ADMINISTRATIVELAWThatbranchofmodernlawunderwhichtheexecutive

departmentoftheGovernment,actinginaquasilegislativeorquasijudicialcapacity,
interfereswiththeconductoftheindividualforthepurposesofpromotingthewellbeing
ofthecommunity,(asunderlawsregulatingpublicinterest,professions,tradesand
callings,ratesandprices,lawsfortheprotectionofpublichealthandsafetyandthe
promotionofpublicconvenience).
A. Introduction
a. ConceptofAdministrativeLaw
Administrativelawbelongstothefieldofpubliclaw,a
branchoflaw,whichregulatestherelationsofthestate
withitssubjects.
Publiclawontheotherhandconcernsitselfwithrightsof
theStateasanentityrepresentingtheorganizedcommunity
andtheregulationsoftheindividualmembersofsuch
societarianorganizationtoit.
Privatelawontheotherhand,areruleswhichregulatethe
relationsofindividualswithoneanotherwithoutregardtot
theirrelationtotheirgovernment
b. ScopeofAdministrativeLaw
(1)thelawwhichFIXEStheadministrativeorganizationandstructureof
thegovernment;
(2)thelaw,theEXECUTIONorenforcementofwhichisentrustedto
administrativeauthorities;
(3)thelawwhichGOVERNSpublicofficersincludingtheircompetence
(toact),rights,duties,liabilities,election,etc.;
(4)thelawwhichCREATESadministrativeagencies,DEFINEStheir
powersandfunctions,PRESCRIBEStheirprocedures,includingthe
adjudicationorsettlementbythemofcontestedmattersinvolvingprivate
interests;
(5)thelawwhichprovidestheREMEDIES,administrativeorjudicial,
availabletothoseaggrievedbyadministrativeactionsordecisions;
(6)thelawwhichGOVERNSJUDICIALREVIEWof,orreliefagainst,
1

administrativeactionsordecisions;
(7)therules,regulations,ordersanddecisions(includingpresidential
proclamations)madebyadministrativeauthoritiesdealingwiththe
INTERPRETATIONandenforcementofthelawsentrustedtotheir
administration;and

(8)thebodyofjudicialdecisionsanddoctrinesdealingwithanyofthe
above.

c. AdministrativeLawvInternationalLaw
AdministrativeLaw
laysdownruleswhichshallguide
theofficersoftheadministrationin
theiractionsasagentsofthe
government.

InternationalLaw
cannotberegardedasbinding
upontheofficersofany
governmentconsideredintheir
relationtotheirowngovernment
exceptinsofarasithasbeen
adoptedintotheadministrativelaw
ofthestate.

d. AdministrativeLawvCriminalLaw
AdministrativeLaw
CriminalLaw
givesapenalsanctionfortheenforcement consistofabodyofpenalsanctions,
ofaruleofadministrativelaw
whichareappliedtoallbranchesoflaw,
includingadministrativelaw
e. AdministrativeLawvConstitutionalLaw
AdministrativeLaw
givesandcarriesoutthisplaninits
minutestdetails
treatstheindividualfromthestandpointof
thepowersofthegovernment
EMPHASIZESthepowersofgovernment
anddutiesofthecitizens
indicatestoindividuals,remediesforthe
violationoftheirrights

ConstitutionalLaw
prescribesageneralplanorframeworkof
governmentalorganization
treatstherightsoftheindividual
STRESSESupontherightsofan
individual
prescribeslimitationsonthepowersof
thegovernmenttoprotecttherightsof
individualsagainstabuseintheirexercise

f. AdministrativeLawvLawofPublicAdministration
g.
AdministrativeLaw
h.
LawofPublicAdministration
i.
thesubjectmatterod
j.
thepracticalmanagementand
AdministrativelawisPUBLIC
directionofthevariousorgansofthestate
ADMINISTRATION
andtheexecutionofstatepoliciesbythe
executiveandadministrativeofficers
k.
l. PrincipalSubdivisionsofAdministrativeLaw
i. LawofInternalAdministrationconsidersthelegalaspectsofpublicadministration
m.
i. LawofExternalAdministrationconsidersthelegalrelationsbetweenadministrative
authoritiesandprivateinterests
n.
Dividedinfourparts:(SARS)
o.
a. Surveysurveyofthepowersanddutiesofadministrativeauthoritiesthat
relatedirectlytoprivateinterest
p.
a. Analysisanalysisofthescopeandlimitsofsuchpowers
q.
a. Sanctionsaccountthesanctionsattachedto,orthemeansofenforcing,
officialdeterminations;and
r.
a. Remediesexaminationoftheremediesagainstofficialaction
s.
t. OriginandDevelopmentofAdministrativeLaw
u.

i. ChristianGeneralAssemblyInc.VIgnacio567S266(2009)
v.
w.
Issue:WhetherornotHLURBhasexclusivejurisdictionoveractionfor
rescissionanddamages
x.
y.
Held:CourtheldthatthoughPDNo.957grantedNHAtheexclusivejurisdiction
toregulaterealestatetradeandbusiness,suchpowerwasexpandedthroughthecreation
ofPD1344,whichnowreplacedNHAwithHLURB,whichnowhasthejurisdiction
overthesaidcase.
z.
B. NATUREANDORGANIZATIONOFADMINISTRATIVEAGENCIES
a.
b. Creation,Reorganizationandabolitionofadministrativeagencies
c.

