RECENT JURISPRUDENCE

January 2013- March 2014

FOREWORD
The fast-paced development in our case law marches in dizzying speed but as its disciples,
it is our firm obligation and duty to apprise ourselves of these latest jurisprudence. Oftentimes,
though, our busy work schedule and pressing commitments slow us down in terms of keeping
track of the most recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court spanning the eight major fields of
legal study.
I created the Deans Circle last year precisely to help us avoid falling into the trap of
intellectual sluggishness. Through the selfless efforts of our law students under the auspices of
DivinaLaw and its assiduous lawyers, we released in 2013 the Compendium of Philippine Case
Law, which highlighted the decisions of the Court from 2010 to 2013.
Spurred with the same dedication to continuous learning, which is one of the hallmarks of
a true Thomasian, I am pleased to present to you the updates to our Compendium of Philippine
Case Law covering decisions of the High Court from 2013 to 2014. Our 2014 Deans Circle
members, namely Rosechelan Acorda, Shiena Angela Aquino, Luis Alfonso Artaiz, Pauleen Ann
Aure, Paula Azurin, Ma. Salve Aure Carillo, Pamela Bianca Dalumpines, Jeseth De Vera, Mark
Kevin Dellosa, Karen Elnas, James Bryan Esteleydes, Janina Fuggan, Frances Anne Gamboa,
Anniebel Guyo, May Grace Javier, Richelle Orpilla, Jose Gabriel Pachoro, Lyra Carissa Profugo,
Angelie Quinto, Anne Katrina Marie Roraldo, Anna Katrina Singcol, Carmela Yumul, and our
tireless lawyers from DivinaLaw, such as Atty. Leandro Rodel Atienza, Atty. Sheryl Lou Bernabe,
Atty. Lourdes Anifel Caspe, Atty. Ian Jerny De Leon, Atty. Rachel Marie Felices, and Atty. Paula
Danica Landayan, have all shared their precious time and exerted diligent efforts to ensure that
we deliver superior quality of work and scholarship in these updates.
I am hopeful that this supplement to the Compendium of Philippine Case Law will once
again ignite fire to the embers of our legal education and keep us constantly moving towards our
journey to competence, compassion and commitment.
Manila. August 12, 2014.

Atty. NILO T. DIVINA

Dean

UST Faculty of Civil Law

POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In deportation proceedings, there is no due process violation when the summary deportation proceedings
were held and when the Summary Deportation Order was issued. In addition, the actual designation of
the offense is not material so long as the act constituting the offense was clearly alleged in the Charge
Sheet and sufficient enough to inform the alien of the specific ground for his deportation.
Summary deportation shall be observed in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying or
expiration of his passport, including those aliens with cancelled passport. In such cases, a full-blown
deportation hearing is not necessary. (THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION v. JUNG KEUN PARK, G.R. No. 159835, January 21, 2010)
Although Section 152 (c) of the Local Government Code requires a barangay clearance for any activity
within its jurisdiction, such clearance cannot be denied when the activity is in a permissible zone,
otherwise such denial is illegal. The same provision allows the city or municipality to which
the barangay unit belongs to issue the required license or building permit despite the withholding of
the barangay clearance. (GREENHILLS EAST ASSOCIATION, INC., v. E. GANZON, INC., G.R. No.
169741, January 20, 2010)
In administrative cases, misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned
in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause; dishonesty, on the other hand, dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false
statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing
his examination, registration, appointment or promotion.
It is a well-settled rule that a public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees are duty-bound
to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and shall remain
accountable to the people. (GERARDO Q. FERRERAS v. RUDY P. ECLIPSE, A.M. No. P-05-2085,
January 20, 2010)
Decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the
ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and recognition
as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty
circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
In election protest cases, disruption of public service is an element that has been weighed and factored in
and cannot per se be a basis to deny execution pending appeal. (JESUS M. CALO v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 185222, January 19, 2010)
A fifth-class municipality like Midsalip is not absolutely prohibited from adopting a salary schedule
equivalent to that of a special city or a first-class province, provided, that it complies with the provision of
R.A. No. 7160. (PAULINO M. ALECHA AND PRECIOSO M. TAPITAN v. ELMER BEN V. PASION et
al., G.R. No. 164506, January 19, 2010)
The failure of a judge to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law may constitute
undue delay but is not tantamount to dereliction of duty. (LUMINZA DELOS REYES v. JUDGE DANILO
S. CRUZ AND GODOLFO R. GUNDRAN, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18, 2010)
The power to appoint rests essentially on free choice. The appointing authority has the right to decide
who best fits the job from among those who meet the minimum requirements for it. As an outsider, quite
remote from the day-to-day problems of a government agency, no court of law can presume to have the
wisdom needed to make a better judgment respecting staff appointments. (DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) AND NATIONAL MARITIME POLYTECHNIC (NMP) v. RUBEN Y.
MACEDA, G.R. No. 185112, January 18, 2010)
It is a well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so

that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The
prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in
ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations, final judgments declaring a
nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of
election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into
mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to
declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
(CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010)
The ruling in Divinagracia v. COMELEC stressed that if the appellants had already paid the amount of
PhP 1,000 to the lower courts within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required to pay the
COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from the time
of the filing of the notice of appeal with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the PhP 3,200
within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed. Divinagracia, however, contained the
following final caveat: that for notice of appeal filed after the promulgation (27 July 2009) of this
decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election
cases are no longer excusable. (MATEO R. NOLLEN, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSAND
SUSANA M. CABALLES, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010)
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without
legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.
(VICTORINO B. ALDABA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R No. 188078, January 25,
2010)
A reading of the conflict of interest rule reveals that the prohibition against NEA personnel from
participating in any question pertaining to a public service entity where he is directly or indirectly
interested has the purpose of preventing such personnel from exercising the power of his office for
personal pecuniary gain, which may cause grave damage and prejudice to public interest. (NATIONAL
ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PEDRO RAMOS, G.R.
No. 149497, January 25, 2010)
Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the court's prior approval
of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process. (BENJAMIN E. SANGA v.
FLORENCIO SJ. ALCANTARA AND SALES T. BISNAR, A.M. No. P-09-2657, January 25, 2010)
When the printed election propaganda was published, there arises a presumption that there was written
acceptance by petitioner of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. (ALVIN B. GARCIA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND TOMAS R.
OSMEA, G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010)
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation is an oppressive
exercise of eminent domain. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010)
The discretion to determine whether a case should be filed or not lies with the Ombudsman. Unless
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is shown, judicial review is uncalled
for as a policy of non-interference by the courts in the exercise of the Ombudsmans constitutionally
mandated powers. (ANGELITA DE GUZMAN v. EMILIO A. GONZALEZ III, et al., G.R. No. 158104,
March 26, 2010)
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
an established rule must be manifest. (TERESITA NARVASA v. BENJAMIN A. SANCHEZ, JR., G.R.
No. 169449, March 26, 2010)

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. (ATTY.
BONIFACIO BARANDON, JR. v. ATTY. EDWIN FERRER, SR., A.C. No. 5768, March 26, 2010)
The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable
classification. (NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL, G.R. No. 176006,
March 26, 2010)
By special jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise power in addition to or over and above the
ordinary jurisdiction of the RTC, such as taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural lands located
outside their regular territorial jurisdiction, so long as they are within the province where they sit as
Special Agrarian Courts. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CORAZON VILLEGAS, G.R. No.
180384, March 26, 2010)
The exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify landholdings for coverage under the CARP is reposed in
the DAR Secretary. The matter of CARP coverage is strictly part of the administrative implementation of
the CARP, a matter well within the competence of the DAR Secretary. (ALANGILAN REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, et al., G.R. No. 180471, March 26,
2010)
The RTC, after hearing the evidence of the parties, dismissed the case, holding that Doa Rosana Realty
and its president were buyers of the property in good faith and Molave Development did not have a cause
of action against them. Clearly, The RTC did not dismiss the case on the ground that the complaint did
not state a cause of action, which is an entirely different matter. (DOA ROSA REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND SYKAKIENG v. MOLAVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 180523, March 26, 2010)
Law enforcers and public officers have the duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs.
This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very heart of his
fundamental rights. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 186498,
March 26, 2010)
The general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for each
candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots themselves. However, this rule
applies only if the ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from the day of elections
until revision. (BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
AND DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN G.R. No. 190734, March 26, 2010)
Acts which affect the performance of duties as an officer of the court and taints the judiciarys integrity
should be punished accordingly. (ROLAND ERNEST MARIE JOSE SPELMANS v. JUDGE
GAYDIFREDO T. OCAMPO, A.M. No.MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010)
The law does not intend to place local government officials in the difficult position of having to choose
between disobeying a reassignment order or keeping an allowance. Thus, absent a legal basis for its
discontinuance, a government official who has been reassigned is still entitled to receive RATA.
(DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT v. OLIVIA LEONES, G.R. No. 169726, March 18,
2010)
Sequestration is simply a provisional remedy. It is an extraordinary measure intended to prevent the
destruction, concealment or dissipation of sequestered properties, and thereby to conserve and preserve
them, pending the judicial determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in
truth ill-gotten. (YKR CORPORATION AND HEIRS OF LUISA YULO v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 162079, March 18, 2010)
Prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer
to the Members of the Supreme Court. (ARTURO DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND
PRES. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)

It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all the courts, that
statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed, to the end that the will of the people
in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by merely technical objections. (PEDRO MANZA et
al. v. EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, et al., G. R. No. 42181, March 15, 2010)
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCBs authority and
functions expressly set forth in PD 1986. (ELISEO SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA LAGUARDIA, et al.,
G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010)
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the immediately
following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the
immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. (VICTORINO ALDABA v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R No. 188078. March 15, 2010)
The National Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of filing/ docket fees. It can no longer
invoke Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its basis
for exemption from the payment of legal fees. (IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF FILING/ DOCKET FEES, A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10,
2010)
Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or deviation from the established norm, whether it be workrelated or not, amounts to misconduct. (PRISCILLA HERNANDO v. JULIANA BENGSON, A.M. No.P09-2686, March 10, 2010)
RA 7160 requires that where the head of the office or department requesting the requisition sits in a
dual capacity, the participation of a Sanggunian member (elected from among the members of
the Sanggunian) is necessary. (ROLANDO SISON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170339,
March 9, 2010)
For an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be entitled to security of tenure,
she/he must pass the CES examinations, be conferred CES eligibility, comply with the other requirements
prescribed by the CES Board, and be appointed to a CES rank by the President. (PEZA BOARD OF
DIRECTORS AND LILIA DE LIMA v. GLORIA MERCADO, G.R. No. 172144, March 9, 2010)
One of the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is that the applicant must have a
right in esse. A right in esse is a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, one clearly founded on or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. The existence of a right to be protected, and the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right must be established.( EUGENE LIM v.
BPI AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK, G.R. No. 179230, March 9, 2010)
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. (CAPT. WILFREDOROQUERO v. THE
CHANCELLOR OF UP MANILA, et al., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010)
It is a universal principle of law that an injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act
already done. This is so for the simple reason that nothing more can be done in reference thereto. A writ
of injunction becomes moot and academic after the act sought to be enjoined has already been
consummated. (JOSEPH BERNARDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND AVELINO TOELAN,
G.R. No. 190382, March 9, 2010)
Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of
citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. When
the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review
should be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.

(DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, et al. v. MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI,

G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010)
If the Court were to tabulate the results reflected in the ERs, it would, in effect, convert itself into a board
of canvassers. This would entail a function which, obviously, this Court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot
perform. (JESUS TYPOCO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 186359, March 5, 2010)
The constitutional mandate to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all
levelsis directed to the State and not to the school. (THE PARENTS-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PTA)
OF ST. MATHEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, et al. v. THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.,
G.R. No. 176518. March 2, 2010)
Due process, simply requires: 1) the right to notice of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
persons legal right; 2) the right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to
introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; 3) the right to a tribunal so constituted as to give
him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and 4) the right
to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at
least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. (MAYOR ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINOv.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
(COMELEC)
et.
al.
G.R. Nos. 187958, 187961, and 187962, April 7, 2010)
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1)
the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents
legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected. (SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR v. APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A.
APRESA, PEOPLES LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB), G.R. No. 177878, April 7, 2010)
The Constitutional provision draws plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to
at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. (SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and
MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010)
The prohibition against the President or Acting President to make appointments within two months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. (ARTURO M. DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G. R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010)
The power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch includes such powers and functions that
may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the
Presidents power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions
in general appropriations laws. (ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA et al. v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, G.R. No.
166620, April 20, 2010)
Compensation and benefits of public officers are not intended purely for the personal benefit of officers
neither is payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement.
That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be
paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other than that such sums are
being paid to someone employed by the government. (RAMON R. YAP v. COMMISION ON AUDIT,
G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010)
The discretion to allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the
assailed decision, order or resolution, or the COMELEC en banc, as the case may be not to the

Presiding Commissioner. (MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

ARTEMIO BALAG, G.R. Nos. 189431 & 191120, April 7, 2010)
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system. (ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)
Unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not
interfere in the findings of probable cause determined by the Ombudsman. (ROBERTO B. KALALO v. OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ AND MARCELO L. AGUSTIN, G.R. No. 158189, April 23,
2010)
Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray. (NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. ALAN A. OLANDESCA, G.R. No. 171434, April 23, 2010)
Our Constitution, in using the expressions all workers and no officer or employee, puts no distinction between a
probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means that both probationary and permanent employees
enjoy security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary
employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. (CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) vs. GREGORIO MAGNAYE, JR., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010)
Non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the
law. (ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.,
G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010)
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or
change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. (LUIS A. ASISTIO v. HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 191124, April 27,
2010)
The State is the sole judge to decide whether to prosecute claims on behalf of an individual. It retains, in
this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a
political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. (ISABELITA C. VINUYA, et al. v. THE
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010)
The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the Section 6(8) of Republic Act
No. 7941 provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. (PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS
BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.190529, April 29, 2010)
Administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence adequate to support the conclusion
that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have been performed (or have not been performed).
(HON. PRIMO C. MIRO v. REYNALDO M. DOSONO, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010)
Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support a finding of
liability. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. RODOLFO ZALDARRIAGA, G.R. No. 175349, June 22,
2010)
Although the formula found in Section 17 of the CARL may be justly adopted in certain cases, it is by no
means the only formula that the court may adopt in determining just compensation. (LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. FORTUNE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177511, June 29, 2010)

The issuance of Memorandum No. 88, which addresses the unabated conversion of prime agricultural
lands for real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country, was made
pursuant to the general welfare of the public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any
basis. CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) v. THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, G.R. No. 183409. June 18, 2010)
Administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the
laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. (LUIS LOKIN v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010)
RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, covers all youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats. A nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. (MILAGROS AMORES v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND EMMANUEL VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 189600,
June 29, 2010)
By specific provision of law, it is PEZA, through its building officials, which has authority to issue building
permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public
or private lands. (PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v. JOSEPH CARANTES, ROSE
CARANTES, AND ALL OTHER HEIRS OF MAXIMINOCARANTES, G.R. No. 18127, June 23, 2010)
The PCGG has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of
the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, to
conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation, which cannot be later withdrawn
without mutual consent. (JESUS DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010)
To sue as a citizen, three factors are relevant the character of funds or assets involved in the
controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with
a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. (ALAN PAGUIA v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, et
al., G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010)
A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other
immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile
ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BELEN MACARIOS,
G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010)
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard
on his motion for reconsideration. (A.Z. ARNAIZ REALTY, INC. v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R.
No. 170623, July 7, 2010)
Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently intends to
return to and to remain his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is
immaterial. (ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010)
It is not the registration of the act of election Philippine citizenship, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of
confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. (BALGAMELO CABILING MA, et al. v.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., et al., G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010)
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DANTE TAN, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010)

The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory functions. (UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, GLENDA A. VARGAS, et al. v. DANES B.
SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010)
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out
their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. (GSIS AND
WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRES. & GEN. MANAGER OF GSIS v. DINNAH
VILLAVIZA, et al., G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010)
Reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of good faith lies
in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith.
(VIRGINIA BAUTISTA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010)
A government contract is essentially similar to a private contract contemplated under the Civil Code. The
legal requisites of consent of the contracting parties, an object certain which is the subject matter, and
cause or consideration of the obligation must likewise concur. Otherwise, there is no government contract
to speak of. (SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al. v. PHILIPPINE
PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 170530. July 5, 2010)
Under the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of
the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract in behalf of the municipality. (MUNICIPALITY OF
TIWI AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TIWI v. ANTONIO B. BETITO, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010)
Being merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have
to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing. (THE LEARNING CHILD, INC., et al.
v. AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, et al., G.R. Nos. 134269, 134440, 144518, July 7,
2010)
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the Sangguniang Bayan over administrative cases
against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27. (OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. ROLSON RODRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 172700. July 23, 2010)
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the
applicant. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO ESPINOSA, G.R. No. 176885, July 5, 2010)
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." (HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN v. ABELARDO R. DOMONDON, et al., G.R. No. 165036,
July 5, 2010)
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a partys personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from
the direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged governmental action. Legal
standing calls for more than just a generalized grievance. (CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND
BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No.
174697, July 8, 2010)
In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (JOEPHIL C. BIEN v. PEDRO
B. BO, G.R. No. 179333. August 3, 2010)
A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or
collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding
where it is invoked. (WINSTON F. GARCIA v. MARIO MOLINA AND ALBERT VELASCO, G.R. No.
157383, August 10, 2010)

A permanent appointment implies the holding of a civil service eligibility on the part of the appointee,
unless the position involved requires no such eligibility. Where the appointee does not possess a civil
service eligibility, the appointment is considered temporary. The subsequent acquisition of the required
eligibility will not make the temporary appointment regular or permanent; a new appointment is needed.
(JUSTINA MANIEBO v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 158708, August 10, 2010)
The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA, even if they impinge upon the
individual employees right or freedom of association, is not to protect the union for the unions
sake. Laws and jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain protections to the certified bargaining
agent in a unionized company because a strong and effective union presumably benefits all employees in
the bargaining unit since such a union would be in a better position to demand improved benefits and
conditions of work from the employer. (BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. BPI EMPLOYEES
UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK, G.R. No. 164301. August
10, 2010)
The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary
for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. (LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, August 24, 2010)
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to
decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes
non-justiciable. (ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO v. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA AND
COMELEC, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010)
The Indeterminate Sentence Law l does not apply to persons sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. (LENIDO
LUMANOG AND AUGUSTO SANTOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 182555, 185123,
187745, September 07, 2010)
The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations. (CLARITA J. CARBONEL
v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 187689, September 07, 2010)
The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this
account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. (IN THE
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al.,
G.R. No. 189155, September 07, 2010)
With regard to pollution-related matters, an administrative recourse to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) must first be made before filing the complaint with the regular courts. (SHELL PHILIPPINES
EXPLORATION B.V., v. EFREN JALOS, et al., G.R. No. 179918, September 08, 2010)
There is a tremendous difference between the degree of responsibility, care, and trustworthiness
expected of a clerk or ordinary employee in the bureaucracy and that required of bank managers,
cashiers, finance officers, and other officials directly handling large sums of money and properties.
(SALVADOR O. ECHANO, JR. v. LIBERTY TOLEDO, G.R. No. 173930, September 15, 2010)
The Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 R.A. 8762 is valid and constitutional. While Section 19, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the
economic environment. Neither does the lessening of restrainton the foreigners' right to property or to
engage in an ordinarily lawful business, amounts to a denial of the Filipinos' right to property and to due
process of law. (REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, et al. v. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR.
(EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY),
et.al
G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010

Since the ownership over the subject lands had been vested in Central Mindanao University as early as
1958, said lands have ceased to be alienable public lands. Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003
to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA. (CENTRAL MINDANAO
UNIVERSITY v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et.al, G.R. No. 184869, September
21, 2010)
The COMELEC is mandated to make the source codes for the AES technologies it selected for
implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available to CenPEG and all other interested political
parties or groups for independent review. (CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010)
Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the grant of additional
compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits does not need the approval of the
President to be valid. (THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. THE COMMISSIONERS,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, et.al, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010)
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been signed by the President
(which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will
determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of
BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. (RE: SENIORITY AMONG THE FOUR (4) MOST RECENT
APPOINTMENTS TO THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010)
The Administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an
exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd. Corollary, the power of the
Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually
mandatory. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. PEDRO DELIJERO, JR, G.R. No. 172635, October 20,
2010)
By explicit provision of law, the Toll Regulatory Board was given the power to grant administrative
franchise for toll facility projects. (ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. AND JOSE MA. O. HIZON v. TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, et al., G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010)
Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution and the
Rules of Court provide, in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, however, the Courts constitutional
duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been
given the authority to resolve the factual issues. (ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, et.al., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010)
The just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Thus, the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum, computed from
the time the property was taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid. (APO FRUITS
CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION, INC., v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
164195, October 12, 2010
The failure to remit the funds in due time amounts to dishonesty and grave misconduct which are both
punishable with dismissal from service. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MARCELA V.
SANTOS, A.M. No. P-06-2287, October 12, 2010)
It is settled that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The Department of Agrarian
Reforms's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner or any other interested party. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLENN Y.
ESCANDOR, et.al., G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010)
A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. (ATTY. ALICE ODCHIGUEBONDOC v. TAN TIONG BIO A.K.A. HENRY TAN, G.R. No. 186652, October 06, 2010)

Consistent with the presumption of regularity, a magistrate's determination of a probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing court as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OLIVE RUBIO MAMARIL,
G.R. No. 171980, October 06, 2010)
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. Consequently, a decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. (OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. JOEL S. SAMANIEGO , G.R. No. 175573, October 05, 2010)

The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. (SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., v. ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNCIL, et.al., G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010)
In the exercise of police power, the State can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility such as
SURNECO. Hence, the ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in those
rates. (SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO) v. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION, G.R. No. 183626, October 04, 2010)
The Ombudsman, in dismissing a complaint carries the duty of explaining the basis for his action; he must
determine that the complainant had failed to establish probable cause. (PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACTFINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS THRU THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT v. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, et.al., G.R. No.
148269, November 22, 2010)
The CES covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Assistant Department
Manager II does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the
CES. (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, G.R. No. 185766, November 23, 2010)
Memorandum Order No. 99-003, prohibiting its employees from charging and collecting overtime fees
from PEZA-registered enterprises, is an internal regulation that clearly falls within the administrative rules
and regulations exempted from the publication requirement. (IRENE K. NACU, SUBSTITUTED BY
BENJAMIN M. NACU, et al. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE
AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 187752, November 23, 2010)
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, and it faithfully complies - not unlawfully defies - the constitutional directive. As intended by
the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. (ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010)
PCGG may not delegate to its representatives and subordinates its authority to sequester and any such
delegation is invalid and ineffective. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTH DIVISION) AND IMELDA R. MARCOS, G.R. No. 155832, December 07, 2010)
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications
of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and
purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives. (WALDEN F. BELLO AND LORETTA
ANN P. ROSALES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 191998, December 07, 2010)
Executive Order No. 1, Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 is declared unconstitutional
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (LOUIS "BAROK" C.
BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 193036, December 07, 2010)

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. (ELENITA C.
FAJARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011)
A settled exception of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is that of an
arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. NGYIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG et al., G.R. No. 180452, January 10, 2011)
While the construction project is void for failing to meet the requirements of the law, payment must be
made as to disallow the same would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of
another. (GREGORIO R. VIGILAR v. ARNULFO D. AQUINO, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011)
When the position is not among those enumerated in Section 7, Chapter 2, Book V, Title 1 (Subtitle A) of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the appointment
in order to be valid does not require presidential appointment. (MODESTO AGYAO, JR. v. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182591, January 18, 2011)
It is a settled rule that the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion
for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. (MOISESTINIO, JR. AND
FRANCIS TINIO v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 160923, January 24, 2011)
As a rule, judgement of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double
jeopardy. In order to come under the exceptional cases where a judgement of acquittal may be
reconsidered by the court, it is not enough that the party invoke the exceptions he must be able to bring
his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. (ANTONIO LEJANO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 176389 and 176864, January 18, 2011)
The structure of the Philippine National Red Cross is sui generis being neither strictly private nor public in
nature. (DANTE V. LIBAN, et al. v. RICHARD J. GORDON, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, G.
R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011)
When the alleged inadmissible statement was spontaneously made by petitioner and was not at all
elicited through questioning during custodial investigation, the statement is admissible against him.
(BENJAMIN JESALVA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 187725, January 19, 2011)
Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to carry or convey from one
place to another. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants
were caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN et al., G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011
Nowhere in the Section 40 of the Local Government Code will one find defective certificate of candidacy
as a ground for disqualifying a candidate. Nor does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for
the disqualification of a candidate. (SERGIO G. AMORA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011)
When a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the Office of the Ombudsman
and the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a month, an appeal may be made to the CA.
However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory and the implementation of the
decision follows as a matter of course. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and
DINAH C. BARRIGA, G.R. No. 172224, January 26, 2011)
The fundamental test in determining the adequacy of the averments in an information is whether the facts
alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ROBERT P. BALAO, et al., G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011)
Mere misdeclaration of the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the
accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the employees income or other sources of
income and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income,

does he become susceptible to dishonesty. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. NIETO A. RACHO, G.R.
No. 185685, January 31, 2011)
National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the
RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, under our national
criminal justice system or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over
US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the
ICC over them. BAYAN MUNA v. ALBERTO ROMULO, AND BLAS F. OPLE, G.R. No. 159618,
February 1, 2011)
Just compensation determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially
imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. (LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAGIN FERRER, ATTY. RAFAEL VILLAROSA, G.R. No. 172230, February
2, 2011)
An employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving the time
of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative case against him has not yet been
resolved or dismissed ((THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM AND WINSTON F. GARCIA v. ALBERT M. VELASCO AND MARIO I. MOLINA, G.R. No.
170463, February 2, 2011)
It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Commission of Audit, are
generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in
recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction. (RUBEN REYNA AND
LLOYD SORIA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011)
The Office of the Solicitor General - deputized counsel may file a notice of appeal. (SOUTH PACIFIC
CORPORATION AND SOUTH EAST ASIA SUGAR MILL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
AND SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, G.R. No. 180462, February 9, 2011)
A person who administered the oath may be guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document if it is
proved that he has knowledge of the facts constituting the falsity in a document and in spite of the same
he still administered said oath. (ROSALIO S. GALEOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos.
174730-37, 174845-52, February 9, 2011)
The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the
filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003
((ROQUE C. FACURA and EDUARDO F. TUASON v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 166495,
February 16, 2011)
The determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities
does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress but measured
on the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a). Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the
capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective
provinces. (LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) et al. v. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS et
al., G.R. Nos. 176951, February 15, 2011)
The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review. (MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII
of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative

function of the Court. (METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CONCERNED

RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011)
While Section 10 of R.A. 6713 provides that when the head of office finds the SALN of a subordinate
incomplete or not in the proper form such head of office must call the subordinates attention to such
omission and give him the chance to rectify the same, and such procedure is an internal office matter.
Whether or not the head of office has taken such step with respect to a particular subordinate cannot bar
the Office of the Ombudsman from investigating the latter. (LIBERATO M. CARABEO v. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
Nos. 190580-81, February 21, 2011)
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (FESTO R.
GALANG, JR. v. HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO and NICASIO M. RAMOS, G.R. No. 192793, February
22, 2011)
In order that the public officer may be held guilty of giving unwarranted advantage to another to the
prejudice of the government, it must be shown that the accused public officials did not rely on the
competence and good faith of his subordinates. (ANTONIO Y. DE JESUS, SR., ANATOLIO A. ANG and
MARTINA S. APIGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. Nos. 182539-40, February 21, 2011)
The doctrine of state immunity should not be extended to the petitioner as the same is an agency of the
Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of
the State in its sovereign capacity. (AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID and ELISEA
RAMOS, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011)
Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR's franchise is subject to amendment, alteration
or repeal by Congress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision
in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of
PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR's transactions with
private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. (PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
(BIR) et al., G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011)
An information elicited in violation of the rights of the accused or without a valid waiver thereof is
inadmissible, and the evidence garnered as the result of that interrogation is also inadmissible. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FEDERICO LUCERO, G.R. No. 188705, March 02, 2011)
Lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Thus, their actions as law
professors must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of
members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they
are lawyers. (RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON
THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT",
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 08, 2011)
Reliance of the judge to the failure of his staff and even that of the party to inform him that the latter is yet
to receive the Order to Comment will not shield him from his liability in failing to render a mere resolution
to a mere motion to recall witness. (FERDINAND C. BACOLOT v. HON. FRANCISCO D. PAO, A.M.
No. RTJ-10-2241, March 09, 2011)
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance
of their duties. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant
without observing the proper procedural steps; otherwise, such act would amount to dishonesty or

extortion. (DY TEBAN TRADING CO., INC. v. ARCHIBALD C. VERGA, A.M. No. P-11-2914, March 16,
2011)
While the executive judge may not require court personnel to perform work outside the scope of their job
description, except duties that are identical with or are subsumed under their present functions, the
executive judge may reassign court personnel of multiple-branch courts to another branch within the
same area of administrative supervision when there is a vacancy or when the interest of the service
requires, subject, further to the limitation that the reassignment is not for an indefinite period.
(EXECUTIVE JUDGE LEONILO B. APITA, v. MARISSA M. ESTANISLAO, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March
16, 2011)
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. (ATTY. RAFAEL T. MARTINEZ, AND
SPOUSES DAN AND EDNA REYES v. JUDGE GRACE GLICERIA F. DE VERA, A.M. No. MTJ-081718, March 16, 2011)
The Land Bank of the Philippines is not merely a nominal party in the determination of just compensation
but an indispensable participant in such proceedings. As such, LBP possessed the legal personality to
institute a petition for determination of just compensation. (DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181566, March 09, 2011)
When the issues presented do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of body but are
purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction should not be applied. (AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
G.R. No. 187714, March 08, 2011)
The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds no application because the Cooperative
Development Authority is not a private entity but a government agency created by virtue of Republic Act
No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of Section 15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(CANDELARIO L. VERZOSA, JR. (IN HIS FORMER CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY) v. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE (IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT), et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 08,
2011)
The period for filing a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy based on false representation is
covered by Rule 23 and not Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 3 of Rule 25 allowing
the filing of a petition at any time after the last day for filing of COCs but not later than the date of
proclamation is merely a procedural rule that cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC). (FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March
08, 2011)
A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal boards and councils, as to include the
power to accordingly reclassify the lands within the zones, would be in accord with the avowed legislative
intent behind the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, which was to increase the autonomy of local governments.
(BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC. v. E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC., G.R.
No. 131481, March 16, 2011)
Failure to regularly submit the corresponding reports on the collections and deposits of court funds/fees
indicates negligence. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MS. MIRA THELMA V.
ALMIRANTE, A.M. No. P-07-2297, March 21, 2011)
Filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative while holding a judicial post constitutes grave
misconduct with a penalty of dismissal from service. (ASHARY M. ALAUYA v. JUDGE CASAN ALI L.
LIMBONA, A.M. No. SCC-98-4, March 22, 2011)
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character
by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration

(LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character. (TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE

COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011)
The COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and
accreditation of a party-list and not the HRET as although it is the party-list organization that is voted for
in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of
Representatives over which the HRET has jurisdiction over. (ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY
CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS CHAIRMAN, JAMES MARTY LIM v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011)
Failure to disclose a spouses business interests and financial connections in the SALN constitutes simple
negligence. (PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT v. SALVADOR A. PLEYTO, G.R. No. 176058, March 23, 2011
As malice is material in a libel case, the glaring absence of maliciousness in the assailed portion of the
news article subject of this case negates the existence of probable cause that libel has been committed
by the respondents. (ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, et al. v. HON. ARTEMIO TUQUERO IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR., G.R. No. 169895, March 23, 2011)
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of Memorandum Circular
(MC) No. 58 is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency. (JUDGE ADORACION
G. ANGELES v. HON. MANUEL E. GAITE et al., G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011)
The Court has time and again admonished judges to be prompt in the performance of their solemn duty
as dispenser of justice, since undue delays erode the people's faith in the judicial system. (JOSEFINA
NAGUIAT v. JUDGE MARIO B. CAPELLAN, A. M. No. MTJ-11-1782, March 23, 2011)
R.A. No. 6975 is intended only to prevent the new appointee from serving beyond the term of office of the
original appointee. It does not prohibit the new appointee from serving less than the unexpired portion of
the term as in the case of a temporary appointment. (HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL v. HON.
ALEJANDRO S. URRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE NEW APPOINTEE VICE HEREIN PETITIONER, et
al., G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011)
The Clerks of Court perform a very delicate function as custodian of the court's funds, revenues, records,
property and premises. They wear many hats - those of treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant
manager of the court, hence, they are "entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly and effectively
implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds" and are thus, "liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction or impairment of such funds and property." (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v.
ATTY. MAGDALENA L. LOMETILLO et al., A.M. No. P-09-2637 (Formerly A.M. No. 08-12-682-RTC),
March 29, 2011)
In administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable doubt or
preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is enough. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.
MANUEL P. VALENCIA, G.R. No. 183890, April 13, 2011)
The decision of the Ombudsman of in finding probable cause is reviewable by the Court when there is
allegation of grave abuse of discretion. (PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE ON
BEHEST LOANS, REPRESENTED BY MAGDANGAL B. ELMA v. HONORABLE ANIANO A.
DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011)
Though respondent is a casual employee as contemplated under Rule III, Section 2(f) of the Omnibus
Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, she is entitled to due process especially if they are
to be removed for more serious causes or for causes other than that provided under Civil Service
Commission Form No. 001, to wit: 1) when their services are no longer needed; (2) funds are no longer
available; (3) the project has already been completed/finished; or (4) their performance are below par.
(PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND REYNALDO P.
MARTIN v. MARIE JEAN C. LAPID, G.R. No. 191940, April 12, 2011)

A province may be created without complying with Sec. 461 of the LGC requiring contiguous territory of
at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometres. (RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, AND
RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011)
This Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
division of the COMELEC. However, the Court held that an exception to this rule applies where the
commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. (MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO v. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DANTE O. TINGA, G.R. No. 193846, April 12, 2011)
Misrepresentation of qualifications i.e. educational attainment and eligibility for government service
amounts to plain and simple dishonesty as it refers to the act of intentionally making a false statement on
any material fact in securing one's appointment. (ANTONIO EXEQUIEL A. MOMONGAN, v PRIMITIVO
A. SUMAYO, A.M. No. P-10-2767, April 12, 2011)
The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure
of public funds unless an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract and
certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and
such funds are available are attached to the contract. (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS v
KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., G.R. No. 182967, April 06, 2011)
Certiorari does not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary
settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted
Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or opinion.
(SPOUSES ANTONIO AND FE YUSAY v. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
OF MANDALUYONG CITY, G.R. No. 156684, April 06, 2011)
The proper determination of the same is a matter of transcendental importance. The determination of just
compensation goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter of public interest - the
proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right of a landowner to receive
just compensation when the government exercises the power of eminent domain in its agrarian reform
program. (APO FRUITS CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION, INC. v. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G. R. No. 164195, April 05, 2011)
The public officials personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in
violation of law. (TOMAS R. OSMEA, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS
CITY MAYOR OF CEBU CITY v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R.No. 188818 May 31, 2011)
An illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period
of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement. (ISABEL
GALANG v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 175276, May 31, 2011)
Security guards, by the very nature of their work, are mandated to secure the court premises and protect
its property from pilferage. It should go without saying that their duty should never be compromised to
advance their own interests. (RE: THEFT OF THE USED GALVANIZED IRON (GI) SHEETS IN THE SC
COMPOUND, BAGUIO CITY, A.M. No. 2008-15-SC. May 31, 2011)
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. (RIMANDO GANNAPAO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No.
180141, May 31, 2011)
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides
that administrative offenses are classified into grave, less grave and light, depending on the gravity of the
nature of the act complained of. The less grave offenses of simple neglect of duty and of simple
misconduct carry the penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the
first offense. (AN ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. PORTIA DIESTA, BRANCH CLERK

OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 236, PASIG CITY AND LUZ SANTOS-TACLA,
CLERK III, SAME COURT, A.M. No. P-05-1970 (Formerly A.M.OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1962-P), May 30,
2011)
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust
of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. (UNIVERSAL ROBINA
CORP. VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011 )
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or employee who
unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another, at
the expense of the rights of others. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) AND
WINSTON GARCIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER OF GSIS v.
ARWIN MAYORDOMO, G.R. No. 191218, May 30, 2011)
The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense charged.
(THERON LACSON v. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., G.R. Nos. 165399, 165475,
165404 and 165489, May 30, 2011)
The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is obviously
not within the province of this Court. Such determination belongs to the Executive branch. (BARANGAY
CAPTAIN BEDA TORRECAMPO v. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, et
al., G.R. No. 188296, May 30, 2011)
Section 8 of DAO 63 is clear. It states that in the event there are two or more applicants over the same
area, priority shall be given to the applicant that first filed its application. (DIAMOND DRILLING
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NEWMOUNT PHILIPPINES INCORPORATED, G.R. No.
183576, May 30, 2011)
A private corporation is beyond the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
LUIS MORALES, G.R. No. 166355, May 30, 2011)
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. (ATTY. ROMULO
B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011)
Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government
instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its
audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter. (BOY SCOUTS OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMSSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011)
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President, without need of congressional authority to exercise the same. (DATU
ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, et al. v. HON. RONALDO PUNO, et al., G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)
Notice is part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the States
intention to acquire a private land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the opportunity to
present evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian law.
(HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE, NAMELY: JOSEFA DELESTE, et al. v. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011)
Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural
tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial
evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy. (LUCIA RODRIGUEZ, et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS
AND TERESITA SALVADOR, G.R. No. 171972, June 8, 2011)

The Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances from the shackles of
technicality in order to render just and equitable relief. On whether the principle of immutability of
judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it to state that the succession of the events
recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved
with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments did not yet come into play.
(LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No.
176951, June 28, 2011)
The fair market value of the lot should be determined at the time when the parties signed the compromise
agreement and the same was approved because this is tantamount to EPZA impliedly agreeing to paying
the market value in 1993. (EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. ESTATE OF SALUD
JIMENEZ, et al., G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011)
The power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to
delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule
otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not
permissible. (RENALD F. VILANDO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, et
al., G.R. Nos. 192147, August 23, 2011)
Falsification or irregularities in the keeping of time records constitute dishonesty, which is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal from the service. (LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ROMEO L. DE LEMOS, et.al., A.M. NO. P11-2953, September 28, 2011)
The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his property is now required to
file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against the allegations in the complaint for eminent
domain. (CITY OF MANILA v. MELBA TAN TE, G.R. No. 169263, September 21, 2011)
Section 63 of the EPIRA as well as Section 5, Rule 33 of the IRR clearly state that the displaced or
separated personnel as a result of the privatization, if qualified, shall be given preference in the hiring of
the manpower requirements of the privatized companies. Clearly, the law only speaks of preference and
by no stretch of the imagination can the same amount to a legal right to the position. Undoubtedly, not all
the terminated employees will be re-hired by the selection committee. (ENRIQUE U. BETOY v. THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4,
2011)
Payment for services done on account of the government, but based on a void contract, cannot be
avoided. (DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. RONALDO E. QUIWA, DOING
BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME "R.E.Q. CONSTRUCTION," et al., G.R. No. 183444, October 12,
2011)
An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this Court of the Ombudsmans exercise
of discretion, however, the Court intervention only occurs when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise
of discretion is shown. (ERDITO QUARTO v. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO,
et al., G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011)
Price escalation is expressly allowed under Presidential Decree 1594, which law allows price escalation
in all contracts involving government projects including contracts entered into by government entities and
instrumentalities and Government Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs). (PHILIPPINE
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY v. GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 188866, October 19, 2011)
A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct. (BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, et al.,
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the
demurrer to evidence in a criminal case. And an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not
appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. (BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR v.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, GR No. 172777, October 19, 2011)
A government officer or employees removal from office as a result of a bona fide reorganization is a valid
cause for that employees removal. (CARLOS COTIANGCO, et al. v. THE PROVINCE OF BILIRAN
ANDTHE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 157139, October 19, 2011)
When custodial investigation is conducted in violation of Sec.12 of Art.III, only evidence on confessions
and admission of the accused as against himself is prohibited. (HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 176229, October 19, 2011)
A petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy,
are two distinct remedies to prevent a candidate from entering an electoral race. Both remedies prescribe
distinct periods to file the corresponding petition, on which the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
over the case is dependent. (ALFAIS T. MUNDER v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ATTY.
TAGO R. SARIP, G.R. No. 194076, October 19, 2011)
The Revised Charter of Quezon City expressly provided that the city government had the power to
regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of
constructing and repairing them. The MMDA does not have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only
courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. (EMILIO GANCAYCO v. CITY
GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No.
177807, October 11, 2011)
As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason
to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard. (MONICO K. IMPERIAL, JR. v.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 191224, October 4, 2011)
While as a rule, it is beyond the province of the Court to analyze and weight the parties evidence all over
again in reviewing administrative decisions, an exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to
believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.
ANTONIO T. REYES G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011)
A one-day delay in filing a Preliminary Conference Brief, does not justify the outright dismissal of an
electoral protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the rules on
the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable. (SALVADOR D. VIOLAGO, SR. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOAN V. ALARILLA, G.R. No. 194143, October 4, 2011)

The exemption of special courts from the regular raffle was not established as an ironclad rule. A.M. No.
05-9-03-SC does in fact allow special courts to acquire jurisdiction over cases that are not drug cases.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. JOSE D. AZARRAGA and JOHN REY PREVENDIDO, G. R.
No. 187117, October 12, 2011)
In a buy-bust operation, the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized, but dutybound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the
commission of the crime. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGG C. BUENAVENTURA, G.R. No.
184807, November 23, 2011)
The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive
department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in
nature. (HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED et.al v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011)

P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials involved in the violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused was acquitted. (FREDRIK FELIX P.
NOGALES, et.al v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 191080, November 21, 2011)
In expropriation cases, the trial court has the discretion to act upon the commissioners report.
(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v. SPS. TAN SONG BOK AND JOSEFINA S. TAN, et al., G.R. No. 191448,
November 16, 2011)
The three-term limitation made under RA No. 9164 has no retroactive application. (CONSTANCIO F.
MENDOZA v. SENEN C. FAMILARA AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 191017,
November 15, 2011)
The president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. (IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZVS.
GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
et.al.
G.R. No. 191805, 193160, November 15, 2011)
Executive Order 883 and Career Executive Service Board Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any
force and effect, the Court can no longer pass upon the issue of their constitutionality. (ATTY. ELIAS
OMAR A. SANA VS.CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD, G.R. No. 192926, November 15, 2011)
Rice subsidy is one of the benefits that will be granted to employees of GOCCs or GFIs only if they are
"incumbents" as of July 1, 1989. (MANOLITO AGRA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No.
167807, December 6, 2011)
A government employee enjoys constitution protection that No officer or employee in the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (VICTOR R. REYES, substituted by
his heirs, CLARIBEL G. REYES, CLARISSA G. REYES, and CZARINA G. REYES v. COURT OF
APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 167002, December 12, 2011)
R.A. No. 9335, otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005 and its IRR are constitutional. (BUREAU OF
(CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) v. HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, G.R. No.
181704, December 6, 2011)
Good faith is actually a question of intention and can be ascertained not from a persons own protestation
of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts. (CESAR S.
DUMDUMA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182606, December 4, 2011)
For a valid dismissal from the government service, the requirements of due process must be complied
with. (PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS and MIA MANAHAN,
G.R. No. 185668, December 13, 2011)

The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the peoples
faith in the judiciary. (ESPINA & MADARANG CO. & MAKAR AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIAL &
DEVELOPMENT CORP. (MAKAR), v. HON. CADER P. INDAR AL HAJ, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069,
December 14, 2011)
The Court has already categorically declared in that if the issue of just compensation is not settled prior to
the passage of the CARL, it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property
was acquired under P.D. 27. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JESUS S. YUJUICO, et
al., G.R. No. 18471, March 21, 2012)
The Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. That should
investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal.

Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be
conducted. (JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, et al.,
G.R. No. 189161, March 21, 2012)
An administrative offense constitutes misconduct when it has direct relation to, and is connected with,
the performance of the official duties of the one charged. Thus, misconduct refers to a transgression of an
established and definite rule of action, more specifically, some unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
the public officer charged. (PRISCILLA L. HERNANDO v. JULIANA Y. BENGSON, LEGAL
RESEARCHER, RTC, BRANCH 104, QUEZON CITY, A.M. No. P-09-2686 (Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 062441-P), March 21, 2012)
The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in
the hands of the Court. (PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN AND ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES v. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012)
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities. Its
purpose is to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and
is entitled to hold the office. (CONGRESSWOMAN LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ v. EUFROCINO C.
CODILLA, JR. AND HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G. R. No.
195191, March 20, 2012)
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, it is provided that administrative investigations shall
be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence
applicable to judicial proceedings. The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is
substantial evidence. (SHERYLL C. DELA CRUZ, COMPLAINANT v. PAMELA P. MALUNAO, CLERK
III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, BAYOMBONG, NUEVA VIZCAYA, A.M. No. P-11-3019,
March 20, 2012)
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of
that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. In cases
involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
(VICTORY M. FERNANDEZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 193983, March 14,
2012)
In the payment of just compensation, the payment of interest shall be made until full payment of the
amount adjudged as just compensation for the land. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PERFECTO
OBIAS, et al, G.R. No. 184406, March 14, 2012)
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority.
The challenge to the Ombudsmans power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the
Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court. (OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN v. NELLIE R. APOLONIO, G.R. No. 165132, March 07, 2012)
Just compensation for private agricultural lands acquired by the government under the auspices of P.D.
No. 27 in relation to E.O. No. 228 should be computed in accordance with the method set forth under
R.A. No. 6657. (DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY OIC-SECRETARY
JOSE MARI B. PONCE, NOW BY SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN v. HEIRS OF ANGEL
T. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 188670, March 7, 2012)
Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service is clear that length of service
may be considered either as mitigating or aggravating depending on the circumstances of the case.
(CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. AURORA M. CLAVE, G.R. Nos. 194665, 194645, March 6, 2012)

Coco-levy funds are public funds as these funds are affected by public interest: to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry. (PETITIONERORGANIZATIONS, NAMELY: PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT
MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), COCONUT INDUSTRY REFORM MOVEMENT (COIR) et
al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al, G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012)
When the question involves the validity of a resolution issued by petitioner, it is the National Electric
Authority, pursuant to its power of supervision, which has the authority to conduct investigations and other
similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric
cooperatives. (SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., et al. v. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR., G.R.
No. 173840, April 25, 2012)
As a separate juridical personality from the government, UP cannot evade execution, and its funds may
be subject to garnishment or levy. This notwithstanding, before execution may be had, a claim for
payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA. (LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND
WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185918, April 18, 2012)
An officer or employee in the government shall be considered habitually absent only if he incurs
unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2/5 days monthly leave credit under the Civil Service
Rules for at least three months in a semester or at least three consecutive months during the year.
(OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MANUEL Z. ARAYA, JR., UTILITY WORKER, MTCC,
BRANCH 2, OZAMIS CITY, A.M. No.P-12-3053, (formerly A.M. No. 06-3-88-MTCC)
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as
a special agrarian court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the
factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. Special agrarian courts are not at liberty to
disregard the formula laid down by the Department of Agrarian Reform. (LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SALVADOR ENCINAS and JACOBA DELGADO, G.R. No. 167735, April
18, 2012)
Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by
PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, HLIs
submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered as the
effective date of taking as it was only during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP
coverage of these lands. (HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL, et al., G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012)
In the absence of convincing proof that indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion, the Priority Development
Assistance Fund cannot be declared unconstitutional. (LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND
POVERTY (LAMP), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN AND COUNSEL, CEFERINO PADUA et al.,
v. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012)
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance with residency requirement since
the question of residence is a question of intention. Notwithstanding, jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once
established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one
domicile at a time. (ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
DAN ERASMO, SR., G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)
In computing the quorum in of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, its entire membership must be taken into
account including that of the City Vice Mayor as presiding officer. (LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL AND THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL v. ATTY. REX G. ROJO, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012)

Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution and similar provisions do not peremptorily prohibit the
promotional appointment of a commissioner to chairman, provided the new appointees tenure in both
capacities does not exceed seven (7) years in all. (DENNIS A. B. FUNA, v. THE CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012)
Section 13(3) of R.A. 7077 evidently has to do with the composition of the Retired Reserve Unit. The
provision in question does not prescribe the retirement age for reservists who are called into active
service in the regular armed forces. (COL. JESUS G. CABARRUS, JR., PAF (RES.) v. HON.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, et al., G.R. No. 180966, June 13, 2012)
Bare general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for
naturalization. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG, G.R. No. 175430, June 18,
2012)
Dismissal from the service, as a prescribed penalty imposed by Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules for the commission of dishonesty even as a first offense, underscores the constitutional principle
that public office is a public trust and only those who can live up to such exacting standard deserve the
honor of continuing in public service. (FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN
OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. FLORENTINOVELOSO, G.R. No. 196201, June 19, 2012)
The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, must carry with it all
powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. (PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et
al. v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012)
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections
is purely administrative in character. This process does not entail any determination of administrative
liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration. (MAGDALO PARA SA
PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012)
The Depratment of Agrarian Reform, as the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of the
agrarian reform program and pursuant to its rule-making power under R.A. No. 6657, translated the
factors in Section 17 into a basic formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, and those found in
succeeding DAR administrative regulations. The application of these formulas are mandatory and
imposes upon the RTC-SACs the duty to apply, and not to disregard, them in determining just
compensation. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JUAN LOPEZ, et al, G.R. No.
171038, June 20, 2012)
There is nothing infirm in an agreement which impliedly waives the right of City of Manila to present
evidence that it was acquiring the subject lots by expropriation for a proper public purpose since it may be
assumed that the parties knew what they were doing and since such agreement would facilitate early
disposal of the case. (CITY OF MANILA v. ALEGAR CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 187604, June 25,
2012)
Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any
public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of
her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the courts
good name and standing. (LOURDES CELAVITE-VIDAL v. NORAIDA A. AGUAM, A.M. No.SCC-1013-P, June 26, 2012)
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor
of the HRET. (ROMEO M. JOLOSJOS, JR. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DAN
ERASMO, SR., G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012)
The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance
of ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and
approval of local government units for the projects described therein. (BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v.

THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY GOV. CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, et al., G.R. No.
196870, June 26, 2012)
The COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well established. This
singular power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as
an incident to its enforcement powers. (LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), et al., G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012)
Evidently in a case where the conflict is exactly on just compensation, the agrarian reform process has
yet to be completed. Thus, the land shall be considered taken only upon payment of just compensation
because it would complete the agrarian reform process. (DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v.
MANOLOGODUCO, G.R. Nos. 174007, 181327, June 27, 2012)
The consequence of a finding of unjust and improper titling of the entire property by the Republic is that
the title over the excluded portion shall be returned or transferred back to the owners of the lot, with
damages. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. PAZ O. MONTALVAN, JOINED BY HER
HUSBAND, JESUS J. MONTALVAN, G.R. No. 190336, June 27, 2012)
In appraising just compensation the courts must consider, in addition, all the facts regarding the condition
of the landholding and its surroundings, as well as the improvements and the capabilities of the
landholding. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VERONICA ATEGANABLE, G.R. No. 176692,
June 27, 2012)
A summary judgment is resorted to in order to expedite the disposition of a case, it appearing from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits of record that no genuine question or issue of fact
exists in such case. When the facts as pleaded are uncontested, there is no genuine issue as to the facts,
and summary judgment is warranted. (POLYFOAM CHEMICAL CORP. v. ELISA S. CHEN, G.R. No.
156869, June 27, 2012)
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.
The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office. (PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012)
The conduct of every court personnel must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause
to sully the image of the Judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
misdemeanor not only in the performance of their official duties but also in conducting themselves outside
or beyond the duties and functions of their office. (FILOMENA B. CONSOLACION v. LYDIA S.
GAMBITO, A.M. Nos. P-06-2186 and P-12-3026, July 3, 2012)
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority on the part
of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided
for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was
strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. (ARNOLD D. VICENCIO v. HON. REYNALDO A.
VILLAR, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012)
A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President, and an exercise
by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. Neither is the provincial governor authorized to
convene a local civilian group or an organization of private citizens as it is proscribed pursuant to the
national policy to establish one police force and under Sec.24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution. (JAMAR
M. KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012)
Competitive bidding is an essential element of a public bidding. It has been held in a long line of cases
that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void and the party to whom it is
awarded cannot benefit from it. (PHILIPPINE SPORTS COMMISSION, et al. v. DEAR JOHN
SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 183260. July 4, 2012)

The failure of a sheriff to make periodic reports on the status of a writ of execution warrants administrative
liability. (RHEA AIRENE P. KATAGUE, et al. v. JERRY A. LEDESMA, SHERIFF IV, RTC, BR. 48,
BACOLOD CITY, A.M. No. P-12-3067, July 4, 2012)
A process servers unjustified delay in serving court notices constitutes neglect of duty that warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions. (JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN v. NICOMEDES DELA
CRUZ, A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012)
The failure of counsel to file the requisite appellants brief amounts to inexcusable. (ISAAC C. BASILIO,
et al. v. ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, A.C. No. 6910, July 11, 2012)
The only exception for an employee to receive additional, double and indirect compensation is where the
law allows him to receive extra compensation for services rendered in another position which is an
extension or is connected with his basic work. (HILARION F. DIMAGIBA, et al. v. JULITA
ESPARTERO, et al., G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012)
The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of
another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate.
(FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, et al., G.R. NO. 202242. JULY 17, 2012)
Taking monetary evidence without proper authority constitutes theft warranting the penalty of dismissal
and cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MA. IRISSA G.
MUSNI, A.M. No. P-11-3024. July 17, 2012)
The power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. (CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SITTING AS AN IMPEACHMENT COURT, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012)
While the Local Government Code charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that
have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, the Local Government Code provides an exception
in cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. (AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, et al., G.R. No. 195770,
July 17, 2012)
The failure of the Clerk of Court to remit the court funds constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and
grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service which warrants the penalty of dismissal
from service. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. LUNALINDA M. PERADILLA, A.M. No.
P-09-2647, July 17, 2012)
The exercise of the right to travel guaranteed by the Constitution is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that such restriction is in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. (OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE IGNACIO B.
MACARINE, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012)
A mere operator, under an operating agreement, cannot file a Mineral Product Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) application in its name without a sufficient and valid authorization from its principal or from the
holders of the mining claims and interests included therein. (DIZON COPPER SILVER MINES, INC. v.
DR. LUIS D. DIZON, G.R. No. 183573, July 18, 2012)
A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same is
a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. (ABRAHAM RIMANDO v. NAGUILAN
EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC., et al., G.R. No. 198860, July 23, 2012)

R.A. 6758 withdrew the authority of the NHA to grant additional incentive benefits to its project personnel.
Only those additional compensation benefits being received by incumbents before the effectivity of R.A.
6758, which were not integrated into the standardized salary rates, shall continue to be authorized.
(GENEROSO ABELLANOSA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012)
The forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that
violates or threatens the right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to
forward and share intelligence regarding private army groups (PAGs) with the body specifically created
for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. (MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)
The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing delegated legislative
authority to reorganize his own office pursuant to E.O. 292. (PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE
OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS-INVESTIGATIVE AND
ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, et al., G.R. NO. 196425, JULY 24, 2012)
A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the right to resume the
practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his
profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice. (IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO MUNESES, A.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012)
Mistrial is the only exception to the well-settled principle that acquittal is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. This Court was categorical in stating that a re-examination of
the evidence without a finding of mistrial will violate the right to repose of an accused, which is what is
protected by the rule against double jeopardy. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012)
Any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy amounts to
an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. (RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION
OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED
CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012)
The mandatory order in the program of devolution under R.A. No. 7160 connotes an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not
to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result to
duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government.
(CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DR. AGNES QUIDA P. YU, G.R. No. 189041, July 31, 2012)
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due process was in fact given several
opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances,
then his cry for due process must fail. (THE HEIRS OF JOLLY R. BUGARIN v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174431, August 6, 2012)
Foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized
to administer oath. (TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R.
No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process. (DR. FERNANDO A. MELENDRES M.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE LUNG CENTER
OF THE PHILIPPINES [LCP] v. PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No.
163859, August 15, 2012)

The Court cannot countenance neglect of duty for even simple neglect of duty lessens the peoples
confidence in the judiciary and ultimately in the administration of justice. (MEMORANDA OF JUDGE
ELIZA B. YU ISSUED TO LEGAL RESEARCHER MARIE JOY P. LAGMAN AND TO COURT
STENOGRAPHER SOLEDAD J. BASSIG, ALL OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47,
PASAY CIT, A.M. No. P-12-3033, August 15, 2012)
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character and could not be validly made the
subject of the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment. (UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v.
HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON,et al., G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012)
The power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory. (ERNESTO A. FAJARDO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012)
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be free from any whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the judicial branch but also to his behavior outside the
court as a private individual. (JUDGE ARMANDO S. ADLAWAN v. ESTRELLA P. CAPILITAN, A.M.
No.P-12-3080, August 29, 2012)
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO BELOCURA, G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012)
Section 2 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary
funds nor part of the general funds of the national government of P.D. No. 755 contravenes the provisions
of the Constitution. (PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), et.al v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 04, 2012
The Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power including the
power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionallycreated Office of the Ombudsman. (EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES et. al, G.R. Nos. 196231, 196232 September 04, 2012)
When an individual is found guilty of dishonesty, the corresponding penalty is dismissal from employment
or service. BAGONG KAPISANAN SA PUNTA TENEMENT, INC v. AZER E. DOLOT, et al., G.R. NO.
179054, September 05, 2012)
In correcting the erroneous entry, the COMELEC need not order the opening of the ballot box for the
purpose of recounting the votes of the candidates affected if the correction sought is such that it can be
made without the need of opening the ballot box. (ANTONIO P. CERON v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTION GRACE P. VALDEZ, et al., G.R. No. 199084, September 11, 2012)
The issuance by the proper disciplining authority of an order of preventive suspension for 90 days of a
civil officer or employee pending investigation of her administrative case is authorized provided that a
formal charge is served to her and her charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or
neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that she is guilty of the charge as to
warrant her removal from the service. (TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. ROSARIO S. MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, G.R. No. 176343, September
18, 2012)
The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case requires two different appeal fees, one
to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal, and the other to be paid in the
COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal. (BIENVENIDO
WILLIAM D. LLOREN v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROGELIO PUA, JR., G.R. No.
196355, September 18, 2012)

There is no impediment for the COMELEC and the DOJ to create the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team for the purpose of conducting a thorough investigation of the alleged massive electoral fraud and
the manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 national elections relating in particular to the
presidential and senatorial elections. Neither does the creation of the said Committee violates the
constitutional rights of an individual. (JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al.,
G.R. No. 199085, September 18, 2012)
Directives and orders issued by the President in the valid exercise of his power of control over the
executive department must be obeyed and implemented in good faith by all executive officials. Acts
performed in contravention of such directives merit invalidation. (DR. EMMANUEL T. VELASCO, et al.
v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AUDIT OFFICE, G.R.
No. 189774, September 18, 2012)
Failure to adduce substantial evidence that the act was part of the fraudulent scheme amounting to grave
misconduct, dishonesty and reasonable violation of office rules and regulations presupposes that the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service is not warranted. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, REPRESENTED BY ROBERT G. VERGARA v. HEIDI R. CHUA, G.R. No.
202914, September 26, 2012)
When the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation due the landowner has yet
to be settled, such just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under Republic
Act No. 6657. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMILIANO R. SANTIAGO, JR., G.R. No. 182209,
October 03, 2012)
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to
valid votes. Hence, the second placer candidate is deemed to have garnered the highest number of
votes and is entitled to hold the corresponding elective position. (EFREN RACEL ARATEA v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTELA D. ANTIPOLO, G.R. No. 195229, October 09, 2012)
Civil Service Commission (CSC) has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who
initiated the complaint. CSC likewise exercises concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents
over administrative cases. (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. Nos.
176162, 178845, October 09, 2012)
There has been no change of any long-standing rule, thus, no redefinition of the term capital. The terms
capital stock subscribed or paid, capital stock and capital were defined solely to determine the basis
for computing the supervision and regulation fees under Section 40(e) and (f) of the Public Service Act.
(HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, G.R. No.
176579, October 09, 2012)
The sale of government-owned Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to a foreign corporation is
not prohibited but only Filipino citizens and corporations 60% of whose capital is owned by Filipinos may
be granted Water rights. (INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC., et al. v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM), et al., G.R. No. 192088, October 09, 2012)
Existence of a valid certificate of candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution, hence a
declaration of a candidates disqualification which rendered his CoC invalid cannot be properly substituted
(MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RODERICK A.
ALCALA , G.R. No. 196804, October 09, 2012)
A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Hence, if a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, all votes
for that candidate are stray votes. (DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND AGAPITO J. CARDINO, G.R. No. 193237, October 09, 2012)

Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense. What
matters for due process purpose are notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is
given, and simply the opportunity to be heard. (SPS. EUGENE C. GO AND ANGELITA GO, AND MINOR
EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO v. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, et. al, G.R. No. 169391,
October 10, 2012)
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. (JOHN C.
ARROYO, et al. v. ROSAL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC, G.R. No. 175155, October 22, 2012)
Acquisition of the property under OLT or P.D. No. 27 does not necessarily mean that the determination of
just compensation thereof must be under the same decree. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPS.
ROKAYA AND SULAIMAN BONA , G.R. No. 180804, November 12, 2012)
The votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such
nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, are not stray but must be
counted in favor of the latter. (CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOHN
LLOYD
M.
PACETE,
G.R.
No.
192221,
November
13,
2012)
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 is valid and constitutional. (HON. PATRICIA A.
STO. TOMAS, et al. vs. REY SALAC, et al., G.R. No. 152642, November 13, 2012)
A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. (JOEL P. QUIO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND RITCHIE R. WAGAS, G.R. No. 197466, November 13, 2012) Sequestration is not
meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to his property and vest the same in the
sequestering agency, the Government or any other person, as these can be done only for the causes and
by the processes laid down by law. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI
(THROUGH ITS EXECUTOR, MANUEL G. MONTECILLO), SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION)
et al., G.R. No. 183446, November 13, 2012)
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts
and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper. (HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION CORPORATION
AND HYMAN YAP v. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLOT), et al., G.R.
Nos. 170217, 170694 December 10, 2012)
The consolidation of cases to a DOJ Special Panel under DO No. 182 does not violate equal protection of
law and the right to speedy disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. (SPOUSES AUGUSTO
G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 188056, January
08, 2013)
The winning elected official in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. (MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 201716, January 08, 2013)
Cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the
COMELEC in division should first decide. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by
acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.
(KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM v. COMELEC and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, G.R. No. 192289, January 08,
2013)
Mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act sought
to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same. (SPECIAL PEOPLE,
INC. FOUNDATION v. NESTOR M. CANDA et al., G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013)

Where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the
services of private counsel. (ROMEO A. GONTANG v. ENGR. CECILIA ALAYAN, G.R. No. 191691,
January16, 2013)
The express grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve election protests carries with it the grant of all
other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and efficient exercise of the power expressly
granted. Verily, the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred by the constitution to the COMELEC to settle
said election protests includes the authority to order a technical examination of relevant election
paraphernalia, election returns and ballots in order to determine whether fraud and irregularities attended
the canvass of the votes. (GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI AND VICE-GOVERNOR RUBY M.
SAHALI, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 201796, January 15, 2013)
A statute having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject. (HENRY R. GIRON v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013)
Picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that
faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No.
9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the
voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest. (LIWAYWAY
VINZONS-CHATO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 199149,
January 22, 2013)
When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should be
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. (RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612,
January 22, 2013)
The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic
knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions, thus, the requirement of a
masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. (UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v.
ANALIZA F. PEPANIO AND MARITI D. BUENO, G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013)
Gross inexcusable negligence, on one hand, and evident bad faith or manifest partiality, on the other
hand, are not two highly opposite concepts that can result in a fatally defective information should the
terms be conjoined in the information. The fact that the prosecution can properly allege these different
modes alternatively in the information only means that the conviction may lie based simply on the
evidence that is supportive of a particular mode. (EDNA J. JACA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 166967, January
28, 2013)
An opposition to a petition for registration of a party-list is not a condition precedent to the filing of a
complaint for cancellation of the same. (ANTONIO D. DAYAO, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 193643
and 193704, January29, 2013)
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. A
violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment. However, the refund of the
disallowed payment of a benefit granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of the Government
may be barred by the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient. (BRENDA L. NAZARETH v.
COMMISSIONERS of the COMMISSION on AUDIT, G.R. No. 188635, January29, 2013)
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. (DON DJOWEL SALES v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 191023, February 6, 2013)
The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public officials may not be sued for acts done in
the perfomance of their official functions or within the scope of their authority. (DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, et al. v. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC., G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013)

The fact that the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) conducts public consultations or
hearings does not mean that it is performing quasi-judicial functions. (SALVACION VILLANUEVA, et
al. v. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, et al., G.R. No. 178347, February
25, 2013)
In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty to justify affirmative
findings. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. RODRIGO MAPOY, et al., G.R. No. 197299, February 13,
2013)
The language of Section 13 of the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or
designation, as such, the prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary. (DENNIS
FUNA v. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al., G.R. No. 191644, February
19, 2013)
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. (PACIFICO C. VELASCO v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169253, February 20, 2013)
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another with a different
offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense. (ISABELO A. BRAZA v. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 1950, February 20, 2013)
A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time, otherwise the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.
(SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 193314, February 26,
2013)
The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately executory, and an appeal therefrom does
not stop the decision from being executory. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. SAMSON G. DE LEON,
G.R. No. 154083, February 27, 2013)
A person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 may still be appointed in a government
position provided that it is a coterminous or primarily confidential position. The tenure of a confidential
employee is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latters pleasure. The position of
a General Manager (GM) in a water district is considered as a confidential position due to the intimate
relationship between the GM and the Board of Directors (BOD) of the water district and the power of the
BOD to terminate the services of the GM on the ground of loss of confidence. (CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION v. PILILLA WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013)
When there is reorganization conducted pursuant to an authority granted to the Board of Directors (BOD)
of a government-owned and controlled corporation, an officer reassigned to a new position cannot claim
that she was illegally removed from the previous one on the claim that the BOD has no authority to
conduct reorganization. The BOD of a government-owned and controlled corporation may be granted by
law the authority to effect reorganization therein. Thus, a reorganization undertaken pursuant to a specific
statutory authority by the Board of Directors of a government-owned and government-controlled
corporation is valid. (ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGILLO v. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP) et al., G.R. No. 168613 & G.R.
No. 185571; G.R. No. 185571, March 5, 2013)
Where the law allows its Board of Directors to create its own staffing pattern, it may hire a person even if
the position being filled does not exist in the compensation and classification system of the Civil Service
Commission. The rules that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) formulates should implement and be in

harmony with the law it seeks to enforce. This is so since the CSC cannot enforce civil service rules and
regulations contrary to, and cannot override, the laws enacted by Congress. (TRADE AND INVESTMENT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No.
182249, March 5, 2013)
In case of dishonesty, the individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material fact, practicing
or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration,
appointment, or promotion. Given the fact that respondent government officer was able to successfully
overcome the onus of demonstrating that he does not possess any unexplained wealth and that the
omissions (he did not disclose any business interest and/or financial connection, but showed a steady
increase of his net worth) in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) did not betray
any sense of bad faith or the intent to mislead or deceive on his part considering that his SALNs actually
disclose the extent of his and his wifes assets and business interests, respondent is merely culpable of
Simple Negligence instead of the more serious charge of Dishonesty. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
v. ARNEL A. BERNARDO, ATTORNEY V, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) G.R. No. 181598,
March 6, 2013)
The ballot images in the compact flash (CF) cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the
functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an election
protest. Both are original documents and carry the same evidentiary weight as official physical ballot.
Where the party received, through his counsel, notices from the COMELEC of an examination requested
by the opposing party and filed a motion for reconsideration against the same examination; he cannot
claim that his right to due process was violated. In administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. (MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HOMER T.
SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013)
Suspension from service of the Judge cannot be used as justification for undue delay in the resolution of
cases as well as the claim of the Clerk of Court that the non-recording of the cases filed in court was due
to lack of supplies. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and
correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. The delay
in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
v. HON. ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES
(MTCC), BRANCH 4, CEBU CITY AND MR. REYNALDO S. TEVES, BRANCH CLERK OF COURTA.M.
No. MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013)
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of contracts
against unwarranted interference by the State. Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 did not divest juridical
persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of
such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. There is likewise no
retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation
those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights
under Act No. 3135.
Further, the equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class
privilege. Equal protection permits of reasonable classification. The difference in the treatment of juridical
persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed whether these are
used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for
industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the
period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of
these acquired assets. (GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK,
G.R. NO. 195540, MARCH 13, 2013)
The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy (COC) is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified
candidate to be validly substituted. If the COC is thereby cancelled or denied due course, the candidate

cannot be validly substituted. (SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)
A protesting candidate cannot file a petition with the Supreme Court when the COMELEC decision is
equally divided and a rehearing is not conducted; otherwise the petition shall be considered premature
and shall be dismissed. When the COMELEC En Banc is equally divided in an opinion and the necessary
majority cannot be had, there shall be a rehearing. To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is
equally divided among the members of the Comelec en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are given the opportunity anew to strengthen their
respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their
case. It is provided also that when the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary
majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action
or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion
shall be denied. (MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RENATO R. SO,
G.R. No. 203833, March 19, 2013)
A person cannot file an action with the Supreme Court questioning the findings of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) except when it committed a grave abuse of discretion. The
abuse must, as contemplated by the law, be so gross that it amounts to evasion of duty. (MARIA
LOURDES B. LOCSIN v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MONIQUE
YAZMIN MARIA Q. LAGDAMEO, G.R. No. 204123, March 19, 2013)
A candidate whose Certificate of Candidacy is cancelled or denied cannot be substituted by another on
the claiming that the former was merely disqualified. In case of disqualification, there can be substitution
because a candidates disqualification does not automatically result to the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy. However, when the certificate of candidacy of a person is denied or is cancelled, substitution
cannot be had because the effect of cancellation is as if there is no candidate at all. (SILVERIO R.
TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE
TORRES-GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)
Where a foreigner seeking to be granted of Philippine citizenship does not follow the rule on the period to
file his petition, the action must be dismissed. The opportunity given to a foreigner to become a citizen is
a mere privilege and the absence of one requirement is fatal to the petition of the foreigner. (REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE KENG,
G.R. No. 197450, March 20, 2013)
The clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for
non-sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties
or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National
and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens. While the major political parties are those that
field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties, however, cannot participate in
the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list
system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the
national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.

