Hohendahl, Peter U., Silberman, Marc (1979) - Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture. Jürgen Habermas and His Critics.

Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture.
Jrgen Habermas and His Critics

Author(s): Peter Uwe Hohendahl and Marc Silberman
Source: New German Critique, No. 16 (Winter, 1979), pp. 89-118
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/487878
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CriticalTheory,PublicSphereand Culture.
Habermas and his Critics
Jiurgen
PeterUwe Hohendahl
Bourgeois theorytendsto separatecarefullythedomainsofcultureand

politics. Its notionof the autonomyof art is particularly
indispensiblefor
counteringargumentswhich conceive the relationbetween cultureand
politics as historicallychanging. One of the essential achievementsof
Critical Theory has been to dissolve this seemingoppositionand make
visible the objective link between the two. The categoryof the culture
industry,introducedbyAdorno and Horkheimerin 1944,containsthisvery
insight.What it does not deal withis theconceptof thepublicsphere.This
der
question was takenup byJiirgenHabermas in hisstudyStrukturwandel
Transformation
of
the
Public
and
(Structural
Offentlichkeit
Sphere) (1962)
has generallydefinedthemassculturedebatewithintheyoungergeneration
of the Frankfurt
School. Even whenHabermas has been contradicted,it is
within
the
frameworkof his theory.The intensiveand sometimes
usually
decidedlypolemic argumentabout the history,presentstateand futureof
the public spherehas alwaysbeen at the same timea discussionabout the
conditions and possibilitiesof culturein an advanced capitalistsociety.
Habermas' theoryof the publicsphereoffereda model forunravellingthe
politicaland social elementintheconceptofculture.Yet thisassertionisstill
too general. The essentiallypolitical characterof culturewas certainly
familiarto the older FrankfurtSchool. One has only to recall Herbert
Marcuse's essay "Uber den affirmativen
Charakter der Kultur"("The
Affirmative
Characterof Culture") (1937)' and WalterBenjamin's works
fromthe 1930s in whichthe politicalfunctionof culturalproductionwas
emphasized. Habermas' workpresupposesthesestudies.His theoryof the
public sphere must be understood as an attemptto reformulatethe
dialectical relationshipof the socio-culturaland politicalsystem(to introduce his later terminology).The theoryof the cultureindustry,as it was
needed historicalgrounding.
developed in the Dialectic of Enlightenment,
The difference
betweentheclassicalanalysisofmassculturebyHorkheimer
and Adorno and the descriptionof disintegration
in the publicsphereby
Habermas is not so much at the level of subject matterand its critical
1. HerbertMarcuse, Kulturund GesellschaftI (Frankfurt,
1965), pp. 56- 101.
89
90
Hohendahl
evaluation as at the level of itssystematic

startingpoint.The theoryof the
cultureindustryremainedabstractinsofaras it assumed the existenceand
influenceof organizedcapitalismwithoutdemonstrating
itmaterialistically.
The developmentof humanhistory
in
culminating monopolycapitalismand
its requisitemass culturewas explainedas the misguideddialecticof ratio,
thatis, less bymeans ofsocial theorythanbytheprinciplesofintellectual
or
One
could
even
that
the
advanced
ideological history.
say
phase of
instrumentalreason was projected back into early European history.
Habermas, on the other hand, strivesfor a socio-historicalexplanation
whichproceeds fromthe historicalconstellationof the early 19thcentury.
His concernis to explainthetransformation
ofculturalinstitutions
through
change in the political system,whose developmentin turnis conceived
throughchangesintheeconomicsystem.Thisintroduces,then,thecategory
of the public sphere as the mediatingconcept whichwas missingin the
Dialectic of Enlightenment.
I. The Disintegration
of thePublic Sphere
For purposes of clarification,let us brieflyrecapitulatethe processof
disintegrationin the publicspheredescribedby Habermas. This summary
will be limitedto the culturalphenomena on whichwe will focus. The
development can be expressed as a transitionfromculturaldiscourse
(Riisonnment)to consumption.For the 18thand early 19thcenturythe
contentsof culture,if not theirformof distribution,
are clearlyseparate
fromthe market.As objects of discussionin a publicsphereof responsible
and
private citizens,theyprepare the way forhumanself-determination
politicalemancipation.In contrast,theproductionand receptionofculture
since the late 19thcenturyare not definedjust formallyby the capitalist
market:culturehas become a commodityand is consumedaccordinglyas
leisure-timeentertainment.Its goal is to reproduce labor power. Late
capitalist mass culturediffersfromearly bourgeoisculturein its lack of
rational discourse among the recipients.Where thisrationaldiscourseis
continuedin themass media, it too takeson thecharacterof a commodity.
Habermas considersthe literaryenlightenment
and culturalemancipationofthemassesforthemostparta failure.Increasedeconomicavailability
throughlowerbook pricesand higherwages has notmade classicalculture
more accessible; it has merelyofferedtheprerequisiteforchangedformsin
which technologicalinnovationsand an expanded book marketare employed in orderto lowerthelevelofculturallife.This appliesnotonlyto the
literarymarketbut,to an even greaterextent,to theinfluenceofelectronic
mass media such as radio and television.These media speak directlyto the
consumer,as it were, by-passingtheprivatespherethroughwhichcultural
receptionwas once mediated:"Publiclyorientedinwardnesshas yieldedtoa
Public Sphere
91
reificationof intimacy." An image arises of a general and politically

dangerousregression.Using theexampleof thepress,Habermasshowsthe
transitionfroma public organ concernedwith formulating
opinion to a
primarilycommercialapparatuswhichmustalignitselfforthemostpartto
the interestof itsadvertisers.
Habermas' presentationof disintegration
withinbourgeoisculturedoes
not differfundamentally
fromAdorno's and Horkheimer'scritique.It is no
accident that Habermas refersto Adorno's famous essay "Uber den
Fetischcharakterin der Musik und die Regressiondes H6rens" (On the
Fetish Character in Music and the Regressionof Hearing")3 and to the
essays by Enzensbergerwhichwere influencedbyAdorno. Mass culturein
advanced capitalism is manipulated culture in which the masses have
become objects. The affirmative
characterof bourgeoisart has become
complete: in thecultureindustryartservesat everylevel as an apologyfor
the statusquo. Here Horkheimerand Adorno, who were confrontedwith
theAmerica ofthe 1940s,wereanalyzingnotso muchtheimpactofthestate
whosecommercialinterests
as thepowerofprivateindustry,
dominatedthe
structure.This vehementprotestagainst a formof culturetotallytransformedintoa commodityrelieson a contrastto bourgeoiscultureinthe18th
and 19thcenturies,one whichwas protectedby autonomyeven thoughit
Faced withthechoicebetweenobjectified,
was accessibleonlyto a minority.
democratic and authenticbut elitist culture,Horkheimerand Adorno
decisively support the latter, since for them emancipationcannot be
expected from the realm of reification."Already today works of art,
displayed attractivelylike politicalslogans, are administered,at reduced
theyare as accessiblefor
prices,to a reluctantpublicbythecultureindustry;
as
a
Critical
park."'
Theory mistrustspopularized
public enjoyment
tradition,as thereis no longera recognizableuse value butonlycommodity
fetishism.JiirgenHabermas participatesin thiscritique,because forhim,
and selftoo, culturelegitimatesitselfas a mediumof self-understanding
liberation.True to his pointof departure,however,he cannotidentify
with
the pessimismof Horheimerand Adorno.
Noteworthyin Habermas' attemptto reformulatethe critiqueof the
older FrankfurtSchool is his effortto understandthe dialectic of the
i.e. by analyzingthe contradictionsin
Enlightenmentsocio-historically,
liberalcapitalism.The weakestpointsinhisinvestigation
are thosewherehe
uncriticallyaccepts Adorno's resultsand therebymakes himselfinto an
advocate of a culturalelitismwhichrunscounterto hispointof departure.
Where in Horkheimerand Adorno ratioas instrumental
reason comes to
2. Strukturwandel
der Offentlichkeit.
zu einerKategorieder biirgerlichen
Untersuchungen
Gesellschaft,2. Aufl. (Neuwied/Berlin,1965), p. 189.
3. Theodor W. Adorno, Dissonanzen,5. Aufl. (G6ttingen,1972), pp. 9-45.
W. Adorno, DialektikderAufkliirung
4. Max Horkheimer/Theodor
am Main,
(Frankfurt
1969), p. 169.
92
Hohendahl
fruitionin the alienationof advanced capitalism(the Lukatcsianheritageof

CriticalTheory), it perforcedenouncesthe traditionof the Enlightenment
der
which is so indispensibleforHabermas. In thisrespect,Strukturwandel
must be seen as a critical response to the Dialectic of
Offentlichkeit
Enlightenment:based on a model of the liberalpublic sphere,Habermas
examines the possibilitiesand limitationsof politicalemancipationunder
conditionsof advanced capitalism.
Habermas has been criticized,among other things,for idealizingthe
Enlightenmentpublicsphere:failingto consideradequatelyitsspecificclass
character,the argumentgoes, he applies an abstractcategoryof thepublic
sphere to advanced capitalistconditions.Recourse to the Enlightenment
thushides thepresentclass conflictand triesto reconstruct
whatis longlost.
The liberal camp argues in a very similarmanner: because Habermas
constructsan ahistoricalmodel fromearly bourgeoissociety,he misconstrues the conditions under which public opinion must functionin an
industrialor post-industrial
mass democracy.Thiscritiquecontainsa kernel
of truth.Habermas does indeed constructa model thathas neverexisted
in pure form.Such an ideal model is necessaryfordescribingdiachronic
whichconstitutesthe
changes. The concept of structuraldisintegration,
centerof attentionin the second partof Habermas' investigation,
logically
presumes a conditionof standardizednormswhose retrievalis desirable.
Therefore, Habermas' model of public sphere has a double function.It
providesa paradigmforanalyzinghistoricalchange,whilealso servingas a
normativecategoryforpoliticalcritique.In orderto preventdecline to a
merely descriptiveconcept of public opinion, Habermas insistson its
of the historical
emphatic use, although he admits the irreversibility
processes involved.
This methodological critique of Habermas' model, while in part
justified,focusestoo muchon peripheralweaknessesof the analysis.Not
untilwe have realized thatthedouble functionof themodel is unavoidable
for Habermas will fruitful
critique be possible. In this context,central
inportancemustbe accorded to thechapteron Hegel and Marx, a section
usuallyoverlookedby his critics.
II. The Model of Classical Public Sphere
In order to presentthe logic of the investigation,
we mustoutlinethe
model of the public spherewhichHabermas derivedfromthe social and
philosophicalmaterialof the 18thand early 19thcentury.The bourgeois
to byHabermasas classical,constituted
public sphere,occasionallyreferred
itselfin the 17thand 18thcenturiesas a sphere(suigeneris)situatedbetween
the absolutisticstateand bourgeoissociety,i.e., betweentheworldofsocial
labor and commoditytrade.It consistsofdiscoursing(riisonierende)
private
persons who criticallynegatepoliticalnormsof the stateand itsmonopoly
on interpretation.
The object of discourseis, on theone hand,questionsof
Public Sphere
93
literatureand art and, on the other,the theoryand practiceof absolutistic

