CDP 3001 - Guidance Ship Security Plan

MODEL SHIP SECURITY PLAN GUIDANCE TO
ACCOMPANY THE SECURITY PLAN TEMPLATE
PRESENTED BY:
Commonwealth of Dominica Maritime Registry
32 Washington Street, Fairhaven, Massachusetts, 02719, USA

Tel: 508-992-7170 * Fax: +508-992-7120
www.dominica-registry.com
Dominica Maritime Registry
Model Ship Security Plan Guidance
rev. 09/03

rev. 09/03
Introduction
In response to the growing threat of terrorism, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has adopted
new security measures and procedures for ships and port facilities. Among the new security initiatives,
each ship will have to develop a comprehensive Ship Security Plan. Fixed and floating platforms are not
covered by this template and instruction as the security needs for these marine facilities and the
implementation of their plans will be very different from that of seagoing ships and ships that are engaged
in international trade.
To help ship owners and operators implement the new security requirements, the Commonwealth of
Dominica Maritime Registry (DMRI) developed this Ship Security Plan Template. The template offers
step-by-step directions, based on guidance from the IMO, to develop a Ship Security Plan.
Every ship security plan must describe actions the crew will take to:
Prevent terrorist or criminal activities happening on board or to the ship,
Identify the potential for criminal or terrorist activities happening on board or to the ship,
Deter terrorist or criminal activities, and
React when terrorist or criminal activities are encountered.
By answering a series of questions in the following guides and completing the template that follows, users
will be able to conduct a survey to assess ship security, determine vulnerabilities, and develop specific
recommendations to improve security and mitigate risks. This book also includes guidance to develop a
threat assessment and to continue to evaluate security at sea and in ports. Some of print in the template
will be in green. This green print will include further guidance and instruction for the user.
The following guides were developed to assist the Company Security Officer in developing a Ship
Security Plan for each of the ships for which he is responsible:
Guide 1 Developing Threat Assessments,
Guide 2 Ship Security Assessment (Survey)
Guide 3 How to Identify and Mitigate Security Vulnerabilities, and
Guide 4 Establishing Protective Measures
Guide 5 Performing Verification Security Assessments
The end product of the ship survey and security assessment is a Ship Security Plan. The plan includes a
decision trees for Company and Ship Security Officers to determine when it is advisable to elevate
Security Levels or readiness conditions in response to a threat(s).
Users of the Security Plan Template will be able to answer questions and supply information on specific
issues, required to generate a complete Ship Security Plan. The template greatly facilitates the
development of threat assessments between each port-to-port call, allowing Ship Security Officers to best
respond to potential threats, from piracy attacks to terrorist stowaways.
By understanding threats, knowing a ships vulnerabilities, and implementing appropriate security
measures and procedures, Company and Ship Security Officers can reduce security risks and safeguard
the ship, crew, and cargo.
The company security Officer should keep the list of who was issued a copy of each security plan. To
assist him in this effort, we have attached Appendix A titled Distribution of Security Plans a Controlled
Document. One of these should be completed for each vessel.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
International Ship and Port Security Division............................................................................................... 1
Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 2
Guide 1: Developing Threat Assessments................................................................................................... 8
1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 8
2 Threats to Ships................................................................................................................................... 8
3 Threat Assessment Criteria.................................................................................................................. 9
4 Worksheet........................................................................................................................................... 11
5 Threat Assessment............................................................................................................................. 12
Guide 2: Ship Initial Security Assessment (Survey)...................................................................................13
1 Survey: Introduction........................................................................................................................... 13
3 On-scene Security Survey.................................................................................................................. 14
5 Ship Access Control........................................................................................................................... 15
5.1 Ship Interior................................................................................................................................. 15
5.2 Identification Systems................................................................................................................. 16
6 Restricted Areas................................................................................................................................ 19
7 Security Alarm, Surveillance and Communications Systems............................................................20
8
Emergency Plans and Equipment................................................................................................. 22
Guide 3: How to Identify and Mitigate Security Vulnerabilities...................................................................23
1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................... 23
2 Security Observations & Recommendations....................................................................................23
2.1 Deck and ship side Lighting....................................................................................................... 23
2.2. Interior Ship Access Control....................................................................................................... 24
2.3 Identification Systems................................................................................................................ 24
2.4 Key Control................................................................................................................................ 25
2.5. Restricted Areas......................................................................................................................... 25
2.6 Security Alarm, Surveillance, and Communications Systems.....................................................26
2.7 Emergency Plans and Equipment...............................................................................................26
Guide 4: Guidance for Establishing Protective Measures..........................................................................28
1
Introduction................................................................................................................................... 28
2
Ensuring the performance of all vessel security duties:................................................................28
3 Monitoring Restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access.............................29
4 Controlling Access to the Ship........................................................................................................... 30
5 Monitoring deck areas and areas surrounding the ship......................................................................31
6 Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects....................................................................32
7
Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects..............................................................33
8 Ensuring that port-specific security communication is readily available.............................................34
Guide 5:
Developing Final Security Assessment................................................................................35
1
Introduction................................................................................................................................... 35
2
Risk Based Security Assessment Simplified.................................................................................35
2.1 Potential Threats......................................................................................................................... 35
Table 1: Notional List of Scenarios........................................................................................................ 36
Typical Types of Scenarios.................................................................................................................... 36
2.2 Consequence assessment.......................................................................................................... 36
Table 2: Consequence Score................................................................................................................ 37
2.3 Vulnerability Assessment............................................................................................................ 37
2.4 Mitigation.................................................................................................................................... 38
Table 5.............................................................................................................................................. 39
2.5 Implementation Methods............................................................................................................ 39
Table 6.............................................................................................................................................. 40
Appendix A: Distribution List Of Security Plans.........................................................................................42
A Controlled Document.............................................................................................................................. 42

