Colgate-Palmolive

Gimenez

Phils.

Inc.

vs.

Hon.

FACTS:
The
petitioner
Colgate-Palmolive
Philippines imported from abroad various
materials such as irish moss extract,
sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate
precipitated
calcium
carbonate
and
dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers
and flavoring of the dental cream it
manufactures. For every importation made
of these materials, the petitioner paid to
the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17%
special excise tax on the foreign exchange
used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and other charges incident
thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601,
as amended, commonly known as the
Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with
the Central Bank three applications for
refund of the 17% special excise tax it had
paid. The auditor of the Central Bank,
refused to pass in audit its claims for
refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the
Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory
that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are
not exempt under section 2 of the
Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General,
but the latter affirmed the ruling of the
auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining
that the term stabilizer and flavors
mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax
Law refers only to those used in the
preparation or manufacture of food or food
products. Not satisfied, the petitioner
brought the case to the Supreme Court
thru the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign exchange used
by petitioner for the importation of dental
cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt
from the 17% special excise tax imposed
by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No.
601).
HELD:
YES. The
reversed.

decision

under

review

was

RATIO:
General and special terms. The ruling of
the Auditor General that the term
stabilizer and flavors as used in the law
refers only to those materials actually used
in the preparation or manufacture of food
and food products is based, apparently, on

the principle of statutory construction that

general terms may be restricted by
specific words, with the result that the
general language will be limited by the
specific language which indicates the
statutes object and purpose. The rule,
however, is applicable only to cases where,
except for one general term, all the items
in an enumeration belong to or fall under
one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the
case at bar, it is true that the term
stabilizer and flavors is preceded by a
number of articles that may be classified as
food or food products, but it is likewise true
that the other items immediately following
it do not belong to the same classification.
The rule of construction that general and
unlimited terms are restrained and limited
by particular recitals when used in
connection with them, does not require the
rejection of general terms entirely. It is
intended merely as an aid in ascertaining
the intention of the legislature and is to be
taken in connection with other rules of
construction.
HIDALGO V HIDALGO
DOCTRINE: Where the true intent of the law
is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail
over the letter thereof. Whatever is within
the spirit of a statue is within the statute,
since adherence to the letter would result
in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions
and would defeat the plain and vital
purpose of the statute.
FACTS:

Case jointly decided two petitions

for review of decisions with the same issue
involving the same landowners and
vendees which dismissed petitioners
actions
as
share
tenants
for
the
enforcement of the right to redeem
agricultural lands. Petitioners have been
working on the lands as share tenants for
several years.
1.
First
case:
respondent-vendor
Policarpio Hidalgo owned lands and sold it
with two other parcels of land for 4,000.
Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales as
tenants alleged that the area of land they
worked on is worth 1, 500 and thus they
seek the execution of a deed of sale for the
same amount by respondents-vendee in
their favor by way of redemption.
2.
Second case: parcel of land worth
750 was sold by respondent. Petitionerspouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo

sought the execution of a deed of sale for

the same price by way of redemption.

Sec12 of the Land Reform Code or

RA 3844 is available to leasehold tenants
only but not to share tenants. It provides
that:
Lessees Right of RedemptionIn case the
landholding is sold to a third person
without the knowledge of agricultural
lessee, the latter shall have the right to
redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration.; Provided: further, that
where there are two or more agricultural
lessees, each shall be entitled to said right
of redemption only to the extent of the
area actually cultivated by him. The right of
redemption under this Section may be
exercised within two years from the
registration of the sale, and shall have the
priority over any right of legal redemption.

No 90-day notice of intention to sell

the lands for the exercise of the preemption prescribed by Sex11 of the
Agricultural Land Reform was given
ISSUE: WON the right of redemption
granted by Sec12 of RA 3844 is applicable
to share tenants also. Or, WON the
plaintiffs, as share tenants are entitled to
redeem the parcel of land they are working
from the purchasers thereof where no
notice was previously given to them by the
vendor, who was their landholder, of the
latters intention to sell their property and
where the vendor did not execute the
affidavit required by Sec13 of RA 3844
before the registration of the deed of sale.
RATIO:
The agrarian court erred in dismissing the
petition on the basis of its conclusion that
the right of redemption granted by Sec12
of Land Reform Code is available to
leasehold tenants only and not shares
tenants and that their respective rights
and obligations are not coextensive or
coequal.

