SURVEY OF RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW | J.

VILLA-IGNACIO
September 11-12, 2014

Corpus Delicti
Crisostimo Villarin and Aniano Latayada vs. People [G.R. 175289, 31 August 2011]
Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delicti had not been established.
They assert that the failure to present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of the
prosecution.
We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom or to the body of the person murdered or, in this case, to the seized timber. Since the corpus
delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness
uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus
delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.
Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph
proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners themselves
stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they were charged with
were likewise crucial to their conviction.
People v. Joselito Beran [G.R. 203028, 15 January 2014]
It is well-settled that in the prosecution of cases involving the illegal sale or illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the evidence of the corpus delicti which is the dangerous drug itself, must be
independently established beyond reasonable doubt. In People v Pagaduan we ruled that proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs demands that unwavering exactitude
be observed in establishing the corpus delicti the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit
drug. The case of People v. Tan, cited in People of the Philippines v. Datu Not Abdul, elucidates and
reminds us why:
"By the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of
shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be
planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably
shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great." Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be
extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses. Needless to state, the lower court should have exercised the utmost
diligence and prudence in deliberating upon accused-appellants' guilt. It should have given more
serious consideration to the pros and cons of the evidence offered by both the defense and the
State and many loose ends should have been settled by the trial court in determining the merits of
the present case.
Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established, and the chain of custody
requirement under R.A. No. 9165 performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that any
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. Blacks Law Dictionary describes "chain of
custody," as follows:
"In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account
for the custody of the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his custody until the moment in which
it is offered in evidence, and such evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence. Com. V. White,
353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E. 2d 335."

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Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain of custody, Section 1(b) of Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 nonetheless explains the
said term, as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature
of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
The purpose of the requirement of proof of the chain of custody is to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drug are preserved, as thus dispel unnecessary doubts as to the identity of
the evidence. To be admissible, the prosecution must establish by records or testimony the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit, from the time it came into the possession of the police officers, until it was
tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, and all the way to the time it was offered in evidence.
Aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strenght
Abuse of superior strength is inherent in assault of a man of a woman.
People v. Madrid [G.R. 201871, 23 November 2000]
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent danger thereof,
and not merely an intimidating attitude. There has to exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of
the person claiming self-defense.
Nothing of the sort could reasonably be said of the actions of Camilo. The sight of Camilo and Antonio
following a wounded Jesus must have led William to believe that the two (2) were responsible for his
uncles injury and were intent on inflicting more harm on him, and probably on himself too, thus his
combative stance. It must be noted however that Camilo was not armed during the confrontation and no
convincing evidence was shown proving that he was intent on inflicting harm on Jesus and William as to
put their lives in imminent danger.
Camilo's attempt to divest William of his knife did not qualify as unlawful aggression on the part of
Camilo as no real danger was placed upon William. On the contrary, Camilo, unarmed, was in greater
danger than William, the latter being armed with a knife. Any threat that William could have perceived
had been greatly diminished with Antonio's flight before the encounter began.
Even assuming ex gratia that initially there was unlawful aggression, the same was borne out of the
confrontation between Jesus and Antonio, with the latter as the aggressor. When Camilo, together with
Antonio, was seen following Jesus, there was no longer any confrontation to speak of as it had already
ceased and ended. Thus, when William received the knife from his uncle Jesus and stabbed Camilo, it was
William who became the aggressor.
Granting that William discerned an attack from Camilo, his response went beyond the perceived
threat. The nature and number of wounds inflicted by William upon Camilo - four (4) incised wounds, six
(6) stab wounds - reveal an intent to deliver serious harm which renders his plea of self-defense and
defense of a relative unavailing. Likewise, the third element is lacking. The sight of William armed with
a knife is sufficient provocation on the part of Camilo to take on an aggressive posture and engage William
in a fight.