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1. Definitions
Bulk carrier Single-deck ships designed to transport dry cargo, such as grain or coal. See SOLAS
regulation IX/1.6.
Chemical tanker A tanker constructed or adapted and used for the carriage in bulk of any liquid
product. Chemical tankers usually have large numbers of very small capacity tanks. See SOLAS
regulation IX/1.6.
Company Security Officer (CSO) A security expert designated by the ships company to develop
and maintain a Ship Security Plan and coordinate security measures and procedures with Port
Facility Security Officers to protect ships, crew, passengers, and cargo.
Declaration of Security A written record of understanding(s) between a Ship Security Officer and
a Port Facility Security Officer to indicate security measures implemented to respond to a designated
security level.
Designated Authority An organization(s) or administration(s) identified by or within the Contracting
Government as responsible for the implementation of the security measures and procedures.
Gas carrier A tanker constructed or adapted and used for the carriage in bulk of any liquefied gas
or other substance of a flammable nature. See definition in SOLAS regulation VII/8.2.
High-speed Craft A craft capable of traveling at high speeds as defined in SOLAS regulation
X/1.2.
Oil Tanker A tanker carrying crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo. See
definition in SOLAS regulation II-1/2.12.
Port Facility Security Plan A plan to ensure the application of measures designed to protect the
port facility and ships, their cargoes and persons on board from the risks of a security accident.
Recognized Security Organization An organization with expertise in security and anti-terrorism
matters, which is recognized by the Administration or the designated authority and authorized by it to
conduct survey, assessment, verification, and certification activities, as required by IMO regulations.
Security Incident Any act threatening the security of a ship or a port facility.
Security Level A description of the degree of risk associated with the threat of an unlawful act
against a ship or port.
Non-specific Threat A threat based on a high probability or likelihood that an attack or incident
may occur in a particular area (e.g., an attack has occurred in the recent past in the area and there
is a likelihood of a future attack or a government has issued a warning about possible attacks in the
region).
Piracy Any illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends on the
high seas against another ship or against persons or property on board the ship. Piracy occurs
outside the jurisdiction of any state.
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Port Facility A separate location within a port at which commercial maritime activities occur.
Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) The person appointed as responsible for the development,
implementation, revision, and maintenance of the Port Facility Security Plan and for liaison with the
ship security officers and company security officers.
Port Facility Security Survey A survey that examines the strengths and weaknesses of security
systems and procedures at a port facility.
Security Readiness Conditions Security Levels or operating procedures that are modified to help
a ship and crew respond to variations in threats.
Ship Security Assessment includes a Ship security survey, threat assessment, and vulnerability
assessment.
Ship Security Officer (SSO) A person on board the Ship accountable to the master for the
security of the Ship, including the implementation and maintenance of the Ship Security Plan and for
liaison with the Company Security Officer and the Port Facility Security Officer.
Ship Security Plan A plan developed to ensure the application of security measures on board a
Ship. The plan provides measures and procedures to protect persons, cargo, and the ship from the
risks of a security incident.
Ship Security Survey A Security Survey is an evaluation of the Ships security systems,
measures, and procedures. The survey allows the SSO to determine potential strengths and
weaknesses in security and a ships ability to counter potential threats at port, anchor, and sea.
Specific Threat A threat in which specific information is available about a pending/potential attack
in a specific region/location.
Threat Assessment The process of identifying and analyzing credible threats of danger, damage,
or loss to a ship, its crew, and cargo.
Vulnerability Assessment An examination of potential shortfalls in the ships existing security
systems and procedures.

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Guide 1: Developing Threat Assessments

1 Introduction
Company Security Officer are required to assess the potential threats to their ships, determine the
level of risk, and set the Security Level (readiness condition) to provide guidance for protection from
security incidents.
Threats will vary during transit between ports. The Ship Security Officer (SSO) is required to provide
advice on the level of threats likely to be encountered by a Ship, using appropriate security
assessments and other relevant information.
Below is information on potential threats, threat assessment criteria, and a worksheet to assess
potential threats.
2 Threats to Ships
There is a wide range of potential threats to a ship. Threats to a ship can quickly change. A ships
location, the time of day, and international events can dramatically alter the threat to a ship. As a
consequence, it is critical for the SSO to regularly monitor events to determine potential threats in
the path of the ship as it travels to its next destination. Following is information on potential threats to
a ship:
Piracy and Armed Attacks Raiders pose a serious threat to ships in many parts of the
world. Most attacks occur while in port. While at sea, ships are most vulnerable when
passing close to land or when transiting narrow channels. Almost any item of value on a
ship may be of interest to robbers. Pirate attacks are often organized by crime syndicates.
In nearly a third of reported cases, there is reported violence or a threat of violence to the
crew.
Terrorism Historically few ships have been attacked by terrorists. One of the most
notable incidents occurred in 1985 when terrorists took control of a cruise ship and held
the passengers hostage to secure the release of terrorists in prison. In October 2002, the
oil tanker Limburg was attacked by terrorists. Terrorists are targeting ships and they are
becoming increasingly violent. Authorities are concerned that a ship could be used as a
weapon; an explosive device in the cargo area could be detonated while in port. Terrorists
may seek to use a ship to smuggle weapons or mount an attack using chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear materials (weapons of mass destruction). Terrorists
may attempt to use cargo containers to smuggle personnel to another country.
Cargo Tampering Billions of dollars in high-value cargo, such as furs, alcohol, and
electronics, is stolen annually while ships are in port. Crewmembers have also been
known to steal items from cargo containers, ships stores, and equipment or to assist
thieves.
Drug/Weapons Smuggling A small fraction of internationally shipped containers are

inspected. As there is a minimal risk of detection, smugglers can potentially conceal illegal

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drugs/weapons in cargo containers. The ships at greatest risk for this type of criminal
activity are container ships transporting cargo to or from areas of civil unrest and known
drug producing nations.
Stowaways, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers Stowaways present an ongoing

problem and liability for the maritime industry. Most incidents involve bribery to smuggle
people on board. International laws and conventions provide guidelines and
responsibilities for handling stowaways, refugees, and asylum seekers.
Sabotage While cargos have been destroyed and/or ships sunk to collect insurance,
the number of reported cases in the maritime industry is small.
Environmental and Political Extremists Actions taken by extremist environmental

groups can threaten the safety of a ship and its crew. Such extremists have been known
to chain themselves to a ship to impede a ships passage. The threat is largely dependant
on the type of cargo a ship carries and the nature of its trade (i.e., heavy oils, forest
products, petroleum, whaling, etc.)
Natural Disasters Natural disasters have always posed serious threats to ships at sea
and in port. All ships should have crisis management plans to deal with such
emergencies.
Collateral Damage An explosion or terrorist attack could cause collateral damage to a

nearby ship in port. Additionally, petrochemical plants and terminals are located in
harbors, and if a plant were targeted, a cloud of toxic gas could threaten the lives of
crewmembers.
Labor Strife Labor groups protesting in port can disrupt operations. Often additional
security measures are warranted to protect crewmembers and prevent unauthorized
access to a ship.
Labor Unrest A host of crew complaints, including excessively long shifts, poor
food/water, cramped and dirty conditions, and failing to pay wages have precipitated
protests by crewmembers. In some cases, they have walked off ships, while others have
held a ship hostage until their demands are met.
Crew Violence Crew violence is best deterred through continued vigilance by the
Master and officers.
Mutiny Crews can threaten to mutiny as a last resort when their complaints about
financial, working and living conditions are not remedied by the ships officers or
operators. Most reported mutinies, although rare in recent times, involve fishing boats
with small crews.
3 Threat Assessment Criteria

Issues to consider when developing a threat assessment are:
Location A ships location can be important in determining a potential threat. For instance,
ships are most vulnerable to attack by pirates at sea when near land and when sailing
through narrow channels where speed and maneuverability may be restricted.