i. CebuUnitedEnterprisesvGallofin106Phil491(1959)
d.
e.
Issue:WhethertheauthorityofthedefunctImportControlCommissionaffectthe
validityofthelicenseissuedbythem?
f.
g.
Held:Inthecaseatbar,thoughtheICChavealreadybeenabolished,thecourt
heldthatthedulyexecutedactscanhavealifespanofsaidgovernmentalagencies.

h.
i.

ii.
CrisostomovCA258S134(1996)
i.
j.
Issue:WhetherornotthesuspendedpresidentofPCCmaybereappointedagain
asthepresidentofPUP,whichisthenewPCC.
k.
WhethertheconversionofPCCtoPUPabolishedPCC.
l.
Held:Thecourtheldthat P.D.No.1341didnotabolish,butonlychanged,the
formerPhilippineCollegeofCommerceintowhatisnowthePolytechnicUniversityof
thePhilippines,inthesamewaythatearlierin1952,R.A.No.778hadconvertedwhat
was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of
Commerce.What took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution,notinitscorporatelife.Hencethechangeinitsname,theexpansionofits
curricularofferings,andthechangesinitsstructureandorganization.
m.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a
department or an office or an organization and to replace it with another one, the
lawmakingauthoritysaysso.
n.
However, the reappointment of the defunct former president of PCC
couldnotnolongerbeapplied,becauseuponthepromulgationofPD1437,thetermof
the office of presidents of state universities and collages was fixed to 6 years and
renewable for another six years, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to
terminatethetermsofincumbentswhowerenotreappointed.
o.

i. ViolavAlunanIII277S409(1997)
p.
q.
Issue:WhethertheRevisedImplementingrulesandguidelinesfortheGeneral
ElectionsoftheLigangmgaBarangayOfficerssofarastheyprovidefortheelectionof
first,secondandthirdvicepresidentsandforauditorsfortheNationalLigangmga
Barangayanditschaptersarevalid
r.
s.
Held: hiletheboardofdirectorsofalocalchaptercancreateadditional
positionstoprovidefortheneedsofthechapter,theboardofdirectorsoftheNational
Ligamustbedeemedtohavethepowertocreateadditionalpositionsnotonlyforits
managementbutalsoforthatofallthechaptersatthemunicipal,city,provincialand
metropolitan political subdivision levels.Otherwise the National Liga would be no
different from the local chapters.There would then be only so many local chapters
withoutanationalone,whenwhatiscontemplatedintheabovequotedprovisionsofthe
LGCisthatthereshouldbeoneLigangmgaBarangaywithlocalchaptersatalllevelsof
localgovernmentunits.Thedissent,bydenyingtotheboardofdirectorsattheNational
Ligathepowertocreateadditionalpositionsinthelocalchapters,wouldreducesuch
boardtoaboardofalocalchapter.Thefactisthat493grantsthepowertocreate
positionsnotonlytotheboardsofthelocalchaptersbuttotheboardoftheLigaatthe
nationallevelaswell.
t.
IndeedwhatwasdoneintheConstitutionandBylawsoftheirligawasto
createadditionalpositionsineachchapter,whethernationalorlocal,withouthowever
precludingtheboardsofdirectorsofthechaptersaswellasthatofthenationalligafrom
creating other positions for their peculiar needs.The creation by the board of the

NationalLigaofthepositionsoffirst,secondandthirdvicepresidents,auditorsand
publicrelationsofficerswasintendedtoprovideuniformofficersforthevariouschapters
inlinewiththemandateinArt.210(g)(2)oftheRulesandRegulationsImplementingthe
Local Government Code of 1991 to the Barangay National Assembly to
formulateuniformconstitutionandbylawsapplicabletothenationalligaandalllocal
chapters.Thevariouschapterscouldhavedifferentminorofficersdependingontheir
localneeds,buttheymusthavethesamemajorelectiveofficers,meaningtosay,the
additionalvicepresidentsandauditors.
u.
The dissent further argues that, following the rule ofejusdem
generis,whatmaybecreatedasadditionalpositionscanonlybeappointiveonesbecause
thepositionsofsecretaryandtreasurerareappointivepositions.Therulemightapplyif
whatisinvolvedistheappointmentofotherofficers.Butwhatwearedealingwithin
thiscaseisthecreationofadditionalpositions.Section493actuallygivestheboardthe
powerto[1]appointitssecretaryandtreasurerand[2]createsuchotherpositionsasit
maydeemnecessaryforthemanagementofthechapter.Theadditionalpositionstobe
createdneednotthereforebeappointivepositions.
v.
w.