The Supreme Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law." The
experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the partylist system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941,
must now come to an end. The High Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions
faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the
Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, in
this case the Supreme Court remanded the present petitions to the COMELEC not because the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may
now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters prescribed by the Supreme Court. (ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President,
Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)
When a government officer is subject to an administrative action, there must be a formal charge against
him/her and an investigation to give him/her ample opportunity to be heard. A formal charge issued prior
to the imposition of administrative sanctions must conform to the requirements set forth in Section 16,
Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. If the purported formal charge
does not contain the requirements set forth in Section 16, it cannot be said that the employee concerned
has been formally charged, rendering the dismissal from service invalid. A memorandum directing the
person to explain within a given period of time does not constitute as a formal charge. Such wanton
disregard of the proper procedure in administrative investigations under the civil service rules cannot be
countenanced. For a valid dismissal from the government service, the requirements of due process must
be complied with. (TERESITA L. SALVA v. FLAVIANA M. VALLE, G.R. No. 193773, April 2, 2013)
The Commission on Elections has to authority to effect the re-clustering of precincts when the act shall
prevent failure of elections and promote a free, orderly and honest elections. Unless they are clearly
illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with the actions of the
COMELEC. (SALIC DUMARPA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 192249, April 2, 2013)
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task
or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand, gross neglect of duty is
characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences, and
in cases involving public officials, by flagrant and palpable breach of duty. It is the omission of that care
that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. Where a bank officer
wilfully disregards the bank procedures, the act constitutes gross, not a simple, neglect of duty. This is so
since the banking business is one impressed with public trust and a higher degree of diligence is imposed
on banks compared to an ordinary business enterprise in the handling of deposited funds; the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their officials and employees is far greater than those
imposed on ordinary officers and employees in other enterprises. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. ARTEMIO S. SAN JUAN, JR., G.R. No. 186279, April 2, 2013)
A government officer subject of an administrative action cannot claim that his right to due process was
violated when he was made known of the charges against him and when he was able to file a counteraffidavit to refute the allegations against him. In an administrative case, due process is the opportunity to
explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
(CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. ARLIC ALMOJUELA, G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013)
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does the
judicial office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly
administration of justice. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave
misconduct which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even the first
offense. (THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. DEVELYN GESULTURA, A.M. No. P-041785, April 2, 2013)
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a
sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the
Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of

exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and
gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law. Hence, in matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be
resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but
it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. (DATU ANDAL
AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO
ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF
PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No.
197291, April 3, 2013)
When an elected official refuses to recognize a legitimate operation of a government agency and wilfully
intervenes to lead the said operation to failure, grave misconduct is committed. It is characterized by a
clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of established rules, which must all be supported by
substantial evidence. (FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING
AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121,
April 3, 2013)
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to exercise
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. The
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee
who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to
public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, any act or
omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies.
The Ombudsman also has the power to impose administrative sanctions. Section 15 of RA 677027
reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority. This provision covers the entire range of administrative activities attendant to
administrative adjudication, including, among others, the authority to receive complaints, conduct
investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require
the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending
an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as
warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the corresponding penalty. These powers
unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power to directly impose administrative sanctions;
its power is not merely recommendatory.
The maintenance of peace and order in the community is a general function undertaken by the punong
barangay. It is a task expressly conferred to the punong barangay under Section 389(b) (3) of RA 7160.
The peace and order function of the punong barangay must also be related to his function of assisting
local executive officials (i.e., the city mayor), under Section 389(b), Chapter III of the Local Government
Code. Local executive officials have the power to employ and deploy police for the maintenance of peace
and order, the prevention of crimes and the arrest of criminal offenders. However, police authority is
superior to the punong barangays authority in a situation where the maintenance of peace and order has
metamorphosed into crime prevention and the arrest of criminal offenders. (FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by
Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013)
The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, Sec. 2] refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State.
Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following
national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of
local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local
government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress under
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.

The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the
provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR,
which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.
Further, he DENR Secretary has the power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the
validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of
what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in
controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.
(LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and
NATURAL RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of DENR, G.R.
No. 175368, April 11, 2013)
The Commission on Audit (COA) has been granted by the Constitution the authority to establish a special
audit group when a transaction warrants the formulation of the same and the authority to determine the
scope of its audit and examination as well as the methods and techniques to be used therefor. (THE
SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT v. COURT OF APPEALS and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 174788, April 11, 2013)
The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely
obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been
committed against the public service. The subsequent desistance by the complainant does not free the
public officer from liability, as the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect the public service
based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. (CARLITO C. ENCINAS v. PO1
ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR. and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)
Where another person takes the civil service examination on behalf of another, the said act constitutes
dishonesty which is punishable by dismissal from service. The said public officer or government
employees length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The CSCs discovery of the perfidy in her
acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her
Personal Data Sheet when she had been already found guilty of an administrative charge even after the
finality of the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell that she has not and does not live
up to the high standards demanded of a court employee. (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MERLE
RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City, A.M. No. P-08-2531, April
11, 2013)
Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture
images, it does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them
without notice to the parties. Without the said notice, there will be a violation of the partys right to due
process which cannot be brushed aside by the invocation that the said party was able to file, after all, a
motion for reconsideration. Without the written order or notice, the party was deprived of the chance to
seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable petition for
certiorari. In that context, he had no real opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount proceedings.
(MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN,
G.R. No. 203302, April 11, 2013)
The act of using a foreign passport does not divest one of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as a foreign citizen, he voluntarily and effectively reverted
to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant he
represented himself as a foreign citizen by using his foreign passport.
Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public
office. If by the time an aspiring candidate filed his certificate of candidacy, he was a dual citizen enjoying
the rights and privileges of Filipino and foreign citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express

disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local
elective position. By being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning.
Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under
the Local Government Code will not apply. (CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in
tune with the shift to bicameralism. It is also very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the
provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary
function to legislate. In the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the
four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government. In so
providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a
certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government. Hence, the argument that a
senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus,
misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of
Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. (FRANCISCO I.
CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL
C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013)
When a government employee undisputedly lacked CES eligibility, he did not hold his managerial
position, within the coverage of the CES, in a permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that
position. Otherwise stated, his appointment was temporary and "co-terminus with the appointing authority.
One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated
at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause.
(EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO v. EMERSON S. CARLOS, G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013)
Courts cannot certainly give primacy to matters of procedure over substance in a party-list groups
Constitution and By-Laws, especially after the general membership has spoken. (SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ROMEO R. ROBJSO, PEDRO T. DABU, JR., LOPE E. FEBLE, NOEL T. TIAMPONG
and JOSE FLORO CRISOLOGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JONATHAN DE LA CRUZ, ED
VINCENT ALBANO and BENEDICT KATO, G.R. No. 203646, April 16, 2013)
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal was in no way estopped from subsequently declaring
that the integrity of the ballot boxes was not preserved opposed to its initial findings, after it had the
opportunity to exhaustively observe and examine in the course of the entire revision proceedings the
conditions of all the ballot boxes and their contents, including the ballots themselves, the Minutes of
Voting, Statements of Votes and Election Returns. (LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER E. PANOTES, G.R. No. 204637, April 16,
2013)
Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC requires that, while the authorization of the municipal mayor need not be
in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which the said local executive is authorized to enter into must
be made pursuant to a law or ordinance. When the said obligation was approved through a mere
resolution, it shall not confer any right to a person. The distinction between ordinances and resolutions is
well-perceived. While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character, resolutions
are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter and are
temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a
resolution." (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, G.R. No. 191667,
April 17, 2013)
We note that the Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not prohibit discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the

classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class. (AMELIA AQUINO, RODOLFO TAGGUEG, JR., ADELAIDA
HERNANDEZ and LEOPOLDO BISCOCHO, JR. v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R. No.
181973, April 17, 2013)
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial
interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. A written statement
given by an employee during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an
anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment, is not a statement given by
a person under custodial investigation, hence, not falling under the proscription provided in Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. (CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
179448, June 26, 2013)
An individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private, including a business office. In this day and age, video
surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The
installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of
privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.
Simply put, a person have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his property, whether he uses it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing his
property or covering a significant portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear violation of their right to
privacy. (SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN
CHOACHUY, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction over the said contests. (REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)
Where an officer or employee in the civil service incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable
2.5 days monthly leave credit for at least (3) months in a semester or at least (3) consecutive months
during the year, his act constitutes habitual absenteeism. If it is the second offense of the employee, the
proper penalty is dismissal from service. Nonetheless, in several administrative cases, the Court refrained
from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts. The Court have considered the
employees length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feelings of remorse, advanced
age, family circumstances and other humanitarian and equitable considerations in determining the
appropriate penalty. The Court also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever
missteps may be committed by the employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe.
(JUDGE MA. MONINA S. MISAJON, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Jose, Antique vs. JERENCE
P. HIPONIA, Clerk II, ELIZABETH B. ESCANILLAS, Stenographer I, WILLIAM M. YGLESIAS,
Process Server, and CONRADO A. RAFOLS, JR., Utility Aide, all of the same court, A.M. No. P-082439, June 25, 2013)
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws, for the following reasons: a.) R.A.
9262 rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact
that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. b.) The
classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The distinction between men and women is germane
to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children. c.) The
classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members. The application

of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as
well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and
abuse. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. (JESUS C.
GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial CourtBranch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor
children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, G.R. No.
179267, June 25, 2013)
The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative
case. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. The law
simply requires that the civil servant is informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him in a
clear and concise manner to give the person a chance to answer the allegations intelligently.(
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. ARIEL R. MARQUEZ, G.R.
No. 191877, June 18, 2013)
The COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election. It is the COMELECs duty to cancel motu proprio the Certificate of Candidacy of a candidate
who is clearly disqualified under the law to run for public office, notwithstanding the absence of any
petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. (ROMEO G. JALOSJOS v.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B.
NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT,
ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013)
The right to information allows the public to hold public officials accountable to the people and aids them
in engaging in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation. By itself, it does not extend to causing the award of the sale of government assets in
failed public biddings. Thus, assuming that a bidder, in a public bidding for the sale of government assets,
may access the records for the purpose of validating the indicative price under the right to information, it
does not follow that the said bidder is entitled to the award. (PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT
OFFICE v. STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT and/or PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION, G.R. No.
200402, June 13, 2013)
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the Ombudsmans decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. But of course, the said
principle is subject to the rule that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and
unappealable by law are still "subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of
grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not
hesitate to reverse the factual findings." (FREDERICK JAMES C. ORAlS v. DR. AMELIA C.
ALMIRANTE, G.R. No. 181195, June 10, 2013)
When a public school teacher is subject of an administrative action, concurrent jurisdiction exists in the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional
Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC). Hence, the body that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. (ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR. v. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 198755, June 5, 2013)
Where the Executive Department implements a relocation of government center, the same is valid unless
the implementation is contrary to law, morals, public law and public policy and the Court cannot intervene
in the legitimate exercise of power of the executive. The rationale is hinged on the principle of separation
of powers which ordains that each of the three great government branches has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. (REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE - REGIONAL FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII) v. ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, OSMEA I.
MONTAER, RAKMA B. BUISAN, HELEN M. ALVAREZ, NEILA P. LIMBA, ELIZABETH B. PUSTA,
ANNA MAE A. SIDENO, UDTOG B. TABONG, JOHN S. KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANG

W. MACMOD, FLORENCE S. TAYUAN, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other officials and
employees of DA-RFU XII, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013)
Acts may constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service as long as they tarnish the
image and integrity of his/her public office. Where a professor in a state university directly sells books to
her students, the acts shall constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service taking into
account that the said act is prohibited by the institution, her moral ascendancy over her students. the
book/compilation was overpriced, and that the students refusal to buy the book/compilation could result
in their failure in the subject. (DR. ZENAIDA P. PIA v. HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR.,
OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, FORMERLY ACTING OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, DR. OFELIA M. CARAGUE, FORMERLY PUP PRESIDENT, DR. ROMAN R. UANNUG,
FORMERLY DEAN, COLLEGE OF ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND POLITICS (CEFP), NOW
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CEFP POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (PUP), STA.
MESA, MANILA, G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013)
It is well-settled that, in expropriation of properties, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained
as of the time of the taking. (HENRY L. SY v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, G.R. No.
202690, June 5, 2013)
When a private property is taken for public use and there is a dispute as to the amount of just
compensation, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling. Compensation must
be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation. (SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and
DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS v. SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA
TECSON, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
When the government takes property pursuant to PD No. 27, but does not pay the landowner his just
compensation until after RA No. 6657 has taken effect in 1998, it becomes more equitable to determine
just compensation using RA No. 6657 and not EO No. 228. Hence, the valuation of the GSP of palay
should be based on its value at the time it was ordered paid by the SAC. It more equitable to determine
just compensation due the petitioners using values pursuant to the standard laid down in Section 17 of
RA No. 6657, considering that the tenant-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land, while the
landowners wait in vain to be paid. (THE HEIRS OF SPOUSES DOMINGO TRIA AND CONSORCIA
CAMANO TRIA v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
G.R. No. 170245, July 1, 2013)
It is hornbook doctrine, however, that "what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation
against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption
or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law." (FERNANDO M. ESPINO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013)
Where the Office of the Ombudsman fails to investigate a case in an expedient manner through its own
fault, the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases is deemed violated. Such constitutional
right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil
or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. (RAFAEL L.
COSCOLLUELA v. SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 191411; EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G. AMUGOD v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 191871, July
15, 2013)
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of
official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or bad
faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the performance
of an official duty. Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the burden to
convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officers performance of his duties. Case
law also exhorts that although a public officer is the final approving authority and the employees who
processed the transaction were directly under his supervision, personal liability does not automatically

attach to him but only upon those directly responsible for the unlawful expenditures. (ROSALINDA
DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, in her capacity as then administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A.
VILLAR AND COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013)
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in
accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best
construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. It simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws
but is obliged to obey and execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that "administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution." (NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, ET. AL. v. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL., G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013)
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC
may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization.
Hence, the due process violation was committed when a party-list group was not apprised of the fact that
the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of the said party-list group in 2010 would be a
material consideration in the evaluation of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the
May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, said party-list group was not able to answer this issue squarely. In
other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the termsharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position. (COALITION OF
ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTYLIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. Nos. 206844-45; COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR
CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President and
Incumbent Representative in the House of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206982, July 23, 2013)
Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the statutory public office or
position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position. Flowing from the
legislative power to create public offices is the power to abolish and modify them to meet the demands of
society; Congress can change the qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory offices.
When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officers security of tenure, even if they
result in his removal from office or the shortening of his term. Modifications in public office, such as
changes in qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at
the office and not at the incumbent. (THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE,
represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR. v. BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, G.R. No. 185740,
July 23, 2013)
Under the present law (Section 43 of RA 9369), the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the
government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses. With this, where there is Joint Panel created to investigate over an alleged commission
of election fraud and is granted a concurrent jurisdiction with the COMELEC over the offense, the
accused cannot claim that the constitution of the Joint Committee is invalid for violating the mandate of
the COMELEC. Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the COMELEC and the DOJ
nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint
Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the COMELEC in
accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot
consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the COMELECs independence
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. (JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET.
AL., G.R. No. 199082; BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. v. HON. LEILA DE LIMA, ET. AL., G.R. No.
199085; GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL.,G.R. No.
199118, July 23, 2013)
In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with all the
requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local government unit where
his business is situated. The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued

exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
(PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN, represented by HON. ALVARO T. ANTONIO, et al. v. JOSEPH LASAM
LARA, G.R. No. 188500. July 24, 2013)
Where there is a dispute as to the amount of just compensation, the method to be used in the
determination of the value of the land must result to a fair and reasonable amount and must not
drastically reduce the said value. Just compensation refers to full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from the owner and to be "just," the compensation must be real, substantial, full and ample. (LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL O. GALLEGO, JR., JOSEPH L. GALLEGO and
CHRISTOPHER L. GALLEGO, G.R. No. 173226, July 29, 2013)
The law (Section 8 of RA No. 7941) expressly requires the submission of a list containing at least five
qualified nominees. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the
cancellation of its registration. The requirement of submission of a list of five nominees is primarily a
statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups and the submission of this list is part of a
registered partys continuing compliance with the law to maintain its registration. A party-list groups
previous registration with the COMELEC confers no vested right to the maintenance of its registration. In
order to maintain a party in a continuing compliance status, the party must prove not only its continued
possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance with the basic
requirements of the law. (COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013)
If circumstances warrant it, the Monetary Board may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under
receivership without prior notice and hearing. Due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. This is considering that the
"close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of the public
interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless
adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged
banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy
itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all
deserve the protection of the government. (ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK v. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013)
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service even if committed for the first time. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. DONABEL
M. SAVADERA, ET. AL., A.M. No. P-04-1903, September 10, 2013)
Factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with
greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the
election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of
evidence. The COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections.
(ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 206987, September 10, 2013)
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party
was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.
(ENGINEER MANOLITO P. MENDOZA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 195395, September 10,
2013)

Cessation from office of a public official by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said
administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of
the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the public official had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case. A public officials resignation does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
v. DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, A.M. No. P-13-3105, September 11, 2013)
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages
are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from
impairment or decrease in value. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI),
G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013).
An ordinance is deemed approved upon failure of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to declare the same
invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. (RAMONITO O.
ACAAC, ET. AL. v. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, ET. AL., G.R. No. 187378, September 30, 2013)
A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial naturalization under CA
473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his
status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial
approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under
CA 473. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, G.R. No. 183110,
October 7, 2013)
The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives. (REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013)
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future performance.
There is no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the
party-list system still need to comply with the track record requirement. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it
mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as
a group. (ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 206952, October 22, 2013)
Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To
constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of
the official functions and duties of a public officer. A government employee who is found guilty of grave
misconduct may be dismissed from the service even upon the first offense. (ROLANDO GANZON v.
FERNANDO ARLOS, G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013)
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor
of the HRET. The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" refers to all matters affecting the validity of
the contestees title. (WIGBERTO R. TAADA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ANGELINA D.
TAN, AND ALVIN JOHN S. TAADA, G.R. Nos. 207199-200, October 22, 2013)
The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. The COMELEC has
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for
the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. It is thus not novel for the Supreme Court to
uphold the COMELECs broad power or authority to fix other dates for a plebiscite to enable the people to
exercise their right of suffrage. (MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et.
al, G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013)

Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the
Commission on Audit which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities.
The scope of the COAs authority to take cognizance of claims is however circumscribed to mean only
liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other
papers within reach of accounting officers. (THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP, G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. The Court, as a rule, will decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a case and proceed to dismiss it when the issues posed have been mooted by
supervening events. Mootness intervenes when a ruling from the Court no longer has any practical value
and, from this perspective, effectively ceases to be a justiciable controversy.
While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the "moot and academic" principle, these
exceptions relate only to situations where: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the
situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and
PERRY L. PE v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206794, November 26, 2013)
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute. It is well settled that findings
of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies are conclusive only when supported by substantial
evidence.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves
additional elements such as corruption or wilful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules,
which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as
an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary
to duty and the rights of others. (PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas v. MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS, CATALINA ALINGASA and PORFERIO I.
MENDOZA, G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45, November 20, 2013)
The Civil Service law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the Court defined such an offense in Ito v. De Vera as
acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of
the people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of the administration of justice. In
Government Service Insurance System v. Mayordomo, the Court further declared that the administrative
offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service need not be related to or connected with
the public officers official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity
of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.
(HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES v. AUGUSTO J. FELICIDARIO, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13,
2013)
Retirement from the service during the pendency of an administrative case does not render the case
moot and academic. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MARCELINO A. DECHAVEZ, G.R. No.
176702, November 13, 2013)
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (RAY PETER O. VIVO v. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION (PAGCOR), G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)

No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and
the regulation and release of funds, in violation of the separation of powers principle [The Court cites its
Decision on Guingona, Jr. v. Carague (Guingona, Jr., 1991)]. From the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional [The Court cites its Decision on Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (Abakada, 2008)].
That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional
tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate
must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and
given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would
not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide
between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of
the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole
PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to
the Presidents power of item veto.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with
post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that: [A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase as may be defined by law. In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a

judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action.
The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of
making equal the unequal (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district
the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the
same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and
Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
Considering that Local Development Councils are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden
nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except
only when acting as a body.
Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
As for the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects
and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential
Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose,
however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so
determine as a priority. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development
projects and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the
delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of a classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase to finance the priority infrastructure development projects
must be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to Section 8 of PD 910 - it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. (BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v.
DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v. PRESIDENT AQUINO III, G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R.
No. 209251, November 19, 2013)
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy. Thus, in
Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco we have ruled that "where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, and adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit
to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually challenging."
(HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 184496, December 2, 2013)
Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of police power, a
property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted
to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just
compensation is not required. On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
property interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose which necessitates the payment
of just compensation therefor. (MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT,
INC. v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013)

The tests to determine if an ordinance is valid and constitutional are divided into the formal (i.e., whether
the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like
the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with
the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
As to substantive due process, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as
with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. Considering that
traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic
centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and
advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the
compelling government purpose. With regard to procedural process the clamping of the petitioners
vehicles was within the exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the
immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors
were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
superfluous. (VALENTINO L. LEGASPI v. CITY OF CEBU, et al./ BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., et al.
v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 159110/G.R. No. 159692. December 10, 2013)
Speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN FIRST DIVISION and THIRD DIVISION, HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO
PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO and ERNEST ESCALER, G.R. No. 188165/G.R. No. 189063. December 11,
2013)
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is
an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. The elements must be complied strictly since if the arrest was illegal, the
search and seizure that resulted therefrom was likewise illegal. (GEORGE ANTIQUERA Y CODES v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013)
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition.
The amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes
entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of
the complaint.
Further, the Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several
factors must be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like
properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors
can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary evidence.
(NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No.
193936. December 11, 2013)
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
ones cause of action.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits exceptions.
One exception which is relevant to the case is where no administrative review is provided by law. The

case falls squarely under the aforementioned exception since the law per se provides no administrative
review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules
and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days. (MARK JAMES S.
MAGLALANG v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as
represented by its incumbent chairman, EFRAIM GENUINO, G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013)
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is
solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of
the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It must be noted that the private complainant or
the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused
is concerned.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The rule is that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and
immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review
without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed
from appealing the judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
but such may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
without placing the accused in double jeopardy. (DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA G.R.
No. 166995. January 13, 2014)
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. To guide the RTC-SAC in the
exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken into
account to correctly determine just compensation. The law (under Section 49 of R.A. No. 665728)
likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 5-98
incorporating the laws listed factors in determining just compensation into a basic formula that contains
the details that take these factors into account. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YATCO
AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, G.R. No. 172551. January 15, 2014)
Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times
the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and
responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle
that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. (ATTY. VIRGILLO P.
ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN, A.M. No. P-12-3069. January 20, 2014)
The grant of a Temporary Protection Order ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC (Violence Against Women and their Children) may already
have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that
the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security. Further, the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to
be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not
only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. (RALPH P. TUA v.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 22, RTC, IMUS, CAVITE; AND
ROSSAN HONRADO-TUA, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014)
Section 26, Chapter 5, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 lists the personnel actions
that may be taken in the government service, namely: (1) appointment through certification; (2)
promotion; (3) transfer; (4) reinstatement; (5) reemployment; (6) detail; and (7) reassignment.
Reassignment should not be confused with a transfer.

Reassignment has been defined as movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another
in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary. Under
Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 (Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments
and Other Personnel Actions) it includes reassignment in the enumeration of personnel movements that
do not require the issuance of a new appointment (but shall nevertheless require an office order from a
duly authorized officer). It is presumed to be regular and made in the interest of public service unless
proven otherwise or if it constitutes constructive dismissal.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC has the power and function to prescribe,
amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law
and other pertinent laws. The reassignment of a government employee which is undoubtedly a
personnel and Civil Service matter to be properly addressed in accordance with the rules and
guidelines prescribed by the CSC. (MARICHU G. EJERA v. BEAU HENRY L. MERTO AND ERWIN
VERGARA, G.R. No. 163109. January 22, 2014)
The Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the protector of the people against the inept, abusive,
and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. Its
independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting
disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
By constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who
effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation
and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department. What is true for the Ombudsman must be
equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as
agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties. (EMILIO A. GONZALES III v.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL./ WENDELL BARERAS-SULIT v. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., ET AL., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232. January 28, 2014)
Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA was vested with the power, authority and
duty to examine, audit and settle the accounts of non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government. Complementing this power is Section
29(1) of the Audit Code, which grants the COA visitorial authority over non-governmental entities required
to pay levy or government share.
The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially
entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan without
jeopardizing the countrys faithful commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its
non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the verification fees it
collects on behalf of the DOLE and the consular fees it collects under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s.
2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such
verification fees and consular fees should be audited by the COA. (DENNIS A.B. FUNA v. MANILA
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE AND COA, G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014)
Section 8 of RA 6713, requires all public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations
under oath of their SALN. In this relation, the same provision mandates full disclosure of the concerned
public official's (a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current
fair market value, (b) personal property and acquisition cost, (c) all other assets such as investments,
cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like,(d) liabilities, and(e) all business interests and
financial connections. (ANGELITO R. MARQUEZ, ET AL. v. JUDGE VENANCIO OVEJERA AND
SHERIFF IV LOURDES COLLADO, A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014)
While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees whose
sworn duty is to discharge their functions with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability
and loyalty; the court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect,
rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions. (MICHAELINA RAMOS
BALASBAS v. PATRICIA B. MONAYAO, G.R. No. 190524. February 17, 2014)

The Constitution and the Local Government Code grants Local Government Units the power to create its
own sources of revenue even if not provided in the NIRC or the LGC, so long as such are not oppressive
and confiscatory.
If the generation of revenue was the primary purpose and regulation was merely incidental, the imposition
is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does
not make the imposition a tax. If the main purpose of the ordinance is to regulate certain construction
activities of the identified special projects, which included cell sites or telecommunications towers, the
fees (charges fixed by law or Ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity) imposed
in the said ordinance are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. (SMART
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR, BATANGAS, G.R. No.204429, February
18, 2014)
Cybercrime Law - Sec. 4 (c) (3) Penalizing posts of unsolicited commercial communications or SPAM.
Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. Commercial speech though not accorded
the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression; it is
nonetheless entitle to protection. The State cannot rob one of these rights without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Sec. 12- Authorizing the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time. If such would be granted to law
enforcement agencies it would curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. Sec. 12 is
too broad and do not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading the right
to privacy.
Informational Privacy which is the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters has two
aspects, specifically: (1) The right not to have private information disclosed; and (2) The right to live freely
without surveillance and intrusion.
Sec. 12 applies to all information and communications technology users and transmitting communications
is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed and sending it through the
postal service.
Another reason to strike down said provision is by reason that it allows collection and recording traffic
data with due cause. Section 12 does not bother to relate the collection of data to the probable
commission of a particular crime. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution
prohibits. Likewise it is bit descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. The authority
given is too sweeping and lacks restraint which only be used for Fishing Expeditions which will
unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or worse to extortion from certain bad elements
in these agencies.
Sec. 19 Authorizing the DOJ to restrict or block access to suspected computer data. Computer data
produced by its author constitutes personal property regardless of where it is stored. The provision grants
the Government the power to seize and place the computer data under its control and disposition without
a warrant. The DOJ order cannot substitute to judicial search warrants.
Content of the computer data also constitute speech which is entitle to protection. If an executive officer
be granted such power to acquire data without warrants and declare that its contents violates the law that
would make him the judge, jury and executioner all rolled in one.
Section 19 also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions
on speech: 1.) Dangerous tendency doctrine; 2.) Balancing of interest test; and 3.) Clear and present
danger rule.
It merely requires that the data be blocked if on its face it violate any provision of the cybercrime law.
Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes libel in connection with section 5 which penalizes aiding or abetting to said
felony. Section 4 (c)(4) is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of the post but void
and unconstitutional with respect to other who simply receive the post and react to it.

With regards to the author of the post, Sec. 4 (c) (4) merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
similar means for committing libel as defined under the RPC.
The internet encourages a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. Facebook and Twitter were given as
examples and stated that the acts of liking, commenting, sharing or re- tweets, are not outright considered
to be aiding or abetting. Such if compared to the physical world would be mere expressions or reactions
made regarding a specific post.
The terms aiding or abetting constitute a broad sweep that generates a chilling effect on those who
express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicament awaits internet users
will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues and democracy will be threatened together with
all liberties.
Charging offenders of violation of RA 10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel; likewise with RA 9775
on Child pornography constitutes double jeopardy. The acts defined in the Cybercrime Law involve
essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same with the RPC and RA 9775. (JOSE
JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335. February 18,
2014)
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the contents of the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the
COC. Material misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to Qualifications for elective
office (residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualifications necessary to run for local elective
office as provided in the Local Government Code) coupled with a showing that there was an intent to
deceive the electorate. (LUIS R. VILLAFUERTA v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No.
206698. February 25, 2014)
The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for
contemptuous acts against the Court. However, mere criticism should be distinguished from insult.
(MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMELEC, ET AL., G.R. No. 209185, February 25, 2014)
The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman (OMB) does not end with a recommendation
to punish. Further, clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14-A was issued, the OMBimposed penalties in administrative disciplinary cases were already immediately executory
notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. (FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ v.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN REPRESENTED BY HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, ET AL., G.R. No.
197307. February 26, 2014)
The 60-day prescriptive period provided under Section 28 of the Public Service Act can be availed of as
defenses only in criminal proceedings and not in proceedings that pertain to regulatory or administrative
aspects of a public service utilitys observance of the terms and conditions of his permit to operate. (GMA
NETWORK, INC. v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 196112, February
26, 2014)
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Taking of private property
without just compensation is a violation of a persons property right. In situations where the government
does not take the trouble of initiating an expropriation proceeding, the private owner has the option to
compel payment of the property taken, when justified. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v.
ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, G.R. No. 171496. March 3, 2014)
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law
which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines
of the granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority
to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform
with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative

power. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU OF FOOD AND

DRUGS (NOW FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION) v. DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC.
AND TERRAMEDIC, INC., G.R. No. 190837. March 5, 2014)
Jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public land
grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. (SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA AND ERLINDA FORTUNA
v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 173423. March 5, 2014)
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government
service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the
judiciary. An administrative case for dishonesty against a court employee is cognizable by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) pursuant to Sec. 6 Article VIII of the Constitution. (CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION v. NENITA C. LONGOS, CLERK II, MUNICPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, DEL
CARMEN-NUMANCIA-SAN ISIDRO-SAN BENITO, SURIGAO DEL NORTE, A.M. No. P-12-3070,
March 11, 2014)
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. The
Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public funds, with enough latitude to determine, prevent and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds. The COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and
the Court generally sustains its decisions in recognition of its expertise in the laws it is entrusted to
enforce.
On the issue whether the TESDA officials should refund the excess EME granted to them, the Court
applied the ruling in the case Casal v. COA where the Court held that the approving officials are liable for
the refund of the incentive award due to their patent disregard of the law of and the directives of COA.
Accordingly, the Director-General's blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the 20042007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. He is
required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for himself. (TECHNICAL EDUCATION
AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT CHAIRPERSON MA.
GRACIA PULIDO TAN, COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR. AND COMMISSIONER HEIDI L.
MENDOZA, G.R. No. 204869. March 11, 2014)
Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding cases and
resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3) months from the date
they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution. (SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN MARCELO v.
JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 78, PARANAQUE
CITY, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838, March 12, 2014)
Applicants for registration of title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (3) that his possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. Each element must necessarily be proven by no less than clear, positive and convincing
evidence; otherwise the application for registration should be denied. (MINDA S. GAERLAN v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 192717. March 12, 2014)
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. It must not be arrived at
arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different factors. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. ASIA PACIFIC
INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 192100. March 12, 2014)
The sale, disposition, etc. of private lands that Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 contextually prohibits and
considers as null and void are those which the original owner executes in violation of this provision, i.e.,

sales or dispositions executed with the intention of circumventing the retention limits set by R.A. No.
6657. Consistent with this interpretation, the proscription in Section 6 on sales or dispositions of private
agricultural lands does not apply to those that do not violate or were not intended to circumvent the
CARLs retention limits. (HEIRS OF TERESITA MONTOYA, et al. v. NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, et al., G.R. No. 181055. March 19, 2014)
Trial courts have no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed
property which is admittedly still part of the public domain. (HEIRS OF PACIFICO POCIDO, et al. v.
ARSENIA AVILA AND EMELINDA CHUA, G.R. No. 199146. March 19, 2014)
The Constitutional mandate of the courts in our triangular system of government is clear, so that as a
necessary requisite of the exercise of judicial power there must be, with a few exceptions, an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution, not merely a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. As Article VIII, Section 1
of the 1987 Constitution provides, "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.
The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned
to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government. (PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., et al., G.R. No.
197942-43/G.R. No. 199528. March 26, 2014)

LABOR LAW

While Bankards Manpower Rationalization Program might have affected the number of union
membership because of the employees voluntary resignation and availment of the package, it does not
necessarily follow that the company indeed purposely sought such a result. It must be recalled that the
subject program was implemented as a valid cost-cutting measure, well within the ambit of the so-called
management prerogatives. Bankard contracted an independent agency to meet business exigencies. In
the absence of any showing that Bankard was motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was
aimed at interfering with its employees right to self-organize, it cannot be said to have committed an act
of unfair labor practice. Bankard, Inc. v NLRC-First Division, et al., G.R. No. 171664 (2013)

An employer has the right to dismiss an employee by reason of willful breach of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. To temper the exercise of such prerogative, the law imposes the burden of proof upon the
employer to show that the dismissal of the employee is for just cause failing which would mean that the
dismissal is not justified. The law mandates that before validity can be accorded to a dismissal premised
on loss of trust and confidence, two requisites must concur, viz: (1) the employee concerned must be
holding a position of trust; and (2) the loss of trust must be based on willful breach of trust founded on
clearly established facts. Torres v Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 184520 (2013)

Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employees full backwages shall be inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. It is the obligation of the employer to pay an
illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits
and bonuses and general increases, to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been
dismissed and had not stopped working. Tangga-an v Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 180636 (2013)
Employees transfer without basis, resulting to her demotion is tantamount to constructive dismissal. The
fact that the employee continued to report for work does not necessarily suggest that constructive
dismissal has not occurred, nor does it operate as a waiver. Constructive dismissal occurs not when the
employee ceases to report for work, but when the unwarranted acts of the employer are committed to the
end that the employees continued employment shall become so intolerable. The Orchard Golf and
Country Club v Francisco, G.R. No. 178125 (2013)
The fact that Inocencio's sickness was later medically declared as not work-related does not prejudice his
right to receive sickness allowance, considering that he got ill while on board the ship and was repatriated
for medical treatment before the end of his 10-month employment contract. Moreover, at the time of his
repatriation, his illness was not yet medically declared as not work-related by company physician;
thus, the presumption of work-relation of the illness in the POEA Contract applies. As such, the seafarer
is entitled to illness allowance pending the assessment of the company-designated doctor that the illness
is not work-related. Transocean Ship Management, Inc., et al. v Vedad, G.R. Nos. 194490-91; G.R.
Nos. 194518 & 194524 (2013)
Even if the medical opinion on non-work-relatedness was issued at an early stage, but the seafarer duly
contests the opinion of the company-designated doctor by presenting a second opinion from the formers
doctor, then he should still be entitled to illness allowance pending the determination of a third doctor as
to work-relation of the illness. Nevertheless, such entitlement shall not exceed 120 days illness
allowance. Transocean Ship Management, Inc., et al. v Vedad, G.R. Nos. 194490-91; G.R. Nos.
194518 & 194524 (2013)
For illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only
reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between
the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may
have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he

might have had. There is a reasonable work connection between respondents condition at work as
pastryman (cook) and the development of his hyperthyroidism. His constant exposure to hazards such as
chemicals and the varying temperatures, like the heat in the kitchen of the vessel and the coldness
outside, coupled by the stressful tasks in his employment caused, or at least aggravated, his illness.
Magsaysay Maritime Services, et al. v Laurel, G.R. No. 195518 (2013)
The principle against diminution of benefits is applicable only if the grant or benefit is founded on an
express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time which is consistent and deliberate.
It presupposes that a company practice, policy and tradition favorable to the employees has been clearly
established; and that the payments made by the company pursuant to it have ripened into benefits
enjoyed by them. Company practice, just like any other fact, habits, customs, usage or patterns of
conduct, must be proven by the offering party who must allege and establish specific, repetitive conduct
that might constitute evidence of habit or company practice. Certainly, a practice or custom is, as a
general rule, not a source of a legally demandable or enforceable right.
In the instant case, there is no substantial evidence to prove that the grant of sales management
incentives to all retired District Sales Supervisors, regardless of whether or not they qualified for the
same, had ripened into company practice. Vergara v Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No.
176985 (2013)
An employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to other established employment privileges, and to his full
back wages. The boarding house privilege, being an established perk accorded to petitioner, ought to
have been granted him if a real and authentic reinstatement to his former position as general manager is
to be posited. Baares v Tobaco Womens Transport Service Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 197353
(2013)
Backwages and reinstatement are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee in
order to alleviate the economic damage brought about by the employees dismissal. Reinstatement is a
restoration to a state from which one has been removed or separated while the payment of backwages is
a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal. Therefore, the
award of one does not bar the other. Reyes, et al. v RP Guardians Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No
193756 (2013)
The decision of the management to remove the operators chairs from the production/manufacturing lines
of its bottling plants was made in good faith and did not intend to defeat or circumvent the rights of the
workers. The removal of the chairs was designed to increase work efficiency. Moreover, the operators
chairs cannot be considered as one of the employee benefits covered in Article 100 of the Labor Code. In
the Courts view, the term "benefits" mentioned in the non-diminution rule refers to monetary benefits or
privileges given to the employee with monetary equivalents. Royal Plant Workers Union v Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc., - Cebu Plant, G.R. No. 198783 (2013)
Loss of trust is a legal ground for terminating the services of an employee particularly for employees
holding managerial positions. The discovery of a falsehood of a managerial employee where she claimed
to be a CPA but in fact was not is a ground constituting loss of trust.
But having a sufficient ground for termination is not enough the Supreme Court emphasized the need for
performing the proper procedure for termination. If the dismissal is based on just cause, then the noncompliance with non-procedural due process should not render the termination from employment illegal
or ineffectual. Instead, the employer must indemnify the employee in the form of nominal damages.
Mendoza v HMS Credit Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 187232 (2013)
Every seaman and the vessel owner (directly or represented by a local manning agency) are required to
execute the POEA Standard Employment Contract (SEC) as a condition sine qua non prior to the
deployment for overseas work. The POEA SEC is supplemented by the CBA between the owner of the
vessel and the covered seaman. The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship
between them. They are bound by their terms and conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the

mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. Philippine Hammonia Ship
Agency, Inc., et al. v Dumadag, G.R. No. 194362 (2013)
Abandonment as a fact and a defense can only be claimed as a ground for dismissal if the employer
follows the procedure set by law. In line with the burden of proof set by law, the employer who alleges
abandonment has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment without any intention of returning. Fianza v National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 163061 (2013)
Having established that the issue of the legality of dismissal of the respondent was in fact necessarilyalbeit not explicitly- included in the Submission Agreement signed by the parties, the voluntary arbitrator
rightly assumed jurisdiction to decide the said issue. Consequently, the voluntary arbitrator may award
backwages upon a finding of illegal dismissal, even though the issue of entitlement thereto is not explicitly
claimed in the Submission Agreement. Backwages in general, are awarded on the ground of equity as a
form of relief that restores the income lost by the terminated employee by reason of his illegal dismissal.
The failure of the parties to limit the issues specifically to that which was stated allowed the arbitrator to
assume jurisdiction over the related issue. In the present case, there is no indication that the issue of
illegal dismissal should be treated, as a two-tiered issue whereupon entitlement to backwages must be
determined separately. Besides, "since arbitration is a final resort for the adjudication of disputes,"
the voluntary arbitrator in the present case can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final
settlement. Thus, the voluntary arbitrator correctly assumed jurisdiction over the issue of entitlement of
respondent to backwages on the basis of the former's finding of illegal dismissal. 7K Corporation v
Albarico, G.R. No. 182295 (2013)
Generally, the Supreme Court looks with disfavor at quitclaims executed by employees for being contrary
to public policy. Where the person making the waiver, however, has done so voluntarily, with a full
understanding of its terms and with the payment of credible and reasonable consideration, the Court has
no option but to recognize the transaction to be valid and binding.
In the instant case, all the seafarers executed the quitclaim with a full understanding of their import and
consequences. Likewise, the amounts given to them in exchange for the quitclaims were reasonable
considering that they received more than what they were entitled to under the POEA Contract. Under the
POEA Contract, in case of termination of employment due to discontinuance of voyage, termination pay is
given to the seafarer equivalent to his one month of his basic wage. Poseidon International Maritime
Services, Inc. v Tamala, et al., G.R. No. 186475 (2013)
The loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid ground for dismissal, must be based on a wilful breach of
trust and confidence founded on clearly established facts. A breach is wilful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers
arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy
of the employer. An ordinary breach is not enough. Moreover, the loss of trust and confidence must be
related to the employees performance of duties. In this case, as a selling teller, respondent held a
position of trust and confidence. Although the act complained of the unauthorized cancellation of the
ticket was related to her work as a selling teller, petitioner did not establish that the cancellation of the
ticket was intentional, knowing and purposeful on her part in order for her to have breached the trust and
confidence reposed in her by petitioner, instead of being only out of an honest mistake. Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. v Trajano, G.R. No. 160982 (2013)
The employment of seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is governed by the contracts they sign
at the time of their engagement. As long as the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, morals, public
order, or public policy, they have the force of law between the parties. Nonetheless, while the seafarer
and his employer are governed by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and Regulations require that
the POEA-Standard Employment Contract be integrated in every seafarers contract.
The prevailing rule under the 1996 POEA-SEC was that the illness leading to the eventual death of
seafarer need not be shown to be work-related in order to be compensable, but must be proven to have
been contracted during the term of the contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the working

conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease or illness. Inter-Orient Maritime, Inc. v Candava,
G.R. No. 201251 (2013)
Loss of confidence applies to: (1) employees occupying positions of trust and confidence, the managerial
employees; and (2) employees who are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employers
money or property which may include rank-and-file employees. Examples of rank-and-file employees who
may be dismissed for loss of confidence are cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the
normal routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.
Century Iron Works, Inc. v Baas, G.R. No. 184116 (2013)

A seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract but this is on the presumption that the company-designated physician had already
issued a certification as to his fitness or disability and he finds this disagreeable. Under the same
provision, it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing a seafarers
disability and there is a procedure to contest his findings. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. NO. 19190 (2013)
To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur, to wit: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship,
with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.
Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To be a
valid cause for dismissal for abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to
sever the employer employee relationship. Clearly, the operative act is still the employee's ultimate act of
putting an end to his employment.
Settled is the rule that mere absence or failure to report for work is not tantamount to abandonment of
work. Even the failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been served does not
necessarily constitute abandonment. Concrete Solutions, Inc. v Cabusas, G.R. No. 177812 (2013)
The power of the employer to terminate a probationary employee is subject to three limitations, namely:
(1) it must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract; (2) the
dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent
the contract or the law; and (3) there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal. In this case, not
only did petitioner fail to show that respondent was apprised of the standards for regularization but it was
likewise not shown how these standards had been applied in his case. Pursuant to well-settled doctrine,
petitioners failure to specify the reasonable standards by which respondents alleged poor performance
was evaluated as well as to prove that such standards were made known to him at the start of his
employment, makes respondent a regular employee. In other words, because of this omission on the part
of petitioner, respondent is deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee. Univac
Development, Inc. v Soriano, G.R. No. 182072 (2013)
Since the subject CBA provision is an insurance contract, the rights and obligations of the parties must be
determined in accordance with the general principles of insurance law. Being in the nature of a non-life
insurance contract and essentially a contract of indemnity, the CBA provision obligates the employer to
indemnify the covered employees medical expenses incurred by their dependents but only up to the
extent of the expenses actually incurred. This is consistent with the principle of indemnity which
proscribes the insured from recovering greater than the loss. Indeed, to profit from a loss will lead to
unjust enrichment and therefore should not be countenanced. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Salaried
Employees Union v Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation, G.R. No. 175773 (2013)
PD No. 1638 is the law that governs the retirement and separation of military officers and enlisted
personnel. With respect to the retirement of military officers and enlisted personnel, the law provides for
two kinds: compulsory retirement and optional retirement. Both kinds of retirements contemplate the
satisfaction of a certain age or length of service requirement by, or the fulfillment of some other conditions
on the part of, a military officer or personnel.

Petitioners civilian service at the DILG should and ought to be included as part of his active service in the
military for purposes of computing his retirement benefits under PD No. 1638. Reblora v Armed Forces of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 195842 (2013)
The nature of work of a bus conductor involves inherent or normal occupational risks of incurring money
shortages and uncollected fares. A conductors job is to collect exact fares from the passengers and remit
his collections to the company. Evidence must, therefore, be substantial and not based on mere surmises
or conjectures for to allow an employer to terminate the employment of a worker based on mere
allegations places the latter in an uncertain situation and at the sole mercy of the employer. Alps
Transportation v Rodriguez, G.R. No. 186732 (2013)
Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. The Court has consistently held
that seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees. Regular seasonal employees are
those called to work from time to time. The nature of their relationship with the employer is such that
during the off season, they are temporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer season or when
their services may be needed. They are in regular employment because of the nature of their job, and
not because of the length of time they have worked.
This rule, however, is not absolute. Seasonal workers who have worked for one season only may not be
considered regular employees. Also when seasonal employees are free to contract their services with
other farm owners, then the former are not regular employees. For regular employees to be considered
as such, the primary standard used is the reasonable connection between the particular activity they
perform and the usual trade or business of the employer. Gapayao v Fulo, et al., G.R. No. 193493 (2013)
Not every sale or transfer of Agricultural Land would warrant DAR Adjudication Board's jurisdiction. When
a suit does not involve an agrarian dispute it does not fall under the jurisdiction of DARAB. There must be
a tenancy relationship between the party litigants or, the controversy must relate to "tenurial
arrangements" for the DARAB to validly take cognizance of the controversy. An allegation to declare null
and void a certain sale involving an agricultural land does not ipso facto make the case an agrarian
dispute. While the Court recognizes the legal requirement for clearances in the sale and transfer of
agricultural lands, the DARAB's jurisdiction over such dispute is limited by the qualification that the land
involved is under the administration and disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank
or, under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws. Laguna v Paramount Holdings-Equities, Inc.,
et al., G.R. No. 176838 (2013)
Reinstatement or payment of separation pay and award of backwages is proper only in cases of illegal
dismissal. Nevertheless, the Court, in exceptional cases, has granted financial assistance to legally
dismissed employees as an act of social justice or based on equity so long as the dismissal was not
for serious misconduct, does not reflect on the employees moral character, or would involve moral
turpitude.
In this case, the dismissal of the 13 non-licensees was due to their failure to possess teaching licenses. It
was not due to any serious misconduct or infraction reflecting their moral character. This being the case,
the Court, in keeping with equity and social justice, grants the award of financial assistance to the 13 nonlicensees equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service rendered with the school. St.
Joseph Academy of Valenzuela Faculty Association v St. Joseph Academy of Valenzuela, et al., G.R. No.
182957 (2013)
The claim of petitioner for two (2) sets of retirement benefits under R.A. 1568 is not, strictly speaking, a
claim for double compensation prohibited under the first paragraph of Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution. Claims for double retirement benefits fall under the prohibition against the receipt of double
compensation when they are based on exactly the same services and on the same creditable period. In
this case, petitioner is not claiming two (2) sets of retirement benefits for one and the same creditable
period. Rather, petitioner is claiming a set of retirement benefits for each of her two (2) retirements from
the Energy Regulatory Board. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 188716 (2013)
Decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties, and entry of judgment shall be made upon the expiration of the

said period. Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC may be sought via a petition for certiorari before the
CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the
assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Hence, in cases where a petition for certiorari
is filed after the expiration of the 10-day period but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC.
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v Legaspi, G.R. No. 202791 (2013)
In cases where the complaint for violation of labor standard laws preceded the termination of the
employee and the filing of the illegal dismissal case, it would not be in consonance with justice to charge
the complainants with engaging in forum shopping when the remedy available to them at the time their
causes of action arose was to file separate cases before different fora. Kapisanang Pangkaunlaran ng
Kababaihang Portero, Inc., et al. v Barreno, et al., G.R. No. 175900 (2013)
In legitimate job contracting, the principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job
contractor only for the payment of the employees' wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same.
On the other hand, in labor-only contracting, the principal employer becomes solidarily liable with the
labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees. In this case, the releases, waivers and
quitclaims executed by employees in favor of the labor-only contractor redounded to the benefit of the
principal. Vigilla, et al. v Philippine College of Criminology, Inc., G.R. No. 200094 (2013)
Illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the
impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. To prove illegal
recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the
power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with
their money in order to be employed. People of the Philippines v Guevarra, et al., G.R. No. 197049 (2013)
Jurisprudence dictates that it is not enough that the employee is given an ample opportunity to be heard
if company rules or practices require a formal hearing or conference. In such instance, the requirement of
a formal hearing and conference becomes mandatory.
The rationale behind this mandatory
characterization is premised on the fact that company rules and regulations which regulate the procedure
and requirements for termination, are generally binding on the employer. Records reveal that while
Gonzaga was given an ample opportunity to be heard within the purview of the foregoing principles,
SURNECO, however, failed to show that it followed its own rules which mandate that the employee who
is sought to be terminated be afforded a formal hearing or conference. As above-discussed, SURNECO
remains bound by and hence, must faithfully observe its company policy embodied in Section 16.5 of
its own Code of Ethics.
Accordingly, since only an informal inquiry was conducted in investigating Gonzagas alleged cash
shortages, SURNECO failed to comply with its own company policy, violating the proper termination
procedure altogether. In this relation, case law states that an employer who terminates an employee for a
valid cause but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages. Hence,
although the dismissal stands, the Court deems it appropriate to award Gonzaga nominal damages in the
amount of P30,000.00. Surigao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v Gonzaga, G.R. No. 187722 (2013)
The list of illnesses/diseases in Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract does not
preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be
presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties. In this
case, the Supreme Court finds that psoriasis was work related. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v Mesina,
G.R. No. 200837 (2013)
As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under
Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court
has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of social justice or on equitable
grounds. In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2)
did not reflect on the moral character of the employee. In this case, the transgressions were serious
offenses that warranted employees dismissal from employment. Hence, employee is not entitled to
separation pay. Unilever Philippines v Rivera, G.R. No. 201701 (2013)

The civil status of the employee as either married or single is not the controlling consideration in order
that a person may qualify as the employees legal dependent. What is rather decidedly controlling is the
fact that the spouse, child, or parent is actually dependent for support upon the employee. The continuity
in the grant of the funeral and bereavement aid to regular employees for the death of their legal
dependents has undoubtedly ripened into a company policy. With that, the denial of Alfante's qualified
claim for such benefit pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the CBA violated the law prohibiting the
diminution of benefits. Philippine Journalists, Inc. v Employees Union, G.R. No. 192601 (2013)
The bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards may be relaxed in cases where there was
substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay
by posting a partial bond.
In the instant case, the Labor Arbiter in his decision ordered PNCC to pay petitioner back wages
amounting to P422,630.41 and separation pay of P37,662 or a total of P460,292.41. When PNCC filed
an appeal bond amounting to P422,630.41 or at least 90% of the adjudged amount, there is no question
that this is substantial compliance with the requirement that allows relaxation of the rules. Pasos v
Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394 (2013)
Project employee is deemed regularized if services are extended without specifying duration. While for
first three months, petitioner can be considered a project employee of PNCC, his employment thereafter,
when his services were extended without any specification of as to the duration, made him a regular
employee of PNCC. And his status as a regular employee was not affected by the fact that he was
assigned to several other projects and there were intervals in between said projects since he enjoys
security of tenure. Pasos v Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394 (2013)

Permanent and total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of
work or work of a similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work
which a person of his mentality and attainment can do. Disability need not render the seafarer absolutely
helpless or feeble to be compensable; it is enough that it incapacitates to perform his customary work.
Esguerra v United Philippines Lines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 199932 (2013)
As a privilege inherent in the employers right to control and manage its enterprise effectively, its freedom
to conduct its business operations to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. The respondents are justified
in moving the petitioner to another equivalent position, which presumably would be less affected by her
habitual tardiness or inconsistent attendance than if she continued as a Category Buyer, a frontline
position in the day-to-day business operations of a supermarket such as Robinsons. Pecskon v
Robinsons Supermarket Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 198534 (2013)
Fundamental is the rule that an employee can be dismissed from employment only for a valid cause.
Serious misconduct is one of the just causes for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Not
every form of misconduct can be considered as a just cause for termination. For misconduct to be serious
and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be (1) of grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial or unimportant and (2) connected with the work of the employee. PNOC-Energy
Development Corp., et al. v Estrella, G.R. No. 197789 (2013)
Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned their
work. A charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The filing thereof is proof enough of ones desire to return to work, thus negating any
suggestion of abandonment. Fernandez, et al. v Newfield Staff Solutions, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 201979
(2013)
The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an
independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being
subjected to the control of the employer, except only to the results of the work. Petitioner cannot rightly
claim that DGMS was an independent job contractor inasmuch as respondents were subjected to the

control and supervision of petitioner while they were performing their job. First Philippine Industrial
Corporation v Calimbas, et al., G.R. No. 179256 (2013)
In the present case, the CBA contains specific provisions which effectively bar the availment of retirement
benefits once the employees have chosen separation pay or vice versa. Section 2 of Article XIV explicitly
states that any payment of retirement gratuity shall be chargeable against separation pay. Clearly,
respondents cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation pay, as selecting one will preclude
recovery of the other. To illustrate the mechanics of how Section 2 of Article XIV bars double recovery, if
the employees choose to retire, whatever amount they will receive as retirement gratuity will be charged
against the separation pay they would have received had their separation from employment been for a
cause which would entitle them to severance pay. These causes are enumerated in Section 3, Article XIV
of the CBA (i.e., retrenchment, closure of business, merger, redundancy, or installation of labor-saving
device). However, if the cause of the termination of their employment was any of the causes enumerated
in said Section 3, they could no longer claim retirement gratuity as the fund from which the same would
be taken had already been used in paying their separation pay. Put differently, employees who were
separated from the company cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation pay as there is only one
fund from which said benefits would be taken. Inarguably, Section 2 of Article XIV effectively disallows
recovery of both separation pay and retirement gratuity. Consequently, respondents are entitled only to
one. Since they have already chosen and accepted redundancy pay and have executed the
corresponding Release and Quitclaim, they are now barred from claiming retirement gratuity. Zuellig
Pharma Corporation v Sibal, et al., G.R. NO. 173587 (2013)
To validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence under Article 296(c) of the
Labor Code, the following guidelines must be observed: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a
position of trust and confidence; and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence. Petitioner's failure to properly account for his shortage of a significant amount is enough
reason for respondent to lose trust and confidence in him. Martinez v Central Pangasinan Electric
Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 192306 (2013)
The non-inclusion in the complaint of the issue of dismissal did not necessarily mean that the validity of
the dismissal could not be an issue. The rules of the NLRC require the submission of verified position
papers by the parties should they fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, and bar the inclusion of any
cause of action not mentioned in the complaint or position paper from the time of their submission by the
parties. In view of this, respondents cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of his
complaint alone but also from a consideration and evaluation of both his complaint and position paper.
Samar-Med Distribution v National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162385 (2013)
A change in the corporate name does not make a new corporation, whether effected by a special act or
under a general law. It has no effect on the identity of the corporation, or on its property, rights, or
liabilities. The corporation, upon such change in its name, is in no sense a new corporation, nor the
successor of the original corporation. It is the same corporation with a different name, and its character is
in no respect changed.
In short, Zeta and petitioner remained one and the same corporation. The change of name did not give
petitioner the license to terminate employees of Zeta like respondent without just or authorized cause.
The situation was not similar to that of an enterprise buying the business of another company where the
purchasing company had no obligation to rehire terminated employees of the latter. Petitioner, despite its
new name, was the mere continuation of Zetas corporate being, and still held the obligation to honor all
of Zetas obligations, one of which was to respect respondents security of tenure. The dismissal of
respondent from employment on the pretext that petitioner, being a different corporation, had no
obligation to accept him as its employee, was illegal and ineffectual. Zuellig Freight and Cargo Systems
v NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 157900 (2013)
A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee; the usual two-notice rule
does not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that [i]f
the termination is brought about by the x x x failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer
in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee,
within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.

In this case, respondents dismissal was effected through a letter dated May 19, 2005 which she received
on May 23, 2005 and again on May 27, 2005. Stated therein were the reasons for her termination, i.e.,
that after proper evaluation, Abbott determined that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for her
regularization considering her lack of time and people management and decision-making skills, which are
necessary in the performance of her functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager. Undeniably, this written
notice sufficiently meets the criteria set forth above, thereby legitimizing the cause and manner of
respondents dismissal as a probationary employee under the parameters set by the Labor Code.
Nonetheless, despite the existence of a sufficient ground to terminate respondents employment and
Abbotts compliance with the Labor Code termination procedure, it is readily apparent that Abbott
breached its contractual obligation to respondent when it failed to abide by its own procedure in
evaluating the performance of a probationary employee. Veritably, a company policy partakes of the
nature of an implied contract between the employer and employee. Abbott Laboratories, Phils., et al. v
Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571 (2013)
A certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the employer itself has to file the
petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, but even after such filing its role in the
certification process ceases and becomes merely a bystander. The employer clearly lacks the personality
to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at all therein.
Inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of
rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. Holy Child
Catholic School v Hon. Sto Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 179146 (2013)
Contracting out of services is not illegal per se. It is an exercise of business judgment or management
prerogative. Absent proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will
not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. BPIs policy of contracting out cashiering and
bookkeeping services was considered as a valid exercise of management prerogative which is further
authorized by the Central Bank in CBP Circular No. 1388, Series of 199. BPI Employees union-Davao
City-FUBU v Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 174912 (2013)
A seafarer who was repatriated due to a finished contact and not for medical reasons, is not entitled to
disability benefits. Villanueva v Baliwag Navigation, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 206505 (2013)
One of the prerogatives of management is the decision to close the entire establishment or to close or
abolish a department or section thereof for economic reasons, such as to minimize expenses and reduce
capitalization.
While the Labor Code provides for the payment of separation package in case of retrenchment to prevent
losses, it does not obligate the employer for the payment thereof if there is closure of business due to
serious losses.
Closure or cessation of business is the complete or partial cessation of the operations and/or shut-down
of the establishment of the employer. It is carried out to either stave off the financial ruin or promote the
business interest of the employer. Unlike retrenchment, closure or cessation of business, as an
authorized cause of termination of employment, need not depend for validity on evidence of actual or
imminent reversal of the employer's regardless of the underlying reasons and motivations therefore, be it
financial losses or not. Manila Polo Club Employees Union FUR-TUCP v Manila Polo Club, Inc., G.R.
No. 172846 (2013)
The employment of seafarers, including claims for death and disability benefits, is governed by the
contracts they sign every time they are hired or rehired, and as long as the stipulations therein are not
contrary to law, morals, public order, or public policy, they have the force of law between the parties. It
must be shown that the injury or illness was contracted during the term of the employment contract. The
unqualified phrase during the term covered all injuries or illnesses occurring during the lifetime of the
contract.

In this case, since Enrique failed to comply with the required post-employment medical examination within
3 days from his arrival and there was no showing that he was physically incapacitated to do so to justify
his non-compliance. Since the mandatory reporting is a requirement for a disability claim to prosper,
Enrique's non-compliance thereto forfeits petitioners' right to claim the benefits as to grant the same
would not be fair to respondents. Manota, et al. v Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, et al., G.R. No.
179607 (2013)
An employer who is found guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing his employee may not be ordered so
to pay backwages beyond the date of closure of business where such closure was due to legitimate
business reasons and not merely an attempt to defeat the order of reinstatement. Polymer Rubber
Corporation v Salamunding, G.R. No. 185160 (2013)
It is settled that the extension of the employment of a project employee long after the supposed project
has been completed removes the employee from the scope of a project employee and makes him a
regular employee. In this regard, the length of time of the employees service, while not a controlling
determinant of project employment, is a strong factor in determining whether he was hired for a specific
undertaking or in fact tasked to perform functions vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual
business or trade of the employer. Verily, the principal test for determining whether an employee is a
project employee, as distinguished from a regular employee, is whether or not he is assigned to carry out
a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which are specified at the time he is engaged
for the project. D.M. Consunji Corporation v Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 159371 (2013)
It is well-settled that workers and employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their
constitutions and rules to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and
activities and to formulate their programs. In this case, RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws expressly
mandate that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the internal remedies within the organization. Petitioners were found to have
violated the provisions of the unions Constitution and By-Laws when they filed petitions for impeachment
against their union officers and for audit before the DOLE without first exhausting all internal remedies
available within their organization. This act is a ground for expulsion from union membership. Thus,
petitioners expulsion from the union was not a deliberate attempt to curtail or restrict their right to
organize, but was triggered by the commission of an act, expressly sanctioned by Section 2.5 of Article IX
of the unions Constitution and By-Laws. Baptista, et al. v Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. 194709 (2013)
Such a floating status is lawful and not unusual for security guards employed in security agencies as
their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties. Caedo
v Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, et al., G.R. No. 179326 (2013)

To warrant removal from service, the negligence should be gross and habitual. Although it was her
second time to commit misposting (i.e., the first misposting was in 1995 while the second misposting was
committed in 1998), Arcobillass act cannot be considered as gross as to warrant her termination from
employment. Gross neglect of duty denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person
to perform a duty. It refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In the instant case,
the misposting was not deliberately done as to constitute as gross negligence. Rather, it was a case of
simple neglect brought about by carelessness which, as satisfactorily explained by Arcobillas, was the
effect of her heavy workload that day and the headache she was experiencing. Philippine National
Bank v Arcobillas, G.R. No. 179648 (2013)
The employer's act of tearing to pieces the employee's time card may be considered an outright - not only
symbolic - termination of the parties' employment relationship. Thus, when Ang tore the respondents time
cards to pieces, he virtually removed them from Viroses payroll and erased all vestiges of respondents
employment; respondents were effectively dismissed from work. Ang v San Joaquin, et al., G.R. No.
185549 (2013)

A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any showing that the same is
prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such, however, does not result in it losing its legal personality
altogether.
In the case at bar, there is nothing shown in the records that the union was expressly forbidden to
disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. This being
so, PEMA is not precluded to disaffiliate from NUBE after acquiring the status of an independent labor
organization duly registered before the DOLE. National Union Bank Employee v Philnabank
Employees Association, et al., G.R. No. 174287 (2013)
The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not
constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling
stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a
violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments. Nacar v Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871
(2013)
In termination cases either by retrenchment or closure, the burden of proving that the termination of
services is for a valid or authorized cause rests upon the employer. Not every loss incurred or expected to
be incurred by an employer can justify retrenchment. The employer must prove, among others, that the
losses are substantial and that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary to avert such losses. And to
repeat, in closures, the bona fides of the employer must be proven. In this case, there was no valid
retrenchment. Nor was there a closure of business.
A lull caused by lack of orders or shortage of materials must be of such nature as would severely affect
the continued business operations of the employer to the detriment of all and sundry if not properly
addressed. Sanoh asserts that cancelled orders of wire condensers led to the phasing out of the Wire
Condenser Department, which triggered retrenchment. Sanoh presented the letters of cancellation given
by Matsushita and Sanyo as evidence of cancelled orders. The evidence presented by Sanoh barely
established the connection between the cancelled orders and the projected business losses that may be
incurred by Sanoh.
Sanoh failed to prove that these cancelled orders would severely impact on their production of wire
condensers. The losses must be supported by sufficient and convincing evidence and the normal method
of discharging this is by the submission of financial statements duly audited by independent external
auditors. Petitioner failed to present proof of the extent of the reduced order and its contribution to the
sustainability of its business. Sanoh Fulton Phils., Inc., et al. v Bernardo, et al., G.R. No. 187214
(2013)
The Court has ruled, time and again, that financial assistance, or whatever name it is called, as a
measure of social justice is allowed only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Considering that Daabay was
dismissed on the grounds of serious misconduct, breach of trust and loss of confidence, the award based
on equity was unwarranted. Daabay v Coca Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 199890 (2013)
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause, in the present case, however, the facts and the evidence do not establish a prima facie
case that the employee was dismissed from employment. Before the employer must bear the burden of
proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of
his dismissal from service. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or
illegality thereof. MZR Industries, et al. v Colambot, G.R. No. 179001 (2013)
Section 20(A) of the POEA Contract require in granting death benefits, seafarer must have suffered a
work-related death during the term of his contract. Here, the seafarer died six months after his
repatriation. Thus, on the basis of Section 20(A), his beneficiaries are precluded from receiving death
benefits. Sea Power Enterprises, Inc., et al. v Salazar, G.R. No. 188595 (2013)
As a general rule, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement (or separation pay, if
reinstatement is not viable) and payment of full backwages. In certain cases, however, the Court has

carved out an exception to the foregoing rule and thereby ordered the reinstatement of the employee
without backwages on account of the following: (a) the fact that dismissal of the employee would be too
harsh of a penalty; and (b) that the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee. Integrated
Microelectronics, Inc. v Pionilla, G.R. No. 200222 (2013)

Petitioner is not entitled to separation pay. Payment of separation pay cannot be justified by his length of
service. It must be stressed that Moya was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He was holding a
supervisory rank being an Officer-in-Charge of the Tire Curing Department. The position, naturally one of
trust, required of him abiding honesty as compared to ordinary rank-and-file employees. When he made a
false report attributing the damage of five tires to machine failure, he breached the trust and confidence
reposed upon him by the company.
In the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility, loss of trust justifies
termination. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that
an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation holds where a person is
entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of
the employers property. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must
be "work-related" such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the
employer. Moya v First Solid Rubber Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 184011 (2013)
A repetition of the same offense for which one has been previously disciplined and cautioned evinces
deliberateness and willful intent; it negates mere lapse or error in judgment. The NLRC and the CA were
thus correct in applying the totality of infractions rule and in adjudging that the petitioner's dismissal was
grounded on a just and valid cause. Alvarez v Golden Tri Bloc, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 202158 (2013)

Where the deceased was diagnosed of leukemia and died because of the said illness, the surviving
spouse cannot claim death benefits as a member of the Government Service Insurance System under
Employees Compensation death benefits. Though the said illness is occupational, it, however, does not
thereby result in compensability in view of the fact that petitioners wife (the deceased) was not an
operating room personnel, as provided under the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626. The coverage of
leukemia as an occupational disease relates to ones employment as an operating room personnel
ordinarily exposed to anesthetics. In the case of petitioners wife, the nature of her occupation does not
indicate exposure to anesthetics nor does it increase the risk of developing Chronic Myelogenous
Leukemia. There was no showing that her work involved frequent and sufficient exposure to substances
established as occupational risk factors of the disease. Lorenzo v GSIS and Department of Education,
G.R. No. 188385 (2013)
While resignation letters containing words of gratitude may indicate that the employees were not coerced
into resignation, this fact alone is not conclusive proof that they intelligently, freely and voluntarily
resigned. To rule that resignation letters couched in terms of gratitude are, by themselves, conclusive
proof that the employees intended to relinquish their posts would open the floodgates to possible abuse.
In order to withstand the test of validity, resignations must be made voluntarily and with the intention of
relinquishing the office, coupled with an act of relinquishment. Therefore, in order to determine whether
the employees truly intended to resign from their respective posts, we cannot merely rely on the tenor of
the resignation letters, but must take into consideration the totality of circumstances in each particular
case. SME Bank, Inc., et al. v De Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 184517 (2013)
While Legacy Consolidated enjoyed wide latitude in evaluating Atty. Chuanicos work and attitude and in
terminating his employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, these are broad principles that
do not themselves show when, where, and how Atty. Chuanico betrayed the trust that Legacy
Consolidated gave him as in-house counsel. To be a valid cause for dismissal, the loss of trust must be
based on a willful breach of such trust and founded on clearly established facts. The company charged
him with having mishandled two things that were assigned to him, the drafting of an answer in one and
the preparation of a complaint affidavit in the other. It failed to present proof, however, of such
mishandling. Chuanico v Legacy Consulted Plans, Inc., G.R. No. 181852 (2013)

The act of HBV Law Firm of moving the effectivity date of Atty. Matorres resignation from September 30,
2008 to September 15, 2008 is not an act of harassment. The 30-day notice requirement for an
employees resignation is actually for the benefit of the employer who has the discretion to waive such
period. Its purpose is to afford the employer enough time to hire another employee if needed and to see
to it that there is proper turn-over of the tasks which the resigning employee may be handling. The rule
requiring an employee to stay or complete the 30-day period prior to the effectivity of his resignation
becomes discretionary on the part of management as an employee who intends to resign may be allowed
a shorter period before his resignation becomes effective. Hechanova Bugay Vilchez Lawyers v
Matorre, G.R. No. 198261 (2013)
While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the
motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in
relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce
bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively requires
that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the
employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day
period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has
elapsed, the correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer
within the 10-day period. Mcburnie v Ganzon, et al., G.R. No. 178034 (2013)
It is a well-settled rule that before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was
legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service.
Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be
given credence. In the instant case, the records are bereft of substantial evidence that will unmistakably
establish a case of constructive dismissal. An act, to be considered as amounting to constructive
dismissal, must be a display of utter discrimination or insensibility on the part of the employer so intense
that it becomes unbearable for the employee to continue with his employment. Here, the circumstances
relayed by Gemina were not clear-cut indications of bad faith or some malicious design on the part of
Bankwise to make his working environment insufferable. Gemina v Bankwise Inc., et al., G.R. No.
175365 (2013)

COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimburse expenses incurred by officials and
employees of the government in the performance of their official functions. It is not payment in
consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. As defined, cost of living refers to "the level of prices
relating to a range of everyday items" or "the cost of purchasing those goods and services which are
included in an accepted standard level of consumption." Based on this premise, COLA is a benefit
intended to cover increases in the cost of living. Thus, it is and should be integrated into the standardized
salary rates. Maynilad Water Supervisors Association v Maynilad Water Services, Inc., G.R. No.
198935 (2013)
Under Article 286 of the Labor Code, the bona fide suspension of the operations of a business or
undertaking for a period not exceeding six months shall not terminate employment. Article 286 provides:
ART. 286. When employment not deemed terminated. The bona fide suspension of the
operations of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the
fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment.
In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority
rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption of
operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty.
In this case, the respondents were already considered illegally dismissed since petitioner failed to recall
them after six months, when its bona fide suspension of operations lapsed. We stress that under Article
286 of the Labor Code, the employment will not be deemed terminated if the bona fide suspension of
operations does not exceed six months. But if the suspension of operations exceeds six months, the
employment will be considered terminated. SKM Art Craft Corporation v Bauca, et al., G.R. No.
171282 (2013)

The respondents jobs and undertakings are clearly within the regular or usual business of the employer
company and are not identifiably distinct or separate from the other undertakings of the company. There
is no denying that the manning of the operations center to air commercials, acting as transmitter/VTR
men, maintaining the equipment, and acting as cameramen are not undertakings separate or distinct from
the business of a broadcasting company.
Petitioners allegation that respondents were merely substitutes or what they call pinch-hitters (which
means that they were employed to take the place of regular employees of petitioner who were absent or
on leave) does not change the fact that their jobs cannot be considered projects within the purview of the
law. Every industry, even public offices, has to deal with securing substitutes for employees who are
absent or on leave. Such tasks, whether performed by the usual employee or by a substitute, cannot be
considered separate and distinct from the other undertakings of the company. While it is managements
prerogative to device a method to deal with this issue, such prerogative is not absolute and is limited to
systems wherein employees are not ingeniously and methodically deprived of their constitutionally
protected right to security of tenure.
As regular employees, they are entitled to security of tenure and therefore their services may be
terminated only for just or authorized causes. Since petitioner failed to prove any just or authorized cause
for their termination, we are constrained to affirm the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that
they were illegally dismissed. GMA Network, Inc. v Pabriga, et al., G.R. No. 176419 (2013)
After being informed of the expired accreditation of Intra Strata, NLRC Commissioners (respondents)
should have refrained from allowing Intra Strata to transact business or to post a bond in favor of the
employer. It is not within respondents' discretion to allow the filing of the appeal bond issued by a bonding
company with expired accreditation regardless of its pending application for renewal of accreditation.
Respondents cannot extend Intra Strata's authority or accreditation. Neither can it validate an invalid bond
issued by a bonding company with expired accreditation, or give a semblance of validity to it pending this
Court's approval of the application for renewal of accreditation. Cawaling, et al. v Menese, et al., A.C.
No. 9698 (2013).