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Government/general warnings are announced for specific countries or regions of high pirate
activity.
Ship Owners Nationality Nationality of the ships owners, and operators may increase
the profile of the ship as a target, to terrorists.
Crew
Nationality of the crew may increase the profile of the ship as a target, to terrorists.
Nationality of the crew should be also considered when evaluating potential internal
threats.
Neighboring ships Nationality - should be considered as certain flags, for one reason or
another, will be more likely to harbor terrorists or support other criminal activities.
Time of day Ships are most vulnerable undercover of darkness when there is inadequate
light to detect or protect against an unauthorized boarding at sea, while moored, or at
anchor.
Type of ship General Cargo Ships, Reefers, Bulk Carriers Container Ships, Ro.Ros are
more vulnerable to theft and drug smuggling than other types of ships. If terrorists are
seeking to smuggle weapons into a country, they may choose a low profile cargo ship. But if
terrorists want to block a channel, a larger ship like a bulk/ore carrier may be targeted. If
terrorists are seeking to use a ship as a weapon, they may seek to gain control of a ship
transporting hazardous materials.

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4 Worksheet
Contracting Governments are responsible for assessing threats at ports and setting the Security
Level. For best practices, a Ship Security Officer may independently assess the quality of the
security measures at port using this worksheet.
The worksheet also provides a tool to assess potential threats for each port-to-port segment of a
ships itinerary. Information about potential threats is available from a variety of sources. These
include port authorities, Captains of the Port, Port Security Officers, local law enforcement officers,
and local consular or diplomatic representatives. A variety of government, industry, and international
business organizations offer information on potential threats. Data is also available from Internet
sites on piracy and other threats.
Below are potential threats ships can face while at sea or while in port. Check the appropriate box if:
1) a current warning has been issued by a government official or organization about the threat;
2) a previous official warning was issued; and/or
3) there have been previous reported incidents.
Threats
Current Warning
Previous Warning
Reported Incidents
Criminal Activity
Piracy and armed attacks
Terrorism
Theft
Drug/weapons smuggling
Stowaways, refuges, &
asylum seekers
Sabotage
Environmental Extremists
Natural Disasters
Labor Unrest
Collateral Damage
Crew Violence
Mutiny

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5 Threat Assessment
Based on intelligence gathered from official sources and the information above, make a
determination whether a potential threat meets either of the following definitions:
Non-specific threat An attack(s) has occurred in the recent past in the area and there is a
likelihood of a future attack or a government has issued a warning about a region.
Alternatively, there have been recent civil/internal problems, such as cargo theft, piracy, or
smuggling, and they are likely to re-occur in the future.
Specific threat Specific information is available about a pending/potential attack in a

specific region/location.
Using information gathered from intelligence sources and the above criteria, determine if there are
non-specific or specific threats of:
Type of Threat
Threat Status
No
Threat
Non
Specific
Environmental conditions that

provide opportunities
Specific
Threat
No
Threat to
Human
Life
Weather
Conditions
Transiting
At Night
Moonlight
While
At Sea
Threat
To
Human
Life
Piracy &
Armed Attacks
Terrorism
Drug/Weapons
Smuggling
Stowaways,
Refugees, and
Asylum
Seekers
Sabotage
Environmental
Extremists
Labor Strife
Labor Unrest
Crew Violence
Mutiny

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Guide 2: Ship Initial Security Assessment (Survey)

1 Survey: Introduction
The Ship Security Survey is the first step to developing a Ship Security Assessment. It is the
responsibility of the Company Security Officer (the SSO can act on behalf of the CSO) to ensure a
Ship Security Assessment is carried out by competent persons with skills to evaluate the security of
a ship.
The survey identifies and evaluates the necessary security measures to counter potential threats to
the ship at port, at anchor, and at sea. An assessment must be documented and a copy retained by
the Company. The assessment must include an on-scene security survey with, at least, the following
elements:
Identify the existing security measures, procedures, and operations.
Identify and evaluate the key shipboard operations that are important to protect.
Identify the possible threats to the key shipboard operations and the likelihood of their occurrence,
in order to establish and prioritize security measures.

Identify security weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies, and
procedures.
2 Review Information
Prior to an assessment, the CSO should review available information on potential threats at the ports
where the ship will call or passengers embark or disembark. The CSO should assess security
measures at the port facilities and previous reports on similar security needs. Where feasible, the
CSO should meet with appropriate persons on the ship and in the port facilities to discuss the
purpose and methodology of the assessment.
Following is a checklist of information the CSO should obtain to conduct an assessment:
General layout of the Ship.
Location of areas that should have restricted access, such as the bridge, engine room, radio room,
etc.
Location and function of each actual or potential access point to the Ship.
Open deck arrangement including the height of the deck above water.
Emergency and stand-by equipment available to maintain essential services.
Numerical strength, reliability, and security duties of the ship s crew.
Existing security and safety equipment for protecting the passengers and crew.
Existing agreements with private security companies for providing ship and waterside security
services.
Existing protective measures and procedures in practice, including inspection, control and monitoring
equipment, personnel identification documents and communication, alarm, lighting, access control and
other appropriate systems.

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3 On-scene Security Survey

The CSO should examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures, and
operations to:
Ensure the performance of all ship security duties.
Control access to all areas of the ship.
Monitor the deck areas and areas surrounding the ship.
Control access to restricted areas of the ship.
Control the embarkation of persons and their effects (luggage, baggage, and crews
personal gear).
Supervise the handling of cargo and ships stores.
Ensure that port-specific security communication, information, and equipment are readily
available.
The CSO should also identify potential weaknesses, including factors in the infrastructure, which
may include:
Conflicting policies between safety and security measure.
Conflicting shipboard and security duty assignments.
Watchkeeping and manning constraints.
Training deficiencies.
This security survey was completed by:
Date completed:
4 Deck and Ship side Lighting

Type of lighting used:
The lighting is:
Manual
Automatic
Who is responsible for the lighting maintenance?

Yes
No: Are all access points to the Ship lighted?

Exceptions:
Yes
No: Do light patterns overlap?
Yes
No: Are all perimeter areas lighted during hours of darkness?