domination.Public opinioninstitutionalizes
itselfwiththegoal ofreplacing
decisionisticsecretpoliticswitha formof dominationthatis legitimatedby
means of rational consensus among participatingcitizens.This model of
norprivileges.Equality
public sphererecognizesneithersocial differences
of themembersand generalaccessiblityare assumed,even iftheycannotbe
realized in specificsituations.The revolutionary
potentialof the model is
attributedto thefactthatitmakespossible,evendemands,itsapplicationto
all social groups. The public sphere sees itselfclearlydistinguishedboth
fromthe state and fromthe privatedomain. Whereasseparationfromthe
state is immediatelyunderstandableand is discernedearly throughthe
genesis of the public sphere (public opinion as the means of controlling
government),separationofthepublicsphereand societyremainslatentand
reveals itselfonly at that point where it becomes problematicthrough
changes in the economic and social system."The sociologicalpremiseis,"
ofWolfgangJiger,"the existenceofa societyof
accordingto a formulation
small commodityproducers,for only then is there a guaranteethat all
commodities. . . are exchanged at a value measured by the amountof
work."" Active participationin thepublicsphereis based on property;the
of freecompetition,togetherwithits balance of
independentfunctioning
is
and
demand, alwaysassumedas the naturalorder.
supply
Here thenare the pointsat which,accordingto Habermas,crisesarise.
As soon as thedevelopmentofcapitalismcauses economiccontradictions
to
be reflectedas social problems,difficulties
arisefortheclassicalmodelofthe
of
public sphere. The bourgeoisie,whichhas employedit as an instrument
now
shows
an
inclination
to
the
political change (emancipation),
adapt
public sphere to the changed circumstances,so that the contradiction
between itsown particularinterestsand theinterestsof thegeneralsociety
are disguised. Structuraldisintegration
of the classical public sphere and
domain
and
(production
private
consumption)startsto break down. As
soon as social conflictsofa developedclass societyare reflectedas demands
in the public realm, discourse loses its characterof a discussionfree of
domination. "Laws thatobviouslycome about underthe pressureof the
streetcan hardlybe consideredthe consensusof publicdiscussionamong
to thecompromise
privatepeople; theycorrespondmoreor less blantantly
of clashing private interests.'"'According to liberal theorythe market
should regulateitselfwithouttheneed forstateintervention.
Therewas no
provision in this theoryfor those social antagonismsarisingfrom the
capitalistmode of productionwhichopen the door to state intervention.
"Interventionalism
intopoliticsofsuchconflicts
originatesin thetranslation
5. Jager,Offentlichkeit
und Parlamentarismus.
Eine Kritikan Jiirgen
Habermas(Stuttgart,
n.d.), p. 14.
6. JiirgenHabermas, Kulturund Kritik(Stuttgart,1973), p. 67.
94
Hohendahl
of interestwhichcannotbe resolvedwithintheprivatesphereitself."7Thus,
state and societypenetrateeach otherincreasingly
and therebydestroythe
basis of the liberalpublicsphere.This erosionoftheclassicalpublicsphere
begins, according to Habermas, after 1870, when liberal competitive
capitalism gives way to the organized capitalismof cartels and trusts.
inthesocialsystemto resolve
Because, on theone hand,thestateintervenes
social conflictsand, on the other, various interestgroups assert their
demands in thepublicsphere,theclassicalfunctionofpublicopinionas the
undermined.The persistenceof
advocate of generalinterestis increasingly
an historicalinstitution
suchas Parliamentcan onlydisguisethefactthatthe
structureof the public sphere has changed.As Habermas summarizeshis
used to
critique: The structurerepresentsno more thana sounding-board
acclaim decisionswhichare no longerpreparedby publicdiscourse.
Habermas' disintegrationthesis is not, as is sometimesassumed, an
appendixto histheory,one whichcan be disregardedwhenthefundamental
validityof the theory'struthis thrownintoquestion.Its pointof departure
and the interestin positinga publicsphereitselfis preciselytheproblematic
of politicaldominationin advanced capitalism,thatis, thedepoliticization
of the public,itsmanipulationbystateadministration
and industrial
public
relations.Habermas' choice of thebourgeoispublicsphereas his frameof
referencecan be explainedbythefactthatthealternative
proposedbyMarx
has not prevailedin theWesternindustrialnations.(Whetherand to what
extent it has materialized in the socialist countriesafter the October
Revolution is never discussed by Habermas.) If the constitutionof the
liberalpublicsphereis connectedto privateproperty
holderas
(theproperty
discoursingcitizen),thenthesocialistpublicspheremusttake as itsstarting
point the socialization of the means of production.Continuedpolitical
domination by one class in bourgeois society will crumble, and the
arose will
previouslyprivateworldofproductionfromwhichsocialconflicts
be subjected to public control."The publicsphere,"as Habermas defines
the changedrelationship,"no longermediatesbetweena societyofprivate
propertyholdersand thestate,butrathertheautonomouspublicas private
people secures itselfa sphere of personal freedomand tolerancein the
systematicorganizationof a stateabsorbed intothe society.""The private
autonomyof the humanbeingderivesfromthesocialistpublicsphere,not
the other way around. Habermas' Marxistcriticslinkup to thissocialist
model - which representsfor him only a theoreticalalternative- by
attemptingto establishitsactual existence.
7. Strukturwandel,
p. 158.
8. Strukturwandel,
p. 143.
PublicSphere
95
III. The Liberal Critique

For Habermas' liberal criticsthe discussionof a socialistalternative
model is equivalent to escaping into utopia. Peter Glotz9 and Wolfgang
agree that Habermas' theorydoes not conformto realityand is
Jdiger1o
thereforeunable to do justiceto thecontemporary
formofmassdemocracy.
of
of
the
critical
this
ideal
Precisely
comparison
type theliberalspherewith
its distortionin advanced capitalismprovokesthe objectionof insufficient
historical grounding.It is noteworthythat both criticstry to classify
Habermas' theoryas conservativeor romanticand, thus,to sabotage its
claim to rationality.Theygiveus to understandthatHabermas' suggestions
because theyreston
cannot contributeto improvingpresentcircumstances
an historicallyinsufficient
materialbasis and, upon application,become
stuck in a purelyutopian attitude.The connectionof these argumentsis
particularlyimportantto Jiger. He bases his chargeof a utopianlack of
on Habermas' misrepresentation
of historicalreality.This objecspecificity
tionshouldbe takenseriously,sinceHabermas' modelmustbe able toclaim
an historicalbasisand notmerelypresentitselfas an abstractideal. Onlywith
the aid of an historicalcategorycan developmentand structural
changebe
described. For Habermas, the publicsphereof the late bourgeoisieshould
presentfromthe
prove to be the historicalresultof innercontradictions
beginningin the bourgeoispublicsphere.
WolfgangJiiger
orientedcritiqueis aimed at provingthatHabermas
Jiger's historically
incorrectlyassessed the historyand importanceof the EnglishParliament
when he describedthe years 1832 to 1867 as the highpointof parliamenIn particular,
tarianismand pointedto a decay thereafter.
Jigerarguesthat
the alleged power of public opinion assumed by Habermas in factnever
existed as such. Parliamentarypolitics were not conducted as rational
consensus but on the basis of compromisesadapted to interests.According
to Jiger, public opinion served economic interestsalready during its
classical period. Its institutions"helped serve the articulationof actual
interests,be it those strataexcludedde factofromparliamentary
representationdespite the rightto vote or thoseexcludeddirectlyfromtherightto
vote."" The alleged manipulationin contemporaryparliamentarianism
blossomed, as Jigersuggests,alreadyin themid-19thcentury.Therefore,it
of thepublicsphere.If we follow
is impossibleto speak of a disintegration
to Habermas'
has
a
there
never
existed
Jdiger,
publicspherecorresponding
9. Glotz, Buchkritikin deutschenZeitungen(Hamburg,1968).
10. Cf. note 5.
11. Offentlichkeit
und Parlamentarismus,
p. 23.
96
Hohendahl
model: "If Habermas' statementsabout the bourgeoispublic sphere are

examinedfortheirhistoricalcontent,thereremainonlya fewsubstantiated
theses.''12
This critiqueclearlygoes too far; no one expects of a model that it

assimilatewithoutcontradictionall historicalcircumstances.
Nevertheless,
Jager does touch on an unresolvedproblem. Habermas assumes that
structural
toorganized
changein thepublicsphereiscaused bythetransition
in
conditions
The
mentioned
capitalism.
by Jager the massive
England
interestlobbies in Parliament- contradictHabermas' theory,whichclaims
thatthe liberalpublic sphereand its mostimportantinstitutions
remained
from
the
domain
of
strictlyseparate
private
production.Jager'sarguments
suggestthehypothesisthatthisstructural
changeoccursalreadyinthephase
on thispoint.
of competitivecapitalism.Habermas himselfis contradictory
Here he deals essentiallywithrestrictions
on
classical
theorybyliberal
placed
criticssuch as J.S. Mill and Tocqueville, as well as Marx's fundamental
critique,yet these predateorganizedcapitalism.Marx sees alreadyin the
FrenchRevolutionof 1848,especiallyintheJuneRevoltbytheworkers,the
thebourgeoispublicsphereforthebenefitofthe
possibilityof transforming
masses." On the other hand, Tocqueville's reservationsabout domination by the masses crystallize in his analysis of liberal capitalist
America.11From thisone could concludethatthe problemof theclassical
public spherewas not firstcaused byorganizedcapitalism.Eithertheseeds
of thesedifficulties
are containedfromthebeginninginthepublicsphereor,
in order to save the model, it is necessaryto distinguishmore precisely
between the pre-capitalistand liberal-capitalist
phase. Jdger'sobjections
an historipoint in thisdirectionwhile accusingHabermas of constructing
cally untenable synthesisout of precapitalistphilosophyin Germany,
1
English social historyof the capitalistperiodand Frenchpoliticaltheory.
ofHabermas'approachitisquitepossibletosupportthe
Withintheframework
thesisthathis projectedmodel ofpublicsphereis essentiallyrootedin precapitalist circumstances.It is in this sense that AnnetteLeppert-F6gen
Habermas' theory.FollowingHans Medick,she stressedthe
reinterpreted
."the establishpre-capitalistcharacterofclassicaleconomictheory(Smith):
mentof economicliberalismdid notcome aboutas an apologyforcapitalism
but ratherprimarilyin struggleagainstthefeudalvestigesin a commodityproducingsocietyand againstthe mercantilepoliticsof the state.""' The
same can be said about thepublicsphere:ittoo is primarily
directedagainst
12. Ibid.
13. Karl Marx, Der achtzehnteBrurnairedes Louis Bonaparte,5. Aufl. (Berlin, 1972).
14. Alexis de Tocqueville, Die Demokratie in Amerika, ed. J.P. Mayer (Frankfurt/
Hamburg, 1956).
15. Jiger,p. 42.
16. Leppert-F6gen, Die deklassierteKlasse. Studien zur Geschichteund Ideologie des
(Frankfurtam Main, 1974),p. 107.
Kleinbiirgertums
Public Sphere
97
absolutisticpolitical dominationand feudal social privileges.The social

