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1.

Mangila vs CA (Remedial Law)

Anita MANGILA V. CA and Loreta Guina


G.R. No. 125027 | AUGUST 12, 2002
FACTS:
Anita Mangila is an exporter of seafoods and doing business under the name of Seafoods Products. Private
respondent Loreta Guina is the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered
proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding business.
In January 1988, Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of Guina for shipment of petitioners products,
such as crabs, prawns and assorted fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Mangila agreed to
pay cash on delivery. Guinas invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent interest per annum on all overdue accounts,
and in case of suit, stipulates attorneys fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit.
On the first shipment, Mangila requested for 7 days within which to pay private Guina. However, for the next three
shipments, March 17, 24 and 31, 1988, petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping charges amounting to
P109, 376.95.
Despite several demands, Mangila never paid. Thus, on June 10, 1988, Guina filed before the RTC Pasay City an
action for collection of sum of money.
The Sheriffs Return showed that summons was not served on Mangila. A woman found at Mangilas house informed
the sheriff that petitioner transferred her residence to Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner
had left the Philippines for Guam.
Thus, on September 1988, construing petitioners departure from the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her
creditors, Ginua filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment, which the court subsequently granted. A Writ of Preliminary
Attachment was thereafter issued.
Through the assistance of the sheriff of RTC Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond was
served on Mangilas household help in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 1988.
On November 1988, Mangila filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment without submitting herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she had not been served a copy of the Complaint and
the summons. Hence, petitioner claimed the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person.
After the hearing on the motion, RTC granted the same on January 13, 1989 upon filing of petitioners counter-bond.
The trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary
attachment.
Thereafter, Guina applied for an alias summons and on January 26, 1989 summons was finally served on petitioner.
On February 1989, Mangila moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue, claiming that as
stipulated in the invoice of Guinas freight services, the venue in case a complaint is filed would be in Makati and not
Pasay. For her part, Guina explained that although Makati appears as the stipulated venue, the same was merely
an inadvertence by the printing press whose general manager executed an affidavit admitting such inadvertence.
Moreover, Guina claimed that Mangila knew that private respondent was holding office in Pasay City and not in
Makati.
The RTC ave credence to Guinas Opposition, denied the Motion to Dismiss, and gave petitioner 5 days to file her
Answer. Petitioner filed an MR but this too was denied. Thus she filed her Answer on June 1989, maintaining her
contention that the venue was improperly laid.

The case was set for pre-trial. Meanwhile, Guina filed a Motion to Sell Attached Properties but the trial court denied
the motion.
On motion of Mangila, the RTC reset the pre-trial but Mangila failed to appear on the rescheduled date. Without
declaring Mangila to be in default, the court allowed Guina to present evidence ex parte.
Mangila filed an MR of the order terminating the pre-trial, and argued that there was no order decalring him in default
and that his attorney was only late but not absent during the rescheduled pre-trial.
Nevertheless, the RTC ruled in favor of Guina and ordered petitioner to pay respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent
interest per annum, 25 percent attorneys fees and costs of suit. Mangila appealed to the CA while Guina filed a
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal but the trial court denied the same.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of attachment
and sustained the filing of the action in the RTC of Pasay. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the declaration of
default on petitioner and concluded that the trial court did not commit any reversible error.
ISSUES:
WON the CA erred in affirming the validity of the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Attachment
HELD:
1) Yes, because there was no proper service of summons, order, and the writ of attachment.
*Improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment. In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this
Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of defendant issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment these do not and cannot
bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either
by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the courts authority. Hence,
when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he
serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of
attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well
as a copy of the complaint xxx.
Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the
court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting
the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must
have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act
in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
DOCTRINE
MANGILA V. CA (REMEDIAL)
Distinction should be made between issuance and implementation of the writ of attachment. It is necessary to
distinguish between the two to determine when jurisdiction over the defendant should be acquired to validly
implement the writ.
The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves 3 stages:
1.

the court issues the order granting the application;

2.
3.

the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
the writ is implemented.

For the initial 2 stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the defendant be first obtained. However, once the
implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from
the court will not bind the defendant.
The alias summons belatedly served cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ.
The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process without obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be served before or simultaneous with the service of summons. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction because the law does not
allow retroactivity of belated service.

2.