i. LarinvExecutiveSec280S713(1997)
x.
y.
Issue:WhetherornotthatthePresidentisauthorizedtoeffectorganizational
changesincludingthecreationofofficesinthedepartmentofagencyconcerned.
z.
aa.
Held:CourtheldthatunderEOno.292Sec.20.ResidualPowers.Unless
Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercisesuch other powers and
functionsvestedinthePresidentwhichareprovidedforunderthelawsandwhich
arenotspecificallyenumeratedaboveorwhicharenotdelegatedbythePresidentin
accordancewithlaw."
ab.
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President
underthelaw.
ac.
Whatlawthengiveshimthepowertoreorganize?ItisPresidential
Decree No. 1772, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees
expresslygrantthePresidentofthePhilippinesthecontinuingauthoritytoreorganize
thenationalgovernment,whichincludesthepowertogroup,consolidatebureausand
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
servicesandactivitiesandtostandardizesalariesandmaterials.Thevalidityofthese
twodecreesareunquestionable.
ad.
The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees,
executiveorders,proclamations,lettersofinstructionsandotherexecutiveissuances
notinconsistentwiththisConstitutionshallremainoperativeuntilamended,repealed
or revoked."[10]So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.
Significantly, the Constitution itself recognizes future reorganizations in the
governmentaswhatisrevealedinSection16ofArticleXVIII.
ae.
However,thepowerofreorganizationisvalidifpursuedingoodfaith.
af.

i.

ii.
DariovMison176S84[Aug.8,1989;Grno.81954]
ag.
ah.
Issue:WhetherornotthePresidentmayeffectreorganization
ai.
aj.
Held:
ak.
Thecourtheldthatasageneralrule,areorganizationiscarriedoutin
goodfaithifitisforthepurposeofeconomyortomakebureaucracymoreefficient.In
thateventnodismissalorseparationactuallyoccursbecausethepositionitselfceasesto
exist.AndinthatcasethesecurityoftenurewouldnotbeaChineseWall1.Bethatasit
may,iftheabolition,whichisnothingelsebutaseparationorremoval,isdonefor
politicalreasonsorpurposelytodefeatsecurityoftenure,orotherwisenotingoodfaith,
novalidabolitiontakesplaceandwhateverabolitionisdoneisvoidabinitio.Thereisan
invalidabolitionaswherethereismerelyachangeofnomenclatureofpositionsorwhere
claimsofeconomyarebeliedbytheexistenceofamplefunds

al.
am.MeaningofAdministrativeAgency
an.
ao.
ADMINISTRATIVEAGENCYisthetermusedgenerallytodescribeanagency
exercisingsomesignificantcombinationofexecutive,legislativeandjudicialpowers.
ap.
aq.
itisagovernmentbodychargedwithadministeringandimplementingparticular
legislation.
ar.

i. PresidentialantiDollarSaltingTaskForcevCA171S348(1989)[GRno.83578;
16March1989]2
as.
at.
Issue:WhetherornotthePresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForceisaquasi
judicialbodysoasitmayissuewarrantsorsearchandseizure.
au.
av.
Held:Thecourtheldthataquasijudicialbodyis"anorganofgovernmentother
thanacourtandotherthanalegislature,whichaffectstherightsofprivateparties
througheitheradjudicationorrulemaking."
aw.
ax.
Inthecaseatbar,theTaskForceuponitscreationwasnotconferredwithquasi
judicialresponsibilities.

1 CHINESE WALL (n) an insurmountable barrier; a means of restricting the flow of

information
2 DOLLAR SALTING occurs when a dollar bill is removed from the Philippines without
the approval of the Central Bank and transferred to an account outside the country.


i. BalanguanvCA562S184(2008)[GRno.174350;13August2008]
ay.
az.
Issue:Whetherornotthepublicprosecutorspowertoconductapreliminary
investigationisquasijudicialinnature.
ba.
bb.
Held:Thecourtheldthatthoughsomecasesdescribethepublicprosecutors
powertoconductapreliminaryinvestigationasquasijudicialinnature,thisistrueonly
totheextentthat,likequasijudicialbodies,theprosecutorisanofficeroftheexecutive
departmentexercisingpowersakintothoseofacourt,andthesimilarityendsatthis
point.
bc.
bd.
Aquasijudicialbodyisanorganofgovernmentotherthanacourtand
otherthanalegislature,whichaffectstherightsofprivatepartiesthrougheither
adjudicationorrulemaking.
be.
bf.
Aquasijudicialagencyperformsadjudicatoryfunctionssuchthatits
awards,determinetherightsofparties,andtheirdecisionshavethesameeffectas
judgmentsofacourt.
bg.
bh.
Suchisnotthecasewhenapublicprosecutorconductsapreliminary
investigationtodetermineprobablecausetofileanInformationagainstapersoncharged
withacriminaloffense,orwhentheSecretaryofJusticeisreviewingtheformersorder
orresolutions.
bi.
bj.
Inthiscase,sincetheDOJisnotaquasijudicialbody,Section14,Article
VIIIoftheConstitutionfindsnoapplication.Bethatasitmay,theDOJrectifiedthe
shortnessofitsfirstresolutionbyissuingalengthieronewhenitresolvedrespondent
HSBCsmotionforreconsideration.
bk.
bl. AdministrativeAgencyorBodyandCourtdistinguished
bm.
bn.
AdministrativeBody
bo.
AdministrativeCourt
bp.
generallyalargeorganization
bq.
atribunalwhichispresidedby
staffedbymenwhoaredeemedtobecome oneormorejuristlearnedinthelaw
somethingofEXPERTSintheirparticular
fields
br.
hasavarietyoffunctions
bs.
onlyhasonefunction
=JUDICIAL
bt.

bu. Statusorcharacterofparticularadministrativeagencies
bv.