In Lopez v. Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc., the Court repeated the guidelines for the application of loss of
confidence as follows: (1) loss of confidence should not be simulated; (2) it should not be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; (3) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the
face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and (4) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to
justify an earlier action taken in bad faith. As applied to the dismissal of managerial employees,
employers as a rule enjoy wider latitude of discretion.
The employer is not required to present proof beyond reasonable doubt as the mere existence of a basis
for believing that such employee has breached the trust of the employer would suffice for the dismissal.
Thus, as long as the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is
responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy
of the trust and confidence demanded of his position, the dismissal on this ground is valid. Baguio
Central University v Gallente, G.R. No. 188267 (2013)
The Writ of Execution in the instant case was procedurally irregular, as it pre-empted the NLRC Rules
which require that where further computation of the award in the decision is necessary during the course
of the execution proceedings, no Writ of Execution shall be issued until after the computation has been
approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on
the matter. When the writ was issued, there was as yet no order approving the computation made by the
NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there was a pending and unresolved Motion to
Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A cursory examination of the motion reveals that it raised valid issues
that required determination in order to arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the parties would be
unjustly enriched. Araullo v Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 194169 (2013)
In the absence of any certification, the law presumes that the employee remains in a state of temporary
disability. Should no certification be issued within the 240 day maximum period, as in this case, the

pertinent disability becomes permanent in nature. Considering that respondent has suffered for more than
the maximum period of 240 days in light of the uncompleted process of evaluation, and the fact that he
has been certified to work again or otherwise, the Court affirms his entitlement to the permanent total
disability benefits awarded him by the CA, the NLRC and the LA. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., et al. v Babol,
G.R. No. 204076 (2013)

Closure of business is the reversal of fortune of the employer whereby there is a complete cessation of
business operations and/or an actual locking-up of the doors of establishment, usually due to financial
losses. Closure of business, as an authorized cause for termination of employment, aims to prevent
further financial drain upon an employer who cannot pay anymore his employees since business has
already stopped. In such a case, the employer is generally required to give separation benefits to its
employees, unless the closure is due to serious business losses.
In this case, considering that SPI closed down its operations due to serious business losses and that said
closure appears to have been done in good faith, the Court deems it just to reduce the amount of nominal
damages to be awarded to each of the minority employees from P50,000.00 to P10,000.00. To be clear,
the foregoing award should only obtain in favor of the minority employees and not for those employees
who already received sums equivalent to separation pay and executed quitclaims "releasing [SPI] now
and in the future any claims and obligation which may arise as results of [their] employment with the
company." For these latter employees who have already voluntarily accepted their dismissal, their
executed quitclaims practically erased the consequences of infirmities on the notice of dismissal, at least
as to them. Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. v Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. Employee Union, G.R. No.
173154 (2013)
Petitioner claims tenancy relationship between him and DBP, however it must be emphasized that in
order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, viz.: (1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee. All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the
absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. Jopson v Mendez,
et al., G.R. No. 191538 (2013)
In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. Time and again, we
have allowed evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with the NLRC in the interest of
substantial justice. Thus, we have consistently supported the rule that labor officials should use all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, in the interest of due process.
However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason and fairplay. The liberality of
procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the
submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. The
reason for these requirements is that the liberal application of the rules before quasi-judicial agencies
cannot be used to perpetuate injustice and hamper the just resolution of the case. Neither is the rule on
liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of procedure. Loon, et al. v Power Master, Inc., et
al., G.R. No. 189404 (2013)

The nature of the employment does not depend solely on the will or word of the employer or on the
procedure for hiring and the manner of designating the employee. Rather, the nature of the employment
depends on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the nature of the
employers business, the duration and scope to be done. Accordingly, Acibo, et al. are neither project nor
seasonal employees.

Acibo, et al. were made to perform tasks that does not pertain to milling operations of URSUMCO.
However, their duties are regularly and habitually needed in URSUMCOs operation. Moreover, they were
regularly and repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks. Being repeatedly hired for the same purpose
makes them regularized employees. Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation, et al. v Acibo, et
al., G.R. No. 186439 (2014)
Under the Rule VI, Section 6 of the 2005 NLRC Rules, "[a] cash or surety bond shall be valid and
effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated, or
the award satisfied." Hence, it is clear that a bond is encumbered and bound to a case only for as long as
1) the case has not been finally decided, resolved or terminated; or 2) the award has not been satisfied.
Therefore, once the appeal is finally decided and no award needs to be satisfied, the bond is
automatically released. Since the money is now unencumbered, the employer who posted it should now
have unrestricted access to the cash which he may now use as he pleases as appeal bond in another
case, for instance. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation v Icao, G.R. No. 196047 (2014)
Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere filing of a formal charge, to our
mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should
be evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents termination. The affidavit executed
by Montegrico simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which
allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of
employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees. The other bits of evidence were
also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage. Grand Asian Shipping Lines, Inc., et al. v Galvez,
et al., G.R. No. 178184 (2014)
The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is determined by the cause of the dismissal. The
years of service may determine how much separation pay may be awarded. It is, however, not the reason
why such pay should be granted at all. Manila Water Company v Del Rosario, G.R. No. 188747 (2014)
Gross inefficiency falls within the purview of other cause analogous to the foregoing, and constitutes
therefore, just cause to terminate an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code. It is closely related to
gross neglect, for both involve specific acts of omissions on the part of the employee resulting in
damage to the employer or to his business. It has been settled that failure to comply with the prescribed
standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignment due to inefficiency may constitute just cause
for dismissal. International School Manila v International School Alliance of Educators and
Members, G.R. No. 167286 (2014)
The mere fact that Cosare was a stockholder and an officer of Broadcom at the time the subject
controversy developed failed to necessarily make the case an intra-corporate dispute. Although he is an
officer of Broadcom for being its AVP for Sales, he was not a corporate officer as the term is defined by
law. There are two circumstances which must concur in order for an individual to be considered as such,
namely: (1) the creation of the position is under the corporations charter or by-laws; and (2) the election
of the officer is by the directors or stockholders. Furthermore, following the controversy test which
enunciates that the status or relationship of the parties and the nature of the question that is the subject of
the controversy must be taken into account, the instance case cannot be deemed intra-corporate. Clearly,
the pending dispute particularly relates to Cosares rights and obligations as a regular officer of
Broadcom, instead of as a stockholder of the corporation. Cosare v Broadcom Asia, Inc., et al. G.R. No.
201298 (2014)
Considering that he continued working as President for UTP for about one (1) year and five (5) months
and since it is not covered by another fixed term employment contract, his employment after the
expiration of his fixed term employment is already regular. Therefore, he is guaranteed security of tenure
and can only be removed from service for cause and after compliance with due process. This is
notwithstanding the companys insistence that they merely tolerated his consultancy for humanitarian
reasons. United Tourist Promotions (UTP) v Kemplin, G.R. No. 205453 (2014)
Cabiles was not eligible to receive his retirement benefits as he failed to meet the required ten years
length of service when he resigned from Intel Phil. and moved to Intel HK. Resignation is the formal

relinquishment of an office, the overt act of which is coupled with an intent to renounce. This intent could
be inferred from the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation.
Cabiles contention that his employment with Intel HK is a continuation of his service with Intel Phil
alleging that it was but an assignment by his principal employer, similar to his assignments to Intel
Arizona and Intel Chengdu is untenable
First, he still accepted the offer of Intel HK despite a non-favorable reply to his retirement concerns. Thus,
such acceptance meant letting go of the retirement benefits he now claims. Clearly, it was his choice to
forego his tenure with Intel Phil., with all its associated benefits, in favor of a more lucrative job for him
and his family with Intel HK.
Second, the court does not agree with his argument that his employment in Hong Kong is an assignment
or extension of his employment with Intel Phil. The continuity, existence or termination of an employeremployee relationship in a typical secondment contract or any employment contract for that matter is
measured by the following yardsticks: first, the selection and engagement of the employee; second, the
payment of wages; third, the power of dismissal; and fourth, the employers power to control the
employees conduct. When he assumed duties with Intel HK, the latter became the new employer. It
provided his compensation. He then became subject to Hong Kong labor laws, and necessarily, the rights
appurtenant thereto, including the right of Intel HK to fire him on available grounds. Lastly, it had control
and supervision over him as its new Finance Manager. Evidently, Intel Phil. no longer had any control
over him.
Third, although in various instances, his move to Hong Kong was referred to as an assignment, it bears
stressing that it was categorized as a permanent transfer. It is clear that his decision to move to Hong
Kong required the abandonment of his permanent position with Intel Phil. in order for him to assume a
position in an entirely different company, with a different employer, rank, compensation and benefits. Intel
Technology Philippines, Inc. v National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 200575 (2014)
Where the petitioner was repatriated twenty days after the expiration of his contract of employment, there
is no automatic renewal of the contract. It is a settled rule that seafarers are considered contractual
employees. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and
their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a
certain period of time. Thus, when petitioner's contract ended on October 25, 2000, his employment is
deemed automatically terminated, there being no mutually-agreed renewal or extension of the expired
contract. Unica v Anscor Swipe Ship Management Corporation, G.R. No. 184318 (2014)
For a disability to be compensable, the seafarer must establish that there exists a reasonable linkage
between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his
work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing
condition he might have had. Ayungo v Beamko Ship Management Corporaiton, et al., G.R. No.
203161 (2014)
Under Article 281 of the Labor Code, however, "an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary
period shall be considered a regular employee." When an employer renews a contract of employment
after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employee thereby becomes a regular employee.
No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees. While length of time is not
the controlling test for project employment, it is vital in determining if the employee was hired for a specific
undertaking or tasked to perform functions vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business of
trade of the employer. Malicdem v Marulas Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 204406 (2014)
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization, is, whether the employer has engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said,
tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees rights; and that it is not necessary that there be
direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the
employer if there is a reasonable inference that the anti-union conduct of the employer does have an
adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. T&H Shopfitters Corporation/Gin Queen

Corporation, et al. v T&H Shopfitters Corporation Corporation/Gin Queen Workers Union, et al.,
G.R. No. 191714 (2014)

The company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work
or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days, pursuant to Article 192 (c)(l) of the Labor
Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation (AREC). If he fails to do
so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled. On the other hand, an employee's disability becomes permanent and total even
before the lapse of the statutory 240-day treatment period, when it becomes evident that the employee's
disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period because, for
instance, he underwent surgery and it evidently appears that he could not recover therefrom within the
statutory period. Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc., et al. v Balasta, G.R. No. 193047 (2014)
An injury or illness is compensable when, first, it is work-related and, second, the injury or illness existed
during the term of the seafarers employment contract. Section 32(A) of the 2000 POEA Amended
Standard Terms and Condition further provides that for an occupational disease and the resulting
disability to be compensable, the following need to be satisfied: (1) the seafarer's work must involve the
risks described; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described
risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary
to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Vetyard Terminals &
Shipping Services, Inc. v Suarez, G.R. No. 199344 (2014)
The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits employers from
eliminating or reducing the benefits received by their employees. This rule, however, applies only if the
benefit is based on an express policy, a written contract, or has ripened into a practice. To be considered
a practice, it must be consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a long period of time.
An exception to the rule is when "the practice is due to error in the construction or application of a
doubtful or difficult question of law." The error, however, must be corrected immediately after its
discovery; otherwise, the rule on Non-Diminution of Benefits would still apply. In this case, respondent
was able to present substantial evidence in the form of affidavits to support its claim that there are two
retirement plans. Wesleyan University-Philippines v Wesleyan University-Philippines Faculty and
Staff Association, G.R. No. 181806 (2014)
The respondents failure to attach the required certification of non-forum shopping does not render the
immediate dismissal of the petition. Llamas adequately explained, in his motion for reconsideration, the
inadvertence and presented a clear justifiable ground to warrant the relaxation of the rules. While the
requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, this requirement should not,
however, be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of
forum-shopping. Diamond Taxi v Llamas, Jr., G.R. No. 190724, 2014
Even the most reasonable employee would consider quitting his job after working for three months and
receiving only an insignificant fraction of his salaries. There was, therefore, not an abandonment of
employment nor a resignation in the real sense, but a constructive dismissal, which is defined as an
involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely.
It is impossible, unreasonable or unlikely that any employee, such as Johnson would continue working for
an employer who does not pay him his salaries. Applying the Courts pronouncement in Duldulao v. CA,
the Court construes that the act of the petitioners in not paying Johnson his salaries for three months has
become unbearable on the latters part that he had no choice but to cede his employment with them.
Dreamland Hotel Resort and Westley Prentice v Johnson, G.R. No. 191455 (2014)
The Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, has jurisdiction to determine just
compensation at the very first instance, and the petitioner need not pass through the DAR for initial
valuation. The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function, which is vested in the
Regional Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court. The Special Agrarian Court is not an appellate

reviewer of the DAR decision in administrative cases involving compensation. The Special Agrarian Court
has jurisdiction over the complaint for determination of just compensation, despite the absence of
summary administrative proceedings before the DAR Adjudication Board. Spouses Estacion v Hon.
Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No. 163361 (2014)
Control in employer-employee relationships addresses the details of day to day work like assigning the
particular task that has to be done, monitoring the way tasks are done and their results, and determining
the time during which the employee must report for work or accomplish his assigned task.
Franchising involves the use of an established business expertise, trademark, knowledge, and training.
As such, the franchisee is required to follow a certain established system. Accordingly, the franchisors
may impose guidelines that somehow restrict the petitioners conduct which do not necessarily indicate
control. The important factor to consider is still the element of control over how the work itself is done,
not just its end result. Tesoro, et al. v Metro Manila Retreaders, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 171482 (2014)
The NWPC had the authority to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the determination of the minimum
wage and productivity measures, and the RTWPB-NCR had the power to issue wage orders.
Pursuant to its statutorily defined functions, the NWPC promulgated NWPC Guidelines No. 001-95
(Revised Rules of Procedure on Minimum Wage Fixing) to govern the proceedings in the NWPC and the
RTWPBs in the fixing of minimum wage rates by region, province and industry. Section 1 of Rule VIII of
NWPC Guidelines No. 001-95 recognized the power of the RTWPBs to issue exemptions from the
application of the wage orders subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC. The National Wages and
Productivity Commission (NWPC), et al. v The Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL), et al., G.R. No.
150326 (2014)

Under the POEA-SEC, the employer is liable for a seafarer's disability, resulting from a work-connected
injury or illness, only after the degree of disability has been established by the company- designated
physician and, if the seafarer consulted with a physician of his choice whose assessment disagrees with
that of the company-designated physician, the disagreement must be referred to a third doctor for a final
assessment.
The facts of the case show that the absence of a disability assessment by the company-designated
physician was not of the doctor's making, but was due to respondents refusal to undergo further
treatment. In the absence of any disability assessment from the company-designated doctor, seaman's
claim for disability benefits must fail for his obvious failure to comply with the procedure under the POEAStandard Employment Contract which he was duty bound to follow. Splash Philippines, Inc., et al. v
Ruizo, G.R. No. 193628 (2014)
Pursuant to existing jurisprudence, if the dismissal is by virtue of a just or authorized cause, but without
due process, the dismissed workers are entitled to an indemnity in the form of nominal damages. In the
present case, the evidence on hand substantially shows that the company closed down due to serious
business reverses, an authorized cause for termination of employment. The failure to notify the
respondents in writing of the closure of the company will not invalidate the termination of their
employment, but the company has to pay them nominal damages for the violation of their right to
procedural due process. Navotas Shipyard Corporation, et al. v Montallana, et al., G.R. No. 190053,
(2014)
The failure to faithfully comply with the company rules and regulations is considered to be a just cause in
terminating ones employment, depending on the nature, severity and circumstances of non-compliance.
An employer has the right to regulate, according to its discretion and best judgment, all aspects of
employment, including work assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and
recall of workers. Sutherland Global Services, Inc. v Labrador, G.R. No. 193107 (2014)
In labor cases, the written statements of co-employees admitting their participation in a scheme to
defraud the employer are admissible in evidence. The argument that the said statements constitute

hearsay because the authors thereof were not presented for their cross-examination does not persuade,
because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), which are summary in nature and decisions may be made on the basis of
position papers. Castillo, et al. v Prudential Life Plans, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 196142 (2014)
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards
from the decisions of the Labor Arbiter. Moreover, the filing of the bond is not only mandatory, but a
jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the
NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. Olores v
Manila Doctors College, G.R. No. 201663 (2014)

TAXATION LAW

Taxpayers with pending tax cases are still qualified to avail themselves of the tax amnesty program.
Neither the law nor the implementing rules state that a court ruling that has not attained finality would
preclude the availment of the benefits of the Tax Amnesty Law. Thus, the exception issues and cases
which were ruled by any court (even without finality) in favour of the BIR prior to amnesty availment of the
taxpayer under BIR RMC 19-2008 is invalid, as the exception goes beyond the scope of the provisions of
the 2007 Tax Amnesty Law. CS GARMENT, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R.
No. 182399 (2014).
A taxpayer claimant only has a limited period of thirty days from the expiration of the 120-day period of
inaction of the CIR to file its judicial claim. The non-compliance with the mandatory 30-day period for the
filing of a judicial claim is fatal to its refund claim on the ground of prescription. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SILICON PHILIPPINES INC., G.R. No. 169778 (2014).
Section 267 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which relates to actions for annulment of tax sales, is
not applicable in cases where the nullity of the auction was raised merely as a defense in a suit for
injunction and damages. Raising such issue as a matter of defense does not convert the action to an
action for annulment of tax sale. SPOUSES SILVESTRE AND ELENA PLAZA vs. GUILLERMO
LUSTIVA, et al., G.R. No. 172909 (2014).
The taxpayer who filed its judicial claims within the validity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 up to its reversal
on October 6, 2010, when the Aichi Doctrine was promulgated, is in a position to claim the benefit of the
ruling, which shields the filing of its judicial claim from the vice of prematurity. PROCTER & GAMBLE
ASIA PTE LTD. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 202071 (2014).
The 30-day period was adopted precisely to do away with the old rule that the taxpayer may file the
judicial claim without waiting for the Commissioners decision if the two-year prescriptive period is about
to expire, so that under the VAT System the taxpayer will always have 30 days to file the judicial claim
even if the Commissioner acts only on the 120th day, or does not act at all during the 120-day period.
With the 30-day period always available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer can no longer file a judicial claim for
refund or credit of input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner to decide until the expiration of the
120-day period. SILICON PHILIPPINES vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. Nos.
184360 & 184361 (2014).
The statutory taxpayer who is directly liable to pay the excise tax on its petroleum products, is entitled to a
refund or credit of the excise taxes it paid for petroleum products sold to international carriers, the latter
having been granted exemption from the payment of said excise tax under Sec. 135 (a) of the NIRC
which embodies our compliance with our undertakings under the Chicago Convention and various
bilateral air service agreements not to impose excise tax on aviation fuel purchased by international
carriers from domestic manufacturers or suppliers. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No. 188497 (2004).
Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of identified
special projects, which included "cell sites" or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed are primarily
regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of
the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not
taxes. Where the fees imposed in an ordinance issued by a municipality on an activity subject of
government regulation are regulatory and not revenue-raising in nature, assailing its constitutionality is
beyond the jurisdiction of the CTA. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF
MALVAR, BATANGAS, G.R. No. 204429 (2014).
The Taxpayers failure to comply with the 120-day mandatory period under Section 112(C) of the NIRC
renders its petition for review with the CTA void. It is a mere scrap of paper from which the taxpayer
cannot derive or acquire any right notwithstanding the supposed failure on the part of the CIR to raise the
issue of the taxpayers non-compliance with the 120-day period in the proceedings before the CTA
Division. Furthermore, a taxpayer can only rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 for the filing of its claim from
the time of its issuance on December 10, 2003 up to its reversal by the Aichi Doctrine on October 6,
2010, where it was held that the 120-day period under Section 112(C) of the NIRC is mandatory and
jurisdictional. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. TEAM SUAL CORPORATION
(FROMERLY MIRANT SUAL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 194105 (2014).

Strict compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods can be dispensed with when
the judicial claims are filed on December 10, 2003 (issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 which states
that the taxpayer need not wait for the 120-day period to expire before it could seek judicial relief) to
October 6, 2010 (promulgation of the Aichi doctrine). COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.
TOLEDO POWER, INC., G.R. No. 183880 (2014).
The taxpayer can file his administrative claim for refund or credit at any time within the two-year
prescriptive period. What is only required of him is to file his judicial claim within thirty (30) days after
denial of his claim by CIR or after the expiration of the 120-day period within which the CIR can decide on
its claim. TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No.
190928 (2014).
Pursuant to ruling in CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the
120-30-day rule does not apply on claims for refund that were prematurely filed during the interim period
from the issuance of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Ruling No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003 to
October 6, 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted. The exemption is premised on the fact that prior to
the promulgation of the Aichi decision, there is an existing interpretation laid down in BIR Ruling No. DA489-03 where the BIR expressly ruled that the taxpayer need not wait for the expiration of the 120-day
period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA. Thus, where the taxpayer filed its judicial claim for
refund or issuance of tax credit certificate prior to the date where the Aichi case was promulgated, even
though the claim was prematurely filed without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day mandatory period,
the CTA may still take cognizance of the same as it was filed within the period exempted from the 120-30day mandatory period. TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION vs. CIR, G.R. No. 197760 (2014).
Section 112(D) speaks of two periods: the period of 120 days, which serves as a waiting period to give
time for the CIR to act on the administrative claim for refund or credit, and the period of 30 days, which
refers to the period for interposing an appeal with the CTA. The 30-day period applies not only to
instances of actual denial by the CIR of the claim for refund or tax credit, but to cases of inaction by the
CIR as well. Therefore, notwithstanding the timely filing of administrative claims, the CTA does not have
jurisdiction over the case where the taxpayers judicial claim was filed beyond the 30 day period, the
nature of such time requirement being mandatory. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.
MINDANAO II PARTNERSHIP, G.R. No. 191498 (2014).
Under Section 112(A) of the NIRC, for VAT-registered persons whose sales are zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated, a claim for the refund or credit of creditable input tax that is due or paid, and that is
attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales, must be filed within two years after the close of
the taxable quarter when such sales were made. The reckoning frame would always be the end of the
quarter when the pertinent sale or transactions were made, regardless of when the input VAT was paid.
Also, in the filing of judicial claims, the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA is dependent on the 120-day
period, compliance with both periods is jurisdictional. The period of 120 days is a prerequisite for the
commencement of the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA. CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. Nos. 198729-30 (2014).
Prior payment of taxes is not necessary before a taxpayer could avail of the 8% transitional input tax
credit. All that is required from the taxpayer is to file a beginning inventory with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). A transitional input tax credit is not a tax refund per se but a tax credit. Section 112 of the
Tax Code does not prohibit cash refund or tax credit of transitional input tax. The grant of a refund or
issuance of tax credit certificate in this case would not contravene the above provision. The refund or tax
credit would not be unconstitutional because it is precisely pursuant to Section 105 of the old NIRC which
allows refund/tax credit. FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, et al., G.R. No.173425 (2014).
Section 173 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (1997 NIRC) states that the persons primarily
liable for the payment of the DST are the person (1) making; (2) signing; (3) issuing; (4) accepting; or (5)
transferring the taxable documents, instruments or papers. Should these parties be exempted from
paying tax, the other party who is not exempt would then be secondarily liable. The assignee or
transferee of a promissory note is not liable for the payment of DST as this transaction is not taxed under
the law. The Court can safely conclude that among the covered transactions liable for DST, where the law
did not specify that the transfer and/or assignment of promissory note is to be taxed, there would be no
basis to recognize an imposition. PHILACOR CREDIT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 169899 (2013).

In claiming a tax refund or tax credit over an excess input VAT, the 30-day period of appeal to the CTA
need not necessarily fall within the two-year prescriptive period, as long as the administrative claim before
the CIR is filed within the two-year prescriptive period. This is because Sec. 112 (D) of the 1997 Tax
Code mandates that a taxpayer can file the judicial claim: (1) only within thirty days after the
Commissioner partially or fully denies the claim within the 120-day period, or (2) only within thirty days
from the expiration of the 120-day period if the Commissioner does not act within the 120-day period.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION; TAGANITO
MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE; PHILEX MINING
CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. Nos. 187485/196113/197156
(2013).
Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) is by nature, an excise tax since it is levied on the exercise by persons of
privileges conferred by law. To charge DST on a transaction which was basically a compliance with a
legislative mandate would go against its very nature as an excise tax. FORT BONIFACIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. Nos. 164155
& 175543 (2013).
The 20% final tax withheld on a banks passive income should be included in the computation of the
Gross Receipts Tax (GRT). Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) has consistently ruled that the term gross
receipts do not admit of any deduction. It emphasized that interest earned by banks, even if subject to the
final tax and excluded from taxable gross income, forms part of its gross receipt for GRT purposes. The
interest earned refers to the gross interest without deduction, since the regulations do not provide for any
deduction. Absent a statutory definition of the term, the BIR had consistently applied it in its ordinary
meaning, i.e., without deduction. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 175108 (2013).
The Court summarized the rules on the determination of the prescriptive period for filing a tax refund or
credit of unutilized input VAT as provided in Section 112 of the 1997 Tax Code, as follows: (1) An
administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when
the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were made and (2) The CIR has 120 days from the date of
submission of complete documents in support of the administrative claim within which to decide whether
to grant a refund or issue a tax credit certificate. MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 193301/194637 (2013).
Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. Provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if
amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. Section 140 of the LGC expressly allows for the
imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theatres,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement. Theatres, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a common typifying characteristic in that they are
all venues primarily for the staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows, exhibitions,
performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience. Accordingly, other places of
amusement must be interpreted in light of the typifying characteristic of being venues where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances or being venues primarily
used to stage spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be
viewed by an audience. Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not
belong to the same category or class as theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It
follows that they cannot be considered as among the other places of amusement contemplated by
Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes. PELIZLOY REALTY
CORPORATION vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, G.R. No. 183137 (2013).
Stipulations cannot defeat the right of the State to collect the correct taxes due on an individual or juridical
person because taxes are the lifeblood of our nation so its collection should be actively pursued without
unnecessary impediment. FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE CORPORATION vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 197117 (2013).
The prescriptive period for filing a tax refund or credit of unutilized input VAT as provided in Section 112
of the 1997 Tax Code, are as follows: (1) an administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two

years after the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were made.
(2) While a judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the CIRs decision
denying the administrative claim or from the expiration of the 120-day period without any action from the
CIR. From the foregoing, it is clear that the prescriptive period for filing an administrative claim is within
two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were
made while for a judicial claim, it must be filed with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the CIRs
decision denying the administrative claim or from the expiration of the 120-day period without any action
from the CIR (120+30). MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP vs. COMMISIIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE/ MINDANAO GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP I v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. Nos. 193301 & 194637 (2013).
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the
Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may,
within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one
hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. This
is commonly referred to as the "120+30" period which is jurisdictional. NIPPON EXPRESS
(PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 196907
(2013).
The requirement of a tax clearance under Section 52(C) of the Tax Code of 1997 is not applicable to rural
banks undergoing liquidation proceedings ordered by the Monetary Board of the BSP under Section 30 of
the New Central Bank Act. Thus, it is grave abuse of discretion to dismiss the petition for assistance in
liquidation filed by a corporation undergoing liquidation on the ground of failure to secure tax clearance.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R.
No. 172892 (2013).
Presidential Decree No. 464 otherwise known as "Real Property Tax Code" provides for the legal
requirements to be complied with during a tax delinquency sale of properties. The requirements provided,
which include notices and publication, are mandatory and that failure to comply therewith can invalidate
the sale in view of the requirements of due process. Hence, a taxpayer questioning such delinquency sale
has the burden to prove by preponderant evidence that the auction sale of the subject properties due to
tax delinquency was attended by irregularities. VALBUECO, INC. vs. PROVINCE OF BATAAN, G.R. No.
173829 (2013).
A perusal of Section 196 of the LGC reveals that in order to be entitled to a refund/credit of local taxes,
the following procedural requirements must concur: first, the taxpayer concerned must file a written claim
for refund/credit with the local treasurer; and second, the case or proceeding for refund has to be filed
within two (2) years from the date of the payment of the tax, fee, or charge or from the date the taxpayer
is entitled to a refund or credit. Failure of the taxpayer to file a written claim for refund/credit despite
paying under protest is fatal to his cause of action. METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP, ET AL.
vs. MS. LIBERTY TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, G.R. No. 190818
(2013).
Indirect taxes are those which are demanded in the first instance from one person with the expectation
and intention that he can shift the economic burden to someone else. In this regard, the statutory
taxpayer can transfer to its customers the value of the excise taxes it paid or would be liable to pay to the
government by treating it as part of the cost of the goods and tacking it on to the selling price. This
shifting process, otherwise known as passing on, is largely a contractual affair between the parties.
Section 204(c) of the NIRC provides that it is the statutory taxpayer which has the legal personality to file
a claim for refund. Accordingly, in cases involving excise tax exemptions on petroleum products under
Section 135, the Court has consistently held that it is the statutory taxpayer who is entitled to claim a tax
refund based thereon and not the party who merely bears its economic burden. However, the
abovementioned rule should not apply to instances where the law clearly grants the party to which the
economic burden of the tax is shifted an exemption from both direct and indirect taxes. In which case, the
latter must be allowed to claim a tax refund even if it is not considered as the statutory taxpayer under the
law. In this case, PALs franchise grants it an exemption from both direct and indirect taxes on its
purchase of petroleum products. Hence, PAL has the legal personality to file the claim for refund for the

passed on excise taxes because of its franchise. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 198759 (2013).
Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, taxing
the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing. There is indeed double taxation if a
taxpayer is subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 (Tax on Manufacturers, Assemblers and other
Processors) and 21 (Tax on Business Subject to the Excise, Value-Added or Percentage Taxes under the
NIRC) of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter the
privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose to make persons conducting
business within the City of Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority petitioner
City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing jurisdiction within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character a
local business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the business. SWEDISH MATCH PHILIPPINES
INC. vs. THE TREASURER OF THE CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 181277 (2013).
A taxpayer claiming the refund must comply with the invoicing and accounting requirements mandated by
the Tax Code, as well as the revenue regulations implementing them before an administrative claim for
refund or tax credit will be granted. A change in the name of the corporation being unauthorized and
without approval of the SEC, and the issuance of official receipts under that name, cannot be used to
allow the grant of tax refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate. The absence of official receipts issued
in its name is tantamount to non-compliance with the substantiation requirements provided by law.
BONIFACIO WATER CORPORATION vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No.
175142 (2013).
The rule that tax deductions, being in the nature of tax exemptions, are to be construed in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer is well settled. Corollary to this rule is the principle that when a taxpayer claims a
deduction, he must point to some specific provision of the statute in which that deduction is authorized
and must be able to prove that he is entitled to the deduction which the law allows. An item of
expenditure, therefore, must fall squarely within the language of the law in order to be deductible. A mere
averment that the taxpayer has incurred a loss does not automatically warrant a deduction from its gross
income. H. TAMBUNTING PAWNSHOP, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R.
No. 173373 (2013).
Basic is the principle that a contract is the law between the parties, and its stipulations are binding on
them, unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Indeed,
paragraph V of the MOA obligates petitioner to pay the taxes due from the sale of the Genicon
laparoscopic instrument. Hence, as between petitioner and respondent, petitioner bears the burden for
the payment of VAT. While by agreement of the parties, petitioner bears the economic burden for paying
the VAT, the legal liability to pay the same to the BIR falls on respondent. ROLANDO M. MENDIOLA vs.
COMMERZ TRADING INT'L., INC., G.R. No. 200895 (2013).
Tax conventions are drafted with a view towards the elimination of international juridical double taxation,
which is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in
respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods. A corporation who has paid 15% Branch
Profit Remittance Tax (BPRT) has the right to avail (by way of refund) of the benefit of a preferential tax
rate of 10% BPRT in accordance with the RP-Germany Tax Treaty despite non-compliance with an
application with ITAD at least 15 days before the transaction for the lower rate. BIR must not impose
additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international
agreements. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for any pre-requisite for the
availment of the benefits under said agreement. Likewise, it must be stressed that there is nothing in
RMO No. 1-2000, which would indicate a deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty relief for failure to
comply with the 15-day period. DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 188550 (2013).
Case law dictates that in a claim for tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must prove not only entitlement
to the claim but also compliance with all the documentary and evidentiary requirements therefor. An
invoice must reflect, as required by law: (a) the BIR Permit to Print; (b) the TIN-V of the purchaser; and
(c) the word "zero-rated" imprinted thereon. Failure to comply with the said invoicing requirements provide

sufficient ground to deny a claim for tax refund or tax credit. J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 171307 (2013).
A corporation like the Philippine Airlines who has a franchise of its own cannot be subject to the minimum
corporate income tax. The reason being- as provided in PD 1590, Section 13 of PAL's franchise, its
taxation shall be strictly governed by two fundamental rules, to wit: (1) respondent shall pay the
Government either the basic corporate income tax or franchise tax, whichever is lower; and (2) the tax
paid by respondent, under either of these alternatives, shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties,
registration, license, and other fees and charges, except only real property tax. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), G.R. No. 179259 (2013).
Section 252 emphatically directs that the taxpayer/real property owner questioning the assessment
should first pay the tax due before his protest can be entertained. As a matter of fact, the words paid
under protest shall be annotated on the tax receipts. Consequently, only after such payment has been
made by the taxpayer may he file a protest in writing (within thirty [30] days from said payment of tax) to
the provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from its
receipt. In no case is the local treasurer obliged to entertain the protest unless the tax due has been paid.
A claim for exemption from payment of real property taxes does not actually question the assessors
authority to assess and collect such taxes, but pertains to the reasonableness or correctness of the
assessment by the local assessor, a question of fact which should be resolved, at the very first instance,
by the LBAA. By providing that real property not declared and proved as tax-exempt shall be included in
the assessment roll, Section 206 of RA No. 7160 implies that the local assessor has the authority to
assess the property for realty taxes, and any subsequent claim for exemption shall be allowed only when
sufficient proof has been adduced supporting the claim. CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION vs. CENTRAL BOARD ASSESSMENT APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 169234 (2013).
A claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly against the
taxpayer. One of the conditions for a judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is
compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict compliance with
the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, whether before, during, or after the
effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-48903 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated
the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.
Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that the "power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other
tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by
the Secretary of Finance," Section 7 of the same Code does not prohibit the delegation of such power.
Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of this
Code to any or such subordinate officials with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to
such limitations and restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner." COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE vs. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION; TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE; PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 187485/G.R. No. 196113/G.R. No. 197156 (2013).
For a taxpayer to be entitled to a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax, the following requisites
must be complied with: First, The claim must be filed with the CIR within the two-year period from the date
of payment of the tax; Second, It must be shown on the return of the recipient that the income received
was declared as part of the gross income; and Third, The fact of withholding is established by a copy of
the statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax
withheld. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. TEAM (PHILIPPINES) OPERATIONS
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 185728 (2013).
The two-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims. The 120day and 30-day periods are not merely directory but mandatory. The taxpayer will always have 30 days to
file the judicial claim even if the Commissioner acts only on the 120th day, or does not act at all during the
120-day period. With the 30-day period always available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer can no longer file a
judicial claim for refund or tax credit of unutilized excess input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner

to decide until the expiration of the 120-day period. Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period
violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and
thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the
taxpayers petition. However, the San Roque case provides exception to the strict compliance with the
120-day period. Although the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, the BIR Ruling No. DA-48903 dated December 10, 2003 provided a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the Tax
Code. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 expressly states that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse
of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review. Thus,
the BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 will shield the filing of a tax payers judicial claim from the vice of
prematurity when such claim is filed during its effectivity. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GST
PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 190872 (2013).
Section 229 of the NIRC, which provides for a two-year period, reckoned from the date of payment of the
tax or penalty, for the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit, is only pertinent to the recovery of taxes
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected. Thus, in claims for refund or a tax credit for the unutilized
creditable input VAT, Section 112(A) of the NIRC is applicable and not Section 229. Furthermore, in
claims for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate, the 120+30 day period is mandatory and
jurisdictional. Where a taxpayer failed to wait for the requisite 120 days after the filing of its claim for
refund with the BIR before elevating the case to the CTA, the judicial claim is considered prematurely filed
and cognizance thereof cannot be taken. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.
VISAYAS GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 181276 (2013).
When the 120+30 day mandatory periods were already in the law and BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 had not
yet been issued, a taxpayer has no excuse for not observing the 120+30 day period. Failure of the
taxpayer to observe the mandatory 120-day period is fatal to its claim and will render the CTA devoid of
jurisdiction over the judicial claim. APPLIED FOOD INGREDIENTS COMPANY, INC. vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 184266 (2013).
Even though the sale of electricity by a power generation company is subject to zero-rated VAT, its claim
for refund or tax credit cannot be granted where no VAT official receipts and VAT returns have been
presented to prove that it actually made zero-rated sales of electricity. An entity claiming for refund or tax
credit carries with it the burden of proving that not only is it entitled under the substantive law to the
allowance of its claim for refund or tax credit but also that it met all the requirements for evidentiary
substantiation of its claim before the administrative official concerned. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION
vs. COMMISSION ON INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 188260 (2013).
Where the purchase and sale of identified assets between two companies under a Purchase and Sale
Agreement does not constitute a merger as defined under Section 40 (C)(6)(b) of the Tax Code, the seller
and the purchaser are considered entities different from one another. Thus, the purchaser company
cannot be held liable for the payment of the deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax assessed against the
seller company. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. BANK OF COMMERCE, G.R. No. 180529
(2013).
Nowhere in the language of the first sentence of Section 5 of RA 7678 does it expressly or even impliedly
provide that petitioners real properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in its
telecommunications business are exempt from payment of realty tax. On the contrary, the first sentence
of Section 5 specifically states that the petitioner, as the franchisee, shall pay the same taxes on real
estate, buildings, and personal property exclusive of this franchise as other persons or corporations are
now or hereafter may be acquired by law to pay. DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES,
INC. v. JESSIE CANTOS, G.R. No. 180200 (2013).
The 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme are valid exercises of police power of the
State absent a clear showing that it is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. The discount is intended to
improve the welfare of the senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more
prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing commodities. As to
its nature an effects, although the regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private
establishment, it does not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation or
conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for

that matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the amount of profits or
income/gross sales that such private establishments may derive from, senior citizens. The State can
employ police power measures to regulate the pricing of goods and services, and, hence, the profitability
of business establishments in order to pursue legitimate State objectives for the common good, provided,
the regulation does not go too far as to amount to taking.MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA
FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF THE DSWD, G.R. No. 175356 (2013).
The 120+30-day period in Section(d) (now subparagraph C) requires that upon the inaction of the CIR for
120 days after the submission of the documents in support of the claim, the tax payer has to file its
judicial claim within 30 days from the lapse of the said period. The 120+30 day period under Sec. 112 is
mandatory and jurisdictional that a judicial claim for refund must be denied if the same has been filed
beyond the period prescribed as the Court of Appeals cannot validly acquire jurisdiction over the claim.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Dash Engineering Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 184145 (2013).
For indirect taxes (such as valued-added tax or VAT), the proper party to question or seek a refund of the
tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even
when he shifts the burden thereof to another. Even if the tax is shifted by Petron to its customers and
even if the tax is billed as a separate item in the aviation delivery receipts and invoices issued to its
customers, Petron remains the taxpayer because the excise tax is imposed directly on Petron as the
manufacturer. Hence, Petron, as the statutory taxpayer, is the proper party that can claim the refund of
the excise taxes paid to the BIR. SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD. vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 166482 (2012).
When the law provided for the remedy to appeal the inaction of the CIR, it did not intend to limit it to a
single remedy of filing of an appeal after the lapse of the 180-day prescribed period. Precisely, when a
taxpayer protested an assessment, he naturally expects the CIR to decide either positively or negatively.
A taxpayer cannot be prejudiced if he chooses to wait for the final decision of the CIR on the protested
assessment. More so, because the law and jurisprudence have always contemplated a scenario where
the CIR will decide on the protested assessment. LASCONA LAND CO., INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 171251 (2012).
A transferee in good faith and for value of a Tax Credit Certificates (TCC) who has relied on the
Department of Finances One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center's
representation of the genuineness and validity of the TCC transferred to it may not be legally required to
pay again the tax covered by the TCC which has been belatedly declared null and void, that is, after the
TCCs have been fully utilized through settlement of internal revenue tax liabilities. Conversely, when the
transferee is party to the fraud as when it did not obtain the TCC for value or was a party to or has
knowledge of its fraudulent issuance, said transferee is liable for the taxes and for the fraud committed as
provided for by law. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PETRON CORPORATION, G.R.
No. 185568 (2012).
Because an excise tax is a tax on the manufacturer and not on the purchaser, and there being no express
grant under the NIRC of exemption from payment of excise tax to local manufacturers of petroleum
products sold to international carriers, and absent any provision in the Code authorizing the refund or
crediting of such excise taxes paid, Sec. 135 (a) should be construed as prohibiting the shifting of the
burden of the excise tax to the international carriers who buys petroleum products from the local
manufacturers. Said provision thus merely allows the international carriers to purchase petroleum
products without the excise tax component as an added cost in the price fixed by the manufacturers or
distributors/sellers. Consequently, the oil companies which sold such petroleum products to international
carriers are not entitled to a refund of excise taxes previously paid on the goods. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No. 188497 (2012).
The mere fact that petitioners application for zero-rating has been approved by the CIR does not, by
itself, justify the grant of a refund or tax credit. The taxpayer claiming the refund must further comply with
the invoicing and accounting requirements mandated by the NIRC, as well as by revenue regulations
implementing them. This Court has consistently held as fatal the failure to print the word zero-rated on
the VAT invoices or official receipts in claims for a refund or credit of input VAT on zero-rated sales, even

if the claims were made prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9337. WESTERN MINDANAO POWER CORP. vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G. R. No. 181136 (2012).
Since building permit fees are not charges on property, they are not impositions from which Angeles
University Foundation (AUF) is exempt. Only portions actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes are exempt from real property taxes, while those portions leased to private entities
and individuals are not exempt from such taxes. ANGELES UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION vs. CITY OF
ANGELES, et al., G.R. No. 189999 (2012).
In assessing Team Pacific Corporations business tax and effectively denying its protest, the Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig cannot be said to be performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function. For this reason,
her actions are not the proper subject of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Moreover, R.A. No. 9282
has vested the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, among others,
appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in tax collection cases originally decided by
them in their respective territorial jurisdiction which appeal should be perfected within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the decision and shall be made by filing a petition for review under a procedure analogous to
that provided for under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. TEAM PACIFIC CORPORATION
vs. JOSEPHINE DAZA IN HER CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF TAGUIG, G.R. No.
167732 (2012).
The evidence presented by Accenture may have established that its clients are foreign. This fact does not
automatically mean, however, that these clients were doing business outside the Philippines. The
recipient of the service must be doing business outside the Philippines for the transaction to qualify for
zero-rating under Section 108(B) of the Tax Code. To come within the purview of the provision, it is not
enough that the recipient of the service be proven to be a foreign corporation; rather, it must be
specifically proven to be a nonresident foreign corporation. ACCENTURE, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 190102 (2012).
The provision relied upon by the Spouses Dipad prohibits employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) from divulging the trade secrets of taxpayers but does not address the confidentiality of ITRs.
Furthermore, in contrast to the interpretation that ITRs cannot be divulged, Section 71 serves as an
exception to the rule on the unlawful divulgence of trade secrets. It makes income tax returns public
records and opens them to inspection upon order of the President of the Philippines. ROBERTO AND
SANDRA DIPAD vs. SPOUSES ROLANDO AND BRIGIDA OLIVAN, AND RUBIO GUIJON
MADRIGALLO, G.R. No. 168771 (2012).
The failure of a taxpayer to print the word zero-rated on its invoices or receipts is fatal to its claim for tax
refund or tax credit of input VAT on zero-rated sales. The reason for such requirement is that it prevents
buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent
such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be refunding money it did not
collect. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 168856 (2012).
Prior payment of taxes is not required for a taxpayer to avail of the 8% transitional input tax credit
because it is not a tax refund per se but a tax credit. Tax credit is not synonymous to tax refund. Tax
refund is defined as the money that a taxpayer overpaid and is thus returned by the taxing authority. Tax
credit, on the other hand, is an amount subtracted directly from ones total tax liability. It is any amount
given to a taxpayer as a subsidy, a refund, or an incentive to encourage investment. Thus, unlike a tax
refund, prior payment of taxes is not a prerequisite to avail of a tax credit. FORT BONIFACIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 173-425
(2012).
The tax privileges granted to electric cooperatives registered with NEA under PD 269 were validly
withdrawn and only those registered with the CDA under RA 6938 may continue to enjoy the tax
privileges under the Cooperative Code. A franchise tax is a tax on the exercise of a privilege. Since it
partakes of the nature of an excise tax, the situs of taxation is the place where the privilege is exercised,
that is, where CASURECO III has its principal office and from where it operates, regardless of the place

where its services or products are delivered. CITY OF IRIGA vs. CAMARINES SUR III ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (CASURECO III), G.R. No. 192945 (2012).
Under the old regulation, definition of gross receipts, for purposes of computing the 3% Percentage Tax
under Section 118(A) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), should include special
commissions on passengers and special commissions on cargo. The new rules compute gross revenues
based on the actual amount received by the airline company as reflected on the plane ticket. While the
petitioners interpretation has been vindicated by the new rules which compute gross revenues based on
the actual amount received by the airline company as reflected on the plane ticket, this does not change
the fact that during the relevant taxable period involved in this case, it was Revenue Regulations No. 6-66
that was in effect. GF cannot insist on the application of Revenue Regulations No. 15-2002 because tax
laws, including rules and regulations, operate prospectively unless otherwise legislatively intended by
express terms or by necessary implication. GULF AIR COMPANY, PHILIPPINE BRANCH (GF) vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 182045 (2012).
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for certiorari. The petition for relief should be filed within the 60-day reglementary period after the
petitioner learns of the judgment under Rule 38. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and AYALA LAND, INC., G.R. No. 190680 (2012).
Section 27(B) of the NIRC does not remove the income tax exemption of proprietary non-profit hospitals
under Section 30(E) and (G). The effect of the introduction of Section 27(B) is to subject the taxable
income of two specific institutions, namely, proprietary non-profit educational institutions and proprietary
non-profit hospitals, among the institutions covered by Section 30, to the 10% preferential rate under
Section 27(B) instead of the ordinary 30% corporate rate under the last paragraph of Section 30 in
relation to Section 27(A)(1). COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., G.R. No. 195909/G.R. No. 195960 (2012).
A tax amnesty is a general pardon or the intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of violating a tax law. It partakes of an absolute waiver by the
government of its right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to
start with a clean slate.ASIA INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONEERS, INC., vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 179115 (2012).
Having chosen to carry-over the excess quarterly income tax, the corporation cannot thereafter choose to
apply for a cash refund or for the issuance of a tax credit certificate for the amount representing such
overpayment. Hence, the controlling factor for the operation of the irrevocability rule is that the taxpayer
chose an option; and once it had already done so, it could no longer make another one. Consequently,
after the taxpayer opts to carry-over its excess tax credit to the following taxable period, the question of
whether or not it actually gets to apply said tax credit is irrelevant. UNITED INTERNATIONAL PICTURES
AB vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 168331 (2012).
The Supreme Court holds that City Ordinance No. 9503-2005 is subject to the limits imposed by Sections
143 and 151 of the Local Government Code. Section 143 recognizes separate lines of business and
imposes different tax rates for different lines of business. Section 143(h) states that on any business
subject to x xx value-added x xx tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of
tax shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year from the
lease of goods or properties. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT CO., INC. vs. CITY OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO, G.R. No. 191761 (2012).
The right to claim a refund or be credited with the excise taxes belongs to the statutory payer. The proper
party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the
tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden thereof to another. Thus, the
supplier remains the statutory taxpayer even if the purchaser, actually shoulders the burden of tax.
DIAGEO PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 183553 (2012).
Under the new law, in case of overpayment of income taxes, the remedies are still the same; and the
availment of one remedy still precludes the other. But unlike Section 69 of the old NIRC, the carry-over of

excess income tax payments is no longer limited to the succeeding taxable year. Unutilized excess
income tax payments may now be carried over to the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized. In
addition, the option to carry-over excess income tax payments is now irrevocable. Hence, unutilized
excess income tax payments may no longer be refunded. Applications for refund of the unutilized excess
income tax payments may no longer be allowed. BELLE CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 181298 (2011).
The non-presentation of the Authority to Print (ATP) and the failure to indicate the word "zero-rated" in the
invoices or receipts are fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales. The failure to
indicate the ATP in the sales invoices or receipts, on the other hand, is not. Under Section 112 (A) of the
NIRC, a claimant must be engaged in sales which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated. To prove this,
duly registered invoices or receipts evidencing zero-rated sales must be presented. However, since the
ATP is not indicated in the invoices or receipts, the only way to verify whether the invoices or receipts are
duly registered is by requiring the claimant to present its ATP from the BIR. Without this proof, the
invoices or receipts would have no probative value for the purpose of refund.
As to the claim of refund for input VAT on capital goods, these must refer to goods or properties with
estimated useful life greater than one year and which are treated as depreciable assets used directly or
indirectly in the production or sale of taxable goods or services. SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC., vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 172378 (2011).
In claiming for a tax credit certificate or a tax refund out of withheld taxes, there is no need for the
claimant to prove actual remittance by the withholding agent (payor) to the BIR. Such proof of remittance
is the responsibility of the withholding agent and not of the taxpayer-refund claimant. Pursuant to Section
57 and 58 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, the withholding of income tax and the remittance thereof to
the BIR is the responsibility of the payor and not the payee. This is because payors of withholding taxes
are by themselves constituted as withholding agents of the BIR, which taxes are held in trust for the
government. In the event that the withholding agents commit fraud against the government by not
remitting the taxes so withheld, such act should not prejudice the payee who has been duly withheld
taxes by the withholding agents acting under government authority. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE vs. ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, G.R. No. 179617 (2011).
The proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on
whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden thereof to another
because once shifted, it is no longer in the nature of a tax, but part of the purchase price or the cost of the
goods or services sold. EXXON MOBIL PETROLEUM AND CHEMICAL HOLDINGS, INC.-PHILIPPINE
BRANCH vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 180909 (2011).
When claiming tax refund/credit, the VAT-registered taxpayer must be able to establish that it does have
refundable or creditable input VAT, and the same has not been applied against its output VAT liabilities information which is supposed to be reflected in the taxpayer's VAT returns. Thus, an application for tax
refund/credit must be accompanied by copies of the taxpayer's VAT return/s for the taxable quarter/s
concerned. ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 159471 (2011).
It is the duty of the claimant to comply with the requirements, including the imprinting of the words "zerorated" in its VAT official receipts and invoices in order for its sales of electricity to NPC to qualify for zerorating, being a mandatory requirement. The denial of a claim for refund of input tax as a consequence for
failure to imprint the words zero rated is not a harsh penalty but is reasonable and must be strictly
complied with, as it is the only way to determine the veracity of its claim. KEPCO PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 179961 (2011).
Section 76 provides that a taxpayer has the option to file a claim for refund or to carry-over its excess
income tax payments. The option to carry-over, however, is irrevocable. Thus, once a taxpayer opted to
carry-over its excess income tax payments, it can no longer seek refund of the unutilized excess income
tax payments. The taxpayer, however, may apply the unutilized excess income tax payments as a tax
credit to the succeeding taxable years until such has been fully applied pursuant to Section 76 of the
NIRC.BELLE CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 181298
(2011).

Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming
exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. As a rule, tax exemptions are
construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly and categorically, and
supported by clear legal provision.
Anent the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision subjecting PAGCOR to 10% VAT
is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No. 9337. Nowhere in R.A. No. 9337 is it provided that petitioner can
be subjected to VAT. R.A. No. 9337 is clear only as to the removal of petitioner's exemption from the
payment of corporate income tax. Section 7 (k) of R. A. No. 9337 provides, xxx Transactions which are
exempt under international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory or under special laws xxx.
Petitioner is exempt from the payment of VAT, because PAGCOR's charter, P.D. No. 1869, is a special
law that grants petitioner exemption from taxes. PAGCOR is undoubtedly exempt from VAT because the
law exempts from taxes persons or entities contracting with PAGCOR in casino operations. Thus, by
extending the tax exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations, it is
exempting PAGCOR from being liable to indirect taxes. It is settled rule that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails,
because the said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. RR No.
16-2005, therefore, cannot go beyond the provisions of R.A. No. 9337. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) vs. THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No.172087
(2011).
Documentary stamp tax (DST) is levied on every document which establishes that insurance was made
or renewed upon a life. As applied to the case, the guaranteed continuity clause gave the insured the
right to renew his life insurance policy which had a fixed term of twenty years. The renewal was not meant
to restore the original terms of an old agreement, but instead it was meant to extend the life of an existing
agreement, with some of the contract's terms modified. Hence, it is a renewal subject to DST. As to the
increase in the group insurance, whenever a master policy admits of another member, another life is
insured and covered. It does not matter that it did not issue another policy to effect this change, the fact
remains that insurance on another life is made and the relationship of insurer and insured is created
between MBLIC and the additional member of that master policy. Hence, it is an insurance made upon
life subject to DST. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. MANILA BANKERS LIFE
INSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 169103 (2011).
Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of Agfha's demand will ultimately fall on the government,
and that, under the political doctrine of "state immunity," it cannot be held liable for governmental acts (jus
imperii), the Court still holds that the Commissioner cannot escape its liability. The Court cannot turn a
blind eye to BOC's ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping of Agfha's goods. The Court is not
likewise unaware of its lackadaisical attitude in failing to provide a cogent explanation on the goods'
disappearance, considering that they were in its custody and that they were in fact the subject of litigation.
Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to
take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it. Accordingly, the Court agrees
with the lower courts' directive that, upon payment of the necessary customs duties by Agfha, the
Commissioners payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of goods or properties seized or forfeited
by the Bureau of Customs.
As to the basis of the conversion rate, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CTA that AGFHA is entitled
to recover the value of its lost shipment based on the acquisition cost at the time of payment and not at
the time of importation. Under Republic Act No. 529, as amended by R.A. No. 4100, stipulations on the
satisfaction of obligations in foreign currency are void. Payments of monetary obligations, subject to
certain exceptions, shall be discharged in the currency which is the legal tender in the Philippines. But
since R.A. No. 529 does not provide for the rate of exchange for the payment of foreign currency
obligations incurred after its enactment, the Court held in a number of cases that the rate of exchange for
the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the time of payment.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. AGFHA INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 187425 (2011).
In case the corporation is entitled to a refund of the excess estimated quarterly income taxes paid, the
refundable amount shown on its final adjustment return may be credited against the estimated quarterly

income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years. Once the option to carryover and apply the excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable quarters of the
succeeding taxable years has been made, such option shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable
period and no application for tax refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefor.
The amount being claimed as a refund would remain in the account of the taxpayer until utilized in
succeeding taxable years, as provided in Section 76 of the NIRC of 1997. It is worthy to note that unlike
the option for refund of excess income tax, which prescribes after two years from the filing of the FAR,
there is no prescriptive period for the carrying over of the same. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE vs. PL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 160949 (2011).
A VAT-registered taxpayer is required to comply with all the VAT invoicing requirements to be able to file
a claim for input taxes on domestic purchases for goods or services attributable to zero-rated sales. A
"VAT invoice" is an invoice that meets the requirements of Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95. It expressly states
that all purchases covered by invoices other than a VAT invoice shall not give rise to any input tax.
Microsoft's invoice, lacking the word "zero-rated, is not a VAT invoice, and thus cannot give rise to any
input tax. MICROSOFT PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No.
180173 (2011).
Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the "Real Property Tax Code," the authority to collect real property
taxes is vested in the locality where the property is situated which requisite was reiterated in Republic Act
No. 7160, also known as the 1991 the Local Government Code. The only import of these provisions is
that, while a local government unit is authorized under several laws to collect real estate tax on properties
falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these properties are unquestionably
within its geographical boundaries. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. STA. LUCIA REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT, INC., vs. CITY OF PASIG, MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, G.R.
No. 166838 (2011).
The requisites for the non-recognition of gain or loss under the foregoing provision are as follows: (a) the
transferee is a corporation; (b) the transferee exchanges its shares of stock for property/ies of the
transferor; (c) the transfer is made by a person, acting alone or together with others, not exceeding four
persons; and, (d) as a result of the exchange the transferor, alone or together with others, not exceeding
four, gains control of the transferee. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. FILINVEST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. Nos. 163653 and 167689 (2011).
Taxes may be imposed only by the government under its sovereign authority, toll fees may be demanded
by either the government or private individuals or entities, as an attribute of ownership. VAT on tollway
operations cannot be deemed a tax on tax due to the nature of VAT as an indirect tax. The seller remains
directly and legally liable for payment of the VAT, but the buyer bears its burden since the amount of VAT
paid by the former is added to the selling price. Once shifted, the VAT ceases to be a tax and simply
becomes part of the cost that the buyer must pay in order to purchase the good, property or service.
RENATO V. DIAZ AND AURORA MA. F. TIMBOL, vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 193007 (2011).
The cost of discount should be computed on the actual amount of the discount extended to senior
citizens. Petitioner is therefore entitled to a tax credit for the full 20% sales discounts it extended to
qualified senior citizens. It is worthy to mention that Republic Act No. 7432 had undergone two (2)
amendments; first in 2003 by Republic Act No. 9257 and most recently in 2010 by Republic Act No.
9994. The 20% sales discount granted by establishments to qualified senior citizens is now treated as
tax deduction and not as tax credit. As we have likewise declared in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, this case covers the taxable years 1993 and 1994, thus, Republic Act
No. 7432 applies.MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
G.R. No. 164050 (2011).
A certificate of deposit need not be in a specific form; thus, a passbook of an interest-earning deposit
account issued by a bank is a certificate of deposit drawing interest. DST is imposed on certificates of
deposit bearing interest pursuant to Section 180 of the old NIRC, as amended. PRUDENTIAL BANK vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 180390 (2011).

Section 234(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 states that properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines
are exempt from real property tax "except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person." Thus, the portions of the properties not leased to taxable
entities are exempt from real estate tax while the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are
subject to real estate tax. The law imposes the liability to pay real estate tax on the Republic of the
Philippines for the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities. CITY OF PASIG, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. 185023 (2011).
Estoppel is clearly applicable to the case at bench. RCBC, through its partial payment of the revised
assessments issued within the extended period as provided for in the questioned waivers, impliedly
admitted the validity of those waivers. It is indisputable that the withholding agent is merely a tax collector
and not a taxpayer. The liability of the withholding agent is independent from that of the taxpayer. The
former cannot be made liable for the tax due because it is the latter who earned the income subject to
withholding tax. The withholding agent is liable only insofar as he failed to perform his duty to withhold
the tax and remit the same to the government. The liability for the tax, however, remains with the
taxpayer because the gain was realized and received by him. While the payor-borrower can be held
accountable for its negligence in performing its duty to withhold the amount of tax due on the transaction,
RCBC, as the taxpayer and the one which earned income on the transaction, remains liable for the
payment of tax as the taxpayer shares the responsibility of making certain that the tax is properly withheld
by the withholding agent, so as to avoid any penalty that may arise from the non-payment of the
withholding tax due. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 170257 (2011).
Congressional deliberations show that the shift from ad valorem to specific taxes introduced by the law
was also intended to curb the corruption that became endemic to the imposition of ad valorem taxes.
Since ad valorem taxes were based on the value of the goods, the prices of the goods were often
manipulated to yield lesser taxes. The imposition of specific taxes, which are based on the volume of
goods produced, would prevent price manipulation and also cure the unequal tax treatment created by
the skewed valuation of similar goods. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORPORATION, G.R. No. 180006 (2011).
Actually, it is R.A. 9337 that in 2005 required the printing of the words "zero-rated" on receipts. But, since
the receipts and invoices in this case cover sales made from 1999 to 2000, what applies is Section
4.108.1 which requires the printing of the words "zero-rated" only on invoices, not on official receipts.
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES POWER CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
G.R. No. 179632 (2011).
Section 143 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 is clear and unambiguous. It provides for two periods: the first
is the 3-year transition period beginning January 1, 1997, the date when R.A. No. 8240 took effect, until
December 31, 1999; and the second is the period thereafter. During the 3-year transition period, Section
143 provides that the excise tax from any brand of fermented liquorshall not be lower than the tax
which was due from each brand on October 1, 1996. After the transitory period, Section 143 provides
that the excise tax rate shall be the figures provided under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Section 143 but
increased by 12%, without regard to whether such rate is lower or higher than the tax rate that is actually
being paid prior to January 1, 2000 and therefore, without regard to whether the revenue collection
starting January 1, 2000 may turn out to be lower than that collected prior to said date. Revenue
Regulations No. 17-99, however, created a new tax rate when it added in the last paragraph of Section 1
thereof, the qualification that the tax due after the 12% increase becomes effective shall not be lower
than the tax actually paid prior to January 1, 2000. Said qualification must, perforce, be struck down as
invalid and of no effect. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 184428 (2011).
It is sufficiently clear that for a person to be excluded from the coverage of the VAP, the verified
information must not only be filed under Section 281 of the Tax Code, it must also be duly recorded in the
Official Registry Book of the BIR before the date of availment under the Voluntary Assessment
Program(VAP).The recording of the information in the Official Registry Book of the BIR is a mandatory
requirement before a taxpayer may be excluded from the coverage of the VAP.COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE vs. JULIETA ARIETE, G.R. No. 164152 (2010).

A non-bank financial intermediary is subject to 10% VAT for the tax years 1996 to 2002; however, with
the levy, assessment and collection of VAT from non-bank financial intermediaries being
specifically deferred by law, then petitioner is not liable for VAT during these tax years. But with the full
implementation of the VAT system on non-bank financial intermediaries starting January 1, 2003,
petitioner is liable for 10% VAT for said tax year. And beginning 2004 up to the present, by virtue of R.A.
No. 9238, petitioner is no longer liable for VAT but it is subject to percentage tax on gross receipts from
0% to 5%, as the case may be.
For purposes of taxation, the pawn ticket is proof of an exercise of a taxable privilege of concluding a
contract of pledge. There is therefore no basis in petitioner's assertion that a DST is literally a tax on a
document and that no tax may be imposed on a pawn ticket.
It is settled that good faith and honest belief that one is not subject to tax on the basis of previous
interpretations of government agencies tasked to implement the tax law are sufficient justification to
delete the imposition of surcharges and interest. TAMBUNTING PAWNSHOP, INC. vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 179085 (2010).
A motion for reconsideration of the denial of the administrative protest does not toll the 30-day period to
appeal to the CTA.FISHWEALTH CANNING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, G.R. No. 179343 (2010).
Since interest from any Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from
deposit substitutes are paid by banks, cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on
the interest from savings and time deposits of their members. Moreover, the amendment in Article 61 of
RA 9520, specifically providing that members of cooperatives are not subject to final taxes on their
deposits, affirms the interpretation of the BIR that Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC does not apply to
cooperatives and confirms that such ruling carries out the legislative intent. DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL
CREDIT COOPERATIVE (DCCCO), vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 182722
(2010).
The Court does not believe that the phrase "person having legal interest in the property" in Section 226 of
the LGC can include an entity that assumes another person's tax liability by contract. For the Court to
consider an entity assuming another person's tax liability by contract as a person having legal interest in
the real property would extend to it the privileges and responsibilities enumerated above. The framers of
the LGC certainly did not contemplate that the listing, valuation, and assessment of real property can be
made in the name of such entity; nor did they intend to make the warrant of levy enforceable against it.
Insofar as the provisions of the LGC are concerned, this entity is a party foreign to the operation of real
property tax laws and could not be clothed with any legal interest over the property apart from its
assumed liability for tax. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. PROVINCE OF QUEZON AND
MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, G.R. No. 171586 (2010).
An action based upon a surety bond cannot be considered a tax collection case. Rather, such action
would properly be a case based on a contract. Verily, the instant case is not a tax collection case; hence,
the CA has jurisdiction over the case. PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC), G.R. No.
185588 (2010).
Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 1590 states that the grantee shall pay either the basic corporate income tax based on
the grantees (PAL) annual net taxable income or its franchise tax of two percent of the gross revenues
derived by the grantee from all sources whichever will result in a lower tax. The tax to be paid by the
grantee under said alternatives shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license,
and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or description, imposed, levied, established, assessed, or
collected by any municipal, city, provincial, or national authority or government agency. While the Court
recognizes the general rule that the grant of tax exemptions is strictly construed against the taxpayer and
in favor of the taxing power, Section 13 of the franchise of respondent leaves no room for interpretation.
Its franchise exempts it from paying any tax other than the option it chooses: either the "basic corporate
income tax" or the two percent gross revenue tax. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), G.R. No. 179800 (2010).

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) as well as his duly authorized representative must indicate
clearly and unequivocally to the taxpayer whether an action constitutes a final determination on a
disputed assessment. Words must be carefully chosen in order to avoid any confusion that could
adversely affect the rights and interest of the taxpayer. A careful reading of the Formal Letter of Demand
with Assessment Notices leads us to agree with petitioner that the instant case is an exception to the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies, i.e., estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R.
No. 175097 (2010).
The appearance of the word "zero-rated" on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents
buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent
such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be refunding money it did not
collect. Further, the printing of the word "zero-rated" on the invoice helps segregate sales that are subject
to 12% VAT from those sales that are zero-rated. The requirement is reasonable and is in accord with the
efficient collection of VAT from the covered sales of goods and services. PANASONIC
COMMUNICATIONS IMAGING CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 178090 (2010).
Even if the law does not expressly state that Ironcon's excess creditable VAT withheld is refundable, it
may be the subject of a claim for refund as an erroneously collected tax under Sections 204(C) and 229.
It should be clarified that this ruling only refers to creditable VAT withheld pursuant to Section 114 prior to
its amendment. After its amendment by R.A. 9337, the amount withheld under Section 114 is now treated
as a final VAT, no longer under the creditable withholding tax system. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE vs. IRONCON BUILDERS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 180042 (2010).
The general rule is that resident foreign corporations shall be liable for a 32% income tax on their income
from within the Philippines, except for resident foreign corporations that are international carriers that
derive income "from carriage of persons, excess baggage, cargo and mail originating from the
Philippines" which shall be taxed at 2 1/2% of their Gross Philippine Billings. SAA, being an international
carrier with no flights originating from the Philippines, does not fall under the exception. As such, SAA
must fall under the general rule. SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, G.R. No. 180356 (2010).
Silkair, as the purchaser and end-consumer, ultimately bears the tax burden, but this does not transform
its status into a statutory taxpayer. The proper party to question, or claim a refund or tax credit of an
indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, which is Petron in this case, as it is the company on which the tax is
imposed by law and which paid the same even if the burden thereof was shifted or passed on to another.
It bears stressing that even if Petron shifted or passed on to petitioner the burden of the tax, the additional
amount which Silkair paid is not a tax but a part of the purchase price which it had to pay to obtain the
goods. SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No.
184398 (2010).
Amendments to the VAT law have been consistent in exempting persons subject to amusement tax under
the NIRC from the coverage of VAT. Only lessors or distributors of cinematographic films are included in
the coverage of VAT. This reveals the legislative intent not to impose VAT on persons already covered by
the amusement tax. This holds true even in the case of cinema/theater operators taxed under the LGC of
1991 precisely because the VAT law was intended to replace the percentage tax on certain services.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. AND FIRST ASIA
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 183505 (2010).
The Philippine VAT system adheres to the Cross Border Doctrine, according to which, no VAT shall be
imposed to form part of the cost of goods destined for consumption outside of the territorial border of the
taxing authority. Hence, actual export of goods and services from the Philippines to a foreign country
must be free of VAT; while, those destined for use or consumption within the Philippines shall be imposed
with VAT.TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, G.R. No. 157594 (2010).