basis of thispublicsphereis a community
ofsmallproducersconnectedwith
each otherbyfairtrade.Leppert-Fogenmakesthisclearwhenshecompares
in thepublicspherewith
the principleof opennessand generalaccessibility
the harmonybetween supplyand demand.17 In both cases freedomfrom
dominationis the aim. Acceptingthisreading,the problemof structural
transformation
appearsin a newlight.As a conceptofthepetitebourgeoisie,
i.e. a transitionalclass between feudalismand capitalism,this theory
became obsolete as soon as the inequalityof propertyrelationsbecame
to organized
apparentin theIndustrialRevolution.It is notinthetransition
but
rather
in
the
of
the
middle
into
class
thepetite
already
capitalism,
split
trouble
the
where
and
an
bourgeoisie
economicallypowerfulbourgeoisie
in
liberal
the
This
in the
situation
was
reached
spots
publicsphereoriginate.
1840s,as Marx demonstratedin hisdiscussionofthe 1848Revolutionin The
EighteenthBrumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). As soon as the petite
bourgeoisie findsitselfconfrontedwith a developed capitalistmode of
production,to whichit is not equal, it turnsaway fromliberaltheoryand
withdrawsto a defensivemiddle class ideology,placingits own interests
above those of thewhole societyand therebyundermining
thefoundations
of the public sphere.
PeterGlotz
Whereas WolfgangJiger limitshimselfto an historicalcritique,Peter
Glotz attemptsto develop an alternativemodel forindustrialsocietybased
on the essentialsof thiscritique.His polemic againstan alleged cultural
elitism on Habermas' part seeks to smooth the way for an extended
democraticpublicsphere.To achievethishe deniesthedisintegration
ofthe
"Much
has
but
it
is
to
changed,
impossible
speak of
public sphere.
The
are
admitted
as
a
transformation
changes portrayed
'disintegration'."'8
whichwas basicallyprogressive.Similarto Jager,Glotz explainshiscritique
bypointingout thehistoricalrealitynotcoveredbyHabermas' theory."The
disintegrationthesis," Glotz argues, "results from an idealization of
circumstancesin the period of bourgeoiscultureand froman empirically
Glotz rightly
pointsout that
inadequate critiqueofmass communication.""19
is ambiguousand thatHabermas approaches
the concept of disintegration
the positionof conservativeculturecritics.For thisreason,he suggeststhat
one speak of a restructuring
of the literary-aesthetic
elite. The pointof this
argumentis to exoneratethe public,since the intellectualsare now made
situation.The organizationofthe
responsibleforthepresentunsatisfactory
consciousnessindustry
is no longerat faultfortheseparationofhighculture
17. Leppert-F6gen,p. 118.
18. Glotz, Buchkritik,p. 68.
19. Glotz, p. 70.
98
Hohendahl
and mass culture; ratherit is the intellectualswho refuseto engage in

discussionwitha broad public.Implicitin thiscriticism
is thenotionthatthe
liberal public sphere is stillbasicallyintactand would functionif literary
intellectualsexploited the possibilitiesof modernmass communication.
transformation.
To
This, of course, simplydismissesthethesisof structural
admit thatcircumstanceshave changedmeans nothingmore thanthatthe
specific conditions have become different,while the structuralmodel
remainsoperative.This tendencycan be clearlyrecognizedintheobjections
Glotz directsat Habermas. Accordingto Glotz, thedepoliticization
of the
German pressis due notto itsformofprivateownership,butto theattitude
of the editors. Second, Glotz sees in Habermas' view of mass culture
(entertainment)an elitistprejudice that defiesdemocratizationand thus
tendsto undercutthedevelopmentofthepublicsphere.Third,Habermasis
accused of a generalhostilitytowardrelaxationand entertainment,
which,
in Glotz's opinion,is not progressivebut conservative.
Peter Glotz concludesthatthe literarypublicspherein Germanydoes
not functionadequately as a democraticinstitution
because itsadministratorsand representatives
misunderstand
theirtaskand are biased withelitist
thecorrectness
conceptions.The materialcollectedbyGlotz demonstrates
of thischallenge.Yet itdoes notsay muchabout thestructure
ofthepublic
sphere. AlthoughGlotz does not do so consciously,he assumes thatthe
classical model can stillbe achieved(the liberalistattitude),and focuseshis
polemic on establishingHabermas' empiricalmistakes.Glotz wantsto save
the public sphere by disprovingthe signs of disintegration
compiled by
Habermas. The contradictory
natureof Glotz's critiqueappears obvious
when he triesto furnisha positivealternativemodel. For thenit becomes
clear thatGlotz followstheliberalmodelofthepublicsphere.His critiqueof
elitismpointsto the postulateof generalaccessibility,
his definition
of the
literarycritic emphasizes the importanceof public discourse and his
communicationplans forthepressreflectonce again thefunction
of media
forthe self-determination
ofthepublic.However,Glotz is forcedto makea
decisive concessionwhichidentifieshimwithelitisttheories:Because the
masses are no longer on an equal footingwith the educated bourgeois
public, the intellectualsmustmediatebetweencultureand an anonymous
public - a hierarchyof good will,so to speak.
The liberalcritiquetouchesbothhistorically
and systematically
on weak
points in Habermas' theoryof public sphere,and attemptsto prove the
failureof thewhole theoryby thisinsufficiency.
In thefinalanalysis,these
are
based
on
a
with
objections
disagreement Habermas'conceptofhistorical
evolution. The socio-historicalprocess since the beginningsof capitalism
should be read differently.
WhereasHabermas' understanding
ofhistorical
materialismconceives of a necessarytransitionfromliberalto monopoly
capitalismand, in the same way, deduces theproblematicof theadvanced
the undeniablesociobourgeois public sphere,his criticstryto reinterpret
economicchanges.Existingmassdemocracyis acknowledgedpositivistically
Public Sphere
99
as the logical and thereforeinevitableoutcomewhichwe mustaccept. The

liberal criticconcedes to historicaldevelopmentitsaffirmative
justification
and denounces Critical Theory as utopian. This objection points to a
fundamentaldilemmainHabermas' theory.As a theoryofbourgeoispublic
sphere it mustelevate one phase ofthehistoricalprocessto a normin order
to constructitspre-and post-history.
But, theliberalheritageof histheory
(the conceptof thebourgeoispublicsphere)inpartturnsagainstthetheory
to thisbourgeoisstageand does not
when he limitshis idea of post-history
pursue the sublationof the bourgeoispublicspherein a socialistone. Here
Habermas chooses not to apply his analysisof Marx, but instead turns
again to the classical concept of the public sphere to explain its faulty
developmentin advanced capitalism.This is theAchillesheel ofhistheory,
for this concept of the public sphere mustthenbe abstractlyopposed to
historicaldevelopment.This becomes evidentin theobjectionsofferedby
Niklas Luhmann.
Niklas Luhmann
Glotz and Jigerarguefroman ideologicallyfixedposition;theirstrategy
is unmistakablyaimed at characterizingHabermas' theoryas "conservaand
tive" and "romantic"in orderto discreditit politically.More fruitful
withoutdoubt more influentialforthe further
developmentof Habermas'
theory is Luhmann's critique. Arguing fromthe standpointof systems
theory,he pursuesthequestionof how and to whatextenttheconceptand
functionof public opinion have changed. His premiseagrees completely
with Habermas. He too assumes an essential differencebetween the
bourgeois public sphereand the presentstateof affairs.He proposesthat
those changesdeduced froma perspectiveof intellectualhistorymusthave
can
had social causes. "For sociologyitis implausiblethatthisdisintegration
dialectical
be interpretedas a self-explanatory,
immanent,
developmentof
and unreliablethe mind; rather,it mustbe attributedto theimprobability
ness of that complicatedsystemsstructurewhich upheld this belief and
provided it withthe necessaryexperiences.""'2 Whereas Habermas insists
thata collectivesocial functionmustbe foundforpublicopinion(even in a
Marxistmodel), Luhmannrejectsthisclaimas an impossiblesolutionfora
society particularizedinto specialized systems."The concept of public
opinion," he argues against Habermas, "cannot simplybe reproduced
organizationallybecause organizationsdependpreciselyon thatsegmenting
of consciousness, and thereforetheycan realize neitherthese structural
premisesnor the correspondingexperienceson whichreststhesupposition
of a criticalpublicopinion."" Thus, Luhmannsuggestsnot a returnto the
20. Niklas Luhmann,"OffentlicheMeinung," PolitischeVierteljahresschrift
(1970), 2-28.
Quote p. 5.
21. Ibid., p. 6.
100
Hohendahl
butadaptingthemodelto theparticularized
socialsystemin
Enlightenment
industrialsocietyas a means of renewingit.
Habermas actually never doubted the possibilityof collectivesocial
communication.Luhmann,however,claimsthatundertheconditionsofan
industrializedsociety,such an all-inclusiveprocessof communication
can
take
in
cases.
The
can
no
place
special
longer be
only
public sphere
its
and
of
recognizedby generality,
rationality capability consensus,"butby
the formof the themesforpoliticalcommunication,
as a
by its suitability
structureforthecommunication
In
the
of
a
search
place
general
process."'"
for trutharises a pragmaticapproach to uncertainty.Through public
discussionthe system'sbalance is sustainedor reconstructed.
Accordingto
Luhmann,then,a sociologicalanalysisofpublicopinionmustconcernitself
withthe attentionand decision ruleswithina politicalsystem.Translated
into everydaylanguage,thismeans thatpublicopiniongrowsaroundand
follows"issues." The limitedattentionspan of a publicoverburdenedwith
problems produces a public sphere in which issues must be changed
constantlyjust to maintaina discussion.What Habermas' model presupposes (the solution of problemsby general consensus) is, accordingto
Luhmann, no longerattainable.Luhmannstressesno less thanHabermas
that the public sphere in an advanced capitalistsocietycan no longer
functionwiththe rulesof the 18thcentury,fortheparticularization
of the
ofgeneral
systemintonumerousspecializedsystemsdiminishestheefficacy
opinion-buildingnotproducedin a specializedsystem.Habermas' problem
of structuraldisintegration
emergesforLuhmannas a questionof how the
public sphere can attaina new functionafterits liberalfunctionhas been
exhausted.
Luhmannemphasizesthestructure
of "politicalcommunication
through
institutionalized
themes."":'In thissituation,publicopinionis dependenton
the authorityinstitutionalized
in organizations- parties,bureaucracies,
interestgroups, etc. Even withoutassumingthatmass communicationis
manipulated,one can easilyrecognizetheadvantageoftheseorganizations
in theproductionofpublicopinion.Luhmannhimselfhas no illusionsabout
this tendency: "The creation, use, and continuationof public opinion
themesbelong essentiallyto thedomainofprofessionalpoliticiansspecially
groomed forthe job.""' The capacityaccomplishingthispublicopinionas
well as its importanceforsocietylie in itsintegrating
function:itconnects
the political systemto other specialized systemsin the society. "Public
betweenpoliticsand
opinion . . . mustbe able to encompassthedifference
also
the
relative
remoteness
and
and,
thus,
non-politics
incomprehensibility
of details in the process of political decision-making.""25
Luhmann's
22. Ibid., p. 9.
23. IbMid.,
p. 18.
24. Ibid., p. 23.
25. Ibid., p. 26 f.
Public Sphere
101
pragmaticassessmentof the publicspherenecessarilyleads to a critiqueof

