Morgan c. Lloyd. Animal Automatism and Consciousness , 1896

Hegeler Institute
ANIMAL AUTOMATISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Author(s): C. Lloyd Morgan
Source: The Monist, Vol. 7, No. 1 (October, 1896), pp. 1-18
Published by: Hegeler Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27897384
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Vol.
VII.
October,
THE
1896.
i.
No.
MONIST.
AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
ANIMALAUTOMATISM
ONE
of those
IN stimulate modern
forcible essays which have done so much to

thought, and to evoke that criticism which gives
to thought new life and interest, Professor Huxley discussed, with

all the fine subtlety tempered by strong common sense which char
acterises his writings, the hypothesis
that animals are automata.1
to which Professor Huxley was led is well known.
The hypothesis which in the time ofDescartes
could be at best but a
bold guess based on scanty and insufficient data, was interpreted in
The
conclusion
the light of modern physiology by an accredited master

branch of science, and was accepted, not only for animals
in that
but for
man himself, with the proviso that automatism is not to be regarded

as necessarily exclusive of consciousness
in any of its phases or in
This essay, at the time of its pub
any degree of its development.
came
in
for
its
share
of criticism. And it is not improb
full
lication,
able that the plain man who reads it to-day, desirous of reaching a
rational and straight-forward interpretation of the phenomena of an
imal life,will be inclined to suspect that in contending that animals
are conscious
automata
outrun his common
Professor
sense.
Such
allowed his subtlety to

Huxley
a one will not readily admit that
his favorite dog is an automatic machine, conscious or unconscious

;
nor will he allow to pass unchallenged
the statement that this view
of the matter
"is
1Collected
Essays,
that which
is implicitly, or explicitly, adopted
Vol.
V.,
I., Essay
by
p. 199.
THE
most
"
persons.
even
And
MONIST.
when
that
is a con
too,
he,
no less than his four-footed companion, he will, I

to accept this conclusion as the last word of that
scious automaton
imagine, hesitate
science which Professor Huxley
himself tells him is trained and or
sense.
common
ganised
is assured
he
In order that we may be in a position to consider how far such

rejection of Professor Huxley's
carefully reasoned conclusion is jus
tifiable, itwill be necessary to quote two or three salient paragraphs
in which his view is set forthwith his usual lucidity of expression.
The following extracts, from the essay in question, will serve to de
fine Huxley's
''
When
of the actions
speak
stinct and not by reason,

are
yet their actions

rest in motion,
but
and
without
of
I believe
nies
of such changes."1
"
Much
ingenious
tion : How
ness,
and,
sumed
to do
engine
the moving
matter
acts ? But
in other words,
mechanical
as the rest of their actions,

called
Their
superfluous.
is the call
sensations,
is the best expres
indicative
volition,
volitions
of which
not
enter
so far as
into
of conscious
matter
in mo
as
it is as
is composed,
suggested,
they desire
the voluntary
to perform?are
they are
the chain
Their
the ques
upon
state
of nature with
the body
is here
is a
and are simply accompanied
the inquiry,
do
which
accompa
not a cause
changes,
times been bestowed
community
the acts which
which
its machinery.
of physical
that volition,
if, as
to the mechanism
to be as completely
and
influence upon
has at various
brutes?or,
consciousness
view
as the steam whistle
is without
is an emotion
to imagine
in voluntary
termed
to be related
of its working,
product
as such, has not the slightest
tion, can act upon
accepted
appear
that working
argument
is it possible
are
which
the
in surround
the function of which
that this generally
of brutes would
of a locomotive
any,
only sets
in relation with changes
of consciousness
as a collateral
if they have
volition,
not
do,
in short,
believe,
system)
in
by
they feel as we
We
organization.
(the nervous
guided
being
known."1
of modifying
any power
animals
is that, though
apparatus,
special
states
those
ideas.
simply
the work
lower
really mean
its movements
with
is provided
sion of the facts at present