i. OlaguervRTC170S478(1989)
bw.
bx.
Issue:WhetherthePCGGisacoequalbodywiththeRTC
by.
Held:Thecourtheldthat,Intheexerciseofitsfunctions,thePCGGisaco
equalbodywiththeregionaltrialcourtsandcoequalbodieshavenopowertocontrolthe
other.TheregionaltrialcourtsandtheCourtofAppealshavenojurisdictionoverthe
PCGGintheexerciseofitspowersundertheapplicableExecutiveOrdersandSection26,
ArticleXVIIIofthe1987Constitutionand,therefore,maynotinterferewithandrestrainor
setasidetheordersandactionsofthePCGG.Bythesametoken,theregionaltrialcourts
havenojurisdictionovertheactsoffiscalagentsofthePCGGactingforandinbehalfof
saidcommission.
bz.
TheCommissionshouldnotbeembroiledinandswampedbylegalsuits
beforeinferiorcourtsallovertheland.Otherwise,theCommissionwillbeforcedtospend
valuabletimedefendingallitsactuationsinsuchcourts.Thiswilldefeattheverypurpose
behindthecreationoftheCommission.Accordingly,Section4(a)ofExecutiveOrderNo.
1expresslyaccordedtheCommissionanditsmembersimmunityfromsuitfordamagesin
that:"NocivilactionshalllieagainsttheCommissionoranymemberthereofforanything
doneoromittedinthedischargeofthetaskcontemplatedbythisorder."
ca.
cb. MainCharacteristicsofAdministrativeAgencies
cc.
cd.
*DELEGATIONOFFUNCTIONANDAUTHORITY(averyimportantcharacteristic
ofAdministrativeProcedure)
ce.
i. Sizethesizeofanadministrativeagencyreflectsboththeirnationwidejurisdictionand
thecharacteroftheirwork.
cf.
i. Specializationonaparticulartradeorbusiness.(eg.BIRiswellversedinthelawon
theoftaxationofrealandpersonalpropertiesandothersourcesofincome)
SkillsofTrainingandExperience
SpecializationonProcedure
cg.
i. Responsibilityforresultsadministrativeagenciesarecreatedasameanstoaccomplish
aparticularstatutoryend
ch.
i. VarietyofAdministrativeduties
ci.
cj. ConsequencesofCharacteristics
ck.

i. PaduavRanada390S663(2002)
cl.
cm.
Issue:WhethertheprovisionaltollrateadjustmentsoftheMetroManilaSkyway
issuedbytheTollRegulatoryBoard(TRB)isvalid.

cn.
co.
WhetherornotTRBmuststatethefactsandlawonwhichtheResolutionno.
200189isbased
cp.
cq.
Held:ThecourtheldthatthelanguageofLOINo.1334Aisnotsusceptibleof
equivocation.Itdirects,ordersandinstructstheTRBtoissueprovisionaltollrates
adjustmentexpartewithouttheneedofnotice,hearingandpublication.Allthatis
necessaryisthatitbeissuedupon(1)afindingthatthemainpetitionissufficientinform
andsubstance;(2)thesubmissionofanaffidavitshowingthattheincreaseinrates
substantiallyconformstotheformula,ifanyisstipulatedinthefranchiseortoll
operationagreement,andthatfailuretoimmediatelyimposeandcollecttheincreasein
rateswouldresultingreatirreparableinjurytothepetitioner;and(3)thesubmissionofa
bond.
cr.
cs.
Onthesecondissue,thecourtheldthatwhileSection14,ArticleVIIIofthe1987
Constitutionprovidesthatnodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithout
expressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased,this
ruleappliesonlytoadecisionofacourtofjustice,notTRB
ct.
cu. DelegationofFunctionandAuthority
i. 4TYPESofDELEGATION(Necessary)
cv.
DelegationofINTERNALMANAGEMENT
DelegationofauthoritytoDISPOSEOFROUTINEMATTERS;
DelegationofauthoritytoDISPOSEOFMATTERSINFORMALLY,orto
INITIATEFORMALPROCEEDINGS;and
Delegationofauthorityandfunctioninformalproceedings(alsoincludesthe
authoritytoconductformalhearings)
ii. DEGREEdelegationmaybecombinedwithsupervisionandcontrol
cw.TYPESOFADMINISTRATIVEAGENCIESwhereinthegovernmentcreatedadministrative
agenciesaccordingtotheirpurposes.
cx.
i. OfferingsomeGRATUITY,GRANTorSPECIALPRIVILEGE
Eg.PhilVet.Administration(PVA),GSIS,SSS,PAO
cy.
i. TocarryoncertainfunctionsofGovernment
Eg.BIR,BureauofCustoms,BureauofImmigration,LRA
cz.
i. Toperformsomebusinessserviceforthepublic
Eg.PNR,MWSS,NFA
da.
i. Toregulatethebusinessesaffectedwithpublicinterest
LTFRB,HLURB
db.
i. Toperform,underpolicepower,regulationofprivatebusinessesandindividuals
SEC,MTRCB,GAB,DDB,BTRCP
dc.