The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of
taxation. Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption,
infringe no constitutional limitation. The Secretary of Finance is granted, under Section 244 of RA 8424,
the authority to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the law. Such authority is subject to the limitation that the rules and regulations must not
override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. The
constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "[no] person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law." CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS'
ASSOCIATIONS, INC. vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, et al., G.R. No.
160756 (2010).
A taxpayer claiming for a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax must comply with the following
requisites: 1) The claim must be filed with the CIR within the two-year period from the date of payment of
the tax; 2) It must be shown on the return that the income received was declared as part of the gross
income; and 3) The fact of withholding must be established by a copy of a statement duly issued by the
payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of the tax withheld. It is not the duty of the
government to disprove a taxpayer's claim for refund. Rather, the burden of establishing the factual basis
of a claim for a refund rests on the taxpayer. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. FAR
EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS), G.R. No. 173854
(2010).
Jurisdiction to review decisions or resolutions issued by the Divisions of the CTA is no longer with the CA
but with the CTA En Banc. This rule is embodied in Section 11 of RA 9282, which provides that a party
adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial,
may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc. It is settled that an appeal must be perfected within
the reglementary period provided by law; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory. TFS,
INCORPORATED vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 166829 (2010).
It is well settled that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it at naught. The
Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. Regional trial courts are
devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. Regional trial courts
are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. MERLINO E. RODRIGUEZ
AND WIRA INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORP., G.R. No. 160270 (2010).
The BIR ruled that the private employees benefit trust funds, which included petitioner, have met the
requirements of the law and the regulations and therefore qualify as reasonable retirement benefit plans
within the contemplation of Republic Act No. 4917 (now Sec. 28(b)(7)(A), Tax Code). The income from
the trust fund investments is therefore exempt from the payment of income tax and consequently from the
payment of the creditable withholding tax on the sale of their real property.
The tax-exempt character of the Employees' Trust Fund has long been settled. It is also settled that
petitioner exists for the purpose of holding title to, and administering, the tax-exempt Employees' Trust
Fund established for the benefit of VMC's employees. As such, petitioner has the personality to claim tax
refunds due the Employees' Trust Fund. MIGUEL J. OSSORIO PENSION FOUNDATION,
INCORPORATED vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R.
No. 162175 (2010).
Unlike the National Internal Revenue Code, the Local Tax Code does not contain any specific provision
prohibiting courts from enjoining the collection of local taxes. Such statutory lapse or intent, however it
may be viewed, may have allowed preliminary injunction where local taxes are involved. ANGELES CITY
vs. ANGELES CITY ELECTRIC CORPORATION, G.R. No. 166134 (2010).

It is settled that provincial governments can levy excise taxes on quarry resources independently from the
national government. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY vs. HON. MAURICIO B.
AMBANLOC, G.R. No. 180639 (2010).
In VAT-exempt sales, the taxpayer/seller shall not bill any output tax on his sales to his customers and,
corollarily, is not allowed any credit or refund of the input taxes he paid on his purchases. This noncrediting of input taxes in exempt transactions is the underlying reason why the Tax Code adopted the
rule on apportionment of tax credits under Section 104(A) whenever a VAT-registered taxpayer engages
in both VAT taxable and non-VAT taxable sales. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, vs.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 163835 (2010).
Given the nature of the TCC's immediate effectiveness and validity, said authority may only be exercised
before the TCC has been fully utilized by a transferee which had no participation in the perpetration of
fraud in the issuance, transfer and utilization thereof. Once accepted by the BIR and applied towards the
satisfaction of such a tranferee's tax obligations, a TCC is effectively used up, debited and canceled such
that there is nothing left to avoid or to cancel anew. Considering the protection afforded to transferees in
good faith and for value, it was held that the remedy of the Government is to go after the grantees alleged
to have perpetrated fraud in the procurement of the subject TCCs. PETRON CORPORATION vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 180385 (2010).
Under the old provision, the option to carry-over the excess or overpaid income tax for a given taxable
year is limited to the immediately succeeding taxable year only. In contrast, under Section 76 of the NIRC
of 1997, the application of the option to carry-over the excess creditable tax is not limited only to the
immediately following taxable year but extends to the next succeeding taxable years. The clear intent in
the amendment under Section 76 is to make the option, once exercised, irrevocable for the "succeeding
taxable years." ASIAWORLD PROPERTIES PHILIPPINE CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 171766 (2010).
The government of Quezon City, pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7160, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93,
otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993, providing, among other things, the
procedure in the collection of delinquent taxes on real properties within the territorial jurisdiction of
Quezon City. Section 14 (a), Paragraph 7, the Code provides that the one-year redemption period should
be counted from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper registry. At first
glance, this provision runs counter to that of Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160 which provides that the one
year redemption period shall be counted from the date of sale of the tax delinquent property. To
harmonize the provisions of the two laws, Section 14 (a), Paragraph 7 of City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93
should be construed as to define the phrase one (1) year from the date of sale as appearing in Section
261 of R.A. No. 7160, to mean one (1) year from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at
the proper registry. CITY MAYOR, ALL OF QUEZON CITY, vs. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 171033 (2010).
Zero-rated seller, directly and legally liable for VAT, can claim a refund or tax credit certificate. Zero-rated
transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and supply of services. The tax rate is set at zero.
When applied to the tax base, such rate obviously results in no tax chargeable against the purchaser. The
seller of such transactions charges no output tax but can claim a refund or a tax credit certificate for the
VAT previously charged by suppliers. AT&T COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC. vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 182364 (2010).
A withholding agent has a legal right to file a claim for refund for two reasons. First, he is considered a taxpayer
under the NIRC as he is personally liable for the withholding tax as well as for deficiency assessments, surcharges,
and penalties, should the amount of the tax withheld be finally found to be less than the amount that should have
been withheld under law. Second, as an agent of the taxpayer, his authority to file the necessary income tax return
and to remit the tax withheld to the government impliedly includes the authority to file a claim for refund and to bring
an action for recovery of such claim.
The right of a withholding agent to claim a refund of erroneously or illegally withheld taxes comes with the
responsibility to return the same to the principal taxpayer. As an agent of the taxpayer, it is his duty to return what he

has recovered; otherwise, he would be unjustly enriching himself at the expense of the principal taxpayer from
whom the taxes were withheld, and from whom he derives his legal right to file a claim for
refund. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SMART COMMUNICATION, INC., G.R. Nos.
179045-46 (2010).
In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the purpose of the
implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even
though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to
regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though
incidentally, revenue is generated. The Policy Guidelines was issued, first and foremost, to ensure the
safety, security, and good condition of the petroleum fuel industry within the CSEZ. The questioned
royalty fees form part of the regulatory framework to ensure free flow or movement of petroleum fuel to
and from the CSEZ. The fact that respondent have the exclusive right to distribute and market petroleum
products within CSEZ pursuant to its JVA with SBMA and CSBTI does not diminish the regulatory
purpose of the royalty fee for fuel products supplied by petitioner to its client at the CSEZ.CHEVRON
PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and CLARK
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 173863 (2010).
The exercise of the option to carry-over precludes a claim for a refund. Under Section 76 of the NIRC of
1997, once the taxpayer exercises the option to carry-over and applies the excess creditable tax against
the income tax due for the succeeding taxable years, such option is irrevocable. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE vs. THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, G.R. No. 175124 (2010).
If an international air carrier maintains flights to and from the Philippines, it shall be taxed at the rate of
2% of its GPB, while international air carriers that do not have flights to and from the Philippines but
nonetheless earn income from other activities in the country will be taxed at the rate of 32% of such
income. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 178788
(2010).
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive
in his favour, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In
both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural
due process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial
claims would result in the denial of his claim. Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the applicable provision in
determining the start of the two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and
Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as both provisions apply only to instances of
erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes. Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly
provides that the CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in
support of the application [for tax refund/credit], within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or
partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from
receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the
application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA
within 30 days. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNALREVENUE vs. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.,
G.R. No. 184823 (2010).
That failure to print the word zero-rated in the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input valueadded tax (VAT) on zero-rated sales. J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, G.R. NO. 177127 (2010).
For purposes of determining their tax liability, pawnshops are treated as non-bank financial
intermediaries. A non-bank financial intermediary is no longer liable for VAT but it is subject to percentage
tax on gross receipts from 0% to 5%, as the case may be. H. TAMBUNTING PAWNSHOP, INC. vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 172394 (2010).
The substantial underdeclared income in the returns constitutes prima facie evidence of fraudulent return
under Section 248(B) of the NIRC. Secretarys ruling that the filing of criminal complaint for violation of
Sections 254 and 255 of the NIRC cannot prosper because of lack of prior determination of the existence

of fraud, is bereft of factual basis and contradicted by the evidence on record. The power of the Secretary
of Justice to review does not preclude this Court and the CA from intervening and exercising our own
powers of review with respect to the DOJs findings, such as in the exceptional case in which grave abuse
of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of
probable cause is ignored. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
Secretary of Justice, L. M. CAMUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177279 (2010).
While the CIR has the authority to prescribe real property values and divide the Philippines into zones, it
cannot unilaterally change the zonal valuation of such properties to commercial without first conducting
a re-evaluation of the zonal values as mandated under Section 6(E) of the NIRC. Certain Guidelines in
the Implementation of Zonal Valuation of Real Properties for RDO No. 38, applying the predominant use
of property as the basis for the computation of the Capital Gains and Documentary Stamp Taxes, shall
apply only when the real property is located in an area or zone where the properties are not yet classified
and their respective zonal valuation are not yet determined. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE
vs. AQUAFRESH SEAFOODS, INC., G.R. No. 170389 (2010).
Under Section 76, the exercise of an option is irrevocable and a decision to carry-over and apply tax
overpayment continues until the overpayment has been fully applied to tax liabilities. Section 76 of the
1997 NIRC wrought two changes to its predecessor, Section 69 of the 1977 NIRC: first, it mandates that
the taxpayers exercise of its option to either seek refund or crediting is irrevocable; and second, the
taxpayers decision to carry-over and apply its current overpayment to future tax liability continues until
the overpayment has been fully applied, no matter how many tax cycles it takes. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE vs. McGEORGE FOOD INDUSTRIES INC., G.R. No. 174157 (2010).
Non-printing the word zero-rated on the sales invoices is a ground for the denial of a claim for VAT
refund. Tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are construed strictly against the taxpayer. The claimants have
the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim for refund or tax credit. HITACHI GLOBAL
STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES PHILIPPINES CORP. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
G.R. No. 174212 (2010).
The appellate jurisdiction of the CTA is not limited to cases which involve decisions of the CIR on matters
relating to assessments or refunds. The second part of the provision covers other cases that arise out of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) or related laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). In the case at bar, the issue at hand is whether or not the BIR's right to collect taxes had
already prescribed. The validity of the assessment itself is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of
whether the right of the CIR to collect the validly assessed tax has prescribed. This issue of prescription,
being a matter provided for by the NIRC, is well within the jurisdiction of the CTA to decide. The mere
filing of a protest letter which is not granted does not operate to suspend the running of the period to
collect tax. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. HAMBRECHT & QUIST PHILIPPINES,
INC., G.R. No. 169225 (2010).
There must be a sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties before any VAT may be levied. Sony did
not render any service to SIS at all. The services rendered by the advertising companies, paid for by
Sony using SIS dole-out, were for Sony and not SIS. SIS just gave assistance to Sony in the amount
equivalent to the latters advertising expense but never received any goods, properties or service from
Sony. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SONY PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 178697
(2010).
To fit into the category listed under the Tariff Harmonized System Headings calling for a higher import
duty rate of 7%, the imported articles must not lose its original character. To manufacture is to make or
fabricate raw materials by hand, art or machinery, and work into forms convenient for use. Stated
differently, it is to transform by any process into another form suitable for its intended
use. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. MARINA SALES, INC., G.R. No. 183868 (2010).
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of
the courts or of the parties, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. Furthermore, this

discretion must be exercised intelligently. MILWAUKEE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION vs. COURT OF

TAX APPEALS AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 173815 (2010).
The VAT invoice is the seller's best proof of the sale of the goods or services to the buyer while the VAT
receipt is the buyer's best evidence of the payment of goods or services received from the seller. Even
though VAT invoices and receipts are normally issued by the supplier/seller alone, the said invoices and
receipts, taken collectively, are necessary to substantiate the actual amount or quantity of goods sold and
their selling price (proof of transaction), and the best means to prove the input VAT payments (proof of
payment). Hence, VAT invoice and VAT receipt should not be confused as referring to one and the same
thing. Furthermore, although it is true that the CTA is not strictly governed by technical rules of
evidence, the invoicing and substantiation requirements must, nevertheless, be followed because it is the
only way to determine the veracity of Kepco's claims. Verily, the CTA En Banc correctly disallowed the
input VAT that did not meet the required standard of substantiation. KEPCO PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 181858 (2010).
The old requirement of merely notifying the taxpayer of the CIR's findings was changed in 1998
to informing the taxpayer of not only the law, but also of the facts on which an assessment would be
made. Otherwise, the assessment itself would be invalid. Thus, the sending of a PAN to taxpayer to
inform him of the assessment made is but part of the "due process requirement in the issuance of a
deficiency tax assessment," the absence of which renders nugatory any assessment made by the tax
authorities. Therefore, for its failure to send the PAN stating the facts and the law on which the
assessment was made as required by Section 228 of R.A. No. 8424, the assessment made by the CIR is
void. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. METRO STAR SUPERAMA, INC., G.R. No.
185371 (2010).
Under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, local government units have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the national government like the PFDA. Thus, PFDA is not liable to pay real property
tax assessed by the Office of the City Treasurer of Lucena City on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex,
except those portions which are leased to private persons or entities. Besides, the Lucena Fishing Port
Complex is a property of public dominion intended for public use, and is therefore exempt from real
property tax. PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (PFDA)vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS, LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF LUCENA CITY, CITY
OF LUCENA, LUCENA CITY ASSESSOR AND LUCENA CITY TREASURER, G.R. No. 178030 (2010).

CIVIL LAW

The grant of temperate damages is drawn from equity to provide relief to those definitely injured.
Therefore, it may be allowed so long as the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss. On the other hand, in order to obtain exemplary damages under Article 2232 of the Civil
Code, the claimant must prove that the assailed actions of the defendant are not just wrongful, but also
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent.(RENO R. GONZALES, ET. AL. v. CAMARINES
SUR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC, G.R. No. 181096, March 6, 2013)
In a judicial confirmation of title under original registration proceedings, applicants may obtain the
registration of title to land upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of (2) agricultural lands of the
public domain, (3) under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, (4) for at least 30 years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on applicants who must show clear,
positive and convincing evidence that their alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and
duration required by law. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
MARTIN T. NG, G.R. No.
182449, March 6, 2013)
Under Article 448 pertaining to encroachments in good faith, as well as Article 450 referring to
encroachments in bad faith, the owner of the land encroached upon petitioner herein has the option to
require respondent builder to pay the price of the land. According to jurisprudence, the price must be fixed
at the prevailing market value, reckoned at the time that the landowner elected the choice, and not at the
time that the property was purchased. (MERCY VDA. DE ROXAS v. OUR LADYS FOUNDATION, INC.,
G.R. No. 182378, March 6, 2013)
The real estate mortgage over the machineries and equipment is in full accord with the classification of
such properties by the Civil Code of the Philippines as immovable property. Article 415 of the Civil Code
provided that the following are immovable property: the Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all
kinds adhered to the soil; xxx Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. (STAR TWO (SPV-AMC), INC. v.
PAPER CITY CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169211, March 6, 2013)
For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must concur: (1) a clear intent to abandon; and (2) an
external act showing such intent. The term is defined as the willful failure of the ARB, together with his
farm household, to cultivate, till, or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any
specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years. It entails, among others, the
relinquishment of possession of the lot for at least two (2) calendar years and the failure to pay the
amortization for the same period. What is critical in abandonment is intent which must be shown to be
deliberate and clear. The intent must be established by the factual failure to work on the landholding
absent any valid reason as well as a clear intent, which is shown as a separate element. (HEIRS OF
LORENZO BUENSUCESO v. LOVY PEREZ, G.R. No. 173926, March 6, 2013)

A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and upon the price. Thus, for a contract of sale to be valid, all of the following
essential elements must concur: a) consent or meeting of the minds; b) determinate subject matter; and
c) price certain in money or its equivalent. In this case, there is no perfected contract of sale between
PELA and Al-Amanah for want of consent and agreement on the price. After scrutinizing the testimonial
and documentary evidence in the records of the case, it is found that the parties did not agree on the
price and no consent was given, whether express or implied. (ROBERN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ET. AL. v. PEOPLES LANDLESS ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 173622, March 11,
2013)

Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they may have
physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such

that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their
occupancy. (PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON DUMADAG, ET. AL., G.R. No.
194336, March 11, 2013)
Contracts are obligatory no matter what their forms may be, whenever the essential requisites for their
validity are present. In determining whether a document is an affidavit or a contract, the Court looks
beyond the title of the document, since the denomination or title given by the parties in their document is
not conclusive of the nature of its contents. In the construction or interpretation of an instrument, the
intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued. If the terms of the document are clear and leave
no doubt on the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. If
the words appear to be contrary to the parties evident intention, the latter shall prevail over the former. In
this case, the terms of the Joint Affidavit of Undertaking executed by the parties readily discloses that it
contains stipulations characteristic of a contract. (RODOLFO G. CRUZ AND ESPERANZA IBIAS v.
ATTY. DELFIN GRUSPE, G.R. No. 191431, March 13, 2013)

Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the
third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. The reservor has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if
the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservor. The transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of
the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.

Under Articles 444 and 1942 of the old Civil Code, possession of real property is not affected by acts of a
possessory character which are merely tolerated by the possessor, or which are due to his license.
Granted that long, continued occupation, accompanied by acts of a possessory character, affords some
evidence that possession has been exerted in the character of owner and under claim of right, this
inference is unavailing to petitioners since Simplecios continued possession of the property after his
defeat in the ejectment suit was clearly upon the tolerance of respondents predecessors-in-interest.
(VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN, ET. AL. v. THE HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B. MAAMO, SR., G.R. No.
174844, March 20, 2013
The court ruled that the power to rescind the obligations of the injured party is implied in reciprocal
obligations, such as in this case. On this score, the CA correctly applied Article 1191, which provides
thus: the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent upon him.The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission,
even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.The court shall decree the
rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. (ALILEO A.
MAGLASANG v. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R. No. 188986, March 20, 2013)

One of the circumstances provided for under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, where a contract shall be
presumed to be an equitable mortgage, is "where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the
parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation." In the instant case, it has been established that the intent of both petitioners and respondent
is that the subject property shall serve as security for the latter's obligation to the former. The
circumstances surrounding the execution of the disputed Deed of Transfer would show that the said
document was executed to circumvent the terms of the original agreement and deprive respondent of her
mortgaged property without the requisite foreclosure. Since the original transaction between the parties
was a mortgage, the subsequent assignment of ownership of the subject lots to petitioners without the
benefit of foreclosure proceedings, partakes of the nature of a pactum commissorium, as provided for
under Article 2088 of the Civil Code. (SPOUSES MARTIRES v. MENELIA CHUA, G.R. No.
174240, March 20, 2013)

The lack of a license to sell or the failure on the part of a subdivision developer to register the contract to
sell or deed of conveyance with the Register of Deeds does not result to the nullification or invalidation of
the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer. The contract to sell remains valid and subsisting. The
intrinsic validity of the contract to sell is not affected by the developers violation of Section 5 of PD
957.Nevertheless, the respondent in this case is entitled to 50% refund under the Maceda Law.
(MOLDEX RAELTY INC. v. FLORA A. SABERON, G.R. No. 176289. April 8, 2013)
When one party enters into a covenant with another, he must perform his obligations with fealty and good
faith. This becomes more imperative where such party has been given a grant, such as land, under the
land reform laws. While the tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the landowner is entitled to
his just compensation for the deprivation of his land. (HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO, ET AL. v.
PORFERIO SOLIMAN, ET AL., G.R. No. 178952. April 10, 2013)
The evident purpose underlying P.D. 385 is sufficiently served by allowing foreclosure proceedings
initiated by GFIs to continue until a judgment therein becomes final and executory, without a restraining
order, temporary or permanent injunction against it being issued. But if a parcel of land is occupied by a
party other than the judgment debtor, the proper procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine
the nature of said adverse possession before it issues a writ of possession.
Considering that the agreement between the parties was not circumscribed by a definite period, its
termination was subject to a condition the happening of a future and uncertain event. The prevailing rule
in conditional obligations is that the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those
already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event that constitutes the condition.
Furthermore, quantum meruit should apply in the absence of an express agreement on the fees.
(International Hotel Corporation v. Francisco B. Joaquin, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 158361. April 10, 2013)

The binding effect of any agreement between parties to a contract is premised on two settled principles:
(1) that any obligation arising from contract has the force of law between the parties; and (2) that there
must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality. Any contract which appears to be
heavily weighed in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result is void. Any
stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract which is left solely to the will of one of the
parties, is likewise, invalid. (Spouses Ignacio F. Juico and Alice P. Juico v. China Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 187678 . April 10, 2013)

Consignation is necessarily judicial. Article 1258 of the Civil Code specifically provides that consignation
shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of judicial authority. The said provision
clearly precludes consignation in venues other than the courts.Spouses Oscar and Thelma Cacayorin
v. Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., G.R. No. 171298. April 15, 2013

A trust by operation of law is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of a property whose legal title is vested
in another. A trust presumes the existence of a conflict involving one and the same property between two
parties, one having the rightful ownership and the other holding the legal title. There is no trust created
when the property owned by one party is separate and distinct from that which has been registered in
anothers name. In this case, the Caparas survey plan and the deed of sale between the petitioners and
Miguela showed that the parcel of land sold to the petitioners is distinct from the consolidated parcels of
land sold by Caparas to the spouses Perez. (Ricardo Chu, Jr. and Dy Kok Eng v. Melania Caparas
and Spouses Ruel and Hermenegilda Perez, G.R. No. 175428. April 15, 2013)

In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of
the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for
the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who
filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other coowners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the

benefit of all co-owners. (Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron, G.R. No. 179011.
April 15, 2013)

It is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond its certificate of
title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which would put a party on guard
and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of
occupants/tenants thereon, it is expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into
the status or nature of possession of the occupants. The burden of proving good faith lies with the second
buyer (petitioners herein) which is not discharged by simply invoking the ordinary presumption of good
faith. After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, this Court holds that the petitioners are
NOT buyers in good faith as they failed to discharge their burden of proof. (Spouses Vallido v. Spouses
Pono, et al., G.R. No. 200173. April 15, 2013)

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on
how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the
status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of
lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. (MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
Petitioners liability under the suretyship contract is different from its liability under the law. There is no
question that as a surety, petitioner should not be made to pay more than its assumed obligation under
the surety bonds. However, it is clear from the above-cited jurisprudence that petitioners liability for the
payment of interest is not by reason of the suretyship agreement itself but because of the delay in the
payment of its obligation under the said agreement. (J PLUS ASIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
UTILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 199650, June 26, 2013)

Where the person making the waiver, however, has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding of its
terms and with the payment of credible and reasonable consideration, we have no option but to recognize
the transaction to be valid and binding. Absence of any evidence showing that fraud, deception or
misrepresentation attended the execution of the waiver and quitclaim, the court is sufficiently convinced
that a valid transaction took place. (POSEIDON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SERVICES, INC. v. TITO
R. TAMALA ET AL., G.R. No. 186475, June 26, 2013)

A contract of sale is defined under Article 1458 of the Civil Code: By the contract of sale, one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and
the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent. The elements of a contract of sale
are: (a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price;
(b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent. The Deed of Sale
executed by the petitioner and the respondent is a perfected contract of sale, all its elements being
present. (ALI AKANG v. MUNICIPALITY OF ISULAN, G.R. No. 186014. June 26, 2013)

Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care required of
respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. This connotes
reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when
confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether negligence attended the performance of

an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. (CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS v. JUANITA REYES, ET AL., G.R. No. 185891, June 26,
2013)
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or
even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society,
other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences. (SPOUSES HING v. ALEXANDER
CHOACHUY, SR. G.R. No. 179736. June 26, 2013)

Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from acquiring
property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. For the prohibition to apply,
the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from
the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the
estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order
declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
(RODOLFO S. SABIDONG v. NICOLASITO S. SOLAS, A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25, 2013)

When a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other than the seller, the buyer must be wary
and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without making such inquiry, one cannot claim
that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty is to read the
public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution
and diligence, which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making
purchases, is in contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover
that the land sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. (HOSPICIO D.
ROSAROSO v. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA, G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013)

Temperate or moderate damages avail when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty In this case, it cannot be
denied that the heirs of Magdua suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proved with
certainty. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PERCIVAL DELA ROSA Y BAYER G.R. No. 201723.
June 13, 2013

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. A Torrens
title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. A strong
presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. In this case,
(DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE CHINESE
CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. No. 184589, June 13, 2013

Estoppel is based on the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice and its purpose is to
forbid one to speak against his own act, representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom
they were directed and who reasonably relied on it. Thus, in order for this doctrine to operate, a
representation must have been made to the detriment of another who relied on it. In other words,
estoppel would not lie against one who, in the first place, did not make any representation. (SPOUSES
RUBIN AND PORTIA HOJAS v. PHILIPPINE AMANAH BANK AND RAMON KUE .R. No. 193453,
June 5, 2013)

The petitioner may vindicate its rights in the property through an action for quieting of title, a common law
remedy designed for the removal of any cloud upon, or doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. The action for quieting of title may be brought whenever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. This Court holds that the DARAB decision in favor of
Cabral satisfies all four elements of a cloud on title. (GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC. v. VICTORIA
CABRAL ET AL., G.R No. 175542, June 5, 2013)

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy
the publication requirement.( NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC. v. MILITARY
SHRINE SERVICES PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE ET AL., G.R. No. 187587, June 5,
2013)

Obligations arising from contracts, after all, have the force of law between the contracting parties who are
expected to abide in good faith with their contractual commitments, not weasel out of them. Moreover,
when the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
the rule is settled that the literal meaning of its stipulations should govern. In such cases, courts have no
authority to alter a contract by construction or to make a new contract for the parties. Since their duty is
confined to the interpretation of the one which the parties have made for themselves without regard to its
wisdom or folly, it has been ruled that courts cannot supply material stipulations or read into the contract
words it does not contain. Indeed, courts will not relieve a party from the adverse effects of an unwise or
unfavorable contract freely entered into. (HEIRS OF MANUEL UY EK LIONG v. MAURICIA MEER
CASTILLO ET AL., G.R. No. 176425, June 5, 2013)

In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the property until the buyer has paid the price in full. A
buyer who covertly usurps the seller's ownership of the property prior to the full payment of the price is in
breach of the contract and the seller is entitled to rescission because the breach is substantial and
fundamental as it defeats the very object of the parties in entering into the contract to sell. In the case at
bar, the court finds that respondent Rowenas act of transferring the title to the subject land in her name,
without the knowledge and consent of petitioners and despite non-payment of the full price thereof,
constitutes a substantial and fundamental breach of the contract to sell. (SPOUSES DELFIN O.
TUMIBAY AND AURORA T. TUMIBA-DECEASED ET AL. v. SPOUSES MELVIN A. LOPEZ, G.R. No.
171692, June 3, 2013)
The law only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the publication of
the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary.
However, the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements.
Precisely, the purpose of the foregoing stipulation is to apprise respondent of any action which petitioner
might take on the subject property, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard his rights. When

petitioner failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach
sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on November 23, 1981 null and void.(Lim vs. Development
Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 177050, July 1, 2013)

Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. The rightful
recipient of the disputed rent in this case should thus be the owner of the subject lot at the time the rent
accrued. It is beyond question that Spouses Maraon never lost ownership over the subject lot.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPS. BERNARD AND CRESENCIA MARAON, G.R. No. 189316,
July 1, 2013.

When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides for the
remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is
not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the land taken. For failure of
respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed
to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the government to expropriate or the public
use for which the power was exercised. (SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS ET AL. v. SPOUSES HERACLEO AND RAMONA TECSON, G.R. No. 179334. July
1, 2013)

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his
children as advance inheritance. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN v. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., G.R. No.
201061, July 3, 2013)

The payment made to Caltex as the insured being thereby duly documented, respondent became
subrogated as a matter of course pursuant to Article 2207 of the Civil Code. In legal contemplation,
subrogation is the "substitution of another person in the place of the creditor, to whose rights he succeeds
in relation to the debt;" and is "independent of any mere contractual relations between the parties to be
affected by it, and is broad enough to cover every instance in which one party is required to pay a debt for
which another is primarily answerable, and which in equity and conscience ought to be discharged by the
latter." (VECTOR SHIPPING CORPORATION, et al. v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO., ET AL.,
G.R. No. 159213)
Petitioner claims to have had an oral contract of attorneys fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145
of the Civil Code allows him a period of six (6) years within which to file an action to recover professional
fees for services rendered. Respondents never asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de
Guzman refused petitioners legal representation. For this reason, petitioners cause of action began to
run only from the time the respondents refused to pay him his attorneys fees. (RANCISCO L. ROSARIO,
JR. v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, et al., G.R. No. 191247. July 10, 2013)

The prescription of actions for the reconveyance of real property based on implied trust is 10 years.
Verily, the reckoning point for purposes of the Dicos demand of reconveyance based on fraud was their
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery was properly pegged on the date of the registration of the transfer
certificates of title in the adverse parties names, because registration was a constructive notice to the
whole world. (SPOUSES ANGELES DICO AND CELSO DICO, SR. v. VIZCAYA MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 161211. July 17, 2013)

The nature of reconstitution proceedings under RA 26 denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is
supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition. On this score, it bears

stressing that the nature of reconstitution proceedings under RA 26 denotes a restoration of the
instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition. As such,
reconstitution must be granted only upon clear proof that the title sought to be restored had previously
existed and was issued to the petitioner. Strict compliance with the requirements of the law aims to thwart
dishonest parties from abusing reconstitution proceedings as a means of illegally obtaining properties
otherwise already owned by other parties. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICORDITO N. DE
ASIS, JR.G.R. No. 193874, July 24, 2013)

Tender of payment "is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If
refused without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but
only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the proper court." Consignation
is the deposit of the proper amount with a judicial authority in accordance with rules prescribed by law,
after the tender of payment has been refused or because of circumstances which render direct payment
to the creditor impossible or inadvisable.
Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect. To have the effect of payment and the consequent
extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the law requires the companion acts of tender of payment and
consignation. (SPS. NAMAEL AND LOURDES BONROSTRO v. SPS. JUAN AND CONSTACIA LUNA,
G.R. No. 172346. July 24, 2013)

A valid contract of sale requires: (a) a meeting of minds of the parties to transfer ownership of the thing
sold in exchange for a price; (b) the subject matter, which must be a possible thing; and (c) the price
certain in money or its equivalent. In this case, all the elements were present. However, there is no
evidence to show that the other co-owners consented to Alejandros sale transaction with the petitioner.
Hence, for want of authority to sell Lot No. 3, Alejandro only sold his aliquot share of the subject property
to the petitioner. (REMAN RECIO v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES AGUEGO and MARIA ALTAMIRANO, G.R.
No. 182349. July 24, 2013)

As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral. However, it must be written when the law requires a
specific form. Specifically, Article 1874 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of agency must be
written for the validity of the sale of a piece of land or any interest therein. Otherwise, the sale shall be
void. A related provision, Article 1878 of the Civil Code, states that special powers of attorney are
necessary to convey real rights over immovable properties. Further the special power of attorney
mandated by law must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary
ingredient of the authorized act. Such power must be must express in clear and unmistakable language.
In the present case, the pieces of documentary evidence by Sally did not convince the Court as to the
existence of agency. Necessarily, the absence of a contract of agency renders the contract of sale
unenforceable. Joy Training effectively did not enter into a valid contract of sale with the spouses
Yoshizaki. (SALLY YOSHIZAKI v. JOY TRAINING CENTER OF AURORA, INC., G.R. No. 174978. July
31, 2013)

Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land. Suffice it to state that
the issue of the buyers good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land,
and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean. In such
case, the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser
in good faith for value. Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands. What applies in this case is Act
No. 3344, as amended, which provides for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real
estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third
party with a better right. (SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR v. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI,
G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013)

The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property acquired during marriage is
conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was

acquired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights
of innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the property is registered in the name of only one
spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse. Moreover, the presumption may be
rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
(BOBBY TAN, v. GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL. v. BOBBY TAN, G.R. No. 172017 / G.R. No. 171904
August 7, 2013)

Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount, the debts of persons who in their
own right are creditors and debtors of each other. The object of compensation is the prevention of
unnecessary suits and payments through the mutual extinction by operation of law of concurring debts.
(ADELAIDA SORIANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181692, August 14, 2013)

In the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of
legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments
shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per annum - as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013, pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution
No. 796. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new rate could only be applied prospectively and not
retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until June
30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of
interest when applicable. (DARIO NACAR, v. GALLERY FRAMES AND/OR FELIPE BORDEY, JR.,
G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013)

A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation
of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners;
and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. (ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY
MANUEL VILLANUEVA ET. AL. v. LEONARDO R. VEGA ET. AL, G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013)
As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong
to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of
the application, provided the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of
the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased
to be part of the public domain and has become private property.
(b)
Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive
period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property
of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. (HEIRS OF

MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179987, September 3,

2013)

Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. Joint
tort-feasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves. It is likewise not an excuse for any of the joint tort-feasors that
individual participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the other. To stress, joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by themselves.
They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly
and severally liable for the whole amount. Thus, as joint tort-feasors, Malvar and the respondents should
be held solidarily liable to the Intervenor. (CZARINA T. MALVAR v. KRAFT FOOD PHILS., INC., ET. AL.
G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013)
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so
offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. The fact that
the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to be a
nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor
when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such
character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities,
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be
substantial and unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the
circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a
nuisance. (SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET. AL., G.R. No. 166330,
September 11, 2013)
In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, pieces of documentary evidence issued by the NSO
were offered but the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public
documents did not testify in court. There is no question that the documents submitted by petitioner as
evidence are all public documents. As provided in Article 410 of the Civil Code, the books making up the
civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution
and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the
petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their
authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary.
Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because
they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated
therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented
evidence to the contrary. (YASUO IWASAWA v. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN ET AL., G.R. No.
204169, September 11, 2013)
The two conditional deeds of sale entered into by the parties are contracts to sell, as they both contained
a stipulation that ownership of the properties shall not pass to the vendee until after full payment of the
purchase price. In a conditional sale, as in a contract to sell, ownership remains with the vendor and does
not pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. The full payment of the purchase price
partakes of a suspensive condition, and non-fulfillment of the condition prevents the obligation to sell from
arising. To differentiate, a deed of sale is absolute when there is no stipulation in the contract that title to
the property remains with the seller until full payment of the purchase price.
Articles 1191 and 1592 of the Civil Code are applicable to contracts of sale, while R.A. No. 6552 applies
to contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552, otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Act, applies to the
subject contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552 (Maceda Law) recognizes in conditional sales of all kinds of real
estate (industrial, commercial, residential) the right of the seller to cancel the contract upon non-payment
of an installment by the buyer, which is simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to
convey title from acquiring binding force. (MANUEL UY & SONS, INC. v. VALBUECO,
INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 179594. September 11, 2013)

The settled rule is that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally shown. In
order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that
they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. Thus, the mere substitution of debtors will not
result innovation, and the fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has assumed
the obligation, will result merely in the addition of debtors and not novation, and the creditor may enforce
the obligation against both debtors. If there is no agreement as to solidarity, the first and new debtors are
considered obligated jointly. (S.C. MEGAWORLD CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. ENGR. LUIS U. PARADA, G.R. No. 183804, September 11, 2013)

It is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the certificate of title was procured by falsification
or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be
attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such
attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. The certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. (HILARIA BAGAYAS v. ROGELIO BAGAYAS, ET. AL., G.R. Nos. 187308 and 187517,
September 18, 2013)

In novation, a subsequent obligation extinguishes a previous one through substitution either by changing
the object or principal conditions, by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third
person into the rights of the creditor. Novation requires (a) the existence of a previous valid obligation; (b)
the agreement of all parties to the new contract; (c) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (d) the
validity of the new one. There cannot be novation in this case since the proposed substituted parties did
not agree to the PRAs supposed assignment of its obligations under the contract for the electrical and
light works at Heritage Park to the HPMC. The latter definitely and clearly rejected the PRAs assignment
of its liability under that contract to the HPMC. (PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY (FORMERLY
KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY) v. ROMAGO, INC./ROMAGO, INC. v. PHILIPPINE
RECLAMATION AUTHORITY, G.R. Nos. 174665 and 175221, September 18, 2013)

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where
the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired
during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by coownership. (JUAN SEVILLA, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013)

The general rule is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except
when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation
or (3) provision of law. In the subject Contract of Lease, not only were there no stipulations prohibiting any
transmission of rights, but its very terms and conditions explicitly provided for the transmission of the
rights of the lessor and of the lessee to their respective heirs and successors. The contract is the law
between the parties. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract, which involves
a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives of
the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party
has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract. (ANALITA P. INOCENCION,
SUBSTITUTING FOR RAMON INOCENCION (DECEASED) v. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE, G.R. No.
201787, September 25, 2013)

To note, while the quality of contingency inheres in a contract to sell, the same should not be confused
with a conditional contract of sale. In a contract to sell, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition will not
automatically transfer ownership to the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered
to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract
of absolute sale.On the other hand, in a conditional contract of sale, the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition renders the sale absolute and the previous delivery of the property has the effect of
automatically transferring the sellers ownership or title to the property to the buyer. (FREDERICK
VENTURA, MARITES VENTURA-ROXAS v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES EUSTACIO T. ENDAYA and
TRINIDAD L. ENDAYA, G.R. No. 190016, October 2, 2013)
Under the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have
no action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds them. As a doctrine in civil law,
the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code. It must be
stressed that Article 1412 of the Civil Code that breathes life to the doctrine speaks of the rights and
obligations of the parties to the contract with an illegal cause or object which does not constitute a
criminal offense. It applies to contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts
rendered void for being simulated, or those in which the parties do not really intend to be bound thereby.
(OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and CASIMIRA MATURINGAN v. HEIRS OF
PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR., G.R. No. 181508, October 2, 2013)
It is not enough for a seller to show that he is capable of delivering the goods on the date he agreed to
make the delivery. He has to bring his goods and deliver them at the place their agreement called for, i.e.,
at the Ajinomoto Pasig River wharf. A stipulation designating the place and manner of delivery is
controlling on the contracting parties. The thing sold can only be understood as delivered to the buyer
when it is placed in the buyers control and possession at the agreed place of delivery. Cargill presented
no evidence that it attempted to make other deliveries to complete the balance of Contract 5026. (SAN
FERNANDO REGALA TRADING, INC. v. CARGILL PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 178008, October 9,
2013)
A person dealing with a registered land has the right to rely on the face of the Torrens title and need not
inquire further, unless the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such an inquiry. The indefeasibility of a Torrens title as
evidence of lawful ownership of the property protects buyers in good faith who rely on what appears on
the face of the said certificate of title. Moreover, a potential buyer is charged with notice of only the
burdens and claims annotated on the title. There has been no showing that Spouses Fernandez were
aware of any irregularity in Carlos title that would make them suspicious and cause them to doubt the
legitimacy of Carlos claim of ownership, especially because there were no encumbrances annotated on
Carlos title. Hence, the current possessor, shall remain to be so until such time that his possession is
successfully contested by a person with a better right. (VIRGILIO G. CAGATAO v. GUILLERMO
ALMONTE, G.R. No. 174004, October 9, 2013)
To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton,
reckless and malicious, in bad faith, oppressive, or abusive. Hence, the person claiming bad faith must
prove its existence by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; hence, it is a question of intention, which can be
inferred from ones conduct and/or contemporaneous statements. The inappropriate dealings of Adriano
to acquire financial gain at the expense of respondents, with the approval or acquiescence of the Board;
the hiring of unqualified personnel being used as a ground for termination despite the fact that such hiring
was upon their recommendation; and the repeated allegations of non-compliance even if respondents
had corrected already what were complained of, constituted unjust and dishonest acts schemed by the
petitioners to provide an appearance of validity to the termination. These acts constituted bad faith on part
of petitioner. (JAIME P. ADRIANO and LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC. v. ALBERTO LASALA and
LOURDES LASALA, G.R. No. 197842, October 9, 2013)

The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only
for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very object of the parties in making
the agreement. It must be pointed that in the absence of a stipulation, a party cannot unilaterally and

extra judicially rescind a contract. A judicial or notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission can take
place.
Even if Article 1191 were applicable, petitioner would still not be entitled to automatic rescission. Under
Article 1191of the Civil Code, the right to resolve reciprocal obligations, is deemed implied in case one of
the obligors shall fail to comply with what is incumbent upon him. But that right must be invoked judicially.
Consequently, even if the right to rescind is made available to the injured party, the obligation is not ipso
facto erased by the failure of the other party to comply with what is incumbent upon him. The party
entitled to rescind should apply to the court for a decree of rescission. The right cannot be exercised
solely on a partys own judgment that the other committed a breach of the obligation. The operative act
which produces the resolution of the contract is the decree of the court and not the mere act of the
vendor. (EDS MANUFACTURING, INC. v. HEALTHCHECK INTERNATIONAL INC. G.R. No. 162802,
October 9, 2013)

In a contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to
deliver a determinate thing while the other party obligates himself to pay therefor a price certain in money
or its equivalent. There was no sale on credit in this case because ownership of the items did not pass
from one party to the other.
There is also no novation made. The acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the
original relation between the complainant and the accused, cannot produce novation. There must be
proof of intent to extinguish the original relationship, and such intent cannot be inferred from the mere
acceptance of payments on account of what is totally due. (NARCISO DEGAOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 162826. October 14, 2013)

Trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in property and another
person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the
performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter. A trust fund refers to
money or property set aside as a trust for the benefit of another and held by a trustee. Under the Civil
Code, trusts are classified as either express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the
trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law. (GERSIP
ASSOCIATION, INC., LETICIA ALMAZAN, ANGELA NARVAEZ, MARIA B. PINEDA, LETICIA DE
MESA AND ALFREDO D. PINEDA v. GOVERNMENT INSURANCE SERVICE SYSTEM, G.R. No.
189827, October 16, 2013)

A marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship is NOT void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS,
G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013)

Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of earning
capacity. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn
money. The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which
must be duly proven by competent proof and the best obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a general
rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the

absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. (ROBERT DA JOSE, ET AL. vs. CELERINA R.
ANGELES, ET AL., G.R. No. 187899. October 23, 2013)

A tenancy relationship is a juridical tie that arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree,
expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result
of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. The
relationship cannot be presumed. Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not
automatically convert the tiller into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. (HEIRS OF
FLORENTINO QUILO v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAGUPAN BRANCH, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 184369. October 23, 2013)

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of
legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. (CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. AND
MICHELLE S. YBANEZ v. SHIRLEY G. QUINONES, G.R. No. 175822. October 23, 2013)

Based on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
The foregoing requisites are indispensable for an application for registration of land title, under Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The absence of any one requisite renders the application for
registration substantially defective. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUIS MIGUEL O. ABOITIZ,
G.R. No. 174626. October 23, 2013)

Well-settled is the rule that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract.
The question of whether a breach of contract is substantial depends upon the attending circumstances.
Also, Article 1191 of the Civil Code expressly provides that rescission is without prejudice to the rights of
third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Article 1385 of the Civil Code. In turn,
Article 1385 states that rescission cannot take place when the things which are the object of the contract
are legally in the possession of third persons who did not act in bad faith. (PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT
BANK V. SPS. ERNESTO LOPEZ AND FLORENTINA LOPEZ, ET AL., G.R. NO. 186332. OCTOBER
23, 2013)

As proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable, Tensuan presented a Certification dated
July 29, 1999 issued by the CENRO-DENR which verified that "said land falls within alienable and
disposable land under Project No. 27-B L.C. Map No. 2623 under Forestry Administrative Order No. 41141 dated January 3, 1968." However, the Supreme Court have declared unequivocally that a CENRO
Certification, by itself, is insufficient proof that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable. The CENRO is
not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public
lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR
Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN, represented by CLAUDIA C. ARUELO, G.R. No. 171136, October 23,
2013)

Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates that no interest
shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Thus, the collection of interest in loans or
forbearance of money is allowed only when these two conditions concur: (1) there was an express
stipulation for the payment of interest; (2) the agreement for the payment of the interest was reduced in
writing. Absent any of these two conditions, the money debtor cannot be made liable for interest. Thus,
petitioner is entitled only to the principal amount of the loan plus the allowable legal interest from the time
of the demand, at the rate of 6% per annum. (TING TING PUA v. SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG
and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG, G.R. No. 198660, October 23, 2013)

A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in such property. To prove good faith, the following conditions must be present: (a) the
seller is the registered owner of the land; (b) the owner is in possession thereof; and (3) at the time of the
sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any
defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property. All these
conditions must be present, otherwise, the buyer is under obligation to exercise extra ordinary diligence
by scrutinizing the certificates of title and examining all factual circumstances to enable him to ascertain
the seller's title and capacity to transfer any interest in the property. (SPOUSES ELISEO R. BAUTISTA
AND EMPERA TRIZ C. BAUTISTA vs. SPOUSES MILA JALANDONI AND ANTONIO JALANDONI,
G.R. No. 171464, November 27, 2013)

The rate of interest declared illegal and unconscionable does not entitle petitioners-spouses to stop
payment of interest. It should be emphasized that only the rate of interest was declared void. The
stipulation requiring petitioners-spouses to pay interest on their loan remains valid and binding. They are,
therefore, liable to pay interest from the time they defaulted in payment until their loan is fully paid.
(SPOUSES BAYANI H. ANDAL AND GRACIA G. ANDAL v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 194201. November 27, 2013)

An unconstitutional law produces no effect and confers no right upon any person. Not only the parties but
all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter
invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total
nullity. (ORETO MIRALLOSA and all persons claiming rights and interests under him v. CARMEL
DEVELOPMENT INC. G.R. No. 194538, Novemeber 27, 2013,

A pure/simple donation is the truest form of donation as it is based on pure gratuity. The
remuneratory/compensatory type has for its purpose the rewarding of the donee for past services, which
services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional/modal donation, on the other hand, is a
consideration for future services; it also occurs where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or
charges upon the donee, whose value is inferior to the donation given. Lastly, an onerous donation
imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation; this is made for a valuable consideration whose cost is
equal to or more than the thing donated. (CERILA J. CALANASAN, REPRESENTED BY TEODORA J.
CALANASAN AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT v. SPOUSES VIRGILIO DOLORITO AND EVELYN C.
DOLORITO, G.R. No. 171937, November 25, 2013)

Only the redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable parties in an action for legal
redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/co-owner A party who is not the co-owner of a land subject of a
compromise agreement cannot claim that he was defrauded when the parties in the compromise
agreement entered into the same. As a third party to the agreement, he is not indispensable for the
agreement to materialize. (VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN,
ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES MANCAO, G.R. No. 182314,
November 13, 2013)
.

A party to a loan agreement cannot claim that the promissory note is void as to him on the ground of
fraud if the same was not employed to deceive him into obtaining his consent. Jurisprudence has shown
that in order to constitute fraud that provides basis to annul contracts, it must fulfill two conditions. First,
the fraud must be dolo causante or it must be fraud in obtaining the consent of the party. Second, this
fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The records showed that petitioner had been
unjustly excluded from participating in the management of the affairs of the corporation. This exclusion
from the management in the affairs of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. constituted fraud incidental to the
performance of the obligation. (ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC., RUPERTO V. TANKEH, VICENTE ARENAS and
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, G.R. No. 171428, November 11, 2013)

It is an established rule that a Torrens certificate of title is not conclusive proof of ownership. Verily, a
party may seek its annulment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. However, such action must be
seasonably filed, else the same would be barred. In this relation, Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the
period to contest a decree of registration shall be one (1) year from the date of its entry and that, after the
lapse of the said period, the Torrens certificate of title issued thereon becomes incontrovertible and
indefeasible. (LAURA E. PARAGUYA vs. SPOUSES ALMA ESCUREL-CRUCILLO ET AL., G.R. No.
200265, December 2, 2013)

Well settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in
nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a
motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is
premature. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits, wherein both parties will
be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. (MODESTO SANCHEZ vs.
ANDREW SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 187661, December 4, 2013)

The full payment of the purchase price in a contract to sell is a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of
which prevents the prospective sellers obligation to convey title from becoming effective, as in this case.
(OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. SPOUSES BENIGNO V. JOVELLANOS and LOURDES R.
JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 189145, December 4, 2013)

A party in a contract cannot claim that his obligation to pay to another is extinguished for the reason that
his debtor failed to pay him and that the other party was witness to the same. Such is not a mode of
extinguishment of an obligation. (METRO CONCAST STEEL CORPORATION, ET AL. vs. ALLIED
BANK CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177921, December 4, 2013)

The elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence,
by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was
guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. (Dra. Leila
A. Dela Llana vs. Rebecca Biong, Doing Business Under the Name and Style of Pongkay Trading,
G.R. No. 182356, December 04, 2013)

While the petitioner claims that it was not obliged to pay any surplus because the balance from the
proceeds was applied to the respondents other obligations and to those of her attorney-in-fact, it failed,
however, to show any supporting evidence showing that the mortgage extended to those obligations. The
petitioner, as mortgagee or purchaser, cannot just simply apply the proceeds of the sale in its favor and
deduct from the balance the respondents outstanding obligations not secured by the mortgage. Thus,
there is no reason to depart from the CAs ruling that the balance or excess, after deducting the mortgage
debt plus the stipulated interest and the expenses of the foreclosure sale, must be returned to the
respondent. (PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS VS. MARY ANN O. YEUNG, G.R. No.
179691, December 04, 2013)

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of
another. (ANTONIO LOCSIN II VS. MEKENI FOOD CORPORATION, G.R. No. 192105, December 09,
2013)

Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such
absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places
upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of wellfounded belief which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouses whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead.
The law did not define what is meant by well-founded belief. It depends upon the circumstances of each
particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply
with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort (not a mere passive one). (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIA FE ESPINOSA
CANTOR, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013)

A contract of sale is classified as a consensual contract, which means that the sale is perfected by mere
consent. No particular form is required for its validity. Upon perfection of the contract, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance, i.e., the vendee may compel transfer of ownership of the object of the
sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold.
In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while
expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds
himself to sell the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed
upon, i.e., the full payment of the purchase price. A contract to sell may not even be considered as a
conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale
until the fulfillment of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of
consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may
not occur. (ACE FOODS, INC. VS. MICRO PACIFIC TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD., G.R. No. 200602,
December 11, 2013)

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis cannot be said to be unforeseeable and beyond the control of a business
corporation, especially a corporation engaged in real estate enterprise. Such corporation is considered a
master in projections of commodities and currency movements and business risks. It has the ability to
foresee such situation. Thus, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is not an instance of caso fortuito. (FILESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. AND FIL-ESTATE NETWORK, INC., v. SPOUSES CONRADO AND
MARIA VICTORIA RONQUILLO, , G.R. NO.185798. January 13, 2014)

The principle of quantum meruit allows a party to recover the reasonable value of the thing or services
rendered despite the lack of a written contract, in order to avoid unjust enrichment. The principle states
that a person must be paid with an amount that he deserves. It aims to prevent undue enrichment based
on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain any benefit without paying for it. In the
instant case, since First Sta. Clara already performed certain works on the project with an estimated value
of, to completely deny it payment for the same would result in Rivelisa Realtys unjust enrichment at the
First Sta. Claras expense. Hence, it is only proper that First Sta. Clara must be paid on a quantum meruit

basis. (RIVELISA REALTY, INC., v. FIRST STA. CLARA BUILDERS CORPORATION, G.R. NO.
189618 January 15, 2014)

In sales with the right to repurchase, the title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested
in the vendee, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor within the stipulated
period. Once the conditions for the repurchase are complied with, the ownership of the subject property is
reverted back to the original vendor. Since, Eduardo fulfilled the conditions for the exercise of the right to
repurchase, he cannot be denied of acquiring the property by exercising his right to repurchase the same.
(ROBERTO R. DAVID v. EDUARDO C. DAVID G.R. NO. 162365. January 15, 2014)

Loans are often secured by a mortgage. However, a mortgage contract is an accessory contract,
dependent upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the principal contract, which is the contract of loan.
The mortgage contract cannot be enforced unless the obligation in the contract of loan is due and
demandable but left unpaid. (DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUARIA
AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. NO. 160758. January 15,
2014.)

The degree of diligence required of common carriers is extraordinary diligence. The extraordinary
responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. Owing to
this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have
been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. (EASTERN
SHIPPING LINES, INC. v. BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., AND MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE CO.,
LTD., G.R. NO. 193986. January 15, 2014)

Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears therein. Since the spouses Vilbar did not cause the transfer of the
certificate title in their name, or at the very least, annotate or register such sale in the original title in the
name of Dulos Realty, have no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their claim.
(SPOUSES BERNADETTE AND RODULFO VILBAR v. ANGELITO L. OPINION, G.R. No. 176043.
January 15, 2014)

The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code applies when the property in question was
acquired during the lifetime of the husband and the wife and the subsistence of the marriage. It is not
overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone. The
consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. However, since the
nature of the property was never alleged in the complaint or raised during trial by the petitioner, the court
cannot apply such. presumption in the instant case. (FRANCISCO LIM v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, NOW
KNOWN AS THE BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC., G.R. No. 183198. January 15, 2014
Sps. Sarili purchased the subject property from Ramos on the strength of the latters ostensible authority
to sell under the subject SPA. The said document, however, readily indicates flaws in its notarial
acknowledgment since the respondents community tax certificate (CTC) number was not indicated
thereon. The due execution and authenticity of the subject SPA are of great significance in determining
the validity of the sale entered into by Victorino and Ramon since the latter only claims to be the agent of
the purported seller. The rule that even if the procurement of a certificate of title was tainted with fraud
and misrepresentation, such defective title may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value is not applicable to the Sps. Sarili. A higher degree of prudence
is required from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of
the transaction is registered. Since Sps. Sarilis claim over the subject property is based on forged

documents, no valid title had been transferred to them and, in turn, to petitioners. (THE HEIRS OF
VICTORINO SARILI v. PEDRO F. LAGROSA, REPRESENTED IN THIS ACT BY HIS ATTORNEY-INFACT, LOURDES LABIOS MOJICA, G.R. No. 193517. January 15, 2014)
There is an exception to the rule that accessory follows the principal. Where it can be duly established
that the owner of the accessory is different from the owner of the principal, the two properties should be
treated separately. Hence, when there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and
the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately.
(MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. SPOUSES FILOMENO GARCIA AND ERMELINDA HALILI-GARCIA,
G.R. No. 190106. January 15, 2014)
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., when a person unjustly retains a
benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The prevention of unjust enrichment is a
recognized public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that [e]very
person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him. (DOMINGO GONZALO v. JOHN TARNATE, JR., G.R. No. 160600. January 15, 2014)

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. Hence, when one of the parties to the
marriage or one of the witnesses to the marriage testifies that the marriage took place, it has been held to
be admissible to prove the fact of such marriage. Thus, the testimony of Tecla (wife) and Adelina, who
was present during the marriage ceremony, serves as an admissible evidence to prove the fact of
marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio. (PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO, G.R. No. 173540. January 22, 2014)

A constructive trust having been constituted by law between respondents as trustees and petitioner as
beneficiary of the subject property, may respondents acquire ownership over the said property? The
Court held in the same case of Aznar, that unlike in express trusts and resulting implied trusts where a
trustee cannot acquire by prescription any property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust, in
constructive implied trusts, the trustee may acquire the property through prescription even if he does not
repudiate the relationship. It is then incumbent upon the beneficiary to bring an action for reconveyance
before prescription bars the same.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten
years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that,
illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. (IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINO TAEZA, G.R. No. 179597,
February 03, 2014)
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should
refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. (REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA G.R. No. 171577, February 12, 2014)

An illegitimate child may use the surname of his father if the latter has expressly recognized their filiation.
However, the child is under no compulsion to use his fathers surname. When Antonio recognized Andre

Lewis and Jerard Patrick as his sons, the two children had the right to use the surname of Antonio.
However, they were under no compulsion or mandate to use the same. The law uses the word may,
which dictates that it is merely permissive. (GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, G.R. No.
206248. February 18, 2014)
In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the subject property. Thus, the seller may still enter
into a valid contract of mortgage. However, when the contract to sell ripens to an absolute contract of
sale, the mortgagor and mortgagee must respect the rights of the buyer over the subject property. Such
buyer is not privy to the contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee; hence, the buyer can make the
necessary actions to protect her rights over the property. Despite the apparent validity of the mortgage
between the petitioner and PEPI, the former is still bound to respect the transactions between
respondents PEPI and Dee. (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. TERESITA TAN DEE, ET AL., G.R. No.
182128, February 19, 2014)

In a contract executed by an agent for a principal, the contract must upon its face purport to be made,
signed and sealed in the name of the principal. When the Real Estate Mortgage, explicitly shows on its
face, that it was signed by Concepcion, the agent, in her own name and in her own personal capacity,
and without indicating that he is signing for and in behalf of his principal, the mortgage is only binding
upon her, the agent, and not upon the principal. (NICANORA G. BUCTON (DECEASED),
SUBSTITUTED BY REQUILDA B. YRAY, PETITIONER, VS. RURAL BANK OF EL SALVADOR, INC.,
ET AL, G.R. No. 179625, February 24, 2014)
A contract where there is no mutuality between the parties partakes of the nature of a contract of
adhesion. Any obscurity will be construed against the party who prepared the contract; the latter being
presumed the stronger party to the agreement, and who caused the obscurity. Moreover, in an increase
of interest rate, the creditor, as in the case of PNB, cannot validly increase the interest rate unilaterally.
Even if the borrower paid the increased interest without protest, such cannot be construed to mean that
the borrower is estopped from assailing the unilateral increase of interest rate. (PHILIPPPINE NATIONAL
BANK v. SPOUSES ENRIQUE MANALO & ROSALINDA JACINTO, ET AL, G.R. No. 174433,
February 24, 2014)
Even if on the outset, a party is a mortgagee in good faith, if he subsequently purchases the property with
notice of lis pendens, he cannot claim to have a better right over the said property by interposing the
argument that he is a mortgagee in good faith. (HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK v.
ASUNCION P. FELONIA AND LYDIA C. DE GUZMAN, REPRESENTED BY MARIBEL FRIAS MARIE
MICHELLE P. DELGADO, ET AL G.R. No. 189477, February 26, 2014)

Pursuant to Section 108 of PD No. 1529, in an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at
the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens
appear as annotations. As indispensable parties, they must be given the proper notice of any proceeding
involving the subject properties.
Thus, in a case where two (2) parcels of land were attached by various creditors and the levies are
annotated on the back of the titles of the subject properties, one creditor cannot file an action for
cancellation of lien without giving notice to all parties-in- interest, like other creditors whose lien over the
subject properties appear on the back of the titles of the subject properties. (JESUS G. CRISOLOGO
AND NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO v. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 196894.
March 03, 2014)
Where a bank was merely a purchaser or transferee of the property that has a pending forcible entry
case, it cannot be made liable for nominal damages since it has not violated or invaded a right. It is not
prohibited from acquiring the property even while the forcible entry case was pending, because as the
registered owner of the subject property, the seller may transfer his title at any time and the lease merely
follows the property as a lien or encumbrance. (ONE NETWORK RURAL BANK, INC., PETITIONER, v.
DANILO G. BARIC, RESPONDENT., G.R. No. 193684, March 05, 2014)

In order to allow resort to the of res ipsa loquitur, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied,
to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged;
and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person
injured.
Where the lack of oxygen causing the patients bradycardia during the operation could have been
triggered by the vago-vagal and not the negligence of his attending physicians, res ipsa loquitur cannot
apply, the first requisite being wanting. (DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 192123. March 10, 2014)
An applicant for registration of titles mere reliance on a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Survey
Plan indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land to prove that the land in question
formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain is not sufficient to prove such fact.
Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land
in question. A mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. Thus, applicants
failure to prove that the subject land has been classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, the application for registration of title must be denied. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON, G.R.
No. 163767. March 10, 2014)
The Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, has jurisdiction to determine just
compensation at the very first instance, and the petitioner need not pass through the DAR for initial
valuation. The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function, which is vested in the
Regional Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court. (SPOUSES JOSE M. ESTACION, JR. AND
AGELINA T. ESTACION v. HON. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 163361. March 12, 2014)
Where a debtor obtained a loan six months after the execution of a Continuing Suretyship, such
obligation of the debtor is still covered by such Continuing Suretyship. This is further bolstered when the
contract clearly states that the surety is liable for all credit accommodations extended to the debtor, both
present and future obligations. The debtor is will still be liable for the principal of the loan, together with
the interest and penalties due thereon. (MARIANO LIM v. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, G.R. No.
188539. March 12, 2014)
CENRO Certification stating that Lot 4342 falls within the alienable and disposable area is inadequate to
prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable. Aside from the CENRO certification, an application
for original registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records in order to establish that the land is indeed alienable and disposable. (MINDA S.
GAERLAN, PETITIONER, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT, G.R. No. 192717,
March 12, 2014)
It is incumbent upon the respondent Malarayat Rural Bank to be more cautious in dealing with the
spouses Guia, and inquire further regarding the identity and possible adverse claim of those in actual
possession of the property, especially since the spouses Guia were not the registered owners of the land
being mortgaged. Since the subject land was not mortgaged by the owner thereof and since the
respondent Malarayat Rural Bank is not a mortgagee in good faith, said bank is not entitled to protection
under the law. (MACARIA ARGUELLES AND THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED PETRONIO
ARGUELLES v. MALARAYAT RURAL BANK, INC., G.R. No. 200468, March 19, 2014)
An application for registration of land must be accompanied by evidence showing that the land in question
was within an area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth. Otherwise, the Court is
left with no alternative but to deny the respondents application for registration. (REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 164408.
March 24, 2014)

REMEDIAL LAW

The CA dismissed Castigadors complaint on the ground that there was no allegation that the petition is
based on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it is
incumbent that when a court finds no substantial merit in a petition for annulment of judgment, it may
dismiss the petition outright but the specific reasons for such dismissal shall be clearly set out.
The petition need not categorically state the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the allegations in the
petition should be so crafted to easily point out the ground on which it was based. LORNA
CASTIGADOR v. DANILO M. NICOLAS. G.R. No. 184023, March 4, 2013
Cailipan, et al. filed a petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs order of default and a Notice of Appeal
questioning the RTCs decision. It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed
since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of
appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is
precisely that there should be no appeal.
The Court observes that Cailipan, et al. should have (a) withdrawn their certiorari petition and instead
raised the jurisdictional errors stated therein in their appeal or (b) at the very least, informed the CAs
Twenty-First Division of the Decision rendered on the main case and the filing of their Notice of Appeal on
January 22, 2011. IRENE VILLAMAR-SANDOVAL v. JOSE CAILIPAN, et al.G.R. 200727, March 4,
2013
An order declared that the Republic was deemed to have abandoned one of the cases of a consolidated
case but trial proceeded for the consolidated cases. There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a
judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is
within the sound discretion of the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES REP. BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION III v. HEIRS OF
ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 199501, March 6, 2013.
The prosecution needs to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs which constitute the corpus delicti
of the offense. The chain of custody of the seized items must be presented by the prosecution as
unbroken starting from the time the items were confiscated and eventually marked until the time they are
presented in court. It is the burden of the defense, meanwhile, to prove that the chain of custody was
broken. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAIME FERNANDEZ Y HERTEZ. G.R. No. 188841, MARCH
6, 2013.
A motion to file a demurrer was granted after the prosecutions presentation of the testimonies of the
apprehending officers because the prosecution failed to present the testimony of the confidential
informant. It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule,
however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review
by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court
finds and so holds that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing
jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE
RAFAEL R. LAGOS, et al. G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013.
Cuenca, et al. filed a complaint for damages sustained by the wrongful issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and the taking of the properties of Arc Cuisine, Inc. There is no dispute that the properties
subject to the levy on attachment belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to Cuenca, et al. in their own
right. They were only stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a personality distinct and separate from
that of any or all of them. The damages occasioned to the properties by the levy on attachment, wrongful
or not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As such, only Arc Cuisine, Inc. had the right under the
substantive law to claim and recover such damages. This right could not also be asserted by Cuenca, et

al. unless they did so in the name of the corporation itself. But that did not happen herein, because Arc
Cuisine, Inc. was not even joined in the action either as an original party or as an intervenor.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. TOMAS CUENCA, et al. G.R. No. 173297, March 6,
2013.
Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. filed a petition for certiorari when the CA extended the freeze order against their
properties. Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari,
to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties.
RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY
THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL
G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is not the same person
who made the demand and filed the complaint. In case of an error in the designation of the offended party
in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the
information, not its dismissal.
If the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in the designation of the
offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of
the offense is specific and identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial.
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 201620, March 6, 2013
It is essential in the prosecution of drug cases that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond reasonable doubt. This means that on top of the elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact
that the substance illegally sold or possessed is, in the first instance, the very substance adduced in court
must likewise be established with the same exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining a
conviction. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO ADRID Y FLORES. G.R. No. 201845, March 6, 2013
Gerry Centeno, Spouses Centenos son, bought the property from his parents and remained in
possession. The Bank petitioned the RTC for the issuance of a writ of possession after title to the
property was consolidated in its name. After consolidation of title in the purchasers name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchasers right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a
confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of
title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function, unless it
appears that the property is in possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the
mortgagor. RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC. v. GERRY CENTENO. G.R. No.
200667, March 11, 2013.
The practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or
modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal cases is no longer allowed.
Hence, the absence of the convicts on the day of promulgation of judgment did not affect its validity. The
RTC did not err in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of its judgment. EFREN S. ALMUETE v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013.
The writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in
nature. Hence, the writ of amparo filed by Spouses Nerio, et al. after Barangay officials raided their
ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants cannot be issued. SPOUSES NERIO AND SOLEDAD
PADOR AND REY PADOR v. BARANGAY CAPTAIN BERNABE ARCAYAN, et al. G.R. No.
183460, March 12, 2013
The CA dismissed Indoyons petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 for being non-compliant with
the Rules of Court and various Supreme Court Circulars. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the proper remedy to question the CAs judgment, final order or resolution is a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final order or

resolution appealed from; or of the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment.
Under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or to the CA by a wrong or an
inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
SURIGAO DE SUR v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 193706, March 12, 2013.
What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts
recited in the Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, which determines the crime being charged in the information. Hence, the
fact that Pielago was charged with acts of lasciviousness did not preclude his conviction of rape by sexual
assault. MIKE ALVIN PIELAGO Y ROS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 202020, March
13, 2013
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when
the concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as would prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances and facts must be
absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis propounding the innocence of the accused.
However, in the present case, the circumstances presented by the prosecution do not form a solid and
cohesive narrative that proves with moral certainty its contention that Soriano perpetrated these heinous
acts. To synthesize, the only circumstances cited to implicate him in the crime are the following: (a) he
passed through the shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on 31 December 1998; (b) Vicky did not see
anyone else use that road from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on that day; and (c) the soiled garments
confiscated from him were identified to have been the same ones he was wearing then. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. GERALD SORIANO ALIAS PEDRO. G.R. No. 191271, March 13, 2013.
For the successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following essential elements
must be established: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a
prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the drug. As regards the failure of the police to strictly comply with the
provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, it is settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of this
section is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated from an accused inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
BENEDICTO MARQUEZ Y RAYOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 197207, March 13,
2013
Isabel filed 3 motions for reconsideration which were denied by the RTC. The CA dismissed her petition
on the ground that she lost her right to appeal when she filed a second motion for reconsideration. When
the RTC issues its decision and orders, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the proper remedy
therefrom is a Rule 42 petition for review. A second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court and the right to appeal is lost.
The RTC ruled on the issue of Isabels transfer of rights even if it was not raised as an error. Under
Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the RTC is mandated to decide the appeal based on the entire
record of the MTC proceedings and such pleadings submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.
Nonetheless, even without this provision, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary
in arriving at a just decision of the case, or is closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which
the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent.
The RTC also denied the motions for reconsideration on the ground that a notice of hearing was not
attached. A motion unaccompanied by a notice of hearing is considered a mere scrap of paper that does
not toll the running of the period to appeal. The requirement of notice of hearing is an integral component
of procedural due process that seeks to avoid "surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who
must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court.

ISABEL N. GUZMAN v. ANIANO N. GUZMAN AND PRIMITIVA G. MONTEALTO. G.R. No.

