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The Civil Code does not provide that the transportation should be
by motor vehicle.
Undertakes to carry for all people indifferently and thus is liable for
refusal without sufficient reason (Lastimoso vs. Doliente, 3 SCRA ,
[1961]);
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
with dirt. As such, Planters filed an action for damages. The defendant
argued that the public policy governing common carriers do not apply to
them because they have become private carriers by reason of the
provisions of the charter-party.
Issue: Whether or not the charter-party contract between the ship owner
and the charterer transforms a common carrier into a private carrier?
Held: A charter party may either her be time charter wherein the vessel is
leased to the charterer, wherein the ship is leased to the charterer for a
fixed period of time or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a
single voyage. In both cases, the charter party provides for the hire of the
vessel only, either for a determinate time or for a single or consecutive
voyage.
It is therefore imperative that such common carrier shall remain as
such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or part of the vessel by
one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in
the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter
includes both ship and its crew as in bareboat or demise that it becomes a
private carrier. Undoubtedly, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter
retains in possession and control of the ship, although her holds may be
the property of the charterer.
3. CALVO V. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE (G.R. NO. 148496 MARCH
19, 2002)
Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal
Services, Inc. (TCTSI), and a custom broker, entered into a contract with
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semichemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port area
to the Tabacalera Compound, Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by
respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
On July 14, 1990, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on
board M/V Hayakawa Maru. After 24 hours, they were unloaded from
vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port Services, Inc.
From July 23 to 25, 1990, petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC,
withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMCs
warehouse in Manila. On July 25, the goods were inspected by Marine
Cargo Surveyors, reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper
were wet/stained/torn and 3 reels of kraft liner board were also torn.
The damages cost P93,112.00.
SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its
insurance contract. Respondent on the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC,
brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On December 20,
1995, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage
to the shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier?
Held: In this case the contention of the petitioner, that he is not a
common carrier but a private carrier, has no merit.
Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully
avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering
such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither
does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Issue: Whether the refusal of the owner and officer of a steam vessel, to
accept for carriage dynamite, powder or other explosives for carriage can
be held to be a lawful act?
Held: The traffic in dynamite gun powder and other explosive is vitally
essential to the material and general welfare of the inhabitants of this
islands and it these products are to continue in general use throughout
the Philippines they must be transported from water to port to port in
various island which make up the Archipelago.
It follows that a refusal by a particular vessel engage as a common
carrier of merchandise in coastwise trade in the Philippine Island to accept
such explosives for carriage constitutes a violation.
The prohibition against discrimination penalized under the statute,
unless it can be shown that there is so Real and substantial danger of
disaster necessarily involved in the courage of any or all of this article of
merchandise as to render such refusal a due or unnecessary or a
reasonable exercise or prudence and discreation on the part of the ship
owner.
7. LOADSTAR SHIPPING VS. CA (315 SCRA 339, 1999)
Facts: On November 19, 1984, loadstar received on board its M/V
Cherokee bales of lawanit hardwood, tilewood and Apitong Bolidenized
for shipment. The goods, amounting to P6,067, 178. Were insured for the
same amount with the Manila Insurance Company against various risks
including Total Loss by Total Loss of the Vessel. On November 20, 1984,
on its way to Manila from the port of Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte, the vessel,
along with its cargo, sank off Limasawa Island. As a result of the total loss
of its shipment, the consignee made a claim with loadstar which, however,
ignored the same. As the insurer, MIC paid to the insured in full settlement
of its claim, and the latter executed a subrogation receipt therefor. MIC
thereafter filed a complaint against loadstar alleging that the sinking of
the vessel was due to fault and negligence of loadstar and its employees.
In its answer, Loadstar denied any liability for the loss of the
shippers goods and claimed that the sinking of its vessel was due to force
majeure. The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of MIC., prompting
loadstar to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals, which however,
agreed with the trial court and affirmed its decision in toto. On appeal,
loadstar maintained that the vessel was a private carrier because it was
not issued a Certificate of Public Convenience, it did not have a regular
trip or schedule nor a fixed route, and there was only one shipper, one
consignee for a special crago.
Issue: Whether or not M/V Cherokee was a private carrier so as to exempt
it from the provisions covering Common Carrier?
Held: Loadstar is a common carrier.
The Court held that LOADSTAR is a common carrier. It is not
necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience,
and this public character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the
goods in question was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled.
Further, the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of
cargo for one shipper, which appears to be purely co-incidental; it is no
reason enough to convert the vessel from a common to a private carrier,
especially where, as in this case, it was shown that the vessel was also
carrying passengers.
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
10
Private Carrier
people Contracts
with
particular
individuals or groups only.
As to required diligence
Requires extraordinary diligence.
As to state regulation
Subject to regulation.
3.
B. Land Transportation
a.
Common Carriers
Private Carriers
Object merchandise
Code of Commerce primary law
Civil Code suppletory law
C. Air Transportation
Domestic Transportation
1.
Civil Code
Code of Commerce
International
2.
Transportation
Warsaw
Convention
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
13
Case/s
KMU LABOR CENTER VS. GARCIA (239 SCRA 386)
Facts: On June 26,1990, Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos issued
memorandum circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB, Chairman Remedios A.S.
Fernando allowing provincial buses operators to charge passengers within
a range of 15% above and 15% below, the LTFRB official rate for a period
of one (1) year. On December 5, 1990 private respondent PBOAP filed an
application for fare rate increase to P0.085 and again it was reduced to
P0.065 per kilometer rate. The application was opposed by the Philippine
Consumer Foundation Inc. that the proposed rate were exorbitant and
unreasonable and that the application contained no allegation on the rate
o return on December 14, 1990. Public respondent LTFRB granted the fare
rate increase on March 16, 1994. Petitioner KMU filed a petition before the
LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, it was dismissed for
lack of merit, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Bus Operators has the power to
reduce and increase fare rated based on the circular order issued by the
LTFRB?
Held: Supreme Court held that the authority given by the LTFRB to the
provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized
existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue
delegation of legislative authority, Potestas delegata non delegari
protest what has been delegated further delegation of such power would
indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in
the delegate inandated to discharged it directly. Furthermore rate fixing or
making is a delicate and sensitive government function that requires
dexterity of judgment and sound discretion with the settle goal at arriving
at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both public utility and the
public.
1. REGISTERED OWNER RULE
GELISAN VS. ALDAY (154 SCRA 388)
Facts: Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu entered into a contract
where the former hired the truck of Gelisan for the purpose of transporting
goods at the price of P18.00. It is also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and
pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be
hauled by him. Benito Alday, a trucking operator, had a contract to haul
the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor,
to its Warehouse in Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4
and the latter offered the use of his truck with the driver and helper at 9
centavos per bag of fertilizer. The offer was accepted by plaintiff Alday
and he instructed his checker Celso Henson to let Roberto Espiritu haul
the fertilizer. Espiritu made two hauls of 200 bags of fertilizer per trip. The
fertilizer was delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with the
necessary way bill receipts, Exhibits A and B. Espiritu, however, did not
deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong.
Subsequently, plaintiff Alday saw the truck in question on Sto.
Cristo St. and he notified the Manila Police Department, and it was
impounded by the police. It was claimed by Bienvenido Gelisan. As a
result of the impounding of the truck according to Gelisan and that for the
release of the truck he paid the premium of P300 to the surety company.
Benito Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 bags of
fertilizer, in the amount of P5,397.33, to Atlas Fertilizer Corporation so
that, on 12 February 1962, he (Alday) filed a complaint against Roberto
Espiritu and Bienvenido Gelisan with the CFI Manila
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
14
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
15
matter, for members of the general public to enforce the rights of action
that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently
operated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. The
registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by proving the identity of
the alleged transferee. Thus, contrary to petitioners claim, private
respondent is not required to go beyond the vehicles certificate of
registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier.
Clearly, to permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for the
passengers or goods transported by its proving a prior sale of the vehicle
or means of transportation to an alleged vendee would be to attenuate
drastically the carriers duty of extraordinary diligence.
2. KABIT SYSTEM
Case/s:
SANTOS VS. SIBUG (104 SCRA 520)
Facts: Petitioner Adolfo Santos was the owner of a passenger jeep, but he
had no certificate of public conveyance for the operation of the vehicle as
a public passenger jeep. Santos then transferred his jeep to the name of
Vidad so that it could be operated under the latters certificate of public
convenience. In other words, Santos became what is known as kabit
operator. Vidad executed a re-transfer document presumably to be
registered it and when it was decided that the passenger jeep of Santos
was to be withdrawn from kabit arrangement.
On the accident date, Abraham Sibug was bumped by the said
passenger jeep.
Issue: Whether the Vidad is liable being the registered owner of the
jeepney?
Held: As the jeep in question was registered in the name of Vidad, the
government or any person affected by the representation that said vehicle
is registered under the name of the particular person had the right to rely
on his declaration of his ownership and registration. And the registered
owner or any other person for that matter cannot be permitted to
repudiate said declaration with the objective of proving that the said
registered vehicle is owned by another person and not by the registered
owner.
Santos, as the kabit, should not be allowed to defeat the levy in his
vehicle and to avoid his responsibility as a kabit owner for he had led the
public to believe that the vehicle belongs to Vidad. This is one way of
curbing the pernicious kabit system that facilitates the commissions of
fraud against the traveling public.
LITA ENTERPRISES VS. IAC (129 SCRA 464)
Facts:
Spouses Nicasio Ocampo and Francisca Garcia (private
respondents) purchased in installment from the Delta Motor Sales
Corporation five (5) Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxi. Since
they had no franchise to operate taxicabs, they contracted with petitioner
Lita Enterprise, Inc., through its representative Manuel Concordia, for the
use of the latters certificate of public convenience for a consideration of
P1, 000.00 and a monthly rental of P200.00/taxicab unit.
For the
agreement to take effect, the cars were registered in the name of Lita
Enterprises, Inc. The possession, however, remains with spouses Ocampo
and Garcia who operated and maintained the same under Acme Taxi,
petitioners trade name.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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17
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming
vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m.,
March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus with plate
number PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspias was cruising along the
national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The
passenger bus was also bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya,
Daanbantayan, Cebu. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A.
Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side
of the bus, about three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw the stalled truck,
which was then about 25 meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to
swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus
rammed into the trucks left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the
bus and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost
consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His wife, Felisa,
was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was later transferred to the
Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter.
Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of
contract of carriage, damages and attorneys fees before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, against the petitioners, D Rough Riders bus
operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspias on May 27, 1987.
The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at
a fast and high speed along the national road, and that petitioner Laspias
did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident.