If not, explain:
Yes
No: Does the system include multiple circuits to prevent the entire system from failing if
one light malfunctions?
Yes
No: Is someone responsible for turning lights on and off?

If so, whom?

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Yes
No: Are there adequate lighting supplies? (bulbs, fuses, etc.)
Yes
No: Does the lighting protect the guards?

Yes
No: Are critical and vulnerable areas well lit?
Yes
No: Is there an auxiliary power source available?

The auxiliary power source is:
Manual
Who is responsible for the manual start?
Automatic
5 Ship Access Control

5.1 Ship Interior
List hatches and other openings:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Describe the types of locks that secure the hatches and openings:
Yes
No: Are hinges and lock hasps securely installed?
Who is responsible for making sure hatches and doors are secured?
Yes
No: Are all portholes and windows that are not used permanently closed?
Yes
No: Do mesh or bars protect all accessible portholes and windows?
Yes
No: Are portholes and windows covered by wire mesh?
Yes
No: If yes, are the mesh coverings fastened from the inside or secured with locks?
Describe the materials used and type of construction of the frames:

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Yes
No: Have glass panes been hardened?
Yes
No: If portholes and windows can be opened and are locked, are they protected by
ordinary window level locks or key locks?
Yes
No: Are there ladders (permanent or nonpermanent) that should be removed, secured, or
blocked from unauthorized usage?
List gangways, ramps, side ports, etc. and current security measures:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Access Point
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Security Control Measures & Equipment
5.2 Identification Systems

Yes
No: Is a personnel identification system used?
If yes, what methods are used?

Guard
Describe:
Badge
Other
Describe:
Describe:
How are vendors, visitors, and repairman controlled? (check appropriate box)
Log
Describe:
Escorted
Describe:

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Badge
Describe:
Yes
No: Are vendors and visitors escorted throughout the ship at all times?
Yes
No: Is there a single egress/ingress control point for all vendors?
Yes
No: Is the personnel egress/ingress control points the same as for visitors?

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Following are the main access points to the ship and other potential access points, including open
weather decks (each access point should be examined and evaluated to determine the potential for
use by persons engaged in unlawful actions):
List special procedures to secure equipment and materials on deck:

Yes
No: Is a property pass system used to remove property?
Height of the deck above water (freeboard):

5.3 Key Control
Yes
No: Is there a log for issuing keys?

Yes
No: Are keys signed for?
Yes
No: Are all the keys accounted for?
Yes
No: Is the log up to date?
Number of master keys:
List of individuals who have master keys:

Name:
Position:
Name:
Position:

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Name:
Position:
Yes
transferred?
No: Are there procedures for returning keys when personnel are terminated or
If yes, describe the procedures:
6 Restricted Areas
Yes
No: Has the SSO established restricted areas throughout the ship?
Yes
No: Do all staff know the proper procedures when an unauthorized person is detected in
a restricted area?
Following are the ships restricted areas, such as the bridge, control station, machinery spaces, radio
room, etc.:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Yes
No: Are all restricted areas clearly labeled as such?

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7 Security Alarm, Surveillance and Communications Systems

New regulations require ships to be fitted with a Ship security alarm system. The regulations apply to
oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers, cargo high-speed craft of 500 gross tons
and upward constructed before July 1, 2004. After this date, all new Ships will come equipped with
the alarm system.
The alarm must automatically initiate and transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent
authority by the Administration that identifies the Ship, its location, and indicates the Ship is under
threat or has been compromised.
The alarm should not send the ship security alert to other ships, it should not raise an alarm on
board the Ship, and should continuously transmit the Ship security alert until it has be deactivated
and reset by authorized personnel on board the ship.
The alarm must be able to be activated on the navigation bridge and at least one other location. The
location of the activation points must be designed to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized
initiation of the ship security alert.
Te following information is Confidential and should be retained as such on board and under
the control of the Captain and Ships Security Officer:
Locations of the security
alarm :
Procedures for using the

security alarm:
Testing:
Activation:
Deactivation:
Resetting:
Yes
No: Are other security alarms used on board?
Date of installation:
Date last inspected:
Procedures for activating and deactivating the system:

Who is authorized to turn off the systems?
Yes
No: Are surveillance systems used on board?


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Following is a description of the Ships communication equipment and backup systems to ensure
effective continuous communication between shipboard security personnel, port facilities, other
Ships, and when appropriate, with national or local authorities with security responsibilities:
Yes
No: Are internal communication systems used on board?


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Emergency Plans and Equipment
Does the Ship have the following emergency plans?

Yes
No: Fire and Explosion
Yes
No: Hurricane and Heavy Weather
Yes
No: Collision
Yes
No: Grounding
Yes
No: Loss of Stability
Yes
No: Loss of power/Steering
Yes
No: Loss of Cargo and/or Fuel Oil
Yes
No: Piracy
Yes
No: Bomb Threat
Yes
No: Terrorism
Yes
No: Other
Yes
No: Have the plans been tested?
Yes
No: Are drills conducted?
Following is a description of the emergency and stand-by equipment:

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Guide 3: How to Identify and Mitigate Security Vulnerabilities

1 Introduction
The Ship Security Plan offers observations about security vulnerabilities and recommendations to
mitigate risks. The Plan also provides:
Guidance to determine when higher readiness conditions are warranted.
Procedures to evacuate in case of security threats or breaches of security.
Procedures to ensure the inspection, testing, calibration, and maintenance of any security
equipment provided on board.

Measures and equipment designed to prevent weapons, dangerous substances, and
devices intended for use against people, ships, or ports and the carriage of which is not
authorized, from being introduced by any means on board a ship.
2 Security Observations & Recommendations

In this section, recommendations are provided to mitigate security vulnerabilities. Determining the
most effective and prudent security measures and procedures to reduce risks can be a complex
process. Following are different security methodologies for consideration in the analysis:
Create layers of increasing defense, starting at the perimeter and working inward to the
center of the ship. If intruders penetrate the perimeter, they should face more stringent
security measures as they move inward.
Maximize human surveillance and the visibility of people and security measures. The better
protected a ship appears to be, the less chance an intruder will attempt to board.
Clearly mark all restricted areas and access points with signs. Marked boundaries create a
sense of control and increase the probability that an intruder will be deterred from attempting
to board the ship.
2.1 Deck and ship side Lighting

Observation Describe below any weaknesses in deck and ship side lighting outlined in the
vulnerability assessment and explain the potential consequences to the ship, crew, and cargo:

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Recommendation Based on the observations and analyses above, provide recommendations

below to correct the security deficiencies:
2.2. Interior Ship Access Control

Observation Describe below any weaknesses in the interior ship access control measures and
procedures outlined in the vulnerability assessment and explain the potential consequences to the
ship, crew, and cargo:

2.3 Identification Systems

Observation Describe below any weaknesses in the identification systems and measures outlined
in the vulnerability assessment and explain the potential consequences to the ship, crew, and cargo:

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2.4 Key Control

Observation Describe below any weaknesses in the key control measures and procedures
outlined in the vulnerability assessment and explain the potential consequences to the ship, crew,
and cargo:

2.5. Restricted Areas

Observation Describe below any weaknesses in the control measures and procedures for
restricted areas outlined in the vulnerability assessment and explain the potential consequences to
the ship, crew, and cargo:

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2.6 Security Alarm, Surveillance, and Communications Systems

Observation Describe below any weaknesses in the security alarm, surveillance, and
communications systems outlined in the vulnerability assessment and explain the potential
consequences to the ship, crew, and cargo:

2.7 Emergency Plans and Equipment

Observation Describe below any weaknesses in the emergency plans and equipment outlined in
the vulnerability assessment and explains the potential consequences to the ship, crew, and cargo:

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Guide 4: Guidance for Establishing Protective Measures

1
Introduction
The Vulnerability Assessment previously completed determines potential shortfalls in the ships
existing security systems and procedures. We have taken information from the USCGs Guidance on
Establishing Protective Measures found in Appendix A to enclosure (1) of NVIC 10-02 to provide the
vessel Owners and operators with additional guidance which may help to select the appropriate
protective measures allowing the ship to achieve an acceptable level of protection for each activity. A
ship may consider implementing those protective measures that are indicated by a yes in a table.
For example, found in Table2. While locking or securing a restricted area may be more protective
and reliable, using a combination of roving patrols and security alarms may provide and acceptable
level of protection for a specific security level.
Security measures and initiatives may be incorporated into existing duties for specific crewmembers.
For example, fire patrols and roving engineering watches make rounds and may perform security
patrol duties during the performance of their current duties.
2
2.1
Ensuring the performance of all vessel security duties:

Ships may incorporate relevant security elements into the duties and responsibilities of
watchstanders. Such elements may include, but not be restricted to:
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.2
Heighten awareness that includes observing and reporting malfunctioning security

equipment, suspicious persons, objects and activities during rounds; and
Additional duties as required by the security plan.
The following Tableprovides additional guidance on protective measures and procedures for
ensuring performance of all security duties:
TABLE 1
PROTECTIVE MEASURE
Security Level
1
2
2
All ships crewmembers normally review and exercise their security

duties and responsibilities through drills and training.
Provide security information to all crewmembers and any security
personnel that includes the specific security and any specific
threat.
Ships Security Officer should normally communicate with
waterfront facility to coordinate protective measures
Yes*
Yes*
Yes*
Optional
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes#
Yes#
*Drills are conducted monthly

#Coordinate additional protective measures with Port facility Office

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3 Monitoring Restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access
3.1
Ships should establish restricted areas to control access to key areas. The following areas
may be designated as restricted areas and, if identified as restricted areas, shall be listed as
such in the Ships Security Plan
Navigation Bridge,
Control Stations and central control stations,
Machinery Spaces containing [propulsion machinery, generators and major electrical

machinery, main and auxiliary steering gear, ventilations and air conditioning
machinery and similar spaces,
Spaces with access to portable water tanks, pumps, or manifolds;
Cargo pump room; and
Any other areas as determined by the Company Security Officer to which access
may be restricted to maintain the security of the ship.
3.2
All restricted areas may be marked indicating that the area has restricted access. Markings
do not need to be conspicuous to persons other than the crew.
3.3
Restricted area monitoring may be accomplished as indicated in the following table:
TABLE 2
PROTECTIVE MEASURE
Security Level
1
2
2
Locking or security access to restricted areas@
Optional
Yes
Yes
Using personnel as security guards or patrols
Optional
Yes*
Yes*
*Dedicating personnel to guarding or patrolling restricting areas may include:

#Posting personnel to continuously guard restricted areas and/or assigning personnel to continuously
patrol restricted areas adjacent to restricted areas
@Doors in escape routes must be capable of being operated without keys from the direction for which the
escape is required.
3.4
Additional Protective measures to monitor restricted areas may include:
3.5
Using surveillance equipment, such as closed circuit televisions (CTV); or

Using automatic intrusion detection devices to alert the crew of unauthorized.
When automatic intrusion detection devices are used to monitor unauthorized access to
restricted areas, automatic intrusion devices may:
Activate an audible and or visual alarm:
Indicate in a location that is continuously staffed or monitored; and be regularly

tested.

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4 Controlling Access to the Ship

4.1
When implementing protective measures the following access points shall be evaluated:
Ladders
Gangways
Side ports
Adjacent piers and aprons, and
Other access points identified in the vessels security assessment.
4.2
Ships may implement the protective measures or combination of protective measures
provided in the Tablebelow to control access to the ship.
TABLE 3
PROTECTIVE MEASURE
Security Level
2
2
Access points are normally secured@ or continuously attended to

prevent unauthorized access
Yes
Yes#
Yes#
Weather-deck access vents, storage boxes, and doors to normally

unmanned spaces (such as storerooms, auxiliary machinery
rooms, etc) may be locked@ or precautions taken to prevent
unauthorized access.
Limit entry to the shop to minimum number of access points +
Coordinate with the waterfront facility to extend access control
beyond the immediate area of the ship
Yes
Yes
Yes
Optional
Optional
Yes
Yes
Yes*
Yes
*Limit entry to single access point.

#Assign additional personnel to appropriate access points as designated in the Security Plan
@Doors in escape routes must be capable of being operated without keys from the direction for which the
escape is required.
+While not restricting egress from the ship in the event of an emergency
4.3
Access may be denied to any person refusing to submit to security verification or inspection
at an access point. Each person denied entry for refusing should be described in a report to
the appropriate authorities.

