he
didnt.
3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays
calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches is not fatal as such petition is meant only to
inform the QC council of such creation. With the mass media publicizing the creation of the city
of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed creation
4. The failure of R.A.8535 to provide a seat of government for Novaliches is
not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGC provides that a government center shall be established by the LGU
as far as practicable. Government centers can also serve as seats of government.
5. The fact that the City of Novaliches was not included among the 17 cities
and municipalities listed in the ordinance attached to the 1987 constitution does not mean that a
constitutional amendment is necessary in order for Novaliches to become a city. The ordinance
attached to the Constitution merely apportions the seat of the House of Representatives to the
different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall be
forever composed of 17 cities and municipalities.
NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite
held for that purpose
Alvarez v. Guingona (G.R. No. 118303, 31 January 1996)
Facts: HB 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of
Representatives, subsequently passed by the House of Representatives, and transmitted to the
Senate. A counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in the Senate, and was passed as well.
The enrolled bill was submitted to and signed by the Chief Executive as RA 7720. When a
plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of
Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
Issue: WON considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 7720
can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives
Held: Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the
Senate, it cannot be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.
Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr 1993). The SB
was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and was transmitted to the
Senate 28 Jan 1994.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon
until it receives the House bill.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House
of Representatives, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local
application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not
act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court said that what the Constitution simply means is
that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public
debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on
the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor
does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill.

3.

4.

5.

1.

1.

Mariano v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 118577, 07 March 1995)

FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as
taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which
contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a
senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati
violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds
with technical descriptions
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate
existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms
as allowed by the Constitution
Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall
comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area
over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of
Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros
and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change
even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted
that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of
LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of
becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of
the City of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the

occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised
of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing
a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.
Cawaling Jr. v. COMELEC (G.R, No. 146319, October 26, 2001)
Aquino v. Comelec (G.R. No. 189793, 07 April 2010)
Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as
unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st)
and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a
New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President MacapagalArroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts
shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383 population
count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard
with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if
population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for noncompliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error
in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 9716.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or
whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.
Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a
city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the
Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was
mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be
satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two
additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than
population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned
during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.
Tan v. Comelec (G.R. No. 73155, 11 July 1986)
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code
Facts:This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating
a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador
Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January
3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: The
voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of
the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite. The area which
would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km.,
which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the
Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO.
Held:Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of
the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected
must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will
necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental
(parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would
be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the
mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the

municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two
or more municipalities if there be a merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial
alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects
it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
E.

The Local Government Code, as amended

1.
Effectivity. January 1, 1992, unless otherwise provided herein, after
its complete publication in at least one newspaper of general
circulation [Sec. 536, R.A. 7160].
2.
Rules of Interpretation
a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the local government unit.
b) Any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the
local government unit enacting it and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax
exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local government unit shall be
construed strictly against the person claiming it.
c) The general welfare provisions shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.
d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this Code and
arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a local
government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of said
contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested.
e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no legal
provision or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customs and
traditions in the place where the controversies take place.

II. General Powers and Attributes of LGUs

A.
Sources of Powers
1. Sources in general:
a) Sec. 25, Art. II; Secs. 5, 6 & 7, Art. X, Philippine Constitution
b) Statutes, e.g., R. A. 7160
c) Charter [particularly of cities]
d) Doctrine of the right of self-government, but applies only in States which
adhere to the doctrine.
2. Classification:
a) express, implied, inherent (powers necessary and proper for governance, e.g.,
to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals of inhabitants)
b) public or governmental, private or proprietary
c) intramural, extramural
d) mandatory, directory: ministerial, discretionary
3. Execution of powers.
a) Where statute prescribes the manner of exercise, the procedure must be
followed.
b) Where the statute is silent, local government units have discretion to select
reasonable means and methods of exercise.
B.
Governmental Powers
1. Police power aka General Welfare Clause (Sec. 16, LGC). Every local government
unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people
to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
its residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
a) The general welfare clause is the statutory grant of police power to local
government units.
b)Limitations on the exercise of powers under this clause:
i) Exercisable only within territorial limits of the local government unit, except
for protection of water supply.
ii) Equal protection clause. (The interests of the public in general, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the
power.)
iii)Due process clause. (The means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals.)
iv)Must not be contrary to the Constitution and the laws. Prohibited activities
may not be legalized in the guise of regulation; activities allowed by law
cannot be prohibited, only regulated. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, G.R.
No. 111097, July 20, 1994, the Supreme Court reiterated its ruling in Tatel v.
Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, 207 SCRA 157, and in Solicitor General v.

Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837, that to be valid, an ordinance

[a] must not contravene the Constitution and any statute; [b] must not be
unfair or oppressive; [c] must not be partial or discriminatory; [d] must not
prohibit, but may regulate trade; [e] must not be unreasonable; and [f] must be
general in application and consistent with public policy.
In De la Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569, the Bocaue, Bulacan ordinance prohibiting the
operation of night-clubs, was declared invalid, because of its prohibitory, not merely
regulatory, character.
In Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508, it was held that the power of municipal corporations is
broad and has been said to be commensurate with but not to exceed the duty to provide for
the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort and convenience, and
consistently as may be with private rights, x x x Ordinance is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons x x x The support for the poor
has long been an accepted exercise of the police power in the promotion of the common
good.
In Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 119249, August 21, 1997, the Supreme Court upheld, as
legitimate exercise of the police power, the validity of
athering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling of
aquatic
Cases:
Dela Cruz v. Paras (G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, 25 July 1983)
Facts: The municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan issued Ordinance 84 (Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan) prohibited the operation of night clubs, and such clubs
employing hostesses. On 5 November 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction
were filed with the CFI Bulacan. The cases were assigned to Judge, now Associate Justice
Paras of the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), who ssued a restraining order on 7 November
1975. The answers were thereafter filed. On 15 January 1976, the lower court upheld the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence the petition for
certiorari by way of appeal.