i. Toadjustindividualcontroversiesbecauseofsomestrongsocialpolicyinvolved
NLRC,ECC,SEC,DAR,COA
dd.
C. AdministrativeOrganization
a.
Referstotheadministrativestructureofgovernmentincludingitspoliticalsubdivisionsandthe
allocationofpowers,functionsanddutiestoitsvariousunitsoragencies.
b.
c. Distributionofpowersofgovernment
d.
3branchesofGovernment3
e.
o Legislative
o Executive
o Judiciary
f.

i. JosonvExec.SecretaryTorres290S279(1998)
g.
h.
Issue:WhetherornottheDILGSecretaryusurpedthepowerofthePresident
whenheproceededwiththeadministrativedisciplinaryproceedingsagainstelectivelocal
officials
i.
j.
Held:Thepowertodisciplineevidentlyincludesthepowertoinvestigate.Asthe
DiscipliningAuthority,thePresidenthasthepowerderivedfromtheConstitutionitselfto
investigatecomplaintsagainstlocalgovernmentofficials.A.O.No.23,however,
delegatesthepowertoinvestigatetotheDILGoraSpecialInvestigatingCommittee,as
maybeconstitutedbytheDiscipliningAuthority.Thisisnotunduedelegation,contrary
topetitionerJoson'sclaim.ThePresidentremainstheDiscipliningAuthority.Whatis
delegatedisthepowertoinvestigate,notthepowertodiscipline
k.
l.
Theprovisionsforadministrativedisciplinaryactionsagainstelectivelocal
officialsaremarkedlydifferentfromappointiveofficials.Therulesontheremovaland
suspensionofelectivelocalofficialsaremorestringent.Theprocedureofrequiring
positionpapersinlieuofahearinginadministrativecasesisexpresslyallowedwith
respecttoappointiveofficialsbutnottothoseelected.Anelectiveofficial,electedby
popularvote,isdirectlyresponsibletothecommunitythatelectedhim.Theofficialhasa
definitetermofofficefixedbylaw,whichisrelativelyofshortduration.Suspensionand
removalfromofficedefinitelyaffectsandshortensthistermofoffice.Whenanelective
officialissuspendedorremoved,thepeoplearedeprivedoftheservicesofthemanthey
hadelected.Implicitintherightofsuffrageisthatthepeopleareentitledtotheservices
oftheelectiveofficialoftheirchoice.Suspensionandremovalarethusimposedonly
3 DEPARTMENT refers to an executive department created by law INSTRUMENTALITY
refers to an agency of the National Government, not integrated with the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. Eg. MIAA

aftertheelectiveofficialisaccordedhisrightsandtheevidenceagainsthimstrongly
dictatestheirimposition.
m.
n.
o. OrganizationofBureaus
p.
q.
BUREAUisanyprincipalsubdivisionorunitofanydepartmentperformingasingle
majorfunctionorcloselyrelatedfunctions.
r.
s. DefinitionofadministrativeRelationships
i. SupervisionandControl
ii. AdministrativeSupervision
iii. Attachment
t.
u.

Eugeniov.CSC242S196(1995)
v.
w.
Issue:WhetherornottheCSCmayabolishtheCareerExecutiveServiceBoard
x.
y.
Held:ThecourtheldthattheCESBwascreatedbylaw,thusitcanonlybe
abolishedbythelegislature.Thisfollowsanunbrokenstreamofrulingsthatthecreation
andabolitionofpublicofficesisprimarilyalegislativefunction.Asaptlysummedupin
AMJUR2donPublicOfficersandEmployees:
z.
ExceptforsuchofficesasarecreatedbytheConstitution,thecreationof
publicofficesisprimarilyalegislativefunction.Insofarasthelegislativepower
inthisrespect,isnotrestrictedbyconstitutionalprovisions,issupreme,andthe
legislaturemaydecideforitselfwhatofficesaresuitable,necessary,or
convenient.Whenintheexigenciesofgovernmentitisnecessarytocreateand
defineduties,thelegislativedepartmenthasthediscretiontodeterminewhether
additionalofficesshallbecreated,orwhetherthesedutiesshallbeattachedtoand
becomeexofficiodutiesofexistingoffices.Anofficecreatedbythelegislatureis
whollywithinthepowerofthatbody,anditmayprescribethemodeoffillingthe
officeandthepowersanddutiesoftheincumbent,andifitseesfit,abolishthe
office.
aa. RelationshipofGovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations
ab.
ac.
referstoanyagencyorganizedasastockornonstockcorporation,vestedwith
functionsrelatingtopublicneedswhethergovernmentalorproprietyinnature4,andownedby

4 Government owned or controlled corporations may perform governmental or

propriety functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created.
If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the
function is PROPRIETARY.
If the purpose is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good
and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is GOVERNMENTAL.