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In
invoking
self-defense,
accused-appellant
William
in
effect
admitted killing the deceased Camilo Malacad and the burden is upon him to prove that his actions
were justified. However, having failed to prove the existence of the elements of self-defense, he must
answer for the death of Camilo.
Conspiracy and the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength were not sufficiently proved
and thus shall not be considered in determining the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant William
Madrid.
Neither
shall
the
aggravating
circumstance
of
disregard
of
rank
be considered against him. Disregard of the rank of Camilo Malacad who was a barangay tanod cannot
be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance there being no proof of any specific fact or circumstance
that William disregarded the respect due the deceased, nor does it appear that William deliberately
intended to insult the rank of the victim as barangay tanod.
Proximate cause
People v. Dulay
US v. Valdez
US v. Bayotas
Neglect of the victim or the third person.
People v. Villacorta [G.R. 186412, 7 September 2011
Villacorta stabbed Cruz with a bamboo stick. Cruz was rushed to the hospital and died 22 days later. SC
held that the proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Immediately after Cruz was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was
rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was
admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following
day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment
Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any
other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities between January 23
to February 14, 2002.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
We explained in Urbano that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil.
1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of

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Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v.
Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)[24]
There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed
to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus
infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As
the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and
those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%)
mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its
subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of
Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was
stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries
under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the
charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries
may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential
ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder.
Conspiracy, Art. 8, RPC
Two concepts of conspiracy:
1) Conspiracy or a concept of incurring criminal liability the act of one is the act of all (Art. 8,
RPC).
2) Conspiracy as a felony or punishable act under the RPC.
Go Tan v. Sps. Tan [G.R. 168812, 30 September 2008]
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. Out of
this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely
six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4),
(h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004.
R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which
explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the
provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that
Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient

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financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as
indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
While Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.
However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the
merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.
R.A. 9262, Sec. 3
Garcia v. Hon. Drilon, G.R. 179267, 25 June 2013
Conspiracy can be applied suppletorily. Expresio unios est exclusion alterius does not apply.
Q: Does VAWC apply to lesbian relationships?
A: YES. The laws use of the gender-neutral word person encompasses lesbian relationships.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the
equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof
defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together

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in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force,
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that
has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N.
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner
that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple
marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the
innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its
application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital
infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of
spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit.
As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had

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a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the
law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica
Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the
allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting
her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
Special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide
People v. Castos (G.R. 187073, 14 March 2011)]?
Q: Whether failure to exactly identify assaulter is material?
A: NO. Extent of culpability is secondary since all conspirators are principals unless they sought to prevent
the killing.
Justifying Circumstance of Self-Defense
People v. Maninding [G.R. 195665, 14 September 2011]
Claim of self-defense shifts burden of proof to accused.
Preliminarily, it is a settled rule that when an accused claims the justifying circumstance of self-defense, an
accused admits the commission of the act of killing. The burden of evidence, therefore, shifts to the
accuseds side in clearly and convincingly proving that the elements of self-defense exist that could justify
the accuseds act.34 In this case, considering that at the outset, accused-appellant has already maintained a
claim of self-defense, the burden of evidence rests upon him in proving his act of stabbing as justifiable
under the circumstances.
According to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, "any person who acts in defense of his person or
rights" do not incur any criminal liability provided that the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Conversely, the accused must be able to establish
that all three circumstances concur in order for the accuseds act to be justified under the law. Reiterated in
People v. Labiaga (GR No. 202867, July 15, 2013).
Defense of denial and frame-up
Aurelio v. People [G.R. 174980, 31 August 2011]
These defenses are given little weight. Planting of evidence is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs act.
We view with disfavor the defenses of denial and frame-up. Like the defense of alibi, said defenses can
easily be concocted and are common and standard defenses employed in prosecutions for violations of the
Dangerous Drug Act.24 For these defenses to prosper there must be clear and convincing evidence.25 In this
case, petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof in support of his defenses. There is simply no evidence to