Issue: Whether the prohibition on the operation of night clubs, to foster public morals, is
reasonable and/or valid.

Held: Reasonableness is consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. Sweeping exercise of a
lawmaking power could not qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too
wide a field. On its face, the Ordinance is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to
be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. A prohibition is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of
those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the
investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed. Republic Act 938 (An
Act granting municipal or city boards and councils the power to regulate the establishment,
maintenance and operation of certain places of amusement within their respective territorial
jurisdiction) granted the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city to have the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs,
cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and
other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction. The power to regulate, was
amended to likewise prohibit on 21 May 1954; but the title remained intact. The power granted
remains that of regulation, not prohibition. The power claimed to enact the ordinance is at the
most dubious and under the present Local Government Code non-existent. The law mandates
the sangguniang bayan to "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports,
hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall
remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise
such authority without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss)
Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or massage parlors; and
(tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses
and other forms of entertainment. It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.
Binay v. Domingo (G.R. No. 92389, 11 September 1991)
Facts: The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 assisting those who only earn less

than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor
Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was
referred to the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of
four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such
disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between
the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its
inhabitants.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare
clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Lalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution 33 [A resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering,

possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to
wit: Family: Scaridae (Mameng), Epine Phelus Fasciatus (Suno), Cromileptes Altivelis (Panther
or Senorita), Lobster below 200 grams and spawning, Tridacna Gigas (Takllobo), Pinctada
Margaritefera (Mother pearl, Oysters, Giant clams, and other species), Penaeus Monodon
(Tiger Prawn, Breeder size or mother), Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green grouper), and
Family: Balistidae (Tropical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of 5 years in and coming from
Palawan waters]. Puerto Princesa City and the province of Palawan implemented said
ordinances. Tano, et. al., who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Resolution 33 and Ordinance 2 of Palawan in Criminal Case 93-05-C of the 1st MCTC of
Palawan; and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, who were charged with violating City Ordinance 1592 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance 2 of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Puerto Princesa, questioned the validity of the said ordinances before the Supreme Court.

Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum
non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Issue: Whether the ordinances in question, which prohibit the fishing of certain marine species
in Palawan, are constitutional and/or valid.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations . Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto
they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,
maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate
with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health,
safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all
the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function
of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the
community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as
to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition
which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards
social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the
promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human
rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor
has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down
to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving
rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of
a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must
not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on
a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
Tano v. Socrates (G.R. No. 110249. 21 August 1997)
Facts: On 15 December 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance 15-92 (taking effect on 1 January 1993; An ordinance banning the shipment of all live
fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from 1 January 1993 to 1 January 1998, and
providing exemptions; penalties and for other purposes thereof). To implement said ordinance,
Acting Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order 23 (series of 1993) dated 22 January 1993
authorizing the inspection of cargoes shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Wharf, and
any other port within the jurisdiction of the City. On 19 February 1993, the Sangguniang

Held: Laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict
with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if wellfounded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. In light of the
principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the Local Government Code (LGC)
and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General
Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458(a)(1)(vi) and 468(a)(1)(vi), which
involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the Ordinances cannot be doubted. The
ordinance also find full support under Republic Act 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan for
Palawan Act), approved on 19 June 1992; which adopts a comprehensive framework for the
sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural
resources and endangered environment of the province, which serve to guide the local
government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and
implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province. The first objective (to
establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a
period of five years) is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal
waters which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The second objective (to protect the
coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from
further destruction due to illegal fishing activities) falls within both the general welfare clause of
the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.

White Light Corp. v. City of Manila (G.R. No. 122846, 20

January 2009)
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the
Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading
as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that
the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC)
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to
admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their
business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the
Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling: No. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including
City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. Police power, while incapable of an exact

definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to
meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people.Police power has been used as justification
for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug
use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and
all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our
emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.That the Ordinance prevents the
lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a
police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life,
liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the
vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance
No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052. February 13,
2008; see also Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v.
Lim/Atienza (G.R. No. 187836, 25 November 2014)
Facts: The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then
mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 that was enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area
described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies (the brief history of the Pandacan Oil Terminals is here).
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which
period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7 March 2007 Decision. The SC ruled that
respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027.
After the SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation
(Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the oil companies ) and the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a
reconsideration of the decision.
Intervention of the oil companies and the DOE allowed in the interest of justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which
may be affected by such proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. While the motions to intervene respectively filed
by the oil companies and the DOE were filed out of time, these motions were granted because
they presented novel issues and arguments. DOEs intervention was also allowed
considering the transcendental importance of this case.
Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals
the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect. Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the
legislators is manifest.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the two acts on the
same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the conflict,
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is: if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the
earlier law. The oil companies argue that the situation here falls under the first category.
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the two
ordinances. However, there was no legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. There is
no conflict since both ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning
classification from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed
residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119). While it is true that both ordinances relate to the
same subject matter, i.e., classification of the land use of the area where Pandacan oil depot is
located, if there is no intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable
construction must be made to reconcile the ordinances so that both can be given effect.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent general law does
not repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature
has intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law. The special law
must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or
provision. Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain area