'
consciousness
The
of their body
of the
one part of which
and coordinates
ing into existence

emotions,
we
what
the results of their physical
that they are machines,
ing bodies,
position
we
acts of
as purely
by the state of
becomes
concerned,
of causation
of their ac
tions at all.
"It
applies
is quite
to brutes
1p. 238.
true that, to the best of my

holds
equally
good
of men
judgment,
; and,
the argumentation
therefore,
which
that all states of con
2p. 240.
ANIMAL
in them, are
in us, as
sciousness
brain
It seems
substance.
If these
are simply
dowed with
in the only
free will
is, and has been,
which
we
respects
series of causes
the great
cause
is the immediate
as in many
much
of a voluntary
the cause
is not
volition,
brain which
sense
intelligible
the symbol
We
automat
of that state of the
conscious
none
like?but
in unbroken
and effects which,
of the
the feeling we call

en
automata,
of that much-abused
to do as we
are able
are
the
that
conditions
take place
which
illustration,
act, but
of that act.
of the matter
that our mental
of the changes
of
changes
there is no proof
in the motion
that, to take an extreme
; and
by molecular
it follows
based,
as in brutes,
of change
in consciousness
the symbols
in the organism
ically
caused
that in men,
are well
positions
CONSCIOUSNESS.
immediately
to me
is the cause
any state of consciousness

organism.
AND
AUTOMATISM
term?inas
the less parts
continuity,
of
that
composes
sum of existence."1
and shall be?the
I take it that Professor Huxley's position, as set forth in the es

are quoted, may be summed up in
which these passages
from
say
the following propositions :
or molecular
1. Every movement
regarded as a physical
occurrence,
change, in the animal body,

has a physical antecedent or
cause.
2. Certain movements
are
elsewhere,
if under
4.
given
The
term
in the brain or
changes,
of consciousness.
are collateral
products which,
these
conditions
serve merely
changes,
states
by
accompanied
states of consciousness
3. Such
even
or molecular
they always accompany

to signify their presence.
is applicable
"automaton"
to any
piece
of mech
anism, no matter how complex, all the workings of which

in terms of physical causation.
given time are explicable
5. An animal
occurrences
sical
is such a piece
in which
are
of mechanism
accompanied
at any
some of the phy
by
consciousness
above
denned.
as
an
adjunct.
6.
Therefore
animals
are
automata,
as
first of these propositions may claim, I take it, our unhes

itating assent. That every physical occurrence has a physical cause
or antecedent, is the fundamental assumption upon which physical
science carries on its investigations.
So, too, with regard to the
The
second proposition, that certain molecular

changes in the brain or
This expresses, in
elsewhere are accompanied
by consciousness.
!pp.
243-244.
THE
MONIST.
general terms, the conclusion which physiological psychology tends

more and more confidently to endorse.
But the third proposition,
that consciousness
is a collateral product of brain action, introduces
a bit of theory which appears to me neither satisfactory nor neces
I, for one, find as much difficulty in imagining or conceiv
ing how matter inmotion can produce consciousness, which, "as
such, has not the slightest community of nature with matter inmo
sary.
tion," as in conceiving how "volition, which is a state of conscious

ness, can act upon the moving matter of which the body is com
The difficulty in each case appears to me to be precisely
posed."
itwould seem that each one of us has at least
the same. Moreover,
as good reason for believing that one state of consciousness
directly
causation, as that these
suggests another in a chain of psychical
conscious
currences
states are merely collateral products which symbolise oc

in a chain of physical causation.
Furthermore, the intro
of this piece of theory is unnecessary so far as the present

The
is concerned.
discussion
facts, or what we believe to be the
are
as
well
facts,
just
expressed by saying that, from one point of
duction
certain
view,
and
that,
from
have
physical
these
occurrences
ley's main
redundant
physical
another
occurrences
point
concomitants
are
contention
links
have
of view,
conscious
certain
concomitants,
conscious
occurrences
; and that, from either point

in a causation
chain.
itwas.
exactly where
This
It merely
leaves
of view,
Hux
strikes out a
hypothesis.
come now to the fourth proposition.
Professor Huxley
terms
"automaton"
define
the
and
not, indeed, anywhere
We
does
"automatism"
tomaton"
; but the definition above given, that the term "au

to any piece of mechanism
all the workings
is applicable
at any given
time are explicable

in terms of physical caus
from
what is explicitly or im
I
be
inferred
think,
ation, may,
fairly
plicitly contained in the essay. And this is no doubt in accord with
of which
a definition
such
an
where
automaton
as
that given
is described
in the Encyclopaedia
as
"
self-moving
Britannica,
machine,
or one
the principle of motion is contained within the mechanism