The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint against the
following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII),
petitioner Tius insurer; respondent Benjamin Condor, the registered
owner of the cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the
truck. They alleged that petitioner Laspias was negotiating the uphill
climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela,
in a moderate and normal speed. It was further alleged that the truck was
parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the
highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner
Laspias promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid
hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to avoid damage to
property and physical injuries on the passengers, the right side portion of
the bus hit the cargo trucks left rear.
HELD: The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety
of their passengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733, 1755and
1756. It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely
transported to the destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of
contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor,
in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination are the matters that need to be proved. This is because
under the said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the express
obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination
safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all
circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course
thereof is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. Upon
the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once
arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It must be
stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from
common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against
them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers.
While evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption of
negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the required
extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
21
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B. Act of God
Requisites:
1. The common carrier must have exercised extraordinary diligence
before, during and after the time of the accident;
2. The event must be unforeseen or even if it can be foreseen, it
cannot be avoided;
3. There must have been no undue delay on the part of the common
carrier;
4. The proximate cause must not be committed by the common
carrier.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
23
Requisites:
1. The act of the public enemy must have been the proximate and
only cause of the loss; and
2. The common carrier must have exercised due diligence to prevent
or minimize the loss before, during or after the act causing the loss,
deterioration or destruction of the goods (Art. 1739, Civil Code)
D. Act or Omission of the Shipper or Owner of Goods
1. The act or omission of the shipper/owner must have been the sole
and proximate cause of the loss. This is an absolute defense.
2. Contributory Negligence: partial defense. (Art. 1741, Civil Code )
Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
owner
of the
of the
which,
24
Said public authority must have the power to issue the order
(Article 1743, Civil Code). Consequently, where the officer acts
without legal process, the common carrier will be held liable.
(Ganzon v. CA 161, SCRA 646 [1988])
Cases:
REPUBLIC VS. LORENZO SHIPPING LINES (7 FEBRUARY 2005)
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines signed an agreement through the
Department of Health and the Cooperative for American Relief
Everywhere, Inc. (CARE) wherein it would acquire from the US government
donations of Non-Fat Dried Milk and other food products. In turn, the
Philippines will transport and distribute the donated to the intended
beneficiaries of the country. As a result, it entered into a contract of
carriage of goods with the herein respondent. The latter shipped 4,868
bags of non-fat dried milk from Sept-Dec 1988. The consignee named in
the bills was Abdurahman Jama, petitioners branch supervisor in
Zamboanga City. Upon reaching the port of Zamboanga, respondents
agent, Efren Ruste Shipping Agency unloaded the said milks. Before each
delivery, Rogelio Rizada and Ismael Zamora both delivery checkers of
Efren Ruste requested Abdurahman to surrender the originals of the Bill of
Lading. However, the petitioner alleged that they did not receive anything
and they filed a claim against the herein respondent. The petitioner
contended that the respondents failed to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Issue: Whether the respondents failed to exercise extraordinary diligence
required by law?
Held The surrender of the Bill of Lading is not a condition precedent for a
common carrier to be discharged of its contractual obligation. If the
surrender is not possible, acknowledgment of the delivery by signing the
receipt suffices. The herein respondent did not even bother to prevent the
resignation of abdurhaman Jama to be utilized as a witness.
CENTRAL SHIPPING CO. VS. INSURANCE CO. (SEPTEMBER 20, 200,
121 SCRA 769)
Facts: On July 25, 1990 at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, the petitioner
received on board its vessel, the M/V Central Bohol, 376 pieces of Round
Logs and undertook to transport said shipment to Manila for delivery to
Alaska Lumber Co., Inc. The cargo is insured for P3, 000, 000.00 against
total lost under respondents MarineCargo Policy.
After loading the logs, the vessel starts its voyage. After few hours
of the trip, the ship tilts 10 degrees to its side, due to the shifting of the
logs in the hold. It continues to tilt causing the captain and the crew to
abandon ship. The ship sank.
Respondent alleged that the loss is due to the negligence and fault
of the captain. While petitioner contends that the happening is due to
monsoons which is unforeseen or casa fortuito.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the loss of cargo?
Held: From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the
goods they transport, according to all the circumstances of each case. In
the event of loss, destruction or deterioration of the insured goods,
common carriers are responsible; that is, unless they can prove that such
loss, destruction or deterioration was brought about -- among others -- by
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
25
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
26
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paying, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter followed
him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran was on he running
board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which
he left under one its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not
shut off while unloading suddenly started moving forward, evidently to
resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still
attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally,
when the bus was again placed in a complete stop, it had traveled about
10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped
form the running board without getting his bayong from conductor. He
landed on the side of the road almost board in front of the shaded place
where he left his wife and his children. At that time, he saw people
beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the
ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than
his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode
earlier together her parent.
For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against
the defendant to recover from the latter damages.
Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus
involved in the incident, and therefore, the contract of carriage was
already terminated?
Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned,
when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded, the
relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner
remained subsisting. The relation of carrier and passenger does not
necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car aids the
carriers servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.
It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease
the moment the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle at a place
selected by the carrier at the point of destination but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave
the carriers premises.
The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which
was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel must have
followed her father. However, although the father was still on the running
board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or
bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he had jumped down from
the moving vehicle. It was that this instance that the child, who must be
near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be
claimed that the carriers agent had exercised the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to
transport safely its passengers. The driver, although stopping the bus,
nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to run the bus even
before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was
still unloading part of the baggage of the passengers Beltran and family.
The presence of the said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable
and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier,
entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP. VS. CA (179 SCRA 95)
Facts: On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/|V Antonio from
Occidental Mindoro bound for Manila. Upon arrival on May 12, 1975, the
passengers therein disembarked through a gangplank connecting the
vessel to the pier. Viana, instead of disembarking through the gangplank,
disembarked through the third deck, which was at the same level with the
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
28
29
child stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the tracks and
were hit by an oncoming train, causing their instant death.
A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver,
Hermogenes Buencamino, the assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas
for Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower court
acquitted Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CA
affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the accused-appellant was
negligent?
Held: There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court
and in the conclusion drawn from the findings.
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common
carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop
they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is
also a matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its
speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit,
ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is
especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes
its run before they are able to disembark; there is no way to stop it as a
bus may be stopped.
The appellant was negligent because his announcement was premature
and erroneous, for it took a full 3 minutes more before the next barrio of
Lusacan was reached. The premature announcement prompted the two
victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said
announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their
respective seats when the train jerked and picked up speed. The
proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and
erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant.
GACAL VS. PAL (183 SCRA 189, G.R. NO. 55300 MARCH 16, 1990)
Facts: Plaintiffs Franklin Gacal, his wife and three others were passengers
of PAL plane at Davao Airport for a flight to Manila, not knowing that the
flight, were Commander Zapata with other members of Moro National
Liberation Front. They were armed with grenades and pistols. After take
off, the members of MNLF announced a hijacking and directed the pilot to
fly directly to Libya, later to Sabah. They were, however, forced to land in
Zamboanga airport for refueling, because the plane did not have enough
fuel to make direct flight to Sabah. When the plane began to taxi at the
runaway of Zamboanga airport, it was met by two armored cars of the
military.
An armored car subsequently bumped the stairs leading inside the
plane. That commenced the battle between the military and the hijackers,
which led ultimately to the liberation of the planes surviving crew and
passengers with the final score of ten passengers and three hijackers
dead.
Issue: Whether or not hijacking is a case fortuito or force majeure, which
would exempt an aircraft from liability for, damages to its passengers and
personal belongings that were lost during the incident?
Held: In order to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt from
liability under Art 1174 of the civil code, it is necessary that the following
elements must occur: (a) the cause of the breach of obligation must be
independent of human will; (b) the event must be unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; (d) the debtor must be
free from any participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
Applying the above guidelines, the failure to transport the
petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident
staged buy the MNLF without connection to the private respondent,
hence, independent of will of PAL or its passengers.
The events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligation
in a normal manner and it cannot be faulted for negligence on the duty
performed by the military. The existence of force majeure has been
established thus exempting PAL from payment of damages.
PILAPIL VS. CA 180 SCRA 546
Facts: On September 16, 1971, Jose Pilapil boarded defendants bus
bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City at about 6:00PM. Upon reaching
the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on
the way to Naga City City, an unidentified man ( a bystander) hurled a
stone at the left side of the bus, which apparently hit petitioner above his
left eye. He was then immediately brought by private respondents
personnel to the provincial hospital in Naga City.
Issue: Whether or not the nature of the business of a transportation
company requires the assumption of certain risks and the stroking of the
bus by a bystander resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is one such
risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability?
Held: The Supreme Court held that while the law requires the highest
degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their
passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not however, make the carrier an insurer of absolute safety of its
passengers. A tort, committed by a stranger which causes an injury to a
passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier.
The negligence for which a common carrier is responsible is the negligent
omission by the carriers employees to prevent the tort from being
committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by
them. Further, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is
due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of
care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of
its passenger is only that of a good father of the family.
COMPANIA MARITIMA VS COURT OF APPEALS AND VICENTE
CONCEPCION (162 SCRA 685)
Facts: Vicente Concepcion is doing business under the name of
Consolidated Construction. Being a Manila based contractor, Concepcion
had to ship his construction equipment to Cagayan de Oro. On August 28,
1964, Concepcion shipped 1 unit pay loader, 4 units of 6x6 Roe trucks,
and 2 pieces of water tanks. The aforementioned equipment was loaded
aboard the MV Cebu, which left Manila on August 30, 1964 and arrived at
Cagayan de Oro on September 1, 1964. The Reo trucks and water tanks
were safely unloaded however the pay loader suffered damage while
being unloaded. The damaged pay loader was taken to the petitioners
compound in Cagayan de Oro.
Consolidated Construction thru Vicente Concepcion wrote Compania
Maritima to demand a replacement of the broken pay loader and also
asked for damages. Unable to get a response, Concepcion sent another
demand letter. Petitioner meanwhile, sent the damaged payloader to
Manila, it was weighed at San Miguel Corporation, where it was found that
the payloader actually weighed 7.5 tons and not 2.5 tons as declared in its
bill of lading. Due to this, petitioner denied the claim for damages of
Consolidated Construction. Consolidated then filed an action for damages
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the complaint stating that the proximate cause of
the fall of the payloader which caused its damage was the act or omission
of Vicente Concepcion for misrepresenting the weight of the payloader as
2.5 tons instead of its true weight of 7.5 tons. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals, reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and ordered
the plaintiff to pay Concepcion damages. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the act of respondent Concepcion of misdeclaring
the true weight of the payloader the proximate and only cause of the
damage of the payloader?
Held: No, Compania Maritima is liable for the damage to the payloader.
The General rule under Articles 1735 and 1752 of the Civil Code is that
common carriers are presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently
in case the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed, or had
deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of liability for the loss
destruction or deterioration common carriers must prove that they have
exercised extraordinary diligence as required by Article 1733 of the Civil
Code.