described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be
considered a general law as it covers the entire city of Manila.
Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in consideration of the
separation of powers of the executive and judiciary. However, while it is true that Courts will not
interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative or executive departments of the
government in the legitimate exercise of its powers, there is an exception to enforce mere
ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer thereof. A writ of mandamus is
the power to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust or station.
The oil companies also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
compel respondent to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, which was to seek relief from the President
of the Philippines through the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) by virtue of the Presidents power of supervision over local government units. This
suggested process, however, would be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently injurious
to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its constituents whose welfare is sought
to be protected. A party need not go first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an
ordinance. Besides, the resort to an original action for mandamus before the SC is undeniably
allowed by the Constitution.
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable. There is no showing that the
Ordinance is unconstitutional.
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of
its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes
and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).
While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be delegated.
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police
power to local governments. LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council.
Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the city.
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the
city.
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of police power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a concurrence of lawful
subject and lawful method. It was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The
Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the
Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly,
as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it
there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became
necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is vested on the
legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the
best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government
may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and
not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health,
morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which
reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning
ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes,
defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future
projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the
oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones
for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is
exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which amounts to taking
without compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as it does not only
regulate but also absolutely prohibits them from conducting operations in the City of Manila.
However, the oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in

Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries
in the zones it established.
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they have
invested billions of pesos in the depot, and the forced closure will result in huge losses in
income and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities. This argument has no merit. In the
exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote
public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when
the states power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of
police power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and,
consequently, is not compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and
safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use
which interferes with paramount rights of the public. In the regulation of the use of the property,
nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence there is no compensable taking.
In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated in the affected
area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable
uses permitted in the commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled
out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings
and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and
Sanitation Code.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of
the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class. The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic
devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community
is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those
areas would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot
itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which
provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals removes the threat they pose.
Therefore it is germane to the purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the
conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the
ordinance is applicable to all businesses and industries in the area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional because it
contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Law of 1998).
It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by Congress.
However, a brief survey of decisions where the police power measure of the LGU clashed with
national laws shows that the common dominator is that the national laws were clearly and
expressly in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so
patent that there was no room for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited merely gave
DOE general powers to establish and administer programs for the exploration,
transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of
energy resources and to encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve
the public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous
supply of petroleum products. These powers can be exercised without emasculating the
LGUs of the powers granted them. When these ambiguous powers are pitted against the
unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general
welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the latter. Considering that the
powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the City of Manila.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under the Constitution.
An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting
the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the
autonomy of local governments as mandated by the Constitution. There is no showing how the
laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its power to enact
ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify the land uses within its
jurisdiction.
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is that Section 4 of Article X of
the Constitution confines the Presidents power over LGUs to one of general supervision.
Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control
over them. The President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with
the activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.
Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the
sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as
long as they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with RA 7924 and EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be submitted to the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance
with its metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924 and
Section 1 of E.O. 72. They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this
review process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans
and zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules
which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans

(CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it
is a very specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to prevent
the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly
formulated as the Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. CLUPs are the
ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical
framework plan and approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national
guidelines and policies. Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB
ratification are necessary, the oil companies did not present any evidence to show that these
were not complied with. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance,
its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of proof showing that the
procedure prescribed by law was not observed.
Conclusion
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand
to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police
power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail.
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027.
Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is
unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed
their desire for the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny
and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors warnings of
doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
Just the same, the Court noted that it is not about to provoke a crisis by ordering the immediate
relocation of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a decision,
specially one with far-reaching consequences, should always be within the bounds of reason, in
accordance with a comprehensive and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame that
complies with the letter and spirit of our resolution. To this end, the oil companies have no
choice but to obey the law.
The Petitions
G.R. No. 187836
To support their petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187, the
petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS) officers allege that:
1. The enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power because the
measures provided therein do not promote the general welfare of the people within the
contemplation of the following provisions of law:
a)
Article III, Section 18 (kk)47 of Republic Act No. 409 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper;
b)
Section 1648 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the Local Government Code, which defines the scope of the
2. The conditions at the time the Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional in G.R. No.
156052 exist to this date;
3. Despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and notwithstanding that the
conditions and circumstances warranting the validity of the Ordinance remain the same, the
Manila City Council passed a contrary Ordinance, thereby refusing to recognize that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of
the Philippines;49 and
4. Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines on the duty of the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people 50
and protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.51chanrobleslaw
Petitioners pray that Ordinance No. 8187 of the City of Manila be declared null and void, and
that respondent, and all persons acting under him, be prohibited from enforcing the same.
G.R. No. 187916
The petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Injunction against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187 of former Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and then Mayor Atienza, together with other
residents and taxpayers of the City of Manila, also alleges violation of the right to health of the
people and the right to a healthful and balanced environment under Sections 15 and 16 of the
Constitution.
Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in violation of the following health and
environment-related municipal laws, and international conventions and treaties to which the
Philippines is a state party:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Municipal Laws
(a) Sections 4,52 12,53 1954 and 3055 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the Philippine
Clean Air Act;
(b) Environment Code (Presidential Decree No. 1152);