The very essence of Agricultural

Land Reform Code is the abolition of
agricultural share tenancy. It was error of
the agrarian court to state that the
systems of agricultural tenancy recognized
in this jurisdiction are share tenancy and
leasehold
tenancy
even
after
the
enactment of the Land Reform Code.

The difference between share and

leasehold tenancy as premised in the
agrarian courts decision refers to the
contractual relationship between the
tenant and the landowner, but the Land
Reform Code forges by operation of law a
vinculum juris (civil obligation)whether
for a leasehold tenant or temporarily a

share tenant.
Juridical consequences
coming from thus are security of tenure of
the tenant and the tenants right to
continue in possession of the land he works
despite the expiration of the contract or
the sale or transfer of the land to third
persons, and the farmers pre-emptive
right to buy the land he cultivates as well
as the right to redeem the land if sold to a
third person without his knowledge.

The Code did not mention tenants,

whether leaseholds or share tenants,
because it outlaws share tenancy and
envisions the agricultural leasehold system
as its replacement, and the agrarian
courts literal construction would wreak
havoc on and defeat the proclaimed and
announced legislative intent and policy of
the
State
of
establishing
ownercultivatorship
for
the
farmers
who
invariable were all share tenants before the
enactment of the Code and whom the Code
would now uplift to the status of the
lessees.

Where the true intent of the law is

clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over
the letter thereof. Whatever is within the
spirit of a statue is within the statute, since
adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and
would defeat the plain and vital purpose of
the statute.

Basbas v Entena is not applicable,

as there, the tenant-redemptioner was
shown by the evidence to have no funds
and had merely applied for them to the
Land Authority which was not yet operating
in the locality and hence, the Court held
that no part of the Code indicates or even
hints that the 2-year redemption period will
not commence to run until the tenant
obtains financing from the Land Bank, or
stops
the
tenant
from
securing
redemption funds from some other
source. In the present case, the sole legal
issue is the right of redemption being
available to the redemption of the share
tenants.

The historical background for the

enactment of the Codes provisions on preemption
and
redemption
further
strengthens the Courts opinion
RULING:
Decisions
appealed
are
REVERSED, petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are GRANTED.
US vs. Toribio
Facts:

Sometime in the 1900s, in the town of

Carmen, province of Bohol, Toribio applied
for a license to have his carabao be
slaughtered. His request was denied
because his carabao is found to be fit for
agricultural work. Even so, he still
slaughtered his carabao for the purpose of
human consumption. The trial court of
Bohol
found
that
the
respondent
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a
carabao without a permit from the
municipal treasurer of the municipality, in
violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act regulating the registration,
branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle.
The act prohibits the slaughter of large
cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
purposes for human consumption.
The counsel for appellant contended that
the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not
prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large
cattle without a permit of the municipal
treasure if the slaughtering of large cattle
happened
outside
the
municipal
slaughterhouse. They said that the
prohibition and penalty is limited only to
the large cattle slaughtered at the
municipal
slaughterhouse
for
the
prohibition contained in section 30 and the
penalty imposed in section 33 stated only
the
phrase
at
the
municipal
slaughterhouse.
They also contended that the act
constitutes a taking of property for public
use in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain
without
providing
for
the
compensation of owners, and it is an undue
and unauthorized exercise of police power
of the state for it deprives them of the
enjoyment of their private property.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition and the
penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 is limited
only to the slaughter of large cattle at the
municipal slaughterhouse.
Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating
the registration, branding and slaughter of
large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power.
HELD:
Where the language of a statute is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions,
that construction should be adopted which
will most tend to give effect to the manifest
intent of the lawmaker and promote the
object for which the statute was enacted,

and a construction should be rejected

which would tend to render abortive other
provisions of the statute and to defeat the
object which the legislator sought to attain
by its enactment. The court is of opinion,
therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the
Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering
or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption of large cattle at any place
without the permit provided for in section
30.
Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property
for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate
exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of
the property as would be inconsistent with
the rights of the publics. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition
that it shall not be so used as to injure the
equal rights of others or greatly impair the
public rights and interests of the
community.
Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal
Company
Facts:
Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the
sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal
Company ate Manay, Panabo, Davao, about
48 kilometers from his residence in Davao
City. Although quarters were provided by
the respondent to its employees at the
sawmill
many of them preferred to
commute and the deceased went home
about thrice a week, to which the
respondent furnished the transportation.
On the day following the accident, Conrado
and Leonora were lawfully wedded in a
marriage ceremony solemnized at San
Pedro Hospital, Davao City, where the
deceased was hospitalized up to his death.
Leonora gave birth to the posthumous
daughter at the deceased named Raquel.
Issue:
Whether or not the widow of a deceased
employee whose marriage occurred after
the accident as well as the posthumous
child could be considered dependents
within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
Held:
Yes, they are dependents whiting that of
expressed in the Workmen's Compensation
Act.