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bolster his defenses other than his self-serving assertions. Moreover, we note that the petitioner did not file
any complaint for frame-up or extortion against the buy-bust team. Such inaction belies his claim of frameup and that the police officers were extorting money from him. His allegations therefore are simply
implausible.1avvphi1
In the absence of evidence of any ill-motive on the part of the police officers who apprehended the
petitioner, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails.26 The presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed was not overcome since there was no proof showing that
SPO2 Bacero and PO1 Jacuba were impelled by improper motive.27 "There is, therefore, no basis to
suspect the veracity of their testimonies."
Criminal Intent in Multiple Rapes committed against a single victim
People v. Lucena [G.R. 190632, 26 February 2014]
Accused is liable for each act of rape. In contrast, in People v. Aaron (438 Phil. 296), where multiple
penetration indicated only one criminal intent the accused may be liable for only 1 count of rape. To
differentiate, in the Aaron case, there was only a change of position in the room; while in Lucena there was
a break of 5 minutes per rape committed.
Political Offense doctrine
Ocampo v. Abando [G.R. 176830, 11 February 2014]
CPP members charged with murder.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty."
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a
killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing
assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished
as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents with
simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal
procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the
sound discretion of the public prosecutor.
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the
court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political
motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.
R.A. 9262 (VAWC), Sec. 3(a)
Dabalos v. RTC [G.R. 193360, 7 January 2013]

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Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA
9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense
committed was only slight physical injuries[, inflicted during a disagreement over an utang,] under the
Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be
considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed
against a woman or her child and the woman is the offenders wife, former wife, or with whom he has or
had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to
result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women
through harassment, to wit:cralawlibrary
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of
such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable
acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long
as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the
offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart
from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be
due to the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no
ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under
RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for
prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more
severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had
a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of
women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a
dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the
petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which
falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law[.]
Bongalon v. People (G.R. 169533, 20 March 2013)
Q: When is the laying of hands on a child considered an offense under R.A. 7610 or slight physical
injuries?
A: Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner
struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that
his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not

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establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the
"intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or
embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal
safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the
loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor
of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor.
Accused is liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code considering
that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention.
Rape with Homicidel Meaning of by reason of the rape/on the occasion of the rape
People v. Villaflores [G.R. 184926, 4 April 2012]
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
xxx
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite crimes of attempted rape with
homicide and rape with homicide. In both composite crimes, the homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion of rape. As can be noted, each of said composite crimes is punished with a single penalty, the
former with reclusion perpetua to death, and the latter with death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in determining whether the
crime is a composite crime or a complex or compound crime. The phrase by reason of the rape obviously
conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender originally designed to
commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. The indivisibility of the homicide and the
rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the phrase on
the occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To understand what homicide may be covered by
the phrase on the occasion of the rape, a resort to the meaning the framers of the law intended to convey
thereby is helpful. Indeed, during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. 8353, the
legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that occurs
immediately before or after, or during the commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where
the victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is
linked to the rape, became evident, viz:
Senator Enrile. x x x
I would like to find out, first of all, Mr. President, what is the meaning of the phrase
appearing in line 24, or on the occasion?
When the rape is attempted or frustrated, and homicide is committed by reason of the

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rape, I would understand that. But what is the meaning of the phrase on the occasion of rape?
How far in time must the commission of the homicide be considered a homicide on the
occasion of the rape? Will it be, if the rapists happen to leave the place of rape, they are drunk
and they killed somebody along the way, would there be a link between that homicide and the
rape? Will it be on the occasion of the rape?
Senator Shahani. x x x It will have to be linked with the rape itself, and the homicide is
committed with a very short time lapse.
Senator Enrile. I would like to take the first scenario, Mr. President: If the rapist enters
a house, kills a maid, and rapes somebody inside the house, I would probably consider that as a
rape on the occasion of. Or if the rapists finished committing the crime of rape, and upon
leaving, saw somebody, let us say, a potential witness inside the house and kills him, that is
probably clear. But suppose the man happens to kill somebody, will there be a link between
these? What is the intent of the phrase on the occasion of rape? x x x
xxx
Senator Shahani. Mr. President, the principal crime here, of course, is rape, and
homicide is a result of the circumstances surrounding the rape.
So, the instance which was brought up by the good senator from Cagayan where, let us say, the offender is
fleeing the place or is apprehended by the police and he commits homicide, I think would be examples
where the phrase on the occasion thereof would apply. But the principal intent, Mr. President, is rape.
Carnapping with Homicide; Killing in the course/on the occasion of kidnapping
People v. Arnel Nocum et al/Mallari [G.R. No. 179041, 1 April 2013]
In this case, accused was convicted by the trial court for carnapping with homicide, aggravated by the
circumstance that the offense was committed by a member of an organized or syndicated crime group
under Article 62 of the Revised Peanal Code, as amended by RA 7659, although the said aggravating
circumstance was not alleged in the information. As a result, on appeal, the Supreme Court held that since
there is no allegation in the information that accused was a member of a syndicate or that he and his
companions had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain,
which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group, the same cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance against him. The Supreme Court thus modified the judgment by not considering
the said aggravating circumstance.
Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the information. This new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to
pending cases since it is favorable to the appellant.
Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging
to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things." The crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable under Section 1461 of the
said law, as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the
original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Thus, the prosecution in this case has the burden of proving
that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original criminal design was carnapping; (3) he killed the
driver, Medel; and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on