(c) Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); and
(d) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
2. International Conventions and Treaties to which the Philippines is a state party
a. Section 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that [e]veryone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person;
b. Articles 6,56 2457 and 2758 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, summarized by the
petitioners in the following manner:
1. the human right to safe and healthy environment[;]
2. human right to the highest attainable standard of health[;]

Panlungsod itself; (2) the Sangguniang Panlungsod may, in the later ordinance, expressly
repeal all or part of the zoning ordinance sought to be modified; and (3) the provision repealing
Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119 is not violative of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which requires that every bill must embrace only one subject and that such shall
be expressed in the title.
On the substantive issues, he posits that the petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the
assailed ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; that it is consistent with the general
welfare clause and public policy, and is not unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the
Constitution, municipal laws, and international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to
overcome the presumption of validity of the assailed ordinance.
Respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso
and the City Councilors who voted
in favor of the assailed ordinance

3. the human right to ecologically sustainable development[;]

4. the human right to an adequate standard of living, including access to safe food and water[;]
5. the human right of the child to live in an environment appropriate for physical and mental
development[; and]
6. the human right to full and equal participation for all persons in environmental decisionmaking and development planning, and in shaping decisions and policies affecting ones
community, at the local, national and international levels. 59
Petitioners likewise posit that the title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. According to them,
Ordinance No. 8027 was never mentioned in the title and the body of the new ordinance in
violation of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that every bill passed
by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

On 14 September 2012, after the Court gave the respondents several chances to submit their
Memorandum,62 they, through the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, prayed that the
Court dispense with the filing thereof.
In their Comment,63 however, respondents offered a position essentially similar to those
proffered by former Mayor Lim.chanrobleslaw
The Intervenors Position
on the Consolidated Petitions
On the other hand, the oil companies sought the outright dismissal of the petitions based on
alleged procedural infirmities, among others, incomplete requisites of judicial review, violation of
the principle of hierarchy of courts, improper remedy, submission of a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping, and forum shopping.

Also pointed out by the petitioners is a specific procedure outlined in Ordinance No. 8119 that
should be observed when amending the zoning ordinance. This is provided for under Section 81
thereof, which reads:
SEC. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance. The proposed amendments to the Zoning
Ordinance as reviewed and evaluated by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)
shall be submitted to the City Council for approval of the majority of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod members. The amendments shall be acceptable and eventually approved:
PROVIDED, That there is sufficient evidence and justification for such proposal; PROVIDED
FURTHER, That such proposal is consistent with the development goals, planning objectives,
and strategies of the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Said amendments shall take effect
immediately upon approval or after thirty (30) days from application.
Petitioners thus pray that:
1. upon filing of [the] petition, [the] case be referred to the Court [E]n Banc, and setting (sic) the
case for oral argument;

As to the substantive issues, they maintain, among others, that the assailed ordinance is
constitutional and valid; that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is in the best position to determine
the needs of its constituents; that it is a valid exercise of legislative power; that it does not
violate health and environment-related provisions of the Constitution, laws, and international
conventions and treaties to which the Philippines is a party; that the oil depots are not likely
targets of terrorists; that the scaling down of the operations in Pandacan pursuant to the MOU
has been followed; and that the people are safe in view of the safety measures installed in the
Pandacan terminals.

2. upon the filing of [the] petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
respondents from publishing and posting Manila City Ordinance No. 8187 and/or posting of
Manila City Ordinance No. 8187; and/or taking any steps to implementing (sic) and/or enforce
the same and after due hearing, the temporary restraining order be converted to a permanent
injunction;

2.02. The location of its Pandacan terminal is continually threatened, and made uncertain
preventing long-term planning, by the changing local government composition. Indeed, the
relevant zoning ordinances have been amended three (3) times, and their validity subjected to
litigation.66
Intervening Events

3. x x x Manila City Ordinance 8187 [be declared] as null and void for being repugnant to the
Constitution and existing municipal laws and international covenants;

On 28 August 2012, while the Court was awaiting the submission of the Memorandum of
respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
Ordinance, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which composition had already substantially
changed, enacted Ordinance No. 8283 67 entitled AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF
ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES
AND OIL DEPOTS ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (1-3) TO HIGH INTENSITY
COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE (C3/MXD).

4. x x x the respondents [be ordered] to refrain from enforcing and/or implementing Manila City
Ordinance No. 8187;
5. x x x respondent City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim [be enjoined] from issuing any permits (business
or otherwise) to all industries whose allowable uses are anchored under the provisions of Manila
Ordinance No. 8187; and
6. x x x respondent Mayor of Manila Alfredo S. Lim [be ordered] to comply with the Order of the
Honorable Court in G.R. 156052 dated February 13, 2008. 60
The Respondents Position
on the Consolidated Petitions

Incidentally, in its Manifestation dated 30 November 2010, 64 Petron informed the Court that it will
cease [the] operation of its petroleum product storage facilities 65 in the Pandacan oil terminal
not later than January 2016 on account of the following:
2.01 Environmental issues, many of which are unfounded, continually crop up and tarnish the
Companys image.

The new ordinance essentially amended the assailed ordinance to exclude the area where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial Zone.
Ordinance No. 8283 thus permits the operation of the industries operating within the Industrial
Zone. However, the oil companies, whose oil depots are located in the High Intensity
Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD), are given until the end of January 2016 within which to
relocate their terminals.