Habermas' theory.The conceptof the publicspheredeveloped by Critical
oftheword"public"
Theorydepends,forHabermas,on thenominalization
behind which he seeks a collective subject. Because systemstheory,
however, surrendersthe traditionalconceptof dominationand no longer
assumes a collectivesubject, the insufficiency
of publicopinion- which
Luhmann also admits- loses itsstrategicimportance.
As in the case of Glotz and Jager,thereare fundamentaltheoretical
differenceshiddenbehindthisdiscussionof theimportanceand functionof
the public sphere,but theycan, at best,onlybe outlined.The concernhere
cannot be a generalanalysisof the relationshipbetweendialecticaltheory
and systemstheory;myremarksmustbe confinedto theaspectofthepublic
sphere. In his critique,Luhmanntoucheson essentialpremisesof Habermas' position. Habermas' socio-philosophicalthoughtis, according to
Luhmann, still marked by presuppositionsof the Enlightenment,consideredbyLuhmannas a naive antecedentofmodernsociology.Habermas
is also includedwhen Luhmannwritesin theessay "SoziologischeAufklirung" (Sociological Enlightenment):"That the individual,throughselfreflectionon his own, can findsomethingcommonto all humanity,
thathe
can reach a consensus,even truth,will not be plausibleto sociologists."'2
The possibility,even the necessityof thisreflectionas a means of finding
truthhas been, underthe titleof knowledgeconstituting
interest(erkenntnisleitendesInteresse),Habermas' centraltheme since 1965. Since Luhof theindividual
mann, as a sociologist,considersthesocial determination
as theprimaryfactorwhichwillassertitselfagainstconsciousnessinmodern
industrialsociety,he mustnecessarilyrejecta conceptof thepublicsphere
derived fromthe idea that collectiveidentitycould be constructedfrom
consensus among individuals.The criticalrecourseto the Enlightenment
implied in Habermas' theoryis subjected by Luhmannto an historically
ofmodern
argued ideologicalcritiquefocusingon theincreasedcomplexity
society.Followingin thestepsofMax Weberand Durkheim,Luhmannlops
offtheconnectionto normativethoughtin earlybourgeoissocialphilosophy
and subsequentlyfindshimselfinthepositionofdescribingthepublicsphere
in advanced capitalism"withoutbias", as itwere,and elucidatingthelimits
of its capacity.The ideal of communicationfreeof domination,whichwas
containedintheliberaltheoryofthepublicsphere,appearsto be historically
of thisapproach.
supersededwithinthe framework
What appears fruitful
to me in thiscriticismis thatit questions,froma
sociological perspective,the possibilityof applyingHabermas' theory,
making visible the tension between normativediscussionand historical
is the
argumentation
explication.The priceforthissociologicallyrestricted
loss ofphilosophicalanalysis.Theoreticalthoughtis limitedto thestatusquo
2. Aufl. (Opladen, 1971), p. 67.
26. SoziologischeAufkliirung,
102
Hohendahl
and its systematicmanagement.Luhmann defines enlightenment

as a
which
is
in
reduced.
this
world
complexity
systemsbuildingby
"Rationality
(can) only be furtheredby the constructionand stabilizationof more
encompassingand complexsystems.""27Because Luhmannvalues so little
the changingpotentialof consciousness,the possibilityof stimulating
the
is
of
self-reflection
blocked.
The
emancipatoryprocessthrough
path history
assumes just that ridigitywhich Critical Theory had attacked fromits
beginning.ThereforeHabermas was rightwhen he later criticizedLuhmann's objectivismin systemstheoryas resultingin decisionismsince for
Luhmannpracticalquestionsare explainedbyformalrulesofbehaviorand
can acquire no furtherlegitimation.(Legitimationin substancemustbe
shrinksin systemstheoryto
illusoryaccordingto Luhmann).Enlightenment
formalrationalitybecause it throwsoverboardwhat forHabermas is the
fundamentalproblem- thatpracticalquestionsare capable of truth,that
thereare justifiablenorms,thathumanself-determination
is possible.
IV. The MarxistCritique
As JuirgenHabermas became the object of radical studentcriticism
during the late 1960s, his theory of public sphere was increasingly
condemned, althoughit had helped the studentmovementoriginallyin
definingitsown position.This is nottheplace to retracethisdevelopment.21
Our interestmustbe directedtowardthosecounter-arguments
and alternative proposals which were advanced. It will be necessaryto distinguish
between thosecritiqueswhichcontinuetheapproachchosenbyHabermas
while radicalizingand therebynegatingpartsof histheoryand thosewhich
of theFrankfurt
School and thusof
identifyHabermas as a representative
bourgeois ideology. Characteristicof the firstposition would be the
und
investigationby Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, Offentlichkeit
Erfahrung[The Public Sphere and Experience](1972), in whichacquaintance withHabermas' theoryis explicitlypresumed.Characteristic
forthe
second position is Ulf Milde's study in connectionwith a collective
investigationon literatureof the 18thcentury."9
Althoughtheirobjections
coincide at certainspots,thegoal and function
oftheirrespectivearguments
are significantly
different.Whereas Negt and Kluge want to salvage the
Milde's attackis aimed at an
concept of public spherewiththeircriticism,
ideological denunciation,which,by the way,correspondsin some waysto
the liberalcritique.
27. Ibid., p. 80.
28. Cf. Die Linkeantwortet
am Main, 1968). Includesessaysby
JirgenHabermas(Frankfurt
WolfgangAbendroth,Peter Briickneret al.
29. "'Biirgerliche Offentlichkeit'als Modell der Literaturentwicklung
des 18. Jahrhunderts," in: Gert Mattenklottand Klaus R. Scherpe, Westberliner
Projekt: Grundkurs18.
Jahrhundert
(Kronberg,1974), pp. 41-73.
PublicSphere
103
UlfMilde
For Milde, Habermas is firstand foremostan ideologue employinghis
categories and historicalmaterialto legitimatepoliticaland social objectives.Milde remarks:"Habermas proveshimselfa latebourgeoisideologue
in thathe mustfalsify
his memoriesofheriocbourgeoisillusionsin orderto
extractfromthem what he wants."'3 To prove his thesishe claims that
Habermas considers the principleof freedomfromdominationas the
essential componentof the public sphere.Because Habermas equates this
elementwiththe bourgeoispublicsphere,he become fixatedon it. At this
In
point the ideological critiqueproves to be a barrierto interpretation.
order to understandand assimilateHabermas' theory,Mildeconsidersit in
connectionwiththe renewedscholarlyinterestin theEnlightenment.
This
interestmustbe seen as a symptomoftheattemptbybourgeoisintellectuals
to criticizethe restorativeWest German state. Because Milde includes
Habermas in this group and attributesto him the same motives,"'he
misjudges the approach and also the goal of Habermas' theory.For the
assumptionthata space freeof dominationcan be constitutedwithinthe
tied to
bourgeois public spheredoes not implythatthisidea is inextricably
the bourgeoispublic sphereitself,but ratherthatthisconceptcan onlybe
recovered if the bourgeoispublic sphereis surmountedby a socialistone.
The meaningofthedisintegration
thesisis thattheliberalpublicspheremust
conflictwithbourgeoissocietyas soon as thecapitalistmode of production
has triumphed.Habermas also does not maintain,as Milde claims,32that
bourgeois propertyrelationsare unpolitical,but ratherthatliberaltheory
considerstherealmof productionand commodityexchangeunpoliticaland
thereforebecomes defensiveas soon as social conflictsforcetheirway into
the public realm.
Not suprisingly,Milde considersthe question of disintegration
in the
public sphere to be unproductive;thatis, he failsto see thatHabermas'
theorymustbe read as a critiqueof the problemsin advanced capitalism.
Thus he closes offaccess to the historicalsectionsof the investigation
and
draws problematicalconclusions.Because Habermas links the idea of a
nondistortedcommunicationfree of domination to the model of the
liberal public sphere, Milde assumes thatHabermas also considersbourgeois societyfreeof dominationand thencriticallyobjects thatHabermas
does not discuss antagonisticclass relations.He overlooks the fact that
Habermas accounts forthe disintegration
of the bourgeoispublic sphere
fromsocial conflictsgeneratedby contradictions
in the capitalistmode of
Milde's
other
In
on the genesisof the
focuses
words,
critique
production.
and
his
for
themostpartwith
coincide
bourgeoispublic sphere,
arguments
30. Ibid.,p. 51.
31. Ibid., p. 46f.
32. Ibid.,p. 52.
104
Hohendahl
those of Jiger: insufficient