172588, March 13, 2013
Before an action can properly be commenced, all the essential elements of the cause of action must be in
existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to the institution of
the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or implied by law
must be performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse
party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition.
Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint, such as the failure to allege
exhaustion of all legal remedies in the complaint warrants dismissal. ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK
(FORMERLY ANCHOR FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION) v. HENRY H. FURIGAY, ET.
AL. G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013.
NLC filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA without filing a motion for reconsideration
before the RTC. Before a petition for certiorari can prosper, the petitioner must be able to show, among
others, that he does not have any other "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." This remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the questioned
order. NOVATEKNIK LAND CORPORATION v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF MANILA CITY. G.R. No. 194104, March 13, 2013.
Tigaz filed three pleadings assailing the Ombudsmans decision finding probable cause to indict him for
violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019 and the Sandiganbayans resolution denying his motion to quash the
information and suspending him pendent lite.
In the determination of probable cause, absolute certainty of evidence is not required, for opinion and
reasonable belief are sufficient. Besides, any other defense contesting the finding of probable cause that
is highly factual in nature must be threshed out in a full-blown trial, and not in a special civil action for
certiorari before this Court.
A Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to quash an
information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite. The remedy is not the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari, but the continuance of the case in due course. ROLANDO Z. TIGAZ v. OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN. G.R. No. 180681, March 18, 2013
Villareal was arrested by PO3 de Leon while holding a plastic sachet and because PO3 de Leon
recognized him as someone he arrested for illegal possession before. A previous arrest or existing
criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided
under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the
arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal
knowledge" as referring to a persons reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous
precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless
arrests based solely on knowledge of a persons previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the
rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NAZARENO
VILLAREAL y LUALHATI. G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013
Section 6, Rule 110 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that when the
date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus,
the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the
period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. Hence, the fact that the
Information did not state the precise date of the commission of the crime did not automatically render the
charge against Engr. Zapanta for qualified theft invalid. ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013
The RTC dismissed the application for land registration of AFP-RSBS for failure to prosecute after it
presented all its evidence and after it decided in its favor. An action may be dismissed for failure to
prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he
fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules
of Court or any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of

an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless
otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order of
dismissal that it is without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits
and is with prejudice.
AFP-RSBS presented Ms. Alma Aban as its witness but her testimony was not considered because she
did not present an authorization to testify from AFP-RSBS. There is no substantive or procedural rule
which requires a witness for a party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the
party presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can
be considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules
require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided therein. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHIL. RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS
SYSTEM v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 188956, March 20, 2013
Courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justices findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause
except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. The CA correctly ruled that no prima facie evidence
existed that sufficiently indicated Philip and Teodoras involvement in the commission of the crime. The
circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase was derived from the bare recollections of
Ariane, and of Guray and Corpus. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
the circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that Philip and Teodora are
probably guilty thereof.
Out of the total of 16 statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective witnesses, only nine were
sworn to before a competent officer. The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of
the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The rule was designed
to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of the preliminary
investigation, the present rules for which do not require a confrontation between the parties and their
witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory. MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD v. PHILIP RONALD P.
ESTEBAN AND TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN. G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013
The chain of custody provided for in Section 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165, to wit: (1) there must be a showing
that a physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official; and (2) there must be photograph(s) of the seized items taken in the presence of the aboveenumerated representatives. It was ruled that omission(s) in strictly following the provision are not fatal to
the prosecutions case as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved
and established with moral certainty. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZENAIDA SORIANO AND
MYRNA SAMONTE. G.R. No. 189843, March 20, 2013.
The Republic has been actively involved in the trial for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth for two decades
but was absent for one hearing. Due to this single absence, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case. Rule
17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that the court may dismiss a complaint in case there are no
justifiable reasons that explain the plaintiff's absence during the presentation of the evidence in chief. The
word "may" in Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, operates to confer on the court the discretion to
decide between the dismissal of the case on technicality vis--vis the progressive prosecution.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Republics Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it failed to
observe the three day notice requirement. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, does not require that
the court receive the notice three days prior to the hearing date. Rule 13, Section 3 of the Rules of Court,
states that the date of the mailing of motions through registered mail shall be considered the date of their
filing in court, it follows that the Republic filed the motion to the court 10 days in advance of the hearing
date. In so doing, it observed the 10-day requirement under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that the time and date of the hearing must not be later than ten days after the filing of the
motion. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ, ET. AL. G.R. No.
181458, March 20, 2013

In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical resistance need not be established
in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker
because of fear. Physical resistance is not an essential element of rape. Also, delay in revealing the
commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is
because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public
scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.
Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the finding of rape. A medical examination of the
victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible,
is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime and the medical certificate will then be rendered as merely
corroborative. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT PENILLA Y FRANCIA
G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013

Spouses Martires filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration and reckoned the 15 day period for filing an
appeal with the Supreme Court from the date the CA denied the Second Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari under the
said Rule "shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after notice of the judgment." Relative thereto, Section 2, Rule 52 of the same Rules provides that "no
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained." Since a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing does
not toll the running of the period to file an appeal by certiorari.
The validity of the contents and the regularity of the notarization of the Deed of Transfer were challenged.
A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private
instrument. When there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the
validity of such document is preponderance of evidence. While indeed a notarized document enjoys the
presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents.
The validity of the contents and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer were challenged in the
proceedings where its prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable
circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. SPOUSES LEHNER AND LUDY MARTIRES v.
MENELIA CHUA. G.R. No. 174240, March 20, 2013.
Spouses Dinglasan filed an action for cancellation of title involving real property valued at Php. 4,000.00
with the RTC. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be
filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since
the amount alleged in the Complaint by Spouses Dinglasan for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the
MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and
void. EDITHA PADLAN v. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELISIMO DINGLASAN. G.R. No.
180321, March 20, 2013
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who
received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of
confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.
It was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of Chu was authorized and
possessed a relation of confidence that Chu would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of
service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial
compliance with the requirements of substituted service. SIXTO N. CHU v. MACH ASIA TRADING
CORPORATION. G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013.
It is necessary for the petitioning government agency or its authorized representatives to certify against
forum shopping, because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to know if another case is
pending before another court. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading
in behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its reasons for doing
so, beyond simply citing cases where the Court allowed the OSG to sign the certification. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION v. ARLIC ALMOJUELA. G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013

A petition for mandamus was filed to compel the Secretary of Justice to charge Dalandag for multiple
murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be
used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised.
Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request
or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act
in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN, JR. v.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al. G.R. No. 197291,
April 3, 2013.
Under the established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations predominate in the
ascending order of importance in determining which action should prevail: (1) the date of filing, with
preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be
dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its
dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the
parties. There can be no doubt Civil Case No. CEB-35529 is the appropriate vehicle to determine the
rights of FDCP and SM Prime. FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SM PRIME
HOLDINGS, INC. G.R. No. 197937, April 3, 2013.
The mere failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition for review is not necessarily fatal as to warrant the outright denial of
due course when the clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of
both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the RTC, and other attachments of the petition
sufficiently substantiate the allegations. SEGUNDINA A. GALVEZ v. SPS. HONORIO C. MONTAO
AND SUSANA P. MONTAO, et al. G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013.
It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he
fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELVIN DIU y KOTSESA, et al. G.R.
No. 201449, April 3, 2013.
Spouses Ugay filed an action for quieting of title while Firaza, Jr. filed a counterclaim. Such counterclaim
is a permissible direct attack to the validity of the adverse partys torrens title. As such counterclaim, it
involves a cause of action separate from that alleged in the complaint; it has for its purpose the
vindication of a right in as much as the complaint similarly seeks the redress of one. NEMESIO FIRAZA,
SR., v. SPS. CLAUDIO AND EUFRECENA UGAY. G.R. No. 165838, April 3, 2013.
A case which has been suspended for 8 years due to LBPs opposition to the admission of an amended
and supplemental complaint may be continued. It is incumbent that trial should continue to settle the
issues between the parties once and for all. Court litigation which is primarily a search for truth must
proceed; and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to
adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. SPS. WELTCHIE RAYMUNDO AND EMILY
RAYMUNDO v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES., substituted by ASSET ASIA PACIFIC (SPVAMC) 2, INC. G.R. No. 195317, April 3, 2013.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the
body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction
to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In instances where a complaint
against a Punong Barangay is filed with the Ombudsman first, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises
jurisdiction over the complaint to the exclusion of the Sandiganbayan, which exercises concurrent
jurisdiction. FRANKLIN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU. G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013.

Under the 1964 Rules of Court, notice of the execution sale to the judgment obligor was not required, or
was merely optional; publication and posting sufficed. It was only in 1987 that the Court, via Circular No. 8
amending Rule 39, Section 18 of the Rules of Court, required that written notice be given to the judgment
debtor. MARCELINO AND VITALIANA DALANGIN v. CLEMENTE PEREZ, et al. G.R. No. 178758,
April 3, 2013.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERRY
OCTAVIO y FLORENDO and REYNALDO CARIO y MARTI. G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013.
The purchaser remains entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual
outcome of the pending annulment case. Otherwise stated, the issuance of the writ of possession
remains the ministerial duty of the RTC until the issues raised in the annulment case are, once and for all,
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. SPS. MONTANO T. TOLOSA AND MERLINDA TOLOSA v.
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK. G.R. No. 183058, April 3, 2013.
The testimony of a rape victim must be given weight and credence. When the issue focuses on the
credibility of the witnesses or the lack of it, the assessment of the trial court is controlling because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witness and the latters demeanor, conduct, and attitude especially
during the cross-examination unless cogent reasons dictate otherwise. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. EDMUNDO VITERO. G.R. No. 175327, April 3, 2013.
The indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu
after PO1 Dimlas marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately
presented as evidence to the trial court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO GONZALES y
SANTOS aka TAKYO. G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a
judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on
the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the
order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order.
The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA
and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN MESINA v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by
THERESA FIAN YRAY, et al.
G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013
An order for extrajudicial foreclosure given by an executive judge in the exercise of her administrative
function is not a civil action of the Regional Trial Courts that may be the proper subject of an action for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession cannot be consolidated with an action for annulment of
mortgage where title to the property has already been consolidated in favor of the mortgagor following the
expiration of the one year redemption period except when title has not yet consolidated in favor of the
mortgagor and this presumed right of ownership is contested and made the basis of another action, in
which case, the actions must be consolidated.
It suffices, according to Altres v. Empleo, that the verification and certification was signed by at least one
of Ingles, et al.who was competent to do so. The certiorari petition was verified by Josefina and Hector F.
Inglesboth of whom the Court finds competent to attest to the truth of the allegations of their petition,
considering that they are unquestionably principal parties-in-interest to their certiorari petition. JOSEFINA
F. INGLES, et al. v. HON. ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, etc., et al./JOSEFINA F. INGLES, et al. v. HON.
ARSENIO J. MAGPALE, etc., et al./JOSEFINA F. INGLES, et al. v. CHARLES J. ESTEBANG.R. No.
141809/G.R. No. 147186/G.R. No. 173641, April 8, 2013
Findings of fact of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility of
witnesses in rape cases depends heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner

of testifying. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL TOLENTINO y CATACUTAN. G.R. No.

187740, April 10, 2013.
In instances where appeals are filed out of time, appeal fees paid on the day of promulgation of a
resolution, or when issues not raised in the pleadings are admitted, the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service themselves provide that administrative investigations shall be conducted
without strict recourse to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings. FRANCISCO C. ADALIM v. ERNESTO TANINAS, et al.
G.R. No. 198682, April 10, 2013.
The Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property
subject of the action and the fact that only one of the heirs executed the verification or certification of nonforum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action. HEIRS OF LAZARO
GALLARDO, et al. v. PORFERIO SOLIMAN, et al.G.R. No. 178952, April 10, 2013.
Boardwalks appeal was not perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay the
docket and other lawful fees before the proper court which is the CA. The perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to
perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory. BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC.
v. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL (deceased) substituted by REYNALDO P. VILLAREAL, JR., et al. G.R. No.
181182, April 10, 2013.
The obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial, once it appears that there is a third party who is in possession
of the property and is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. ROYAL SAVINGS BANK,
formerly COMSAVINGS BANK, now GSIS FAMILY BANK v. FERNANDO ASIA, et al. G.R. No.
183658, April 10, 2013

Although the RTC has legal basis under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA in relation to Section 5, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court to order the dismissal of the case, the Court finds this sanction too severe to be
imposed on PMMA where the records of the case is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of
the rules on mediation proceedings. SANDOVAL SHIPYARDS, INC., and RIMPORT INDUSTRIES, INC.,
represented by ENGR. REYNALDO G. IMPORTANTE v. PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE
ACADEMY (PMMA) G.R. No. 188633, April 10, 2013.
No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERT P. NARCEDA. G.R. No.
182760, April 10, 2013
Non-compliance with Sec. 21, R.A. 9165 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized
inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA QUESIDO y BADARANG. G.R. No. 189351, April 10, 2013
To allow the presentation of evidence on a piece-meal basis, thereby needlessly causing a delay in the
resolution of the case would be anathema to the purpose of delivering justice. ALBERT CHUA, JIMMY
CHUA CHI LEONG and SPOUSES EDUARDO SOLIS and GLORIA VICTA v. B.E. SAN DIEGO,
INC./LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION v. B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. G.R. No. 165863/G.R. No.
165875. April 10, 2013
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take
the witness stand. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio.
Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay
evidence. Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy

which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten
receipt. ROGELIO DANTIS v. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR. G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013.
Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a
detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding
may also be given in evidence. EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N.
NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN v. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No.
204700, April 10, 2013.
A preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought
and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. Factually, there must exist a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. As the
Supreme Court has previously ruled, while the existence of the right need not be conclusively
established, it must be clear. THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT v. COURT OF
APPEALS AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM. G.R. No. 174788, April 11, 2013

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise
of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as
opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character. CARLITO C. ENCINAS v.
PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG. G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013
A complaint for the consignation of a loan payment of a subdivision lot does not fall within the jurisdiction
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Consignation is necessarily judicial, as the Civil Code
itself provides that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of
judicial authority. SPOUSES OSCAR AND THELMA CACAYORIN v. ARMED FORCES AND POLICE
MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No. 171298, April 15, 2013.
A petition filed under Rule 45 required the evaluation of the factual findings of the RTC and the CA. The
question, to be one of law, must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances
and should avoid the scrutiny of the probative value of the parties evidence. Once the issue invites a
review of the factual findings of the RTC and of the CA, as in this case, the question posed is one of fact
that is proscribed in a Rule 45 petition. RICARDO CHU, JR. and DY KOK ENG v. MELANIA CAPARAS
and SPOUSES RUEL AND HERMENEGILDA PEREZ. G.R. No. 175428, April 15, 2013.
A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA v.
MARIO and MARGIE LAURON. G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013.

An Arbitration Committee rendered a decision which was contested by the other party as a judgment or a
final order under the Labor Code, hence the Rules of Court do not apply. A decision or award of a
voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43.
Upon receipt of
the Voluntary Arbitrators Resolution denying RPWUs motion for reconsideration, RPWU should have
filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for
certiorari. ROYAL PLANT WORKERS UNION v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R.
No. 198783, April 15, 2013
The writ of amparos curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty, and
security may be caused not only by a public officials act, but also by his omission. Accountability may
attach to Arroyo, et al. who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. The duty to investigate must
be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. N THE
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF

NORIEL RODRIGUEZ: NORIEL RODRIGUEZ v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, et al. G.R. No.
191805/G.R. No. 193160, April 16, 2013.
Intervention
of
a
rival
candidate
in
a
disqualification
case
is
proper
when
there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and
important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. A disregard of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition. EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO
v. EMERSON S. CARLOS. G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013
CJ Sereno
The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only
upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal. Otherwise, the Supreme Court shall
not interfere with the electoral tribunals exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. AGAPAY NG
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE RIGHTS ALLIANCE (A-IPRA) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. G.R.
No. 204591, April 16, 2013
Issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court are deemed
waived, because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity. PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT
& DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. UNION BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, NOTARY PUBLIC JOHN DOE, AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY AND
CEBU PROVINCE; J. KING & SONS. CO., INC. G.R. No. 179018, April 17, 2013.
Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when they
are under official custody. In Mamba v. Lara, it has been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the
contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts
entered into by the government. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN.
G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013
Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by
death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving
his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. Thus, the alleged admission of the
deceased Pedro Caparas that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with Modesta Garcia and
Cristina Salamat cannot be used as evidence against Dominga Caparas as the latter would be unable to
contradict or disprove the same. APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother,
Modesta Garcia, and CRISTINA SALAMAT v. DOMINGA ROBLES vda de CAPARAS. G.R. No.
180843, April 17, 2013.
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of
stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. AMELIA AQUINO, et al. v. PHILIPPINE
PORTS AUTHORITY. G.R. No. 181973, April 17, 2013.
It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject
property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The argument of Spouses Abacan that
they subsequently acquired ownership of the subject property cannot be considered as a supervening
event that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, as unlawful detainer does not deal with the
issue of ownership. HOLY TRINITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SPOUSES
CARLOS ABACAN AND ELIZABETH ABACAN. G.R. No. 183858, April 17, 2013
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out
by strong hand, violence or terror. SPOUSES ARMANDO SILVERIO, SR. and REMEDIOS SILVERIO v.

SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN MARCELO/SPOUSES EVELYN and RICARDO MARCELO v.

SPOUSES ARMANDO SILVERI, SR. and REMEDIOS SILVERIO. G.R. Nos. 184079/184490, April 17,
2013.
The existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the
properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court
from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity
exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the
property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the DEPARTMENT FO THE PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v. SPOUSES
WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO. G.R. No. 187677, April 17, 2013.
The failure of police officers to mark the items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately
upon its confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of
custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. Marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE L. DUMALAG. G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013
The granduncle, or more specifically the brother of the victims grandfather, is a relative of the victim in
the fourth civil degree, and is thus not covered by Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1) of the Revised Penal
Code. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOT. G.R. No. 189280,
April 17, 2013
Despite the failure of the apprehending officers to make an inventory of and to photograph the items
seized from Aguilar, they were nevertheless able to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence had been preserved, the chain of custody of such items, having been adequately established in
the case at bar. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARILYN AGUILAR y MANZANILLO. G.R. No.
191396, April 17, 2013
In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or
any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original
record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction,
at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending. SPOUSES FELIX CHINGKOE and ROSITA CHINGKOE v. SPOUSES FAUSTINO CHINGKOE
and GLORIA CHINGKOE. G.R. No. 185518, April 17, 2013.
Fujiki, Marinays first spouse, filed an action for recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying the second
bigamous marriage of her marriage to Maekara. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be
reflected in the civil registry.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89
and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "the term of
prescription of the crime of bigamy shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago." MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and the ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE. G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

After Mercado was granted immunity and placed under the witness protection program, the
Sandiganbayan refused to recognize his immunity by declining to discharge him from the information as a
state witness. The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has
vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to

employ an accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose
mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts. Courts should
generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can
be used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION),
ANTONIO P. BELICENA, ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., RAUL C. DE VERA, ROSANNA P. DIALA
and JOSEPH A. CABOTAJE. G.R. Nos. 185729-32, June 26, 2013. J. Abad

For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties or any of them. Otherwise stated, there is a question of law when the issue
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the issue involves
the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. In the present case, the controversy arises not from the findings
made by Hammonia and Dorchesters physicians which contradict the fit-to-work certification of the
company-designated physician; it arises from the application of the law and jurisprudence on the
conflicting assessments of the two sets of physicians. PHILIPPINE HAMMONIA SHIP AGENCY, INC.
and DORCHESTER MARINE, LTD. v. EULOGIO DUMADAG. G.R. No. 194362, June 26, 2013.

Abdul was convicted despite the evidentiary gaps in the testimonies of the police officers. The chain-ofcustody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus delicti presented in court is
shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the accused or from the crime scene.
Two crucial links must be complied with. First, the seized illegal drug must be marked in the presence of
the accused and immediately upon confiscation. This marking must be supported by details on how,
when, and where the marking was done, as well as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of
the seized drugs at every stage from confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station,
conveyance to the chemistry lab, and presentation to the court must be shown and substantiated.
It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of custody simply because the
plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried, sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive
for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated item throughout the entire process had
never been established. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DATU NOT ABDUL. G.R. No. 186137, June
26, 2013.
The CIAC rendered an arbitral award that was appealed to the CA through a Petition for Review under
Rule 43. With the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7902 and promulgation of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, the CIAC was included in the enumeration of quasijudicial agencies whose
decisions or awards may be appealed to the CA in a petition for review under Rule 43. Such review of the
CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, of law, or of fact and law. J PLUS ASIA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. UTILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION. G.R. No. 199650, June
26, 2013.

A petition was filed to assail a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 where it failed to pass upon the
intrinsic correctness of the NLRC decision. In reviewing the legal correctness of a CA decision rendered
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court examines the CA decision from the prism of whether it
correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it,
and not strictly on the basis of whether the NLRC decision under review is intrinsically
correct. POSEIDON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SERVICES, INC. v. TITO R. TAMALA, FELIPE S.
SAURIN, JR. ARTEMIO A. BO-OC and JOEL S. FERNANDEZ. G.R. No. 186475, June 26, 2013

Under the requirements, it is clear that only fifteen (15) days may initially be requested, not the
thirty (30) days petitioner requested. The petitioner cannot also assume that his motion has been
granted if the CA did not immediately act.In any case, the late response cannot be used as an
excuse to delay the filing of its pleading as a party cannot make any assumption on how his
motion would be resolved. Precisely, a motion is submitted to the court for resolution and we

cannot allow any assumption that it would be granted. WILSON T. GO v. BPI FINANCE
CORPORATION. G.R. No. 199354, June 26, 2013

The Supreme Court has been regular in its declaration that "inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony
do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the
essential fact of the commission of rape."Besides, the task of evaluating the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies is best left to the RTC, which had the opportunity to scrutinize the witnesses directly
during the trial. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMAN ZAFRA y SERRANO.G.R. No. 197363,
June 26, 2013.
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial. The first is made by the public
prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court.The second is one made by
the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. VIRGINIA DE
LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and WESTDALE ASSETS,
LTD. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S. CAGUIOA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND
G.R. No. 178947, June 26, 2013PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TIMOTHY J. DESMOND. G.R. No.
179079, June 26, 2013.
When the witness rendered a clear and direct narration of the details of the buy-bust operation from the
moment the team was organized, upon receipt of the information from the confidential informant, to the
time the shabu was marked and turned over to the crime laboratory for examination, andabsent any
showing of ill-motive or bad faith on the part of the arresting officers, as in this case where accusedappellant testified that he did not know any of the members of the team, the doctrine of presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty finds application. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PETER
LINDA y GEROLAGA G.R. No. 200507, June 26, 2013
The defense of the accused that she was arrested without a valid warrant, thus making the seized items
the fruit of the poisonous tree, should fail, especially when the arrest falls under the instances when a
valid warrantless arrest can be made. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONICA MENDOZA y
TRINIDAD. G.R. No. 191267, June 26, 2013

We have reiterated in jurisprudence that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled
that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
binding upon this Court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMIL MORES. G.R. No. 189846, June 26,
2013.

A written admission, even if given without the assistance of counsel, can be admitted in evidence. More
so in this case, as petitioners written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by
his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment, and not during custodial investigation. CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of the subject property, thus making them
unable to remove the installed surveillance cameras on the corporations building, cannot be upheld
especially when the corporation who is managed by the family of petitioners. They are thus considered

parties-in-interest in the present case. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER
CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY. G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013.
Respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT had already been issued in favor of
petitioner. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. As
such, respondent had neither the right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription. RAYMUNDO
CODERIAS, as represented by his Attorney-In-Fact, MARLON M. CODERIAS v. ESTATE OF JUAN
CIDOCO, represented by its Administrator, DR. RAUL R. CARAG. G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
"shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature,
then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC. REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN. G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed
during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of
respondents cessation from office. Respondents cessation from office x x x does not warrant the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it
render said administrative case moot and academic. The Courts jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the
pendency of the case. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. RETIRED JUDGE GUILLERMO
ANDAYA. A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181, June 25, 2013.
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a
court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that
RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of
their conformity to the fundamental law." JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T.
DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPEGARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA. G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.

While the share was bought by Sime Darby and placed under the name of Mendoza, his title is only
limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of the clubs facilities and privileges while employed with
the company.Despite being informed by Sime Darby to stop using the facilities and privileges of the club
share, Mendoza continued to do so. Thus, in order to prevent further damage and prejudice to itself, Sime
Darby properly sought injunction in this case. SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. v. JESUS B.MENDOZA.
G.R. No. 202247, June 19, 2013
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be put into issue while in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, only questions of jurisdiction may be inquired into. CENTURY IRON
WORKS, INC. and BENITO CHUA v. ELETO B. BANAS. G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013.
.PD 27 encompasses only rice and corn land, i.e., agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn
under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy. In the instant case, since the landholdings cultivated by
respondents are primarily devoted to vegetable production, it is definitely outside the coverage, and
necessarily cannot properly be placed under the umbrella, of PD 27. Thus, as the RARAD found, the
landholdings cultivated by respondents which are portions of the subject lot were improperly placed under
PD 27 through OLT. CONRADA O. ALMAGRO v. SPS. MANUEL AMAYA, SR. and LUCILA
MERCADO, JESUS MERCADO, SR., and RICARDO MERCADO
G.R. No. 179685, June 19, 2013

The finding of the credibility of the testimonies of the arresting officers should prevail over the testimonies
of the accused-appellant and his friend-witnesses especially so when their respective testimonies were
inconsistent on material points. Even assuming that these were not substantial enough to doubt the
credibility of the testimonies of the defense witnesses, we cannot simply disregard the contradicting
testimonies of the accused-appellant on one hand and his witnesses on the other as to the place where
the arrest was made. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND CASTRO. G.R. No. 195777,
June 19, 2013.

The question as to what part of the body of the accused did the police officers recover the money does
not dissolve the elements of illegal sale and possession as minor inconsistencies do not negate or
dissolve the eyewitnesses positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Minor
inconsistencies in the narration of the arresting officers do not detract from their essential credibility as
long as their testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically believable. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. BENEDICT HOMAKY LUCIO. G.R. No. 191391, June 19, 2013.

The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in
the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, so long
as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
SPOUSES MANUEL SY AND VICTORIA SY v. GENALYN D. YOUNG. G.R. No. 169214, June 19,
2013.

The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a
Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim
that "the period of extension" in such a case "is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from
the original expiration of the period." The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that "any extension
of time to file the required pleading should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of
the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday." REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL
SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS, PTE., LTD. v. CAPTAIN FRANCISCO
B.GUEVARRA. G.R. No. 157020, June 19, 2013.
The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondent. Since respondents motion to dismiss was filed
after petitioner has completed the presentation of its evidence in the trial court, we can say that the filing
of the motion to dismiss was a mere ploy on the part of respondent to delay the prompt resolution of the
case against her. BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G.
TOLEDO. G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013.
In petitions for review under Rule 45, only questions of law must be raised.It is elementary rule that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Here, the
findings of the Labor Arbiter, on one hand, and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, on the other, are
conflicting, thus we are constrained to determine the facts of the case. CONCRETE SOLUTIONS,
INC./PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORPORATION, represented by ANASTACIO G. ARDIENTE, JR. v.
ARTHUR CABUSAS. G.R. No. 177812, June 19, 2013.
The CA can grant a petition when the factual findings complained of are not supported by the evidence on
record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice; when the findings
of the NLRC contradict those of the LA; and when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. Thus,
contrary to the contention of petitioner, the CA can review the finding of facts of the NLRC and the
evidence of the parties to determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding that there
was no illegal dismissal against respondent. UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT INC. v. WILLIAM M. SORIANO.
G.R. No. 182072, June 19, 2013.
The disputable presumptions provided under Rule 131, Sec. 3 operate against an adversary who has not
introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie

case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden
of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time
being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place
of evidence unless rebutted. HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO, ANTONIO D. ROSAROSO, MANUEL D.
ROSAROSO, ALGERICA D. ROSAROSO, and CLEOFE R. LABINDAO v. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA,
SPOUSES HAM SOLUTAN and LAILA SOLUTAN, and MERIDIAN REALTY CORPORATION. G.R.
No. 194846, June 19, 2013.

Courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such
findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers. On the other hand, the
courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justices determination of probable cause only through a
special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a
quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the
requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. IRIS KRISTINE
BALOIS ALBERTO and BENJAMIN D. BALOIS v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY.
RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL
CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA. G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013. THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MUNTINLUPA, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY, BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, and IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS
ALBERTO v. ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA,
JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA. G.R. No. 182132, June 19, 2013.

The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given
by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised
without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other
words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn
from these facts are correct is a question of law. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v. ROSA REYES, CENANDO, REYES and CARLOS REYES. G.R. No. 194247, June 19, 2013.

As to the credibility of witnesses, the trial judge can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth,
being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value
were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying and detect if they were lying. Moreover, even if there are no eyewitnesses to the commission of
the crime, especially so if the crime is rape, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to by the courts.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNESTO DELA CRUZ @ BERNING. G.R. No. 183091, June 19,
2013.
A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge.
As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR) v. ARIEL R. MARQUEZ. G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013. IRENEO M. VERDILLO v.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR). G.R. No. 192287, June 18,
2013.

The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in remedial law. Indeed, by restricting the review of judgments
or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari before this Court, the Constitution
and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors of

jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple
errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewedeven by this Court. ROBERTO B.
REBLORA v. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195842, June 18, 2013.
There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law. The first
mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It is
done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in
cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition
for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies in the type of
jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed. DARMA MASLAG v.
ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, and REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUET. G.R. No.
174908, June 17, 2013.

Prosecution's failure to prove the second and third elements of the violation of BP 22, it can be deduced
that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the first and fourth elements, i.e., (1) a person
draws and issues a check and (4) the check is dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds or credit.
Hence, the fact that petitioner was proven to have drawn and issued a check and that the same was
subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion that the fact from which her
civil liability might arise, indeed, exists. As such, the RTC correctly entertained the respondents appeal
of the civil aspect of the case. LUCILLE DOMINGO v. MERLINDA COLINA. G.R. No. 173330, June 17,
2013.

A supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable
judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes
the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A
supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of
new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties
were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time.
SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO and DEMETRIO ABRIGO v. JIMMY F. FLORES, EDNA F. FLORES, DANILO
FLORES, BELINDA FLORES, HECTOR. FLORES, MARITES FLORES, HEIRS OF MARIA F. FLORES,
JACINTO FAYLONA, ELISA FAYLONA MAGPANTAY, MARIETTA FAYLONA CARTACIANO, and
HEIRS of TOMASA BANZUELA VDA. DE FAYLONA. G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013.

The fact that petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the funds of the association of the year 2000
which were received by him in trust, already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or
conversion of said properties to petitioners own personal use. ABELARDO JANDUSAY v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 185129, June 17, 2013.

The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a]
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." The
factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully
arrested. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search and seizure made by
the police officers were likewise valid. Hence, appellants claim of unreasonable search and
seizure must fail. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA
COLLADO Y SENICA, MARK CIPRIANO Y ROCERO, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO Y ENRIQUE,
AND REYNALDO RANADA Y ALAS. G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a certiorari petition
may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. However, this rule is not absolute as
jurisprudence has laid down several recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action
for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION, ARNEL
U. TY, MARI ANTONETTE N. TY, ORLANDO REYES, FERRER SUAZO and ALVIN U. TY v. PETRON
CORPORATION, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and SHELL INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED. G.R. No. 194062, June 17, 2013
Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these
elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i)
identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject
matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii)
identity of causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY: LOLIBETH SOTTO NOBLE,
DANILO C. SOTTO, CRISTINA C. SOTTO, EMMANUEL C. SOTTO, and FILEMON C. SOTTO; and
SALVACION BARCELONA, AS HEIR OF DECEASED MIGUEL BARCELONA v. MATILDE S.
PALICTE. G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013
The nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title under R.A. No. 26 denotes a
restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and
condition. The purpose of such a proceeding is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after
proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred. The same R.A. No.
26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for
reconstitution of a certificate of title. Failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a
petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
EDWARD M. CAMACHO. G.R. No. 185604, June 13, 2013
The material inconsistencies asserted by the accused-appellant which allegedly create grave doubts are,
on the contrary, too minor, trivial and inconsequential to affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
the inconsistencies having been fully and sufficiently explained during trial by the witnesses themselves,
and their explanations having been accepted by the Trial Court. Besides, it has been held, time and
again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not destroy the
witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL REBOTAZO y ALEJANDRA. G.R. No. 192913,
June 13, 2013.
The assertion by petitioner that parts of onw of the witness testimony were inconsistent with that of the
other witnesses cannot be given credence. It should be noted that the witnesses saw the incident from
different vantage points, the former being a passive eyewitness, and latter being direct witnesses to the
incident. As such, the latter were able to observe events that the latter might have overlooked or failed to
see. JOSELITO RAMOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 194384, June 13, 2013
Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion by a public officer on whom the law
imposes the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which the officer is required to
act. Neither can mandamus be issued unless a clear right of the bidder is shown. Mandamus does not
lie if the right is doubtful.PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE v. STRATEGIC
DEVELOPMENT and/or PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION. G.R. No. 200402, June 13, 2013

While the provisions of the Rules of Court apply to Special Agrarian Court proceedings, it is clear that,
unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court, the appointment of a commissioner or
commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the parties.And
since neither party objected to the appointment of commissioners, the proper fees to be paid to them
should likewise be governed by the Rules of Court. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATTY.
RICARDO D. GONZALEZ. G.R. No. 185821, June 13, 2013

The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes,
including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. Basic is the rule that the "jurisdiction
of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of
a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief
prayed for irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by Fritzi C. Pantoja, in her capacity as the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR-Laguna v. PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS EQUITIES, INC.,
JIMMY CHUA, ROJAS CHUA, BENJAMIN SIM, SANTOS C. TAN, WILLIAM C. LEE and STEWART C.
LIM. G.R. No. 176838, June 13, 2013

Denial is intrinsically a weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility. To be sure, it is negative, self-serving evidence that cannot be given evidentiary weight
greater than that of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Time-tested is the rule that
between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the
former indisputably deserves more credence and evidentiary weight. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
PERCIVAL DELA ROSA y BAYER. G.R. No. 201723, June 13, 2013
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review
for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of
questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF VALENZUELA
FACULTY ASSOCIATION (SJA VFA)-FUR CHAPTER-TUCP v. ST. JOSEPH ACADEMY OF
VALENZUELA and DAMASO D. LOPEZ. G.R. No. 182957, June 13, 2013

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, interventions have
been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of
justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the
petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,
and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory.DEOGENES O.
RODRIGUEZ v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHINESE CHARITABLE
ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No. 184589, June 13, 2013
In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial courts
findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ABEL DIAZ. G.R. No. 200882, June 13, 2013
The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or
resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding
evidence that is material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without
looking into the evidence of the parties. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. LEANDRO
LEGASPI. G.R. No. 202791, June 10, 2013

What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or

administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by different fora upon the same issues. KAPISANANG PANGKAUNLARAN NG
KABABAIHANG POTRERO, INC. and MILAGROS H. REYES v. REMEDIOS BARRENO, LILIBETH
AMETIN, DRANREV F. NONAY, FREDERICK D. DIONISIO and MARITES CASIO. G.R. No. 175900,
June 10, 2013

Out-of-court identifications, when the same is not supported by detailed narrations, cannot be given
weight. For no way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and
reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; the length of time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally
justifies our strict treatment and assessment of Linos testimony.
That being said, there can be conviction if the prosecution can establish the appellants participation in
the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the accused, and none other, committed the imputed crime, and such was done in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA and BENJAMIN
JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused. BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No.
191752, June 10, 2013.
The "equiponderance of evidence" rule states that when the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and
there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the
defendant. Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claim; even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the
defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to
establish his cause of action. VALBUECO, INC. v. PROVINCE OF BATAAN, represented by its
Provincial Governor ANTONIO ROMAN; EMMANUEL M. AQUINO, in his official capacity as
Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Balanga, Bataan; and PASTOR P. VICHUACO, in his official
capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Balanga, Bataan. G.R. No. 173829, June 10, 2013
It is the swearing of a person before the Notary Public and the latters act of signing and affixing his seal
on the deed that is material and not the submission of the notarial report. Parties who appear before a
notary public to have their documents notarized should not be expected to follow up on the submission of
the notarial reports. They should not be made to suffer the consequences of the negligence of the Notary
Public in following the procedures prescribed by the Notarial Law. Such notarization gives prima facie
evidence of the due execution of the releases, waivers, and quitclaims; and since such were not refuted
nor disputed by complainants herein, thus, we have no recourse but to uphold their due execution.
BENIGNO M. VIGILLA, ALFONSO M. BONGOT, ROBERTO CALLESA, LINDA C. CALLO, NILO B.
CAMARA, ADELIA T. CAMARA, ADOLFO G. PINON, JOHN A. FERNANDEZ, FEDERICO A. CALLO,
MAXIMA P. ARELLANO, JULITO B. COST ALES, SAMSON F. BACHAR, EDWIN P. DAMO, RENA TO
E. FERNANDEZ, GENARO F.CALLO, JIMMY C. ALETA, and EUGENIO SALINAS v. PHILIPPINE
COLLEGE OF CRIMINOLOGY INC. and/or GREGORY ALAN F. BAUTISTA. G.R. No. 200094, June
10, 2013
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a valid
cause. Failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. In this relation, the
quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence which, as defined in case
law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. SURIGAO DEL
NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., and/or DANNY Z. ESCALANTE v. TEOFILO GONZAGA
G.R. No. 187722, June 10, 2013.

The solo performance by SPO1 Dela Victoria of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of the offense
is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself, in serious doubt. No
definite answer can be established regarding the question as to who possessed what from the time of the
alleged apprehension until the trial of the case. We are left in doubt whether or not the sachet of shabu
allegedly seized from Calumbres was the very same object offered in court as the corpus delicti, or if a
sachet of anything was in fact seized from Calumbres.SPO1 Dela Victorias claim that the sachet of
shabu presented in court was the same one confiscated from Calumbres, cannot be taken at its face
value, solely on the presumption of regularity of ones performance of duty. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA CALUMBRES y AUDITOR. G.R. No. 194382, June 10, 2013
Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the regulatory philosophy
adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal case filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman and that remedy is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. AMANDO P. CONTES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), VICTORY M.
FERNANDEZ, JULIO E. SUCGANG and NILO IGTANLOC. G.R. Nos. 187896-97, June 10, 2013
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same
time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive
unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several
tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the others. ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. G.R. No. 198755, June 5,
2013
First level courts are clothed with the power to preliminarily resolve questions on the ownership of real
property, if necessary, to arrive at the proper and complete determination of the question on physical
possession or possession de facto. Thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, the MTCC should have taken
cognizance of the complaint as it was well within its jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, considering that B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, has distinctly defined and granted the MTCC with jurisdiction, it is the trial courts
duty and obligation to exercise the same when properly invoked.. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIONISIO DELOY and PRAXEDES MARTONITO, represented by POLICARPIO
DELOY. G.R. No. 192893, June 5, 2013.
Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it. This doctrine is based on the grounds
of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his
own act, representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who
reasonably relied on it. Thus, in order for this doctrine to operate, a representation must have been made
to the detriment of another who relied on it. In other words, estoppel would not lie against one who, in the
first place, did not make any representation. SPOUSES RUBIN AND PORTIA HOJAS v. PHILIPPINE
AMANAH BANK AND RAMON KUE. G.R. No. 193453, June 5, 2013
An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is
a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns
the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.No
one shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound
by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an
action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant
thereto.GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC. v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL, SPS. ENRIQUE T. MORAGA and
VICTORIA SORIANO, FILCON READY MIXED, INC., DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), and REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUA YAN
BRANCH. G.R. No. 175542, June 5, 2013. VICTORIA P. CABRAL v. PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR,
JOSEPH NOEL C. LONGBOAN I OFFICE OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR, GREEN

ACRES HOLDINGS, INC., SPOUSES ENRIQUE T. MORAGA and VICTORIA SORIANO and FILCON
READY MIXED, INC. G.R. No. 183205, June 5, 2013

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that mandates strict
compliance. It was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law
enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those suspected to
be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly
construed against the government, stringent compliance therewith is fully justified. RODRIGO RONTOS y
DELA TORRE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 188024, June 5, 2013
Settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and
identification of an accused by the complainant. Positive identification where categorical and consistent
and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a
denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO
GANI y TUPAS. G.R. No. 195523, June 5, 2013.

The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE - REGIONAL FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII) vs. ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, OSMEA
I. MONTAER, RAKMA B. BUISAN, HELEN M. ALVAREZ, NEILA P. LIMBA, ELIZABETH B. PUSTA,
ANNA MAE A. SIDENO, UDTOG B. TABONG, JOHN S. KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANG
W. MACMOD, FLORENCE S. TAYUAN, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other officials and
employees of DA-RFU XII. G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam the power of the court to render a personal
judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the
action is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in
actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not
required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an actionas long as it acquires jurisdiction over the
resthat is thesubject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.ALLEN
A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R.
GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR. G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013

In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is
substantial evidence. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court defines substantial evidence as that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
The settled rule provides that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are
affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to review evidence on record
and assess the probative weight thereof. DR. ZENAIDA P. PIA v. HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO,
JR., Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Formerly Acting Ombudsman, Office of the Ombudsman, Dr.
OFELIA M. CARAGUE, Formerly PUP President, Dr. ROMAN R. DANNUG, Formerly Dean, College
of Economics, Finance and Politics (CEFP), now Associate Professor, CEFP Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP), Sta. Mesa, Manila. G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective
defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in custody
because of a judicial process or a valid judgment. MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS, represented by
the CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR), through its Executive
Director, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS; and the NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through its Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES, JR. v.
SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO, DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM,
PANABO CITY, DIGOS DAVAO DEL NORTE. G.R. No. 182855, June 5, 2013
"AAAs" momentary inaction will neither diminish nor affect her credibility. "The filing of complaints of rape
months, even years, after their commission may or may not dent the credibility of witness and of
testimony, depending on the circumstances attendant thereto." "It does not diminish the complainants
credibility or undermine the charges of rape when the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear
instilled by the threats of bodily harm, specially by one who exercises moral ascendancy over the victim."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUILLERMO LOMAQUE. G.R. No. 189297, June 5, 2013
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This rule is, however,
not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the
seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. Though there are deviations from the required
procedure, what is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MYLENE TORRES. G.R. No. 191730, June 05, 2013
The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor
details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence
and positive identification of the assailant. The prosecution witnesses positive identification prevails over
the mere denial of appellant. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense. When unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, it is negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARIEL CALARA. G.R. No. 197039, June 05, 2013
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice,
and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order, but such conduct
which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully
and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of
monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory.
However,respondents act was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually
providing for the needs of his children. SUSAN LIM-LUA v. DANILO Y. LUA. G.R. Nos. 175279-80,
June 05, 2013
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim
that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Moreover,
it is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving
assertion that deserves no weight in law because denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and
categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of the complainant and
the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO BUSTAMANTE. G.R. No. 189836, June 05, 2013
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in
fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame
to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are

generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a
horrible story.
As between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on
the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so
far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was in the
immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of commission of the crime. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PIOSANG. G.R. No. 200329, June 05, 2013.

A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely warrant a relaxation of the rules. Verily, the
party invoking such should be able to show that the procedural oversight or lapse is attended
by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen fortuitousness which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against so as to justify the relief sought. The standard of care required is that
which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important business. In this accord, the duty
rests on every counsel to see to adopt and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take
into account all court notices sent to him. HENRY L. SY v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON
CITY. G.R. No. 202690, June 5, 2013.
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis,
gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness credibility, and
the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. MOISES CAOILE. G.R. No. 203041, June 5, 2013
Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by
the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, not because of the strict
application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic considerations of due process dictate
that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be
considered by a reviewing court, except when their factual bases would not require presentation of any
further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to properly meet the issue raised. JOSELITO
C. BORROMEO v. JUAN T. MINA. G.R. No. 193747, June 5, 2013

The Court held that the original period for filing the petition for review may be extended for a
period of fifteen (15) days, which for the most compelling reasons, may be extended for
another period not exceeding fifteen (15) days. In other words, the reglementary period
provided under Section 3, Rule 8 of the RRCTA is extendible and as such, CTA Divisions grant of
respondents motion for extension falls squarely within the law. METRO MANILA SHOPPING
MECCA CORP., SHOEMART, INC., SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., STAR APPLIANCES CENTER,
SUPER VALUE, INC., ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC., HEALTH AND BEAUTY, INC.,
JOLLIMART PHILS. CORP., and SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION v. MS. LIBERTY M.
TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, and THE CITY OF MANILA.
G.R. No. 190818, June 5, 2013.
Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is
nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a

demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R. No.
182963, June 3, 2013.
The broader interests of justice and equity demand that we set aside procedural rules as they
are, after all, intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice. If the rigid and
pedantic application of procedural norms would frustrate rather than promote justice, the
Court always has the power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation,
particularly if defects of jurisdiction appear to be present. ERNESTO L. NATIVIDAD v.
FERNANDO MARIANO, ANDRES MARIANO and DOROTEO GARCIA. G.R. No. 179643, June 3,
2013.
It has been settled that affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony
especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Absent clear and convincing
evidence, alibi and denial are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be proved, not only that the assailant was in another place
when the crime was committed, but that it was physically impossible for him to be present at
the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission altogether. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. REGGIE BERNARDO. G.R. No. 198789, June 3, 2013.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. When the defendant,
however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case
brought by a vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of a right to hold possession. WILLIAM T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO,
substituted by his legal heirs TERESITA C. LOOYUKO, et. al. G.R. No. 196529, July 1, 2013.
When there is only one witness to the crime and that he was familiar with both the victim and the
accused, it can therefore be established that such witness is telling the truth. Finding of guilt based on the
testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon. "For although the number of witnesses may be considered
a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and
conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEMARI JALBONIAN alias BUDO. G.R. No. 180281, July 01,
2013.
When a party files an appeal bond amounting to at least 90% of the amount it was adjudged to pay, such
payment can be considered as substantial compliance. The bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed
when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant
shows willingness to post a partial bond. ROY D. PASOS v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION. G.R. No. 192394, July 03, 2013
When the Office of the Ombudsman decides on a case, the Court of Appeals has no authority nor
discretion to stay such decision as this would tantamount to an encroachment on the rule-making powers
of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the
Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN v. ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ, ROLANDO L. LONTOC, SR. et al. G.R. No. 172206,
July 03, 2013
When a party fails to specify the assessed value of the property subject matter of the action, this court to
which it was filed, will not acquire jurisdiction over the case. This is because what determines the nature
of the action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. HEIRS OF JOSE FERNANDO v. REYNALDO DE BELEN. G.R. No.
186366, July 03, 2013
When the parties executed a compromise agreement, such agreement does not extinguish the obligation
of the debtor; hence, the attachment to his property should continue to subsist such obligation is fully
complied with. While the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an attachment
lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said
lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
ALFREDO C. LIM, JR. v. SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO and CARMEN T. LAZARO. G.R. No. 185734,
July 03, 2013
When a witness takes participation in a case, it is only mandated that he possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. There is no provision of the Rules
disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law
does not provide default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the
operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS v.
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. ANDRESS NAVARRO, JR. G.R. No. 198240, July 03, 2013
The allegation that the petitioners are the lawful heirs is not sufficient to be entitled to the relief. There is a
need to institute a separate special proceeding for heirship before the said heirs can be considered real
parties-in-interest and without such, any complaint instituted by them shall not prosper for failure to state
a cause of action.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is wellsettled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this
relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its
face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON,
NAMELY ALVARO YPON, et al. v. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE, ETC, ET.AL. G.R. No.
198680, July 08, 2013
A party aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision,
but only insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is
already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or modified. An action for revival of
judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to
be revived or enforced. HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR. v. PABLO R. MIRANDA. G.R. No.
179638, July 08, 2013
When there is a delay in the execution of the decision caused by the respondent for his own
advantage, the five-year period to enforce the same shall be suspended. The Rules of Court provide that
a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or
by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows
exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions
have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor
and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v.
FEDERICO A. SERRA. G.R. No. 203241, July 10, 2013
When petitioner files a claim for attorneys fees, he may do such as an incident in the main action or have
it instituted in a separate action. While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment is
rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held
in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim for attorneys fees may arise has become
final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. FRANCISCO L.

ROSARIO, JR. v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN, et al. G.R. No. 191247, July 10,
2013
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial
question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through
falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 161075. JULY 15, 2013
When the commission, having no knowledge of a prior dismissal, fixes the reckoning point of the period of
disallowance at an erroneous date, it does not tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Not every error
in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.
ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, in her capacity as then Administrator of POEA v. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, represented by CHAIRMAN REYNALDO VILLAR and COMMISSIONER JUANITO G.
ESPINO, JR.. G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013
When a party assails the legality of an official act, he must first establish that he has a direct and personal
interest. Not only should they show that the act is invalid but they must sustain that they may suffer as a
result of its enforcement. Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to
bring a matter to the court for adjudication. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, et. al. v. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, et. al. G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013
Co-parties before the RTC and CA cannot be made adversary parties in a petition for review on certiorari.
There is no basis to treat the co-parties as such when it cannot be shown that there was a cross-claim
filed against said co-parties. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set
up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against her co-defendants before the RTC,
petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition. JOYCE V. ARDIENTE v. SPOUSES
JAVIER and MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CDO WATER DISTRICT and GASPAR GONZALEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
When a trial court merely denied a motion for being unmeritorious without further elaborating on the
bases of its conclusion, it then fails to perform its bounden-duty to make an independent evaluation of the
merits of the case. Such failure of the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. CAROLINA B. JOSE v. PURITA SUAREZ. G.R. No. 17611 July 17, 2013

When a party files a motion to quash information for bigamy based on the trial courts declaration that his
marriage is null and void ab initio, the same cannot be granted. A motion to quash information is the
mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It
is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which
are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN. G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013

When a witness fails to positively identify the accused as the victims assailant and that there are
inconsistencies between his affidavit and testimony, the same shall not affect his credibility.
Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters not to the central fact of the crime
do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses declarations, as long as
these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRIS
CORPUZ y BASBAS. G.R. No. 191068, July 17, 2013

When there are inconsistencies with the testimonies of two witnesses, this does not exculpate the
accused from criminal liability and does not ignore the fact that one witness was able to unequivocally
identify the accused as the gunman. It cannot be denied that once a person gains familiarity of another,
identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. BOBBY ABEL AVELINO
y BULAWAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013.
The fact that the inventory was made at the accused-appellants house and not at the scene of the buybust operation did not adversely affect the chain of custody. If it is shown that the illicit drugs seized from
accused-appellant are the same illicit drugs marked and subjected to physical inventory then the chain of
custody was continuous and the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs seized
from accused-appellant were preserved. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO ANDY
SOMOZA y HANDAYA. G.R. No. 197250, July 17, 2013
When the victim commits a mistake in remembering the dates when she was raped, such does not
contradict the fact that she did not consent to the sexual act. A rape victim is not expected to make an
errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might in fact be trying to obliterate
it from her memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the
testimony of the offended party. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARVIN CRUZ. G.R. No. 201728,
July 17, 2013
When a party is detained for legal reasons, she cannot avail of the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention
is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ
will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record. ANITA MANGILA v. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ET AL. G.R. No. 160739,
July 17, 2013
When a party files motion for reconsideration which is not set for hearing, it renders the motion without no
legal effect. It is considered a pro forma motion which shall not toll the reglementary period of the appeal.
This requirement is mandatory Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant
except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse
party. DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 168651 & 169000, July 17, 2013

When the COMELEC reviews the registration of party lists, it must give the latter the opportunity to be
heard and to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements for the
accreditation. However, a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; Rule
17 of the COMELECs Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the
standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process. COALITION OF ASSOCIATION
OF SENIOR CITIZEN IN THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC. G.R. No. 206844-45/G.R. No. 206982, July
23, 2013
A plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending case
if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case,
Section 5(a) of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending. ABBOTT LABORATORIES,
PHILS., et al. v. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ. G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013
When a party to a case wishes to request for subpoena duces tecum, it must be established first that the
records would have been offered as evidence for admission in court. Otherwise, such request is
premature. Furthermore, Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the
offer of such evidence for admission in court. JOSIELEN LARA CHAN v. JOHNNY T. CHAN
G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013

When a party fails to comply with a pre-requisite mandated by law, he does not therefore acquire any
legal right to be protected by an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights.
Where the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. PROVINCE OF
CAGAYAN, represented by HON. ALVARO T. ANTONIO, et. al. v. JOSEPH LASAM LARA. G.R. No.
188500, July 24, 2013
When a party causes a publication short of the thirty-day period preceding the hearing, there is a
mandatory publication notice required under the Rules of Court. The law clearly requires that (a) notice of
the petition should be published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette; and (b) publication
should be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing. Substantial compliance with this
jurisdictional requirement is not enough. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICORDITO N. DE ASIS,
JR. G.R. No. 193874, July 24, 2013
The victims mental retardation does not affect her credibility of her testimony. Mental retardation per se
does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her
testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the
court. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she
can make them known to the court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NINOY ROSALES y ESTO. G.R.
No. 197537, July 24, 2013.
A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of sight,
remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and
experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with
others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in
this case, sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to
make observations and he/she can make those observations known to others. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS. G.R. No. 181539, July 24, 2013
When a land dispute or problem is lodged before COSLAP, it is not assumed that it has jurisdiction over
it. Under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those
involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease
agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants. Outside said scope, COSLAP has no authority to
resolve the case before it. DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BASES
CONVERSATION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. G.R. No. 192896, July 24, 2013
When there are clear inconsistencies in the testimony or presentation of the facts of the prosecution, the
accused cannot be convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. If
the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present
evidence on its own behalf, in which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily
be acquitted. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE CLARA y BUHAIN. G.R. No. 195528, July 24,
2013

When the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. SPS
ARGOVAN and FLORIDA GADEITANO v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION. G.R. No. 188767, July 24,
2013

.
When the agencies and their public records are involved and affected by any decision rendered in a
petition for correction filed by a party, it is thus required that they are made parties to said proceeding.
They are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. An
indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. The absence
of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be
estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. POLICE SENIOR
SUPERINTENDENT DIMAPINTO MACAWADIB v. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT. G.R. No. 186610, July 29, 2013.
When a party raises issues involving questions of facts, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is not proper. Such petition covers only questions of law. In this relation, questions
of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court unless exceptions are found to exist.
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is well-defined. A question of law exists
when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on
the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. SARABIA MANOR HOTEL CORPORATION. G.R. No. 175844, July 29, 2013
When courts appoint a receiver, it must not only consider the reasons given by the owners of the
properties. Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury resulting
from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left
undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights
deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership. MILA
CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE v. DOMINILDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE
CABOVERDA-YU, et al. G.R. No. 203585, July 29, 2013
When the PAC was appointed as commissioners for the determination of just compensation, there was
no contravention to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Although the appointment of commissioners is
mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on the appointment, other than that
the commissioners should not number more than three and that they should be competent and
disinterested parties.NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. SPS. SALVADOR AND NENITA CRUZ, et
al. G.R. No. 165386, July 29, 2013
When a person is not impleaded in a case, he cannot be bound by the decision therein and consequently,
he was not given the opportunity to present his case. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by
a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Not being a party to the case, he has the right to vindicate
his claim in a separate action. TERESA C. AGUILAR, et al. v. MICHAEL J. OPALLICK. G.R. No.
182280, July 29, 2013
The daughter of the deceased may be entitled to the issuance of letters of administration as she is one of
the preferred persons enumerated by law to such. An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one
who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as
a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIZON,
et al. v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON. G.R. No.
189121, July 31, 2013
When a party files a second motion for reconsideration, it is considered as a prohibited pleading and as
such, the Court will dismiss it. This rule, however, is not absolute. A second motion for reconsideration
may be allowed if there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons therefor, and upon express leave of court
first obtained. RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA
RUEDA-ACOSTA REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF SHERIFFS EXPENSES.
A.M. No. 11-10-03, July 30, 2013

When there is a pending civil case challenging the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure, such
pendency does not bar the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession after said foreclosure, sale
of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of the one-year period. As a ministerial function of the court,
the judge need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, as these are the
questions that should be properly decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in the pending case filed
before it. DONNA C. NAGTALON v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK. G.R. No. 172504, July 31,
2013.
When a party resorts to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it must be shown that there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to it other than such petition. If, however, the order partakes of a
final adjudication, the proper remedy therefore should be appeal, under Rule 41. A petition for certiorari is
not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of
remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
basis is grave abuse of discretion. FAUSTINO T. CHINGKOE and GLORIA CHINGKOE v. Republic of
the Philippines, represented by THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS. G.R. No. 183608, July 31, 2013
When there is absence of direct evidence to prove that the appellant caused the crime charged of him,
circumstantial evidence may be availed of. To justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of the accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALAMANDA MACABANDO. G.R. No.
188708, July 31, 2013
When a petitioner wishes to file an action for unlawful detainer, there should first be a demand to pay or
to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso
facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate
the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenants refusal or failure to vacate,
which make unlawful withholding of possession. MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN v. SPS. RODRIGO C.
MARCELO and CARMEN T. MARCELO. G.R. No. 197725, July 31, 2013
When a witness commits discrepancies relating to minor details and collateral matters, such testimony
does not affect the veracity of the witness declarations. It is an oft-repeated doctrine that the testimony of
even a single eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as such testimony is found to be
clear and straight-forward and worthy of credence by the trial court. ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 181119, July 31, 2013
When a party is deprived of his day in court because of her counsels failure to notify him, such is not
excusable and cannot be considered by the court. The failure of a partys counsel to notify him on time of
the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable. Notice
sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of
an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face. RHODORA PRIETO v. ALPADI DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION. G.R. No. 191025, July 31, 2013
When the court liberally allows the petitioner-spouses to file their petition five days after the extended
period, there is no ground to believe that the court gravely abused its discretion when it subsequently
dismissed the petition. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave
abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous
concept that may easily be manipulated to suit ones purpose. SPOUSES JESUS DYCOCO and JOELA
E. DYCOCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 147257, July 31, 2013
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are
to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the
parties. When there are two criminal cases that are consolidated together, it must be for the purpose of
expediency and speedy disposition of justice. If not, the same shall be denied. ROMULO L. NERI v.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 202243, August 07, 2013

When the acts being prevented by a party have already been accomplished, a writ of prohibition is not
proper. A prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the
proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not
intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND
ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OR EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK v. THE MONETARY
BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and THE PHILIPPINE EPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION. G.R. No. 191424, August 07, 2013
When a court grants a motion to release founded on legal bases supporting its , it therefore did not
gravely abuse its discretion. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In order to be qualified as "grave," the abuse of discretion must be so
patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to
act at all in contemplation of law. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE v. COURT OF
TAX APPEALS ET AL. G.R. No. 168137, August 07, 2013
A trial court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. It must, however, be observed that the judges power to immediately dismiss a
criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. The judges dismissal of
a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish
probable cause that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ
MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE, ETC.v. ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA. G.R. No. 183014, August 07, 2013
When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the
same punishable act or omission. Furthermore, in Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is
reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party
to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly
liable is the offended party. LEE PUE LIONG a.k.a. PAUL LEE v. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE. G.R. No.
181658, August 07, 2013
When the validity of a land title has long been settled in a previous case, an action to annul the same is
already barred from being questioned in another case despite the fact that they are in different actions.
Conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of the causes of action for it to work. If a particular
point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of
that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive
in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY v. CORAZON B. BAELLO, ET AL. G.R. No. 200858, August 07, 2013
When the CA does not affirm the RTCs findings of facts, such as when both have ruleddifferently on the
identity of the lands in a case, the Supreme Court may then review the findings of fact of the appellate
court. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited
to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. However, the
Court enumerated the exceptional circumstances when the Supreme Court may review the findings of
fact of the CA, such as when the lower courts findings of fact are conflicting. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ANGELES BELLATE, ET AL. G.R. No. 175685, August 07, 2013
A Motion for Reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the
special civil action for certiorari. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to afford the NLRC an
opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can
be had.

It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure. It
is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK v. MARY SHEILA ARCOBILLAS. G.R. No. 179648, August 07, 2013
When a party wishes to compel another do a duty expected of the latter, the same should be through a
petition for certiorari and mandamus. However, to be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, the party
must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth requirement: it is
justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainants right is thus doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.
FLORD NICSON CALAWAG v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS, ET AL./ MICAH P.
ESPIA, ET AL. v. DR. CARLOS BAYLON, ET AL. G.R. No. 207412/207542, August 07, 2013
When a person wishes to correct or change the entries in the Civil Registrar regarding her name and
status, it is required that the indispensable parties must be impleaded in the proceedings. The Rules of
Court mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the
petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of
vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY. G.R. No. 198010, August 12, 2013
When a party wishes to appeal a decision rendered by the CSC, the CA has jurisdiction over the case
and the proper recourse is a petition for review under Rule 43. The jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for
review under Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. CITY GOVERNMENT OF
MAKATI, AS REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JEJOMAR C. BINAY v. EMERITA B. ODENA. G.R.
No. 191661, August 13, 2013
A party who files a complaint against another need not show proof that the acts alleged of happened. It is
sufficient that there is probable cause to file such case. The prosecutors findings on the existence of
probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been
made with grave abuse of discretion.A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. MASAYUKI HASEGAWA v. LEILA F. GIRON. G.R. No.
184536, August 14, 2013
When there is a similarity of parties, subject matter and cause of action and that judgments were issued
on the merits, a subsequent filing of an action involving the same elements are barred by the prior
judgment. However, the identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. The test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two
actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
COURT OF APPEALS. G.R. No. 155943, August 19, 2013
When there is a failure on the party to comply with Section 5, Rule 65, which is to implead other persons
in the case, it is not a ground to have the case dismissed. It is stated in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, states that neither the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action. HADJI PANGSAYAN T. ABDULRAHMAN v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR MINDANAO
AND GUIAMALUDIN A. SENDAD. G.R. No. 175977, August 19, 2013

Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the power of judicial review, the following must be extant:
(1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for
adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the "standing." Hence, when a case is still ripe or
premature, a party cannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking judicial intervention, like filing an action for
prohibition. ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICPAL MAYOR OF NAGCARLAN,
LAGUNA AND DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR
OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 186613, August 27, 2013
A party who, after complying with the requirements laid down by law, files a petition for continuing
mandamus may institute the same with the RTC having jurisdiction of the place in controversy.
Jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by
law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. A special civil action for continuing mandamus
shall be filed with the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or
omission occurred. MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON v. HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL. G.R. No. 199199,
August 27, 2013
When a party files another petition while one that is identical to it is pending before another tribunal, there
constitutes a ground for forum shopping since the relief sought is the same. Forum shopping is treated as
an act of malpractice and, in this accord, constitutes a ground for the summary dismissal of the actions
involved. To be sure, the rule against forum shopping seeks to prevent the vexation brought upon the
courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SUMITOMO CORPORATION / SUMITOMO CORPORATION v.
ASIA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. G.R. No. 196723/G.R. No. 196728,
August 28, 2013
When a party files a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari, the court should not
admit the same due to non-compliance with the reglementary period prescribed by the court. It is wellsettled that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, the Court has
recognized exceptions to the strict application of such rules, but only for the most compelling reasons
where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. However,
despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
which now disallows an extension of the 60-day reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari,
courts may nevertheless extend the same, subject to its sound discretion. MARIA LOURDES D.
CASTELLS AND SHALIMAR CENTI-MANDANAS v. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES. G.R. No. 188514,
August 28, 2013
When a trial court dismissed a case involving a rural bank, the same must be treated as a dismissal with
the character of finality. That being a final decision, the proper recourse that petitioner should have
availed of is the remedy under Rule 41, which is appeal, and not Rule 65. VIRGINIA M. VENZON v.
RURAL BANK OF BUENAVISTA, INC., represented by Lourdesita E. Parajes. G.R. No. 178031,
August 28, 2013
When the petitioners allege that the main purpose of their complaint is for collection of Agents
Compensation, Commission and Damages, it is nonetheless principally for the collection of a sum of
money representing the same and is thus not capable of pecuniary estimation. In determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. ARACELI J. CABRERA v. ANGELO G. FRANCISCO, ET AL. G.R. No. 172293, August 28, 2013

In a case of reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth, it is sufficient that the Republic prove their
demand through a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence refers to the comparative
weight of the evidence presented by the opposing parties. As such, it has been defined as "the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side," and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is proof that is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT v. LUZ REYES BAKUNAWA, ET AL. G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013

When an accused dies pending appeal of his conviction, such death extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Since the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO. G.R. No. 201447, August
28, 2013
When the NLRC promulgates a decision, the proper recourse from such is not to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 but instead, to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The petitions from Rule 45 and Rule 65 are not the same. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As a general rule, a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The filing of a
motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and
factual aspects of the case. MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA NG STAYFAST PHILS., INC. v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013
When the petitioner filed other pending actions involving the same people, same reliefs prayed for and
essentially the same issue, there exists forum shopping because the elements of litis pendentia are
present. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. LUCENA B.
RALLOS v. CITY OF CEBU G.R. No. 202651, August 28, 2013
The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be
trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused.
Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no
young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to public trial, if she was not motivated solely
by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
APOLIARIO MANALILI. G.R. No. 191253, August 28, 2013
When a party inappropriately files a petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal, the same
shall be dismissed. Appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court. FELY Y. YALONG v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013
Persons who are not parties to a case, either as petitioners, defendants or intervenors, they cannot
participate in the proceedings of the same. Consequently, they also cannot be adversely affected by the
outcome of such proceeding. A complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it
is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. The complaint-in-intervention
essentially latches on the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint
leads to its concomitant dismissal. B. STA. RITA & CO., INC. AND ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI v.
ANGELINE M. GUECO. G.R. No.193078, August 28, 2013

When the court ignored the fact that an objection was raised in the motion for reconsideration, it then
proceeded to say that the defense was not pleaded during trial so that it cannot be considered on appeal.
This is not correct. As principle that since the statement in the pleading is conclusive on the pleader, it is
unaffected by any contrary proof submitted by the pleader, whether or not objection is interposed by any
party. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BIENVENIDO CASTRO. G.R. No. 189125, August 28,
2013.
When there is a single eyewitness, her testimony is sufficient to support a conviction so long as such
testimony is found to be clear and straight-forward and worthy of credence by the trial court.
Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity of the
witness declarations. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOJIE SUANSING. G.R. No. 189822,
September 02, 2013
When a party fails to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal, the decision shall become final and
executory. Under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF PANGASUGAN,
BAYBAY, LEYTE v. EXPLORATION PERMIT APPLICATION OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL
COMPANY. G.R. No. 162226, September 02, 2013.
When a court has already ruled on a matter binding over an issue, another court cannot set aside the
ruling of said court which is of co-equal and coordinate standing.The doctrine of judicial stability states
that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale for the same is founded on the concept of jurisdiction verily, a
court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL. G.R. No. 169461, September 02, 2013
When the drugs confiscated from the accused were properly accounted for and forthrightly submitted to
the Crime Laboratory, there will be no suspicion as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
articles. The chain of custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. FREDDY SALONGA Y AFIADO. G.R. No. 194948, September 02, 2013.
The Heirs of Maximo Alvarez and Valentina Clave filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages
against Margarita Prodon. They alleged that Prodon maliciously made an entry in the TCT of the property
of the respondents, the entry states that the property had been sold to them with a right of repurchase.
The deed of sale with the right of repurchase had been lost.
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry.
In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that
purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and
the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document. HEIRS OF
MARGARITA PRODON v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE. G.R. No.
170604, September 2, 2013

The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners for lack of
sufficient basis both in fact and in law. The respondents filed their separate petitions before the DOJ. The
DOJ ordered the filing of separate informations against the respondents. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration. The DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that there was no probable cause. The
respondents elevated the matter to the CA. The CA annulled and set aside the recent Resolutions of the
DOJ. ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN AND RAINIER PUNZALAN v. MICHAEL
GAMALIEL J. PLATA AND RUBEN PLATA. G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013,
It a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave
the DOJ a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of the supposed offenders. The rule is based not only upon
the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the executive
department but upon practicality as well.
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders without giving
HOLCIM the chance to be heard. Since HOLCIM was not given an opportunity to rebut the petitioners
evidence, considering that the formers Manifestation and Motion for Ocular Inspection was denied,
justice will be better served if the trial court determines first the existence of documents relative to
HOLCIMs payments made to de Guzman, and if the same is not done, to receive further evidence, this
time, from both parties. In the examination of a person, corporation, or other juridical entity who has the
property of such judgment obligor or is indebted to him, and such person, corporation, or juridical entity
denies an indebtedness, the court may only authorize the judgment obligee to institute an action against
such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules gives the court
the authority to order such person or corporation to pay the judgment obligee and the court exceeds its
jurisdiction if it orders the person who denies the indebtedness to pay the same. The Court held that an
"execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one
who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision
can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties. LIGAYA ESGUERRA, ET AL.
v. HOLCIM PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 182571, September 2, 2013
Rivera claimed that AAA was his girlfriend and that sexual intercourse was consensual. AAA went to the
motel voluntarily. The sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense that must be supported by convincing
proof. Such defense is "effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently
places on accused-appellant the burden of proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence."
Independent proof is required. It cannot be argued that because AAA voluntarily went with Rivera to the
Ilang-Ilang Lodge, she consented to have sex with him. To presume otherwise would be non sequitur. It
must be noted that AAA, who was not in good terms with a co-worker, wanted a change in employer. She
easily believed Rivera who convinced her that he could help her look for a new job. Thus, she trusted
Rivera and went along with him because of his assurance that he could help her find a new employment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRISTOPHER RIVERA Y ROYO. G.R. No. 200508, September 4,
2013.

Alberto Lagaray filed a complaint for estafa against Gilbert Reyes for allegedly placing orders over the
phone and issuing a check with insufficient fund as payment. Alberto Ligaray expressly admitted that he
did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over the telephone.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce
against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the
elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to
discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Courts
constitutional duty to acquit him. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT REYES WAGAS. G.R.
No. 157943, September 4, 2013
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver
the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a

criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a
prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the
criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013
The DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of registered CLOAs relating to an
agrarian dispute between landowners and tenants. However, in cases concerning the cancellation of
CLOAs that involve parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees cases related to the
administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations - the jurisdiction is with the
DAR, and not the DARAB. It is the DAR and not the DARAB that has jurisdiction. First, the issue of
whether the CLOA issued to petitioners over respondents land should be cancelled hinges on that of
whether the subject landholding is exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of two zoning ordinances. This
question involves the DARs determination of whether the subject land is indeed exempt from CARP
coverage a matter involving the administrative implementation of the CARP Law. Second, respondents
complaint does not allege that the prayer for the cancellation of the CLOA was in connection with an
agrarian dispute. The complaint is centered on the fraudulent acts of the MARO, PARO, and the regional
director that led to the issuance of the CLOA. RODULFO VALCURZA AND BEATRIZ LASAGA, ET AL.
v. ATTY. CASIMIRO N. TAMPARONG, JR. G.R. No. 189874, September 4, 2013.