Respondent former Mayor Lim

In his Memorandum,61 former Mayor Lim, through the City Legal Officer, attacks the petitioners
lack of legal standing to sue. He likewise points out that the petitioners failed to observe the
principle of hierarchy of courts.
Maintaining that Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional, he expounds on the following
arguments:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the procedural issues, he contends that: (1) it is the function of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to enact zoning ordinances, for which reason, it may proceed to amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8119 without prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals
(MZBAA) as prescribed under Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning) and the City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO) pursuant to Section 81 (Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance) of
Ordinance No. 8119, especially when the action actually originated from the Sangguniang

Former Mayor Lim, who was then the incumbent mayor, did not support the amendment.
Maintaining that the removal of the oil depots was prejudicial to public welfare, and, on account
of the pending cases in the Supreme Court, he vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 on 11 September
2012.68chanrobleslaw
On 28 November 2012, former Mayor Lim filed a Manifestation informing this Court that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod voted to override the veto, and that he, in turn, returned it again with
his veto. He likewise directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod to append his written reasons for
his veto of the Ordinance, so that the same will be forwarded to the President for his
consideration in the event that his veto is overridden again. 69chanrobleslaw
On 11 December 2012, Shell also filed a similar Manifestation. 70chanrobleslaw
Meanwhile, three days after former Mayor Lim vetoed the new ordinance, Atty. Luch R. Gempis,

Jr. (Atty. Gempis), Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, writing on behalf of respondents
Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors of Manila who voted in favor of the assailed
Ordinance, finally complied with this Courts Resolution dated 17 July 2012 reiterating its earlier
directives71 to submit the said respondents Memorandum.

assailed ordinance repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In the alternative, a local

referendum may be had. And, assuming that there were laws violated, the petitioners may file
an action for each alleged violation of law against the particular individuals that transgressed the
law.

In his Compliance/Explanation with Urgent Manifestation 72 dated 13 September 2012, Atty.

Gempis explained that it was not his intention to show disrespect to this Court or to delay or
prejudice the disposition of the cases.

It would appear, however, that the remedies identified by the intervenors prove to be inadequate
to resolve the present controversies in their entirety owing to the intricacies of the circumstances
herein prevailing.

According to him, he signed the Comment prepared by respondents Vice-Mayor and the City
Councilors only to attest that the pleading was personally signed by the respondents. He
clarified that he was not designated as the legal counsel of the respondents as, in fact, he was
of the impression that, pursuant to Section 481(b)(3) of the Local Government Code, 73 it is the
City Legal Officer who is authorized to represent the local government unit or any official thereof
in a litigation. It was for the same reason that he thought that the filing of a Memorandum may
already be dispensed with when the City Legal Officer filed its own on 8 February 2010. He
further explained that the Ordinance subject of these cases was passed during the 7 th Council
(2007-2010); that the composition of the 8th Council (2010-2013) had already changed after the
2010 elections; and that steps were already taken to amend the ordinance again. Hence, he
was in a dilemma as to the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time he received the
Courts Resolution of 31 May 2011.

The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied in Sec. 2, Part I,
Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special
civil actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Regional Trial Courts involving enforcement
or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but not
limited to the following:
(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;
xxxx
(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;
xxxx

Atty. Gempis, thus, prayed that the Court dispense with the filing of the required memorandum
in view of the passing of Ordinance No. 8283.chanrobleslaw
Issue
The petitioners arguments are primarily anchored on the ruling of the Court in G. R. No. 156052
declaring Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional and valid after finding that the presence of the oil
terminals in Pandacan is a threat to the life and security of the people of Manila. From thence,
the petitioners enumerated constitutional provisions, municipal laws and international treaties
and conventions on health and environment protection allegedly violated by the enactment of
the assailed Ordinance to support their position.
The resolution of the present controversy is, thus, confined to the determination of whether or
not the enactment of the assailed Ordinance allowing the continued stay of the oil companies in
the depots is, indeed, invalid and unconstitutional.chanrobleslaw
Our Ruling
We see no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down insofar as the
presence of the oil depots in Pandacan is concerned.chanrobleslaw
I
We first rule on the procedural issues raised by the respondents and the oil companies.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, has already pronounced
that the matter of whether or not the oil depots should remain in the Pandacan area is of
transcendental importance to the residents of Manila. 74chanrobleslaw
We may, thus, brush aside procedural infirmities, if any, as we had in the past, and take
cognizance of the cases 75 if only to determine if the acts complained of are no longer within the
bounds of the Constitution and the laws in place. 76chanrobleslaw
Put otherwise, there can be no valid objection to this Courts discretion to waive one or some
procedural requirements if only to remove any impediment to address and resolve the serious
constitutional question77 raised in these petitions of transcendental importance, the same having
far-reaching implications insofar as the safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila,
and even its neighboring communities, are concerned.
Proper Remedy
Respondents and intervenors argue that the petitions should be outrightly dismissed for failure
on the part of the petitioners to properly apply related provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of
Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate
remedy available to them.
To begin with, questioned is the applicability of Rule 65 78 of the Rules of Court to assail the
validity and constitutionality of the Ordinance.
there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law
Rule 65 specifically requires that the remedy may be availed of only when there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 79chanrobleslaw
Shell argues that the petitioners should have sought recourse before the first and second level
courts under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, 80 which govern the enforcement
or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations. 81 Petron
additionally submits that the most adequate remedy available to petitioners is to have the