Chuidian vs Sandiganbayan (Remedial Law)

Vicente CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN and the Republic


G.R. No. 1339941 | JANUARY 19, 2001
(modes of quashal of the writ of attachment)
FACTS:
In September 1980, Chuidian allegedly a dummy of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, was able to obtain, allegedly
under false pretenses, a loan guarantee from Philguarantee Corp., the BOI and the Central Bank, in favor of the
Asian Reliability Co. Inc. (ARCI). ARCI, 98% of which was allegedly owned by Chuidian, was granted a loan
guarantee of US $25M for the establishment of 5 inter-related projects in the country.
However, Chuidian used the same in investing in corporations operating in the US. ARCI then defaulted in the
payments of the loan, compelling Philguarantee to undertake payments for the same. Philguarantee sued Chuidian
before a Californian court, charging him of violating the terms of the loan, defaulting in payments and misusing the
proceeds for his personal benefit. Chuidian claimed that he himself was a victim of the systematic plunder
perpetrated by the Marcoses.
On November 1985, Philguarantee entered into a compromise agreement with Chuidian whereby Chuidian shall
assign and surrender title to all his companies in favor of the Phil. Govt. In return, Philguarantee shall absolve
Chuidian from all civil and criminal liability concerning the payments Philguarantee had made on Chuidians defaulted
loans. It was further stipulated that the Phil. government shall pay Chuidian the amount of US $5.3M. Chuidian
received the 1st two installments of the payment. The remaining balance of US $4.6M was to be paid through an
irrevocable Letter of Credit (L/C) from which Chuidian would draw US $100k monthly.

With the advent of the Aquino administration, the newly-established PCGG exerted earnest efforts to search and
recover properties and assets suspected as having been illegally acquired by the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies. Chuidian was among those whose assets were sequestered by the PCGG. The PNB was directed to place
the letters of credit under its custody, in behalf of the PCGG.

In the meantime, Philguarantee filed a motion before the Superior Court of California, seeking to vacate the stipulated
judgment containing the settlement between Philguarantee and Chuidian on the grounds that: (a) Philguarantee was
compelled by the Marcos administration to agree to the terms of the settlement; (b) Chuidian blackmailed Marcos into

pursuing the settlement agreement by threatening to expose the fact that the Marcoses made investments in
Chuidians American enterprises; and (c) the Aquino administration had ordered Philguarantee not to make further
payments on the L/C to Chuidian. However, the Californian court concluded that Philguarantee was not able to
sufficiently show that the settlement should be set aside. On appeal, the CA of the State of California affirmed the
judgment of the Superior Court denying Philguarantees motion.
Chuidian filed before the California Central District Court, an action against PNB seeking to compel the latter to pay
the proceeds of the L/C. Philguarantee intervened in said action, raising the same issues and arguments it had earlier
raised in the action before the Santa Clara Superior Court, alleging that PNB was excused from making payments on
the L/C since the settlement was void due to illegality, duress and fraud.
The Federal Court rendered judgment ruling: (1) in favor of PNB excusing the said bank from making payment on the
L/C; and (2) in Chuidians favor by denying intervenor Philguarantees action to set aside the settlement agreement.

Meanwhile a Deed of Transfer was executed between then Sec. of Finance and then PNB President Edgardo
Espiritu, to facilitate the rehabilitation of PNB. Thus, the govt assumed all liabilities of PNB including the L/C listed in
favor of Chuidian in the amount of US $4.4M
On July 1987, the govt filed before the Sandiganbayan a civil case against the Marcos spouses, several govt
officials, and a number of individuals known to be cronies of the Marcoses, including Chuidian, seeking the
reconveyance, accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth allegedly procured illegally by the defendants.
While the case was pending, the Republic filed a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment over the L/C in the name
of Chuidian, citing as grounds therefor the following:
(1) Chuidian embezzled or fraudulently misapplied the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary capacity, justifying issuance
of the writ under Section 1(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The writ is justified under Section 1(d) of the same rule as Chuidian is guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action was brought, or that he concealed or disposed of the property that is
the subject of the action;
(3) Chuidian has removed or disposed of his property with the intent of defrauding the plaintiff as justified under
Section 1(c) of Rule 57; and
(4) Chuidian is residing out of the country or one on whom summons may be served by publication, which justifies the
writ of attachment prayed for under Section 1(e) of the same rule.
The Republic also averred that should the action brought by Chuidian before the U.S. District Court of California to
compel payment of the L/C prosper, inspite of the sequestration of the said L/C, Chuidian can ask the said foreign
court to compel the PNB Los Angeles branch to pay the proceeds of the L/C. Eventually, Philguarantee will be made
to shoulder the expense resulting in further damage to the government. Thus, there was an urgent need for the writ
of attachment to place the L/C under the custody of the Sandiganbayan so the same may be preserved as security
for the satisfaction of judgment in the case before said court.
Chuidian opposed the motion for issuance of the writ of attachment, contending that:
(1) The plaintiffs affidavit appended to the motion was in form and substance fatally defective;
(2) Section 1(b) of Rule 57 does not apply since there was no fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and
Chuidian;
(3) While Chuidian does not admit fraud on his part, if ever there was breach of contract, such fraud must be present
at the time the contract is entered into;