thegovernmentdirectlyorthroughitsinstrumentalitieseitherwhollyor,whereapplicableasin
thecaseofstockcorporations,totheextentoatleast50%ofitscapitalstock.
ad.
ae. RelationshipofRegulatoryAgenciestotheDepartment
af.
ag.
AREGULATORYAGENCYreferstoanyagencyexpresslyvestedwithjurisdictionto
regulate,administeroradjudicatemattersaffectingsubstantialrightsandinterestofprivate
persons,theprincipalpowersofwhichareexercisedbyacollectivebody,suchascommission,
board,orcouncil.
ah.
(1)Itshallbesubjecttotheadministrativesupervisionofthedepartmentunderwhich
theyareplaced,exceptwhentheyaregovernmentcorporationsinwhichcasetheyshallbe
governedasprovidedabove.
ai.
(2)Theheadsofregulatoryagenciesshallsubmitannually,fortheapprovalofthe
Secretaryconcerned,theirbudgetsandworkplanswhichshallbethebasisoftheirdaytoday
operations.
aj.
(3)Theregulatoryagenciesmayavailthemselvesofthecommonauxiliaryand
managementservicesofthedepartmentasmaybeconvenientandeconomicalfortheir
operations.
ak. MandatesoftheDifferentDepartments
al.

i. LumiquedvExevea282S125(1997)
am.
an.
Issue:Whetherthedueprocessclauseencompassestherighttobeassistedby
counselduringanadministrativeinquiry
ao.
ap.
Held:Therighttocounsel,whichcannotbewaivedunlessthewaiverisinwriting
andinthepresenceofcounsel,isarightaffordedasuspectoranaccusedduring
custodialinvestigation.Itisnotanabsoluterightandmay,thus,beinvokedorrejected
inacriminalproceedingand,withmorereason,inanadministrativeinquiry.Inthecase
atbar,petitionersinvoketherightofanaccusedincriminalproceedingstohave
competentandindependentcounselofhisownchoice.Lumiqued,however,wasnot
accusedofanycrimeintheproceedingsbelow.Theinvestigationconductedbythe
committeecreatedbyDepartmentOrderNo.145wasforthepurposeofdeterminingifhe
couldbeheldadministrativelyliableunderthelawforthecomplaintsfiledagainsthim.
aq.
ar.
Whileinvestigationsconductedbyanadministrativebodymayattimesbeakinto
acriminalproceeding,thefactremainsthatunderexistinglaws,apartyinan
administrativeinquirymayormaynotbeassistedbycounsel,irrespectiveofthenature
ofthechargesandoftherespondent'scapacitytorepresenthimself,andnodutyrestson
suchabodytofurnishthepersonbeinginvestigatedwithcounsel.
as.
Whenthedisputeconcernsone'sconstitutionalrighttosecurityoftenure,
however,publicofficeisdeemedanalogoustopropertyinalimitedsense;hence,the
righttodueprocesscouldrightfullybeinvoked.Nonetheless,therighttosecurityof
tenureisnotabsolute.OfequalweightisthecountervailingmandateoftheConstitution
thatallpublicofficersandemployeesmustservewithresponsibility,integrity,loyalty

andefficiency.Inthiscase,ithasbeenclearlyshownthatLumiqueddidnotliveupto
thisconstitutionalprecept.
at.
Thecommittee'sfindingspinningculpabilityforthechargesofdishonestyand
gravemisconductuponLumiquedwerenot,asshownabove,fraughtwithprocedural
mischief.Itsconclusionswerefoundedontheevidencepresentedandevaluatedasfacts.
Wellsettledinourjurisdictionisthedoctrinethatfindingsoffactofadministrative
agenciesmustberespectedaslongastheyaresupportedbysubstantialevidence,evenif
suchevidenceisnotoverwhelmingorpreponderant.Thequantumofproofnecessaryfor
afindingofguiltinadministrativecasesisonlysubstantialevidenceorsuchrelevant
evidenceasareasonablemindmightacceptasadequatetosupportaconclusion.
au.
D. POWERSANDFUNCTIONSOFADMINISTRATIVEAGENCIES
a.
I.
GeneralMeaningofPowerandFunctions
b.
c.
Functionthatwhichoneisboundorwhichitisonesbusinesstodoso
d.
Powerrefertothemeansbywhichafunctionisfulfilled
e.
II.
SourceofPowers
f.
a. Constitution
b. Statutes
g.
III.
Scopeofpowers
a. ExpressandImpliedPowers
h.
i. Expresspowersbecausethestatuteitselfhaveprovidedpowerstoanagencycreatedby
suchstatureorbytheconstitution
j.
k. Impliedpowersbecauseitisnecessaryintheexerciseofitsexpresspowers
l.

i. ChavezvNHA530S235
m.
n.
Issue:WhetherrespondentsNHAandRBIhavebeengrantedthepowerand
authoritytoreclaimlandsofthepublicdomainasthispowerisvestedexclusivelyin
PEAasclaimedbypetitioner
o.
p.
Held: Basicinadministrativelawisthedoctrinethatagovernmentagencyor
office has express and implied powers based on its charter and other pertinent
statutes.Express powers are those powers granted, allocated, and delegated to a
governmentagencyorofficebyexpressprovisionsoflaw.Ontheotherhand,implied
powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or
conferred bynecessary orfair implication in the enabling act.InAngarav. Electoral
Commission, the Court clarified and stressed that when a general grant of power is
conferredordutyenjoined,everyparticularpowernecessaryfortheexerciseoftheone
ortheperformanceoftheotherisalsoconferredbynecessaryimplication.Itwasalso
explicatedthatwhenthestatutedoesnotspecifytheparticularmethodtobefollowedor

q.