The CA issued a TRO in order to stop the demolition order. It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction
should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and
demonstrable. Here, there is no "irreparable injury" as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by
the petitioner, namely," immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients" and the cost of
the billboard which is "a considerable amount of money" is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall
within the concept of irreparable damage or injury.
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there
is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. "An irreparable injury
which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which
produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any
accurate standard of measurement." An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious
charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has
been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary
value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof. Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is
easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a
preliminary injunction is not warranted. HEIRS OF MELENCIO YU, ET AL. v. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 182371, September 4, 2013

Petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract notwithstanding the fact that
it assails the validity of such contract. This is due to the doctrine of separability. Under the doctrine of
separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as independent of the main contract. Being a
separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be invoked regardless of the possible
nullity or invalidity of the main contract. OPPEL, INC. v. MAKATI ROTARY CLUB FOUNDATION, INC.
G.R. No. 198075, September 4, 2013
Plameras was found guilty of violation of RA 3019 by the Ombudsman. He appealed via petition for
review under Rule 45. Petitioner insists that his transaction is related to the mother contract between the
DECS and CKL Enterprises, which culminated in a case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, where
the Ombudsman absolved the DECS officials.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of
fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt is on what the law is on a certain set of
facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt is on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The Court
reiterates the well-settled rule that, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness
committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are

binding and conclusive upon this Court. JOVITO C. PLAMERAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013
There can be no forum shopping in the instant case because the grounds cited by private respondent in
its motions to dismiss filed in 1998 and in the present case are different. In 1998, the motion to dismiss is
based on the argument that the final and executory decision in the Perez case serves as res judicata and,
thus, bars the re-litigation of the issue of employer-employee relations between private respondent and
petitioners. In the instant case, private respondent again cites res judicata as a ground for its motion to
dismiss. This time, however, the basis for such ground is not Perez but the final and executory decision in
RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97. Thus, the relief prayed for in private respondent's motion to dismiss
subject of the instant case is founded on totally different facts and issues. HERNANDO BORRA, JOHN
PACHEO, ET AL. v. CA, 2ND AND 19TH DIVISIONS AND HAWAIIAN PHILIPPINE COMPANY. G.R.
No. 167484, September 9, 2013
Jurisprudence dictates that the appellees role in the appeal process is confined only to the task of
refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not the party who instituted
the appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed therefor, he merely assumes
a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to the affirmance of the judgment appealed from.
Keeping in mind that the right to appeal is essentially statutory in character, it is highly erroneous for the
appellee to either assign any error or seek any affirmative relief or modification of the lower courts
judgment without interposing its own appeal.
The CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of
improper venue because the same was not an error raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. The
CA cannot take cognizance of MIAAs position that the venue was improperly laid since, being the
appellee, MIAAs participation was confined to the refutation of the appellants assignment of errors.
CORAZON S. CRUZ UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE, VILLA CORAZON CONDO DORMITORY v.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY. G.R. No. 184732, September 9, 2013
In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous
notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. As long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Mendoza was afforded
due process despite his claim that he had never personally received a copy of the Notice of
Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission gave due course to
the Motion and ruled on the merits. Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly afforded an opportunity
to explain his side and seek a reconsideration of the ruling he assails, which is the "essence of
administrative due process. ENGINEER MANOLITO P. MENDOZA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. G.R.
No. 195395, September 10, 2013.
Under the 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure, as amended, an opposition to an application for a locational
clearance for a cellular base station or a complaint for the revocation of a locational clearance for a
cellular base station already issued, is within the original jurisdiction of the HLURB Executive Committee.
There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of administrative remedies prior to instituting
Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the RTC.
Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action. However, the Court
herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. The Court does not
lose sight of the fact that respondents Complaint is primarily for abatement of nuisance; and respondents
alleged the lack of HLURB requirements for the cellular base station, not to seek nullification of
petitioners locational clearance, but to support their chief argument that said cellular base station is a
nuisance which needs to be abated. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET
AL. G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013
It is an established rule that when the dispositive portion of a judgment, which has meanwhile become
final and executory, contains a clerical error or an ambiguity arising from an inadvertent omission, such
error or ambiguity may be clarified by reference to the body of the decision itself. The very contents of the

body of the Decision dated July 21, 2008 rendered by this Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 undoubtedly
reveal that both CA G.R. SP No. 80675 and CA G.R. SP No. 83165 were the subject matter of the
petition therein. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION/FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE. G.R. Nos. 167274-75& G.R. No. 192576, September 11, 2013
The discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. As
between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits
taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court.
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public
document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of
its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to
identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the
plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to
the rights of the accused. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence,
the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not
change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. LETICIA I. KUMMER v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if
true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material
allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it
should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. In this case,
the Court finds that Consing, Jr.s complaint properly states a cause of action since the allegations there
insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code.
UNICAPITAL INC., ET AL. v. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., ET AL./RAFAEL CONSING, JR. v. HON.
MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN, ETC., ET AL. G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013

DPWH wanted to expropriate portions of the properties of BPI. BPI claimed for the inclusion of the value
of its building in determining the just compensation although it was never taken by the government. The
general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to is
the market value. The general rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is
expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken; he
is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. No
actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are
awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or
decrease in value. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. G.R. No. 20303,
September 11, 2013
Actions based upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues. Non-fulfillment of the obligation to pay on the due date, that is, on November 15, 1974, would
give rise to an action by the vendor, which date of reckoning may also apply to any action by the vendee
to determine his right under R.A. No. 6552. The vendee, respondent herein, filed this case on March 16,
2001, which is clearly beyond the 10-year prescriptive period; hence, the action has prescribed.
Even though the ground of prescription was raised only for the first time before the Supreme Court, the
respondents right to due process was not violated as it was given the opportunity to oppose such
defense. It is well within the authority and discretion of the Court to resolve such issue of prescription as
provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court. MANUEL UY & SONS, INC. v.
VALBUECO, INCORPORATED. G.R. No. 179594, September 11, 2013

The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint is not a jurisdictional but a formal
requirement, and any objection as to non-compliance therewith should be raised in the proceedings
below and not for the first time on appeal.
Genlite Industries is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the respondent by which he
conducted his business. As such, it does not exist as a separate entity apart from its owner, and therefore
it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued. As the sole proprietor of Genlite Industries,
there is no question that the respondent is the real party in interest who stood to be directly benefited or
injured by the judgment in the complaint below. S.C. MEGAWORLD CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. ENGR. LUIS U. PARADA, REPRESENTED BY ENGR.
LEONARDO A. PARADA OF GENLITE INDUSTRIES. G.R. No. 183804, September 11, 2013
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the
offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or
information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The test does not require absolute certainty
as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the
Prosecution to proceed to trial. The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials)
and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court. HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
ET AL./HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. Nos.
169823-24, September 11, 2013
The Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutors resolution if he arbitrarily
disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In particular, case law states that probable
cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
ELISEO AGUILAR v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013
When a supervening event renders the execution of a judgment impossible or unjust, the interested party
can petition the court to modify the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts. A supervening
event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which develops after a judgment has become final
and executory. This includes matters which the parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because
they were not yet in existence at that time.
In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening event. Petitioner, who did not
have possession of the ship, was only informed of its destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation,
dated July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision of this Court in Orix Metro Leasing and
Finance Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy attained finality on January
19, 2010. During the course of the proceedings in the RTC, the CA and this Court, petitioner could not
have known of the worsened condition of the vessel because it was in the possession of Colorado.
ERNESTO DY v. HON. GINA M. BIBAT-PALAMOS. G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013
A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties
so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. A
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if
the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or
other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as
recognition in a public instrument. It has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father. As to
the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled
that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of
the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent

evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity. NARCISO SALAS v.
ANNABELLE MATUSALEM. G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013.
There is no eyewitness to the shooting of the victim. Prosecutions key witness testified that he saw the
respondents went to the house of the victim and he received a call from the victim asking for help.
Likewise, the respondents tested positive for gunpowder nitrates. Nonetheless, jurisprudence tells us that
direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt. It is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the
facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such
as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO1 ALFREDO
ALAWIG. G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013
Remulla is not a party to the compromise but he has the legal standing to file the petition before the Court
either in his personal capacity as taxpayer or as then Vice-Governor and, hence, Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite. As a taxpayer, he may be allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law or ordinance. As then Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite, he represents the interests of the province itself which is,
undoubtedly, a real party in interest since it stands to be either benefited or injured by the execution of the
compromise judgment. JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA v. ERINEO S. MALIKSI, ETC., ET AL. G.R.
No. 171633, September 18, 2013

In rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance because it is not
an element of rape. Hence, the absence of abrasions or contusions in AAAs body is inconsequential.
What is necessary is that the force employed against her was sufficient to consummate the purpose
which he has in mind. Sufficient force does not mean great or is of such character that is irresistible; as
long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are
beside the point. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEY BACATAN. G.R. No. 203315, September
18, 2013

The CA set for hearing on January 4, 2005, the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. This
hearing did not push through. Although the scheduled January 4, 2005 hearing on the propriety of issuing
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction did not push through, the parties were nonetheless amply heard thru their
pleadings. There is no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction where
a party was not deprived of its day in court, as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its
arguments and defenses. SPOUSES CARMELITO AND ANTONIA ALDOVER v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. No. 167174, September 23, 2013
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a
remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an
action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties
previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third
option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the
estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified, the probate court of the outstanding amount of its
claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having
unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86,
respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPS. FLAVIANO MAGLASANG AND SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG, NAMELY,
OSCAR A. MAGLASANG, ET AL. v. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, NOW SUBSTITUTED BY
FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT (SPV-AMC). G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013

Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief, assailing the constitutionality of certain sections of RA
9372. Private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which
the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain
untrammeled.
Private respondents petition for declaratory relief failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are
in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions
of RA 9372. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief,
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double
contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it
of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE ET. AL. G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically render the
seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when "(i) there is a justifiable ground for
such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved." Thus, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the
non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus
delicti. In the case at bar, not only was there no justifiable ground offered for the non-compliance with the
chain of custody requirement, there was an apparent failure to properly preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to
the time of presentation in court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTURO ENRIQUEZ Y DE LOS
REYES. G.R. No. 197550, September 25, 2013
P02 Aldea marked the seized items not at the crime scene but at the police station in the presence of
Ocfemia. The "chain of custody" requires that the "marking" of the seized items to truly ensure that they
are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done
(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.". "Immediate
confiscation" has no exact definition. To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is
required is that the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation.
"Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. In one case, the marking of the seized items at the
police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on
chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GIOVANNI OCFEMIA Y
CHAVEZ. G.R. No. 185383, September 25, 2013
The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's
competence. Petitioners flimsy objections on Rachels lack of education and inability to read and tell time
carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her
father.
On the other hand, Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provided that a witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Anicetas testimony is mainly hearsay,
especially on the purported fight between Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredos death. Anicetas
testimony as such carries no probative weight. At best, Anicetas testimony is an independent relevant
statement: offered only as to the fact of its declaration and the substance of what had been relayed to
Aniceta by Marilou, not as to the truth thereof. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN IBANEZ Y
ALBANTE, ET AL. G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013
Petitioner did not receive a notice of the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 10371. A
land registration case is a proceeding in rem. In land registration proceedings, being in rem, there is no
necessity to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered in order to
vest the courts with power and authority over the res. Moreover, since no issue was raised as to Antonia
Victorino's compliance with the prerequisites of notice and publication, she is deemed to have followed
such requirements. As a consequence, petitioner is deemed sufficiently notified of the hearing of

Antonia's application. Hence, petitioner cannot claim that she is denied due process. CRISANTA GUIDOENRIQUEZ v. ALICIA I. VICTORINO, ET AL. G.R. No. 180427, September 30, 2013
The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court, and its ruling on
the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. GREGORIO
SINGIAN, JR., v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION). G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013

Section 252 emphatically directs that the taxpayer/real property owner questioning the assessment
should first pay the tax due before his protest can be entertained. As a matter of fact, the words paid
under protest shall be annotated on the tax receipts. Consequently, only after such payment has been
made by the taxpayer may he file a protest in writing (within thirty [30] days from said payment of tax) to
the provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from its
receipt. In no case is the local treasurer obliged to entertain the protest unless the tax due has been paid.
A claim for exemption from payment of real property taxes does not actually question the assessors
authority to assess and collect such taxes, but pertains to the reasonableness or correctness of the
assessment by the local assessor, a question of fact which should be resolved, at the very first instance,
by the LBAA. By providing that real property not declared and proved as tax-exempt shall be included in
the assessment roll, Section 206 of RA No. 7160 implies that the local assessor has the authority to
assess the property for realty taxes, and any subsequent claim for exemption shall be allowed only when
sufficient proof has been adduced supporting the claim. CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. CENTRAL BOARD ASSESSMENT APPEALS, ETC., ET AL. G.R. No. 169234,
October 2, 2013
A claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly against the
taxpayer. One of the conditions for a judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is
compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict compliance with
the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, whether before, during, or after the
effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-48903 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated
the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.
Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that the "power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other
tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by
the Secretary of Finance," Section 7 of the same Code does not prohibit the delegation of such power.
Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of this
Code to any or such subordinate officials with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to
such limitations and restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner." COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE v. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION/ TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE/ PHILEX MINING CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE. G.R. No. 187485/G.R. No. 196113/G.R. No. 197156, October 8, 2013
For a taxpayer to be entitled to a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax, the following requisites
must be complied with: First, The claim must be filed with the CIR within the two-year period from the date
of payment of the tax; Second, It must be shown on the return of the recipient that the income received
was declared as part of the gross income; and Third, The fact of withholding is established by a copy of
the statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax
withheld. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. TEAM (PHILIPPINES) OPERATIONS
CORPORATION [FORMERLY MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) OPERATIONS CORPORATION). G.R. No.
185728, October 16, 2013
The two-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims. The 120day and 30-day periods are not merely directory but mandatory. The taxpayer will always have 30 days to
file the judicial claim even if the Commissioner acts only on the 120th day, or does not act at all during the
120-day period. With the 30-day period always available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer can no longer file a
judicial claim for refund or tax credit of unutilized excess input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner

to decide until the expiration of the 120-day period. Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period
violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and
thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the
taxpayers petition.
However, the San Roque case provides exception to the strict compliance with the 120-day period.
Although the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, the BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated
December 10, 2003 provided a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the Tax Code. BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 expressly states that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review. Thus, the BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 will shield the filing of a tax payers judicial claim from the vice of prematurity when
such claim is filed during its effectivity. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GST PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 190872, October 17, 2013.
Petitioners filed review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC. Petitioners argue that the Breakdown of
Account which the RTC used as a basis in awarding the claim, as affirmed by the CA , is hearsay since
the person who prepared it was not presented in court to authenticate it.
It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of
facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when
in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.
The entries in the Breakdown of Account and their corresponding amounts are not supported by the
respondents presented evidence. The itemized expenses, as repeatedly pointed out by the petitioners,
were not proven, and the remaining indebtedness, after the partial payment of P600,000.00, was merely
derived by the RTC from the Breakdown of Account. It is unacceptable for the RTC to simply come up
with a conclusion that the payment of P600,000.00 did not extinguish the debt, or, assuming it really did
not, that the remaining amount of indebtedness amounts exactly to P460,505.86, without any showing of
how this balance was arrived at. To our mind, the RTCs ruling, in so far as the determination of the actual
indebtedness is concerned, is incomplete. NUCCIO SAVERIO AND NS INTERNATIONAL INC. v.
ALFONSO G. PUYAT, G.R. No. 186433, November 27, 2013
The buy-bust team failed to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon seizure and at the site of
accused-appellants apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory of the same in the presence of all
the persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a
physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the place of
arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the
chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ASIR GANI Y ALIH AND NORMINA GANI
Y GALOS. G.R. No. 198318, November 27, 2013

King Construction filed a money claim against the Province of Aklan with the RTC of Marikina. Under
Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the COA
which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities.
Respondents collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should
have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer
the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v.
JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262,
November 27, 2013.
Atty. Enriquez filed with the SC a petition for review dated 19 August 2011 challenging the IBP Board of
Governors 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions. The Spouses Williams filed opposed the petition
for review because it was filed out of time.
The IBP Board of Governors Resolutions did not become final. Resolutions of the IBP Board of
Governors are only recommendatory and always subject to the Courts review. The Supreme Court
exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. It exercises such disciplinary functions
through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are
exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the IBPs recommendations imposing the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law or disbarment are always subject to this Courts review and
approval.SPOUSES DAVID AND MARISA WILLIAMS v. ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, A.C. No. 7329,
November 27, 2013
The appellant argues that the police officers who apprehended her failed to strictly comply with the
procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, specifically, the failure to
take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence, and the lack of participation of the
representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official in the
operation.
Despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a perusal of Section 21,
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 reveals the existence of a
clause which may render non-compliance with said procedural rule non-prejudicial to the prosecution of
drug offenses. Notwithstanding the procedural error, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal
drugs used in this case were duly preserved and the chain of custody of said evidence was shown to be
unbroken.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARISSA CASTILLO Y ALIGNAY. G.R. No. 190180,
November 27, 2013
Accused denied the charges against him and pointed out that during the times and dates the alleged
criminal acts took place, he was working at the construction site with his nephew. Roderick Palconet,
nephew of the accused, was presented in court in order to corroborate his alibi.
It is established by jurisprudence that in order for a corroboration of an alibi to be considered credible, it
must necessarily come from disinterested witnesses. The testimony of appellants nephew, which is
undoubtedly coming from a close relative, cannot, in any way, be described as disinterested and
unbiased. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO VELASCO. G.R. NO. 190318, November 27,
2013
William Francisco filed a complaint for specific performance with RTC of Imus, Cavite to compel the
petitioners to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the a lot situated in Makati covered by TCT No.
220530 Fernandos name. Petitioner Fernando claimed that RTC Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case
as it involved an adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati City.
Although the end result of the respondents claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the
suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernandos
execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made. Section 2, Rule
4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondents action. It provides that personal
actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant

where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff." Considering the respondents statement in his
complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was
proper.SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSATIO SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA v. WILLIAM
FRANCISCO. G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013
Lilia Tulop filed an ejectment case against the Generoso Enesio with the MTC. MTC proceeded with the
pre-trial conference and required the parties to submit position papers. Generoso posited that the MTC
should have conducted a preliminary hearing and received evidence to determine the existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties.
As expressly provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, ejectment cases merely require the
submission by the parties of affidavits and position papers. The rule directs courts to conduct hearings
only when necessary to clarify factual matters. "This procedure is in keeping with the objective of the Rule
of promoting the expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases." GENEROSO ENESIO v. LILIA
TULOP. G.R. No. 183923, November 27, 2013
The petitioner mortgaged the subject property to respondent bank. Upon maturity of the loan, petitioner
failed to pay the loan despite demand. The property was foreclosed and sold in a public auction where
respondent bank was the highest bidder. Spouses Sia filed suit questioning the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage. Petitioner, however, failed to redeem the property within the one-year
redemption period. Respondent bank consolidated its ownership over the property and a new title was
issued in its favor. Hence, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession
applied for by respondent bank. Despite the pending suit for annulment of the mortgage and Notice of
Sheriffs Sale, respondent bank is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice to the eventual
outcome of the said case. SPOUSES PIO DATO AND SONIA Y. SIA v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS G.R. No. 181873, November 27, 2013

The buy-bust team failed to make an inventory and to take photographs of the subject drug. The noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 which identifies the said requirements does not necessarily
render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible. What is essential is that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused are preserved. In this case, the defense failed to substantiate its claim that such integrity
and evidentiary value of the subject drug was adversely affected by the police officers handling thereof.
As the Court explained in People v. Mendoza:
This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is
not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit in evidence
the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165, will not render [the accused]s arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FAISAL LOKS Y PELONYO, G.R. NO. 203433, NOVEMBER 27, 2013
The 23 respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals but only nine of the respondents
had signed the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition.
The general rule that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. However,
that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only
one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification
requirement. The verification signed by nine of the respondents substantially complied with the
verification requirement since respondents share a common interest and cause of action in the case. The
23 respondents in G.R. No. 171282 were employed by petitioner SKM Art Craft Corporation which is
engaged in the handicraft business. SKM ART CRAFT CORPORATION v. EFREN BAUCA ET AL. G.R.
NO. 171282, November 27, 2013Sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32. . A written demand

letter was sent sometime in April 2002 .On January 14 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer before the MeTC.
The one-year prescriptive period for filing a case for unlawful detainer is tacked from the date of the last
demand, the reason being that the other party has the right to waive the right of action based on previous
demands and to let the possessor remain on the premises for the meantime. When respondent sent
petitioner a demand letter in April 2002 and subsequently filed the Complaint in January 2003, it did so
still within the one-year prescriptive period imposed by the rules. MORETO MIRALLOSA v. CARMEL
DEVELOPMENT INC. G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013

Appellant claimed that he was at work at the time of the AAA was raped. This was corroborated by
another defense witness Allan Talinghale. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove
that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not
possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission.
In the case at bar, we find that appellants alibi did not sufficiently establish that he was working at a
construction site when AAA was raped and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime when it was committed. Likewise, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Talinghale
does not discount the possibility that appellant may have left the construction site to commit the dastardly
act he was charged with and came back afterwards.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELMO LINSIE
Y BINEVIDEZ. G.R. No. 199494, November 27, 2013.
The RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty of the rape. RTC took appellants silence and
passiveness when he was confronted by "AAA" with the rape charge at the police station as an implied
admission of guilt.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at the police station,
he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not
be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that appellants silence
should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be inadmissible in
evidence. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONAS GUILLEN Y ATIENZA. G.R. No. 191756,
November 25, 2013
Pursuant to a courts order respondent issued Warrants of Levy against several delinquent properties of
the petitioner. These properties were advertised and sold at public auction. Digital Telecommunications
made a request to the respondent to lift the warrant invoking the final Decision in Civil Case No. 3514
decreeing petitioners exemption from the payment of real property tax is binding upon respondent. Since
the warrants remained unlifted, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Indirect Contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice,
and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order, but such conduct
which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of
the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere
with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation. The acts of respondent in issuing the
Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public auction sale of petitioners real properties, were neither
intended to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of
Branch IX. He merely performed a ministerial function which he is bound to perform under Sections 176
and 177 of RA 7160. DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. JESSIE E. CANTOS.
G.R. No. 180200, November 25, 2013

Natalio Hilarion was charged with statutory rape for raping AAA, a six (6) years old girl. AAA and her
mother testified that AAA was six (6) years old at the time she was rape but no documentary evidence
was presented to prove the same.
In the present case, the records are completely devoid of evidence that the certificates recognized by law
have been lost or destroyed or were otherwise unavailable. The mother simply testified without prior proof
of the unavailability of the recognized primary evidence. Thus, proof of the victims age cannot be
recognized, following the rule that all doubts should be interpreted in favor of the accused. We stress that
age is an essential element of statutory rape; hence the victim's age must be proved with equal certainty
and clarity as the crime itself. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATALIO HILARION Y LALIA. G.R.
No. 201105, November 25, 2013
Roberto Garcia was charged with rape for raping AAA, a three (3) year old girl.
In People v. Arpon, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member
of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him.
In this case, there is nothing on record to prove the qualifying circumstance that "the victim is a child
below 7 years old." The testimony of AAA anent her age and the absence of denial on the part of Garcia
are not sufficient evidence of her age. On the other hand, the information regarding the age of AAA as
indicated in Medico Legal Report No. M-4356-04 is not reliable because there was no showing who
supplied the same. Lamentably, her age was not one of the subjects of stipulation during the pre-trial
conference. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO GARCIA Y PADIERNOS. G.R. No. 206095,
November 25, 2013
a. While it is true that a notarized document, like an SPA, carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity, this presumption,
however, is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In brushing
aside the expert witness testimony, it was observed that in order to bring about an accurate comparison
and analysis, the standard of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected
signature. However, when the dissimilarity between the genuine and false specimens of writing is visible
to the naked eye and would not ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer, resort
to technical rules is no longer necessary and the instrument may be stricken off for being spurious. When

so established and is conspicuously evident from its appearance, the opinion of handwriting experts on
the forged document is no longer necessary.
b. Ownership and real rights over real property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession
of ten years, provided that the occupant is in good faith and with just title. A prescriptive title to real estate
is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless
such possession was acquired with color of title and good faith. However, it must be stressed that
possession by virtue of a spurious title, as the Spouses Go believed it to be, cannot be considered
constructive possession for the purpose of reckoning the ten-year prescriptive period. The conclusion of
the appellate court that prescription has already set in is erroneously premised on the absence of forgery
and the consequent validity of the deed of sale. HEIRS OF THE LATE FELIX M. BUCTON v. SPOUSES
GONZALO and TRINIDAD GO, G.R. No. 188395, November 20, 2013
In this relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the
requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the Rules, resulting in the
admission of the material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings.
As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings without the
introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted. In this case, records disclose that in
its Answer, GSIS admitted the material allegations of PGAIs complaint warranting the grant of the relief
prayed for. In particular, GSIS admitted that: (a) it made a request for reinsurance cover which PGAI
accepted in a reinsurance binder effective for one year; (b) it remitted only the first three reinsurance
premium payments to PGAI; (c) it failed to pay PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium
installment; and (d) it received demand letters from PGAI. It also did not refute the allegation of PGAI that
it settled reinsurance claims during the reinsured period. On the basis of these admissions, the Court
finds that the CA did not err in affirming the propriety of a judgment on the pleadings. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC.,
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No.
165585, November 20, 2013
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, the Supreme Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by Regional Trial
Courts.
Although the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the
contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdiction of
the MTC, the complaint, however suggests that the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the
reliefs prayed for, is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. GENESIS INVESTMENT, INC. v. HEIRS of
CEFERINO EBARASABAL. G.R. No. 181622, November 20, 2013

Under Rule 41 of the Rules, an appeal from the RTCs decision may be undertaken in three (3) ways,
depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (1) an ordinary appeal to
the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) a petition for review to
the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) a petition for
review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved.
The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is filed with the Court only on questions of law. It is only where pure questions of law

are raised or involved can an appeal be brought to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. The rule in this jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of
fact being conclusive." However, when the petitioner questioned the RTCs ruling, it was, in fact, raising
the issues of falsity and of forgery of the signatures in the bail bond, which questions are purely of fact
and must be resolved before the CA and not proper under Rule 45 certiorari petition. FAR EASTERN
SURETY AND INSURANCE CO. INC. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 170618, November
20, 2013
The rule on conclusiveness of factual findings is not an absolute one. Despite the respect given to
administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on
record and reverse the administrative agencys findings if not supported by substantial evidence. Since,
the CA found no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the
administrative charges against them, the Ombudsmans findings can be reversed, as mere allegation and
speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof.
The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the
fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can
be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination.
However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but
without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply.
The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of money from
Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically allege that they saw
Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. However, their testimonies are still "evidence not of what the
witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as
Deputy
Ombudsman
for
the
Visayas
v. MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS. G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45, November 20, 2013

a. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing),
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining
owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered,
shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of
hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration
cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected
by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Here, the Chabons did
not make any mention of the ownership or occupancy by the Philippine Army and did not indicate any
efforts or searches they had exerted in determining other occupants of the land. Such omission
constituted extrinsic fraud.
b. Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot
be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government is not estopped
by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In any case, even granting that the said official
was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State. As in the case, the subject
lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable and cannot be the subjects of land registration
proceedings. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO BACAS. G.R. No. 182913, November 20,
2013
The primordial policy is a faithful observance of procedural rules, and their relaxation or suspension
should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which
are not bound by technical rules of procedure. While petitioner submitted mere photocopies as
documentary evidence, it should be noted that the IPO had already obtained the originals in the related
Cancellation Case earlier filed before it; hence, the IPO Director Generals relaxation of procedure was a
valid exercise of his discretion in the interest of substantial justice. BIRKENSTOCK ORTHOPAEDIE

GMBH AND CO. KG v. PHILIPPINE SHOE EXPO MARKETING CORPORATION. G.R. No. 194307,
November 20, 2013
Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and
unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross
abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly
misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to
reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or
reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no
jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Since, the Office of the Ombudsmans Decision exonerating respondents from the administrative charges
had resolved all issues raised by petitioner, it is in a proper exercise of discretion when it found the
evidence adduced by petitioner as wanting to support the administrative charges brought against
respondents.
Further, considering that a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of
Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. WILLIAM C. DAGAN v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN. G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013

But while it is true that the prosecution has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court, once the case is filed, any disposition the prosecutor may
afterwards deem proper should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. It is the
courts bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the same.
The rule is that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not by the caption of the information
or the citation of the law allegedly violated but by the actual recital of facts in that information. Here the
issue is whether the facts alleged in the informations in the subject criminal cases make out a case for the
crime of technical malversation. However, the informations show that there is no allegation in the
informations that the P2 million and P6 million grants to COCOFED had been earmarked for some
specific expenditures. ROLANDO P. DE LA CUESTA v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN. G.R. Nos. 164068-69,
November 19, 2013
Act No. 3135 has no requirement for the determination of the mortgaged properties appraisal value.
Nothing in the law likewise indicates that the mortgagee-creditors appraisal value shall be the basis for
the bid price. Neither is there any rule nor any guideline prescribing the minimum amount of bid, nor that
the bid should be at least equal to the properties current appraised value. Under the circumstances, no
necessity of determining the mortgaged properties current appraised value or any showing of the
existence of any prejudicial question warrants the suspension of the foreclosure proceedings. It must be
noted that a prejudicial question is a prior issue whose resolution rests with another tribunal, but at the
same time is necessary in the resolution of another issue in the same case. SYCAMORE VENTURES
CORPORATION v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY. G.R. No. 173183, November 18,
2013
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. Nevertheless, as an
exception, when the lower courts grossly misunderstood the facts and circumstances that, when correctly
appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion, a review of the lower courts' findings may be made.
Nonetheless, an examination of the issues shows that the claimed errors primarily question the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lower courts' conclusion that is proper for a question of fact.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v. CRESENCIASTA.TERESA RAMOS. G.R. No.
179181, November 18, 2013

In criminal cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had the direct
opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not. This deference
to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the
principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to
convict the accused. Since the eyewitness positively identified the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime, no further defense could negate the lower courts appreciation and finding of guilt. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. BASILIO VILLARMEA Y ECHAVEZ. G.R. No. 200029, November 13, 2013
It is a settled rule that the Court examines only questions of law on appeal and not questions of facts.
However, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by
the Court, such as when the factual findings of the courts a quo are conflicting. As there has been
conflicting finding between RTC and CA, a review of facts necessitates question of fact.
Settled is the rule that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge,
which means those facts which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify as to what
he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. When CIGIs
installation manager, testified a request in writing was made but no evidence was submitted, the
testimony is a self-serving allegation, which is not equivalent to proof. However, it may be considered as
an independently relevant statement and may be admitted to show that utterances were made.
CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIAL GASES, INC. v. ALABANG MEDICAL CENTER. G.R. No. 181983,
November 13, 2013
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 provides that a petition for annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence has recognized denial of due process as an
additional ground.
An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted
indiscriminately. It is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there
is no adequate or appropriate remedy available (such as new trial, appeal, petition for relief) through no
fault of petitioner. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being used by
a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and
executory. A review of the evidence presented reveals that respondent failed to show any artifice or
extrinsic fraud being committed against the Spouses Paray, hence CAs decision of setting aside the
compromise agreement is grounded on surmises or conjectures. Further, the approved compromise
agreement serves as the final judgment that settles the controversy. VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN v.
CHARLES MANCAO. G.R. No. 182314, November 13, 2013

The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an
affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves
only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured
from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Only when there exist
special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of
the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld.
The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is also shown
by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or
having the accused arrested by the law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the
accused, attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on
declare that all the foregoing is actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of
recantation. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN. G.R. No. 198338,
November 13, 2013
The issue of whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation primarily boils down to one of
credibility. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment

deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses
testimony does not negate positive finding of guilt specially, as in this case, where the inconsistencies
pertains to minor details. Settled is the rule that discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the
essential integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses honesty. These
inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen
rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARILYN SANTOS and ARLENE VALERA.
G.R. No. 193190, November 13, 2013
The rule that the Court will not disturb the CA' s findings of fact is not an absolute rule that admits of no
exceptions. A notable exception is the presence of conflict of findings of fact between or among the
tribunals' rulings on questions of fact.
This Court cannot be any clearer in laying down the rule on the quantum of evidence to support an
administrative ruling: In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner
is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming. An
examination of the records shows that the Ombudsman's appreciation of the evidence is in accord with
reason and common experience so that it successfully proved, Dechavez's dishonesty. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. MARCELINO A. DECHAVEZ. G.R. No. 176702, November 13, 2013

As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration,
amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. An exception to this rule
is the existence of supervening events which refer to facts transpiring after judgment has become final
and executory or to new circumstances that developed after the judgment acquired finality, including
matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at
that time. The presence of strained relations between petitioner and respondent, consisted the
supervening event that justified the NLRC in modifying its final resolution.
Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for
legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it
ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on
the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. BANI RURAL BANK INC.
v. TERESA DE GUZMAN. G.R. No.170904, November 13, 2013

The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of
rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling
element of rape. When the accused raised the affirmative defense that sexual relations exist between him
and the victim, it necessarily entails that evidence must be adduced to support the claim.
Pursuant to number 4 of the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance, however, in the absence of the foregoing documents (certificate of live birth or
authentic document), the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused. In the case at bar, AAA testified that she was 13 years old on July 20, 1999 and
that her birthday was in February. Further, when accused-appellant, insisted that the incident occurred on
October 20, 1999, he admitted that AAA was still 13 years old when the rape was committed. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANIEL ALCOBER. G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013

The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and
collateral matters, do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even enhance their veracity as the variances erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Though inconsistent, the testimony of the prosecution witness was
straightforward, hence minor inconsistencies that attended their testimony did not negate finding of guilt.
The defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation that can easily be concocted. For this claim to prosper, the
defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official
acts of government officials. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KENNETH MONCEDA. G.R. No.
176269, November 13, 2013
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by respondent in
his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by
petitioner against respondent as well as the validity of petitioners act in preventing respondent from
participating in the election of the corporations Board of Directors. Being corporate in nature, the issues
should be threshed out before the RTC sitting as a special commercial court. The issues on damages can
still be resolved in the same special commercial court just like a regular RTC which is still competent to
tackle civil law issues incidental to intra-corporate disputes filed before it. MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. ROBERT H. CULLEN. G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Further,
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Consequently, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable through the original civil action of
certiorari. What petitioner seeks to rectify pertain to the appellate courts failure to uphold the findings of
facts of the lower court. As such, the petition is simply a continuation of the appellate process proper for a
petition under Rule 45.
In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court has the discretion
to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1)
the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
ALEJANDRO
V.
TANKEH
v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 171428, November 11, 2013
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning the
existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place to be searched. And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or
information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent the element of
personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance
being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary. The application and the issuance of the search warrant is was
coupled with the required probable cause as shown by the complainants trademark certificate.
CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LING NA LAU. G.R. No.
188526, November 11, 2013
As can be gleaned, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear that the
corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a reservation to file such separately is not allowed.
The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. If the accused,
however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held

civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted.
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of
proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for
civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a persons
acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on
reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit
the act complained of. Though the accused has been acquitted from the criminal charge, the acquittal
was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check
which was subsequently dishonored upon its presentment. NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS v.
PURIFICACION F. FELIPE. G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions
raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of
the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded
the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the
political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial
power.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the
first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. On
the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under
Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in
one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a. "Bogarts," G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013. GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA
B. BELGICA v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication there must be an actual case or controversy. Thus, where
the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereof
would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest however intellectually challenging. The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge
operated as a supervening event that mooted the petition and a resolution on validity of the order or
suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer. HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN. G.R. NO. 184496, DECEMBER 2, 2013

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss attended by
grave abuse of discretion. While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-

appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or
in excess of jurisdiction.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period within which to file
a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion should be filed within the time
for, but before the filing of, the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Equally important to
this provision is Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following
grounds: 1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4)
prescription. Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as waived
in the event that they are not timely invoked. Where the respondents motion to dismiss was filed after the
filing of an answer, the ground relied upon in the motion should have been raised as an affirmative
defense, otherwise it is deemed waived. REBECCA PACAA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAA
v. ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC. G.R. NO. 168979, DECEMBER 2, 2013
Furthermore, well settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is
evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot
be resolved in a motion to dismiss.
The affirmative defense of prescription does not automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint under
Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion
to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. If the
issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot
be determined in a motion to dismiss. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits
wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.
However, Contrary to petitioners contention, it is not apparent from the complaint that the action had
already prescribed. Upon closer inspection of the complaint, it would seem that there are several possible
scenarios that may have occurred given the limited set of facts. It is also apparent from the pleadings that
both parties denied each others allegations. Hence, the outright dismissal of the action is not proper
where there are factual matters in dispute, which require presentation and appreciation of evidence.
MODESTO SANCHEZ v. ANDREW SANCHEZ. G.R. NO. 187661, DECEMBER 4, 2013
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded
an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from
entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. When DeGuzmans filed his
petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA, there resulted a premature fling of the petition as the
proper recourse is to seek relief before the CSC. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily
becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.
Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. There is forum
shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata. Since De Guzman
pursued the remedies of petition for certiorari and appeal, that have long been held to be mutually
exclusive, and not alternative or cumulative remedies, forum shopping was committed. It must be noted
that the ultimate relief sought by De Guzman was the reversal of the resolution on his dismissal.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and
(iii) identity of cause of action. In this case, there was no judgment on the merits as the dismissal of the
complaint against De Guzman was a result of a fact-finding investigation only for purposes of determining

whether a prima facie case exists.PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, v. COURT OF APPEALS

AND CRISANTO G. DE GUZMAN. G.R. NO. 173590, DECEMBER 9, 2013
We have consistently held that an administrative or disciplinary complaint is not the proper remedy to
assail the judicial acts of magistrates of the law, particularly those related to their adjudicative functions.
Indeed, any errors should be corrected through appropriate judicial remedies, like appeal in due course
or, in the proper cases, the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition if the errors were jurisdictional.
Having the administrative or disciplinary complaint be an alternative to available appropriate judicial
remedies would be entirely un-procedural.
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge. This discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that judges are in a better position to determine
the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.
The decision on whether he should inhibit himself, however, must be based on his rational and logical
assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. The rule does not give the
judge the unfettered discretion to decide whether he should desist from hearing a case. The inhibition
must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will
undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. The
disqualification of a judge cannot be based on mere speculations and surmises or be predicated on the
adverse nature of the judges rulings towards the movant for inhibition.RE: LETTERS OF LUCENA B.
RALLOS, FOR ALLEGED ACTS/INCIDENTS/OCCURENCES RELATIVE TO THE RESOLUTION(S)
ISSUED IN CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 BY COUIRT OF APPEALS EXECUTIVE JUSTICE PAMPIO
ABARINTOS and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON PAUL HERNANDO and VICTORIA ISABEL
PAREDES.
IPI No. 12-203-CA-J, DECEMBER 10, 2013
The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes,
including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction
over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. Since the dispute between the
petitioner and respondent involved a non-agricultural property and no tenancy relation exists between
them, the decisions made by DARAB were without force and effect. WELLER JOPSON v. FABIAN O.
MENDEZ, JR. AND DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. NO. 191538 , DECEMBER 11,
2013.
When prosecuting the sale or possession of dangerous drugs like shabu, the State must prove not only
the elements of each of the offenses. It must prove as well the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will
be unable to discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
To prove the corpus delicti, the prosecution must show that the dangerous drugs seized from the accused
and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as
evidence to prove his guilt. To ensure that this is done right and that the integrity of the evidence of the
dangerous drugs is safeguarded, Congress outlined in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 the mandatory procedure
that law enforcers must observe following the seizure of such substance.
The Court has of course held that non-compliance with the procedural safeguards provided in Sec. 21 of
R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not necessarily void the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs for as
long as there is a justifiable ground for it and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. As the buy-bust team did not show the that there was justifiable reason to deviate
from the procedure, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, it must be
stressed that the step-by-step procedure under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be
simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
FERDINAND BAUTISTA Y SINAON. G.R. NO. 198113, DECEMBER 11, 2013.
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008 which refer to the amendment of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. It deleted the Community Tax Certificate among the accepted proof of identity of the
affiant because of its inherent unreliability. Nevertheless, the defective jurat in the Verification/Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect because it is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement

that the Court may waive. Furthermore, we cannot simply ignore the millions of pesos at stake in this
case. To do so might cause grave injustice to a party, a situation that this Court intends to avoid.
The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court cannot, on its
own, disregard such evidence. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, it must so
state in the form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on
appeal. However, hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no
probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to
object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there
were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue. However, since the testimony of Haw
was based not on his personal knowledge as he was not present during the documents preparation, his
testimony was hearsay. Further, the documents does not fall under the exception to the hearsay rule, but
for failure to timely object on the matter, the sales invoice formed part of the records of the case.
The issue of credibility of witnesses is to be resolved primarily by the trial court because it is in the better
position to assess the credibility of witnesses as it heard the testimonies and observed the deportment
and manner of testifying of the witnesses. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to great respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result
of the case. ADVANCE PAPER CORPORATION AND GEORGE HAW v. ARMA TRADERS
CORPORATION. G.R. NO.176897, DECEMBER 11, 2013
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there
is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no
administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14)
where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.MARK JEROME
S. MAGLALANG v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION. G.R. NO. 190566,
DECEMBER 11, 2013

If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest redeeming the
foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds, the title
over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation confirms the purchaser as the owner
entitled to the possession of the property without any need for him to file the bond required under Section
7 of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ of possession to the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon
the consolidation of title in his name, while the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the
property.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses
sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the
applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of
the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie
showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive

writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is
violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to
prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction,
means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. CHRISTOPHER LUMBO AND MILAGROS LUMBO. G.R. NO.
162757, DECEMBER 11, 2013
Consistently with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the
parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party "fails to appear at a pre-trial
conference be may be non-suited or considered as in default. The obligation in appear denotes not simply
the personal appearance, or the mere physical presentation by a party of ones self, but connotes as
importantly, preparedness to go into the different subject assigned by law to a pre-trial.
Petitioners State Solicitors initial attendance during the pre-trial conference could not be equated to the
personal appearance mandated by Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The duty to appear during
the pre-trial conference is not by mere initial attendance, but taking an active role during the said
proceedings.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), AND
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), G.R. NO. 201715, DECEMBER 11, 2013
In the absence of any convincing justification, a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed a month late
from the lapse of the period to file the same will not warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Section 4, Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within a
period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day
period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of
parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict
observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable
or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
THE HON. JUANITO CASTANEDA, JR., ET AL. G.R. NO. 208290; DECEMBER 11, 2013
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases
involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their
minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such
children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them
emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and
properly counselled. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG
KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP v. JOVY CABCABAN. UDK no.
14817, January 13, 2014
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. Clearly then, an
application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, hence, the conformity of the public prosecutor is
not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to
quash search warrants.
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge,
the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts. It is presumed that a judicial function has been
regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. However, a trial judges finding of probable cause
may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the
person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police
officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth
on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. On the other hand, innocent
and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant.

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not
required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the
property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. A
search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the
things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued. WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION AND CHERRYLL L. YU v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY. G.R. NO. 161106,
January 13, 2014
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is
burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court
simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on
said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the
findings and conclusions of the trial court.
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been
deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave
abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. In the case, there is no deprivation of due process
or a mistrial committed against petitioner, and that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
CA, hence the rule against double jeopardy operates making the judgment of acquittal final and no longer
appealable. DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA. G.R. NO 166995, JANUARY 13, 2014
While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for review before the
Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking to extend the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. The 15-day period for filing a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory
RIVELISA REALTY, INC. v. FIRST STA. CLARA BUILDERS CORPORATION. G.R. NO. 189618,
JANUARY 15, 2014
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is
an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based
on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil
aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. v. HANZ CALAPIZ. G.R. NO.
163753, JANUARY 15, 2014
The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether
on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribe the duty and limit the
power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law of
the case in all other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. Without the rule there would be no end
to criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared
the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal,
notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. But the law of the
case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former

appeal. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUARIA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. G.R. NO. 160758, January 15, 2014
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain
best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and
demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court."
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are generally expected. Rape is a
painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. Since human memory is fickle and
prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard
in testing the credibility of a witness.
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a
conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would
be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single
witness in a rape case.
A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of
the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNABE PAREJA. G.R.
NO. 202122, JANUARY 15, 2014.
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Hence, an administrative proceeding for
disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute
the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous
notices. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents.ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG v. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA. A.C. No. 5581, January
14, 2014

Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is clear that the court considers the
evidence only when it is formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the
trial court to base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the
parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without probative value unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered. The formal offer of
evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an evidence which may not be
admissible for the purpose it is being offered. However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the
foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted, provided, the same must have
been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and the same must have been incorporated in the records
of the case. RODOLFO LABORTE and PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY v. PAGSANJAN
TOURISM CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE and LELIZA S. FABRICIO. G.R. NO. 183860, January 15,
2014
Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by the CA was to
determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and enjoyment of the property
when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case was remanded to the RTC for the
purpose of computing the damages, the case was not considered a new case where an amendment of
the complaint may still be allowed. Rather, it is merely a continuation of the trial of the original complaint
filed in 1992 only for the purpose of receiving the evidence of the damages which respondent allegedly
suffered as alleged in the original complaint, since no evidence proving damages was received and
passed upon when the RTC issued its Order dated March 29, 1996. Therefore, the Section 2 and 3, Rule

10, Rules of Civil Procedure on amendments of pleading find no applicability in this case. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. TETRO ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED. G.R. NO. 183015, January 15, 2014
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any third person is
mistakenly levied upon to answer for another mans indebtedness, such person has all the right to
challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 39
specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine
whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor
or obligor, or an independent "separate action" to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over
the foreclosed property.
Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against
one who did not have his day in court. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his
title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct
the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant
must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. However, the Spouses
Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building as they were unable to present
credible evidence to prove their ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their postulation as title
holders of the land and the presumption of ownership over improvements built thereon; whereas Villasi,
on the other hand, was able to show documentary proof of ownership. MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v.
FILOMENO GARCIA G.R. NO. 190106, January 15, 2014
As a general rule, the Courts jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions of
law. The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is "whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law." Any question that invites calibration of the whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, is a question of fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the
evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not
authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge." They may, however, take
judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the
parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its
discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YATCO
AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES. G.R. NO.172551, JANUARY 15, 2014
For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or
of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
Before entries made in the course of business may qualify under the exception to the hearsay rule and
given weight, the party offering them must establish that: (1) the person who made those entries is dead,
outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at, or near the time of the transaction
to which they refer; (3) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated therein; (4) the entries were
made in the professional capacity or in the course of duty of the entrant; and, (5) the entries were made in
the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. In the case, Land Bank neither identified the persons
who made the entries in the passbooks nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify.
While the deposit entries in the banks passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption of regularity, they
are mere prima facie proof of what are stated therein. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
EMMANUEL OATE. G.R. NO. 192371, JANUARY 15, 2014

Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the
grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court
motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss
the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and
(d) prescription of action.
It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. Failure to allege in the
complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions.
Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived. HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR v. JUANA
GONZALES. G.R. NO. 185922, JANUARY 15, 2014
Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea
on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their
arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity
was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction.
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of
(1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented
searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they
are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be
evidence to the contrary. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONALD VASQUEZ. G.R. NO. 200304,
JANUARY 15, 2014
A judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to
stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and (3) periodically
deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Since the Acbangs perfected an
appeal but failed to file the required superseadeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment in an
ejectment suit cannot be stayed. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not
suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the
deposit of the accruing rentals. HERMINIA ACBANG v. HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON. G.R. No. 164246,
JANUARY 15, 2014
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed
orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the
pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the
case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses,
for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and
as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the
subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the
order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent
is to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the

administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to
facilitate the administration of the estate. Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an
estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the
inventory.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The
trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong
to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO. G.R. NO. 156407, JANUARY 15,
2014
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed
of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to
be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment
or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his
defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without
prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution
is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as
if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order,
Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the following statutory requirements for
the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort
to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no
fault of the petitioner.
The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud
or lack of jurisdiction.
The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must
be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must
be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity
the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioners good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS
BOULEY ARD, INC. v. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY. G.R. NO. 159926 , JANUARY 20,
2014
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial
has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them." In the case, the judgment rendered in G.R. No. 167998 was
rendered by the CA under its jurisdiction and was a judgment on the merits. Further, the parties involved
in the previous case and the case at bar were the same parties raising the same relief.
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial
proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse
of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is
sought an opportunity to be heard.
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It
is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure

sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a
wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. LZK HOLDINGS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK. G.R. NO. 187973, January
20, 2014
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during
(with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he
is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation
of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in
fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond
in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After
the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ
of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is
merely a ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion
in connection with such issuance is misplaced.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial
foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertinently
provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. The
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had already consolidated their title over
the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature. SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ
AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ v. SPOUSES ALINDOG. G.R. NO. 184045, January 22, 2014
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the
prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals
in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not
preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Verily,
a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction
and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that
jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition
based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy. A.L. ANG NETWORK,
INC. v. EMMA MONDEJAR. G.R. NO. 200804, JANUARY 22, 2014
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of
regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action
against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in
both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R.
CAMPOS AND CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS v. ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS. A.C. NO. 8644, January 22,
2014.
The rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the identification of the
persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements
of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the accused until the
time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody
rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that

the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case, the prosecution must still prove that (a) there is a
justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were properly preserved. Further, the non-compliance with the procedures must be justified by the States
agents themselves. The arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the
procedures laid down under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the procedure was not
followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law
would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their
own convenience. CARLITO VALENCIA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. NO. 198804,
January 22, 2014
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, which
may not be proven by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the
execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact,
such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the
introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary.
It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced,
its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol
evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may
effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the
parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that the loss may be
shown by any person who knows the fact of its loss, or by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the
court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character
are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or
who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument has
indeed been lost. PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO. G.R. NO.
173540, January 22, 2014
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of the witness, which is best addressed by
the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed
his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. Verily, findings of the trial court on such
matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
Where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is
presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material details of a given
incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their
probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on
the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the

testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein
cannot destroy their credibility. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO DADAO. G.R. NO.
201860, January 22, 2014
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and
matters determined in the former suit. The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former
judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be,
between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. The
Bagano case has been settled by the court having jurisdiction and was based on the merits. Nonetheless,
the Bagano case and the present controversy does not point to similarity of the parties or to the cause of
action presented, hence res judicata cannot be raised to bar determination of the issue.
An independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such intervention will
not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It
is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenors case an aspect peculiar to himself and
differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the wouldbe intervenor to
litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of the
action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of
intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of
the action. Hence, the issue of double sale as alleged cannot be injected into the Bagano case, which is
based on facts peculiar to the transaction between Bagano and petitioners. PEBLIA ALFARO AND THE
HEIRS OF PROSPEROUS ALFARO v. SPOUSES EDITHO AND HERA DUMALAGAN. G.R. NO.
186622, January 22, 2014
A client has of course the right to dismiss and replace his counsel of record as provided in the second
paragraph of Section 26 above. But this assumes that such client has given counsel a notice of dismissal
so the latter could immediately cease to represent him. Indeed, it would have been more prudent for
newly hired counsel to refrain from entering his appearance in the case until he has ascertained that the
previous counsel has been dismissed from it.
Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC specifically requires that a) The
appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by
the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the
form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed
decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i)
proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6
of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties. b) A
mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of
the period of perfecting an appeal.
Insisting on such requirement even on appeal is a prerogative of the NLRC under its rule making power
considering the great volume of appeals filed with it from all over the country. DIONES BELZA v.
DANILO T. CANONERO. G.R. NO. 192479, January 27, 2014
Factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of
their probative weight are given great respect if not conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued,
misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered,
would alter the outcome of the case.
Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a
minor, as in this case, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the
shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice
and have the offender apprehended and punished.

In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court has adopted the
totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into consideration: (1) the witnesss
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witnesss degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORO MANIGO.
G.R. NO. 194612, January 27, 2014
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake. In relation thereto, Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that
through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public
documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.
The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under
the exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in
official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The document's
trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps
are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and
manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO,
and GLORIA, ALL SURNAMED DIMAGUILA v. JOSE AND SONIA A. MONTEIRO. G.R. NO. 201011,
January 27, 2014
In order to perfect an appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting monetary award, the
Labor Code requires the posting of a bond, either in cash or surety bond, in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award. Nonetheless, we have consistently held that rules should not be applied in a very rigid
and strict sense. This is especially true in labor cases wherein the substantial merits of the case must
accordingly be decided upon to serve the interest of justice. When there has been substantial
compliance, relaxation of the Rules is warranted.
In termination disputes, the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a just or valid cause rests
on the employers. Failure on their part to discharge such burden will render the dismissal illegal. The
quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. Here, the mere filing of a
formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid. Unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees.
However, the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no
application when the employer denies having dismissed the employee. The employee must first establish
by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal before shifting to the employer the burden of proving the
validity of such dismissal. GRAND ASIAN SHIPPING LINES, INC., EDUARDO P. FRANCISCO AND
WILLIAM HOW v. WILFREDO GALVEZ. G.R. NO. 178184, January 29, 2014
The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is essentially an
executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the

Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the
conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of
probable cause are generally not subject to review by the Court.
Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutors exercise of discretion
requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not
without exception. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.
The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. What is merely required is "probability of guilt." UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC. v.
MICHAEL TAN a.k.a. PAUL D. TAN. G.R. NO. 179367, January 29, 2014

A petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists,
unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.
However, there are exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule, such as (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence without appellants fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.
Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. However, the counting 60 days from
private respondents counsels receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private
respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6,
2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on
September 8, 2009, which date is beyond the expiration of the period sought to be extended. THE
NAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS. G.R. NO. 191215, February 3, 2014
There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as they
disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is
considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case. A perusal of RA 9282 amending RA 1125 would show that, while it is
clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the
RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which
provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by
the RTC in local tax cases filed before it
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from
the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. On the strength of the constitutional provisions under Article
VIII, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there

has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It,
thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
in these cases. THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO. G.R. NO. 175723 ,
February 4, 2014
It is settled that Rule 45 limits us merely to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA
decision. The Court is generally bound by the CAs factual findings, except only in some instances,
among which is, when the said findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body
exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.
The steps on how to comply with procedural due process in terminating an employee:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds
for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their
written explanation within a reasonable period.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference
wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge
against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented
against them by the management. During the hearing or
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees
a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the
employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their
employment.
Although letters were sent to Kemplin, such letters were lame attempt to comply with the notice
requirement, for the charges against Kemplin were not specified. Further, it merely made a declaration on
the expiration of the employment, without however, specifying the criminal suits filed against Kemplin.
UNITED TOURIST PROMOTIONS vs. HARLAND B. KEMPLIN. G.R. No. 205453, February 5, 2014
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed,
unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to
maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve
written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its
case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Another reason for the rule
is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus
prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise
prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. In the case,
Metrobanks officers were sought to be presented by the petitioner as its initial witness and to present
documents in the possession of Metrobank, which move cannot be allowed in the petitioners
presentation of its evidence-in-chief. SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA
AFULUGENCIA vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. G.R. NO. 185145, February 5, 2014
In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the items seized
from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible in
evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said items have been preserved. PEOPLE
OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs. GLENN SALVADOR and DORY ANN PARCON
G.R. NO. 190621, February 10, 2014
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we
cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties
had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as
set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage
by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as

there was no marriage to speak of. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR.
G.R. NO. 189538, February 10, 2014
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that
are also legal or constitutional in nature. TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, et al. vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. NO.183191, February 11,
2014
Issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of arrest, as
petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are normally not within the purview of
a petition for certiorari, such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases. SATURNINO C.
OCAMPO vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, et al.G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of
this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
However, A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the
theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of
justice.
P/SUPT.
HANSEL
M.
MARANTAN
vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O
G.R. NO. 205956, February 12, 2014
In the case at bar, the evidence is unclear as to where the responsible police officer marked the seized
substance and whether it was done in Merlitas presence. In fact, it is also not clear from the evidence
which police officer did the marking. This uncertainty concerning a vital element of the crime warrants
overturning the judgment of conviction.
Though Merlita's denial and alibi as a defense are weak, such cannot relieve the prosecution the burden
of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal transaction actually took place. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLITA PALOMARES y COSTUNA. G.R. No. 200915, February 12, 2014

Non-payment of docket fees is a jurisdictional defect. Anent the counterclaims interposed by defendant
for the collection of certain sum of money adverted earlier hereof, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction
over the same as defendant did not pay the docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were
denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected with the
plaintiffs complaint. The counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiffs complaint hence
they are a sic permissive counterclaims. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIGNAY EX-IM
PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. NO. 171590, February 12, 2014
It has been repeatedly emphasized that in the case of natural persons, the certification against forum
shopping must be signed by the principal parties themselves and not by the attorney. The certification
against forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by the
attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an
assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the
same parties, issues and causes of action. Hence, the petition is dismissible outright for being
accompanied by a defective certification of non-forum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin

instead of the complainants as the principal parties. ATTY. EMMANUEL D. AGUSTIN, et al. vs.
ALEJANDRO CRUZ-HERRERA. G.R. NO. 174564, February 12, 2014
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate
credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a
claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not
corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While
judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks
justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable doubt in
Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant
must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to
support a conviction. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PATENTES Y ZAMORA. G.R. NO.
190178, February 12, 2014.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of
the court. The rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first
time on appeal. RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES. G.R. NO. 188694, February 12, 2014
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum
shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return of the properties to
the Estate in order that such properties would be partitioned among the heirs. In the other cases, the
petitioners failed to attain the objective because Palictes right in the properties had been declared
exclusivse. There was between Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and the other cases a clear identity of the
parties, of subject matter, of evidence, and of the factual and legal issues raised. The Court saw through
the petitioners "ploy to countermand the previous decisions sustaining Palictes rights over the
properties." HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. MATILDE S. PALICTE, Respondent. G.R. No. 159691,
February 17, 2014
When the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial courts
observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears
in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.
The straightforward, candid and intrepid revelation in coming forward to avenge the immoral defilement
upon her person is more convincing and plausible compared to the weak and uncorroborated defense of
petitioner. Despite the minor inconsistencies in her testimony, her general statements remained
consistent throughout the trial as she recounted the sordid details of her tormenting experience in the
hands of her own father. EMILIO RAGA y CASIKAT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
200597, February 19, 2014
Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court cannot simply
allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter heard the testimony of
another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's counsel to protect the interest of his client during
the presentation of other witnesses. If respondent actually believed that the testimony of Kenneth would
greatly affect that of Stephen's, then respondent's counsel was clearly remiss in his duty to protect the

interest of his client when he did not raise the issue of the exclusion of the witness in a timely manner.
DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC., et al. vs. LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL
G.R. No. 193966, February 19, 2014
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice
and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct
which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice. Respondents willful disregard and defiance of this
Courts ruling on a matter submitted for the second time before his office cannot be countenanced. By
acting in opposition to this Courts authority and disregarding its final determination of the legal issue
pending before him, respondent failed in his duty not to impede the due administration of justice and
consistently adhere to existing laws and principles as interpreted in the decisions of the Court. CITY
GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, et al. vs. ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENG. G.R. No. 188913, February 19,
2014
Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed to do so, he
cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. Notice and hearing is the
bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. LUCENA D. DEMAALA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and OMBUDSMAN. G.R. No. 173523, February 19, 2014.

Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or
animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi.
Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellants guilt for the offense
of illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE ROM. G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014
It is a fundamental principle in jurisprudence involving rape that the accused may be convicted based
solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. In this regard, we defer to the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of AAAs testimony, most especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERVIN GAHI. G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014
In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Courts mind, the
September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It
is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the
Rules. The recourse provided for in the Rule 71 is clear enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt
must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its
suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the
September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory. CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., et
al. vs. MANUEL O. SANCHEZ. G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into
legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. Case law instructs
that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable
against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached
property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy
itself.

Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded,
inter alia, Ligons prior attachment lien over the subject property patently anathema to the nature of
attachment proceedings which is well-established in law and jurisprudence. LETICIA P. LIGON vs. THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 56 AT MAKATI CITY, et al.
G.R. No. 190028, February 26, 2014
While a government office may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for reconsideration with respect to
its decisions or orders, the fact remains that certiorari inherently requires the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself.
Unless it is filed, there could be no occasion to rectify. Worse, the remedy of certiorari would be
unavailing. Simply put, regardless of the proscription against the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the
same may be filed on the assumption that rectification of the decision or order must be obtained, and
before a petition for certiorari may be instituted.. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC.
vs. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (PWUAGLO). G.R. No. 180962, February 26, 2014
The disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself. A petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower courts decision or final order
direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a
decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that
no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party
can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of
appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an
outright dismissal. CORAZON MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 193217,
February 26, 2014
The Ombudsman-imposed penalties in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately executory
notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In
case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered
as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA
when it ruled that the penalties imposed by the Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately
executory. Immediate execution argues against the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only
recommend disciplinary sanctions. FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ
vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al. G.R. NO. 197307, February 26, 2014
Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in
cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule
that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or
the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.
Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were represented by the
PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular, failed them,
Hence, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxed the rules and decides to allowed the
action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. RUFA A. RUBIO, ET AL. vs. LOURDES
ALABATA. G.R. NO. 203947, February 26, 2014
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible
when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such
character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
In the case at bench, AAAs categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the
appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and
to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ. G.R. NO. 190632, February 26, 2014.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. Consequently, the
proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void.
To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of
legal standing is to prolong the denial of due process to the persons whose interests are indispensible to
the final disposition of the case. It will only result in a protracted litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be
forced to rely on a petition for the annulment of judgment before the CA (as the last remaining remedy),
which may again reach this Court. To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift administration
of justice, the CA should have applied liberality by striking down the assailed orders despite the lack of
legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition before it. Besides, this lacking
requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely the reason why this
controversy arose.JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO v. JEWM AGROINDUSTRIAL CORPORATION. G.R. NO. 196894, MARCH 3, 2014

Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion for
reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if it puts an end to a particular
matter, leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision. An appeal from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the
order of dismissal itself. It is an appeal from a final decision or order. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
G.R. NO. 171496, MARCH 3, 2014
It is entrenched in our jurisprudence that perfection of an appeal in a manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of
making judgment final and executory. While dismissal of an appeal on technical grounds is frowned upon,
Article 223 of the Labor Code which prescribes the appeal bond requirement, however, is a rule of
jurisdiction and not of procedure. Hence, there is a little leeway for condoning a liberal interpretation
thereof, and certainly none premised on the ground that its requirements are mere technicalities.
The finding of the Labor Arbiter holding the petitioners liable for illegal dismissal is binding on them. Not
having been timely appealed, this issue is already beyond our jurisdiction to resolve, and the finding of
the Labor Arbiter can no longer be disturbed. CO SAY COCO PRODUCTS PHILS, INC., et al. v.
BENJAMIN BALTASAR, ET AL. G.R. NO.188828, MARCH 5, 2014
When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove nonpayment for it is
presumed. The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been
discharged by payment.
In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of the subject Trust Indenture Certificates
strongly supports his claim that petitioner Bank's obligation to return the principal plus interest of the
money placement has not been extinguished. The TICs in the hands of respondent is a proof of
indebtedness and a prima facie evidence that they have not been paid. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC.) v. ARTURO P. FRANCO, SUBSTITUTED BY
HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: MAURICIA P. FRANCO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180069, MARCH 5, 2014
The lower courts erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the performance that a police
officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would induce him to falsify his
testimony. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be noted that the
presumption is precisely just that a presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, it
cannot be regarded as binding truth. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY CARANTO Y
PROPETA. G.R. 193768, MARCH 5, 2014

The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only those errors
assigned will be considered applies in the absence of certain exceptional circumstances. As exceptions to
the rule, the Court has considered grounds not raised or assigned as errors in instances where: (1)
grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned
as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision
and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which
the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are closely related to the
assigned error/s; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose determination is necessary to
rule on the question/s properly assigned as errors.
The present case falls into the exceptions. We find no error by the CA in resolving the issues on the
nature and duration of the petitioners possession and on the alienable character of the subject land.
These issues were apparently not raised by the Republic in its appeal before the CA, but are crucial in
determining whether the petitioners have registrable title over the subject land. SPOUSES MARIO AND
JULIA CAMPOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. NO. 184371. MARCH 5, 2014
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the
determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal
therefrom notwithstanding. Upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action,
the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it.SPOUSES
SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA v. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE
MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO. G.R. NO. 172909, MARCH 5, 2014
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas,
Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead. This may be true but the
prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides
basis for the conviction of all the accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL ENOJAS Y
HINGIPIT, ET AL. G.R. NO. 204894. MARCH 10, 2014
A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites,
to wit: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. Hence, to be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows that
he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
In the present case, the Court finds the RTC grant of injunction to be in order. There is no question that
when the Pagbilao Development Corporation bought the properties from the vendors, it had full
knowledge that there were questions involving ownership of the parcels of land it bought. Likewise there
is no question that Pagbilao Development Corporation did not take any step to have the annotation or
encumbrance in each title cancelled. Inevitably, PDC is deemed to have obtained the properties subject
to the outcome of the litigation among the heirs of Arsenio. PEDRO LUKANG v. PAGBILAO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. NO. 195374. MARCH 10, 2014
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with and in such case, the burden of proof rests on the
appellant. Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden. Moreover, and as aptly observed by
the CA, appellant did not seasonably question these procedural gaps before the trial court. Suffice it to

say that objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. SHERWON BIS Y AVELLANEDA. G.R. NO. 191360, MARCH 10, 2014
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount
of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by
RTCs.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of
pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA
v. FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINIA LINDO, et al. G.R. NO. 208232. MARCH 10, 2014

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to
do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.
Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was
not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect.
Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not
made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. DR.
FERNANDO SOLIDUM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 192123, MARCH 10, 2014
In the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for
probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal
before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition
supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as
amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. G.R. NO. 188191.
MARCH 12, 2014

Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial office, and interfere
with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant may be held liable for indirect
contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and reputation of the judges and the Judiciary. In
the instant case, AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment against respondent Justices. Hence, we now demand that AMALIs authorized
representative to show cause in writing why they should not be held in indirect contempt of court for
bringing the unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice. RE:
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND INC. AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANBO E. VILLON AND HON.
RICARDO R. ROSARI A.M. OCA IPI NO. 12-204-CA-J. MARCH 11, 2014

Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are actions
considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that: Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court
is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the
potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court. There is potential custody

when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly
recognized by law. While the subject properties are in the US, the the Republics interest over the Arelma
assets has already been recognized in an earlier decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court. FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES/ IMELDA
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 189505 & G.R. NO. 189434,
MARCH 12, 2014
Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey
during the commotion, Erwins liability is not diminished since he and the others with him acted with
concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally liable as coprincipals by direct participation.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERWIN TAMAYO Y BAUTISTA.
G.R. NO. 196960, MARCH 12, 2014.

While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy, there is no harm
if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in
evidence by the party proponent. Hence, Respondents failure to present the original copy of the
Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a mere
photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the case.
Moreover, the rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted,
unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies only to parties to such instrument.
Hence only Fernando may be held liable for the judgment amount of P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was
not a signatory to the Acknowledgment. SPOUSES FERNANDO AND MA. ELENA SANTOS v. LOLITA
ALCAZAR, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT DELFIN CHUA. G.R. NO. 183034, MARCH
12, 2014
In this jurisdiction, courts generally accord great respect and finality to factual findings of administrative
agencies. These findings, however, are not infallible. This doctrine espousing comity to administrative
findings of facts cannot preclude the courts from reviewing and, when proper, disregarding these findings
of facts when shown that the administrative body committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously,
whimsically or arbitrarily disregarding evidence or circumstances of considerable importance that are
crucial or decisive of the controversy. DIAMOND TAXI AND/OR BRYAN ONG v. FELIPE LLAMAS, JR.
G.R. NO. 190724, MACRH 12, 2014
Petitioners admission that the five affiants were their former employees is binding upon them. While they
claim that respondent was the employee of their suppliers Mayol and Apondar, they did not submit proof
that the latter were indeed independent contractors; clearly, petitioners failed to discharge their burden of
proving their own affirmative allegation. SOUTH EAST INTERNATIONAL RATTAN, INC. AND/OR
ESTANISLAO AGBAY v. JESUS J. COMING. G.R. NO. 186621, MARCH 12, 2014
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must
initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is
the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The Court found no merit in respondents contention that
complainants have no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and
that the present suit was merely instituted to harass him. NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO
VICTORIA, JR. v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ. A.C. NO. 9116, MARCH 12, 2014
In an appeal to the SC of a CA decision dismissing a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 47 for lack of proof of
authority and affidavit of service of filing as required by Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, the
court held that While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so
strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are
intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they
seek which are the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the

relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when
substantial justice requires it, as in the instant case, should no longer be subject to cavil. DREAMLAND
HOTEL RESORT AND WESTLEY J. PRENTICE v. STEPHEN B. JOHNSON. G.R. NO. 191455,
MARCH 12, 2014
In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only
questions of law may be raised. When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the
conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law. In the present case, there seems to be
no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented before us calls for a review of the CAs conclusion
that the documents and evidence presented by petitioner are insufficient to support her application for
registration of title. Hence, the petition is properly filed. MINDA S. GAERLAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES. G.R. NO. 192717., MARCH 12, 2014

As a rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. In this case, the only legal issue raised by petitioner is
whether the trial court based its determination of just compensation on the factors provided under existing
laws and jurisprudence.
In this case, we find that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value of the subject
property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax declarations and
current selling price supported by documentary evidence. Indeed, just compensation must not be arrived
at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different factors.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION. G.R. NO. 192100. MARCH 12, 2014
A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no
authority to act upon. Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When
the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the
pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is
deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied
with. MARYLOU CABRERA v. FELIX NG. G.R. NO. 201601, MARCH 12, 2014
The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the merits of the
case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a petition for certiorari under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. While it is true that the primary relief prayed for by
Capulong in his petition has already been voluntarily corrected by the Ombudsman by the issuance of the
order lifting his preventive suspension, we must not lose sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed
for other remedies. There being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it
was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. JOSE T. CAPULONG. G.R. NO. 201643, MARCH 12, 2014
There should be no inexplicable delay in the filing of a motion to set aside order of default. Even when a
motion is filed within the required period, excusable negligence must be properly alleged and proven.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed to answer the
complaint within the required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order of default without an
acceptable excuse why its counsel failed to answer the complaint. It failed to prove the excusable
negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the order of default. LUI
ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS. G.R. NO. 193494, MARCH 12, 2014
The almost four months that lapsed before the records reached the ponentes office was caused by the
gross incompetence and inefficiency of the division personnel at the CA. It was the height of injustice for
the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for extension reached the ponentes office beyond
the last date prayed for.