(4) Chuidian has not removed or disposed of his property in the absence of any intent to defraud plaintiff;
(5) Chuidians absence from the country does not necessarily make him a non-resident; and
(6) Service of summons by publication cannot be used to justify the issuance of the writ since Chuidian had already
submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court by way of a motion to lift the freeze order filed through his counsel.
On July 1993, the Sandiganbayan ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against the L/C as security for the
satisfaction of judgment. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
1) Although there was no separate was attached to the motion, the motion itself contained all the requisites of an
affidavit, and the verification thereof is deemed a substantial compliance of Rule 57, Section 3.
2) Fiduciary relationship exists between Chuidian and ARCI but not with the Republic. Hence, the Republic cannot
invoke Sec. 1(b) of Rule 57.
3) There was a prima facie case of fraud committed by Chuidian, justifying the issuance of the writ of attachment.
4) The Sandiganbayan also adopted the Republics position that since it was compelled to pay, through
Philguarantee, the bank loans taken out by Chuidian, the proceeds of which were fraudulently diverted, it is entitled to
the issuance of the writ of attachment to protect its rights as creditor.
5) Chuidians absence from the country was considered by the Sandiganbayan to be the most compelling ground for
the issuance of the writ.
Almost four (4) years after the issuance of the order of attachment, Chuidian filed a motion to lift the attachment
based on the following grounds:
1) He had returned to the Philippines, and considering that his absence was the most compelling ground for the
issuance of the writ, the latter should be lifted.
2) There was no evidence at all of initial fraud or subsequent concealment except for the affidavit submitted by the
PCGG Chairman whose statement is hearsay since he was not a witness to the litigated incidents, was never
presented as a witness by the Republic and thus was not subject to cross-examination.
3) He denies that he ever disposed of his assets to defraud the Republic, and there is nothing in the records that
support the Sandiganbayans erroneous conclusion on the matter.
4) He was never a defendant in any other pending criminal action.
5) He was not guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. L/C was not a product of fraudulent
transactions but the result of court-approved settlement.
6) Should the attachment be allowed to continue, he will be deprived of his property without due process. The L/C
was payment to Chuidian in exchange for the assets he turned over to the Republic. Said assets had already been
sold by the Republic and cannot be returned to Chuidian should the government succeed in depriving him of the
proceeds of the L/C.
7) Finally, throughout the 4 years that the preliminary attachment had been in effect, the govt had not set the case for
hearing. The case itself should be dismissed for laches owing to the Republics failure to prosecute its action for an
unreasonable length of time. Accordingly, the preliminary attachment, being only a temporary or ancillary remedy,
must be lifted and the PNB ordered to immediately pay the proceeds of the L/C to Chuidian.
The Republic opposed e motion and contended that allowing the foreign judgment as a basis for the lifting of the
attachment would essentially amount to an abdication of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide the
ill gotten wealth cases lodged before it in deference to the judgment of foreign courts.