It is true that we are told that "the word is generally ap
to contrivances which simulate for a time the motions of ani
inwhich
itself."
plied
ANIMAL
AUTOMATISM
AND
CONSCIOUSNESS.
ifwe apply it to any of the motions of animal life,

there would appear to be no logical grounds for rejecting its appli
And ifwe accept these definitions as
cation to all these motions.
mal
life."
But
position, as summarised in propositions 5 and

they stand, Huxley's
in
follow
6,
logical sequence, and we must hold with him that in the
life of animals
and man
automatism
We
reigns supreme.
first, whether the definition, so
may fairly ask, however,

applied, is in accordance with general usage ; secondly, whether it
is helpful in the study of animal life ; and, thirdly, whether it pre
serves the spirit of the teaching of that acute thinker, Ren? Des
cartes, whose
thought Professor
Huxley
interpreted
in terms of
science.
modern
It certainly does not appear to be in accordance with common

I receive a telegram from a friend,who has recently
usage. When
returned to England,
begging me to come and see him, and delib
erate whether> in view of certain engagements intowhich I have en
tered, I can accede to his request, itwould seem to be scarcely in
accordance with established usage to say that I fill in the reply-tel
egram automatically. Nor would most persons, I imagine, describe
my action as instinctive, as they should do ifHuxley's view be ac
cepted in its entirety, and if, "when we speak of the actions of the
lower animals being guided by instinct, . . . what we really mean
is that, though they feel as we do, yet their actions are the results
For the words which Professor
of their physical organisation."
inserts after instinct?"are

guided by instinct and not by
Huxley
reason "?may be omitted if reason, too, like volition, be no less
than reflex action, "one of the results of our physical organisation."
again, is it in accordance with established usage to call a be
ing which profits by experience and which is susceptible of progres
Nor,
sive
education
an
automaton.
the second question, as to the first, I am disposed to give a

terms are of service just in so far as
Distinctive
negative answer.
they help us to draw the distinctions which are necessary for clear
To
If we universalise the term autom

ness of thought and expression.
atism so as to comprise the whole active life of man and animals,
The term as applied to animal life
it loses all its distinctive value.
THE
MONIST.
just in so far as it serves to distinguish actions which are

automatic from others which are not automatic. On these grounds,
is useful
I am prepared to advocate a more restricted definition, according

to which an automatic action is one that we have reason to suppose
is not performed under the immediate guidance of consciousness,
this phrase being understood to be a shortened expression for "with
the intervention of certain controlling physical occurrences which
are
and
states
by
accompanied
of
sequence
these
of consciousness."
as
occur
they
we
occurrences,
physical
foundly ignorant ; but of the nature

consciousness
Of
are
we
at present
at any
do,
nature
pro
of the states of
and sequence
in ourselves,
exact
the
know
rate,
And we may fairly infer the existence of somewhat

something.
similar states from the observable behavior of animals.
But does Professor Huxley's
position preserve the spirit of the
? I venture to think not. Huxley himself,
teaching of Descartes
in an
earlier
on
essay?that
thus briefly indicates
''
According
to Descartes
imals are performed

as
sciousness
This
rational
by
in man
(and
as
mechanism,
distinction
of the
'chosepensante,'
going on
ern physiologists
is lodged
seat and
to be
in the cortical
instrument
Now what
in the pineal
of the animal
or influenced
so exalted
they adopt
a function
Descartes's
part of the brain?at
he
looks
of the
gland
as
and
soul,'
to the body.
in a sort of cen
of the body.
suppose
least this is commonly
con
'rational
to the little pineal
principle,
and an
upon
it became
spirits,
the operations
aware
Mod
gland, but,
that the soul
regarded
as the
of consciousness."1
is the essential
feature of Descartes's
conception of
Is it not that that which con
?
the part played by consciousness
from
the
automatic
trols, stands apart
control is exercised
ness
and
is superadded
opinion)
lodged
intermediation
in the body,
do not ascribe
sort of way,
in Descartes's
only
soul he conceived
to man
are common
the functions which

a mere
tral office ; and here, by the

of what was
all
the body
the peculiar
in man
in a vague
of the r?le of con
conception
sciousness
which
the Cartesian
on Method"?
Discourse
"Descartes's
in the pineal
1Collected
Essays,
mechanism
? It is true that his enthronement

body was
Vol.
I., Essay
about
as wide
IV., pp.
over which
its
of conscious
of the mark as was his
188-189.
ANIMAL
AND
AUTOMATISM
CONSCIOUSNESS.
conception of the nerves as conduit pipes through which the ani

mal spirits, pumped from the heart to the brain, are emptied into
the muscles.
But if in the latter case his principles were sound,
facts were
conjectural, so, too, in the former case, his

essence though his pineal gland took no
in
conception
share in its elaboration.
And one may be permitted to wonder in
though his
was valid
what
"unwearied
manner,
dissector
and
as
observer"
he was,
Des
cartes regarded the pineal body in the animals he dissected and ob

it an empty throne awaiting its royal occupant ? This,
served. Was
The essential feature of his teaching, as I
however, by the way.
understand
it, is that when,
dence
of guidance
to consciousness,
as in the actions of man, we have evi
and control, in view
of certain
data
afforded
stands
that which guides and controls

apart
re
concerned
in merely automatic
from the bodily mechanism
himself believed that the soul, enthroned in the
sponse. Descartes
pineal
lieved
gland, performed this function.