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5 Monitoring deck areas and areas surrounding the ship

5.1
A ships capabilities should normally include the ability to perform monitoring at all times and
under all conditions.
5.2
Monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship to identify and take preventive
measures against security incidents may be accomplished by using:
Equipment such as alarms and CCTV, and

Personnel, such as security patrols and access point guards.
TABLE 4
PROTECTIVE MEASURE
Use security lockouts and our security patrols

Perform waterside boat patrols
Use divers to inspect the underwater pier structures prior to the
ships arrival, upon the ships arrival and in other cases as deemed
Security Level
2
Optional
Optional
Optional
Yes
Optional
Optional
2
Yes*
Yes
Yes
*Increase the number and frequency of: Security patrols; and Waterside boat patrols to ensure continuous
monitoring.
5.3.1
Ships may consider illuminating their deck and access points to the ship while conducting
ship/water front facility interface activities. Ships may co-ordinate lighting with other entities
involved in the interface. While underway, ships shall consider using maximum lighting
available consistent with the ships safe navigation. A ship shall also consider the following in
establishing the appropriate level and location of lighting:
5.4
Crewmembers are generally able to see beyond the ship on both the pier side and
the waterside; and
Coverage normally includes the area around the ship.
At heightened security levels, additional lighting may be coordinated with the waterfront
facility to provide additional shore side lighting. Additional lighting may include:
Using spotlights and floodlights to enhance visibility of the deck and areas
surrounding the vessel; and
Using lighting to enhance visibility of the surrounding water and waterline.

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6 Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects

6.1
Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects to adequately identify and take
preventative measures against security incidents may include the protective measures
provided in the following table:
TABLE 5
PROTECTIVE MEASURE
Security Level
2
2
Yes
Yes#
Yes*
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes#
Yes
Yes@
Yes
Yes
Optional
Yes
Yes*
Optional
Yes
Yes
Limit entry to only passengers and crewmembers.
Optional
Optional
Yes
Escort all service providers or other personnel needed aboard to

provide essential services to the ship.
Optional
Optional
Yes
Verify reason personnel are embarking by using tickets,

Boarding passes, work orders, or other means.
Positively identify crewmembers, passengers, vendors, visitors,
and other persons prior to each embarkation.
Arriving crew verified as authorized to serve on board the ship.
Inspect persons, baggage, carry on items, and personal gear for:
weapons, incendiaries, explosives, etc.
Security briefings provided to all passengers prior to departing, on
any specific threats and vigilance and reporting of suspicious
persons, objects or activities.
Assign personnel to guard designated inspection areas.
*Security briefings are generally provided to all passengers, prior to embarkation and disembarkation.
#This may be accomplished by random inspections, such as 5-20% or some other method addressed in
the ships security plan.
@Increase the frequency, such as 25-50% and increase the scope of the inspection.
6.2
Areas should be designated to inspect baggage, carry-on items, and personal gear. Access
to and from these areas should be controlled to segregate inspected persons ands articles
form un-inspected persons and or articles.
6.3
The purpose of the inspection of private entities to secure their personal safety and the
safety of their property. Such inspections are intended to ensure that incendiary devices,
explosives or other items that pose a threat to the ship are removed. Inspections may be
limited and no more intrusive than necessary to protect against the danger of sabotage or
similar destructive acts of violence. Inspection techniques may include, but are not limited to:
magnetometers, physical examination of the person or object visually, the use of trained
animals, electronic devices or a combination of methods.

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7
7.1
Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects

Ships may use the following Tableas a guide on supervising the handling of cargo, vessels
stores and bunkers to adequately identify and take preventative measures against security
incidents:
TABLE 6
PROTECTIVE MEASURE
Security Level
1
2
2
Verify non-containerized cargo against the manifest.#

Verify the container identification numbers of loaded containers
against the manifest. #
Verify the container identification numbers of empty containers
against the manifest. #
Inspect the ships store and provisions
Yes*
All
All
All
All
All
Yes*
All
All
Yes*
Yes+
All
*This may be accomplished by random verification, such as 25-50%.

#Companies are encouraged to participate in government programs such as the U.S. Customs Service
program titled: Custom Trade Partnership Against terrorism (C-PTAT).
+Increase the frequency and depth of inspections, such as 25-50%
7.2
Verification and inspection of cargo and ships stores may be accomplished by:
Visual and physical examination:
Using scanning/detection equipments, mechanical devices or canines; or
Coordinating with the shipper or other responsible party through and established
agreement and procedures.
7.3
At heightened security levels, the detail or depth of the above methods may be increased
commensurate with the threat.

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8 Ensuring
that port-specific security communication is readily available
8.1 Ships normally ensure that means of communication for reporting threats to the ship are:
8.2
Maintained and operable

Readily available
Able to communicate within the ship, to the waterfront facility, and with the appropriate
authorities (law enforcement personnel); and
Able to relay essential information related to the nature and extent of the threat.
At heightened Security levels, ships may enhance their means of communication of reports
of threatening act as provided in the following table.
TABLE 7
PROTECTIVE MEASURE
Security Level
1
2
2
Perform regular communications checks

Provide backup means of communication.
Optional
Optional
Yes
Yes
*Provide redundant and multiple means of communication

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Yes
Yes*
Guide 5: Developing Final Security Assessment

1
Introduction
The Vulnerability Assessment previously completed determines potential shortfalls in the ships
existing security systems and procedures. The initial Assessment is required to develop an effective
plan. Refer to the Ship Security Survey (Guide 2) to develop specific details regarding this ships
security.
Risk Based Security Assessment Simplified
The following is a visual representation of a risk-based assessment that can be tailored to a specific
vessels:
Repeat Process until all unique scenarios have been evaluated
2.1 Potential Threats

To begin an assessment, a ship or company needs to consider attack scenarios consisting of
potential threat to the ship under specific circumstances. It is important that the scenario or
scenarios are within the real of possibility and, at a minimum address known capabilities and intents
as given by a threat assessment. For example a boat containing explosives ramming a tanker
(Limburg - October 2002) (as a specific attack scenario). The tanker could be outbound creating a
choke point for the harbor (a specific circumstance). It may be less credible that a hand held missile
would be launched from a distance at a tanker so that the terrorists could sink a ship that is
outbound through a choke point.
The number of scenarios is left to the judgment of plan developers and to the satisfaction of the
Company and ship Security Officers. An initial evaluation should at least consider those scenarios
provided in Table1 with emphasis being placed on the worst-case scenario, and the most probable
scenarios. Care should be taken to avoid unnecessarily evaluating excessive scenarios that result in
low consequences. Minor variations of the same scenarios do not need to be evaluated separately
unless there are measurable differences in the consequences.

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Table 1: Notional List of Scenarios

Typical Types of Scenarios
Application Example
a. Damage and destroy
with explosives
b. Damage and destroy
through malicious
operations or acts
1. Intruder take control of

the ship with intent to:
c. Create a hazardous
materials incident/or
pollution incident without
destroying the vessel
d. Take hostages and kill
people on board.
a. Moving explosives next
to the vessel: waterside,
shore side or subsurface.
b. Ramming a stationary
target: With your ship as a
missile.
2. External attack:
c. Launching or shooting
weapons from distance
a. Materials to be used as
weapons.
b. People into or out of a
country.
3. Use of the vessel as a

means of transporting:
Intruder plants explosives.