From the express language of the

Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow
living with the deceased or actually
dependent upon him totally or partly as
well as her daughter, if under 18 years of
age or incapable of supporting him or
herself, and unmarried, whether or not
actually dependent upon the deceased are
considered dependents.
It is also supported in the fundamental
principle that once the policy or purpose of
the law has been ascertained, effect should
be given to it by judiciary. Even if honest
doubts could be entertained, therefore, as
to the meaning of statutory provisions, still
respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a
rejection of the plea of DSTC.
Assuming a choice is necessary between
conflicting theories, that which best
conforms to the language of the statute
and its purpose should prevail. In US v.
Toribio, SC held that no construction is to
be adopted that would tend "to defeat the
purpose and object of the legislator."
Therefore, the decision of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission of awarding the
claimant widow for herself and in behalf of
her minor child the compensation and
attorney's fees is affirmed.
Amatan vs. Aujero
Facts:
Rodrigo
Umpad
was
charged
with
homicide. Upon arraignment, he and his
counsel, the offended party and the public
prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining
whereby, with the approval of the judge,
the information was amended to attempted
homicide and the accused pleaded guilty
thereto. The plea bargaining agreement
was entered into and approved by Judge
Aujero pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of
the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure - which allows an accused with
the consent of the offended party, to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of
whether or not such offense is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction.
Amatan filed an administrate suit against
Judge Aujero for gross ignorance of the law
for
approving
the
plea
bargaining
agreement and sentencing the accused for
the crime of attempted homicide, the Judge
explained that what he did was in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Whether
or
not
Judge
Aujero
is
administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law.
Held:
Yes, Judge Aujero is
ignorance of the law.

guilty

of

gross

Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
allows the accused in criminal case to
plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of
whether or not it is necessarily included in
the crime charged." The fact of death of
the victim for which the accused Rodrigo
Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by
simple logic and plain common sense be
reconciled with the plea of guilty to the
lower offense of attempted homicide. The
crime of homicide as defined in Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code necessarily
produces death; attempted homicide does
not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in
the case before us, which could either lead
to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule
116 or to outright confusion. Such a result
was itself recognized by the Deputy Court
Administrator when he recommended an
amendment to the provision in his
Memorandum.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of
solutions in such cases. In instances where
a literal application of a provision of law
would lead to injustice or to a result so
directly inopposition with the dictates of
logic and everyday common sense as to be
unconscionable,
the
Civil
Code
5
admonishes judges to take principles of
right and justice at heart. In case of doubt
the intent is to promote right and justice.
Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated differently,
when a provision of law is silent or
ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a
solution responsive to the vehement urge
of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the
case at bench, the fact of the victim's
death, a clear negation of frustrated or
attempted homicide, ought to have alerted
the judge not only to a possibly
inconsistent result but to an injustice. The
failure to recognize such principles so
cardinal to our body of laws amounts to
ignorance of the law and reflects
respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not
competence, in the performance of his
duties.
Kuenzle v. Collector of Customs

Issue:
Facts:

From the record it appears that the plaintiff

and appellant imported into Philippine
Islands a quantity of merchandise, which
was invoiced as "cases roast coffee,
chicory, cereals." Said merchandise was
classified by the department of customs as
"Bonanza
mixture."
Against
that
classification the plaintiff, through its
attorney, protested, alleging "that the
mixture is a product and manufacture of
the United States, in chief value of the
growth of the United States; the shipment
came direct, was accompanied by the
proper certificate of origin; the goods
should have been passed free of duty as
American products, under section 5 of
American Tariff of 1909."
Said protest was duly considered by the
Insular Collector of Customs, who decided
that: "This claim for the free entry of
certain
`bonanza
mixture'
as
a
manufacture of the United States under
section 12 of the Philippine Tariff Law of
1909, is overruled and denied, for the
reasons stated in the decision of this office,
on protest 7298 of the same importers
(copy attached), which decision has been
affirmed by the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
As stipulated by the parties, the "bonanza
mixture" is a mixture of coffee, cereals and
chicory; that the coffee it contains was
originally imported coffee it contains was
originally imported into the United States in
the bean, and was there roasted, ground
and finally mixed with the chicory and
cereals which are, nevertheless, products
of the United States. According to the
report of the Bureau of Science, the
proportion of the mixture is about 50 per
cent of real coffee and the rest is chicory
and cereals.
Issue:
Whether or not the roasting, grinding and
mixing of coffee with chicory and cerals
constitutes a manufacture
Held:
The bonanza mixture is not a manifacture
article. The Philippine Tariff Law of August
5th, 1909 in paragraph 242 provides for a
duty upon coffee. said duty depends upon
the condition of the coffee or the manner
of its packing. Paragraph 243 provides for a
duty on chicory. Paragraph 215 218
provide for duty upon various classes of
cereals. There is no express provisions in
the law of a duty upon a mixture of said
articles.