usedbyagovernmentagencyintheexerciseofthepowervestedinitbylaw,saidagency
hastheauthoritytoadoptanyreasonablemethodtocarryoutitsfunctions.
r.
ThepowertoreclaimonthepartoftheNHAisimplicitfromPD757,RA7279,
MO415,RA6957,andPD3A.
s.
t. InherentPowersAdministrativeagencieshaveNOINHERENTPOWERSunless
otherwiseprovidedbyprovisionoflaw.
u.
v.
w.


i. MasangcayvCOMELEC6S27
x.
y. Issue:WhetherornotCOMELECexceededitsjurisdictioninpunishingpetitioner
Masangcayforcontempt
z.
aa. Held:ThecourtheldthattheCommissiononElectionshasonlythedutyto
enforceandadministeralllawstotheconductofelections,butalsothepowertotry,
hearanddecideanycontroversythatmaybesubmittedtoitinconnectionwiththe
elections.Inthissense,said,theCommission,althoughitcannotbeclassifiedacourt
ofjusticewithinthemeaningoftheConstitution(Section30,ArticleVIII),foritis
merelyanadministrativebody,mayhoweverexercisequasijudicialfunctionsinsofar
ascontroversiesthatbyexpressprovisionlawcomeunderitsjurisdiction.The
difficultyliesindrawingthedemarcationline5betweenthedutywhich,inherentlyis
administrativeincharacterandafunctionwhichcallsfortheexerciseofthequasi
judicialfunctionoftheCommission.Inthesamecase,wealsoexpressedtheview
thatwhentheCommissionexercisesaministerialfunctionitcannotexercisethe
powertopunishcontemptbecausesuchpowerisinherentlyjudicialinnature.
ab.
ac. 'Thepowertopunishforcontemptisinherentinallcourts;itsexistenceis
essentialtothepreservationoforderinjudicialproceedings,andtotheenforcement
ofjudgments,ordersandmandatescourts,and,consequently,intheadministrationof
justice.Theexerciseofthispowerhasalwaysbeenregardedasanecessaryincident
andattributeofcourts.Itsexercisebyadministrativebodieshasbeeninvariably
limitedtomakingeffectivethepowertoelicittestimony.Andtheexerciseofthat
powerbyanadministrativebodyinfurtheranceofitsadministrativefunctionhas
beenheldinvalid.
ad.
IV.

ae.
QuasiJudicialPowers
af.

i. CityofBaguiovNino487S216
ag.
ah. Issue:WhethertheCityMayorhasthepowertoorderthedemolitionofillegally
builtstructures
ai.
aj. Held:CourtheldthatIngeneral,thequantumofjudicialorquasijudicialpowers
whichanadministrativeagencymayexerciseisdefinedintheenablingactofsuch
agency.Inotherwords,theextenttowhichanadministrativeentitymayexercise
suchpowersdependslargely,ifnotwholly,ontheprovisionsofthestatutecreating
orempoweringsuchagency
ak.
ii.
MakatiStockExchangevSEC14S620
al.
am.Issue:DoesSEChavetheauthoritytopromulgatetheruleinquestion?
an. Held:None.(1)Testfordeterminingexistenceofauthority."TheCommission
citesnoprovisionoflawexpresslysupportingitsruleagainstdoublelisting.It
suggeststhatthepoweris'necessaryfortheexecutionofthefunctionsvestedinit.'It

5 DEMARCATION LINE boundary around a specific area

arguesthatsaidrulewasapprovedbytheDepartmentHeadbeforetheWaranditis
notinconflictwiththeprovisionsoftheSecuritiesAct.Theapprovalofthe
Department,byitself,addsnoweightinajudiciallitigation.
ao. ThetestisnotwhethertheActforbidstheCommissionfromimposinga
prohibitionbutwhetheritempowerstheCommissiontoprohibit."
ap. (2)Commissionwithoutpowertoimposeprohibition."TheCommission
possessesnopowertoimposetheconditionoftherulewhichresultsindiscrimination
andviolationofconstitutionalrights.Itisfundamentalthatanadministrativeofficer
hassuchpowersasareexpresslygrantedtohimbystatute,andthosenecessarily
impliedintheexercisethereof.Accordingly,thelicenseoftheMakatiStock
Exchangeisapprovedwithoutsuchconditionagainstdoublelisting."
V.

VI.

aq.
NatureofPowers
ar.
as.
AdministrativepoweroAdministrativefunction
at.
i. CooperativeDevelopmentAuthorityvDolefilAgrarianReformBeneficiaries
CooperativeInc.382S552
au.
av. Issue:WhetherCDAhastheauthoritytoconducthearingsorinquiriesand
expressgranttoitofcontemptpowers
aw.
ax. Held:Thecourtheldthatitisafundamentalruleinstatutoryconstructionthat
whenthelawspeaksinclearandcategoricallanguage,thereisnoroomfor
interpretation,vacillationorequivocationthereisonlyroomforapplication.Itcan
begleanedfromtheabovequotedprovisionofR.A.No.6939thattheauthorityof
theCDAistodischargepurelyadministrativefunctionswhichconsistofpolicy
making,registration,fiscalandtechnicalassistancetocooperativesand
implementationofcooperativelaws.Nowhereinthesaidlawcanitbefoundany
expressgranttotheCDAofauthoritytoadjudicatecooperativedisputes.Atmost,
Section8ofthesamelawprovidesthatuponrequestofeitherorbothparties,the
Authorityshallmediateandconciliatedisputeswithacooperativeorbetween
cooperativeshowever,witharestrictionthatifnomediationorconciliation
succeedswithinthree(3)monthsfromrequestthereof,acertificateofnonresolution
shallbeissuedbythecommissionpriortothefilingofappropriateactionbeforethe
propercourts.Beinganadministrativeagency,theCDAhasonlysuchpowersas
areexpresslygrantedtoitbylawandthosewhicharenecessarilyimpliedinthe
exercisethereof.
ay.
az. Therequirementofdueprocessissatisfiedifthefollowingconditionsarepresent,
namely:(1)theremustbeacourtortribunalclothedwithjudicialpowertohearand
determinethematterbeforeit;(2)jurisdictionmustbelawfullyacquiredoverthe
personofthedefendantoroverthepropertywhichisthesubjectoftheproceedings;
(3)thedefendantmustbegivenanopportunitytobeheard;and(4)judgmentmustbe
rendereduponlawfulhearing
ba.
bb.