historicalspecification,problematicalsynthesizing, incomplete development of the economic base.:" When Milde
suggeststhattheEnglishbourgeoispublicsphereowes a debt"in factto the
maturityand varietyof ideological and politicalclass strugglewithinthe
most progressive nation in the European context,"" he touches on
Habermas' problematicalindecisionas to whethertheliberalpublicsphere
establisheditselfbeforeor simultaneously
withindustrialcapitalism.
In the finalanalysis,Milde's critiqueis directedagainstthetendencyto
of the relationshipbetweenbase and
qualifythe orthodoxinterpretation
in
favor
of
an
superstructure
approachinwhichinteraction
(communicative
is
as
action)
regarded
being no less primarilyimportantthan work
behavior).Such an approachchangestherelationship
(production-oriented
between economy and culture.Culture is no longerconsidereda simple
variable, as in the orthodoxconcept, but ratheran independentthough
interfering
system.I understandthetheoryof thepublicsphereto be a first
attemptto introducewithinthenotionsof rationaldiscourse(Rasonnment)
a concept of communicativeinteraction.The goal of the public sphereis
intersubjectiveagreementon values and standards,whichcan thenbe used
to resolvepracticalquestions.What Habermas sees institutionalized
in the
public sphere- individuation,
emancipation,extensionof communication
freeof domination- appears in the 1968essay"TechnikundWissenschaft
als 'Ideologie"' (Technologyand Science as 'Ideology') underthecategory
of "symbolicallymediated interaction."::" Since these deviations from
the
der Offentlichkeit,
orthodoxy are voiced already in Strukturwandel
reservationsof the orthodoxycamp were to be expected.
Oskar Negtand AlexanderKluge
Two tendencies emerge in the study Offentlichkeit
und Erfahrung
critical
of
the
(1972): (a)
analysis
bourgeois public sphere based on
Habermas but not relyingunquestioningly
on his categoriesand (b) the
search foran alternative,i.e., fora proletariancounter-public
sphere.The
inherentconnectionbetweenthesetwois especiallyimportant
inthecontext
of the formof mass culturein developed industrialsocieties. It is in this
respectthatthetraditionofCriticalTheoryassertsitself;noris itan accident
thatthestudyis dedicatedto Adorno. Negtand Kluge use theframework
of
Habermas' disintegration
and thereby
theorybutcontinueone stepfurther
turncriticallyagainstHabermas' model. They attackthe idealistconstruc33. Mildes' exegesis is not alwaysimmuneto misunderstandings.
For example,he assumes
thatforHabermas thebourgeoisstatederivesfromthefunctional
in thepublic
transformation
thatthebourgeoispublicsphere
sphere,whereasHabermas was concernedwithdemonstrating
constituteditselfas an instrument
of struggleforthe bourgeoisie.Cf. Milde, p. 54f.
34. Ibid., p. 57.
35. Habermas, Technikund Wissenschaft
als 'Ideologie' (Frankfurt,1968), p. 64.
Public Sphere
105
tion whichsuggeststhatthe publicspherehas ever takensubstantialshape

and they exclude the possibilitythat the liberal-bourgeoispublic sphere
could ever be revivedin any formwhatsoever.Habermas' ambivalencehisinsistenceon an emphaticconceptofthepublicsphereinordertoretaina
of structural
regulative idea despite his insightinto the irreversability
- giveswayto a clearand finalnegation.The resolutionof
transformations
crisisin late bourgeoissocietyis soughtin theproletarianpublicsphere.
The bourgeois public sphere, Negt and Kluge argue, has only the
appearance of being highlyorganized,functionaland efficient.However,
"If one considersitstruesubstance,thenitis notat all unifiedbutratherthe
cumulationof individualpublic spheresmerelyabstractlyrelatedto one
another.'""3 In other words, the self-imageof the liberal public sphere
followed by Habermas conceals the real structure,whichis considerably
more disjointedthanbourgeoistheorywould admit.Negt and Kluge stress
more stronglythan Habermas that this bourgeoispublic sphere had an
ideological characterfromthebeginning,in thatitnegateditsownmaterial
basis: the realm of productionwas excluded. Negt and Kluge resolvethis
tension between ideal claim and social reality,also recognizedby Habermas, by contendingthat the capitalistbourgeoisieemployedthe public
to serveitsprivate,economicinterests.
spherein the 19thcenturyprimarily
The public sphere mustconceal the factthatthe statedoes not represent
of individualones. From this
general interestsbut servesas an instrument
and
draw
thenotaltogetherconvincing
Kluge
Negt
apologeticalframework,
conclusionthatthepublicsphereneverreallyexistedas a unifiedprinciple.
What Habermas had described as an institutionturnsout to be a loose
association of heterogenousorganizations.Since Negt and Kluge do not
differentiate
betweenlevels of insitutionand organization,the
sufficiently
of
category public spherethreatensto dissolve.
In place of a collectivepublicsphere,Negtand Kluge identify
a number
of partialpublicspheresthroughwhichin each case particularsocialaspects
are represented.37They distinguishfirstbetween constitutionalpublic
and publicsphereas theorganizational
sphere (Konstitutionsoffentlichkeit)
formof bourgeoissociety;in addition,theyseparatethe publicsphereas
appearance of a collectivesynthesisfromtheformsof expressionofcertain
use value characteristics.By constitutionalpublic sphere theymean the
creationofa unifiedpublicprinciplebywhichall privilegesand specialrights
are dissolved. In oppositionto thisis the bourgeoisformof organization
whichpreventstheprincipleofpublicspherefromprevailingagainstmodes
ofprivatecapitalistproduction."The pointis thatthepoliticalpublicsphere
should not exist."38The thirdpointis closestto Habermas' intentions:
Negt
und Erfahrung.Zur Organisationsanalyse
von biirgerlicher
36. Negt/Kluge,Offentlichkeit
am Main, 1972), p. 15.
und proletarischer
(Frankfurt
Offentlichkeit
37. Cf. Offentlichkeit
und Erfahrung,pp. 102ff.
38. Ibid., p. 104.
106
Hohendahl
and Kluge introducein thenameofa collectivesocialsynthesis

theexistence
of a common will, "of a meaningfulcoherenceencompassingthe whole
world and the appearance of participationby all membersof thesociety."
Finally,the aspect of real use value coexistswiththisideologicalconstruction so that actual human needs at least partiallyreceivetheirdue right
(emancipatorypotential).The innerconflictof bourgeoissocietyis characterized by contradictoryaspects of the public sphere. Negt and Kluge
are containedfromthe beginningwithin
assume that these contradictions
the structureof the public sphere. Therefore,theyare less inclinedto
distinguishbetween a time of blossomingand a phase of disintegration.
They employ the analyticalsophisticationof theirarsenal of conceptsin
order to definepossibilitiesand limitsof the currentactualizationof the
ofthepublicsphere(Habermas' model)proves
publicsphere.The synthesis
to be highlyunstable. It is producedunderchangingconditionsand then
abandoned as soon as the social conditionschange. "While the isolated
phenomenaof the contemporary
publicsphereare beingcriticizedand this
criticalanalysisis beingprepared,thepublicspherehas alreadychangedits
costume.""9 The public sphere in advanced capitalismis abandoned as
appearance withoutsubstanceand a proletarianpublicsphereis postulated
as the necessaryalternative.Thus, in oppositionto Habermas, theyclaim:
"A counter-publicsphere,buttressedby ideas and discoursewithenlightened content,is not capable of developingeffectiveweapons againstthe
coherence of appearance, publicsphereand violence.""'4
This critiqueof the bourgeoispublic sphereowes more to Habermas
thanNegt and Kluge are aware. TheyanalyzeconceptuallywhatHabermas,
based on his model, has describedas the historyof thepublicsphere.The
resultsconcurin thebasics. Withintherealmof mediacriticism
Offentlichkeit und Erfahrungundoubtedlyhas an advantagein thatthe studywas
der Offentlichkeit:
by including
completed the years afterStrukturwandel
the most recentdevelopmentsin the media sectorit is able to advance an
importantstepbeyondHabermas' results.WhereasHabermas'critiquewas
concerned forthe most part withcontentand responseto programming,
Negt and Kluge - in thefootstepsofBrechtand Prokop4'- deal critically
withorganizationand thewayinwhichitcontrolsmasscommunication.
The
evaluationofavailable technologygoes beyondtheframework
oftheliberal
public sphereand is thereforerejectedbybourgeoistheoryas utopian.Negt
and Kluge emphasizequitecorrectly
thattheproblemcannotbe solvedwith
in controlcommissions),but
political controls(e.g., equal representation
ratherpresupposes"massivechangesinthemodeofproductionintelevision
39. Ibid., p. 142.

40. Ibid., p. 143.
41. Cf. Dieter Prokop, Massenkulturund Spontaneitiit.
Zur veriinderten
der
Warenform
Massenkommunikation
im Spiitkapitalismus
am Main, 1974).
(Frankfurt
PublicSphere
107
an in itsrelationshipto theaudience."42WhereHabermas,as an heirofthe

older Frankfurt
School, once again callson thebourgeoisconceptofculture
to denounce mass culture,Negt and Kluge depend on the organizationof
social experienceby the masses as the necessaryconditionforsubstantive
change. In thisway, theircritiquepointsin a directionthatwas lackingin
Habermas.
mustbe understood
The media criticismin Offentlichkeit
undErfahrung
in connectionwiththe conceptof a proletariancounter-public
sphere.The
proletarianpublicsphereis seen as theonlychanceofprovidinga historical
groundingforsocial theory.43This is nottheplace to developtheconceptin
its entirety,so a fewremarksmustsuffice.The proletarianpublicsphereis
not identical with the labor movementand its organizations(parties,
unions). To a greatextentthesehave been subsumed,forhistoricalreasons,
underthebourgeoispublicsphere.The goal oftheproletarianpublicsphere
is forthe masses as workingpeople (not as a party)to constitutetheirown
experience;in otherwords,forthemto gainan autonomoussphereinwh'ich
theycan formulatetheirown needs. "The proletarianpublic sphere," as
Negt and Kluge defineit, "denotes not particularformsor contentsbut
applies the Marxistmethodin a way thatno sourceof social upheaval,no
concreteinterestremainsexcludedor unresolved,and itguaranteesthatthe
of interestsis the whole
medium of this conversionand tranformation
frameworkof real production and socialization."44The proletariatis
task of
confrontedthen with the difficultand sometimescontradictory
in
to
its
and
order
misuse
the
prevent
appropriating bourgeoispublicsphere
a counter-public
This
new
instituwithsimultaneouslyconstructing
sphere.
tion mustnot be understoodas a mereorganizationaltask,forexampleas
the triumphoftheworkersoverbourgeoissociety;ratheritmustbe grasped
as theexpressionofa qualitatively
newframework
ofexperience.
realistically
Habermas' refusalto discusspossibilitiesof a socialistpublicspherein
Western societies is directlytied to his notionthatthe proletariatas the
"designated vehicle of a futuresocialist revolution" has dissolved in
Marxisttheorycan no
advanced capitalism.45 In his view, revolutionary
at
to
address
the
socialistworld,it is
seek
the
longer
proletariat.Looking
also clear forhimthatSovietMarxismhas notbeen able to createa socialist
whicheven
society.Insteadwe finda politicaldominationbyfunctionaries,
underStalinbecame legalizedterrorin thehandsofPartyleadership.In this
contextthequestionarisesas to howNegtand Kluge can projecta notionof
to thoseverylearningmodels
the proletarianpublicspherewithoutresorting
of orthodoxMarxismwhichwere liquidatedby CriticalTheory.Because
their descriptionand evaluation of advanced capitalismgenerallyagrees
42.
43.
44.
45.
und Erfahrung,p. 180.