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the occasion thereof."

The trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving that
Mallari was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. These courts ruled that Mallari
stole the FX taxi driven by Medel after he agreed to illegally supply his co-accused with this type of
vehicle. The trial and appellate courts found that Mallari killed Medel in the course of the commission of
the carnapping.
We find no reason to deviate from these courts evaluation as to Mallaris culpability.
Prescriptive period for offenses punishable by R.A. 3019
Republic v. Cojuanco Jr. [G.R. 139930, 26 June 2012]
Criminal suit for graft concerning UCPBs investment in UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned
by respondent Cojuangco, a supposed a Marcos crony.
Petitioner maintains that, although the charge against respondents was for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand Marcos and of his family and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject to prescription, the same began to run
only from the date it was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus, the charge could be
filed as late as 1996.
Q: Whether alleged violation of R.A. 3019 has already prescribed?
A: YES. Sec. 15, Art. XII 1987 CONST. applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not
to criminal cases (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto).
Accordingly as a special law, prescription begins to run on date of commission or discovery thereof, and
prescribes within 10 years after such, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted. The
last day for filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after martial law
ended.
Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth
contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription. Notably,
Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years
[as amended by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982].
To differentiate, in the Behest Loans case, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the discovery of
such loans as aggrieved party (the government), could not have known that those loans existed when they
were made but only after the 1986 EDSA Revolution as no person would have dared question the legality
or propriety of the loans prior to that date.
Here, news of the investment was not suppressed or withheld from the curious or from those who were
minded to know like banks or competing businesses. The OSG made no allegation that respondent
members of the board of directors of UCPB connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the
investment. Neither did they allege that the SEC denied public access to UCPBs investment in UNICOM
during martial law at the Presidents or anyone elses instance.

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The transaction even became public when UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible
government clearing house for increases in corporate capitalization, to accommodate UCPBs
investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in the General Information Sheets that corporations
have been mandated to submit annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon request.
Robbery with Homicide
People v. Concepcion [10 July 2012]
Q: What crime is committed by RIT who snatched a purse and then crashed into a taxicab, resulting in the
death of the motorcycle driver?
A: It is only theft. No violence, intimidation or force was used to commit the crime. May only appreciate
Art. 14(20), use of motor vehicle in theft if it is a generic aggravating circumstance. Accused not guilty for
homicide.
Robbery; distinguished from theft. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code defines robbery as a crime
committed by any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another,
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. Theft, on the
other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the
latters consent.
Robbery; distinguished from theft. Concepcion claimed that even assuming that he snatched Acampados
shoulder bag, Concepcion should be held liable for simple theft only. In People v. Omambong, the
Supreme Court distinguished robbery from theft. It was held there that had the appellant then run away, he
would undoubtedly have been guilty of theft only, because the asportation was not effected against the
owners will, but only without his consent; although, of course, there was some sort of force used by the
appellant in taking the money away from the owner. Here, the prosecution failed to establish that
Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching Acampados shoulder bag. Acampado herself
merely testified that Concepcion snatched her shoulder bag which was hanging on her left shoulder.
Acampado did not say that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder bag.
Given the facts, Concepcions snatching of Acampados shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not
robbery. (People of the Philippines v. Cesar Concepcion y Bulanio, G.R. No. 200922, July 18, 2012.)
Criminal Intent in Technical Malversation
Indro v. Perez [14 November 2012]
Q: Will good faith absolve accused?
A: NO. Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes mere diversion of
funds from one project for a public purpose to another. The crime is malum prohibita. Malice or criminal
intent is irrelevant.
People of the Philippines v. Arnold James M. YSIDORO, G.R. No. 192330
Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP
beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting
department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues
that he cannot be convicted of the crime. But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation.