VII.

VIII.

bp.

Classificationofpowers
a. AstoNature
i. InvestigatoryPowers
ii. QuasilegislativeorRuleMakingPowers
iii. QuasiJudicialorAdjudicatoryPowers
b. DiscretionaryPowervMinisterialPower
bc.
bd.
DiscretionaryPower
be.
MinisterialPower
bf.
Definedasthepowerorright
bg.
Definedasoneperformedin
conferreduponthembylawofacting
responsetodutywhichhasbenpositively
officiallyundercertaincircumstances,
imposedbylawanditsperformancerequired
accordingtothedictatesoftheirown
atatimeandinamanneroruponconditions
judgmentandconscience,andnotcontrolled specificallydesignated,thedutytoperform
bythejudgmentorconscienceofothers.
undertheconditionsspecifiednotbeing
dependentupontheofficersjudgmentor
discretion.
bh.
bi.

i. FlorendovEnrile239S22
bj.
bk. Issue:Whetherornotthesheriffisguiltyofseriousderelictionorneglectofduty
bl.
bm.
Held:Thedutyimposeduponthesherifftoexecutethewritisministerial,
notdirectory.Apurelyministerialactordutyisonewhichanofficerortribunal
performsinagivenstateoffacts,inaprescribedmanner,inobediencetothemandate
ofthelegalauthority,withoutregardtotheexerciseofhisownjudgmentuponthe
proprietyorimproprietyoftheactdone.
bn.
InvestigatoryPowers
a. Definitionincludethepowerofanadministrativebodytoinspecttherecordsandpremises,
andinvestigatetheactivitiesofpersonsorentitiescomingunderitsjurisdiction,tosecure,or
torequirethedisclosureofinformationbymeansofaccounts,records,statements,testimony
ofwitnesses,productionofdocuments,orotherwise.
bo.
b. Solepowersgranted
c. Asaidtootherpowers
i. Sec.ofJusticevLantion322S160
bq. Issue:MayanAdministrativeAgencyconductaninvestigativeproceeding
br. Held:Inadministrativelaw,aquasijudicialproceedinginvolves:(a)takingand
evaluationofevidence;(b)determiningfactsbasedupontheevidencepresented;and
(c)renderinganorderordecisionsupportedbythefactsproved.Inquisitorialpower,
whichisalsoknownasexaminingorinvestigatorypower,isoneorthedeterminative
powersofanadministrativebody,whichbetterenablesittoexerciseitsquasijudicial
authority.Thispowerallowstheadministrativebodytoinspecttherecordsand
premises,andinvestigatetheactivities,ofpersonsorentitiescomingunderits
jurisdiction,ortorequiredisclosureofinformationbymeansoraccounts,records,
reports,testimonyofwitnesses,productionofdocuments,orotherwise.

bs. Thepowerofinvestigationconsistsingathering,organizing,andanalyzing
evidence,whichisausefulaidortoolinanadministrativeagency'sperformanceof
itsrulemakingorquasijudicialfunctions.Notably,investigationisindispensableto
prosecution.

IX.
E. A

bt.
d. InvestigatoryPowersvJudicialFunctions
i. RupertovTorres100Phil1098
ii. MontemayorvBundalian405S264
e. ApplicationofTechnicalrulesofprocedureandevidence
i. CarmelovRamos6S836
ii. EvangelistavJarencio69S99
f. Hearingnotpartofcriminalprosecution
i. RemolonavCSC362S304
a

a.
b. TeststodeterminewhetherornotthereisavalidDELEGATIONOFPOWER
1. COMPLETENESSTEST
thelawmustbeCOMPLETEinallitstermsandconditionswhenitleavesthelegislativesuch
thatwhenitreachesthedelegatetheonlythinghewillhavetodoisENFORCEIT.
c.
d.
Whatmustbepresent:
a. Theremustbealaw
b. Itmustbecompleteinalltermsandconditions
c. Thedelegatesunderstandsit,andhisonlyjobistoENFORCEit
e.
2. SUFFICIENTSTANDARDTEST
f. theremustbeadequateguidelinesorlimitationsoflawtomapouttheboundariesofthe
delegatesauthoritytoandpreventthedelegationfromrunningriot
g.
h.