(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, x x x; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation,
development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural
resources.82 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of
violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks that
would support the other position of the petitioners the protection of the right to life, security
and safety.
Moreover, it bears emphasis that the promulgation of the said Rules was specifically intended to
meet the following objectives:
SEC. 3. Objectives.The objectives of these Rules are:
(a)
(b)

To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology;
To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure for the enforcement of environmental rights
regulations, and international agreements;
(c)
To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices ensuring the effective enforcement of remedies and re
(d)
To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with orders and judgments in environmental cases. 83
Surely, the instant petitions are not within the contemplation of these Rules.
Relative to the position of Petron, it failed to consider that these petitions are already a sequel to
G.R. No. 156052, and that there are some issues herein raised that the remedies available at
the level of the Sangguniang Panlungsod could not address. Neither could the filing of an
individual action for each law violated be harmonized with the essence of a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy.
From another perspective, Shell finds fault with the petitioners direct recourse to this Court
when, pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises only
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance. 84 Thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question. (Emphasis supplied)
To further support its position, it cites the case of Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor
of Manila,85 where the petitioners sought the nullification of the mayors executive order and the
councils ordinance concerning certain functions of the petitioners that are vested in them by
law. There, the Court held:
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the
declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. 86 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides: x x x
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. 87
Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that the petitions should
have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, we have, time and again, resolved to treat such a
petition as one for prohibition, provided that the case has far-reaching implications and
transcendental issues that need to be resolved, 88 as in these present petitions.
On a related issue, we initially found convincing the argument that the petitions should have
been filed with the Regional Trial Court, it having concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over a
special civil action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
However, as we have repeatedly said, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance

warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. 89 In the case of Jaworski v.

PAGCOR,90 the Court ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar. x x x This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
persons aggrieved thereby
As to who may file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, Petron posits that
petitioners are not among the persons aggrieved contemplated under Sections 1 to 3 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
Chevron argues that petitioners, whether as citizens, taxpayers, or legislators, lack the legal
standing to assail the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8187. It further claims that
petitioners failed to show that they have suffered any injury and/or threatened injury as a result
of the act complained of.91chanrobleslaw
Shell also points out that the petitions cannot be considered taxpayers suit, for then, there
should be a claim that public funds were illegally disbursed and that petitioners have sufficient
interest concerning the prevention of illegal expenditure of public money. 92 In G.R. No. 187916,
Shell maintains that the petitioners failed to show their personal interest in the case and/or to
establish that they may represent the general sentiments of the constituents of the City of
Manila so as to be treated as a class suit. Even the minors, it argues, are not numerous and
representative enough for the petition to be treated as a class suit. As to the city councilors who
joined the petitioners in assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187, Shell posits that they
cannot invoke the ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,93 where the Court held that
legislators may question the constitutionality of a statute, if and when it infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators, because of the absence of the allegation that the assailed ordinance
indeed infringes upon their prerogatives.
Former Mayor Lim submitted a similar position supported by a number of cases on the concept
of locus standi,94 the direct injury test,95 an outline of the stringent requirements of legal standing
when suing as a citizen, 96 as a taxpayer,97 as a legislator and in cases where class suits are filed
in behalf of all citizens.98chanrobleslaw

Only the first two requisites are put in issue in these cases.
On the matter of the existence of a legal controversy, we reject the contention that the petitions
consist of bare allegations based on speculations, surmises, conjectures and hypothetical
grounds.
The Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 valid and constitutional and ordered its implementation.
With the passing of the new ordinance containing the contrary provisions, it cannot be any
clearer that here lies an actual case or controversy for judicial review. The allegation on this,
alone, is sufficient for the purpose.
The second requisite has already been exhaustively discussed.
Proof of identification required in the notarization
of the verification and certification against forum
shopping in G.R. No. 187916
At the bottom of the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping of the petition in G.R.
No. 187916 is the statement of the notary public to the effect that the affiant, in his presence
and after presenting an integrally competent proof of identification with signature and
photograph,106 signed the document under oath.
Citing Sec. 163 of the Local Government Code, 107 which provides that an individual
acknowledging any document before a notary public shall present his Community Tax Certificate
(CTC), Chevron posits that the petitioners failure to present his CTC rendered the petition
fatally defective warranting the outright dismissal of the petition.
We disagree.
The verification and certification against forum shopping are governed specifically by Sections 4
and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Section 4 provides that a pleading, when required to be verified, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading if it lacks a proper verification while Section 5 requires that the certification to be
executed by the plaintiff or principal party be under oath.
These sections, in turn, should be read together with Sections 6 and 12, Rule 2 of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.

Their arguments are misplaced.

In G.R. No. 156052, we ruled that the petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the petition concerns a public right,
and they, as residents of Manila, have a direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances
of the city. Thus:
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the
ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on
Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of
Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are
interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need
not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest
in the enforcement of the citys ordinances. 99 x x x (Citations omitted)
No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed
ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns a public right. Necessarily,
the people who are interested in the nullification of such an ordinance are themselves the real
parties in interest, for which reason, they are no longer required to show any specific interest
therein. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that SJS, now represented by SJS Officer Alcantara,
has been recognized by the Court in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal standing to sue in
connection with the same subject matter herein considered. The rest of the petitioners are
residents of Manila. Hence, all of them have a direct interest in the prohibition proceedings
against the enforcement of the assailed ordinance.
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its
constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of
certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,
and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. Issues of constitutional import x x x
carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself
constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, noncompliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be
reviewed here is one such law.104 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Requisites of judicial review
For a valid exercise of the power of judicial review, the following requisites shall concur: (1) the
existence of a legal controversy; (2) legal standing to sue of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) a plea that judicial review be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.105chanrobleslaw