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The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public
purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the
law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.
Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoros act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the
crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave,
warranting a mere fine.
Extinction or Survival of Criminal Liability
Does acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence [Art. 365] bar recovery of civil liability Lumantus
v. Culapis [G.R. 163733, 15 January 2014]?
NO. Every person is entitles to the physical integrity of his body. Though there can be no pecuniary value,
can have civil due, through the form of moral damages. Acquittal of accused of crime charged does not
extinguish civil liability.
Q: Does the acquittal from the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries
extinguish civil liability? And can preponderance of evidence be used to prove the same?
A: It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless, the
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan
v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on
the different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from
still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the
petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging his civil liability for the
same act complained of based on mere preponderance of evidence. In this connection, the Court reminds
that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the complainants recovery of civil
liability should be through the institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.
The petitioners contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there was no proof of his

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negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence
with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his
negligence to hold him civilly liable.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although we have long advocated the view
that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of ones body, is not equatable to
a pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should be assessed
once that integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of
ones body. The usual practice is to award moral damages for the physical injuries sustained. In Hanzs
case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision performed by the petitioner forced the young
(Lumantas v. Calapiz G.R. No. 163753, Jan 15, 2014)
Suspension of Sentence
People v. Manalaba [21 July 2011]
17-year-old found selling shabu. SC took note of minority. R.A. 9344 was passed on May 20, 2006, while
the case was decided by the RTC on September 14, 2005 when accused was no longer a minor. RTC did
not suspend sentence. Accused entitled to appropriate disposition [confinement of convicted children].
May serve in agricultural camp or training facility.
The appellant was 17 years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was
committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTCs Decision. It must be
noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on
September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. In People v. Sarcia (G.R. No. 169641,
September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 20), it was held that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits
the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Hence, the appellant, who
is now beyond the age of 21 years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344
as to his suspension of sentence, because this has already become moot and academic. (People of the
Philippines vs. Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011.)
Sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019
Jaca v. People [G.R. 19667, 28 January 2013]
Violation of Sec. 3(e) may be committed either with do (evident or manifest partiality) or culpa
(negligence) xxx should meet the gravity required by law: must be evident or manifest/gross or
inexcusable. xxx Takes place only when breach of duty is flagrant or devious. A public officer need not
look into every detail of the transaction before approving projects by attaching his signature to the
paperwork; error may be those of his subordinates alone and there is no conspiracy between such public
officer and his subordinates.
Pursuant to the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, the Revised Rules of Court require, inter alia, that the information state the designation of the
offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged
xx
x
As long as the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity and reasonable
certainty that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged, then the information is considered
sufficient. x x x
Admittedly, the prosecution could have alleged in the information the mode of committing a violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 with technical precision by using the disjunctive term "or" instead of the
conjunctive term "and." Nonetheless, in the early case of Gallego, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court

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already clarified that the phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable
negligence" are merely descriptive of the different modes by which the offense penalized in Section
3(e) of RA No. 3019 may be committed, and that the use of all these phrases in the same information
does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses.
Notably, a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the
accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as when the accused committed
gross inexcusable negligence. Unlike in the commission of ordinary felonies however, the law requires that
the intent or negligence, which must attend the commission of the prohibited acts under Section 3(e) of RA
No. 3019, should meet the gravity required by law. Thus, in construing these phrases, the Court observed
that bad faith or partiality, on the one hand, and negligence, on the other hand, per se are not enough for
one to be held criminally liable under the law; that the bad faith or partiality is evident or manifest, or, that
the negligent act or omission is gross and inexcusable must be shown.
Gross inexcusable negligence is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care; acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission
of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property; in cases
involving public officials, it takes place only when breach of duty is flagrant and devious. (Jaca v. People
and Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 1686678 Jan 28, 2013)
Considering the countless scenarios that may fall under the provisions of Section 3 of RA No. 3019,
particularly paragraph e, and the avowed purpose of the law to repress certain acts of public officers
constituting graft or corrupt practices or leading thereto, the law considers the gravity of the bad faith (or
partiality) or negligent act or omission as a mode to commit the violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
In requiring the negligence to be both gross and inexcusable, the law demands the neglect or disregard of
duty to be willful and intentional in order for a violation to exist, although it may fall short of the required
degree of bad faith, which must be evident, or of partiality, which must be manifest.
Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA 309) Alias Doctrine
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems dishonest
or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is
suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single
detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved
in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good
faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. . . . There has to be
some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small
government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are
hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through
his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
Abuse of Superior Strength
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the
aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. It is
taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked. In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant
struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the