The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was received by the CA on
September 13, 2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading by registered mail. They are not required to
ensure that it would be received by the court on or before the last day of the extended period prayed for.
Though no party can assume that its motion for extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be
reasonable. HEIRS OF AMADA A. ZAULDA v. ISAAC Z. ZAULDA. G.R. NO. 201234, MARCH 17, 2014
The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into the
property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the filing of the
complaint before the MTC. However, the timeliness of the filing of the Complaint for unlawful detainer is
not an issue in this case. Hence, the failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco
came into possession of the property does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property, possession de facto and
not possession de jure. But where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the
property. Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela
Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of
the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of
ownership in this case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that the
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ AND AMELIA CONCIODELA CRUZ v. SPOUSES RUFINO R. CAPCO AND MARTY C. CAPCO. G.R. NO. 176055, MARCH
17,2014.
The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public document by virtue of its being acknowledged
before notary public. As a notarized document, the deed carried the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor the presumption of regularity. Hence, it was
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity, and was entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. To rebut its authenticity and genuineness, the contrary evidence must be clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the deed should be upheld.
Petitioners undeniably failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence against the genuineness and
authenticity of the deed. Instead, their actuations even demonstrated that their transaction with
respondents had been regular and at arms-length, thereby belying the intervention of fraud.
METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC., et al. v. PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC. et al.G.R. NO.
154390,
MARCH
17,
2014

The petitioners essentially assail in this petition the validity of the NHAs acquisition of the property, in
view of the prohibition on sale or disposition of agricultural lands under E.O. No. 228, in relation to P.D.
No. 27 and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Resolution of this petitions core issue requires the proper
interpretation and application of the laws and the rules governing the governments agrarian reform
program, as well as the laws governing the powers and functions of the NHA as the propertys acquiring
entity. As presented, therefore, this petitions core issue is a question of law that a Rule 45 petition
properly addresses.
This notwithstanding, the resolution of this petitions core issue necessitates the prior determination of two
essentially factual issues, i.e., the validity of the propertys conversion and the petitioners claimed
ownership of the property. As questions of fact, they are proscribed in a Rule 45 petitionThe settled rule
is that the Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to resolving only questions of
law. HEIRS OF TERESITA MONTOYA, et al. v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al. G.R. NO.
181055, MARCH 19, 2014

While the determination of probable cause is primarily an executive function, the Court would not hesitate
to interfere if there is a clear showing that Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached.
When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on the lone fact that
the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the merits of the defense. When
he made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against the
accused, he effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence
and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction. BARRY LANIER AND PERLITA LANIER v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. NO. 189176, MARCH 19, 2014
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies,
in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The. For res judicata in
the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of parties and identity of issues.
As the issues of whether Lot J of Psd. 146880 is one of the properties donated by the spouses Cornelio
and Nieves to Angel and whether such donation was valid have been necessarily settled in Civil Case No.
1185, they can no longer be relitigated in Civil Case No. 2735. HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL v. HEIRS
OF
ANGEL
MIGUEL.
G.R.
NO.
158916,
MARCH
19,
2014
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO.
In a rape case filed by a mental retardate, the Court held that mental retardation per se does not affect a
witness credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. Only those whose mental condition, at
the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others are disqualified. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY OBOGNE
G.R. NO. 199740, MARCH 24, 2014
The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden to establish the
allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof required
is preponderance of evidence.
Hence, the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, who failed to establish by
preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the proximate cause of
the fatal accident of Balbino could not recover damages. BJDC CONSTRUCTION v. NENA E. LANUZO,
ET
AL.
G.R.
NO.
161151,
MARCH
24,
2014

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, confines this Court to a review of the case solely on pure questions of law.
In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for
certiorari it ruled upon was presented; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it
correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it,
not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we
have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the
challenged NLRC decision. The CA gravely misappreciated the import of the evidence on record and can
even be said to have disregarded it. The NLRC glossed over Labradors repeated violations that led the
latter to request that he be allowed to resign to preserve his reputation for future employment, rather than
be dismissed from the service. SUTHERLAND GLOBAL SERIVES (PHILIPPINES), INC. AND JANETTE
G. LAGAZO v. LARRY S. LABRADOR. G.R. NO. 193107. MARCH 24, 2014
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his
Motion for Consolidation vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well
settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount

to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY T.
GO. G.R. NO. 168539, MARCH 25, 2014

The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group visited the school to demand
their compliance with the decision was not borne out of a contumacious conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness,
bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the contrary,
SLU was well within its rights to appeal the decision and not immediately heed the demand of the Olairez
group.
Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule on hearing of motions as provided
in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when they scheduled the hearing on their Very Urgent Motion
to Cite Defendants In Contempt just one day after they filed the said pleading. As a rule, any motion that
does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be received for filing and, if filed, is not
entitled to judicial cognizance, subject only to some exceptions, such as where a rigid application of the
rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice or if there was substantial compliance. BABY
NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, et al. vs. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., et al. G.R. NO. 174758, MARCH 26,
2014
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as frequent unauthorized absences from duty during
office hours. The word frequent connotes that the employees absent themselves from duty more than
once. Respondents two absences from his post, being without authority, can already be characterized as
frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty, which adversely affect the prompt delivery of
justice.
Substantial evidence shows that respondent is guilty of loafing. The investigation conducted by the
investigating lawyers of the OCA revealed at least two (2) instances when he was out of his assigned
post/station during regular office hours. He failed to sufficiently refute these findings.OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JOHNI GLENN D. RUNES. A.M. NO. P-12-3055, MARCH 26, 2014
Subject to Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 the, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of
a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72)
hours from issuance, but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as
to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid
seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary
injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours provided herein.
The Court does not now find that Judge Jurado acted in bad faith or with ill will or malicious motive when
he granted the TRO extension and later the preliminary injunction. It would have been irregular and
unreasonable for him to act on the extension of the 72-hour TRO on June 6, 2011 when the cases were
first raffled to him, and besides, under Rule 58 he had 24 hours to act thereon.
Moreover, PAGCOR is not justified in failing to file a requisite motion for reconsideration, and to observe
the hierarchy of courts. While the question of whether to give due course to the petitions is addressed to
the discretion of the Court, it behooves PAGCOR to observe the applicable rules and keep in mind that
the Court will not take lightly any non-observance of our settled rules as if they are mere technicalities. A
motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the special civil action of certiorari. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS AND
RESORTS, INC., et al. G.R. NO. 197942-43/G.R. NO. 199528, MARCH 26, 2014

A court employee who was charged with dishonesty cannot claim that the admission of documentary
evidence which were mere photocopies and were obtained without her consent constitute a violation of
her right to due process. Proceedings in administrative investigation are not strictly governed by the
technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature. Thus, administrative due process cannot be
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It is enough that the party is given the chance to
be heard before the case against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of
due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the
opportunity to be heard. Anonymous Complaint Against Otelia Lyn G. Maceda, Court Interpreter,
Municipal Trial Court, Palapag, Northern Samar. A.M. No. P-12-3093, March 26, 2014
After a careful review, this Court is convinced that AAAs unwavering narration of how she was raped,
together with her positive identification of her own father as the one who raped her, are worthy of belief.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical
distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when
the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places. PEOPLE OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
v.
JESUS
BURCE.
G.R.
NO.
201732,
MARCH
26,
2014
As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the judgment to be
executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of
the judgment sought to be executed; the execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original
judgment or award. However, a writ of execution issued upon a final judgment adjudicating the ownership
of land to a party may authorize putting her in possession although the judgment does not specifically
direct such act. LEONORA A. PASCUAL v. JOSEFINO L. DAQUIOAG, ET AL. G.R. NO. 162063,
MARCH 31, 2014

The petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court to undo the findings of fact of
the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis of the documents submitted with her petition.
But the Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45,
Rules of Court explicitly requires the petition for review on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth. Accordingly, the petition for review of Limson is outrightly rejected for this
reason. REVELINA LIMSON v. EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ. G.R. NO. 162205, MARCH 31, 2014

The rationale for the requirement of first filing a motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for
certiorari is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors
and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. In the instant case,
the NLRC had all the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself. Hence, the CA erred in dismissing
the Rule 65 petition filed by Olores. EMMANUEL M. OLORES v. MANILA DOCTORS COLLEGE
AND/OR TERESITA O. TURLA. G.R. NO. 201663, MARCH 31, 2014

LEGAL ETHICS
In administrative proceedings where the charge equates to a criminal offense, the showing of culpability
on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially
because the charge is penal in character. Knowingly rendering an adjust judgment constitutes a serious
criminal offense. Thus, the complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment
is patently contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate
intent to perpetrate an injustice. In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or
some other similar motive in issuing the judgment. Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability. The
failure of the judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable. Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly
degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. Indeed,
no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or to answer for performing his
judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility. RE:
Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, et al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 12202-CA-J, (2013)
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same
person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what
are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in
question, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act or deed. Respondents
failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the
notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function
of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as
a lawyer. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn
oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to
the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the
duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
Patricio V. Agbulos v. Atty. Rosekker A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350 (2013)

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of
his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. Augusto P. Baldado v. Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica, A.C. No. 9120
(2013)
The following procedural requisites must be complied with before petitioner may be punished for indirect
contempt: First, there must be an order requiring the petitioner to show cause why she should not be
cited for contempt. Second, the petitioner must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge
against her. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider
petitioners answer. Finally, only if found guilty will petitioner be punished accordingly. What is most
essential in indirect contempt cases, however, is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to
meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. Plainly, respondent Judge's obstinate
disregard of established rules of procedure amounts to gross ignorance of the law or procedure, since he

disregarded the basic procedural requirements in instituting an indirect contempt charge. Anna Liza
Valmores-Salinas v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, A.M.
No. RTJ-12-2335 (2013)
An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong information to his client
regarding the matter subject of their professional relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of
the Court. He thereby violates his Lawyer's Oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client. Furthermore, he
also violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he is called upon
to serve his client with competence and diligence. Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and
concerns of his clients. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the clients.
His duty to safeguard the clients interests commences from his engagement as such, and lasts until his
effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every reasonable step and exercise
ordinary care as his clients interests may require. Johnny Pesto v. Marcelito Millo, Adm. Case No.
9612 (2013)
A lawyer engaged for his services regarding the recovery of a land title which the other party refuses to
convey to his client cannot by himself lease the subject property to any third person and collect rentals as
payment for expenses incurred in the process of the title transfer; more importantly when there is no valid
showing that the said collections were actually used for the said transfer. Money entrusted to a lawyer for
a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should
be immediately returned. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Gloria
P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz, A.C. No. 9615 (2013)
Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from
submission for decision or resolution. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties
efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters
also applies to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the magistrate. Unreasonable
delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and
constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction against the
defaulting magistrate. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension
from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. Office of the Administrator Court v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes III, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342/A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318 (2013)
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed
during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an
administrative case is predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government service.
However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the public official or
employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case. In fine, cessation from office by reason
of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case filed against the said officer or
employee at the time that he was still in the public service or render it moot and academic. If after his
retirement a judicial audit has been conducted and it was found that he is indeed liable, though the Court
concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit, the absence of such rules
should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their
incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial
audit. Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235 (2013)
Mere allegations of impartiality against the respondents cannot be the sole basis for the grant of a Motion
for Inhibition against them. An inhibition must be for just and valid reason. The mere imputation of bias or
partiality is not enough ground, especially when the charge is without basis. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v.
Atty. Manuel Lolong M. Lazaro, et al, A.C. No. 9259 (2013)

It is the duty of every judge to resolve the cases submitted before them promptly. The honor and integrity
of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but
also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. The delay in deciding a case within the
reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
which mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with promptness. A judge cannot simply take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of her court personnel, for the latter are not the guardians of the formers responsibility.
Unless the reins of control and supervision over the administrative aspect of the adjudicatory process are
tightened, the swift and efficient delivery of justice will be impeded and rendered illusory. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818
(2013)
The personal letters written by the respondent seeking for the mercy of the Supreme Court in order to
lighten the penalties imposed upon her were treated as Motions for Reconsideration. Filing of multiple
Motions for Reconsideration in the guise of personal letters to whoever sits as the Chief Magistrate of the
Court, is trifling with the judicial processes to evade a final judgment. Carmen P. Edano v. Judge Fatima
Gonzales-Asdala and Stenographer Myrla del Pilar Nicandro, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974 (2013)
The signing of the Complaint by the office secretary of the respondent upon his own instructions
constituted an unauthorized practice of law as it is the lawyers duty and not that of his secretary. A
lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded
on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control
of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of
the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he
may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further,
under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading;
(2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not
interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. Rodrigo E. Tapay and
Anthony J. Rustia v. Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo and Atty. Janus T. Jarder, A.C. No. 9604 (2013)

Employees of the judiciary should be very circumspect in how they conduct themselves inside and
outside the office. It matters not that his acts were not work-related. Employees of the judiciary should be
living examples of uprightness, not only in the performance of official duties, but also in their personal and
private dealings with other people, so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the
courts in the community. Any scandalous behavior or any act that may erode the peoples esteem for the
judiciary is unbecoming of an employee. Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners
and right conduct are expected of all judicial officers and employees. Any transgression or deviation from
the established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct. However, respondent
cannot be held liable for grave abuse of authority. Grave abuse of authority has been defined as a
misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any
person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of
authority. In the present case, the acts complained of against the respondent are not connected to the
performance of his duty as a sheriff. Antioco Bonono, Jr. and Victoria Ravelo-Camingue v. Jaime
dela Pena Sunit, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Surigao City, A.M. No. P-12-3073
(2013)
Falsification of time records constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in

principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. The conduct
of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and
must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion
that may taint the judiciary. The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of
public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Judge Anastacio C, Rufon v. Manuelito P. Genita, Legal researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Bacolod City, A.M. No. P-12-3044 (2013)

Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons
of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are
inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting
judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent
them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions. Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept
that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue
to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The act of a judge coaching her
daughter who is the counsel of the respondent during a hearing is considered as engaging in private
practice of law. A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the private practice of
law. His acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from engaging in such practice,
regardless of the beneficiary of the activity being a member of his immediate family. The judges act of
doing so renders him guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Sonia C. Decena and Rey C. Decena v.
Judge Nilo Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 (2013)
Complainants complaint charging the respondent with Impropriety and Partiality cannot hold water on the
basis that respondent is defendants second cousin by affinity since the formers aunt is married to an
uncle of the defendant. There is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood
relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wifes brother, but not to the wife of his wifes
brother. There is no affinity between the husbands brother and the wifes sister; this is called affinitas
affinitatis. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case No. 40.
Johnwell W. Tiggangay v. Judge Marcelino K. Wacas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk City,
Kalinga, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ (2013)
Solemnizing marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of
questionable character constitutes gross inefficiency. Failure to ensure the payment of solemnization fees
constitutes neglect of duty. Solemnizing marriages where legal impediments existed during cohabitation
such as the minority status of one party constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Ignorance of the law is a
mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an
indication of lack of integrity. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et
al., A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 (2013)
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies a notary public from notarizing a document where
the affiants are related to him within the fourth civil degree of affinity. On the other hand, if the notary
public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards.
Violation of the disqualification rule under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground to
disbar a notary public since he did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross
immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Bernard N. Jandoquile v. Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr. A.C. No. 9514 (2013)
Respondents as security guards to the premises of the Hall of Justice cannot be fully exonerated from
liability. While they may have been properly moved to call attention to an apparent irregularity,
respondents acts of "shouting" while angrily pointing their fingers at the complainants in front and in the
presence of so many court personnel and visitors, thus causing complainants shame and
embarrassment, cannot be allowed or tolerated. This Court has consistently directed the employees of
the judiciary to exercise self-restraint and civility at all times. Hence, court employees cannot engage in a
shouting match, act with vulgarity or behave in such a way that would diminish the sanctity and dignity of

the courts, even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. Respondents' breach of this mandate not
only showed a paucity of professionalism but also unjustifiably embarrassed complainants. Hence,
regardless of respondents' motivations, their transgression of the bounds of decency warrants the
imposition of a penalty as provided by law. L.G Johnna E. Lozada and L.G Liza S. Millado v. Ma.
Theresa G. Zerrudo, Clerk of Court IV, and Salvacion D. Sermonia, Clerk IV, both of the Office of
the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo City, A.M. No. P-13-3108 (2013)
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other
lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. As noted
by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation
of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's
conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required
from lawyers. It is proper that he be sanctioned. The duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy
and impressed with public interest. Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization
converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the
necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. Efigenia M. Tenoso v. Atty.
Anselmo S. Echanez, A.C. No. 8384 (2013)
The Constitution has empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the integrated bar.
Pursuant thereto, the Court wields a continuing power of supervision over the IBP and its affairs like the
elections of its officers. It is not only an exercise of its constitutional and statutory mandated duty, but also
of its symbolic function of providing guiding principles, precepts and doctrines for the purpose of steering
the members of the bench and the bar to the proper path. Each region, as enumerated under Section 3,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, shall have the opportunity to have its representative elected as
Executive Vice-President of the IBP, provided that, the election for the position of Executive Vice
President shall be on a strict rotation by exclusion basis. A region, whose representative has just been
elected as Executive Vice President, can no longer have its representative elected for the same position
in subsequent elections until after all regions have had the opportunity to be elected as such. At the end
of the rotational cycle, all regions, except the region whose representative has just served the
immediately preceding term, may be elected for another term as Executive Vice-President in the new
rotational cycle. The region whose representative served last in the previous rotational cycle may be
elected Executive Vice-President only after the first term of the new rotational cycle ends, subject once
more to the rule on exclusion. The order of rotation by exclusion shall be without prejudice to the regions
entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each
region will have its turn in the rotation. A violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by
annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in
the IBP. In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines: Atty. Marcial M. Magsino, et al v. Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC/A.C. No.
8292 (2013)
If a misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer
may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar. Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar. A
member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Lawyers in
government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be
more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the everconstant scrutiny of the public. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must
also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened
with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. Rosario
Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer v. Atty. Isabel E. Florin, et al., A.C. No. 5119 (2013)

All directives coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of this
Courts administrative supervision of trial courts and their personnel, hence, should be respected. These

directives are not mere requests but should be complied with promptly and completely. Indefensible
disregard of the orders of the OCA for him to comment on the complaint and to explain his infractions,
shows his disrespect for and contempt, not just for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct
administrative supervision over trial court officers and employees through the OCA. His indifference to,
and disregard of, the directives issued to him clearly constituted insubordination. Respondents failure to
explain his side is tantamount to his admission of the charges against him. Auxencio Joseph B.
Clemente, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 48, Pasay City v. Erwin Bautista, Clerk
III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 48, Pasay City, A.M. NO. P-10-2879 (2013)
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of representing
conflicting interest: One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Another test of inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. The termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that
the clients confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional
employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client,
do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented
him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. Dr.
Teresita Lee v. Atty. Amador L. Simando, A.C. No. 9537 (2013)
Respondent's (security guard) act of hurling invectives on the complainants (clerks of court) during office
hours and within the court premises was correctly held to be a case of simple misconduct. Respondents
foul and vulgar utterances, albeit not work related, constitute clear deviations from the established norms
of conduct which ought to be followed by public officers. The conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most
junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all
times be characterized by strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the public's respect for the
judiciary. Any fighting or misunderstanding among court employees becomes a disgraceful sight reflecting
adversely on the good image of the judiciary. Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good
manners, and right conduct are expected of all judicial officers and employees. This standard is applied
with respect to a court employee's dealings not only with the public but also with his or her co-workers in
the service. Conduct violative of this standard quickly and surely corrodes respect for the courts. Ria
Pamela B. Abulencia and Blesse M. Burgonio v. Regino R. Hermosisima, Security Guard II, Sheriff
and Security Division, Sandiganbayan, A.M. SB-13-20-P (2013)
A judges retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant administrative proceeding that
was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the OCA, of any jurisdiction to
still subject him to the rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions
committed while he was still in the service. This Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on
the conduct of judicial audit. However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to
recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were never given
a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Retired Judge Guillermo R. Andaya, A.M. RTJ-09-2181 (2013)
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from acquiring
property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. The rationale advanced for
the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved.
In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud,
which is what can and must be done. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property
must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall
remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate
against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of
others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public

order, public safety and public interest. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas, A.M. No. P-011448 (2013)
A close-to-unbearable working condition under Judge Misajon is a mitigating circumstance to the fact that
respondent as Process Server is guilty of habitual absenteeism. Judge Misajons act of humiliating the
respondent in the presence of other court personnel, the parties or the public, gives way to the
compassion of the court in the imposition of proper penalties. All judges should always observe courtesy
and civility. They should be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language. Indeed,
Judge Misajon can hold her colleagues in the Bench and her staff to the efficient performance of their
duties without being offensive in her speech, remembering always that courtesy begets courtesy. Judge
Ma. Monina S. Misajon v. Jerence P. Hiponia, et al., A.M. No. P-08-2439 (2013)
A court stenographers representation that he himself took the Civil Service Examination when someone
else took it for him constitutes Dishonesty. It bears noting that per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15,
Series of 1991, the use of spurious Civil Service eligibility constitutes dishonesty, among others.
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. No other office in the government
service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the
judiciary. Civil Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, A.M. No. SCC-08-11-P (2013)
A Labor Arbiter who refused to issue a writ of execution without monetary compensation from the
complainant, is guilty of gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct. The possession of good moral
character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyers duty to observe the highest
degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bars integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part
of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. Eduardo
A. Abella v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. Adm. Case No. 7332 (2013)
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy of the
entries to the proper clerk of the RTC within the first ten days of the month next following or the failure of
the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk of court. The failure of
respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report for the month of
November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her within that month, has farreaching implications and grave consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the
said Deed of Sale and showed the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its
authenticity. Anita C. Pena v. Atty. Christina C. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191 (2013)
A Clerk of Court is the courts accountable officer. It was not the cash clerk. It was her duty to supervise
and monitor her subordinate to ensure that the proper procedures were followed in the collection of the
courts funds. Being the custodian of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties, and premises, she
was liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property. Time and again,
the Court reminds that "those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the
lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. A public servant is
expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity, and should be made
accountable to all those whom he serves. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet
the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. The Court condemns and would never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice
which would violate the norm of public accountability and would diminish, or even just tend to diminish,
the faith of the people in the Judiciary." Office of the Court Administrator v. Lorenza M. Martinez, A.M.
No. P-06-2223 (2013)
The preparation of an extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes practice of law. Not being a lawyer, a
court stenographer had no authority to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of estate. Worse,
respondent also admitted receiving money from complainant for her services. Being a court employee,
respondent ought to have known that it was improper for her to prepare and finalize the extrajudicial
settlement of estate, a service only a lawyer is authorized to perform, and to receive money therefore. It is
true that respondent prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement of estate pursuant to a private
agreement between her and complainant. However, respondent is an employee of the court whose

conduct must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to
let her be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. She is expected to exhibit the highest sense
of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and
private dealings with other people to preserve the courts good name and standing. In preparing and
finalizing the extrajudicial settlement of estate and receiving compensation for the same even when she is
not a lawyer, respondent is guilty of simple misconduct. Leticia A. Arienda v. Evelyn A. Montilla, A.M.
No. P-11-2980 (2013)
Falsification of Daily Time Record constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty refers to the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It is a grave offense
penalized by dismissal from the service even for the first offense. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Nelson P. Magbanua, A.M. P-12-3048 (2013)
Undue delay in the disposition of cases calls for administrative measures against the respondent judge as
she fails to resolve the cases submitted before her within the time mandated by the Constitution. A judge
should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often
justice denied. Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to
duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the
prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in
the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. He should be punctual in the performance
of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if
the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction
with the administration of justice. Maricor L. Garado v. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, A.M. No.
MTJ-11-778 (2013)

Failure to submit a written explanation for her continuous absence and failure to transcribe stenographic
notes despite written and verbal warnings; as well as her failure to improve work performance, warrant
the unsatisfactory rating of the respondent, a court stenographer. Public accountability essentially
includes discharging one's duties as a public officer with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence,
loyalty, and efficiency. Incompetence and inefficiency have no place in public service, especially in the
dispensation of justice. RE: Dropping from the Rolls of Joylyn R. Dupaya, Court Stenographer III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Aparri, Cagayan, A.M. No. P-13-3115 (2013)
A process server, whose primary task is to serve court notices, is not authorized to collect or receive any
amount of money from any party-litigant. The act of collecting or receiving money from a litigant
constitutes grave misconduct in office. Thus, this kind of gross misconduct by those charged with
administering and rendering justice erodes the respect for law and the courts. Respondent likewise
violated Canon 1, Section 2 of the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel which provides that court
personnel shall not solicit or accept any gifts, favor or benefit of any explicit or implicit understanding that
such gift shall influence their official actions. Judge Antonio C. Reyes v. Edwin Fangonil, Process
Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 of Baguio City, A.M. No. P-10-2741 (2013)
It is a fundamental rule of ethics that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates
to carry it to its conclusion. It was a lawyers bounden duty to see his cases through until proper
completion; he could not abandon or neglect them in midstream. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio
V. San Juan, A.C. No. 7944 (2013)

Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as
vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to
act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing
the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and
not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Thus, even at the risk of jeopardizing the probability of
prevailing on his clients application for a search warrant, respondent should have informed the court of

the patents expiration so as to allow the latter to make an informed decision given all available and
pertinent facts. Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. v. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C. No. 6942 (2013)
If the complainant feels aggrieved, she should resort to the available proper judicial remedy and exhaust
it, instead of resorting to the unworthy disciplinary charge. Truly, disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions brought against any Judge or Justice in relation to the performance of official functions are neither
complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. To
be clear, although we do not shirk from the responsibility of imposing discipline on the erring Judges or
Justices and employees of the Judiciary, we shall not hesitate to shield them from baseless charges that
only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. RE: Letter Complaint of
Merlita B. Fabiana against Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., et al., A.M. No. CA-13-51-J
(2013)
A judge who fails to promptly decide cases and resolve pending motions is guilty of gross inefficiency. As
a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times act with efficiency and probity. He is
duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of
excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain
the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the institution he represents.
Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of circumstances
that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed
extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request
and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably granted such
request. RE: Failure of Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for Decision and to
Resolve Pending Motions in the regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No.
08-5-305-Rtc (2013)
A lawyer who represented those who were victims of a pyramid scam against a corporation and then later
on enters his appearance as counsel for the officers of such corporation for the criminal cases involving
the same pyramid scam is guilty of misconduct. The lawyers highest and most unquestioned duty is to
protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the clients ceasing to employ
the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the
death of the client. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents
to it after consultation. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be
treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.
The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Ferdinand
Samson v. Atty. Edgardo Era, A.C. No. 6664 (2013)
A court stenographer who caused another to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead is
guilty of gross dishonesty. All court employees of the Judiciary, being public servants in an office
dispensing justice, must always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their
conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with
the law and court regulations. They should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty, for that is the
only way to maintain the people's respect for and faith in the Judiciary. They should avoid any act or
conduct that would diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Concerned Citizen v. Nonita
Catena, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P (2013)
The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In
this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain
at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to
the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer's
negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or

carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyers mere
failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. Josefina Caranza Vda. De Saldivar
v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanez, Jr., A.C. No. 7749 (2013)
While it may be true that complainant herself is engaged in illicit activities, the complainants own
complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent lawyers offense. Quite the
contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took
advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. It is clear that
respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit when he executed the revocations of
SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject
parcels when all the while he knew it belongs to his client. It is established in Jurisprudence that
disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the
property rights of other persons. Lilia Tabang and Concepcion Tabang v. Atty. Glenn C, Gacott, A.C.
No. 6490. (2013)
The deputy sheriffs act of using levied properties constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty.
These are flagrant and shameful acts and should not be countenanced. They grossly neglected their duty
to safely keep the levied property under their custody. Sheriffs are reminded that they are repositories of
public trust and are under obligation to perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best
of their abilities. Being frontline officials of the justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always
strive to maintain public trust in the performance of their duties." Office of the Court Administrator v.
Noel R. Ong and Alvin A. Buencamino, A.M. No. P-09-2690 (2013)
Complainants were assailing the propriety of the decision rendered by Judge Cabochan. Complainants
should be reminded that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. Should they disagree with the
ruling, there are judicial remedies available for them under the Rules of Court. As a matter of public
policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long
as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. On the other hand, failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring
magistrate. The penalty to be imposed on the judge varies depending on the attending circumstances of
the case. In deciding the penalty to be imposed, the Court takes into consideration, among others, the
period of delay; the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; the number of years the judge
has been in the service; the health and age of the judge; and the case load of the court presided over by
the judge. Konrad A. Rubin and Conrad C. Rubin v. Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City, OCA I.P.I No. 11-3589-RTJ (2013)
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. It is only upon strict compliance with the
condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, his
representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. The respondent should be reminded that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate
their clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice. Konrad A. Rubin and Conrad C. Rubin v. Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City, OCA I.P.I No. 11-3589-RTJ (2013)
While there is incongruity between a post office certification and the records of respondents law firm as to
when the subject NLRC decision was actually received by the latter, there is no clear and convincing
evidence presented by complainants that respondents maliciously made it appear that they received the
decision on a date ten days later than what is reflected on the records of the post office. The burden of
proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The
Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly
preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the
legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An

attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his
oath. Jaime Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Attys. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin III, A.C.
No. 7686 (2013)
A sheriffs failure to fully implement the writ should not be taken entirely against him. He could not fulfill
his task solely by verbally telling the occupants to vacate the property as he encountered resistance from
the informal settlers on the property who had built permanent structures thereon and refused to leave. He,
however, cannot fully be excused for his failure to make periodic reports in the proceedings taken on the
writ, as mandated by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The submission of the return and of
periodic reports by the sheriff is a duty that cannot be taken lightly. It serves to update the court on the
status of the execution and the reasons for the failure to satisfy its judgment. The periodic reporting also
provides the court insights on how efficient court processes are after a judgments promulgation. Its
overall purpose is to ensure speedy execution of decisions. A sheriffs failure to make a return and to
submit a return within the required period constitutes inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties; it is conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro, A.M. No. P-10-2789 (2013)

Respondent, in sending a text message trying to mediate an alleged bribery, committed misconduct. A
perusal of the said text message reveals that respondent acted contrary to the norms of conduct required
of her position. As Branch Clerk of Court, she serves as a sentinel of justice and any act of impropriety on
her part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples confidence in it.
Respondent should be reminded that a public servant must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and
integrity for no less than the Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust and public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. This constitutionallyenshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic
sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public service. The conduct of every
court personnel must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause to sully the image of
the Judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in
the performance of their official duties but also in conducting themselves outside or beyond the duties and
functions of their office. Court personnel are enjoined to conduct themselves toward maintaining the
prestige and integrity of the Judiciary for the very image of the latter is necessarily mirrored in their
conduct, both official and otherwise. Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 63, Makati City v. Fe A. Mabalot, Clerk of Court III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63,
Makati City, A.M. No. P-09-2726 (2013)

The 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is
mandatory. The period is reckoned from the date of the filing of the last pleading. If the Judge cannot
decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a
written request for the extension of her time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter. Only a valid
reason may excuse a delay. A judge who failed to resolve a motion within the 90-day period to resolve
the same is not guilty of gross inefficiency where the surrounding circumstances would involve a heavy
court docket and large volume of the judges official workload. This failure does happen frequently when
one is too preoccupied with too much work and is faced with more deadlines that can be humanly met.
Most men call this failure inadvertence. A few characterize it as oversight. In either case, it is excusable
except if it emanated from indolence, neglect, or bad faith. This reiteration is our way of assuring all
judicial officials and personnel that the Court is not an uncaring overlord that would be unmindful of their
fealty to their oaths and of their dedication to their work. For as long as they act efficiently to the best of
their human abilities and for as long as they conduct themselves well in the service of our Country and
People, the Court shall always be considerate and compassionate towards them. Col. Danilo Lubaton v.
Judge Mary Josephine Lazaro, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2320 (2013)
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously
under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases
with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay

in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the
defaulting judge. At the same time, however, the Court is also aware of the heavy case load of trial
courts. The Court has allowed reasonable extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such
extensions must first be requested from the Court. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the
period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. RE: Cases Submitted for Decision before
Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355
(2013)
The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the criminal
complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been easily averted
had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant. A client pays his
lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. He must constantly
keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. He is
expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him
has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a wholehearted fealty to the clients cause. Similarly, under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client
of the status and developments of the case and all other information relevant thereto. He must be
consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly should there be queries or requests for
information from the client. The honor bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end
upon taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for
the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only
satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the
client and the pursuit of justice. Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149 (2013)
A client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time with or without
cause. But this right of the client is not unlimited because good faith is required in terminating the
relationship. The limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil Code, which mandates that "every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith." The right is also subject to the right of the attorney to be
compensated. A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the
contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was
without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in
the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his
rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein
his services had been retained by the client. In the absence of the lawyers fault, consent or waiver, a
client cannot deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. The
Court must thwart any and every effort of clients already served by their attorneys worthy services to
deprive them of their hard-earned compensation. Truly, the duty of the courts is not only to see to it that
attorneys act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that attorneys are paid their just and
lawful fees. Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952 (2013)
Unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and failure to decide the
remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition
of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. A judge is mandated to diligently discharge
administrative responsibilities and maintain professional competence in court management. Furthermore,
a judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. Office
of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683 (2013)
It is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers

not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice. It must, however, be noted that a lawyers
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that
arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. Josephine L. Orola, et al. v. Atty. Joseph
Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860 (2013)
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law for a period spanning more than 30 years, without
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys as when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance
before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys; only to find out later on that it was nothing but a
mere attendance sheet. That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability
for his years of inaction. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without
taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provided that a lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. While an honest mistake of fact could be
used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law
and its consequences. IN RE: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys Michael A. Medado, B.M. No.
2540 (2013)
Justices are prohibited from sitting in any case in which he has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review. However, if the Decision is not in issue or under review and is
merely incidental or part of the "history" of the case, the prohibition is inapplicable. Crisanta GuidoEnriquez v. Alicia I. Victorino, et al., G.R. No. 180427 (2013)
A lawyer who forges a court decision in consideration of a sum of money and represents it as that of a
court of law is guilty of grave misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment. The
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country,
given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a
person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. No lawyer should ever lose
sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only
to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and
respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities.
Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to
investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity. The test
is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.
Atty. Oscar Embido v. Atty. Salvador Pe, A.C. No. 6732 (2013)
A lawyer who commits overt acts of sexual harassment against a female client is guilty of reprehensible
conduct that is unbecoming of a member of the Bar and may be condignly punished with suspension from
the practice of law. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. The possession of good moral
character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and
to retain membership in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are clearly duty- bound to observe the
highest degree of morality and integrity in order to safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant
behavior on the part of a lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor, be it in the lawyers public or private activities, is sufficient to warrant the lawyers
suspension or disbarment. Jocelyn de Leon v. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401 (2013)
Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 10154, which
requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC should not be made to apply to employees of the

Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Courts constitutionally-enshrined power of

administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to
secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which
makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state
policy of RA 10154. It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary
administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains
with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be
imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court
personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciarys power of administrative supervision. RE:
Request for Guidance/Clarification of Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring
Retiring Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Cases from
the Civil Service Commission, A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC (2013)
Safe keeping of public and trust funds is essential to an orderly administration of justice. No protestation
of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars designed to promote full accountability of
government funds. The Court has not hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen
short of their accountabilities. Any conduct that would violate the norms of public accountability and
diminish, or even merely tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system has never been
tolerated or condoned by the Court. This ought to be so. Clerks of court are the chief administrative
officers of their respective courts. As such, they are duty-bound to use skill and diligence in the
performance of their officially designated functions. Clerks of court perform a delicate function as
designated custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises. As such, they
are generally regarded as treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant manager thereof. Thus, they
are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Nancy R. Leal, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Sta. Ignacia
Mayontoc-San Climente San Jose, Tarlac, A.M. No. P-12-3047 (2013)
By failing to afford his clients every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law, a lawyer falls short
of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court. A lawyer "is expected to exert his best efforts and
ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the
ends of justice." Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law, legally applied. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. A lawyers diligence and vigilance is more imperative in
criminal cases, where the life and liberty of an accused is at stake. Verily, the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar
and to the public. Mary Ann T. Mattus v. Atty. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922 (2013)
The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be
confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment
is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the
judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with
the judgment. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional
mistakes or errors of judgments, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with fundamental
and basic legal principles in order to merit the confidence of the citizenry. Respondent Judge has shown
lack of familiarity with our laws, rules and regulations as to undermine the public confidence in the
integrity of the courts. Jesus D. Carbajosa v. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834 (2013)
It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in them. They are duty-bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in
all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Irrefragably, the legal profession demands of
attorneys an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly,
with the interests of their clients. Lest it be forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. These unyielding

standards respondent evidently failed to adhere to. Ma. Jeniffer Tria-Samonte v. Epifania Fanny
Obias, A.C. No. 4945 (2013)

Undoubtedly, the use of prohibited drugs by Castor, court personnel, violated the norms of conduct for
public service. By indulging in the use of illegal drugs, he committed conduct unbecoming of court
personnel, which tarnished the very image and integrity of the Judiciary. The image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat. The conduct of a
person serving the Judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum and above all
else, be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the Judiciary. The Court
would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those in the administration of
justice, which will violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the
faith of the people in the Judiciary. RE: Administrative Charge of Misconduct relative to the Alleged
Use of Prohibited Drug ("Shabu") of Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division,
Administrative Services, A.M. No. 2013-08-SC (2013)
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued
with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be evermindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs.
For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to
devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain
lawful objectives. Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher v. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532
(2013)
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any payments from the parties in the course of the performance of
their duties. They cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from the parties without observing the
proper procedural steps. Sheriffs, as officers of the court and agents of the law, play an important role in
the administration of justice. They are in the forefront of things, tasked as they are to serve judicial writs,
execute all processes, and carry into effect the orders of the court. As a front-line representative of the
judicial system, sheriffs must always demonstrate integrity in their conduct for once they lose the peoples
trust, they also diminish the peoples faith in the entire judiciary. There being no sufficient justification for
his delay in serving the summons on the defendant in the said case, he clearly disregarded his duty to
promptly serve the summons and should thus be held liable for simple neglect of duty. The Court cannot
overemphasize that the conduct required of court personnel must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may
taint the judiciary. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage. As a court employee, it therefore behooves respondent sheriff to act with
more circumspection and to steer clear of any situation, which may cast the slightest suspicion on his
conduct. Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao v. Neptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III, Branch 30,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, A.M. No. P-13-3153 (2013)
Court personnel must at all times act with strict propriety and proper decorum so as to earn and rebuild
the publics trust in the judiciary as an institution. This Court will not tolerate the practice of asking for
advance payment from litigants, much less the unauthorized acceptance of judicial fees. Section 11, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that payment for requests of copies of the TSN shall be
made to the Clerk of Court. Clearly, therefore, payment cannot be made to respondent, as it is an official
transaction, and, as such, must be made to the Clerk of Court. Respondent, being a stenographer, is not
authorized to accept payment for judicial fees, even if two-thirds of those fees would be paid to her
anyway. Court personnel must at all times act with strict propriety and proper decorum so as to earn and
rebuild the publics trust in the judiciary as an institution. Every employee of the judiciary should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Joefil Baguio v. Maria Fe V. Arnejo, A.M. No. P-13-3155
(2013)
A vital administrative function of a judge is effective management of his court, and this includes control of
the conduct of the courts ministerial officers. He has the responsibility to see to it that his clerk of court
performs his duties and observes the circulars issued by the Supreme Court and that includes the
safekeeping and on-time remittance of the legal fees collected. A Clerk of Court, on the other hand, is

primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether personally received by him or
by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. Being the custodian of the courts
funds, revenues, and records, respondent is likewise liable for any loss, shortage, destruction, or
impairment of said funds and property. Clerks of Court have always been reminded of their duty to
immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories for
they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody. The non-remittance of said amounts deprived the
Court of the interest that may be earned if the amounts were deposited in a bank, as prudently required.
The failure of a public officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer constitutes prima facie
evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property to personal use. Thus, they are not
only guilty of gross neglect of duty in the performance of their duty for their failure to timely turn over the
cash deposited with them but also gross dishonesty. Report on The FinanciaL Audit Conducted in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Ismael Salubre, et al. A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618 (2013)
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake committed by judges in the performance of their
official duties renders them administratively liable. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption or
malice may be the subject of disciplinary actions. For administrative liability to attach, respondent must be
shown to have been moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive. Gross
ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may also be
administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in
ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Though not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanction, the same applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where the law
is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. With regard to inhibition of judges, it must be borne in mind that it is rooted in
the Constitution which recognizes the right to due process of every person. Due process necessarily
requires that a hearing be conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal because
unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All
the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision
would come from a partial and biased judge. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v. Judge George E. Omelio /
Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge George E. Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge George E.
Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259 / A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264 / A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273 (2013)

The Judge was very much concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the OneDay Examination of Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that the
witness was already exhausted, having testified for almost three hours. The acts of the respondent judge
were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify any administrative liability on his part. Atty.
Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel L. Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, A.M. No. RTJ-132359 (2013)
It is the duty of clerks of court to perform their responsibilities faithfully, so that they can fully comply with
the circulars on deposits of collections. They are reminded to deposit immediately with authorized
government depositaries the various funds they have collected because they are not authorized to keep
those funds in their custody. The fact that the collected amounts were kept in the safety vault does not
reduce the degree of defiance of the rules. The Office of Court Administrator v. Ma. Theresa G.
Zerrudo, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, A.M. No. P-11-3006 (2013)
A judges acts of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours constitute gross
misconduct. Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states
that " Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer." Section 2, Canon 2 of the Code states that "The behavior and
conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary Section 1, Canon 4 of
the Code states that "Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities". Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Balajo, Jr. v. Judge Moises Pardo and Jaime
Calpatura, Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge, Regional Trial Court Branch 32, Cabarroguis
Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962/A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243-P/A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC (2013)

In a nutshell, the rules are explicit that the filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional. The whole essence of requiring the filing of bond is defeated if the bond issued turned out to
be invalid due to the surety company's expired accreditation. Thus, without the approval of this Court, the
bond issued by bonding companies produces no legal effect. Respondents, by allowing the bonding
company with expired accreditation to post bonds, as a consequence, put the litigants at risk, in the event
the Court denies the application for accreditation. It betrays the purpose of the required certification
issued by this Court which seeks to protect the litigants from spurious surety companies. It is not within
respondents' discretion to allow the filing of the appeal bond issued by a bonding company with expired
accreditation regardless of its pending application for renewal of accreditation. Respondents cannot
extend Intra Strata's authority or accreditation. Neither can it validate an invalid bond issued by a bonding
company with expired accreditation, or give a semblance of validity to it pending this Court's approval of
the application for renewal of accreditation. It must be the emphasized that it is only the Supreme Court,
through the Office of the Court Administrator, which can give authority and accreditation to surety
companies to be able to transact business involving judicial bonds. Rolando E. Cawaling, et. al. v.
Napoleon M. Menese, et. al., A.C. No. 9698, (2013)
The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. It exercises such
disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form its own judgment.
Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the IBPs
recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of law or disbarment are always
subject to this Courts review and approval. In administrative cases, the only issue within the ambit of the
Courts disciplinary authority is whether a lawyer is fit to remain a member of the Bar. Other issues, like
the issue of ownership of real properties, are proper subjects of judicial action. The Court can dismiss an
administrative case without prejudice when it could not determine his fitness to remain a member of the
Bar without delving into issues which are proper subjects of judicial action. Spouses David and Marisa
Williams v. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C. No. 7329 (2013)
The fabrication of an order by Judge Pacalna constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not
simply bad judgment or negligence, but a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person
accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave
rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences
of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. Dishonest acts have no place
in the judiciary and are even more detestable when perpetrated by a judge who is expected to be the
visible representation of truth and justice. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he is expected
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the laws and rules of procedure. The litigants will
have faith in the administration of justice only if they believe that the occupants of the bench cannot be
accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. Mamasaw Sultan Ali v. Hon. Baguinda-Ali
Pacalna, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court Municipality of Balindong, Province of
Lanao del Sur, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505 (2013)
The rule clearly requires that the sheriff executing a writ shall provide an estimate of the expenses to be
incurred, and such estimated amount must be approved by the court. Upon approval, the interested party
shall then deposit the amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff. The expenses shall be
disbursed to the assigned deputy sheriff to execute the writ, subject to liquidation upon the return of the
writ. Any amount unspent shall be returned to the interested party. Any amount received by the sheriff in
excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for
grave misconduct and gross dishonesty. Eleanor P. Olivan v. Arnel Jose A. Rubio, Deputy Sheriff IV,
Office of the Clerk of Court Regional Trial Court, Naga City, A.M. No. P-12-3063 (2013)
When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the
latter's rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a
family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not
just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. Respondent's refusal to obey the
orders of the IBP "is not only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his
fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey

court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being
themselves officers of the court." Respondent should be reminded that As an officer of the court, [he] is
expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be
complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm
of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers. Respondent should strive harder to live up to his
duties of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts, respect for law and for legal processes,
and of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in order to perform his responsibilities as
a lawyer effectively. Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, A.C. No. 10043 (2013)
Respondent lawyer admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits because he
believes that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same would be refused admission by
the RTC. If respondent truly believes that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were
fabricated, then he has the option to withdraw from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his
services for good cause such as when the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the
matter he is handling or when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons
and rules. Spouses George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner v. Atty. Reni M. Dublin, A.C. No.
5239 (2013)
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected to be circumspect in his language. While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,
he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. The lawyer's
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It
must be done within the confines of reason and common sense. Furtehrmore, Court orders are to be
respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to
judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch the Government to which they belong, as well as to the
State which has instituted the judicial system. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal v. Atty. Rodolfo Flores, A.C. No. 8954 (2013)
Failure to properly account for and duly return his clients money despite due demand is tantamount to a
violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code. Verily, a lawyers duty to his client is one
essentially imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable
efforts towards its faithful compliance. Besides, the obligatory force of said duty should not be diluted by
the temperament or occasional frustrations of the lawyers client, especially so when the latter remains
unsatisfied by the lawyers work. Indeed, a lawyer must deal with his client with professional maturity and
commit himself towards the objective fulfillment of his responsibilities. If the relationship is strained, the
correct course of action is for the lawyer to properly account for his affairs as well as to ensure the smooth
turn-over of the case to another lawyer. Except only for the retaining lien exception under Rule 16.03,
Canon 16 of the Code, the lawyer should not withhold the property of his client. Azucena SegoviaRibaya v. Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965 (2013)
The Civil Service law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the Court defined such an offense as acts or omissions
that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of the administration of justice. The administrative offense
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service need not be related to or connected with the
public officers official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of
his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.
Respondents transgressions may not be related to his official duties and functions, but certainly reflect
badly upon the entire Judiciary. Respondent failed to live up to the high ethical standards demanded by
the office he occupies. However, since respondent was not acting in the performance of his official duties,
he cannot be administratively liable for misconduct, whether grave or simple. Respondent is guilty of
simple dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of grave misconduct.

Heirs of Celestino Teves represented by Paul John Teves Abad, et al., v. Augusto J. Felicidario,
Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Manila, A.M. No. P-12-3089 (2013)
Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Court personnel are expected to act in a
manner free from reproach. Medical treatment of a sick husband does not excuse the actions of the
respondent who repeatedly deceived this Court by misusing court funds, falsifying public documents, and
failing to comply with orders. Clerks of Court are the custodians of the courts funds and revenues,
records, properties, and premises. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of
those entrusted to them. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual
remittance constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held administratively liable.
Respondent Acampado committed gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct when she failed to turn
over the funds of the Judiciary that were placed in her custody within the period required by law. Such
behavior should not be tolerated as it denigrates this Courts image and integrity. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Ms. Rosa A. Acampado, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern
Samar, A.M. Nos P-13-3116 & P-13-3112 (2013)
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence
or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Wellentrenched is the rule that substantial evidence, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond
reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon the erring
employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer, in this case the Court,
has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his
participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, Regional Trial Court Branch 20, Cauayan Isabela v.
Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cauayan Isabela, A.M. No. P-12-3100
(2013)
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and Extensions for Travel/Stay
Abroad) requires that a request must be made for an extension of the period to travel/stay abroad, and
that the request be received by the OCA ten (10) working days before the expiration of the original travel
authority. Failure to do so would make the absences beyond the original period unauthorized.
Furthermore, Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1998,
states that an official or an employee who is absent without approved leave shall not be entitled to receive
the salary corresponding to the period of the unauthorized leave of absence. RE: Unauthorized Travel
Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional trial Court Branch 6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-9167-RTC (2013)
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent s failure to make the proper entry or entries in
his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a principal at the time of the
notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge by competent
evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyer s commission as a notary public. Canon 10, Rule
10.0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides that a lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice. In the same vein, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 mandates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Mariano Agadan, et al., A.C. No. 9385 (2013)
While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to remain as a
member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the Court, in this instance,
however, cannot ascertain whether the respondent committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer
without going through the factual matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil cases. As a matter
of prudence and so as not to preempt the conclusions that will be drawn by the court where the case is
pending, the Court deems it wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the filing of another
one, depending on the final outcome of the civil case. However, respondent's unjustified disregard of the
lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for
the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly
called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with
court directives being themselves officers of the court. As an officer of the court, respondent is expected

to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with
promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in
administrative cases against lawyers. Nestor V. Felipe, et al. v. Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal, A.C. No.
4549
(2013)
Failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper
justification, exhibits inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his clients cause in violation of
Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He is
likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts. These principles are
embodied in Rule1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the
Code. Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen, A.C. No. 5044
(2013)
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and
not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for his misconduct outside of his
professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in
his non-professional capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney
where his misconduct outside the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character to show him
morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer. Victoria C. Heenan v.
Atty.
Erlina
Espejo,
A.C.
No.
10050
(2013)
The charges of ignorance of law is bereft of merit since it is clear that the respondents judges order was
issued in the proper exercise of his judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to administrative
disciplinary action; especially considering that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on the part of
respondent judge. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned for
mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance,
corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. As a matter of public policy, a
judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he
acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No.
10-3492-RTJ (2013)
Atty. Chaguile acted in a capacity as a de facto officer; one that is illegitimate but in effect. Thus, it is
settled that the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in
so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. This is necessary so as to
protect the sanctity of their dealings with those relying on their ostensible authority: third persons cannot
always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office. They have a right to assume that
officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such. RE: Nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile /
RE: Alleged Nullity of Election of IBP Southern Luzon Governor Vicente M. Joyas / RE: LetterRequest of the National Secretary of the IBP RE Proposed Oath Taking, A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC/A.M.
No.
13-05-08-SC/A.M.
No.
13-06-11-SC
(2013)
This Court commiserates with Judge Lopez for the heart attack, other ailments, and personal tragedy that
he suffered. However, these do not exonerate him from the consequences of his omissions that took
place before he became ill and more than a decade after he had resumed reporting to work. In the
absence of any showing that his medical and personal problems prevented him from working after his
operation, Judge Lopez had no valid excuse for not giving due attention to the cases in his sala. At the
very least, his health problems and personal crises would only mitigate his liability. Time and again, this
Court reminds judges to decide cases with dispatch. The Court has consistently held that the failure of a
judge to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency, and
non-observance of this rule is a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. Office of

the Court Administrator v. Judge Raymundo Lopez and Edgar M. Tutaan, former Presiding Judge
and Clerk of Court, respectively, MTC, Palo, Leyte, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1790, (2013)
Respondent cannot be admonished for advising his client to institute an action instead of agreeing to a
settlement of ten million pesos since such amount is measly compared to the thirty-five million pesos
under the original agreement. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of their
client and pursue the ends of justice. Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against abuses
under the circumstances. The Court cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a lawyer
only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. Conchita Baltazar, et al., v. Atty. Juan
B. Banez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091 (2013)
By attempting to mislead the court and failing to comply with the resolutions of the court showing
indifference and has affected and protracted the investigation and resolution of an administrative matter,
the respondents are guilty of violation of the Lawyers Oath which states, among others that a lawyer will
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients. Elpidio Sy, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation,
Edgar Esponilla, legal Researcher and Officer-in-Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2261 (2013)
Instead of punishing the respondents, there is ample showing that their conduct and decision not to help
the complainant were pursuant to the diligent performance of their sworn duties as elected officials of
Palompon, Leyte since they truly believe that the complainants had no vested right to continue operating
its quarries. It was also shown that Pheschem violated the terms and conditions of the ECC and quarry
permit so the respondents are justified in protecting and preserving the environmental and natural
resources of their municipality. Pheschem Industrial Corporation v. Atty. Lloyd P. Surigao and Atty.
Jose A. Villardo III, A.C. No. 8269 (2013)

The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the secretary of Justice since it is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merit of the case and the facts of the case show that the
respondent judge did not act arbitrarily in denying the joint motion to withdraw informations. Since there is
no showing of bad faith, malice or any corrupt purpose attended the denial, respondent judge cannot be
admonished for refusing to order withdrawal of the joint Informations against Junio and Lorica. Sr. Remy
Angela Junio, SPC and Josephine D. Lorica v. judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran, Branch 3,
Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367 (2014)
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law
doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period. The doctrine of maintenance was directed against
wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest
whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without justification or excuse. Champerty, on the other
hand, is characterized by the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler. Some
common law court decisions, however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts,
namely, that the lawyer must also, at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation. In
order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made
subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed, striking down
champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds of public
policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses
thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment
is obnoxious to the law. The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for
part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyers expense is designed to
prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is
to enable the lawyer to acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of
his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to
his clients cause. The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita ArcoyCadavedo (both deceased), Substituted by their Heirs v. Atty. Victorino T. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188
(2014)
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the performance of their dutes.

Nor can a sheriff request or ask sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper
procedural steps. Even assuming that such payments were indeed given and received in good faith, the
fact alone would dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes.
Neither will the complainants acquiescence or consent to such expense absolve the sheriff for his failure
to secure the prior approval of the court concerning such expense. Any amount received by sheriffs in
escess of lawful fees is an unlawful exaction; it constitutes unauthorized fees. This renders them liable
administratively. Atty. Marcos R. Sundian v. Erlito DS. Bacho, Sheriff IV, RTC Branch 124, Caloocan
City,
A.M.
No.
P-12-3043
(2014)
The respondents contention is that the disbarment case cannot continue since he failed to answer the
charges against him despite numerous notices. Respondents acts of deliberately making excuses for not
receiving the complaint and merely disappearing constitures willful disobedience to the order of the court.
Being sui generis in nature, it is immaterial whether the respondent was able to answer the charges
against him since a disbarment case is an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. A
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but rather an investigation by
the court into the conduct of its officers. The Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence
is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty considering the serious consequence of
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar. Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A.
Celera,
A.C.
No.
5581
(2014)
The conduct of a lawyer ought and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. Any means,
not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by lawyer, even pursuant to his clients cause, is
condemnable and unethical. Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135 (2014)
A clerk of court is remiss in the performance of her duties as clerk of court since she failed to supervise
Mapue and to properly manage the court funds entrusted to her thus enabling Mapue to misappropriate
the funds. She is held liable for simple neglect of duty. A clerk of court has general administrative
supervision over all the personnel of the court. The administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital
to the prompt and proper administration of justice as his judicial duties. As custodian of court funds and
revenues, the clerk of court is primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether
personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. The
conduct of all court personnel is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. The Court will not
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of those involved in the administration of justice
which violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. As
clerk of Court, the respondent is still liable for failing to exercise supervision over court funds enabling
Mapue to misappropriate the funds. Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Mona Lisa A.
Buencamino, et al./ RE: Report on the Financial Audit Conducted in the Metropolitan Trial Court,
etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118-MeTC (2014)
A certificate is a written assurance or final representation that some act has or has not been done or
some event occurred or some legal formality has been complied with. Without records to verify the
truthfulness and authenticity of a document, no certification should be issued. The clerk of court should
know that when she certified the finality in a special proceeding case, she did so under the seal of the
court. Thus when the decision she certified turned out to be spurious and non-existent, she undoubtedly
compromised the Judiciary and jeopardized the integrity of the court. The acts committed by respondent
are so grave that they carry the extreme penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits and perpetual disqualification from employment in the government
service. Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara v. Mylene H. dela Cruz, et al., A.M. No. P-13-3141 (2014)
The investigation conducted shows that respondent is guilty of delay in scheduling the various motions in
the case. As the officer of the court next in line to the Presiding Judge, the clerk of court is tasked to
regularly check not only the status of the cases but also the functions of the other court personnel and
employees under his supervision. Respondent is remiss in the performance of his duties as clerk of court
when he failed to supervise his subordinates well and to efficiently conduct the proper administration of
justice thus causing delay in the hearing of various motions. Raul K. San Buenaventura v. Timoteo A.
Migrino, Clerk of Court III, METC, Branch 69, Pasig City, A.M. No. P-08-2574 (2014)

Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than his own
children inside the chamber of a judge. The Court shall not countenance crude social behavior. The
courtroom is looked upon by people with high respect and is regarded as a sacred place where litigants
are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed. Misbehavior within or around the
vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity. Although Alistair and Charmaine were not entirely faultless, a
higher level of decorum and restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose conduct failed to show due
respect for the court and lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of the legal profession in violation of
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Aida R. Campos, et al. v. Atty. Eliseo M.
Campos, A.C. No. 8644 (2014)
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. He shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession and he shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from the client. Furthermore, a lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. Natividad P. Navarro and
Hilda S. Presbitero v. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872 (2014)
By reason of the nature and functions of their office, officials and employees of the Judiciary must be role
models in the faithful observance of the constitutional canon that public office is a public trust. Pursuant to
this dictum, the Court issued Memorandum Circular No. 49-2003, dated December 1, 2003, reminding all
government officials and employees to be accountable at all times to the people and exercise utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. They must give every minute of their prescribed official time
in the service to the public and must work for every centavo paid to them by the government. This duty
calls for the observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of official time for public service, if
only to recompense the government, and ultimately, the people who shoulder the cost of maintaining the
judiciary. Thus, to inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees should at all
times strictly observe official time. As punctuality is a virtue, absenteeism and tardiness are
impermissible. RE: Habitual Tardiness of Cesar E. Sales, Cash Clerk III, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Office of the Clerk of Court, Manila, A.M. No. P-13-3171 (2014)
Respondent judges use of abusive and insulting words, tending to project complainants ignorance of the
laws and procedure, prompted by his belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously
and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. In pending or prospective litigations before them,
judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their
personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges possess
proficiency in law, they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their
counsel of the judges competence, integrity and independence. Even on the face of boorish behavior
from those he deals with, he ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer
of the court. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the activities of a
judge. It bears stressing that as a dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament
at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. He must maintain composure and equanimity. Any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutors Office, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas,
RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City / Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch
7, Tacloban City, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377 (2014)
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction against a misbehaving member of the
Integrated Bar. As such, the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution only for the most
imperative reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. A lawyer is not to be sanctioned for every
perceived misconduct or wrong actuation. He is still to be presumed innocent of wrongdoing until the
proof arrayed against him establishes otherwise. It is the burden of the complainant to properly show that
the assailed conduct or actuation constituted a breach of the norms of professional conduct and legal
ethics. Otherwise, the lawyer merits exoneration. Heinz R. Heck v. City Prosecutor Casiano A.
Gamotin, Jr. A.C. No. 5329 (2014)

A Judge who allowed his bodyguard to take possession of a firearm that is the subject of a criminal case
pending before the court where he is presiding is administratively liable for gross misconduct for violating
Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. He is guilty
of misusing evidence entrusted to the court. The admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety
but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to lower court judges. Indeed, judges are
reminded that after having accepted their exalted position in the Judiciary, they owe to the public to
uphold the exacting standards of conduct demanded of them. The Court had defined gross misconduct as
a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer. Gross misconduct involves corruption, or an act that is inspired by
the intention to violate the law, or that is a persistent disregard of well-known rules. Needless to state, any
gross misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary. P/Sr. Ins.
Teddy M. Rosqueta v. Judge Jonathan A. Asuncion, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Laoag City, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1823 (2014)
Failure to join an indispensable party in a case is a manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures
and constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. The trial judges obstinate disregard of basic and established
rule of law or procedure is an inexcusable abuse of authority. Such level of ignorance is not a mere error
of judgement. It amounts to evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, or in essence, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial
competence requires no less. Jesus Crisologo and Nanette Crisologo v. Jewm Agro-Industrial
Corporation, G.R. No. 196894 (2014)
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral
character. In this regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission
into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the
Philippine Bar. The Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable
individual in whom the public may repose confidence. Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character
in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. A lawyer's issuance of a worthless
check renders him in breach of his oath to obey the laws. To accord with the canon of professional
responsibility that requires him to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect
for the law and legal processes, he thereby becomes administratively liable for gross misconduct. That
this act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer invested himwhether he
was acting as such or in a non-professional capacitywith the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness
and candor in his relationship with others. There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only
for the malpractice of his profession, but also for the grave misconduct committed outside of his
professional capacity. His being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest
moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others. Benjamin Ong v. Atty. William
delos Santos, A.C. No. 10179 (2014)

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
A lawyer who, despite having accepted his acceptance fee, fails to perform his obligation to file the case
for the titling of his clients lot despite the lapse of five years breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence and is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Stephan Brunet and Virgina Vrunet v. Atty. Ronald Gauren, A.C. No 10164 (2014)
A lawyer who fails to file a complaint despite the lapse of four years is guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Failure of
complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorneys fee is not a valid
excuse that would exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer
deserves his full attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had

not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to his client and inform
him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked
professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the
appropriate charges. Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client
with competence, and to attend to his clients cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him. Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez v. Atty. Arnulfo Agleron,
Sr. A.C. No. 5359 (2014)
A court personnel who asked another person to take the Civil Service Professional Examination in her
stead is guilty of dishonesty and, by reason of such, failed to take heed of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, which regards all court personnel as sentinels of justice expected to refrain from any act of
impropriety. It is beyond question that the act of fraudulently securing ones appointment constitutes
dishonesty. All public service must be founded on and sustained by character. With the right character,
the attitude of judiciary employees is set in the right direction. It is then of utmost consequence that every
employee of the judiciary exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity to preserve the good name
and integrity of the courts of justice. Civil Service Commission v. Nenita Longos, A.M. No. P-12-3070
(2014)
While it has been held that a presiding judge shall at all times remain in firm control of the proceedings,
he is nevertheless mandated to adopt a policy against unwarranted delays. In this case, Judge Pichay did
not sufficiently explain the reasons as to why he failed to resolve the pending incidents on time, as well as
to why he still had to set the same for hearing and repeatedly grant postponements therefor, either motu
proprio or by motion, despite the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and the ministerial nature of
the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution. These considerations he should have been fully aware of.
Spouses Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo v. Judge Ramsey Domingo Pichay, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838,
(2014)
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person
executing it and personally appearing before him to attest the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is
the partys free and voluntary act and deed. Licero Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr., A.C. No.
10185 (2004)
A Clerk of Court is guilty of misconduct where she incurred delay in the remittance of the fiduciary
collections in her custody and used the same for her own personal use. Clerks of Court perform a delicate
function as designated custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises. As
such, they are generally regarded as treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant manager thereof.
They are the chief administrative officers of their respective courts. It is also their duty to ensure that the
proper procedures are followed in the collection of cash bonds. Thus, their failure to faithfully perform
their duties makes them liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and
property. While the Court empathizes with the respondent in her predicament concerning her brothers
medical needs, her wrongdoing cannot be excused. As a custodian of the courts funds and revenues,
she was entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing regulations
regarding fiduciary funds. She was an accountable officer entrusted with the great responsibility of
collecting money belonging to the funds of the court. She was, therefore, liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction, or impairment of said funds and property. She was not supposed to keep those funds in her
possession or worse appropriate them for her personal use. The respondents subsequent restitution of
the amounts did not alter the fact that she was remiss in the discharge of her duties. Shortages in
amounts to be remitted and the years of delay in actual remittance constitute gross neglect of duty for
which the clerk of court shall be administratively liable. By failing to timely remit the cash collections
constituting public funds, she violated the trust reposed in her as disbursement officer of the Judiciary.
Delay in the remittance of collection is a serious breach of duty. It deprives the Court of the interest that
may be earned if the amounts are promptly deposited in a bank. It constitutes dishonesty which carries
the extreme penalty of dismissal from service even if committed for the first time. The Office of the Court
Administrator v. Clarita Perez, A.M. No. P-12-3074 (2014)

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest
with utmost diligence. In belatedly filing the first motion for extension of time to file appellants brief and
thereby causing the dismissal of his clients appeal, the lawyer had fallen far short of his duties as counsel
as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every
member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty.
Diosdado Jimenez, A.C. No. 9116 (2014)
Where a lawyer was disbarred by committing a grossly immoral act, his plea to be readmitted to the Bar
cannot be granted when the same are mere words that are hollow and bereft of any substance, such as
when he continued to live with the woman for whose sake he abandoned his family. The practice of law is
not a right but a privilege. It is only enjoyed by those who continue to display unassailable character. The
Court, in deciding whether the respondent should indeed be readmitted to the practice of law, must be
convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had already rid himself of any grossly immoral act
which would make him inept for the practice of law. Julieta B. Narag v. Atty. Dominador M. Narag, A.C.
No. 3405 (2014)
A judge who unjustifiably failed to decide a case within the reglementary period is guilty gross inefficiency.
The speedy disposition of cases the courts is a primary aim of the Judiciary, so that the ends of justice
may not be compromised and the Judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their
constitutional right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of their cases. Under the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, a judge is obliged to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery
of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. To comply with his obligation, he
must first display such interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the days labors fixed by
law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official seasons, but which proceeds diligently on holidays
and by artificial light and even into vacation periods. Any unjustified failure to decide a case within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency that deserves the imposition of the proper
administrative sanctions. Furthermore, a judge who submitted false certificates of service certifying he did
not have any unresolved cases and matters pending in his court docket is likewise guilty of grave
misconduct pursuant to Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Thereby, he defrauded the
Government. The certificates of services were not only the means to ensure his paycheck but were also
the instruments by which the Court could fulfil the constitutional mandate of the peoples right to speedy
disposition of cases. RE: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan
de Oro City, Misamis Occidental, A.M. No. 0-9-454-RTC (2014)
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the
contrary is proved. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the
complainant. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
this Court has consistently held that a clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition
of the administrative penalty. Atty. Clodualdo C. de Jesus v. Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, A.C. No. 7961
(2014)
A lawyers act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the clients case and,
subsequently, failing to render the services, constitutes as an inexcusable negligence and is a clear
violation of Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that: A
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. The mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered
per se a violation. Ma. Elena Carlos Nebreja v. Atty. Benjamin Reonal, A.C. No. 9896 (2014)
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as frequent unauthorized absences from duty during
office hours. The word frequent connotes that the employees absent themselves from duty more than
once. Respondents two absences from his post, being without authority, can already be characterized as
frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty, which adversely affect the prompt delivery of
justice. Office of the Court Administrator v. John Glenn D. Runes, A.M. No. P-12-3055 (2014)
Court employees who tamper case records done through the intercalation of the explanation in a Notice
of Appeal in a pending Special Civil Action are guilty of grave misconduct. A court employee is not
prohibited from helping individuals in the course of performing his official duties, but his actions cannot be

left unchecked when the help extended places the integrity of the Judiciary in a bad light. Court
employees are strictly instructed not to use their official duties to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges
or exemptions for themselves or for others. The evident purpose of the instruction is precisely to free the
court form suspicion of misconduct. Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Leah Espera Miranda,
Clerk of Court V and Ms. Jocelyn Divinagracia, Clerk III, both of the RTC, Br. 38, Iloilo City, A.M.
No. P-09-2648 (2014)
An MTC Court Interpreter who falsified her Daily Time Records so that she could attend her law classes is
guilty of dishonesty, notwithstanding the permission of the MTC Presiding Judge. Dishonesty is defined
as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to fraud, deceive or
betray. Time and again, the OCA and Courts have underscored the importance of court employees
truthfully and accurately recording in their DTRs the time of their arrival in and departure from office.
Anonymous Complaint against Otelia Lyn G. Maceda, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court,
Palapag, Northern Samar, A.M. No. P-12-3093 (2014)

CRIMINAL LAW
Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and
under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the
accused but always in the proper period. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and
compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have acted with less
discernment. This is regardless of the fact that his minority was not proved during the trial and
that his birth certificate was belatedly presented for our consideration, since to rule accordingly
will not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.
It is also settled that upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO AGACER, et al.
G.R. No. 177751. January 7, 2013)
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present
existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed. (KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN DIEO vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59,
ANGELES CITY, ETC., ET AL., G.R. NO. 193960, JANUARY 7, 2013)
To establish the age of the minor victim, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance, the Court has set the guidelines in People v. Pruna, as follows: In order to remove
any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of
birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic
document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity
who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO BUADO, JR., Y CIPRIANO., G.R. No. 170634, January 8,
2013)
In the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the two essential elements are: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.
R.A. No. 7659 provides that the unauthorized sale of 200 grams or more of shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. But since the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death consists of two indivisible penalties, appellant was correctly meted the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
when there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SIMPRESUETA M. SERASPE
G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013)

Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession the
onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. With
the burden of evidence shifted to the petitioner, it was his duty to explain his innocence about the
regulated drug seized from his possession. This, petitioner failed to do. (NELSON VALLENO vs.
PEOPLE, G.R. No. 192050, January 09, 2013)
It is material in illegal sale of dangerous drugs that the sale actually took place. What consummates the
buy-bust transaction is the delivery of the drugs to the poseur-buyer and, in turn, the sellers receipt of the
marked money. While the parties may have agreed on the selling price of the shabu and delivery of
payment was intended, these do not prove consummated sale. Receipt of the marked money, whether
done before delivery of the drugs or after, is required. (PEOPLE vs. HONG YEN E AND TSIEN TSIEN
CHUA, G.R. No. 181826, January 09, 2013)
Then to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender must concur. The foregoing elements of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in
relation to Article 266-B , paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are sufficiently alleged
in the Information against Amistoso, viz: (1) Amistoso succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA
against her will and without her consent; (2) AAA was 12 years old on the day of the alleged rape; and (3)
Amistoso is AAAs father. (PEOPLE vs. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO, G.R. No. 201447, January 09, 2013)
The stepfather-stepdaughter relationship as a qualifying circumstance presupposes that the victims
mother and the accused are married to each other. (PEOPLE vs. ROLANDO CABUNGAN, G.R. No.
189355, January 23, 2013)
The crime committed was murder qualified by treachery. Records would show that Pablo was fifty-seven
(57) years old at the time of his death. Admittedly, ones thought processes and reflexes slow with age
that Pablo did not readily understand the intentions of the appellants. The attack was, therefore, clearly
sudden and unexpected. (PEOPLE vs. BENJAMIN PETELUNA AND ABUNDIO BINONDO, G.R. No.
187048, January 23, 2013)
Appellant was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound for Davao
City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in his
possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversized Spicer rubber shoes. While it may be
argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs in his
possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the
purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another. (PEOPLE vs.
CAMALODING LABA, G.R. No. 199938, January 28, 2013)
Without doubt, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the provisions of
law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent
to a sexual act. (PEOPLE vs. REY MONTICALVO, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013)
The failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape and even the victims lack of resistance
especially when intimidated by the offender into submission does not signify voluntariness or consent.
Furthermore, the Court has emphatically ruled that the failure of a rape victim to shout, fight back, or
escape from the scoundrel is not tantamount to consent or approval because the law imposes no
obligation to exhibit defiance or to present proof of struggle. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ANTONIO BASALLO, G.R. No. 182457, 30 January 2013)
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements: (1) the accused commits an act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years old. All the elements of violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 have been established. First, Rayon embraced AAA, parted her legs,
touched her breasts, inserted his hand inside the victims underwear, and touched her vagina. Second,
the appellant used his moral ascendancy over her daughter in order to perpetrate his lascivious conduct.
Finally, AAA was below 18 years of age at the time of the incident, based on her birth certificate and on

her mothers testimony. Conviction for the qualified rape of the other daughter BBB stands. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. PATRICIO RAYON, SR.,G.R. No. 194236, 30 January 2013)
The failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the
authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties, the doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. REYNALDO NACUA, G.R. No. 200165, 30 January 2013)

The chain of custody of the drugs in a buy-bust operation had been sufficiently established when there
was proof of the following: first, the seizuare and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
LINDA ALVIZ y YATCO and ELIZABETH DE LA VEGA y BAUTISTA, G.R. No. 177158, 6 February
2013)
Mere possession of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under Republic Act No. 9165.
Since Manalao failed to adduce any evidence showing that he had legal authority to possess the seized
drugs, then he was correctly charged with its illegal possession. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
MALIK MANALAO y ALAUYA, G.R. No. 187496, 6 February 2013)
The different links that the prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust
operation, namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SAIBEN
LANGCUA y DAIMLA, G.R. No. 190343, 6 February 2013)
R.A. No. 6235 (The Anti-Hijacking Law) authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit
the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing an accused into the aircraft and sending him
home, and thereby depriving them of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search
without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Failure of the prosecution to show compliance with the procedural
requirements provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR is not fatal and does not
automatically render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
As long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. (DON
DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 191023, 6 February
2013)
A buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a legitimate form of entrapment of the
culprit. It is distinct from instigation, in that the accused who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the
crime is enticed or lured or talked into committing the crime. While entrapment is legal, instigation is not.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL BARTOLOME y BAJO, G.R. No. 191726, 6 February
2013)SS
Despite the rigid procedural rules under the law on the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized,
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, it was held, however, that a testimony about a perfect chain is not
always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. What is essential is to
preserve the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
VICTOR DE JESUS y GARCIA, G.R. No. 198794, 6 February 2013)

A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the
parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which requires that the apprehending officer
must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. Martinezs
warrantless arrest was based on his alleged violation of a city ordinance punishing breaches of the
peace. Consequently, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be established that the
apprehension was effected after a reasonable assessment by the police officer that a public disturbance
is being committed. It cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly populated place, with many
people conversing with each other on the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under the
ordinance. Therefore, there was no probable cause to justify Martinezs warrantless arrest and the
warrantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus the sachet of shabu which was purportedly
seized from Martinez is inadmissible in evidence for being a fruit of the poisonous tree. (RAMON
MARTINEZ y GOCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 198694, 13 February 2013)
To prosecute illegal possession of dangerous drugs, there must be a showing that (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAMES GALIDO Y NOBLE. G.R. No. 192231, February 13, 2013)
The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What has to be proved by the
prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JONATHAN "UTO" VELOSO Y RAMA. G.R. No. 188849.
February 13, 2013)
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
Only those who formed and manage associations that receive contributions from the general public who
misappropriated the contributions can commit syndicated estafa. RAFAEL H. GALVEZ AND
KATHERINE L. GUY vs. ASIA UNITED BANK/ASIA UNITED BANK VS. GILBERT, ET AL, GILBERT
GUY, ET AL. VS. ASIA UNTIED BANK., G.R. Nos. 187919/G.R. No. 187979/G.R. No. 188030,
February 20, 2013)
The elements of statutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b)
the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim. Considering that the essence of statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a female without her consent, neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female,
nor the females deprivation of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female
of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TOMAS TEODORO Y ANGELES, G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013)
The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, requires simply the
consummation of the selling transaction, which happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNOLD TAPERE Y POLPOL. G.R. No. 178065,
February 20, 2013)
Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when
the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the
two places. Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the
defense of alibi must fail. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK JOSEPH R. ZAPUIZ, G.R. No.
199713. February 20, 2013)
It is settled that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred from the
collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime. It can be presumed
from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose, design,
concerted action, and community of interests. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. P/SUPT. ARTEMIO
E. LAMSEN, et al., G.R. No. 198338. February 20, 2013)

Conspirators are persons who, under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Because witnesses are rarely present
when several accused come to an agreement to commit a crime, such agreement is usually inferred from
their concerted actions while committing it. On the other hand, accomplices, according to Article 18 of
the RPC, are the persons who, not being included in Article 17 which identifies who are principals,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should be committed; but they assent to the plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Miriam Ruth T. Magsino Vs. PO1 Ricardo
Eusebio, SPO2 Romeo Isidro, and Jojit George Contreras, G.R. No. 182152, February 25, 2013)
Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the marking of the seized items to truly
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence
should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE ALEX SECRETO Y VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 198115.
February 27, 2013)
The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit.
(Edmundo Escamilla y Jugo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188551. February 27, 2013)
The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the
extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression. (SIMON A. FLORES vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013)

The only elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs is proof that the illicit
transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence. In buy-bust operations, the delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the sellers
receipt of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping
officers and the accused. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust
team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies
on the operation deserve faith and credit. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE RAFAEL R.
LAGOS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013, CJ. Sereno)
The Supreme Court finds that the accused San Mateo is not guilty of violation of BP 22. To be liable
therefore, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. In the present case, the second element was not duly proved.
Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of
funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. This presumption, however, arises only after it
is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. In this case,
there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually received the notice of dishonor. It has been the
consistent ruling of the SC that receipts for registered letters including return receipts do not themselves
prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be
a notice of dishonor. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the
accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service
provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused. (ERLINDA C.
SAN MATEO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 200090, March 6, 2013, J. Abad)
The Supreme Court lowered the penalty imposable for the violation of the accused of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines. Although a final judgment (generally) may no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, rendered it, the

Court recognized certain exceptions to the application of this rule. According to the Court, aside from
matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most
mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings of
fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. In
this case, there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result if the Court will not
relax the application of the Rules. (EFREN S. ALMUETE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
179611, March 12, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
The elements of qualified theft are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to
another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f)
it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence. All these elements are present in this case. The petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project
site, without the authority and consent of the owner of the construction materials. (ENGR. ANTHONY V.
ZAPANTA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013, J. Brion)
In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical resistance need not be established
in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker
because of fear. Physical resistance is not an essential element of rape. Also, delay in revealing the
commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is
because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public
scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.
Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the finding of rape. A medical examination of the
victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible,
is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime and the medical certificate will then be rendered as merely
corroborative. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT PENILLA Y FRANCIA, G.R. No.
189324, March 20, 2013, J. Perez)
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10
(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by
the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse. The records showed that the laying of hands on Jayson has been
done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of accuseds being then overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the
hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, the accused lacked that specific intent to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so
essential in the crime of child abuse. As such, the accuseds act should instead be punished under the
Revised Penal Code. (GEORGE BONGALON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
169533, March 20, 2013, J. Bersamin)
To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the
essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNEL NOCUM, ET AL., G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013, J. Del
Castillo)
The established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where
the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by
or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. The
premise used is that the illegal possession, being an element of the illegal sale, was necessarily included
in the illegal sale. The crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425
therefore, necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. Any other illegal substance
found in the possession of the accused that is not part of the subject of the illegal sale should be
prosecuted under a distinct and separate information charging illegal possession; otherwise, the

fundamental right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
would be flagrantly violated. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, G.R.
No. 175939, April 3, 2013, J. Bersamin)
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is
only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. The
constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime.
Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be
robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. When homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery
would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to
prevent the same. If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the
robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit
robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the
robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can
no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELVIN
DIU y KOTSESA, ET AL, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013, J. Leonardo De Castro)
The elements of qualified rape are as follows: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years
of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender
has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation. All the elements of the
crime charged were proved in this case. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDMUNDO VITERO, G.R.
No. 175327, April 3, 2013, J. Leonardo De Castro)
AAAs failure to shout for help, although her siblings were sleeping beside her and her parents were on
the other room, does not detract from the credibility of her claims. She explained to the courts satisfaction
that appellant, while holding a knife, had threatened to kill her family if she reported the incident. An 11year old child like AAA can only cower in fear and submission in the face of a real threat to her life and
her familys posed by an armed assailant. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL TOLENTINO y
CATACUTAN, G.R. No. 187740, April 10, 2013, J. Perez)
In the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, it matters not that no ransom was actually paid, it
being sufficient that a demand for it was made. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BETTY SALVADOR
y TABIOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 201443, April 10, 2013, J. Reyes)
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2)
the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4)
there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. Fencing is malum
prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by
the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery
or theft. (JAIME ONG y ONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190475, April 10, 2013,
Sereno, CJ).