Intruder takes control of a vessel and runs it
aground, or intentionally collides with
something.
Intruder intentionally opens valves to sink
the vessel in a specific location.
Intruder opens valves to release a toxic
substance or releases toxic materials brought
with the intruder.
Intruder overrides interlocks leading to
damage and destruction.
USS Cole or LIMBURG type attacks
Car Truck Bomb
Divers or swimmers
International allision meant to damage/destroy
the target (i.e. waterway choke point). Note:
Evaluate overall consequences from the
potential allision, but only evaluate the
vulnerabilities of the vessel and not the
vulnerabilities of any target the ship may be
used to ram.
Shooting your vessel using rifle, missile or
other weapon.
2.2 Consequence assessment

Each Scenario should be evaluated in terms of the potential consequences of an attack. Three
elements are included in the consequence assessment: death and injury, economic impact and
environmental impact. A descriptor of the consequence components follows:
DEATH AND INJURY
ECONOMIC IMPACT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

The potential number of lives that could be lost and injuries occurring
as a result of an attack scenario.
The potential economic impact of an attack scenario.
The potential environmental impact of an attack scenario.
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The appropriate consequence scoring should be evaluated for each scenario. Consequence ratings
are criteria with benchmarks and are provided in the following table. These ratings are intended to
be broad relative estimates. The appropriate rating is determined by using the consequence
component that results in the highest rating. For example, if the death and injury and economic
impacts result in a moderate or 1 rating, but the environmental impact results in Significant or 2
rating, then the overall consequence score would be a 2. A precise calculation of these elements is
not necessary or possible.
Table 2: Consequence Score

Assign a rating of:
3
2
1
If the Impact could be

Catastrophic = numerous loss of life or injuries, major national or long
term economic impact, complete destruction of multiple aspects of the
eco-system over a large area.
SIGNIFICANT = multiple loss of life or injuries, major regional economic
impact, long-term damage to a portion of the eco-system.
Moderate = little or no loss of life or injuries, minimal economic impact, or
some environmental damage.
2.3 Vulnerability Assessment

Each Scenario should be evaluated in terms of the ships vulnerability to an attack. Four elements of
the vulnerability score are: availability, accessibility, organic security, and ships hardness. With the
understanding that the ships owner and/or operator has the greatest control over the accessibility
and organic security elements, these elements may be addressed for each scenario. Descriptors for
these two vulnerability elements follow:
ACCESSIBILITY
ORGANIC
SECURITY
Accessibility of the ship to the attack scenario. This related to the physical and
geographic barriers that deter the threat without organic security. For example:
An attack by swimmers while anchored in a quick running river like the
Mississippi is mot improbable.
The ability of security personnel to deter attack. It includes security plans,
communications capabilities, guard force, intrusion detection systems, and
responsiveness of outside law enforcement to prevent an attack.
The vessel owner and operator should address each vulnerability element for a given scenario. The
initial evaluation of vulnerability is normally viewed with only existing strategies and protective
measures meant to lessen vulnerabilities, which are already in place. After the initial evaluation has
been performed, a comparison evaluation can be made with new strategies and protective measures
considered. Assessing the vulnerability with only the existing strategies and protective measures
provides a better understanding of the overall risk associated with the scenario and how new
strategies and protective measures will mitigate the risk.
The vulnerability score and criteria with benchmark examples are provided in the following table.
Each scenario should be evaluated to get the individual score for each element and then sum
the elements to get the total vulnerability score (Table 5 step 3). This score should be used as
the vulnerability score when evaluating each scenario in the next step of the process.
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Table 3: Vulnerability Score

Category
3
Accessibility
Organic Security
No deterrence (e.g. unrestricted

access to the ship and unrestricted
internal movement
Good deterrence (e.g. Single

substantial barrier: unrestricted access
to within 100 yards
Excellent deterrence (Expected to

deter an attack; access restricted to
within 500 yards of the vessel; multiple
physical and geographic barriers).
No deterrence capability (e.g. no plan, no guard

force, no guard force, no emergency
communication, no outside law enforcements
availability for timely prevention, no detection
capability.
Good deterrence capability (e.g. minimal security
plan, some communications, armed guard force
of limited size relative to the vessel; outside law
enforcement not available for timely prevention,
limited detection systems)
Excellent deterrence capability (Expected to
deter attack; covert security elements that
represent additional elements not visible or
apparent.
2.4 Mitigation
The vessel owner and operator should next determine which scenarios may have mitigation
strategies (protective measures) implemented. This should be accomplished by determining where
the scenario falls in Table4 based upon the consequences and vulnerability assessment scores.
Following are terms used in Table4 as mitigation categories:
MITIGATE means the mitigation strategies, such as security protective measures and/or
procedures, may be developed to reduce risk for the scenario. An appendix to the Ship Security Plan
may contain the scenario(s) evaluated, the result of the evaluation of each, a description of the
mitigation measure evaluated, and the reason measures were or were not chosen.
CONSIDER means that the scenario should be considered and mitigation strategies should be
developed on a case-by-case basis. The Ship Security Plan may contain the scenario(s) evaluates,
the results of the evaluation, and the reason mitigation measures were or were not chosen.
DOCUMENT means the scenario may not need a mitigation measure at this time and therefore
needs to be documented. However, mitigation measures having little cost may still merit
consideration. The security plan may contain the scenario evaluated and the results. This will be of
the security assessment.

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Table 4: Vulnerability & Consequence

Matrix
Total Vulnerability Score
3-4
2
Consequenc
e
Score
5-6
CONSIDERED
MITIGATE
MITIGATE
DOCUMENT
CONSIDER
MITIGATE
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
CONSIDER
To assist the ship owner and /or operator in determining which scenarios may require mitigation
methods, the ship owner and or operator may find it beneficial to use Table5 provided below. The
ship owner/operator can record the scenarios considered, the consequence score (Table (2),
outcome of each element of vulnerability (Table 3), the total vulnerability score, and the mitigation
category (Table 4).
Table 5
MITIGATION DETERMINATION WORKSHEET
Step 1
Step 2
Scenario/Description
Consequence
Score (Table 2)
Step 3
Step 4
Vulnerability Score (Table 3)

Accessibility
+
Organic
Score
Mitigation Results
(Table 4)
= Total
Score
2.5 Implementation Methods

The true value of each assessment is realized, once the ship owner and or operator determines,
which scenarios require mitigation, when mitigations strategies (protective measures) are
implemented to reduce vulnerabilities. The overall desire is to reduce the risk associated with
identified scenarios. Note that generally. As mentioned previously, it is easier to reduce
vulnerabilities than to reduce consequences or threats when considering mitigation strategies. To
Assist the ship owner or operator in evaluating the effectiveness of specific mitigation strategies
(protective measures) the ship owner or operator may find it beneficial to use Table 6 provided
below:

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Table 6
MITIGATION IMPLEMENTATION WORKSHEET

Step 1
Mitigation
Strategy
(Protective
Measure)
1.
2.
Step 2
Scenarios
that are
affected by
Mitigation
Strategy
From Step 1
in Table 5
Step 2
Step 3
Consequence
Score (Remains
the Same)
New Vulnerability Score (Table 3)
Step 4
New
Mitigation
Results
(Table 4)
Accessibility Organic = Total

+
Security Score
1.
2.
>>>
1.
2.
The following steps correspond to each column in Table 6.