Extraordinary Diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for
shipment requires the common carrier to know and follow the required
precaution fro avoiding damage or destruction of the goods entrusted to it
for safe carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render
service with the greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable
means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of goods tendered for
shipment and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage including
such methods as their nature requires.
The Supreme Court further held that the weight in a bill of lading
are prima facie evidence of the amount received and the fact that the
weighing was done by another will not relieve the common carrier where it
accepted such weight and entered it in on the bill of lading. The common
carrier can protect themselves against mistakes in the bill of lading as to
weight by exercising extraordinary diligence before issuing such.
SERVANDO VS. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.(117 SCRA 832)
Facts: Bico and Servando loaded on board the FS-176 the following
cargoes: 1.528 cavans of rice and 44 cartons of colored paper, toys and
general merchandise. Upon the arrival of the vessel, the cargoes were
discharged, complete and in good order to the warehouse of the Bureau of
Customs. At 2:00 pm of the same day, a fire of unknown reasons razed
the warehouse. Before the fire, Bico was able to take delivery of 907
cavans of rice. The petitioners are now claiming for the value of the
destroyed goods from the common carrier.
The Trial Court ordered the respondent to pay the plaintiffs the
amount of their lost goods on the basis that the delivery of the shipment
to the warehouse is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736 of the
New Civil Code, since the loss occurred before actual or constructive
delivery. The petitioners argued that the stipulation in the bills of lading
does not bind them because they did not sign the same. The stipulation
states that the carrier shall not be responsible for loss unless such loss
was due to the carriers negligence. Neither shall it be liable for loss due
to fortuitous events such as dangers of the sea and war.
Issue: Whether or not the carrier should be held liable for the destruction
of the goods
Held: No. There is nothing on record to show that the carrier incurred in
delay in the performance of its obligation. Since the carrier even notified
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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the plaintiffs of the arrival of their shipments and had demanded that they
be withdrawn.
The carrier also cannot be charged with negligence since the
storage of the goods was in the Customs warehouse and was undoubtedly
made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged
and maintained by the Government, it would be unfair to impute
negligence to the appellant since it has no control over the same.
DSR SENATOR LINES VS. FEDERAL PHOENIX 7 OCTOBER 2003
Facts: Berde plants, Inc. delivered 632 units of artificial trees to C.F. Sharp
and Company, Inc., the General Sip Agent of DSR- Senator Lines, a foreign
shipping corporation, for transportation and delivery to the consignee, AlMohr International Group, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Sharp issued an
international bill of landing for the cargo, with a stipulation that the port of
discharge for the cargo was at the Khor Fakkan port and the port of
delivery was Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
On June 7, 1993, the vessel left Manila for Saudi Arabia with the
cargo on board. When the vessel arrived in Khor Fakkan Port, the cargo
was reloaded on board DSR-Senator Lines feeder vessel, however while in
transit, the vessel and all its cargo caught fire.
Consequently, Federal Phoenix Assurance paid Berde Plants
corresponding to the amount of the insurance for the cargo. In turn, Berde
Plants executed in its favor a Subrogation Receipt.
Federal Phoenix demanding payment on the basis of the
subrogation receipt. C.f. Sharp denied any liability that such liability was
extinguished when the vessel carrying the cargo was gutted by fire. Thus,
Federal Phoenix filed a complaint for damages against DSR-Senator Lines
and C.F, Sharp.
Issue: Whether or not there was a breach of contract of carriage.
Held: Fire is not one of those enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil
Code to wit,
Art. 1734, Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any
of the following causes only:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international civil;
3. Act or omission of the shipper or the owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
5. Order or act of competent public authority.
6. Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently of
the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. In those cases where
the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it
exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the
presumption.
SARREAL VS. JAPAN AIRLINES (117 SCRA 832)
Facts: On September 14, 1979, the petitioner purchased in Bangkok from
private respondent Japan Air Lines (JAL) ticket no. 131-4442-517-368,
having various foreign destinations from Bangkok and back to Bangkok.
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On or about June 23, 1980, he was in Los Angeles, USA with his
business representative Atty. Pol Tiglao, and Luis Espada, the boxing
manager of World Flyweight Boxing Champion Hilario Zapata. They were
negotiating a possible match between the latter and the winner of the "
Netrnoi Vorasing - Brigildo Caada" main event fight which was scheduled
on July 4, 1980 in Manila. This agreement was to be confirmed by the
petitioner through overseas call in Manila on or before July 2, 1980.
The petitioner then flew from Los Angeles to Tokyo arriving thereat
on June 26, 1980.
At the Narita Airport Office, the petitioner inquired if there was a JAL
flight from Bangkok to Manila on July 2, 1980. He explained to a lady
employee of JAL that he had a very important business in Manila on July 2,
1980. He also told her that if he could not take a flight from Bangkok to
Manila on that date, he would not be going to Bangkok anymore.
The JAL lady employee looked into her scheduled book put a stamp
on the petitioner's ticket and told him not to worry because she has
endorsed his JAL ticket to Thai International leaving Bangkok on July 2,
1980 for Manila.
Relying on the assurance of the lady employee, the petitioner then
proceeded to Bangkok.
However, in the morning of July 2, 1980, when the petitioner was
about to board the said Thai International, he was not allowed to board
the said plane through it had available seats because he was told that his
ticket was not endorsable.
Since the petitioner failed to reach Manila by July 2, 1980, Espada
cancelled his transaction with the petitioner and decided to have the
champion fight in Japan instead.
This led the petitioner to file an action for damages with the
Regional Trail Court (RTC ), Pasay City against private respondent JAL
premised on the breach of contract of carriage.
Issue: Whether or not the assurance of an airline employee, not
evidenced by any hard proof, is sufficient as an assurance of a passenger
securing his seat?
Held: The petitioner is said to be a well-traveled person who average two
long trips to Europe and two trips to Bangkok every month since 1945. He
claims to have used practically all the airlines but mostly Philippine
Airlines whenever he travels abroad in connection with his occupation as
international boxing matchmaker and manager of world-champion boxers.
Certainly, a man of such stature was aware of the restrictions
carried by his ticket and the usual procedure that goes with traveling. The
petitioner ought to know that it was still necessary to verify first from Thai
International if they would honor the endorsement of his JAL ticket or
confirm with the airline if he had a seat in the July 2 flight.
The court finds no justification for the relief prayed for by the
petitioner. He has failed to show that the findings of the respondent court
are not based on substantial evidence or that it conclusions are contrary
to law and applicable jurisprudence.
VASQUEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS (138 SCRA 553)
Facts: MV Pioneer Cebu left the port of Manila and bounded for Cebu. Its
officers were aware of the upcoming typhoon Klaring that is already
building up somewhere in Mindanao. There being no typhoon signals on
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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their route, they proceeded with their voyage. When they reached the
island of Romblon, the captain decided not to seek shelter since the
weather was still good. They continued their journey until the vessel
reached the island of Tanguingui, while passing through the island the
weather suddenly changed and heavy rains fell. Fearing that they might
hit Chocolate island due to zero visibility, the captain ordered to reverse
course the vessel so that they could weather out the typhoon by facing
the strong winds and waves. Unfortunately, the vessel struck a reef near
Malapascua Island, it sustained a leak and eventually sunk.
The parents of the passengers who were lost due to that incident
filed an action against Filipinas Pioneer Lines for damages. The defendant
pleaded force majeure but the Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the decision of the lower
stating that the incident was a force majeure and absolved the defendants
from liability.
Issue: Whether of not Filipinas Pioneer Lines is liable for damages and
presumed to be at fault for the death of its passenger?
Held: The Supreme Court held the Filipinas Pioneer Lines failed to observe
that extraordinary diligence required of them by law for the safety of the
passengers transported by them with due regard for all necessary
circumstance and unnecessarily exposed the vessel to tragic mishap.
Despite knowledge of the fact that there was a typhoon, they still
proceeded with their voyage relying only on the forecast that the typhoon
would weaken upon crossing the island of Samar. The defense of caso
fortuito is untenable. To constitute caso fortuito to exempt a person from
liability it necessary that the event must be independent from human will,
the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner, the obligor must be free from any
participation or aggravation to the injury of the creditor. Filipina Pioneer
Lines failed to overcome that presumption o fault or negligence that arises
in cases of death or injuries to passengers.
GATCHALIAN V DELIM AND CA 203 SCRA 126
Facts: Gatchalian boarded the respondents Thames minibus at San
Eugenio, Aringay, La Union bound of the same province. On the way, a
snapping sound was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and shortly
thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the
road, went off the road and fell into a ditch. Several passengers including
the petitioner was injured. They were taken into an hospital for treatment.
While there, private respondents wife Adela Delim visited and paid for the
expenses, hospitalization and transportation fees. However, before she
left, she had the injured passengers including the petitioner sign an
already prepared Joint Affidavit constituting a waiver of any future
complaint. However, notwithstanding this document, petitioner filed an
action Ex Contractu to recover compensatory and Actual Damages. Private
respondent denied liability on the ground that it was an accident and the
Joint which constitutes as a waiver. The trial court dismissed the complaint
based on the waiver and the CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent has successfully proved
that he exercised extraordinary diligence.
Held: The court held that they failed to prove extraordinary diligence.
After a snapping sound was suddenly heard at one part of the bus, the
driver didnt even bother to stop and look f anything had gone wrong with
the bus. With regard to the waiver, it must to be valid and effective,
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of the person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains
to him. In this case, such waiver is not clear and unequivocal. When
petitioner signed the waiver, she was reeling from the effects of the
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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accident and while reading the paper, she experienced dizziness but upon
seeing other passengers sign the document, she too signed which
bothering to read to its entirety. There appears substantial doubt whether
the petitioner fully understood the joint affidavit.
JUNTILLA VS FONTANAR (136 SCRA 624)
Facts: Herein plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on
course from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by driven by
defendant Berfol Camoro and registered under the franchise of Clemente
Fontanar. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire
exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff
who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Plaintiff
suffered a lacerated wound on his right palm aside from the injuries he
suffered on his left arm, right thigh, and on his back.
Plaintiff filed a case for breach of contract with damages before the
City Court of Cebu City. Defendants, in their answer, alleged that the tire
blow out was beyond their control, taking into account that the tire that
exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew
up.
Issue: Whether or not the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event?
Held: No. In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was
caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of
mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach drivers not
to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and
to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring
the safety of passengers at all tines.
NECESSITO VS. PARAS (104 PHIL 75)
Facts: On January\y 28, 1954, Severina Garces and her one year old son,
Precillano Necesito boarded passenger auto truck bus of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines at Agno, Pangasinan.