Accused Sombol cannot avail of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. As Sombol failed to prove the
existence of unlawful aggression, his plea of self-defense necessarily fails. Unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non for self-defense to be appreciated. For it to be present, jurisprudence dictates that
there must be an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.
It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating
action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life. Without
unlawful aggression, the accused has nothing to prevent or repel, and there is then no basis for
appreciating the other two requisites. (SERGIO SOMBOL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
194564, April 10, 2013, CJ. Sereno)
The accused cannot be convicted of usurpation of official functions when he issued permits to transport
salvaged forest products. The DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue
permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the
general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the
records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery
Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his
authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The
records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said
permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit
from the DENR. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting. (LEOVIGILDO R. RUZOL v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013, J. Velasco, Jr.)
For a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, it must be shown that (a) the
accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in
possession of the drug.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements must concur: (1)
the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance
seized as evidence.
The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and
cumulative." The informant's testimony is not needed if the sale of the illegal drug has been adequately
proven by the prosecution. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE L. DUMALAG, G.R. No. 180514,
April 17, 2013, J. Leonardo De Castro)
The accused-appellant is liable only for simple rape. The unauthenticated photocopy of AAAs baptismal
certificate is not sufficient to prove the age of AAA. While it was alleged in the Information that accusedappellant is AAAs grandfather, what was proven during the trial was that he was AAAs granduncle,
being the brother of AAAs paternal grandfather. As such granduncle, or more specifically the brother of
the victims grandfather, he is a relative of the victim in the fourth civil degree, and is thus not covered by
Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1). (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO DELIGERO y
BACASMOT, G.R. No. 189280, April 17, 2013, J. Leonardo De Castro)
Mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to possess, animus
possidendi, sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession. The
burden of evidence, thus, is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of intent to possess. Aguilar
miserably failed to discharge such burden. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARILYN AGUILAR y
MANZANILLO, G.R. No. 191396, April 17, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)

It has been ruled, in a long line of cases,32 that absence of external signs of physical injuries does not
negate rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMAN ZAFRA Y SERRANO, G.R. No. 197363, June
26, 2013, J. Leonardo De Castro)

All the essential requisites for illegal sale of shabu were present in this case: (a) the identities of the buyer
and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing. There is no iota of doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item
were preserved. The Letter-Request for Laboratory Examination shows that it was PO2 Bernabe who
personally delivered to the crime laboratory the specimens and that it was the very chemist who
examined the specimens who brought the same to the court. Clearly, the chain of custody was not
broken. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PETER LINDA Y GEROLAGA, G.R. No. 200507, June 26,
2013, J. Perez)
It is significant to reiterate and emphasize that the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale
of drugs were convincingly established. These are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and consideration, and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
MONICA MENDOZA Y TRINIDAD, G.R. No. 191267, JUNE 26, 2013, J. PEREZ)
Famor was adjudged not guilty of the crime charged because his proximity and whispered
communications to Mores moments before the grenade throwing incident occurred was deemed by the
trial court as insufficient evidence to establish conspiracy between him and appellant. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. RAMIL MORES, G.R. No. 189846, June 26, 2013, J. Leonardo De Castro)
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because before the falsified document is actually used to defraud another; the crime of falsification has
already been consummated. Damage or intent to cause damage is not an element of the crime of
falsification. Only when an existing falsified public, official or commercial document is used to defraud
another, then that is estafa. (CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
179448, June 26, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
The identity of the sachets of shabu confiscated and the continuous chain of custody was established by
the prosecution. An adequate foundation establishing a continuous chain of custody is said to have been
established if the State accounts for the evidence at each stage from its acquisition to its testing, and to
its introduction at trial. In this case, it was shown that after the three sachets of shabu were confiscated
from appellant and that they were marked. At the police station, the seized drugs were the subject of a
Request for Examination and were personally delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Subsequently,
qualitative tests were conducted and the test results, presented in evidence confirmed that the specimen
contained shabu. During trial, the witness identified the plastic sachet marked presented as the same
sachet of shabu which he bought from accused Castro. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND
CASTRO Y LAPENA,
G.R. No. 195777, June 19, 2013, J. Perez)
In illegal sale, what the prosecution needs to present is proof that a transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. The commission of illegal
sale merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction while illegal possession is constituted by
prima facie evidence of knowledge of the illegality or animus possidendi which is sufficient to convict him.
Prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is
accompanied by their informant. It is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buy-bust
operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting one. When time is of essence, the
police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance.
The following elements are necessary in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the

investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized by the forensic chemist to the court. Upon review, the Supreme Court is convinced that the
prosecution had sufficiently proved all the elements to establish chain of custody of illegal drugs.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENEDICT HOMAKY LUCIO, G.R. No. 191391, June 19, 2013, J.
Perez)
The DOJ erred in charging Gil for Rape in relation to Child Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610. Jurisprudence dictates that accused may be charged only for one and not both crimes. If the victim
is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under RA 7610 or rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC. The offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because
his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A felony under the RPC cannot be complexed with
an offense penalized under special law. (IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO AND BENJAMIN D.
BALOIS v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA,
GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA AND GRACE EVANGELISTA, G.R. Nos.
182130 and 182132, June 19, 2013, J. Perlas Bernabe)
The accused as the elected treasurer of CALAPUPATODA received and held money for administration
and in trust for the association. He was thus under an obligation to turnover the same upon conclusion of
his term as Treasurer. Instead, however, he misappropriated the same to the prejudice of the association
and, despite demand, failed to account for or return them. Such failure to account, upon demand, of funds
or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. (ABELARDO JANDUSAY v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185129, June 19, 2013, J. Reyes)
In a buy-bust operation, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties must be upheld
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overturn the same. While in case of violation of
Section 14 of Article II, R.A. No. 9165, the accused must either have in his possession and under his
direct control the said paraphernalia, There is no degree of participation to speak of, either one has
possession and control over the paraphernalia or none. If there is none, then one must be acquitted.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA COLLADO Y SENICA,
MARK CIPRIANO Y ROCERO, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO Y ENRIQU AND REYNALDO RANADA
Y ALAS, G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
In the conduct of a valid buy-bust operation with regards to R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with the
requirements provided for in Section 21 to prove the chain of custody is not fatal as long as there is a
substantial ground for the non-compliance presented in court; in which case, substantial compliance will
do. Any minor inconsistencies with the details can be disregarded if such inconsistencies are fully
explained by the prosecution and accepted by the Courts. Further, failure to mark the money or to present
it in evidence is not material, since failure to do so will not necessarily disprove the sale. If at all, the
marked money merely serves as corroborative evidence in proving appellants guilt. The failure to present
the marked money does not affect the prosecution, as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately
proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court, as what has been
satisfactorily shown in this case. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL REBOTAZO Y
ALEJANDRA, G.R. No. 192913, June 13, 2013, CJ. Sereno)

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which the offense was perpetrated;
or inferred from the acts of the accused when those acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interests. Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not
essential, but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices. The
act of attacking the victim, boxing and stabbing, at the same time for the purpose of killing the victim is
considered an act of conspiracy. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PERCIVAL DELA ROSA Y
BAYER, G.R. No. 201723, June 13, 2013, J. Reyes)
The accuseds alibi is worthless as his presence at a mere 30 meters away from the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission definitely does not constitute a physical impossibility for him to be at Maras
room at the time of the rape. On the contrary, it is an implied admission that there is facility of access for

the accused Diaz to be at the place where the crime happened when it happened. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ABEL DIAZ, G.R. NO. 200882, JUNE 13, 2013J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO)
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that
they endeavored to prevent the same. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE ARMANDO
CERVANTES CACHUELA AND BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013,
J. Brion)
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or from
the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community
of interest. Tendenilla and Rea together with Azul, conspired to commit the crime of illegal recruitment.
Azul referred all private complainants to Tendenilla, who made representations that she could deploy
them abroad. It was either Azul or Tendenilla who received the payment of placement fees. And as
previously stated, Rea met some of the complainants at the training center, and accompanied some of
them while in Thailand. Their actions showed unity of purpose and, taken all together, leave no doubt that
they are coconspirators. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIA JENNY REA Y GUEVARRA AND
ESTRELLITA TENDENILLA, G.R. NO. 197049, June 10, 2013, J. Perez)
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by itself overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Nothing less than evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
can erase the postulate of innocence. And this burden is met not by placing in distrust the innocence of
the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability. The solo performance by SPO1 Dela
Victoria of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of the offense is unexplained and puts the proof of
corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself, in serious doubt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
GLORIA CALUMBRES Y AUDITOR, G.R. NO. 194382, June 10, 2013, J. Perez)
The elements of Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse are: (a) The accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse; and, (c) The child is below 18 years of age.
A minor child, even though not engaged in prostitution, who indulges in sexual intercourse or any
lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult is deemed to be a child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse. Coercion and Influence by the adult of the child qualifies the act as
that of the second element of the offense. (CHRISTIAN CABALLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013, J. Perlas Bernabe)
An accused charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be convicted if the
identity and integrity of the drugs seized as well as the handling of the said items cannot be established.
Section 21 is a matter of substantive law that mandates strict compliance as it is a safety precaution
against potential abuses by law enforcement agents. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly
construed against the government, stringent compliance therewith is fully justified and failure to do so
without justifiable grounds are not excusable. It is clear that Section 21 was not observed, as in this case
no photograph or inventory of the confiscated items was taken or made. Such noncompliance brings to
the fore the question of whether the illegal drug items were the same ones that were allegedly seized
from petitioner. (RODRIGO RONTOS Y DELA TORRE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
188024, June 5, 2013, CJ. Sereno)
When the victim of rape is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim, such is considered as qualified rape. Both the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the accused were sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution.
AAAs testimony that she was raped by her own uncle is worthy of belief as it was clear, consistent and
spontaneously given. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO GANI Y TUPAS, G.R. No. 195523,
JUNE 5, 2013, J. PERALTA)

While the special qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and proved, the circumstance of
relationship of "AAA" was not clearly established. When one of the qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the Information and proved by the
evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Therefore, AAAs minority may be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUILLERMO
LOMAQUE, G.R. NO. 189297, June 5, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that an immediate conduct of physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph be made by the team, non-compliance is not fatal as long as there is a
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it
show the "justifiable ground" which may excuse the failure to make and inventory and to photograph the
drugs confiscated. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MYLENE TORRES Y CRUZ, G.R. No. 191730,
June 5, 2013, J. Perez)

An accused who while in a fistfight with the victim, inflicts a fatal wound to the back is guilty of treachery.
The position of the fatal wound is more than clear indication that the victim was stabbed in a defenseless
state. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the
perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or repel the aggression,
thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the
victim. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARIEL CALARA Y ABALOS, G.R. No. 197039, June 5,
2013, J. Perez)
The elements of rape under Art. 335 of the RPC before it was amended by R.A. 8353 are: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was either: a) accomplished through force
and intimidation; or, b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or, c) when the
victim is under 12 years of age. The testimony of the victim established both elements. That the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim and that the act was accomplished through force and intimidation. In
rape committed by a close kin, such as the victims father (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO
BUSTAMANTE Y ALIGANGA, G.R. NO. 189836. JUNE 5, 2013, J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO)
A statutory rape departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot
have a will of her own on account of her tender years. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICARDO
PIOSANG, G.R. No. 200329, June 5, 2013, J. Leonardo De Castro)
The fact that AAA did not sustain any injury in her sex organ does not ipso facto mean that she was not
raped. Full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen
necessary, to conclude that carnal knowledge took place; the mere touching of the external genitalia by a
penis that is capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICARDO PAMINTUAN Y SAHAGUN, G.R. NO. 192239. JUNE 5,
2013, J. Leonardo- De Castro)
Regardless of the perpetrators awareness of his victims mental condition, carnal knowledge of a woman
who is a mental retardate is automatically a rape under Article 266-A paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code. This is because a mentally deficient person is incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Thus,
what needs to be proven are the facts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the victim, and the
victims mental retardation. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MOISES CAOILE, G.R. No. 203041,
June 5, 2013, J. Leonardo De Castro)
An accused who committed two separate crimes, Murder and Attempted Murder, can only be convicted of
the complex crime of murder with attempted murder and not of two separate crimes because the
information only contained one criminal actuation. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if
duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information. Any conviction
contrary to the allegations made or necessarily included in the information is violative of the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A complex crime is only

one crime. Although two or more crimes are actually committed, there is only one crime in the eyes of the
law as well as in the conscience of the offender when it comes to complex crimes. Hence, there is only
one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
REGGIE BERNARDO, G.R. No. 198789, June 3, 2013, J. Reyes)

The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery. Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a
person, which is not parricide or infanticide, committed with any of the attendant circumstances
enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, one of which is treachery. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. JOEMARI JALBONIAN ALIAS "BUDO, G.R. NO. 180281, JULY 1, 2013, J. DEL
CASTILLO)
In cases involving dangerous drugs, compliance with the requirements of Section 21, the chain of custody
rule, is required to protect the procedures in keeping custody and disposition of dangerous drugs and as
well as to avoid any abuse on the part of the authorities who conducted the operation. It is the
prosecution who has the burden of establishing the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs seized from
the accused. It should establish the following links in that chain of custody of the confiscated item: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. Non-compliance with the chain of custody can only be
allowed if (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO ONIZA Y ONG
AND MERCY ONIZA Y CABARLE, G.R. NO. 202709, JULY 3, 2013, J. ABAD)
A person who contracts a second marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage is liable for the
crime of bigamy. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of the second marriage for being null and
void have no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that there is a first marriage
that is subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. It is what makes a person criminally liable
for bigamy.
A person may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage because the crime of bigamy is consummated at the time of the celebration
of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void. The
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. (JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 183805. JULY 3, 2013, J. PERALTA)
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. All that is necessary for conviction is
sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do
so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the
accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts. (MAJOR JOEL G. CANTOS v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 184908. JULY 3, 2013, J. VILLARAMA, JR.)
The element of unlawful aggression is absent to warrant self-defense. The victims actuations did not
constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force employed by Vergara. The records reveal that
the victim had been walking home albeit drunk when he passed by the accused. There is no indication of
any untoward action from him to warrant the treatment that he had by Vergaras hands. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. GARRY VERGARA Y ORIEL AND JOSEPH INCENCIO Y PAULINO, ACCUSED,
GARRY VERGARA Y ORIEL, ACCUSED-APPELANT

G.R. NO. 177763, JULY 3, 2013, J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO)

When the information alleges the crime of estafa specified under paragraph 1(b) and yet what was proven
was estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same Art. 315 of the RPC, what determines the real nature and
cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information and not
the caption of the information. The information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused
with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental
principle of criminal law that one act can give rise to two offenses, all the more when a single offense has
multiple modes of commission. (FERNANDO M. ESPINO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
188217. JULY 3, 2013, CJ. SERENO)
When three men with a bolo each attack an unarmed person who was only holding a lemon and an egg,
such action by the attackers constitute conspiracy in the execution of the crime and abuse of superior
strength to ensure that they kill their target. The claim of self-defense or defense of family is untenable
because there can be no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he was only holding a lemon
and an egg as compared to the bolos of the attackers. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONALD
CREDO, ET AL., G.R. NO. 197360. JULY 3, 2013, J. PEREZ)
In making the friendly gesture of offering a drink to a person whom the accused intended to kill, the court
sees no other reason than to intentionally lure the victim into a false sense of security before attacking
him, such act constitutes treachery on the part of the accused. The essence of treachery is that the attack
is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. The manner in which Gravo was
stabbed by Hatsero has treachery written all over it. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LITO
HATSERO, G.R. NO. 192179. JULY 3, 2013, J. Leonardo- De Castro)
Public officers who act in conspiracy with one another and blatantly disregarding the rules and regulation
prescribed by law resulting to a huge loss to the Local Government as well as resulting into unnecessary
benefits to one of them all because their act was was "common practice" is definitely in violation of R.A.
7160; P.D. 1445; and the circulars issued by the COA. (BENILDA N. BACASMAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ALAN C. GAVIOLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
EUSTAQUIO B. CESA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NOS. 189343/189369/189553. JULY
10, 2013, CJ. SERENO)
For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1)
sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to warrant the
imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age
at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim.
A father who rapes his own minor daughter do not need to use any physical force or intimidation because
in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICENTE CADELLADA, G.R. NO. 189293, JULY 10, 2013, J.
Leonardo- De Castro)
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give
his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason
that the victim was shot. Accused can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. The fact of
asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly established,
accused should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery with homicide. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. JOSEPH BARRA, G.R. NO. 198020. JULY 10, 2013, J. Leonardo- De Castro)
In an attempt to murder a person and the wounds inflicted are of such nature that it would not caused the
victims death if not for timely medical intervention, the crime committed is attempted murder. In frustrated
murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely
medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have
caused the victims death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted

murder and not frustrated murder. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REGIE LABIA, G.R. NO. 202867.
JULY 15, 2013, J. Carpio)
The crime of arson is punished pursuant to Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613, the penalty to be imposed if the
property burned is an inhabited house or dwelling is from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. Not
being composed of three periods, however, such penalty should be divided into three equal portions of
time, and each portion forms one period of the penalty. Yet, reclusion perpetua, being an indivisible
penalty, immediately becomes the maximum period, leaving reclusion temporal to be divided into two in
order to fix the medium and minimum periods of the penalty. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law requires the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, to sentence the accused "to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense." Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty in this
case should be within the range of the medium period because neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime; and the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime, without
regard to its periods. (GILFREDO BACOLOD A.K.A. GILARDO BACOLOD v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 206236. JULY 15, 2013, J. Bersamin)
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. (People of the Philippines v. Edgardo V. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566. July 17, 2013, J.
Peralta)
The qualifying circumstance of treachery or alevosia was properly appreciated in this case. The two
elements that must be proven to establish treachery are: (a) the employment of means of execution which
would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim
no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of execution were deliberately
and consciously adopted by the offender. These elements are established by the testimony of
Manalangsang showing the unexpected attack by the petitioner on the unsuspecting Hispano whose
vehicle was suddenly blocked by three men, at least one of whom was armed with a firearm. The victim
was then unarmed and had no opportunity to defend himself. (BOBBY "ABEL" AVELINO Y BULAWAN
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 181444. JULY 17, 2013, J. VILLARAMA, JR.)
Non-presentation of the entire amount of the marked money is not a mortal blow to the prosecutions
case. Further, the lack of pre-operation report has no effect on the legality and validity of the buy-bust
operation as it is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
REYNALDO "ANDY" SOMOZA Y HANDAYA, G.R. NO. 197250. JULY 17, 2013, J. Leonardo- De
Castro)
In rape cases, the interpretation of the Supreme Court regarding the "sweetheart defense" is that love is
not a license for lust. A love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to
subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARVIN
CRUZ, G.R. NO. 201728. JULY 17, 2013, J. Reyes)
The mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. The slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim's
genitalia consummates the crime of rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTORINO REYES, G.R.
NO. 173307. JULY 17, 2013, J. Bersamin)
There are two (2) ways by which a public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the
performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government;
or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The accused may
be charged under either mode or under both. In this case, the Court is convinced that the accused

caused undue injury to the Government in appointing Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director with evident
bad faith while he is still part of the faculty of UP. (DR. ROGER R. POSADAS AND DR. ROLANDO P.
DAYCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NOS. 168651 & 169000.
JULY 17, 2013, J. VILLARAMA, JR.)
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed
to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing as there is nothing to repel. The unlawful
aggression of the victim must put the life and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual
peril. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression. Also, Abaccos
act of going to their house and calling out Rogelio so they may talk can hardly be considered as unlawful
aggression under the law. Even Abaccos injuries which proved to be multiple and fatal reveal that it was
Rogelio and Marissa who were truly the aggressors. Thus, the Court is convinced that Abacco was by no
means the unlawful aggressor. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGELIO RAMOS and MARISSA
INTERO RAMOS, G.R. No. 190340, JULY 24, 2013, J. Del Castillo)

Under the aforementioned provisions, when rape is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of the
victims mental retardation, the penalty is increased to death. This circumstance must be alleged in the
information being a qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty to death and changes the nature
of the offense from simple to qualified rape. Although appellant denied any knowledge about AAAs
mental condition, it was he himself who volunteered the information that he had been living with AAA for
four (4) months in his house. It is therefore logical to assume that appellant was fully aware of the
workings of AAAs mental faculties. Furthermore, AAAs mental condition was sufficiently established by
medical findings, as well as the testimony of AAAs mother. Considering the presence of the special
qualifying circumstance of the appellant's knowledge of the victim's mental retardation, the same being
properly alleged in the Information charging the appellant of the crime of rape and proven during trial, this
Court imposes on the appellant the supreme penalty of death. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
NINOY ROSALES Y ESTO, G.R. NO. 197537, JULY 24, 2013, J. PEREZ)
Although the Court, in numerous cases, has been inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of public officers the Court noted that this is not a hard-and-fast rule. Inconsistencies
committed by the police officers amounting to procedural lapses in observing the chain of custody of
evidence requirement effectively negated this presumption. Their inaccurate recall of events amounted to
irregularities that affected the presumption and tilted the evidence in favor of the accused. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE CLARA Y BUHAIN, G.R. NO. 195528, JULY 24, 2013, J. PEREZ)
The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being conducted
by the prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check. SMC
is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading to its dishonor and the eventual
garnishment of petitioners savings account. The source of the funds of petitioners savings account is no
longer SMCs concern. The matter is between petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the other hand, the
issue in the preliminary investigation is whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment of
beer products. Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for the unlawful
garnishment of petitioners savings account, petitioners cannot be automatically adjudged free from
criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of worthless checks
with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself the offense. (SPOUSES
ARGOVAN AND FLORIDA GADITANO v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 188767, JULY 24,
2013, J. PEREZ)
Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa under paragraph 2( a) of that
provision does not require as an element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or
converted the swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage sustained by
the complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation. The prosecution in this case
discharged its evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the installment payments made by Sy on
the purchase price for the Club share. Petitioner and Ragonjan knew that the Club was a bogus project.
(RALPH LITO W. LOPEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 199294, JULY 31, 2013, J.
Carpio)

Petitioners were property convicted of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which has the
following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Having
affixed their signatures on the disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein, petitioners
were properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in approving the "ghost" purchases. Their
participation in facilitating the payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to a loss on the part of the
government. (SPO1 RAMON LIHAYLIHAY AND C/INSP. VIRGILIO V. VINLUAN v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 191219. JULY 31, 2013, J. Perlas- Bernabe)
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been
proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that
the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and
convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses
were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social
Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used
as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence.
That the appellants act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellants act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established
evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to
the neighboring houses. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALAMADA MACABANDO, G.R. NO.
188708, JULY 31, 2013, J. Brion)
In a catena of cases, the Court held that mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory
explanation of such possession - the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUPER POSING y ALAYON,
G.R. NO. 196973. JULY 31, 2013, J. Perez)

The alleged self-defense has no leg to stand on. It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that, for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, unlawful aggression as a condition sine qua non must be present.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression
against the person defending himself. There is unlawful aggression when the peril to ones life, limb or
right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test
for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the
victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements
of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

In this case, the victim was only walking in the yard, unarmed. There was not the least provocation done
by the victim that could have triggered the accused-appellant to entertain the thought that there was a
need to defend himself. The victim did not exhibit any act or gesture that could show that he was out to
inflict harm or injury. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILSON ROMAN, G.R. NO. 198110, JULY 31,
2013, J. Reyes)

The Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the accused for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The failure of
petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which the canal was to be built because of his
unfounded belief that it was public land constitutes gross inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner cannot hide behind the Arias doctrine, because it is not on all fours with his case. In Arias, six
people comprising heads of offices and their subordinates were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. 3019. The accused therein allegedly conspired with one another in causing, allowing, and/or
approving the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds. In acquitting the two
heads of offices, the Court ruled that they could not be held liable for the acts of their dishonest or
negligent subordinates because they failed to personally examine each detail of a transaction before
affixing their signatures in good faith.
In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is being held
liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in performing the duties primarily vested in him by law,
resulting in undue injury to private complainant. The good faith of heads of offices in signing a document
will only be appreciated if they, with trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in whom the
duty is primarily lodged. (ANTONIO B. SANCHEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
187340, AUGUST 14, 2013, CJ Sereno)
When both parties enter into an agreement knowing fully well that the return of the goods subject of the
trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt
transaction penalized under Sec. 13 of PD 115 in relation to Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC, as the only
obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction.
This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent
for the purchase of the goods. (HUR TIN YANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 195117,
AUGUST 14, 2013, J. Velasco Jr.)
The non- presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. lnformants are usually
not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and maintain their valuable service to the
police. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RYAN BLANCO Y SANGKULA, G.R. NO. 193661, AUGUST
14, 2013, J. Perez)
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. [T]he death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO Y
BROCA, G.R. NO. 201447, AUGUST 28, 2013, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO)
Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and
secluded places away from the prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word of
the offended woman herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the prosecutions
single witness of the actual occurrence. As a corollary, a conviction for rape may be made even on the
testimony of the victim herself, as long as such testimony is credible. In fact, the victims testimony is the
most important factor to prove that the felony has been committed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
APOLINARIO MANALILI y JOSE, G.R. NO. 191253, AUGUST 28, 2013, J. Perez)

For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented." From these requisites, it can
thus be deduced that rape is committed the moment the offender has sexual intercourse with a person
suffering from mental retardation. "[C]arnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A
mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial assault
on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to

the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes rape[,] without
requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation in committing the act." Only the facts of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim and the latters mental retardation need to be
proved.
In this case, the evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the sexual
congress between appellant and "AAA" and the latters mental retardation. "AAA" positively identified
appellant as her rapist. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BRION, JOJIE SUANSING, G.R. No.
189822, September 2, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
AAAs failure to shout or resist did not automatically mean voluntary submission to the act. In rape, the
force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of
the commission of the crime. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way.
Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may
appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to
offer any resistance at all. Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to
prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as
the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRISTOPHER RIVERA Y ROYO, G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013, J.
Mendoza)
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender
must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check,
whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the
check by the offender.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Hence, he cannot
be convicted of estafa. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT REYES WAGAS, G.R. No.
157943, September 4, 2013, J. Bersamin)
To be held liable under Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, the following elements must concur: 1) the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2) he must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3) that his action
caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the
Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to
successfully get full payment for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or
omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality. (JOVITO C. PLAMERAS v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013, J. Perez)
The allegations in the information in the two cases, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crimes.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are: 1) that the
offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and 2) that the offers or
promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that will
make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are: 1) that the offender has family or
close personal relation with a public official; 2) that he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such
family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material

or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government; 3) that the public official with whom the offender has family or close
personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the
government. (HERMINIO T. DISINI v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 & G.R. NOS. 174764-65, September 11, 2013,
J. Bersamin)
Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the elements of murder namely: (a) that a
person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide
are, in all reasonable likelihood, present in Dangupons case. As to the first and second elements,
Dangupon himself admitted that he shot and killed Tetet. Anent the third element, there lies sufficient
basis to suppose that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended Tetets killing in view of the
undisputed fact that he was restrained by respondents and thereby, rendered defenseless. Finally, with
respect to the fourth element, Tetets killing can neither be considered as parricide nor infanticide as the
evidence is bereft of any indication that Tetet is related to Dangupon. (ELISEO V. AGUILAR v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET. AL., G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013, Per Curiam)
The Court found that the circumstances obtaining in this case (i.e. alleged pretense made by the
appellant and cohorts that they were going to conduct a police operation regarding illegal drugs, as well
as the telephone call made by the victim to his friend Reyes before the incident) do not constitute clear
and positive evidence of outward acts showing a premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are
indicative only of conspiracy among the accused. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be considered. "It must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the
crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation,
calculation, reflection or persistent attempt." Notably, even the OSG admitted that the lapse of time from
the moment the victim was fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient for appellant to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO1 ALFREDO
ALAWIG, G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the
victim. In this case, circumstances show that the victims abduction was with the purpose of raping her.
Thus, after Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several places until they reached his
sisters house where he raped her inside the bedroom. Under these circumstances, the rape absorbed
the forcible abduction. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARVIN CAYANAN, G.R. No. 200080,
September 18, 2013, J. Reyes)
It must be emphasized that force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; it need but be present,
and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less
irresistible is beside the point. So must it likewise be for intimidation which is addressed to the mind of the
victim and is therefore subjective. Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening
the girl with a knife or pistol. And where such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission
as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the
least, to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be
futile because of continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault
as to make the victims participation in the sexual act voluntary. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
RYAN FRIAS Y GALANG A.K.A. "TAGALOG", G.R. No. 203068, September 18, 2013, J. Reyes)
In rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance because it is not
an element of rape. Hence, the absence of abrasions or contusions in AAAs body is inconsequential.
Also, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be
shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong
resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The failure of a rape victim to
offer tenacious resistance does not make her submission to accuseds criminal acts voluntary. What is
necessary is that the force employed against her was sufficient to consummate the purpose which he has
in mind.

Sufficient force does not mean great or is of such character that is irresistible; as long as it brings about
the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEY BACATAN, G.R. No. 203315, September 18, 2013, J.
Reyes)
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be proved: a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and, c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carryout the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
Accused-appellant, in razing Antonio Ardets house in order to drive him out and shooting him the
moment he appears at his front door, clearly had a previously and carefully crafted plan to kill his victim.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GARY ALINAO, G.R. No. 191256, September 18, 2013, J.
Leonardo-De Castro)
The elements of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the
victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age. There
is ample evidence to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of the then minor victim through the use
of force and intimidation. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLITO ESPENILLA, G.R. No. 192253,
September 18, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
Under Article 266-A (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape is committed when: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) that the same was committed by using force and
intimidation. In this case, the prosecutions evidence established that Cedenio was able to forcibly have
carnal knowledge of AAA after he poked her with a knife and threatened to kill her. Physical resistance
need not be established in rape cases when intimidation is exercised upon the victim who submits against
her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JIMMY
CEDENIO y PERALTA, G.R. No. 201103, September 25, 2013, J. Reyes)
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby
ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. Treachery attended the killing of the victim because
he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift and sudden. He had not means and there was no time
for him to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected than when petitioners
Edwin and Alfredo attacked the victim. The latter did not have the slightest idea that he was going to be
attacked because he was urinating and his back was turned from his assailants. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN IBANEZ Y ALBANTE AND ALFREDO (FREDDIE) NULLA Y IBANEZ, G.R.
No. 197813, September 25, 2013, J. Perez)
For one to be successfully prosecuted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the following elements must be
proven: "1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government." However, private persons may likewise be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 if they conspired with the public officer. Thus, "if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private
person may be held liable together with the public officer, in consonance with the avowed policy of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which is to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike which may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. (SINGIAN, JR.
v.SANDIGANBAYAN (3RD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, G.R. Nos.195011-19, September 30, 2013, J. Del Castillo)

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court
that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the
collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common

understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. The testimonies, when taken
together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all united in its
execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the
accused-appellants kept coming back to the victims house; (2) during the kidnapping, accusedappellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when
the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted. To be a conspirator,
one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need
not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Once
conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN
Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, J.
Perez)
If what is charged in the information is rape through carnal knowledge but during the trial what is proved
is the crime of sexual assault, the accused cannot be found guilty thereof (rape by sexual assault
although it was proven), without violating the accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. In this case, it is proper to convict the accused of acts
of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos as it is necessarily included in rape. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. JADE CUAYCONG y REMONQUILLO, G.R. No. 196051, October 2, 2013, J.
Leonardo-De Castro)
The loss of 45% or nearly half of the original weight of shabu brought for forensic test due to a supposed
weighing error by the forensic chemist implies tampering with the evidence; hence, the Court did not
accept the same as evidence against the accused. It would have been different if only a small amount
thereof was lost and a reasonable explanation is offered therefore. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
JOVI PORNILLOS y HALLARE, G.R. No. 201109, October 2, 2013, J. Abad)
The Court found the accused guilty of two (2) counts of rape rape by sexual intercourse and rape by
sexual assault. This Court agrees with the trial and the appellate courts that the crime of rape by sexual
assault was committed against Ana when a mans sex organ was forcibly inserted into her mouth after
poking a gun at her head and punching her. The crime of rape by sexual intercourse was committed
against Ana when a man had carnal knowledge of her after delivering fist blows on her stomach, pointing
a gun at her, and threatening to kill her.
Rape by sexual intercourse is a crime committed by a man against a woman. Rape by sexual assault, on
the other hand, contemplates two situations. First, it may be committed by a man who inserts his penis
into the mouth or anal orifice of another person, whether a man or a woman, under any of the attendant
circumstances mentioned in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. Second, it may be committed by a
person, whether a man or a woman, who inserts any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person, whether a man or a woman. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL ESPERA y
CUYACOT, G.R. No. 202868, October 2, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
Rape of a minor under 12 years of age is statutory rape. "The elements of statutory rape are that: (a) the
victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.
[N]either the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the females deprivation of reason or
being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent machinations or grave
abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
RODOLFO DE JESUS y MENDOZA, G.R. No. 190622, October 7, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds intent to take his victims life. The
prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding
homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender
used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. (FE ABELLA y
PERPETUA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013, J. Reyes)

The accused cannot be convicted of qualified rape for failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. Upon closer scrutiny, it was noted that the
Certificate of Live Birth of the victim was never presented or offered during the trial of the case. The same
is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship. The prosecution likewise
miserably failed to establish AAAs relationship with the appellant. Although the Information alleged that
appellant is the common-law husband of AAAs mother, AAA referred to appellant as her step-father.
The terms "common-law husband" and "step-father" have different legal connotations. For appellant to be
a step-father to "AAA," he must be legally married to "AAA's" mother. Suffice it to state that qualifying
circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the crime itself. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. MARCIANO CIAL y LORENA, G.R. No. 191362, October 9, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
The Court found the accused guilty of murder by appreciating the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation. It has been established by the prosecution, and even confirmed by the
defense, that the victims were sleeping when they were shot. To be precise, it was Emeterio who was
asleep when he was shot, considering that the women were able to cry for help before the rapid firing that
silenced them. In any case, it was clear that the women were in no position to defend themselves, having
been rudely awakened by the shooting of their companion. The fact that they shouted for help also
showed their loss of hope in the face of what was coming rapid gunfire from long firearms. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICARDO DEARO, PAULINO LUAGUE AND WILFREDO TOLEDO, G.R. No.
190862, October 9, 2013, CJ. Sereno)
For one (1) to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one (1) of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, must be alleged in the Information
and duly proved during the trial. In the case at bar, appellant used a sharp- pointed bolo locally known as
sundang in consummating the salacious act. This circumstance was alleged in the Information and duly
proved during trial. Being in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, "use of a deadly weapon" increases
the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance which
affects only the period of the penalty. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORENTINO GALAGAR, JR,
G.R. No. 202842, October 09, 2013, J. Reyes)
There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, if no unlawful aggression from the victim
is established. In self-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a condition sine qua non. If
no unlawful aggression attributable to the victim is established, self-defense is not a defense, because
there would then be nothing to repel on the part of the accused. The test for the presence of unlawful
aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.
Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression,
namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual,
or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon,
an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent
unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in
a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong
(like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as
pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance,
or like aiming to throw a pot. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMON PLACER, G.R. No. 181753,
October 09, 2013, J. Bersamin)
"A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending
drug peddlers and distributors." As in all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial
in any prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The rule is
imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very

same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
In drugs cases, the prosecution must show that the integrity of the corpus delicti has been preserved.
This is crucial in drugs cases because the evidence involved the seized chemical is not readily
identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered with or substituted. "Proof of the corpus delicti in
a buy-bust situation requires not only the actual existence of the transacted drugs but also the certainty
that the drugs examined and presented in court were the very ones seized. This is a condition sine qua
non for conviction since drugs are the main subject of the illegal sale constituting the crime and their
existence and identification must be proven for the crime to exist." The flagrant lapses committed in
handling the alleged confiscated drug in violation of the chain of custody requirement even effectively
negate the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers duties, as any taint of
irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. GARYZALDY GUZON, G.R. No. 199901, October 09, 2013, J. Reyes)
Since the crime has already been qualified to murder by the attendant circumstance of treachery, the
other proven circumstance of evident premeditation should be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. In this case, it was clearly shown that the two accused who were "riding in tandem"
hatched the means on how to carry out and facilitate the commission of the crime. The time that had
elapsed while the accused were waiting for their victim to pass by, is indicative of cool thought and
reflection on their part that they clung to their determination to commit the crime; hence evident
premeditation is duly proved. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALDRIN M. GALICIA, G.R. No.
191063, October 9, 2013, J. Perez)
Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 (on total extinguishment)
and Article 94 (on partial extinguishment) of the Revised Penal Code list down the various grounds for the
extinguishment of criminal liability. Not being included in the list, novation is limited in its effect only to the
civil aspect of the liability, and, for that reason, is not an efficient defense in estafa.
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal information in court by the state
prosecutors because up to that time the original trust relation may be converted by the parties into an
ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original
trust. But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in court, the
offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as
distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the state, only the latter can renounce it.
(NARCISO DEGAOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR. No. 162826, October 14, 2013, J.
Bersamin)
In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who
are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there
is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA, G.R. No. 191263, October 16, 2013, J. Perez)
Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
31
perpetrators will be liable as principals. Stated otherwise, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the complicity. Bulauitans overt acts indicate no less than his concurrence with Mangahas design to
deprive Editha of her liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom. The existence of conspiracy and
Bulauitans participation therein were evident. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO JOSE y
LAGUA alias JOJO, JOEY JOSE y MATUSALEM ARNOLD MACAMUS alias KYAM or DIKIAM,
FORTUNATO MANGAHAS alias NATO SANDIQUE, JOEL BULAUITAN MACAMUS and JOHN
DOES, JOEL BULAUITAN y MACAMUS, G.R. No. 200053, October 23, 2013, J. Reyes)
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without it,
there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked. "There is an
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or
right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a

weapon." It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. It must be
continuous; otherwise, it does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense. Here, the accusedappellant, miserably failed to discharge his burden of proving that unlawful aggression justifying selfdefense was present when he killed Apolinario. The aggression initially staged by Apolinario was not of
the continuous kind as it was no longer present when the accused-appellant injured Apolinario. When
unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the original
aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the original
aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by
the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense the aggression still
existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTERO
GAMEZ y BALTAZAR, G.R. No. 202847, October 23, 2013, J. Reyes)
As for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it must be proven that (1) the accused passed on
possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) such delivery
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is that the
delivery may be committed even without consideration.
For the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the following essential elements
must be proven, namely: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possess the said drug. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL MAONGCO y YUMONDA and
PHANS BANDALI y SIMPAL, G.R. No. 196966, October 23, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
In incestuous rape cases, the fathers abuse of the moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter
can subjugate the latters will thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants. In other words, in an
incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering
moral influence of the father would suffice. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO M. VIDAA,
G.R. No. 199210, October 23, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)

If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention is immaterial. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN NIEGAS Y
FALLORE, G. R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo- De Castro)
The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied with the rule on the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Jurisprudence
has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a physical inventory
and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not
render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of
custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ASIR GANI y ALIH and NORMINA
GANI
y
GALOS,
G.R. No. 198318, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 requires the prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr. Posadas
caused "undue injury" to the government or gave him "unwarranted benefits." The Court has always
interpreted "undue injury" as "actual damage." What is more, such "actual damage" must not only be
capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A finding of "undue
injury" cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture, or
guesswork. The Court held in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan that the element of undue injury cannot be
presumed even after the supposed wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the
elements of the crime. Here, the majority assumed that the payment to Dr. Posadas of P30 000.00
monthly as TMC Project Director caused actual injury to the Government. The record shows, however,
that the P247 500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident Auditor disallowed was deducted from his
terminal leave benefits. The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas
"unwarranted advantage" as a result of the appointments in question. The honoraria he received cannot

be considered "unwarranted" since there is no evidence that he did not discharge the additional
responsibilities that such appointments entailed. (DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P.
DAYCO
v.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000, November 27,
2013, J. Abad)
It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the
testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better
position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide
who among them is telling the truth. Lastly, in order for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of
a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant
for the crime charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor
inconsistencies in her testimony. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO VELASCO, G.R. No.
190318, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
The Court had occasion to rule that treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where
the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden
infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is
done at the spur of the moment. In this case, there was no time for appellant and his companions to plan
and agree to deliberately adopt a particular means to kill Claro. The first query of Claro was regarded as
innocent enough and was given no attention. It was the second query that was considered impertinent,
and witnesses testified that appellant and his companions went after Claro immediately after it was
uttered. Even the choice of weapon, a beer bottle readily available and within grabbing range at the table
as appellant followed outside, shows that the intent to harm came about spontaneously. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. JAVIER CAAVERAS, G.R. No. 193839, November 27, 2013, CJ Sereno)
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk
to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims." Two conditions must
concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted.
The established facts easily demonstrate the existence of treachery in this case. The perpetrators waited
for the victims van in ambush, with Maglente standing at the corner with his gun drawn. Thereafter, a car
blocked the vans path and the perpetrators started shooting at the van and its passengers. The means
employed by the perpetrators show that it was employed to discount any possibility of retaliation or
escape, and that such means or method was deliberately employed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
HERMENIGILDO MAGLENTE y MEDINA alias "JUN MAGLENTE" and ROLANDO VELASQUEZ y
GUEVARRA alias "RANDY," DAN MAGSIPOC CANCELER and PABLO INEZ alias "KA JAY," G.R.
No. 201445, November 27, 2013, J. Reyes)
In People v. Seraspe, the Court emphasized that in the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
two essential elements of the offense must concur, namely: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these
elements have been established in this case. The witnesses for the prosecution clearly showed that the
sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in
court. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FAISAL LOKS y PELONYO, G.R. No. 203433, November
27, 2013, J. Reyes)
The Court reiterated that rape victims are not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident,
so humiliating and painful that they might be trying to obliterate it from their memory, thus, a few
inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party.
Likewise, appellants allegation that AAA did not "tenaciously" resist his sexual advances cannot be given
credence. The victims testimony will bear out that she did exert efforts to refuse appellants carnal
desires by slapping the accused, kicking him and trying to create noise but she was physically
overpowered and intimidated by the threat of mortal harm posed by appellants knife as well as debilitated

by illness. Nevertheless, we have in the past held that failure of a rape victim to shout, fight back, or
escape from the scoundrel is not tantamount to consent or approval because the law imposes no
obligation to exhibit defiance or present proof of struggle. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELMO
LINSIE y BINEVIDEZ, G.R. No. 199494, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
Failure of "AAA" to shout for help should not be taken against her. People react differently when
confronted with a shocking or startling situation. Some may show aggressive resistance while others may
opt to remain passive. The failure of "AAA" to shout for help and seek assistance should not be construed
as consent, or as voluntarily engaging in an illicit relationship with the appellant, as implied by the
defense. It would be recalled that appellant poked a knife at "AAAs" neck. Such threat of immediate
danger to her life cowed "AAA" to submit to the carnal desires of the appellant. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. JONAS GUILLEN y ATIENZA, G.R. No. 191756, November 25, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
In the absence of proof of AAA s minority in accordance with the guidelines set in People v. Pruna we
concur with the CA s conclusion that he could not be properly found guilty of qualified rape. Indeed, his
substantial right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be nullified
otherwise. To reiterate, while AAAs mother, BBB, testified that her daughter was six (6) years old at the
time of the rape, it had not been previously established that the certificate of live birth or other similar
authentic document such as the baptismal certificate or school records have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable. Even AAAs own testimony on cross examination that she was six (6) years old at
the time of the incident would not suffice to prove her minority since her age was not expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused. We stress that age is an essential element of statutory rape; hence the
victim's age must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. NATALIO HILARION y LALIAG, G.R. No. 201105, November 25, 2013, J. Brion)

Well-settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information and
duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself. The victims minority must be proved conclusively and
indubitably as the crime itself. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him. In this case, there is nothing on record to prove the qualifying
circumstance that "the victim is a child below 7 years old." The testimony of AAA anent her age and the
absence of denial on the part of Garcia are not sufficient evidence of her age.
It bears stressing that the prosecution did not adduce any independent and competent documentary
evidence such as AAAs original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate, school records or
any authentic documents indicating her date of birth, to show that the commission of the crime was
attended by the subject qualifying circumstance of minority. In the absence of any qualifying
circumstance, the crime committed by Garcia is Simple Rape by Sexual Assault. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
v.
ROBERTO
GARCIA
y
PADIERNOS
G.R. No. 206095, November 25, 2013)
The element in the crime of technical malversation that public fund be appropriated for a public use
requires an earmarking of the fund or property for a specific project. For instance there is no earmarking if
money was part of the municipalitys "general fund," intended by internal arrangement for use in paving a
particular road but applied instead to the payrolls of different barangay workers in the municipality. That
portion of the general fund was not considered appropriated since it had not been earmarked by law or
ordinance for a specific expenditure. Here, there is no allegation in the information that the P2 million
and P6 million grants to COCOFED had been earmarked for some specific expenditures. (ROLANDO P.
DE LA CUESTA v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 164068-69, November 19, 2013; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, SALVADOR ESCUDERO III VICENTE
B. V ALDEPENAS, JR., ROLANDO P. DE LA CUESTA and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION), G.R. Nos. 166305-06; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ROLANDO P. DE LA CUESTA, HERMINIGILDO**C. ZAYCO, JOSE
R. ELEAZAR, JR., FELIX V. DUENAS, JR., SALVADOR ESCUDERO III, and VICENTE B. V
ALDEPENAS, JR., G.R. Nos. 166487-88, J. Abad)

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is committed by any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another with any of the enumerated qualifying circumstances
including treachery and conspiracy. In a litany of cases, this Court has consistently explained that there is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. In People v. Barde, we stated that
the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done swiftly and
unexpectedly, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BASILIO VILLARMEA y ECHAVEZ, G.R. NO. 200029, November
13, 2013, J. Villarama, Jr.)
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of
rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling
element of rape. This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the prosecution has successfully established a
prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to adduce evidence that the
intercourse was consensual. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANIEL ALCOBER, G.R. No. 192941,
November 13, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment thereof." People v. Nicolas adds that "[w]hat is material to the prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARILYN
SANTOS and ARLENE VALERA, G.R. No. 193190, November 13, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
In a charge of illegal sale of shabu, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, (b) the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and (c) the
delivery of the thing sold and of the payment made.26 What assumes primary importance is the proof
clearly showing that an illegal transaction actually took place, and the presentation in court of what was
sold as evidence of the corpus delicti. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operations. We generally defer to the trial
courts assessment of the evidence as it had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, their
demeanor, and their credibility on the witness stand. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KENNETH
MONCEDA y SY alias "WILLIAM SY" and YU YUK LAI alias "SZE YK LAI,"G.R. No. 176269,
November 13, 2013, J. Brion)
To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the penalty for qualified theft, there must be an
allegation in the information and proof that there existed between the offended party and the accused
such high degree of confidence or that the stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance
of the accused. In other words, where the accused had never been vested physical access to, or material
possession of, the stolen goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or material
possession thereby committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking the property. (RYAN VIRAY v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013, J. Velasco)
The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt does not
relieve her of the corresponding civil liability. (NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS v. PURIFICACION F.
FELIPE, G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013, J. Mendoza)
Sexual assault is committed by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is also called "instrument or object
rape", also "gender-free rape", or the narrower "homosexual rape." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DONEY GADUYON y TAPISPISAN, G.R. No. 181473, November 11, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape." Otherwise stated, an unexpected and sudden attack which renders the victim unable and
unprepared to put up a defense is the essence of treachery. In this case, the victim Labando was totally
unaware of the threat. He was merely sitting on the bench in front of a sari-sari store eating bananas
when appellant, without any provocation or prior argument, suddenly stabbed him on his chest, piercing
the right ventricle of his heart thus causing his instantaneous death. The stabbing was deliberate,
unexpected, swift and sudden which foreclosed any escape, resistance or defense coming from the
victim. This is a classic example of treachery. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a.
"Bogarts," G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013, J. Del Castillo)

There is no libel in this case because the remarks are privileged. The legal conclusion was arrived at
from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest,
and the context of Munoz statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is o longer presumed
and the prosecution has the burden of providing that Munoz acted with malice in fact. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILLIPINES v. ROGELIO MANICAT y DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 205413, DECEMBER 2, 2013, J.
BRION)
In every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following
elements must be proved: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence. On the other hand, in
prosecuting a case for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of the same law,
the following elements must concur: "(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is
identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the drug. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAY MONTEVIRGEN y
OZARAGA, G.R. No. 189840, December 11, 2013, J. Del Castillo)
Non-compliance with the procedural safeguards provided in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not
necessarily void the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs for as long as there is a justifiable
ground for it and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Here,
however, the buybust team did not bother to show that they "intended to comply with the procedure but
where thwarted by some justifiable reason or consideration." Accordingly, despite the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, the Court stressed that the step-by-step procedure outlined
under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND BAUTISTA y SINAON, G.R.
NO. 198113, DECEMBER 11, 2013, J. ABAD)
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating
to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there. But the circumstances here do not make
out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. [V]arious drug paraphernalia that the police officers
allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and
seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the
Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. (GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013, J. ABAD)
Roallos assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a
situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or
intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution
and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to
prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other
sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.
(VIVENCIO ROALLOS y TRILLANES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 198389, December
11, 2013, J. Reyes)

The elements of qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in relation to Article 308 of the RPC are as
follows: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the said property belongs to another; (3) the
taking was done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; (5) the
taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against person, or force upon things; and (6) the
taking was done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave
abuse of confidence. All the elements of the crime were established in this case. Intent to gain oranimus
lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of
asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified theft, must be the result of the relation
by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that
might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. The element of
grave abuse of confidence is present in this case. Verily, the petitioner, as sales clerk/agent of PCS, is
duty-bound to remit to Ingan the payments which she collected from the customers of PCS. She would
not have been able to take the money paid by LACS if it were not for her position in PCS. In failing to
remit to Ingan the money paid by LACS, the petitioner indubitably gravely abused the confidence reposed
on her by PCS. (DELIA INES RINGOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 198904, December
11, 2013, J. Reyes)
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect the same. Moreover, if the victim is a minor, or the
victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention becomes inconsequential. Ransom is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for
the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. JONATHAN CON-UI and RAMIL MACA, G.R. No. 205442, December 11, 2013, J. Reyes)
Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody,
photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void
the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
The courts a quo correctly rejected the accused-appellants contention that the chain of custody rule was
not fulfilled. The arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and the items seized from him rendered
inadmissible on the sole ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Article II of RA 9165. The Court
emphasized that what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERLINDA MALI y QUIMNO, G.R. No. 206738, December 11, 2013,
J. Reyes)
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the
concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor, which the
prosecution has satisfactorily established. The prosecution satisfactorily proved the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and presented in court the evidence of corpus delicti.
(PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, v. ROSELITO TACULOD y ELLE, G.R. No. 198108, December 11, 2013, J. LeonardoDe Castro)
AAAs narration disclosed that she was not able to successfully resist appellant because she was simply
overpowered by fear and by the physical force employed against her. Nevertheless, it matters not
whether AAA strongly resisted appellants unwanted purpose for it is jurisprudentially settled that physical
resistance need not be established when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and the latter
submits out of fear the failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victims
submission to the criminal acts of the accused. Furthermore, we have previously held that force or
violence required in rape cases is relative it does not need to be overpowering or irresistible and it is
present when it allows the offender to consummate his purpose. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DALTON LAURIAN, JR. y PUGSOT, G.R. No. 199868, December 11, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
Pursuant to Article 266-B(1)of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship must concur. As these circumstances raise the penalty of the crime to death,

great caution must be exercised in their evaluation. For these circumstances to be appreciated, both must
be specifically alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial with equal certainty as the crime
itself. There seems to be no dispute as to the relationship of AAA and accused-appellant and as to the
minority of AAA. During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated that accused-appellant is the father of
AAA and that AAA is only eight years old at the time the crime was committed. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. LINO PALDO, G.R. No. 200515, December 11, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)

Rape and acts of lasciviousness are crimes of the same nature. However, the intent to lie with the woman
is the fundamental difference between the two, as it is present in rape or attempt of it, and absent in acts
of lasciviousness. "Attempted rape is committed when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled
with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be acts of lasciviousness."
The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the
commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the
interruption. Thus, for Banzuela to be convicted of the crime of attempted rape, he must have already
commenced the act of inserting his sexual organ in the vagina of BBB, but due to some cause or
accident, excluding his own spontaneous desistance, he wasnt able to even slightly penetrate BBB as he
still had his pants on. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND BANZUELA, G.R. No. 202060,
December 11, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
In order to be appreciated, the circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be "evident
premeditation." To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the
confluence of the following requisites:(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b)
an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act. Evident premeditation, like other circumstances that would qualify a killing as murder, must be
established by clear and positive evidence showing the planning and the preparation stages prior to the
killing. Without such evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable,
will not suffice.
The prosecutions evidence herein pertained merely to the actual commission by Sabangan of the crime.
It did not submit any proof that Sabangan, at some prior time, determined to kill Felonia; that Sabangan
performed an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination to kill Felonia; and that there was
sufficient interval of time between his determination and execution which allowed Sabangan to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERRY SABANGAN, et al., G.R.
No. 191722, December 11, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
AAAs conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also not
enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or
in accordance with societys expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an
irrational experience, especially from a young victim. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with different
circumstances.
A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of
the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNABE PAREJA y
CRUZ, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following: (1) making, drawing and issuing any check to
apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.

The SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a contract is subject to a suspensive
condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and when the event that constitutes the
condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, at the time private respondent presented the September and
October 1997 checks for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet no obligation due from
petitioner. (NARI K. GIDWANI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195064, January 15, 2014,
C.J. Sereno)
It is well-settled that in the prosecution of cases involving the illegal sale or illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the evidence of the corpus delicti which is the dangerous drug itself, must be
independently established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be established, and the chain of custody requirement under R.A. No. 9165 performs this function in
buy-bust operations as it ensures that any doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSELITO BERAN y ZAPANTA, G.R. No. 203028, January 15,
2014, J. Reyes)
Where the accused is charged of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and now questioning the legality
of his arrest as the same was done without a valid search warrant and warrant of arrest, the Court ruled
that the accused was caught in flagrante delicto and had reiterated that warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving
vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant
of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto,
(2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN, G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014, J. Leonardo-de Castro)
In rape cases, where the victim was only a child and was able to narrate how the accused had been
raping her since 2003 and describe in great detail the last rape that occurred on September 12, 2004, it is
settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, because when a
woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROEL VERGARA y CLAVERO, G.R. No. 199226, January 15,
2014, J. Leonardo-de Castro)
Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually
higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are
seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended
stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the
trial courts finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when the means, methods, and
forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such
means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL
AQUINO y CENDANA, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
The Court ruled that non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon actually used in the killing did
not diminish the merit of the conviction primarily because other competent evidence and the testimonies
of witnesses had directly and positively identified and incriminated accused as the assailant of victim.
(RICARDO MEDINA, JR. y ORIEL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161308, January 15,
2014, J. Bersamin)
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte
determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not
be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the courts
discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts
against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed. (RALPH P. TUA v.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite,
G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, J. PERALTA)

The Court ruled that even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot
serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO, EDDIE MALOGSI
(deceased) and ALFEMIO MALOGSI, G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
The Court ruled that the "uncertainty"(with respect to the object inserted) is so inconsequential and does
not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into the victims private parts. This is the
essence of rape by sexual assault. "[T]he gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault x x x is the
insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
persons genital or anal orifice." In any event, "inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do not impair
her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR, G.R.
No. 196435, January 29, 2014, J. Del Castillo)
In cases of seizures of prohibited drugs, where the police had conflicting testimonies and lack of evidence
leading to a reasonable conclusion that no markings were actually made on the seized items, the
accused must necessarily be acquitted. It is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. (LITO LOPEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188653, January 29, 2014, J. Perez)
The Court ruled that any objection with regard to the evidence offered and/or chain of custody cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must
so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSELITO MORATE Y TARNATE, G.R. No. 201156,
January 29, 2014, J. LeonardoDe Castro)

The accused contends that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not
sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs. The Court ruled on the contrary stating that in conspiracy, it need not be shown that the
parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.
The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts
and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014, J.
Perez)
The justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be appreciated for failure on the part of the accused to
establish unlawful aggression. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by
the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey
while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the petitioners'
compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by which the
wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then
clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with
the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in
self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.
(RODOLFO GUEVARRA AND JOEY GUEVARRA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
170462, February 5, 2014, J. Brion)
It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9346 which states that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua,
or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILFREDO GUNDA ALIAS FRED, G.R. No. 195525, February 5,
2014, J. Del Castillo)
Sec. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 provided that in a buy-bust situation,
the marking of the dangerous drug may be done in the presence of the violator in the nearest police
station or the nearest office of the apprehending team. Appellant should not confuse buy-bust situation
from search and seizure conducted by virtue of a court-issued warrant. It is in the latter case that physical
inventory (which includes the marking) is made at the place where the search warrant is served.
Nonetheless, non-compliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. GLENN SALVADOR Y BAL VERDE, AND DORY ANN PARCON Y DEL ROSARIO,
G.R. No. 190621, February 10, 2014, J. Del Castillo)
The Court ruled against the petitioners and stated that the burden of demonstrating political motivation
must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. The
proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to
present evidence supporting his defense. SATURNINO C. OCAMPO v. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, ET
AL. G.R. No. 176830/G.R. No. 185587/G.R. No. 185636/G.R. No. 190005, February 11, 2014, CJ.
SERENO)
Case law shows numerous instances of rape committed under indirect and audacious
circumstances. The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor place. Neither the crampness of the
room, nor the presence of people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and
effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape. In the case at bar, the assertion of the accused that a
rapist, under normal circumstances, will not indulge in sexual foreplay is not sufficient to cast a
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AURELIO JASTIVA,
G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following essential
elements must be duly established: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit drug to the
poseur-buyer, as well as the receipt of the marked money by the seller, successfully consummates the
buy-bust transaction. Hence, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
VICENTE ROM, G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014, J. Perez)
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ruled that a rape victims pregnancy and resultant childbirth
are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. What is important and decisive is that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latters will or without her consent, and such fact
was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument
that AAA had a romantic attachment with a person other than the accused at the time of the rape
incidents or thereafter, this does not negate the truth that AAA was raped by her aunts husband.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERVIN GAHI
G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as civil liability ex delicto as provided under Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. BENJAMIN SORIA Y GOMEZ, G.R. No. 179031, February 24, 2014, J. Del Castillo)

The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible
when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such
character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Further, it should be viewed from the
perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the
force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission.
Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.failed

to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ, ALIAS MACHETE, G.R. No. 190632,
February 26, 2014, J. Del Castillo)

In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of
the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as coprincipals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating
circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
qualifying a homicide to murder. The accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGIPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZY FABREGAS, FERNANDO
SANTOS Y DELANTAR, AND ROGER JALANDONI Y ARI, G.R. NO. 204894, MARCH 10, 2014, J.
ABAD)
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable
risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the
patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case exists.
Because most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with special medical
qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict.
In this case, the prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in anesthesia to
provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice
action were attendant. (DR. FERNANDO SOLIDUM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
192123. MARCH 10, 2014, J. Bersamin)
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State, and
may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely
upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a
penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to
immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The
law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of
probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused to wager on the result of
his appeal that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal he now applies for probation as an
escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction. (ENRIQUE
ALMERO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 188191. MARCH 12, 2014, CJ. Sereno
Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless victim, relentlessly
bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no question
that the accused took advantage of their superior strength. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERWIN
TAMAYO , G.R. NO. 196960. MARCH 12, 2014, J. ABAD)
Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age
regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is
unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is
conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the
victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUILLERMO B. CADANO, JR.
G.R. NO. 207819. MARCH 12, 2014, J. PERLAS-BERNABE)
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidences chain of custody is fatal to its case as the Court
can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
dangerous drug were properly preserved. In this case, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3
Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu
purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the custody
of the same to another police officer. This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as
to the identity of the drugs actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented

before the trial court, especially considering that three different people, during the interval, supposedly
received and marked the same. This omission diminished the importance of the markings as the
reference point for the subsequent handling of the evidence. As a consequence, an objective person
could now justifiably suspect the shabu ultimately presented as evidence in court to be planted or
contaminated. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. Y BINAYUG,
A.K.A. "JOJIT"
G.R. NO. 199689. MARCH 12, 2014, J. LEONARDO- DE CASTRO)
Where the accused interposed the defense of alibi saying that it was impossible for him to be present at
the date, time and place of the incident but the location where the incident took place was just right
outside the bakery where the accused claims that he was working at the date and time of the incident,
such defense cannot lie.
In addition, the erroneous reference to Article 266-A 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code referring to a case
where the offended party is demented, and the proper reference should have been Article 266-A 1(b)
referring to a case where the offended party is deprived of reason, in the Information will not exonerate
Ventura because he failed to raise this as an objection, and the particular facts stated in the Information
were protestation sufficient to inform him of the nature of the charge against him. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO VENTURA, SR., G.R. NO. 205230, March 12, 2014, J. Reyes)
It has been consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of
drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity
of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused actually
sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeed knew that what he had sold
and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug.
Contrary to the claim of accused, the prosecution was able to clearly recount how the buy-bust operation
was conducted, and the eventual submission of the subject sachet of shabu as part of its evidence.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FREDDIE LADIP Y RUBIO, G.R. NO. 196146, March 12, 2014, J.
Perez)
When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on the lone fact that
the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the merits of the defense. Such
is no longer the duty of the Secretary of Justice. His duty involves the finding of whether there is probable
cause to charge a party of a crime.
Where the court has established that the presence elements of the crime of illegal possession of drugs by
evidence, such is a sufficient ground to establish a well-founded belief that the crime of illegal possession
of drugs has been committed. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the court is not bound by a
resolution of the DOJ regarding the presence of probable cause, but is required to evaluate the evidence
before proceeding farther with the trial. While the Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on
courts. (BARRY LANIER AND PERLITA LANIER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189176,
March 19, 2014, J. Perez)
Under Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability,
emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying
circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. Hence, the mere fact that the rape victim
is a mental retardate does not automatically render the crime as qualified rape. Where the Information
fails to mention such qualifying circumstance, the crime committed remains to be simple rape. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY OBOGNE
G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014, J. Del Castillo)
Where a private person has been charged of conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 but the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information,
the private person may be indicted alone.

In crimes involving conspiracy, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators
attaches by reason of the conspiracy. Even if one or more of the accused has died, or cannot be charged
of the crime, if there is sufficient evidence, one of the conspirators may be charged alone of the crime.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY T. GO, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014, J. Peralta)
Where the accused has been charged and tried with five charges of rape, and among the five, he was
only convicted in one, it does not follow that his conviction is erroneous.
The charges of rape are different and separate from one another. The evidence adduced in one case is
different from that of the others. Thus, there is no logical, as well as legal, reason to say that when the
accused has only been found guilty in one of the five charges against him, he should be acquitted in all
the five charges, especially when the evidence against him in that one case is so strong that it leaves no
room for reasonable doubt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS BURCE
G.R. No. 201732, March 26, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Thus, even in a case where
an informant acts as a broker or agent between the poseur-buyer police officer and the accused, as long
as the poseur-buyer police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by
appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated by the
delivery of the goods. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL APLAT Y SUBLINO AND
JACKSON DANGLAY Y BOTIL, MANUEL APLAT Y SUBLINO, G.R. No. 191727, March 31, 2014, J.
Del Castillo)