Offentlichkeit
Ibid., p. 143, note 39.
Ibid., p. 346.
Theorieund Praxis (Neuwied und Berlin, 1963), p. 164.
108
Hohendahl
with Habermas, recourse to a concept of the proletariatis not without

problems.On theone hand,one mustdefinemorecarefullytheproletariat
and its class strugglesin advanced capitalismwhile at the same time
exploringthe relationshipbetweenthepoliticalpublicsphereand theparty
organization- a central question for orthodoxy.The problemcan be
formulatedas follows:can one even speak of theproletarianpublicsphere
withoutacknowledginga revolutionary
proletariatwhoseorganizationis to
become thebasis of thisnewpublicsphere?In orderto developtheconcept
of the proletarianpublicsphere,Negtand Kluge proceedhistorically,
that
is, they elucidate throughthe historyof the English labor movement
and limitations
oftheproletarianpublicsphere.
possibilities,contradictions
In so doing, they reassertthe existenceof a class conscious, struggling
proletariat.Yet, in theirconclusiontheyare forcedto concede thatthis
"proletariat" cannot necessarilybe thoughtof as tangible:"'Proletarian'
does not under all social conditionsreferto a social substance.4"" To the
extentthatworkersin advanced capitalismbecome appendagesofcommodity production, the "proletarian life context" can only be defined
negativelyas theblockingofneeds,wishesand hopes.Thus,Negtand Kluge
conclude thatitis no longernecessaryto organizerealproletarian
experience
in advanced capitalismand thatclass strugglecan no longertake theforms
itdid in the 19thcentury.To be sure,thisqualitativedifference
is developed
in
form
of
criticism
and
the
of
historical
class
only
analysis
strugglesin the
20th
the
of
early
century.Using
example Austromarxism,
theydemonstrate
that the proletariatwas unable to force its own organizationoffthe
bourgeoisie. The productionprocess was excluded fromclass struggle.
Thus, a politicalcompromisewas introducedthatappearedprogressivebut
that in the long run had to resultin a defeatforthe workers.Using the
example of the German CommunistParty(KPD) before1933, Negt and
Kluge show thatseparatingtheproletarianpublicspherefromthecollective
has catastrophiceffects,
foritleads to a separation
public sphereultimately
fromactual social reality.In theircritiqueof the communistpartieswhich
failedto resistfascism,itsoon becomesapparentthatNegtand Klugedo not
necessarilywant to relyon partyorganizationto revolutionizetheproletariat.At thesame timeitis nevermade clearhowthepoliticalstruggle
is to be
organized. Thus a gap emergesbetweentheearlierphases of class struggle
and thecurrentsituation.For, whereNegtand Kluge reconstruct
thisearlier
phase of class struggle,theyare able to proceed froman organizedlabor
movement, so that here the proletarianpublic sphere and the formal
organizationsof the proletariat(such as partyand union), althoughnot
actuallythe same, do at least overlap. Yet, giventhattheseorganizations
have been largelyneutralizedin Westerncapitalismthroughtheirintegrationintothelatebourgeoispublicsphere,a contemporary
proletarianpublic
46. Offentlichkeit
und Erfahrung,p. 483.
Public Sphere
109
spherehas to be reformulated.
Negtand Klugeacknowledgethisandmodify
their concept of the proletariataccordingly.But they have get to be
successful in formulatingthe relationshipbetween proletariat,public
sphere,and class strugglein a way thatmakesvisiblea new politicalpraxis.
V. The Public Spherein Habermas' More RecentTheory
As far as I know, Habermas has never respondedto criticismsof his
theoryof the public sphere. One can only speculate as to the reasons.
Nevertheless,it is possible to draw some conclusionsfromcircumstances
both internal as well as external to the theory.First, the critique of
Habermas' theorywas formulatedmainlyin the 1970s,yetby thistimethe
concept of the public sphereno longerhad such centralimportancein his
increasinglysystematizedtheory.The attemptat a metacritiquecould not
have followeddirectlyfromthe older study,but would have necessitated
reformulationof the problem in a new systematiccontext.Habermas'
answer to his criticsis contained in this theoryitself,particularlyin his
analysis of crises in advanced capitalism,wherethe problemswhichwere
formerlycharacterizedas disintegrationof the classical public sphere
and motivationintherealmofthepolitical
reappear as crisesof legitimation
and socio-culturalsystem.Habermas seemsbasicallyto adhereto hisearlier
position,but he takes intoaccountthecriticalobjectionsto hisconstruction
of an historicallyideal type.He chooses an approachworkedoffof Niklas
thecrisissituation
Luhmann'ssystemstheoryand on thisbasisdemonstrates
of advanced capitalismin a new light,which is also interesting
for the
concept of the public sphere.
The frameworkof this changed approach permitsus to definemore
preciselythe differencebetween Habermas and his critics.First,we see
more clearly Habermas' ambivalentattitudetoward the late bourgeois
public sphere,his vacillationbetweena stricthistoricalanalysisand theuse
of thisconceptas a generalmodel. In contrastto Negtand Kluge,thenotion
of an alternativepublic sphere is not open to Habermas. Constituting
an
autonomous proletarianpublic spherewhichwould actuallydissolve the
bourgeois public sphere is itselftied to an idea of fundamentalsocial
upheaval which,forHabermas,is no longerpossibleinadvancedcapitalism.
Here he introducesthreeargumentsto justifyhis position:(1) theclassical
formof class strugglehas become obsolete because of a growthin state
intervention
unforeseenbyMarx; (2) due to theincreasinginterdependency
of researchand technology,the Marxistlabor theoryof value is inapplicable; (3) with the dissolution of liberal, competitivecapitalism, the
oppositionbetweenbourgeoisieand proletariatin itsclassicalformhas also
dissolved.47Class struggleis replaced by the problem of legitimizinga
47. Cf. also: Habermas, "Uber einige Bedingungender RevolutionierungspatkapitalistischerGesellschaften,"in: Habermas, Kulturund Kritik(Frankfurt
am Main, 1973),pp. 70ff.
110
Hohendahl
system primarilyinterestedin stabilizingitself.A substituteprogramis

developed by whichthe systemis obligated"to sustainthe conditionsof
stability for a total system which can guarantee social securityand
opportunityforpersonaladvancementand to preventgrowthrisks.""
The Scientizationof Politicsand Public Opinion
Even after completingStrukturwandel
der Offentlichkeit
Habermas
continued to examine the structureof the public sphere and its role for
the
politicalparticipationbycitizens.A firstimportant
stepinreformulating
problem is the essay "The Scientizationof Politicsand Public Opinion"
(1964) which criticallypresentsMax Weber's model in whichobjectified
administrationand decisionisticpoliticsare irreconcilably
opposed. This
technocraticmodel provides an appearance of cogent, objective logic
withouttheoreticallyconfronting
the irrationalside of politicaldecisionthe
Within
framework
of
this
ofpublicopinion
model,thefunction
making.
is limited.Essentialpoliticaldecisionsare withheldfromdiscussionbecause
theycannoteasilybe rationalized.For Weberand Schumpeter,theprocess
of formulatingpolitical objectives in the public sphere is limitedto
acclamation.Publicopinionleads hereto thelegitimation
ofelitesand notto
rationalizationof domination.On theotherhand,in thepragmaticmodel,
as it was developed in the workof Dewey, the relationbetweenpolitical
decision-makingand scientificresearch is mediated by public opinion.
"Value beliefs"and scientific
progressare joined unproblematically
through
discourse.
this
model, in whichthe publicsphereserves
public
Regarding
once again in its classical function,Habermas objects that due to the
complexityof scientifictheoryand its technicalconsequences,scientific
knowledgeas well as social interestsand values can no longerbe mediated
by common sense. Thus, the pragmaticmodel is abandoned. At thesame
timeHabermas insistson thestrategicroleofpublicopinionbecause,forthe
mediation of science and politics, it arises not externallybut rather
oftheconfrontation
of
"immanentlyand necessarilyfromtherequirements
technical knowledge and capacity with tradition-bound
self-understanding."'' This problemof mediationconsistsof two aspects.First,following
his earlier study,Habermas asserts that the classical public sphere has
theproblemhas
disintegrated.Moreover,and thismaybe moreimportant,
become one of method:how can the rationality
of scientific
knowledgebe
introducedintotherealmof practicallifeinterest;in otherwords,howcan
instrumentalrationalityrelate to practicalinterests?Habermaspostulates
an answer: "'A scientizedsocietycould constituteitselfas a rationaland free
one onlyto theextentthatscienceand technology
are mediatedthroughthe
48. Ibid., p. 72f.
49. Technikund Wissenschaft
als 'Ideologie', p. 137.
Public Sphere
111
To be sure,thereis no exconductof lifethroughthemindsof itscritics."50