1. The ship owner and/or operator should brainstorm mitigation strategies (protective
measures) and record them in the first column of Table 6.
2. Using scenarios from Table 5, list all of the scenarios that would be affected by the selected
mitigation strategy.
3. The consequence score remains the same as was recorded in Table 5 for each scenario.
4. Re-evaluate the vulnerability score Table 3 for each element, taking into consideration the
benefit of the mitigation strategy, for each scenario.
5. With the consequence score and new vulnerability score, use Table 4 to determine the new
mitigation results.
There are two factors, effectiveness and feasibility, to consider in determining if a mitigation strategy
should be implemented. A strategy may be thought of as highly effective if its implementation lowers
the mitigation category (e.g. from MITIGATE to CONSIDER). A strategy may be though of as
partially effective if the strategy will lower the overall vulnerability score when implemented by itself
or with one or more other strategies. For example, if a mitigation strategy lowers the vulnerability
score from 5-6 to 3-4 while the consequence score remains 3 and the mitigation category
remains MITIGATE.
It should be noted that if a mitigation strategy, when considered individually, does not reduce the
vulnerability, that multiple strategies may be considered in combination. Considering mitigation
strategies as a whole may allow the vulnerability to be reduced.
A strategy may be though of as feasible if it can be implemented with little operational impact or
funding relative to the prospective reduction in vulnerability. A strategy may be thought of as partially
feasible if its implementation requires significant changes or funding relative to the prospective
reduction invulnerability. A strategy may be thought of as not feasible if its implementation is
extremely problematic or cost prohibitive.

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DCISPS3001
The ship owner and/or operator should keep in mind that some strategies may be deployed
commensurate with various security threat levels established. Feasibility of a mitigation strategy may
vary based on the security level, therefore some strategies may not be warranted at security level 1,
but may be at Security level 2 or 3. For example using divers to inspect the underwater pier structure
and the ship may not be warranted at security level 1, but may be necessary if there is a specific
threat or an increase in the security level. Mitigation strategies should ultimately ensure that a level
of security is maintained to achieve the security objectives discussed in the Ships Security Plan.
As an example of a possible vulnerability mitigation measure, a company may implement security
patrols by hiring additional personnel to detect and r prevent unauthorized persons from entering
spaces below the main deck on a passenger ferry. This measure would improve organic security and
may reduce the overall vulnerability score from high to a medium. This option, however, is
specific for this scenario and also carries certain costs. Another option might be to secure all access
points to spaces below the main deck. This may reduce the accessibility score from high to
medium. This option does not require additional personnel and is a passive mitigation measure.
Similarly, other scenarios can be tested to determine the most effective strategies for your ship.
The Ship Owner and/or operators should develop a process through which overall security is
continually evaluated by considering consequences and vulnerabilities, how they may change over
time, and what additional mitigation strategies can be applied.

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Appendix A: Distribution List Of Security Plans

A Controlled Document
Ship: _______________
Copy Number
Issue Number
Issued to:
Date:
Initials
Issued to:
Date:
Initials
Ship: _______________
Copy Number
Issue Number

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DCISPS3001
Ship: _______________
Copy Number
Issue Number
Issued to:
Date:
Initials
Issued to:
Date:
Initials
Ship: _______________
Copy Number
Issue Number

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CDP 3001 - Guidance Ship Security Plan

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MODEL SHIP SECURITY PLAN GUIDANCE TO

ACCOMPANY THE SECURITY PLAN TEMPLATE

Commonwealth of Dominica Maritime Registry

32 Washington Street, Fairhaven, Massachusetts, 02719, USA

Dominica Maritime Registry

Dominica Maritime Registry

Dominica Maritime Registry

Dominica Maritime Registry

Dominica Maritime Registry

Guide 1: Developing Threat Assessments

Drug/Weapons Smuggling A small fraction of internationally shipped containers are

Dominica Maritime Registry

Stowaways, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers Stowaways present an ongoing

Environmental and Political Extremists Actions taken by extremist environmental

Collateral Damage An explosion or terrorist attack could cause collateral damage to a

Master and officers.

3 Threat Assessment Criteria

Dominica Maritime Registry

Dominica Maritime Registry

Dominica Maritime Registry

Specific threat Specific information is available about a pending/potential attack in a

Environmental conditions that

Dominica Maritime Registry

Guide 2: Ship Initial Security Assessment (Survey)

in order to establish and prioritize security measures.

Dominica Maritime Registry

3 On-scene Security Survey

4 Deck and Ship side Lighting

Who is responsible for the lighting maintenance?

No: Are all access points to the Ship lighted?

No: Do light patterns overlap?

No: Are all perimeter areas lighted during hours of darkness?

No: Is someone responsible for turning lights on and off?

Dominica Maritime Registry

No: Are there adequate lighting supplies? (bulbs, fuses, etc.)

No: Does the lighting protect the guards?

No: Are critical and vulnerable areas well lit?

No: Is there an auxiliary power source available?

5 Ship Access Control

No: Are hinges and lock hasps securely installed?

No: Do mesh or bars protect all accessible portholes and windows?

No: Are portholes and windows covered by wire mesh?

Describe the materials used and type of construction of the frames:

Dominica Maritime Registry

No: Have glass panes been hardened?

Security Control Measures & Equipment

5.2 Identification Systems

No: Is a personnel identification system used?

If yes, what methods are used?

Dominica Maritime Registry

No: Is there a single egress/ingress control point for all vendors?

Dominica Maritime Registry

List special procedures to secure equipment and materials on deck:

No: Is a property pass system used to remove property?

Height of the deck above water (freeboard):

No: Is there a log for issuing keys?

No: Are keys signed for?

No: Are all the keys accounted for?

No: Is the log up to date?

Number of master keys:

List of individuals who have master keys:

Dominica Maritime Registry

If yes, describe the procedures:

No: Are all restricted areas clearly labeled as such?