After the bus entered a wooden bridge, the front wheels swerved to
the right. The driver lost control, and after the wrecking the bridge
wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was
breast deep. The mother, Severina was drowned and the son Precillano
was injured.
Issue: Whether or nor the carrier is liable for manufacturing defect of the
steering knuckle?
Held: It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers safety.
His liability rest upon negligence, that his failure to exercise utmost
degree of diligence that the law requires.
The passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the
selection and use of the equipment and the appliances in use by the
carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the
defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while
carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an
insurer of the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to
answer for flaws of his equipment if such cause were at all discoverable.
C. DEFENSE/S
Cases :
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VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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about half of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of
Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio
Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated
argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at
Gelacio Tumambing. The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had to be
taken to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for treatment. After sometime, the
loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on 4 December 1956, Acting
Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by 3 policemen, ordered captain
Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was
docked. The rest was brought to the compound of NASSCO. Later on
Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the Municipality of
Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.
Tumambing instituted with CFI Manila an action against Ganzon for
damages based on culpa contractual. The trial court rendered a decision
absolving Ganzon from liability. On appeal, however, the appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision appealed. Hence, the petition for
review on certiorari.
Held: Now the petitioner is changing his theory to caso fortuito. Such a
change of theory on appeal we cannot, however, allow. In any case, the
intervention of the municipal officials was not In any case, of a character
that would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation.
The petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into
the sea the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that
the issuance of the same order was attended with such force or
intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner's
employees. The mere difficulty in the fullfilment of the obligation is not
considered force majeure. We agree with the private respondent that the
scraps could have been properly unloaded at the shore or at the NASSCO
compound, so that after the dispute with the local officials concerned was
settled, the scraps could then be delivered in accordance with the
contract
of
carriage.
D. DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY OR LIABILITY OF COMMON
CARRIERS
A. IN CASE OF GOODS
START: From the time that the goods are delivered to the common
carrier. (Article 1736, Civil Code. Cia Maritima vs. Insurance Co. of
America)
TERMINATION: When the goods are delivered, actively or constructively,
by the carrier to the consignee/person who has the right to receive them,
or the consignee/person who has the right to receive them has been
informed of the arrival of the goods and the consignee had reasonable
time to remove such. (Article 1736 and 1738, Civil Code)
The liability remains in full force and effect even when they are
temporarily unloaded or stored in transit unless the shipper or owner
made use of the right of stoppage in transitu. (Article 1737, Civil
Code)
WHEN RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU IS EXERCISED:
It is the right of the unpaid seller who has parted with his goods to
stop its delivery while in transit when the buyer of the goods is or turns
insolvent. (Article 1530, Civil Code)
The common carrier who holds the goods becomes the
warehouseman or ordinary bailee and the contract is terminated when
such right is exercised.
Requisites:
1. Unpaid seller (Article 1525, Civil Code);
2. Goods must be in transit (Article 1531, Civil Code);
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3. The seller must either actually take possession of the goods sold or
give notice of his claim to the carrier or other person in possession
(Article 1532 [1], Civil Code);
4. The seller must surrender the negotiable document of title, if any,
issued by the carrier or bailee (Article 1532[2], Civil Code);
5. The seller must bear the expenses of delivery of the goods after the
exercise of the right (Article 1532[2], Civil Code); and
6. The buyer is in a state of insolvency or becomes insolvent.
B. IN CASE OF PASSENGERS
START: The carrier is bound to exercise utmost diligence with respect to
passengers the moment the person who purchases the ticket (or a token)
from the carrier presents himself at the proper place and in a proper
manner to be transported. Such person must have bona fide intention to
use the facilities of the carrier, possess sufficient fare with which to pay
for his passage, and present himself to the carrier for the transportation in
the manner provided. (Vda. De Nueca v. Manila Railroad Company, CA,
G.R. No. 31731, January 30, 1968)
It is the duty of carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances for
a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity
to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding
passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their
conveyances (Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. CA, 202 SCRA [1991])
TERMINATION: Until the passenger has, after reaching his destination,
safely alighted from the carriers conveyance or had a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carriers premises. (La Mallorca v. CA, 17 SCRA
739 [1966])
A person by stepping and standing on the platform of a bus, is
already considered a passenger and is entitled to all rights and protection
pertaining to such conventional relation (I.d.).
E. RULES ON PASSENGERS BAGGAGE
1. Baggage in the custody of the passengers or their employee:
That baggage, while in transit will be considered as necessary deposits.
The common carrier shall be responsible for the baggage as
depositaries, provided that notice was given to them or its employees
and the passengers took the necessary precautions which the carrier has
advised them relative to the care and vigilance of their baggage.
2. Baggage not in personal custody, but in that of a Carrier
Carrier who has in its custody the baggage of a passenger to be carried
like any other goods is required to observe extraordinary diligence. In
case of loss or damage, the carrier is presumed negligent. As to the
other baggage, the rules in Article 1998 and 2000 to 2003 of the Civil
Code concerning the responsibility of hotel-keepers shall be applicable.
(Art.1733-1735, Civil Code)
Case/s
QUISUMBING VS. CA
Facts: Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. and Gunther Leoffler were among the
of ... (PAL's) Fokker 'Friendship' PIC-536 plane in its flight of November 6,
1968 which left Mactan City at about 7:30 in the evening with Manila for
its destination.
After the plane had taken off, Florencio O. Villarin, a Senior NBI
Agent who was also a passenger of the said plane, noticed a certain
'Zaldy,' a suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez, seated at the front seat
near the door leading to the cockpit of the plane. A check by Villarin with
the passenger's ticket in the possession of flight Stewardess Annie
Bontigao, who was seated at the last seat right row, revealed that 'Zaldy'
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had used the name 'Cardente,' one of his aliases known to Villarin. Villarin
also came to know from the stewardess that 'Zaldy' had three companions
on board the plane."
Villarin then scribbled a note addressed to the pilot of the plane
requesting the latter to contact NBI duty agents in Manila for the said
agents to ask the Director of the NBI to send about six NBI agents to meet
the plane because the suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez was on board
(Exh. 'G'). The said note was handed by Villarin to the stewardess who in
turn gave the same to the pilot.
After receiving the note, which was about 15 minutes after take off,
the pilot of the plane, Capt. Luis Bonnevie, Jr., came out of the cockpit and
sat beside Villarin at the rear portion of the plane and explained that he
could not send the message because it would be heard by all ground
aircraft stations. Villarin, however, told the pilot of the danger of
commission of violent acts on board the plane by the notorious 'Zaldy' and
his three companions.
While the pilot and Villarin were talking, 'Zaldy' and one of his
companions walked to the rear and stood behind them. Capt. Bonnevie
then stood up and went back to the cockpit. 'Zaldy' and his companions
returned to their seats, but after a few minutes they moved back to the
rear throwing ugly looks at Villarin who, sensing danger, stood up and
went back to his original seat across the aisle on the second to the last
seat near the window. 'Zaldy and his companion likewise went back to
their respective seats in front.
Soon thereafter an exchange of gunshots ensued between Villarin
and 'Zaldy' and the latter's companions. 'Zaldy' announced to the
passengers and the pilots in the cockpit that it was a hold-up and ordered
the pilot not to send any SOS. The hold-uppers divested passengers of
their belongings.
Issue: Whether or not Pal is liable for damages against the passengers for
loss caused by the robbers on board?
Held: It is illusive to assume that had these precautions been taken, the
hijacking or the robbery would not have succeeded. The mandatory use of
the most sophisticated electronic detection devices and magnetometers,
the imposition of severe penalties, the development of screening
procedures, the compilation of hijacker behavioral profiles, the assignment
of sky marshals, and the weight of outraged world opinion may have
minimized hijackings but all these have proved ineffective against truly
determined hijackers. World experience shows that if a group of armed
hijackers want to take over a plane in flight, they can elude the latest
combined government and airline industry measures. And as our own
experience in Zamboanga City illustrates, the use of force to overcome
hijackers, results in the death and injury of innocent passengers and crew
members. We are not in the least bit suggesting that the Philippine
Airlines should not do everything humanly possible to protect passengers
from hijackers' acts. We merely state that where the defendant has
faithfully complied with the requirements of government agencies and
adhered to the established procedures and precautions of the airline
industry at any particular time, its failure to take certain steps that a
passenger in hindsight believes should have been taken is not the
negligence or misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active
and cooperative cause.
BRITISH AIRWAYS VS. CA (285 SCRA 450)
Facts: On April 16, 1989, Mahtani is on his way to Bombay, India from
Manila. His trip was Manila-Hong Kong via PAL and then Hong Kong-India
via British Airways. Prior to his departure, he checked in two pieces of
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40
luggage containing his clothing and other personal effects, confident that
the same would be transferred to his BA flight.
Unfortunately, when he arrived in India, he discovered that his
luggage was missing.
The RTC awarded Mahtani damages which was affirmed by CA.
Issue: Whether or not in a contract of air carriage a declaration by the
passenger is needed to recover a greater amount?
Held: American jurisprudence provides that an air carrier is not liable for
the loss of baggage in an amount in excess of the limits specified in the
tariff which was filed with the proper authorities, such tariff being binding
on the passenger regardless of the passengers lack of knowledge thereof
or assent thereto. This doctrine is recognized in this jurisdiction.
The inescapable conclusion that BA had waived the defense of
limited liability when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual
damages he incurred due to misplacement of his luggage, without any
objection.
It is a well-settled doctrine that where the proponent offers
evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for
any reason, the latter has the right to object. However, such right is a
mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be
made at the earliest opportunity, in case of silence when there is
opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections.
F.LIABILITY OF SUCCESSIVE AIR CARRIERS
KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES VS CA (65 SCRA 237)
Facts: Spouses Mendoza approached Mr. Reyes, the branch manager of
Philippine Travel Bureau, for consultation about a world tour which they
were intending to make with their daughter and niece. Three segments of
the trip, the longest, was via KLM. Respondents decided that one of the
routes they will take was a Barcelona-Lourdes route with knowledge that
only one airline, Aer Lingus, served it. Reyes made the necessary
reservations. To this, KLM secured seat reservations for the Mendozas and
their companions from the carriers which would ferry them throughout
their trip, which the exception of Aer Lingus. When the Mendozas left the
Philippines, they were issued KLM tickets for the entire trip. However, their
coupon for Aer Lingus was marked on request.
When they were in Germany, they went to the KLM office and
obtained a confirmation from Aer Lingus. At the airport in Barcelona, the
Mendozas and their companions checked in for their flight to Lourdes.
However, although their daughter and niece were allowed to take the
flight, the spouses Mendozas were off loaded on orders of the Aer Lingus
manager, who brusquely shoved them aside and shouted at them. So the
spouses Mendozas took a train ride to Lourdes instead.