planation of how such a maturesocietycan arise. Habermas considersthe
conditionsunfavorablein advanced capitalistcountriessuch as America.
to geta gripon
The aporia is both historicaland theoretical.In attempting
the theoreticalvacuumby differentiating
interests,
knowledge-constituting
Habermas prepares at the same time a more exact formulationof the
historicalproblem.
Knowledge and Human Interests
In his inaugural address of 1965, Habermas undertookto separate
technical,practical,and emancipatory
cognitiveinterestsin orderto refine,
both by means of theoryand method,the decisiveproblemforadvanced
capitalistsociety-the mediationof politicsand science. At thisstage the
task of the publicspherecan be definedas thelinkingof technicalprogress
and socio-culturaltraditionthroughan emancipatory
interest.The stateof
autonomyand responsibility
(Miindigkeit)as a necessary,self-chosengoal
of human action is, forHabermas, ultimately
of
groundedin the structure
language, by which man is set off from nature. "With its structure,
are given.""' The categoryof publicsphereis
autonomyand responsibility
no longer exclusivelyhistoricalbut ratheris derived from the quasitranscendentalprincipleof knowledge-constituting
interests.
This derivation was not historicallyspecified until the studies on
advanced capitalism. In LegitimationCrisis (1973) the historicaland
sociological consequences are drawnfromthistranscendental
principleof
interests.Whereas in 1965 Habermas contended:
knowledge-constituting
"The knowledge-constituting
interestsarise in the medium of work,
and
the
later studydevelops these categoriesas
domination,""52
language
within
a
total
social
system:work is formulatedas an
partial systems
economic system,language as socio-culturaland dominationas political.
The interactionbetween these partial systemsnot only determinesthe
of thewhole but also characterizesthepossibletroublespotsin
functioning
advanced capitalistsociety.They emergeas crisesin legitimation,
motivation and rationality.Within this systematicapproach, which is more
interestedin synchronicthandiachronicaspects,crisisin advancedcapitaism is interpretedin a new way. In orderto demonstratethe impactof this
approach, it will be necessaryto look morecloselyat the characterof such
advanced capitalistcrisis.Habermas considersadvancedcapitalistsocieties
to be overlappingsystemsencompassingpartialsystemsand engagedmainly
in sustainingthemselvesand eliminatingcrises.To reachthisgoal, a large
numberof legitimating
measuresare necessary.Accordingto Habermas,
50. Ibid., p. 144.
51. "Erkenntnisund Interesse,"in: Technikund Wissenschaft
als 'Ideologie', p. 163.
52. Ibid.
112
Hohendahl
of pre-capitalist
traditionsthiscan onlybe achieved
afterthe disintegration
bourgeoisideology.Depleted as formaldemoby means of universalistic
cracy, it providesthe illusionof politicalparticipationwithoutrestricting
governmentand administrationin mattersof content. At this point
Habermasreturns
to theconceptofthepublicsphere:"Structural
alteration
of
and
the bourgeois public sphere provides for applicationof institutions
in themidstof
proceduresthatare democraticin form,whilethecitizenry,
an objectivelypoliticalsociety,enjoythestatusofpassivecitizenswithonly
the rightto withholdacclamation.""5What Habermas had describedin
as diffusion,
as an intersecting
ofthestate
der Offentlichkeit
Strukturwandel
to an objectifiedcultureofconsumpand privatedomains,as thetransition
Lack of participation, now appears as the shrunkenbasis of legitimation.
tion is purchasedwithappropriatecompensationin the domainof professional life,consumerpossibilitiesand social security.Habermas interprets
thedepoliticizationofthepopulationas theinnerlogicofa systeminwhicha
politicallyactivecitizenryis no longerdesirable.
The classical publicspherewas constitutedin double form,literaryand
political. Therefore,its crisis in organizedcapitalismcan be tied to the
relationshipbetween the socio-culturaland political systems,while the
relationshipbetweentheeconomicand politicalsystemsmaybe ignoredfor
the moment.In the formercase interactionarisesin theexchangeof social
benefitsfromthe statein thepoliticalsystemand mass loyaltyin thesocioculturalsystem.Disintegrationof the publicspherecan be definedin this
contextas a motivationalcrisisand as a legitimation
crisis.The legitimation
crisis arises froma dysfunction
in the culturaland politicalsystems.In
Habermas' words, it results"when fulfilling
state planningthrowsinto
question the structureof the depoliticizedpublic sphere and the formal
democraticguaranteeof private,autonomouscontrolover the means of
The loyaltyof themasses mayno longerbe presumed.
production.""54
The legitimationcrisissituatedin thepoliticalsystemis opposed to the
motivationcrisisin thesocio-culturalsystem.Motivationcrisesinadvanced
capitalism are caused by the depletion of culturaltraditionand by the
exhaustionof centralcomponentsin bourgeoisideologywhichhad nourished liberalcapitalism.If such a shrinkageof motivationalfactorsoccurs,
the political systemcannot count on necessarysupports.Thus, the bond
between the literaryand political public sphere is definedin advanced
motivation:Because of thereduction
capitalismas a contextof crisis-prone
of culturaltradition,politicaldiscourseloses itscustomarypower.
The sectionon theoremsofmotivationcrisisis essentialforour analysis,
forhereHabermas attemptsto developthistypeofcrisisbothsystematically
and historically.He maintainsthatformaldemocraticsystemsare dependenton veryspecificmarginalconditionsintheculturewhichare historically
53. Legitimationsprobleme
im Spiitkapitalismus
am Main, 1973), p. 55.
(Frankfurt
55. Habermas, Legitimationsproblenme,
p. 69.
Public Sphere
113
unique and thereforenotreproduceablewithinthesystem.The desiredcivic

state,forwhichthecitizenis
passivityrestson a traditionoftheauthroitarian
of
an
administration.
object
only
Disintegrationof the political public
to
to
be
sphere proves
regression pre-bourgeoisbehavioral patternsor
incompleteemancipation.The same applies to culturalvalues and socially
determinedmoralnorms.Theytoo emergefrompreviousstrataand are not
immanentlyreproduceablein the system.
Traditionalimagesof theworldwere abolisheddue to theirincompatirationality
(Weber); simultaneously,
bilitywiththe growthof instrumental
the bourgeois ideology of competitionwas increasinglyeroded under
conditionsoforganizedcapitalism,so thatindividualproperty
finallylostits
value. Thus, structures
becomevisible"whichare unfitforreproducing
civic
For Habermas, the new cultural
and familial-professional
privatism.""55
patternscrystallizearound scientism,post-auraticart and a universalistic
morality.Scientismcreatesan unstablesituationbecause, on theone hand,
it supportsdepoliticizationwithitsillusionofpureobjectivity,
whileon the
other,itcontainscriticalelementswhichcan be turnedagainsttechnocracy.
If theautonomyoftheworkofartis dissolved,a similarambivalencearises.
The groundingof artin politicsas observedbyWalterBenjaminpermitsits
instrumentalization
both for propaganda and for subversivecountercultures.This evaluationcontainsa revisionof theearlierthesison disintegration of the literarypublic sphere, which had followedHorkheimerand
Adorno. ObviouslyHabermas' new attitudeon the functionaltransformationof modernart (loss of aura) was influencedbyWalterBenjamin." But
he conformsto himonlyin describingthe loss of aura (end of autonomy),
mass culture.
withoutfullysharingBenjamin's hope fora revolutionary
From theargumentbetweenAdorno and Benjaminhe drawstheconclusion
that "the divergencebetween values offeredby the socio-culturalsystem
and values claimed by the political system"is deepened.57That means
motivationis diminished.The same tendencycan be seen in the ethical
realm, where the transitionto a politicallyuniversalmorality,presuming
both generalityof norms and autonomyof acting subjects, comes into
contradictionwith demands of the political and economic systemin
advanced capitalism.This happensbecause socializingprocessesno longer
lead inevitablytowardadaptationto social realitybut ratherincreasingly
exhibitunconventionalresults.
ofwhatHabermas
Legitimationand motivationcrisesare manifestations
of the public sphere. It was not seen
earlier referredto as disintegration
simplyas irreversible,but therewas no readyalternative.The idea of a
proletarianpublicspheredid notcome intoquestionforHabermas,because
55. Legitimationsprobleme,
p. 117.
56. Cf. also: Habermas, "Bewusstmachendeoder rettendeKritik- Die AktualititWalter
Benjamins," in: Habermas, Kulturund Kritik,pp. 302-344.
p. 120.
114
Hohendahl
it cannot develop withoutthe notionof class struggle.Withthe transition

from competitiveto monopoly capitalism,however, the juxtaposition
between the two was altered,so thatthe familiarformsof argumentation
from the 19th centurylost theirsignificance.In his analysisof crises in
advanced capitalism,Habermas continuesdiscussionof the publicsphere.
He asks thequestion:Underwhatconditionsand inwhatformscan a public
sphere be constitutedwhichhastensthe processof humanemancipation?
Because languageand communication
(togetherwithlabor) are fundamental forHabermas, renewalof the publicsphereis a centraltheme.
The discussion is carried out on two levels. It must be established
theoreticallythatpoliticalquestionscan be determinednotonlydecisionistically,butrationallyas well,bymeansofa sharedsearchfortruth.Habermas
adheres strictlyto thispresuppositionagainstthe decisionisticmodel. He
argues thatpracticaldiscoursehas alwaysimputedan ideal communicative
situation"which,due to itsnormalcharacteristics,
allowsa consensusonly
on generalizable interests.""5On the level of historicalinterpretation
it
would be a matterof provinghow and to whatextentthestructurally
crisisridden situationcan be overcome.Habermas offersno clear answer.If in
this contexthe refersonce again to the Dialecticof Enlightenment
and to
Adorno's Minima Moralia, his intentis to show thatHorkheimer'sand
Adorno's pessimisticexpositiondoes not offera solutionto the problem.
Rather than capitulating,Habermas urges at least a critique of those
theorieswhichconsiderthegoal ofa sharedsearchfortruthobsolete.Thisis
especiallydirectedtowardLuhmann'stheory,whichhad dismissedHaberin adminimas' theoryas antiquated.For Luhmann,popularparticipation
strativedecisions is possible but not sensible, as it involvestoo much
frustration.Habermas' argumentwithLuhmannremainsin the realmof
theoryand never proceeds to a concreteappraisalof the possibilityfora
public spherewithinand beyondan advancedcapitalistsociety.Discussion
of alternativeconcepts (Naschold, Offe, Scharpf) does not go beyond
hypotheticalconsiderations.Habermas is aware ofthisdilemmaand honest
enough to articulateit in the concludingsection.In Luhmann'stheorythe
interestin reasonis particularized;thatmeansthatenlightenment
(in Kant's
sense) as a common goal of mankindis abandoned. Habermas is not
prepared to accept this approach and therebyto forsakehis conceptof
thepublicsphere.He equallyrejectsthepathback to an orthodoxMarxism.
"Both ways," he concludes,"are unfeasiblefora praxiswhichis bound to a
rational will and does not avoid demands forjustificationbut aspires to
theoreticalclarityabout thosethingswe do notknow."5"Legitimation
Crisis
ends witha rhetoricalappeal notto throwawaytheidea ofa societyfreeof
domination. This demand implies the necessityof a functioning
public
sphere in which politicaldecisions are discussed and explained. To this
p. 152.
p. 195f.
PublicSphere
115
extentHabermas stilladheresto themodelhe establishedinStrukturwandel