The Sandganbayan denied petitioners motion and also the latters subsequent MR.
ISSUE:
WON the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted as a result of petitioners return to the country and his
averments that there was no fraud in incurring the obligation
HELD: No
*Preliminary attachment issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action. When the
preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action, the
defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show
the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiffs application and affidavits on which the writ was based and
consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued the reason being that the
hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other
words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.
The merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for
dissolution of the attachment; otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the
case on a mere motion.
There are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a counterbound immediately; or (b) by moving
to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance. These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are
fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the
grounds specified therein. Petitioners motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or defect in the
issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a counterbond.
*SC ruling taken from www.scribd.com/doc/110773918/BSL-CASE-DOCTRINES-IN-CIVIL-PROCEDURE-BRONDIAL
CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN (REMEDIAL)
Petitioner argues that he also raised the issue that there was no evidence on record other than the affidavit of PCGG
Chairman. This issue of fraud, however, touches on the very merits of the main case which accuses petitioner of
committing fraudulent acts in his dealings with the government. Moreover, this alleged fraud was one of the grounds
for the application of the writ, and the Sandiganbayan granted said application after it found a prima facie case of
fraud committed by petitioner.
In fine, fraud was not only one of the grounds for the issuance of the preliminary attachment, it was at the same time
the government's cause of action in the main case.
The SC has uniformly held that:
xxx when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of
action, e.g., an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a
public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his
employment as such, or by any person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation as such, or an action against a
party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought,
the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 Rule 57 by offering to show
the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ was based - and
consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued - the reason being that the hearing
on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words,
the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.
Thus, this Court has time and again ruled that the merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has
been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment, otherwise, an applicant for the lifting of the
writ could force a trial on the merits of the case on a mere motion.

Moreover, we have held that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the
applicant's cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance
with Section 12 of the same rule. This recourse however, was not availed of by the petitioner.
To reiterate, there are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment:
1.
2.

by filing a counterbond immediately; and


by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance.

These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the
Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified therein. Petitioner's motion to lift
attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment, neither did he file a
counterbond.

3.

NG WEE V. TANKIANSEE (REMEDIAL)

For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure
to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud
the creditor.

In the instant case, petitioner's affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that respondent committed fraud. As to the
participation of the respondent in the transaction, the affidavit merely states that respondent, an officer and director of
Wincorp, connived with the other defendants in the civil case to defraud petitioner of his money placements. In other
words, petitioner has not shown any specific act or deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud.

Considering therefore, that in this case, petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the specific acts
constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by respondent, the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of respondent.

We are not unmindful of the rule enunciated in GB Inc. v. Sanchez, that the merits of the main action are not triable in
a motion to discharge an attachment, otherwise, an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the
case on his motion.

4.

TORRES vs SATSATIN

(A) belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement
of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction
over their person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of
summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the
circumstances of the case.

Facts:

Siblings Torres (petitioners) each owned adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land in Dasmarias, Cavite. Nicanor
Satsatin, through petitioners mother Agripina Aledia, was able to convince the siblings to sell their property and
authorize him via SPA, to negotiate for its sale. Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources, to which
Solar allegedly agreed to buy the three parcels of land plus the property of one Rustica Aledia for P35, 000,000.
Petitioners claimed that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price, however Nicanor only remitted P9, 000,000
out of the P28, 000,000 sum they are entitled to and that Nicanor had acquired a house and lot and a car (which he
registered in the names of his children). Despite the repeated verbal and written demands, Nicanor failed to remit the
balance prompting the petitioners to file a complaint for sum of money against the family Satsatin.

Petitioners filed an Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among other things, that
respondent was about to depart the country and that they are willing to post a bond fixed by court. After filing a Motion
for Deputation of Sheriff, which the RTC granted, it issued a Writ of Attachment (WOA) on November 15. On
November 19, after serving a copy of the WOA upon the Satsatins, the sheriff levied their real and personal
properties. On November 21, the summons and copy of complaint was served upon the respondents. Respondents
filed their answer and a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment, claiming, among others, that: the bond was issued
before the issuance of WOA, the WOA was issued before the summons was received. Respondents posted a
counter-bond for the lifting of WOA, which was denied along with MR. Aggrieved, they filed with CA a Petition for
Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and TRO under Rule 65. CA ruled in favor of
respondents and denied petitioners MR hence the petition for review on certiorari with the SC.

Issue:

W/N CA erred in finding that RTC was guilty of GADALEJ in the issuance and implementation of the WOA

Held:

No. A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an
action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter
by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the
attaching creditor against the defendant.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all the
requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its
approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.

Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between the issuance
and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is
indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order
to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.

In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three
stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the
order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the
court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and
authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.

At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do so since the motion
for its issuance can be filed at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment. However, at
the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent
since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial
court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of
attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the
respondents.

Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the trial court later
acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the summons upon them, such belated service of summons
on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot
enforce such a coercive process on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary
writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by
personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction

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