Forum shopping
Shell contends that the petitioners in G.R. No. 187836 violated the rule against forum shopping
allegedly because all the elements thereof are present in relation to G.R. No. 156052, to wit:
1. identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions

According to Shell, the interest of petitioner SJS in G.R. No. 156052 and the officers of SJS in
G.R. No. 187836 are clearly the same. Moreover, both actions implead the incumbent mayor of
the City of Manila as respondent. Both then respondent Mayor Atienza in G.R. No. 156052 and
respondent former Mayor Lim in G.R. No. 187836 are sued in their capacity as Manila mayor.
2. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same fact(s)

Shell contends that, in both actions, petitioners assert the same rights to health and to a
balanced and healthful ecology relative to the fate of the Pandacan terminal, and seek
essentially the same reliefs, that is, the removal of the oil depots from the present site.
3. the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other

Relative to the filing of the Manifestation and Motion to: a) Stop the City Council of Manila from
further hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance No. 8027 x x x (Manifestation and Motion)
and Very Urgent Motion to Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing Draft Ordinance
No. 7177 [now Ordinance No. 8187] and to Cite Him for Contempt if He Would Do So (Urgent
Motion) both in G.R. No. 156052, Shell points out the possibility that the Court would have
rendered conflicting rulings on cases involving the same facts, parties, issues and reliefs
prayed for.110chanrobleslaw
We are not persuaded.
It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially filed, not to secure a judgment adverse
to the first decision, but, precisely, to enforce the earlier ruling to relocate the oil depots from the
Pandacan area.
As to the matter of the denial of the petitioners Manifestation and Urgent Motion in G.R. No.
156052, which were both incidental to the enforcement of the decision favorable to them
brought about by the intervening events after the judgment had become final and executory, and

which involve the same Ordinance assailed in these petitions, we so hold that the filing of the
instant petitions is not barred by res judicata.

Terminal has never been one of the targets of terrorist attacks; 127 that the petitions were based
on unfounded fears and mere conjectures; 128 and that the possibility that it would be picked by
the terrorists is nil given the security measures installed thereat. 129chanrobleslaw

II
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is
vested with the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city 116 subject to the
pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed
by another ordinance.117 These have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052, where the Court
upheld the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the
Ordinance,118 and declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027,
provided that it has not been repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled
by the courts.119 In the same case, the Court also used the principle that the Sanguniang
Panlungsod is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents 120 that the
removal of the oil depots from the Pandacan area is necessary to protect the residents of
Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals.121chanrobleslaw
Do all these principles equally apply to the cases at bar involving the same subject matter to
justify the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance?
We answer in the negative.
We summarize the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter subject of these
petitions. In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary.
Hence, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027.
In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already changed, Ordinance No. 8187
was passed in favor of the retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of the previous
members were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-Mayor still holding the same seat, and
pending the resolution of these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the oil depots
until the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor Lim stood
his ground and vetoed the last ordinance.
In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the assailed Ordinance was enacted to
alleviate the economic condition of its constituents. 122chanrobleslaw
Expressing the same position, former Mayor Lim even went to the extent of detailing the steps 123
he took prior to the signing of the Ordinance, if only to show his honest intention to make the
right decision.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the
operations of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not
substantially differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of the
council and/or political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
general welfare of the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true
sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference of the
members who sit in the council as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to
favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on
the matter, favoring the citys economic-related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil
terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for
this Court to make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which
specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history
reveals that there is truly no such thing as the will of Manila insofar as the general welfare of
the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara 124 by Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary
mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them.chanrobleslaw
III
The measures taken by the intervenors to lend support to their position that Manila is now safe
despite the presence of the oil terminals remain ineffective. These have not completely removed
the threat to the lives of the inhabitants of Manila.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as a
guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. There,
the Court said that the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power
with the concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila; 125 and a lawful method the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial, which effectively
ends the continued stay of the oil depots in Pandacan. 126chanrobleslaw
In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil companies plead that the Pandacan