der Offentlichkeit.
In LegitimationCrisisHabermas basicallylimitshimselfto a defensive
strategy,i.e., he upholds fundamentalpositions of Critical Theory by
des
metacriticallysubvertingcounterpositions.In Zur Rekonstruktion
HistorischenMaterialismus[On the Reconstructionof HistoricalMaterialism] (1976), however,he presentsthe beginningsof a new theoryof the
public sphere (without,to be sure,actuallyemployingthe term).It is not
accidental that these suggestionsfollow from his criticismof Niklas
Luhmann, whichshould at least be outlinedhere. The dialogue between
Luhmann and Habermas focused on minimalconditions:the question,
namely, whetherthere can be a collective identityin addition to the
individual one; in other words, whetherintersubjectivity
is essentialfor
constitutingsociety. Luhmann rejects this necessityemphatically:the
modem social systemno longerneeds collectiveidentity,
because integration is achieved on the level of systemand not on that of normative
withinthe populace becomes superfluous
regulation.Thus, self-reflection
forthefunctioning
of thesystem.As Luhmannmaintains,"social evolution
has proceeded beyond the point where it makes sense to relate social
relationsto people."60The achievementof identity,the capacityto define
can
throughreflectiontherelationbetweenoneselfand one's environment,
be managed just as well by the system.A partialsystemcan be specialized
forthistask. Habermas correctly
objects to thisinterpretive
suggestion.He
contends that it completes the dehumanizationof societyby turningall
forthesystem."Habermascharacterizes
subjects "into mereenvironments
theresultofsystemstheoryinthefollowingmanner:"Disclaiminganyunity
of system beyond that produced by normativeintegrationmeans that
cultural traditioncan be manipulatedaccordingto controlneeds, that
historycan be neutralized.[ ... ] Historicalconsciousnessis immobilized
in favor of self-objectification.""6'
Habermas adheres to the postulateof
human self-determination,
and thatmeans, as opposed to Luhmann,that
social integrationcan not be achieved simplythroughintegrationof the
Habermas at this point resortsto the Dialectic of
system. Significantly,
in
order
to articulatethecontinuity
ofhiscriticalapproachas
Enlightenment
well as the differences
in possiblesolutions.He renewsthepolemicagainst
atrophyand ossificationof the subject as the centralobjectionof Critical
Theory toward modem rationalism.Yet thispositionis modifiedto the
extent that both the autonomyof natureand of the system'sstructureis
conceded." For this reason Horkheimer'sand Adorno's solutionis not
revitalized, nor is Marx's approach, which linked problems of system
60. Quoted inHabermas, Zur Rekonstruktion
des Historischen
Materialismus
am
(Frankfurt
Main, 1976), p. 113.
61. Ibid., p. 113f.
62. Ibid., p. 114.
116
Hohendahl
integrationand social integrationby analyzingthe commodityin Capital.

Here Habermas notes: "Today an analogous attemptat cuttingthrough
ofintersubjectivity
would
theoreticalconnectionsinthesystemto structures
be
hardly promising."63
Having opposed systemstheorywhileassimilatingitsproblematization
of the Marxist tradition,Habermas then outlinesa theoryof collective
identitywhichrestoresfundamentalelementsof thepublicspheretheory,
althoughnot withinthe old framework(the libralpublicsphere). Among
these elements are the categories of generality,equal opportunityand
universalityof norms.The futuresocietyis expresslydefinedas a "world
and politicization
ofitsmembers
society"; itsgoals includedemocratization
is
now
of
It
that
Habermas
constant
themes
Habermas).
noteworthy
(both
seems dissatisfiedwiththeseconcepts,as theydo notappear wellsuitedfor
characterizingthe originalityof the postulated collective identity.In
contrast to the traditionalconcept of politics anchored in institutions,
Habermas stresses the subpoliticalcharacterand informalstructureof
the new collective identity.He mentions grass roots interestgroups
as an example of this public sphere, for their mark
[Biirgerinitiative]
of distinctionis that theybypass officialchannelsof communicationand
"The conceptof demostandardmechanismsof politicaldecision-making.
cratizationdoes not reallydescribethisphenomenon,because suchinterest
groups rarely extend the marginsof effectiveparticipationin political
lies inchangingtheinterpretaTheirreal accomplishment
decision-making.
tionsofpubliclyrecognizedneeds.""'4 It is preciselyundertheconditionsofa
valuesand normshave
social systeminwhichtraditional
fullydifferentiated
been liquidated or have lost theirinfluentialpower thatHabermas now
postulates the validityof a universalisticmoralityemergingfrom the
fundamentalnorms of rational speech. This morality,however,is not
deduced according to the formof metaphysicalmoral systems;on the
contrary,it representsan open, emendablesystemwhichcan be developed
furtherthroughcollectivelearningprocesses.These normsare constructed
from identityprojections. They "cannot claim the status of scientific
theories; they resemble, rather,practical hypotheseswhose success or
of
failuredepends on theirabilityto structurea populace's understanding
that
there
""5
Habermas
its
world.
and
itself
argues,againstsystemstheory,
is more to be done thansimplysolvingsocial tasksthroughplanning.This
orientedtowardtraditional
is neitherexclusively
acquired collectiveidentity
values nor exclusivelya projectionof planningperspectives.Rather,says
Habermas, it develops withoutgoal-directed,organizedaction; it comes
fromthe communicationof participating
subjects.Habermas is carefulto
make clear thatneitherthe state nor the partyorganizationscan seriously
63. Ibid., p. 115.
64. Ibid., p. 116f.
65. Ibid., p. 118.
Public Sphere
117
stimulatethiscommunication.Thus he states:"If a collectiveidentity

would
emerge in complex societies,it would have a formof community
identity
hardlyprejudicedincontentand independentofwell-defined
organizations.
The members would develop their identity-related
knowledge about
that is,
competing identityprojectionsdiscursivelyand experimentally,
while criticallyrecallingtraditionand throughthe inspirationof science,
philosophyand art.""66To translatethisformulationinto the language of
politics,Habermas is thinkingof counter-public
sphereswhichare situated
beside and amongpartialsocial systemsand whichprovidefortheirsubjects
a criticaldistanceto the totalsystemand itsintegrating
mechanism.
In conclusion,we shouldconsiderthecurrentstatusof thediscussionin
connectionwiththe theoreticalas well as the politicaldevelopment.The
turnwhich is manifestedin Habermas' writingsafterLegitimationCrisis
(1973) is evidently
groundedin hispoliticalexperiencewithgrassrootsinterest
in
West
of existing
groups
Germany,whichhave organizedindependently
and
unions
in
the
intervention
state
in
the
citizen's
struggle
against
parties
qualityof life.Their partialsuccesseshave demonstratedthatthe thesisof
individualpassivityinadvancedcapitalism,as developedbyCriticalTheory,
is onlypartiallycorrect.Applyingtheseexperiencesto histheoryundoubtedlybringsHabermas closerto thenotionsofNegtand Kluge. The structure
of the earlyliberalpublicsphereas an ideal patternis finallyabandoned.A
populist concept takes its place, recallingin some ways the proletarian
public sphere. In agreementwithhis earliertheory,however,Habermas
avoids anytiebetweenthisnewpublicsphereand historicalclasses,as is the
case forNegtand Kluge despitetheirobjectionsto orthodoxy.Thisdoes not
seem to me to be onlya disadvantage.UnlikeNegtand Kluge,Habermasis
able to escape the dangerof romanticizing
the counterpublicsphere.(An
interpretationromanticizesif it generallyand ahistoricallyimputesthe
within
possibility[ifnottheactualization]ofan experienceoftotalsolidarity
the proletariatas the oppressed class.) The oppositionof bourgeoisand
proletarianpublicspheresuggesttheoppositionof societyand community.
Habermas avoids such a transfiguration
of historicalformations,
whichhe
does not findusefulforthe currentsituation.This stancecan be tracedin
part to his earlier attemptsto disputethe claims of Luhmann's systems
theory.
It would be difficult
to arguethatthisdiscussionhas founda satisfactory
conclusion.Habermas' populistconceptis stillrelatively
vagueand requires
specification.That could come about if the idea of collectiveidentityis
whichit seeks to
analyzed againstthe backgroundof the social structures
affect.How and whydoes a collectiveidentityarise in advanced capitalist
societiesagainsttheexpectationsofsystemstheory?How does itrelate(as a
new public sphere) to traditionalclasses and theirconflicts?In whatway
does a new social and politicalpraxisemergefromaestheticexperimentation
66. Ibid.,p. 121.
118
Hohendahl
afterthe end of the autonomousworkof art,as Habermas expects?Such

questions,as yetunansweredbyHabermas,shouldindicatethedirectionof
futuredebate.
Translated
byMarcSilberman
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Hohendahl, Peter U., Silberman, Marc (1979) - Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture. Jürgen Habermas and His Critics.

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Hohendahl, Peter U., Silberman, Marc (1979) - Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture. Jürgen Habermas and His Critics.

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Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture.

Jrgen Habermas and His Critics

Bourgeois theorytendsto separatecarefullythedomainsofcultureand

evaluation as at the level of itssystematic

reificationof intimacy." An image arises of a general and politically

fruitionin the alienationof advanced capitalism(the Lukatcsianheritageof

literatureand art and, on the other,the theoryand practiceof absolutistic

III. The Liberal Critique

model: "If Habermas' statementsabout the bourgeoispublic sphere are

This critiqueclearlygoes too far; no one expects of a model that it

absolutisticpolitical dominationand feudal social privileges.The social

and mass culture; ratherit is the intellectualswho refuseto engage in

as the logical and thereforeinevitableoutcomewhichwe mustaccept. The

pragmaticassessmentof the publicspherenecessarilyleads to a critiqueof

and its systematicmanagement.Luhmann defines enlightenment

31. Ibid., p. 46f.

32. Ibid.,p. 52.

those of Jiger: insufficient

tion whichsuggeststhatthe publicspherehas ever takensubstantialshape

and Kluge introducein thenameofa collectivesocialsynthesis

39. Ibid., p. 142.

an in itsrelationshipto theaudience."42WhereHabermas,as an heirofthe

und Erfahrung,p. 180.

with Habermas, recourse to a concept of the proletariatis not without

system primarilyinterestedin stabilizingitself.A substituteprogramis

To be sure,thereis no exconductof lifethroughthemindsof itscritics."50

unique and thereforenotreproduceablewithinthesystem.The desiredcivic

it cannot develop withoutthe notionof class struggle.Withthe transition

extentHabermas stilladheresto themodelhe establishedinStrukturwandel

integrationand social integrationby analyzingthe commodityin Capital.

stimulatethiscommunication.Thus he states:"If a collectiveidentity

afterthe end of the autonomousworkof art,as Habermas expects?Such

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