Thus, they filed a complaint for damages against KLM for breach of
contract of carriage. The trial court decided in favor of the Mendozas. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, KLM brings this petition to
the Supreme Court. KLM cites Art 30 of the Warsaw Convention, which
states: the passenger or his representatives can take action only against
the carrier who performed the transportation during which the accident or
delay occurred. Also, KLM avers that the front cover of each ticket reads:
that liability of the carrier for damages shall be limited to occurrences on
its own line.
Issue: Whether or not KLM is liable for breach of contract of carriage?
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However, the carrier cannot limit its liability for injury to, or loss of,
goods shipped where such injury or loss was caused by its own
negligence.
o
44
TIME OF DELIVERY
Stipulated in
Contract/Bill of Lading
Carrier is bound to fulfill the
contract and is liable for
any delay; no matter from
what cause it may have
arisen.
No stipulation
1.
2.
Effects of delay:
1. Merely suspends and generally does not terminate the contract of
carriage.
2. Carrier remains duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence.
3. Natural disaster shall not free the carrier from responsibility
(Art.1740, Civil Code)
4. If delay is without just cause, the contract limiting the common
carriers liability cannot be availed of in case of loss or deterioration
of the goods (Art.1747, Civil Code)
C. Duty to exercise extraordinary diligence
o Inquiry may be made as to the nature of passengers baggage, but
beyond this constitutional boundaries are already in danger of
being transgressed. (Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., 30 SCRA
68)[this doctrine is not applicable to aircrafts because of Section 8
of Anti-Hijacking Law (RA 6235)]
RIGHT OF CONSIGNEE TO ABANDON GOODS
Instances:
1. Partial non-delivery, where the goods are useless without the others
(Art. 363, Code of Commerce);
2. Goods are rendered useless for sale or consumption for the purposes
for which they are properly destined (Art. 365, Code of Commerce);
and
3. In case of delay through the fault of the carrier (Art. 371, Code of
Commerce).
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NOTICE OF DAMAGE
Requisites for Applicability:
1. Domestic/inter-island/coastwise transportation
2. Land/water/air transportation
3. Carriage of goods
4. Goods shipped are damaged (Art. 366, Code of Commerce)
Rules:
a. Patent damage: shipper must file a claim against the carrier
immediately upon delivery (it may be oral or written)
b. Latent damage: shipper should file a claim against the carrier within 24
hours from delivery.
o These rules do not apply to misdelivery of goods. (Roldan vs. Lim
Ponzo)
o The filing of notice of claim is a condition precedent for recovery.
Purpose of Notice: To inform the carrier that the shipment has been
damaged, and it is charged with liability therefore, and to give it an
opportunity to make an investigation and fix responsibility while the
matter is fresh.
Prescriptive Period
Not provided by Article 366. Thus, in such absence, Civil Code rules on
prescription apply.
If despite the notice of claim, the carrier refuses to pay, action must be
filed in court.
1. If no bill of lading was issued: within 6 years
2. If bill of lading was issued: within 10 years.
COMBINED CARRIER AGREEMENT
General Rule: In case of a contract of transportation of several legs, each
carrier is responsible for its particular leg in the contract. (Art. 373, Code
of Commerce)
Exception: A combined carrier agreement where a carrier makes itself
liable assuming the obligations and acquiring as well the rights and
causes of action of those which preceded it.
ARTICLE 366 (COC)
46
The filing of claim under either (a) or (b) is a condition precedent for
recovery.
If the claim is filed, but the carrier refuses to pay, enforce carriers
liability in court by filing a case:
1. Within six (6) years, if no bill of lading has been issued; or
2. Within ten (1) years, if a bill of lading has been issued.
Written demand within twenty-four (24) hours is necessary only when the
package does not show exterior signs of damage but when there are
exterior signs of damage, a verbal claim made immediately is sufficient
compliance with law. (Mapaso Goldfields v. Compania Maritima [CA], 2 OG
307)
Payment of the transportation charge precludes the presentation of
any claim against the carrier.
The real and hypothecary nature of maritime law simply means that
the liability of the carrier in connection with losses related to
maritime contracts is confined to the vessel, which stands as the
guaranty for their settlement. (Aboitiz Shipping Corp. vs. General
Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. 217 SCRA 359)
PREFERENCE OF CREDITS
Mortgage of a vessel properly registered becomes preferred
mortgage lien which shall have priority over all claims against the vessel
in an extrajudicial foreclosure for:
1. Credit in favor of the public treasury;
2. Judicial costs of the proceedings;
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Pilotage and tonnage charges and other sea and port charges;
Salaries of depositaries keepers of the vessel;
Captain and crews wages;
General average;
Salvage, including contract salvage;
Maritime liens arising prior in time to the recording of the preferred
mortgage;
9. Damages arising out of tort; and
10.Preferred mortgage registered prior in time.
MERCHANT VESSEL
Vessel engaged in maritime commerce, whether foreign or otherwise.
Constitutes property which may be acquired and transferred by any of
the means recognized by law. They shall continue to be considered as
personal property. (Arts. 573, 585 Code of Commerce)
o
The limited liability doctrine applies not only to the goods but
also in all cases like death or injury to passengers. (Heirs of Amparo
Delos Santos vs. CA, 186 SCRA 649)
If the vessel is not entirely lost, the hypothecary nature will not apply,
unless the shipowner or the ship agent abandons the vessel.
When Applicable:
1. Civil liability for indemnities in favor of third persons which arise
from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the
vessel carried. (Art. 587, Code of Commerce)
2. Civil liability arising from collisions. (Art. 837, Code of
Commerce)
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3.
Unpaid wages of the captain and the crew if the vessel and its
cargo are totally lost by reason of capture or shipwreck. (Art. 643,
Code of Commerce)
This is not to say, however, that the limited liability rule is without
exceptions, namely: (1) where the injury or death to a passenger is
due either to the fault of the shipowner, or to the concurring
negligence of the shipowner and the captain. (Phil. Am. Gen.
Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA, 273 SCRA 649,271 [1997]); (2) where the
vessel is insured; and (3) in workmens compensation claims.
(Monarch Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA, 333 SCRA 71 [2000])
Contrary to the theory that the limited liability rule has been rendered
obsolete by the advances in modern technology, which considerably
lessen the risks involved in maritime trade, this Court continues to
apply the said rule in appropriate cases. (Monarch Insurance Co., Inc.
v. CA, 333 SCRA 71 [2000])
ABANDONMENT
Abandonment of the vessel is necessary to limit the liability of the
shipowner. The only instance were abandonment is dispensed with is
when the vessel is entirely lost (Luzon Stevedoring vs. CA 156 SCRA
169[1987]).
o
49
Not a mere agent under civil law; he is solidarily liable with the ship
owner.
50
Crew
If the seamen contract is not for a definite period or voyage, he
may discharge them at his discretion. (Art. 603, Code of
Commerce)
If for a definite period, he may not discharge them until after the
fulfillment of their contracts, except on the following grounds:
- Insubordination in serious matters;
- Robbery;
- Theft;
- Habitual drunkenness;
- Damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo through malice or
manifest or proven negligence. (Art. 605, Code of Commerce)
CAPTAINS AND MASTERS
They are the chiefs or commanders of ships.
The terms have the same meaning, but are particularly used in
accordance with the size of the vessel governed and the scope of
transportation, i.e., large and overseas, and small and coastwise,
respectively.
Nature of Position of Captains and Masters (3-Fold character):
1. General agent of the shipowner;
2. Technical director of the vessel;
3. Representative of the government of the country under whose flag he
navigates.
Qualifications of Captain and Masters:
1. Filipino citizen;
2. Legal capacity to contract;
3. Must have passed the required physical and mental examinations
required for licensing him as such. (Art. 609, Code of Commerce)
Inherent powers of Captains:
1. Appoint crew in the absence of ship agent;
2. Command the crew and direct the vessel to its port of destination;
3. Impose correctional punishment on those who, while on board vessel,
fail to comply with his orders or are wanting in discipline;
4. Make contracts for the charter of vessel in the absence of ship agent.
5. Supply, equip, and provision the vessel; and
6. Order repair of vessel to enable it to continue its voyage. (Art. 610,
Code of Commerce)
Duties of Captains:
1. Bring on board the proper certificate and documents and a copy of the
Code of Commerce;
2. Keep a Log Book, Accounting Book and Freight Book;
3. Examine the ship before the voyage;
4. Stay on board during the loading and unloading of the cargo;
5. Be on deck while leaving or entering the port;
6. Protest arrivals under stress and in case of shipwreck;
7. Follow instructions of and render an accounting to the ship agent;
8. Leave the vessel last in case of wreck;
9. Hold in custody properties left by deceased passengers and crew
members;
10.Comply with the requirements of customs, health, etc. at the port of
arrival;
11.Observe rules to avoid collision;
12. Demand a pilot while entering or leaving a port. (Art. 612, Code of
Commerce)
No liability for the following:
1. Damages caused to the vessel or to the cargo by force majeure;
2. Obligations contracted for the repair, equipment, and provisioning of
the vessel unless he has expressly bound himself personally or has
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4.
Liability of Pilot
General Rule: On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot is
responsible for damage to a vessel or to life or property due to his
negligence.
Exceptions:
1. Accident caused by force majeure or natural calamity provided the
pilot exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize
damages.
2. Countermand or overrule by the master of the vessel in which case the
registered owner of the vessel is liable. (Sec.11, Art.III Philippine Ports
Authority Administrative Order 03-85)
DESERTION
An act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel
before the expiration of his term of duty without leave and without
intention to return. (Singa Ship Management Phils. v. NLRC 276 SCRA
201[1997])
CAUSES OF REVOCATION OF VOYAGE
1. War or interdiction of commerce;
2. Blockade;
3. Prohibition to receive cargo at destination;
4. Embargo;
5. Inability of the vessel to navigate. (Art. 640, Code of Commerce)
Terms:
1. Interdiction of Commerce A governmental prohibition of
commercial intercourse intended to bring about an entire cessation for
the time being of all trade whatever.
2. Blockade A sort of circumvallation of a place by which all foreign
connection and correspondence is, as far as human power can effect it,
to be cut off.
3. Embargo A proclamation or order of a state, usually issued in time of
war or threatened hostilities, prohibiting the departure of ships or
goods from some or all the ports of such state until further order.
Vessels
LOPEZ VS. DURUELO 52 PHIL 229
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54
that Riveras right cannot prevail over those acquired by Rubiso in the
ownership of the pilot boat, thought the latters acquisition of the vessel
at public auction was subsequent to its purchase by the defendant,
Rivera.