In order to ascertain the ordinary meaning

of these words, resort may be had to the
definitions
given
by
well-recognized
lexicographers. Webster, in his valuable
International
Dictionary,
defines
manufacture as "The operation of
making wares or any product by hand, by
machinery, or by other agencies; anything
made from raw material, by the hands, by
machinery, or by art, as clothes, iron
utensils, shoes, machinery, saddlery, etc."
Black, in his valuable Law Dictionary,
defines manufacture as "Any useful
product made directly by human labor, or
by the aid of machinery directed or
controlled by human power, and either
from raw materials or from materials
worked up into a new form. Also the
process by which such products are made
or fashioned." Bouvier, in his Law
Dictionary, defines manufacture "To
make or fabricate raw materials by hand or
by
machinery,
worked
into
forms
convenient for use;" and, when used as a
noun, "anything made from raw materials
by hand or by machinery or by art.
The application of labor to an article, either
by hand or by mechanism, does not make
the article necessarily a manufactured
article within the meaning of that term as
used in the tariff laws, unless the
application of such labor is carried to such
an extend that the article suffers a species
of transformation and is changed into a
new and different article, having a
distinctive name, character or use.
If the mixing of the different kinds of
ground coffee or different grades of tea
does not constitute manufacture, then it
would seem to be reasonable to say that
the mixture simply of ground coffee with
other ground materials or articles such as
chicory and cereals, would not constitute a
manufacture.
The courts have been obliged to formulate
their definitions in order to give effect to
the purpose of legislative enactments,
while lexicographers have been free to
define said term upon the pure etymology
of the word. Courts have been obliged to
define the terms in order to make it
applicable to practical affairs. It is the duty
of the court to give the Tariff Law a strict
interpretation, which will give force and
effect to such law. The primary purpose of
the law is to produce revenue.
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs Central
Bank
Facts:

During the period from January 8, 1953 to

October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant
imported sun dried cocoa beans for which
it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per
cent
totaling
P74,671.04.
Claiming
exemption from said tax under section 2 of
same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had
exacted payment; and in its amended
complaint it included the Treasurer of the
Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case
on the ground that the term "chocolate"
does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.
Issue:
Whether or not cocoa beans may be
considered as "chocolate" for the purposes
of exemption from the foreign exchange
tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as
amended.
Held:
No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate
does not include cocoa beans. Having in
mind the principle of strict construction of
statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are
of the opinion and so hold, that the
exemption for "chocolate" in the above
section 2 does not include "cocoa beans".
The one is raw material, the other
manufactured consumer product; the latter
is ready for human consumption; the
former is not.
On the other hand, the congress approved
Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by
substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate.".
However,
since
statutes
operate
prospectively, the amendments cannot be
applied in the case at bar. The appellant's
cocoa beans had been imported during
January - October 1953, i.e. before the
exemption decree which is after September
3, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62,.
Tan vs. People
Facts:
On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in
the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan
Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph
Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted
a dump truck loaded with narra and white
lauan lumber. The truck was driven by
Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A &
E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on
October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay
Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and
Rabino apprehended another dump truck
with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile
lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin
Cabudol, also an employee of A & E
Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well