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manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head
with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably
showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court: it has long been established that
an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him and
from which the woman was unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given
the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not
mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the
aggressors natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the
employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. (People of the Philippines v.
Conrado Laog y Ramin, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011.)

Extinction of Criminal Liability

Q: During the pendency of the appeal for qualified theft, accused died. Will it extinguish criminal and civil
liability?
A: Yes, both criminal and civil liability are completely extinguished ex delicto when pending appeal and
NO final judgment is passed on. Thus, actual damages arising from civil liability cannot be claimed.

Stages of a Criminal Act

Q; Is there a crime of frustrated theft?
A: None according to the Supreme Court in Valenzuela v. People
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its elements
are spelled out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove
or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or
which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the
same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic
means by which theft may be committed. In the present discussion, we need to concern ourselves only with
the general definition since it was under it that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and
sustained. On the face of the definition, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved

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in theft the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in order that
such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the
taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons;
and it was without the consent of the owner of the property.
With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Dio/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to
freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support
or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens
rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of
theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that
the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to
gain, of personal property of another without the latters consent. While the Dio/Flores dictum is
considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the
perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property
on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the
question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the
position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with
intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender,
once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property
stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This
conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquinos commentaries, as earlier cited, that [i]n theft or robbery
the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate
the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated.
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the
concept of taking itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control
over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its
attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been
completed, the taking not having been accomplished. Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for
future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such
consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the
facts of this particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent
for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long
enough to load these onto a taxicab. (Valenzuela v. People, GR 160188, June 21, 2007)

Double Jeopardy
Q: Can double jeopardy be invoked for quasi-offenses?
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from
persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules
in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing

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of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to
benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty
for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x, a single mental
attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime
resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when
proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the
complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models
that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with
varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma
is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to
complex the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a
single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
x x x
By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the
resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to
mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of
their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as light offenses (or,
as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling. (Jason Ivler y Aguilar v. People, G.R. No. 172716, Nov 17, 2010)

MALVERSATION
Q: Can an accountable officer be liable for malversation without direct evidence?

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A: Yes. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession
public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession; and that he could
not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of
malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in
his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.
Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable
officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized
to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion.
Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the
presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so,
the accused may be convicted under the said provision.
However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may
overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has
not put said funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is
destroyed. (Zenon Perez vs People G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008).

Q: For a case of malversation of property to prosper, is there a requirement that the subjet property be
inventoried or audited?
A: No. An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one
who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. To be liable for
malversation, an accountable officer need not be a bonded official. The name or relative importance of the
office or employment is not the controlling factor. What is decisive is the nature of the duties that he
performs and that as part of, and by reason of, said duties, he receives public money or property, which he
is bound to account for.
x x x
[T]his Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds or property, the
prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property, and that he could not
account for them or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for their
disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has
not been able to explain satisfactorily.(Lt. Col. Pacifico Alejo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. NO.
173360 : March 28, 2008)

CONSPIRACY
Q: Can conspiracy apply to special penal laws?
A: The doctrine of conspiracy under the RPC is applicable to special penal laws such as
RA9262. Therefore, offenders under such law are not limited to those related to the victim only by
marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; but also include those acting in
conspiracy with them.

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Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a
particular matter. (Go-Tan v. Sps. Tan and Tan; G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008)
Q: May a private person commit plunder?
A: YES. Sec. 2 of the law punishes any person who participated with the public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder, applying the degree of participation under the RPC.

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