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(156 SCRA 169)
Facts: A maritime collision occurred between the tanker CAVITE owned by
LSCO and MV Fernando Escano (a passenger ship) owned by Escano, as a
result the passenger ship sunk. An action in admiralty was filed by Escano
against Luzon. The trial court held that LSCO Cavite was solely to blame
for the collision and held that Luzons claim that its liability should be
limited under Article 837 of the Code of Commerce has not been
established. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The SC also
affirmed the CA. Upon two motions for reconsideration, the Supreme
Court gave course to the petition.
Issue: Whether or not in order to claim limited liability under Article 837
of the Code of Commerce, it is necessary that the owner abandon the
vessel
Held: Yes, abandonment is necessary to claim the limited liability wherein
it shall be limited to the value of the vessel with all the appurtenances and
freightage earned in the voyage. However, if the injury was due to the
ship owners fault, the ship owner may not avail of his right to avail of
limited liability by abandoning the vessel.
The real nature of the liability of the ship owner or agent is
embodied in the Code of Commerce. Articles 587, 590 and 837 are
intended to limit the liability of the ship owner, provided that the owner or
agent abandons the vessel. Although Article 837 does not specifically
provide that in case of collision there should be abandonment, to enjoy
such limited liability, said article is a mere amplification of the provisions
of Articles 587 and 590 which makes it a mere superfluity.
The exception to this rule in Article 837 is when the vessel is totally
lost in which case there is no vessel to abandon, thus abandonment is not
required. Because of such loss, the liability of the owner or agent is
extinguished. However, they are still personally liable for claims under
the Workmens Compensation Act and for repairs on the vessel prior to its
loss.
In case of illegal or tortious acts of the captain, the liability of the
owner and agent is subsidiary. In such cases, the owner or agent may
avail of Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. But if the injury is caused
by the owners fault as where he engages the services of an
inexperienced captain or engineer, he cannot avail of the provisions of
Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. He is personally liable for such
damages.
In this case, the Court held that the petitioner is a t fault and since
he did not abandon the vessel, he cannot invoke the benefit of Article 837
to limit his liability to the value of the vessel, all appurtenances and
freightage earned during the voyage.
YANGCO VS. LASERNA (73 PHIL 330)
Facts: On the afternoon of May 26, 1927, the steamer SS Negros left the
port of Romblon on its return trip to Manila. Typhoon signal no. 2 was then
up and in fact, the passengers duly advised the captain before sailing. The
boat was overloaded. After 2 hours of sailing, the boat encountered strong
winds and rough seas between the islands of Banton and Simara. While in
the act of maneuvering, the vessel was caught sidewise by a big wave
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which caused it to capsize and sink. Many of the passengers died on the
mishap. Civil actions were instituted in the CFI of Capiz, the petitioner
sought to abandon the vessel to the plaintiffs in three cases.
Issue: Whether the shipowner or agent is liable for damages for the
consequent death of its passengers notwithstanding the total loss of the
vessel?
Held: The petitioner is absolved from all complaints.
Under Article 587 the ship agent shall also be civilly liable for
indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from the conduct of the
captain in the vigilance over the goods which the vessels carried; BUT he
may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her
equipment and the freight he may have earned during the voyage.
Whether the abandonment of the vessel sought by the petitioner in
the case was in accordance with the law or not, is immaterial. The vessel
having totally perished, any act of abandonment would be idle ceremony.
NO VESSEL, NO LIABILITY.
MANILA STEAMSHIP CO. INC. VS. INSA ABDULHAMAN (100 PHIL
32)
Facts: Insa Abdulhaman together with his wife and five children boarded
M/L Consuelo V in Zamboanga City. The said ship was bound for Siokon
under the command of Faustino Macrohon. On that same night, M/S
Bowline Knot was navigating from Marijoboc towards Zamboanga.
Around 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening of May 4, 1948, while some of
the passengers of the M/L Consuelo V were then sleeping and some lying
down awake, a shocking collision suddenly occurred. The ship that
collided was later on identified as the M/V Bowline Knot. M/L Consuelo V
capsized that resulted to the death of 9 passengers and the loss of the
cargoes on board.
The Court held the owners of both vessels solidarily liable to
plaintiff for damages caused to the latter under Article 827 of the Code of
Commerce but exempted defendant Lim Hong To from liability due to the
sinking and total loss of his vessel. While Manila steamship, owner of the
Bowline Knot was ordered to pay all of plaintiffs damages.
Petitioner Manila Steamship Co. pleads that it is exempt from any
liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code because it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees,
particularly the officer in command of the M/S Bowline Knot.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Manila Steamship Co. is exempt from any
liability under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code?
Held: NO. Petitioner is not exempted from liabilities. While it is true that
plaintiffs action against petitioner is based on a tort or quasi delict, the
tort in question is not a civil tort under the Civil Code but a maritime tort
resulting in a collision at sea, governed by Articles 826-939 of the Code of
Commerce. Under Art. 827 of the Code of Commerce, in case of collision
between two vessels imputable to both of them, each vessel shall suffer
her own damage and both shall be solidarily liable for the damages
occasioned to their cargoes. The shipowner is directly and primarily
responsible in tort resulting in a collision at sea, and it may not escape
liability on the ground that exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the vessels officers and crew.
VASQUEZ VS. CA (138 SCRA 553)
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FACTS: The litigation involves a claim for damages for the loss at sea of
petitioners respective children after the shipwreck of MV Pioneer Cebu
due to typhoon Klaring in May of 1966. When the inter-island vessel MV
Pioneer Cebu left the Port of Manila in the early morning of May 15, 1966
bound for Cebu, it had on board the spouses Alfonso Vasquez and Filipinas
Bagaipo and a four-year old boy, Mario Vasquez, among her passengers.
The MV Pioneer Cebu encountered typhoon Klaring and struck a reef on
the southern part of Malapascua Island, located somewhere north of island
of Cebu and subsequently sunk. The aforementioned passengers were
unheard from since then.
Due to the loss of their children, petitioners sued for damages
before the Court Instance of Manila. Respondent defended on the plea of
force majeure, and extinction of its liability by the actual loss of the
vessel. After proper proceedings, the trial court awarded damages. On
appeal, respondent Court reversed judgment and absolved private
respondent from any liability. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether the shipowners liability is extinguished despite of the loss
of the ship?
Held: With respect for the private respondents submission that the total
loss of the vessel extinguished its liability pursuant to Article 587 of the
Code of Commerce as construed in Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phil. 330
(1941), suffice it to state that even in the cited case, it was held that the
liability of the shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or to the
insurance thereon, Despite the total loss of the vessel therefore, its
insurance answers for the damages that the shipowners agent may be
held liable for by reason of the death of its passengers. Judgment of the
CFI reinstated.
57
as result of collision; nor the responsibility for wages of the crew, but a
liability created by a statute to compensate employees and laborers in
cases of injury received by or inflicted upon them, while engaged in the
performance of their work or employment, or the heirs and dependents
and laborers and employees in the event of death caused by their
employment. Such compensation has nothing to do with the provisions of
the Code of Commerce regarding maritime commerce. It is an item in the
cost of production which must be included in the budget of any wellmanaged industry.
It has been repeatedly stated that the Workmen's Compensation
Act was enacted to abrogate the common law and our Civil Code upon
culpable acts and omissions, and that the employer need not be guilty of
neglect or fault, in order that responsibility may attach to him and that
shipowner was liable to pay compensation provided for in the Workmen's
Compensation Act, notwithstanding the fact that the motorboat was
totally lost.
Doctrine of Limited Liability, Art. 587
ABOITIZ SHIPPING VS. GENERAL ACCIDENT FIRE AND LIFE (GR NO.
100446 JANUARY 21, 1993)
Facts: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of maritime
trade as a carrier. As such, it owned and operated the M/V P/ ABOITIZ, a
common carrier that sank on voyage from Hong Kong to Manila. Private
respondent GAFLAC is a foreign insurance company pursuing its remedy
as a subrogee of several cargo consignees whose respective cargo sank
with the said vessel and for which it has priory paid. The sinking of vessel
gave rise to filling of suit to recover the lost cargo either by shippers, their
successors-in-interest, or the cargo insurers like GAFLAC as subrogees.
The sinking was initially investigated by the Board of Marine Inquiry, which
found that such sinking was due to fortuitous event.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of limited liability is applicable to the
case?
Held: The real an hypothecary nature of maritime law simple means that
the liability of the carrier in connection with losses related to maritime
contracts is confined to the vessel, which is hypothecated for such
obligations or which stands as the guaranty for their settlement. It has its
origin by reason of the conditions and risks attending maritime trade in its
earliest years when such trade was replete with innumerable and
unknown hazards since vessels had to go through largely uncharted
waters to ply their trade. Thus, the liability of the vessel owner and agent
arising form the operation of such vessel were confined to the vessel
itself, its equipment, freight and insurance, if any, which limitation served
to induce capitalist into effectively wagering their resources against
consideration of the large attainable in the trade.
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE VS. CA (208 SCRA 343)
Facts: On or about June 19, 1998, Cheng Hwa Pulp Corp. shipped 5,000
bales of bleached kraft pulp from Haulien, Taiwan on board SS Kaunlaran
(owned by National Marine Corporation). The shipment was consigned to
Mayleen Paper, Inc. which insured the same with American Home
Assurance Co. On June 22, 1998, the shipment arrived in manila and was
discharged onto the custody of the Marina Port Services, Inc. However,
upon delivery to Mayleen Paper Inc., it was found that 122 bales had
either been damaged or lost with the value of P61, 263.41.
Mayleen Paper Inc, duly demanded indemnification from NMC but
was not heeded. Mayleen then sought recovery from American Home
Assurance, the insurer, which was adjusted to P31, 506.75. As subrogee,
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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American Home then filed a suit against NMC for the recovery of the said
amount. NMC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no
cause of action based on Art 848 of the Code of Commerce which provides
that claims for averages shall not be admitted if they do not exceed 5%
of the interest which the claimant may have in the vessel or in the cargo if
it be gross average and 1% of the goods damaged if particular average,
deducting in both cases the expenses of appraisal, unless there is an
agreement to the contrary. NMC contended that based on the allegations
of the complaint, the loss sustained in the case was P35, 506.75 which is
only .18% of P17.420.000.00, the total value of the cargo.
The trial court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
American Home then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which later dismissed as constituting plain errors of law. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the law on averages applies when there is
negligence?
Held: NO. Common carriers cannot limit their liability for injury or loss of
goods where such injury or loss was caused by its own negligence.
Otherwise stated, the law on averages under the Code of Commerce
cannot be applied in determining liability where there is negligence. It is
reasonable to conclude that the issue of negligence must first be
addressed before the proper provisions of the Code of Commerce on the
extent of liability may be applied.
Instead of presenting proof of
diligence as requires by law, NMC
hypothetically admitting the truth of the
the effect that the loss or damage to
negligence or fault of NMC.