as the construction firm, were owned by

Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances,
no documents showing legal possession of
the lumber were, upon demand, presented
to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of
lumber were confiscated.
Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael
Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & E
Construction, were charged by First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R.
Rocero with violation of Section 68,[6] PD
No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. The
accused were all convicted for failure to
comply with the Forestry Reform Code
which requires: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2)
a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice,
(4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber
dealer permit. The CA found no cogent
reason for the reversal or modification of
the decision.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is
unconstitutional.
(2) Whether or not "lumber" is to be
construed as "timber" and/or forest product
within the contemplation of PD 705.
Held:
(1) Section 68 deals with penalizing the
"cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber
or other forest products without license.".
One of the essential requisites for a
successful
judicial
inquiry
into
the
constitutionality of a law is the existence of
an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination. As Respondent Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners
were not charged with the [unlawful]
possession of firewood, bark, honey,
beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the
associated water or fish;
thus,
the
inclusion of any of these enumerated items
in EO 277 is absolutely of no concern to
petitioners. They are not asserting a legal
right for which they are entitled to a
judicial determination at this
time.
Besides, they did not present any
convincing evidence of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution that
would justify the nullification of said
provision. A statute is always presumed to
be constitutional, and one who attacks it on
the ground of unconstitutionality must
convincingly prove its invalidity.
(2) In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme
Court held that lumber is included in the
term timber. Lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the

Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary

or common usage. In the 1993 copyright
edition
of
Websters
Third
New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined,
inter alia, as timber or logs after being
prepared for the market.
Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber. To
exclude possession of "lumber" from the
acts penalized in Section 68 would
emasculate the law itself.
Bernardo vs. Bernardo
Facts:
On December 31, 1947, the Republic of the
Philippines purchased from Roman Catholic
Church the estate known as the "Capelania
de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, under
the
provisions
of
section
1,
of
Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act
authorizes the expropriation or purchase of
private lands and that lands acquired
thereunder should be subdivided into lots,
for resale at reasonable prices to " their
bona
fide
tenants
or
occupants."
Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent herein,
applied
to
the
Rural
Progress
Administration for the purchase of the lot in
question. Petitioners Enrique Bernardo, et
al ., contested the application and claimed
preferential right to such purchase, and on
January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress
Administration resolved to recognize the
petitioners as entitled to preference. The
respondents then appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, and the latter upheld
their claim, and the decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.

ignorance of a superior claim, and absence

of intention to over each another.
It is also in contrary that the words "bona
fide
occupants"
employed
in
the
Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to
"actual" occupants. The first reason is that
Section 7 of Act 1170 of the old Philippine
Legislature, employs the terms "actual
bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly
indicating that "actual" and "bona fide" are
not synonymous, while the Commonwealth
acts deleted the term "actual" and solely
used the words "bona fide occupant",
thereby emphasizing the requirement that
the prospective beneficiaries of the acts
should be endowed with legitimate tenure.
The second reason is that in carrying out
its social readjustment policies, the
government could not simply lay aside
moral standards, and aim to favor
usurpers,
squatters,
and
intruders,
unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin
and character of their occupancy. Such a
policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of
attaining their just solution. It is safe to say
that the term "bona fide occupants" was
not designed to cloak and protect violence,
strategy, double dealing, or breach of trust.
The SC ruled that a person who, at the time
of the acquisition of the Tambobong Estate
by the Government, has been gratuitously
occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance
of its lessee, and who does not own the
house erected on such lot, is not a "bona
fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition, as
the term is used in Commonwealth Act. No.
539.
Manlayaon vs. Lising

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are bona
fide occupants of the lot in question.
Held:
No, Enrique does not come under the
description of bona fide tenant or occupant
employed in the statute. The term "bona
fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not
a tenant) has been defined as "one who
supposes he has a good title and knows of
no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17
Atl. 220,221); "one who not only honestly
supposes himself to be vested with true
title but is ignorant that the title is
contested by any other person claiming a
superior right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware to
that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil
Law (Civil Code of 1889, art. 433; new Civil
Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona
fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest
belief in the validity of one's right,

Facts:
Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation
of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). He was suspended from
office but he died during his incumbency,
and while the case was pending. The case
was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner
sought the payment of the Mayor's salary
during his period of suspension pursuant to
Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides should a public officer be convicted by final
judgement he shall lose all retirement or
gravity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted
he
shall
be
entitled
to
reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits to which he failed to receive
during his suspension. Malanyaon was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula,
Camarines Sur. He filed an action to
declare illegal the disbursement made by

Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the widow

of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the salary of
the late Mayor as such Mayor of such
municipality during the period of his
suspension from August 16, 1977 up to
November 28, 1979. However, Judge Lising
dismissed the action on the ground that
the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal
due to his death amounted to acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case
due to the death of the accused constitutes
acquittal.

Held:
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of
the suspended officer being "acquitted". It
means that after due hearing and
consideration of the evidence against him
the court is of the opinion that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Dismissal of the case against the
suspended officer will not suffice because
dismissal does not amount to acquittal.