The intervenors went on to identify the measures taken to ensure the safety of the people even
with the presence of the Pandacan Terminals. Thus:
1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and Petron, continues to enhance the safety and
security features of the terminals. They likewise adopt fire and product spill prevention
measures in accordance with the local standards set by the Bureau of Fire Protection, among
others, and with the international standards of the American Petroleum Industry (API) and the
National Fire Prevention and Safety Association (NFPSA); that since 1914, the oil depots had
not experienced any incident beyond the ordinary risks and expectations 130 of the
residents of Manila; and that it received a passing grade on the safety measures they installed
in the facilities from the representatives of the City of Manila who conducted an ocular
inspection on 22 May 2009; and
2. Referring to the old MOU entered into between the City of Manila and the DOE, on the one
hand, and the oil companies, on the other, where the parties thereto conceded and
acknowledged that the scale-down option for the Pandacan Terminal operations is the best
alternative to the relocation of the terminals, Shell enumerates the steps taken to scale down its
operations.
As to the number of main fuel tanks, the entire Pandacan Terminal has already decommissioned
twenty-eight out of sixty-four tanks. Speaking for Shell alone, its LPG Spheres, which it claims is
the only product that may cause explosion, was part of those decommissioned, thereby
allegedly removing the danger of explosion. Safety buffer zones and linear/green parks were
likewise created to separate the terminal from the nearest residential area. Shells portion of the
oil depot is likewise allegedly equipped with the latest technology to ensure air-quality control
and water-quality control, and to prevent and cope with possible oil spills with a crisis
management plan in place in the event that an oil spill occurs. Finally, Shell claims that the
recommendations of EQE International in its Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study, which
it says is one of the leading independent risk assessment providers in the world and largest risk
management consultancy, were sufficiently complied with; and that, on its own initiative, it
adopted additional measures for the purpose, for which reason, the individual risk level
resulting from any incident occurring from the Pandacan Terminal, per the QRA study, is twenty
(20) times lower compared to the individual risk level of an average working or domestic
environment.131chanrobleslaw
We are not persuaded.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has
already been passed upon in G. R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on
Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then position of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod,132 the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is
imminent. It remains so convinced.
Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of the depots
where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of whether or
not the composition may cause explosions, has no place in a densely populated area. Surely,
any untoward incident in the oil depots, be it related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise,
would definitely cause not only destruction to properties within and among the neighboring
communities but certainly mass deaths and injuries.
With regard to the scaling down of the operations in the Pandacan Terminals, which the oil
companies continue to insist to have been validated and recognized by the MOU, the Court, in
G.R. No. 156052, has already put this issue to rest. It specifically declared that even assuming
that the terms of the MOU and Ordinance No. 8027 were inconsistent, the resolutions ratifying
the MOU gave it full force and effect only until 30 April 2003. 133chanrobleslaw
The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain insufficient to convince the Court that
the dangers posed by the presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area have already
been completely removed.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no matter
how remote it is as perceived by one or some, we cannot allow the right to life to be dependent
on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability have no place in situations
where the very life of not just an individual but of residents of big neighborhoods is at stake.
IV
It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in
and made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187,
compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay
of the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring
health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian

reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:

On the matter of the failure of Atty. Gempis to immediately comply with the directives of this
Court to file the Memorandum for the Vice-Mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of
the assailed Ordinance, the records do not bear proof that he received a copy of any of the
resolutions pertaining to the filing of the Memorandum.

(1)

the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products
A narration
whichofinclude
the events
petroleum
from hisgas,
endliquefied
would show,
petroleum
however,
gas,that he was aware of the directive
aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
issued in 2009 when he stated that when the City Legal Officer filed its Memorandum dated 8
(2)
the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
February 2010, [he] thought the filing of a Memorandum for the other respondent city officials
(3)
it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacaang Palace; and
could be dispensed with.139 There was also a categorical admission that he received the later
(4)
in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboringResolution
communities.
of 31 May 2011 but that he could not prepare a Memorandum defending the position
of respondents vice-mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of Ordinance No. 8187 in
view of the on-going drafting of Ordinance No. 8283, which would change the position of the
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
Sanggunian, if subsequently approved.
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly,
as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it
The reasons he submitted are not impressed with merit.
(sic) there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat
That he was not officially designated as the counsel for the vice-mayor and the city councilors is
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot
beside the point. As an officer of the court, he cannot feign ignorance of the fact that a
remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any
resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with
convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of
promptly and completely. 140 As early as 2009, he should have immediately responded and filed
Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No.
a Manifestation and therein set forth his reasons why he cannot represent the vice-mayor and
8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
the city councilors. And, even assuming that the 31 May 2011 Resolution was the first directive
he personally received, he had no valid excuse for disregarding the same. Worse, the Court had
There is, therefore, no need to resolve the rest of the issues.
to issue a show cause order before he finally heeded.
Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test of police power against the assailed
ordinance. Suffice it to state that the objective adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod to
promote the constituents general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the
very basic rights to life, security and safety of the people.
In. G.R. No. 156052, the Court explained
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand
to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police power
clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail. 135
We thus conclude with the very final words in G.R. No. 156052:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and
14,000 liters of diesel exploded in the middle of the street a short distance from the exit gate of
the Pandacan Terminals, causing death, extensive damage and a frightening conflagration in
the vicinity of the incident. Need we say anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated 162
to 211 million liters [or whatever is left of the 26 tanks] of petroleum products in the terminal
complex will blow up?136
Finally, let it be underscored that after the last Manifestation filed by Shell informing this Court
that respondent former Mayor Lim vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 for the second time, and was
anticipating its referral to the President for the latters consideration, nothing was heard from
any of the parties until the present petitions as to the status of the approval or disapproval of the
said ordinance. As it is, the fate of the Pandacan Terminals remains dependent on this final
disposition of these cases.chanrobleslaw
VI

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance No. 8187 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil
Terminals.
The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8187. In coordination with the appropriate government agencies and
the parties herein involved, he is further ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil
terminals out of the Pandacan area.
As likewise required in G.R. No. 156052, the intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation shall, within a non-extendible period of
forty-five (45) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later than
six (6) months from the date the required documents are submitted. The presiding judge of
Branch 39 shall monitor the strict enforcement of this Decision.
For failure to observe the respect due to the Court, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, is REMINDED of his duties towards the Court and WARNED that a
repetition of an act similar to that here committed shall be dealt with more severely.
References:
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2.
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4.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution A Comprehensive Reviewer, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,

S.J.
Outline Reviewer in Political Law, Justice Antonio B. Nachura
The Local Government Code of 1991 Annotated, Rufus B. Rodriguez
Public Corporations, Justice Ruperto G. Martin