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salvage charges are properly collectible under Act. No. 2616, known as the
Salvage Law.
The trial court dismissed the PHACs complaint and ruled in favor of
ESLI. The court said that the Supreme Court has ruled in Erlanger and
Galinger vs. Swedish East Asiatic Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 178, that three
elements are (1) a marine peril (2) service voluntary rendered when not
required as an existing duty or from a special contract and (3) success in
whole or in part, or that the service rendered contributed to such success.
The court said that the above elements are all present in the instant case.
Salvage charges may thus be assessed on the cargoes saved from the
vessel. As provided for in Section 13 of the Salvage Law, The expenses of
salvage, as well as the reward for salvage or assistance shall be a charge
on the things salvaged or their value. In Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Macondray Co., 37 Phil. 583. It was also held that When a ship and its
cargo are saved together, the salvage allowance should be charged
against the ship and the cargo in the proportion of their respective values,
the same as in the case of general average Thus, the compensation to
be paid by the owner of the cargo is in proportion to the value of the
vessel and the value of the cargo saved.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, respondent court affirmed the
trial courts findings and conclusion; hence, the present petition for review
before this Court on the following error, among others:
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Court erroneously adopted with
approval the Trial Courts conclusion that the expenses or averages
incurred in saving the cargo constitute general average?
Held: On the issue whether or not respondent court committed an error in
concluding that the expenses incurred in saving the cargo are considered
general average, we rule in the affirmative. As a rule, general or gross
averages include all damages and expenses which are deliberately caused
in order to save vessels, its cargo or both at the same time, from a real
and known risk. While the instant case may technically fall within the
purview of the said provision, the formalities prescribed under Article 813
and 814 of the Code of Commerce in order to incur the expenses and
cause the damage corresponding to gross average were not complied
with. Consequently, respondent ESLIs claim for contribution from the
consignees of the cargo at the time of the occurrence of the average turns
to naught.
The Court reversed and set aside the judgment of the respondent
court and ordered respondent Eastern Shipping Lines. Inc. to return to
petitioner Philippine Home Assurance Corporation the amount it paid
under protest in behalf of the consignees.
SALVAGE LAW (ACT NO. 2616)
Provides a compulsory reward to those who save cargo by requiring the
owner of the property to give a reward equivalent to the maximum of 50%
of the value of the property saved.
SALVAGE (Two Concepts)
1. Service one person renders to the owner of a ship or goods, by his own
labor, preserving the goods or the ship which the owner or those
entrusted with the care of them have either abandoned in distress at
sea, or are unable to protect or secure.
2. Compensation allowed to persons by whose voluntary assistance a ship
at sea or her cargo or both have been saved in whole or in part from
impending sea peril, or such property recovered from actual peril or
loss, as in cases of shipwreck, derelict or recapture.
Requisites:
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61
assist the disabled ship, the crew of Henry I attached tow lines and
proceeded to tow the Don Alfredo heading towards the port of Dumaguete
City. The following morning, they encountered a sister ship of Don Alfredo,
the MV Lux. Upon the request of the captain of the Don Alfredo, the crew
of the Henry I released the towlines and continued on their voyage.
After the incident, Barrios as captain of MV Henry I claimed
entitlement to compensation under the salvage law which was opposed by
Go Thong and Co. who claimed that what occurred was only mere towage.
The trial court dismissed the claim.
Issue: Whether the rescue of the MV Don Alfredo should be classified as a
salvage, thus entitling Barrios et al. to reward?
Held: No. Not all the requisites were present for the rescue to be
considered as salvage under the law.
The claim of Barrios is anchored on the provisions of the Salvage
Law that stipulates that a ship that is lost or abandoned at sea is
considered as a derelict and the proper subject of salvage. A ship in a
desperate condition with passengers and persons on board but who are
unable to do anything for their own safety may be considered a quasiderelict.
Further, the Salvage Law provides that those assisting in saving a
vessel in its cargo from shipwreck shall be entitled to a reward. There are
three elements that are necessary for a salvage claim:
1. the existence of a marine peril
2. service is voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing
duty or a special contract; and
3. success in whole or in part, or that the service rendered contributed
to such success.
It is therefore imperative to establish whether the MV Don Alfredo
was exposed to any form of marine peril when it was assisted by the MV
Henry I. The Supreme Court however noted that the nature of its
disability and the circumstances surrounding it could be construed as a
marine peril as contemplated in the Salvage Law. When the engine failure
occurred the seas were calm and the weather was clear. In fact the ship
did not drift too far from the location where its engines failed. Further, the
captain and crew of the MV Don Alfredo did not find it necessary to
jettison the vessels cargo as a safety measure. Therefore the MV Don
Alfredo cannot even be considered as a quasi derelict.
Although the service of the defendant did not constitute as salvage,
it can be considered as a quasi contract of towage. However in a contract
of towage, only the owner of the towing vessel is entitled to remuneration.
It is noteworthy that the owner of MV Henry I, William Lines, Inc., already
waived its claim for compensation.
SPECIAL CONTRACTS OF MARITIME COMMERCE
1. Charter party
2. Bill of lading
3. Contract of transportation of passengers on sea voyages
4. Loan on bottomry
5. Loan on respondentia
6. Marine insurance
A. CHARTER PARTY
A contract by virtue of which the owner or agent binds himself to
transport merchandise or persons for a fixed price.
A contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof is
let/leased by the owner to another person for a specified time or use.
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B.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
At Shipowners Request:
1. If the extra lay days terminate without the cargo being placed
alongside the vessel;
2. Sale by the owner of the vessel before loading the charterer.
C.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Fortuitous causes:
War;
Blockade;
Prohibition to receive cargo;
Embargo; and
Inability of the vessel to navigate.
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BILL OF LADING
Written acknowledgment of receipt of goods and agreement to
transport them to a specific place to a person named or to his order.
(Compania Maritima v. Insurance Comp. of North America, 12 SCRA
213)
The consignee and the shipper who accepts a bill of lading even
without signing are bound by the terms and conditions thereof.
(Keng Hua Paper Products v. CA 286 SCRA 257[1998])
Acceptance of the consignee is implied if he claims reimbursement
for missing goods and files a case based on the bill of lading.
(Belgian Overseas Chartering v. Phil. First Insurance, 383 SCRA 23
[2002])
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6.
7.
AVERAGE
An extraordinary or accidental expense incurred during the voyage
order to preserve the cargo, vessel or both, and all damages
deterioration suffered by the vessel from departure to the port
destination, and to the cargo from the port of loading to the port
consignment. (Art. 806, Code of Commerce)
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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or
of
of
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CLASSES OF AVERAGES:
1. Gross or General Average
2. Particular or Simple Average
Jettisoned goods are not res nullius nor deemed abandoned within
the meaning of civil law so as to be the object of occupation by
salvage.
In order that the jettisoned goods may be included in the gross or
general average, the existence of the cargo on board should be
proven by means of the bill of lading. (Art. 816, Code of Commerce)
Under the York-Antwerp Rules, deck cargo is permitted in Coastwise
Shipping but prohibited in Overseas Shipping.
1. If deck cargo is located with the consent of the shipper on
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International
Deck cargo is not allowed
Particular average
Captain is liable
B.
COLLISION
The impact of two moving vessels.
Zones of Time in the Collision of Vessels:
a. 1st zone all time up to the moment when risk of collision begins;
b. 2nd zone time between moment when risk of collision begins and
the moment it becomes a practical certainty; and
c. 3rd zone time when collision has become a practicable certainty
to the point of actual impact.
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said faultless vessel. (Urrutia and Co. v. Baco River Plantation Co., 26
Phil. 632)
Rules on Liability in Collision and Allision
Consequential Damages Covered:
1. Damages caused to vessel
2. Damages caused to the passenger
3. Damages caused to the cargo
Rule:
1. One vessel at fault
Vessel at fault is liable for damage caused to the vessel,
passenger, and cargoes of both vessels. (Art. 826, CoC)
2. Both Vessels At Fault
Each vessel must bear its own loss, but as to the other damages,
the passenger and cargoes, they shall be both solidarily liable.
(Art. 827, CoC)
3. Vessel at fault not known
Each vessel must bear its own loss, but both shall be solidarily
liable for losses and damages on the cargoes. (Art. 828, CoC)
Doctrine of Inscrutable Fault
In case of collision where it cannot be determined which between
the two vessels was at fault, both vessels bear their respective
damage, but both should be solidarily liable for damage to the
cargo of both vessels.
4. Third vessel at fault
The third vessel will be liable for all the losses and damages.
(Art. 831, Code of Commerce)
5. Fortuitous event/force majeure
No liability. Each party shall bear its own loss. However, due
diligence must be exercised by the carrier to lessen the
damages before, during, and after the impact (Art. 830, Code
of Commerce).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in case a moving vessel
strikes a stationary object, such as a bridge post, dock, or
navigational aid. (Far Eastern Shipping v. CA, 297 SCRA 301; Luzon
Stevedoring vs. CA, 156 SCRA 169)
MARITIME PROTEST
It is a written statement made under oath by the captain of a vessel
after the occurrence of an accident or disaster in which the vessel or cargo
is lost or damaged, with respect to the circumstances attending such
occurrence, for the purpose of recovering losses and damages.
Excuses for not filing protest: 1) where the interested person is not on
board the vessel; and 2) on collision time, need not be protested. (Art.
836, Code of Commerce)
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SHIPWRECK
It is the loss of the vessel at sea as a consequence of its grounding,
or running against an object in sea or on the coast. It occurs when the
vessel sustains injuries due to a marine peril rendering her incapable of
navigation.
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rests solely in the charterer, such stipulations are valid because they are
freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good custom, public order or public policy.
SWEET LINES VS. CA (121 SCRA 769)
Facts: Herein private respondents purchased first-class tickets from
petitioner at the latters office in Cebu City. They were to board M/V Sweet
Grace bound for Catbalogan, Western Samar. Instead of departing at the
scheduled hour of about midnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel set sail at
3:00 am of July 9, 1972 only to be towed back to Cebu due to engine
trouble, arriving there on the same day at about 4:00 pm. The vessel lifted
anchor again on July 10, 1972 at around 8:00 am. Instead of docking at
Catbalogan (the first port of call), the vessel proceeded direct to Tacloban.
Private respondents had no recourse but to disembark and board a ferry
boat to Catbalogan. Hence, the suit for breach of contract of carriage.
Issue: Whether or not the mechanical defect constitutes a fortuitous
event which would exempt the carrier from liability?
Held: No. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, there was
no fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from
fulfilling its undertaking of taking the private respondents to Catbalogan.
In the first place, mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a
caso fortuito that exempts the carrier from responsibility. In the second
place, even granting arguendo that the engine failure was a fortuitous
event, it accounted on for the delay of departure. When the vessel finally
left the port, there was no longer any force majeure that justified bypassing a port of call.
TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING VS. CA (254 SCRA 260)
Facts: Plaintiff (herein private respondent Atty. Renato Arroyo) bought a
ticket from herein petitioner for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand Vessel to
Cagayan de Oro from Cebu City. Arroyo boarded the vessel in the evening
of November 12, 1991 at around 5:30. At that instance, plaintiff noticed
that some repair works were being undertaken on the evening of the
vessel. The vessel departed at around 11:00 in the evening with only one
engine running.
After an hour of slow voyage, vessel stopped near Kawit Island and
dropped its anchor threat. After an hour of stillness, some passenger
demanded that they should be allowed to return to Cebu City for they
were no longer willing to continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro City.
The captain acceded to their request and thus the vessel headed back to
Cebu City. At Cebu City, the plaintiff together with the other passengers
who requested to be brought back to Cebu City was allowed to disembark.
Thereafter, the vessel proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Plaintiff, the
next day boarded the M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to Cagayan de Oro
City, likewise a vessel of the defendant.
On account of this failure of defendant to transport him to the place
pf destination on November 12, 1991, plaintiff filed before the trial court a
complaint for damages against the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of a common carrier to maintain in
seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage a breach
of its duty?
Held: Undoubtedly, there was, between the petitioner and private
respondent a contract of carriage. Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code,
the petitioner was bound to observed extraordinary diligence in ensuring
the safety of the private respondent. That meant that the petitioner was
pursuant to the Article 1755 off the said Code, bound to carry the private
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respondent safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. In this case, the Supreme Court is in full accord with the
Court of Appeals that the petitioner failed or discharged this obligation.
Before commencing the contact of voyage, the petitioner undertook
some repairs on the cylinder head of one of the vessels engines. But even
before it could finish these repairs it allowed the vessel to leave the port
of origin on only one functioning engine, instead of two. Moreover, even
the lone functioning engine was not in perfect condition at sometime after
it had run its course, in conked out. Which cause the vessel to stop and
remain adrift at sea, thus in order to prevent the ship from capsizing, it
had to drop anchor. Plainly, the vessel was unseaworthy even before the
voyage begun. For the vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately
equipped for the voyage and manned with the sufficient number of
competent officers and crew. The Failure of the common carrier to
maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of
carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil
Code.
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Commonwealth Act. No. 65; Public
Act No. 521, 74th US Congress)
Domestic Trade: Civil Code and Code of Commerce applies.
Foreign Trade: COGSA applies.
The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall
govern the liability of the common carrier for loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods. (Art 1753, NCC)
The Civil Code is the primary law on goods that are being shipped from
a foreign port to the Philippines. However, COGSA remains to be a
suppletory law for international shipping.
For COGSA TO BE
1.
2.
3.
Philippine port).
74
1.
2.
Under the COGSA, suits for loss or damage to the cargo should be
brought within one year after:
1. Delivery of the goods; or
2. The date when goods should have been delivered.
The one-year period shall run from delivery of the last package and is
not suspended by extrajudicial demand. Reasons:
1. Matters affecting transportation of goods by sea should be decided
at the shortest time possible.
2. The Civil Code does not apply to a special law like COGSA.
The rule applies in cases of collision, but it starts not from the date of
collision, but when the goods should have been delivered had the
cargoes been saved.
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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Primordial considerations
convenience.
are
public
interest,
necessity
and
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storage;
Where the operator abandons totally the service. clear
Under section 16 (n) of Public Service Act, the power of the Commission to
suspend or revoke any certificate may only be exercised whenever the
holder thereof has violated or willfully and contumaciously refused to
comply with any order, rule or regulation of the Commission or any
provision of the Act.
General Rule: Prior notice and hearing.
Exception: When it is necessary to avoid serious and irreparable damage
or inconvenience to the public or private interest, in which case, a
suspension not more than 30 days may be ordered, prior to the hearing.
Powers Requiring Notice and Hearing
Issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience or Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity;
Fixing of rates, tolls, and charges;
Setting up of standards and classifications;
Establishment of rules to secure accuracy of all meters and all
measuring appliances;
Issuance of orders requiring establishment or maintenance of
extension of facilities;
Revocation, or modification of Certificate of Public Convenience or
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity;
Suspension of Certificate of Public Convenience or Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity, except when it is necessary to avoid
serious and irreparable damage or inconvenience to the public or
private interest, in which case, a suspension not more than 30 days
may be ordered, prior to the hearing.
Powers Exercisable Without Prior Notice and Hearing
Investigation of any matter concerning public service;
Requiring operators to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service;
Requiring public services to pay expenses of investigation;
Valuation of properties of public utilities;
Examination and test of measuring appliances;
Grant of special permits to make extra or special trips in territories
specified in the certificate;
Uniform accounting system and furnishing of annual reports;
Compelling compliance with the laws and regulations.
ACTS REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL
Establish and maintain individual or joint rates;
Establish and operate new units;
Issue free tickets;
Issue any stock or stock certificates representing an increase of capital;
Capitalize any franchise in excess of the amount actually paid to the
Government;
Sell, alienate, mortgage or lease property, certificates or franchise
UNLAWFUL ACTS OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANIES
Engagement in public service business without first securing the
proper certificate;
Providing or maintaining unsafe, improper or inadequate service as
determined by the proper authority;
Committing any act of unreasonable and unjust preferential treatment
to any particular person, corporation or entity as determined by the
proper authority;
Refusing or neglecting to carry public mail upon request.
PRIOR OPERATOR RULE
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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as it does not operate them to serve the public. In law, there is a clear
distinction between the operation of a public utility and the ownership of
the facilities and the equipment used to serve the public.
ALBANO VS. REYES (175 SCRA 264)
Facts: On April 20, 1987, the PPA ( Philippine Ports Authority ) Board
adopted its Resolution No. 850 directing PPA management to prepare the
Invitation to Bid and all relevant documents and technical requirements
necessary for the public bidding of the development, management and
operation for the MICT ( leasing as well as to implement this project.
Respondent Secretary Reyes created a 7 man Special MICT Bidding
Committee charged with all bid proposals.
After evaluation of the seven companies that submitted bids, the
committee recommended the award of the contract to ICTSI for having
offered the best technical and financial proposal. However, before the
MICT contract could be signed, 2 cases were filed against respondents
which assailed the legality and regularity of the bidding. But on May 18,
1988, the President of the Philippines approved the proposed MICT
Contract with specific directives on the part of the PPA and the contractor
ICTSI.
Meanwhile, Rodolfo Albano, the petitioner filed a petition assailing
the award of the MICT contract to ICTSI claiming that the former is a public
utility and therefore needs a legislative franchise before it can legally
operate as a public utility, pursuant to Article 12, Sec 11 of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the MICT needs a legislative franchise from
Congress to legally operate as a public utility?
Held: NO. EO No. 30 dated July16, 1986 provides for the immediate recall
of the franchise granted to the Manila International Port Terminals Inc.,
and authorize the PPA to take over, manage and operate the Manila
International Port Complex at North Harbor, Manila and undertake the
provision of cargo handling and port related services thereat, in
accordance with PD 857 and other applicable laws and regulations.
Sec. 6 of PD 857 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the PPA
provides as one of the corporate duties of the PPA is to provide services
( whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise ) within the Port Districts
and the approaches thereof including but not limited to
As stated above, PPA has been tasked under EO No. 30, with the
management and operation of the Manila International Port Complex in
accordance with PD 857 and other applicable laws and regulations.
However, PD 857 itself authorizes the PPA to perform the service by itself,
by contracting it out, or through other means. Reading EO No. 30 and PD
857 together, the inescapable conclusion is that the lawmaker has
empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the operation and management
of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by another by
contract or other means at its option. The latter power having been
delegated to the PPA, a franchise from Congress to authorize an entity
other than the PPA to operate and manage the MICP becomes
unnecessary.
Therefore, PPAs act of privatizing the MICT and awarding the
Contract to ICTSI are wholly within its jurisdiction under its Charter which
empowers the PPA to supervise, control, regulate, construct, maintain,
operate and provide such facilities necessary in the ports vested.
LITIMCO VS. LA MALLORCA (18 MAY 1962)
Fact: Tomas Litimco filed a petition with the Public Service Commission
praying for the authority to operate a bus service between Manila and
Malolos via Sta. Isabel using 10 buses. Several operators filed their
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In support of his first two contentions petitioner argues that the 500
passengers found by the Commission as commuting daily from
Norzagaray to Manila could easily be accommodated in the buses of
existing operators; that the existing operators were authorized to operate
31 buses which made around 100 round trips a day; that since a bus could
accommodate about 50 passengers, the existing authorized services could
easily accommodate not only the 500 but even 5000 passengers a day.
Petitioner also asserted that the Commission failed to consider that 200 of
the 500 commuters worked in the Republic Cement Factory located at
Norzagaray and so there were really only 300 commuters daily traveling
on the Norzagaray - Manila line. Petitioner further claimed that the new
terminal proposed in the application was not based on actual need,
because there were no importing firms, or business establishments, or
manufacturing concerns, in Norzagaray, whose employees had to make
trips to the piers at the south harbor in Manila. On the question of public
necessity, petitioner pointed out that the evidence presented by the
respondent consisted only of the testimony of two witnesses who did not
make any formal or systematic study of the movement and frequency of
public utility buses, so that their testimonies were based only on casual
observations. On the other hand, as petitioner pointed out, the oppositors
presented five witnesses, two of whom made meticulous, systematic and
daily observations on the line applied for.
Petitioner likewise asserted that public necessity did not require the
operation of the ten buses applied for by the respondent because of the
fact that on December 20, 1961, the Public Service Commission granted
to herein petitioner, in Case No. 61-5807, authority to operate only 10
buses on the line Norzagaray - Manila, even if he had applied for 20 buses;
and that out of the many applications to operate buses from Paradise
Farms (Bulacan) to Manila, only 10 buses were authorized.
Issue: Whether or not preference over common carriers interest will
prevail over public convenience?
Held: The decision of the Public Service Commission is affirmed.
"While it is the duty of the government as far as possible to protect
public utility operators against unfair and unjustified competition, it is
nevertheless obvious that public convenience must have the first
consideration. . . ." The public convenience is properly served if
passengers who take buses at points in one part of a line are able to
proceed beyond those points without having to change buses. On this
point this Court said:
"It is the convenience of the public that must be taken into account,
other things being equal, and that convenience would be effectuated by
passengers who take buses at points in one part of a line being able to
proceed beyond those points without having to change buses and to wait
the arrival of buses of a competitive operator. We can perceive how under
such conditions one public utility could gain business at the expense of a
rival."
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
88
case, it has been shown that petitioner had not operated all the units that
it was authorized to operate.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
89