that the soul used the cerebral
Later
thinkers have
cortex as
be
the instrument
Professor Huxley, wield

through which its control was exercised.
its throne, and
ing the sword of logic, forces the soul to abdicate
by his extended hypothesis of automatism does away altogether
with the conception of guidance and control. But if we dethrone
the soul, and deny its divine right to rule our actions, that is no
reason why we
leave the body politic without any form of

truer inference is that the cerebral cortex is the
should
The
government.
organ of control not as the instrument of the soul, (which may or
are con
may not exist,1 so far as the matters we are discussing
own right. For the cortex itself stands apart

cerned,) but in its
from the lower brain-centres which are concerned in automatism in
the more
restricted sense.2 The
cortex is not the instrument of that
which controls, but is, from the physical point of view, that which
The molecular changes therein, evoked by bodily condi
controls.
tions, are such as to augment, or inhibit (and by augmenting here
!This
I conceive
to be
the rigidly agnostic
position.
as we have more
than once
insisted, seem to
hemispheres,
Professor M. Foster, Text-book
stand apart from the rest of the brain."
of Physi
Part III., p. 999.
ology, 5th Edition,
2"The
cerebral
THE
MONIST.
and inhibiting there to modify1) the action of the lower automatic

centres; and these molecular
changes are accompanied
by con
The
the
to
sciousness.
future may be able
indicate
physiology of
the physical conditions under which control is effected ; but as mat
ters now stand, we know far more about the accompaniments
in
than we do about the concomitant molecular
consciousness
changes.
In describing
therefore what we believe to occur, we may say, if
we desire to be somewhat pedantically
accurate, that the actions
which we term voluntary are the effects of those molecular
changes
are accompanied
; or we may
by consciousness
that they are the results
say in brief and to avoid circumlocution,
of conscious guidance and control.
Thus we preserve the essence
in the cortex which
teaching but interpret it in terms of modern
of Descartes's
scientific
thought.
On all grounds, then, a more restricted definition of the term
"automaton"
than that which Professor Huxley
in his
adopted
on the ground of general usage, on
the ground of scientific utility, and on the ground of historical pre
And our consideration of Descartes's
cedent.
teaching helps us to
later Essay2
reach
seems
further
stricted sense.
out
advisable;
definition
Automatic
the immediate
of
animal
action
and effective
automatism,
is that which
intervention
in
re
the more
is performed with
of those molecular
changes in the cerebral cortex which are accompanied

by conscious
ness (such intervention being rendered possible by association);
action is that which is performed without
or, in brief, automatic
as an adjunct there
guidance and control. Consciousness
no
in
the
be
but
direction
it
share
of
active response.
takes
;
may
returns to the subject of animal automatism
Professor Huxley
conscious
in a subsequent
essay?that
on The Connection of theBiological
Sei
1Descartes
when he likened the rational soul to the

used similar expressions
to increase, or
amidst
the automatic
figures of a grotto "when he wishes
engineer
to slacken, or in some way to alter their movements."
Collected
by Huxley,
Quoted
Vol. I., Essay
IV., p. 183.
Essays,
2 In his
earlier essay on Descartes's

Discourse
he seems to accept
the more re
See his remarks on the effects of education
usage.
by which acts become
Loc. cit., p. 188.
mechanical.
See also the sentences at the top of p. 187.
stricted
ANIMAL
AND
AUTOMATISM
ences with Medicine1
indicates
(1881)?and
views which more
Descartes's
pound
which
is the distinctive
he was
misled
hydraulic
apparatus,
tral source
conception
with
the machines
between
of power,
of that power.
The
of
to carry out,
he was
which
familiar,
the first to pro
with
in all
such
mechanism,,
ancient
the living machine.
and
the parts of the machine

conceived
as clocks
are merely
physiology,
a parallel
its details,
and pieces
passive
of the living body
of
there is a cen
In all such machines
and
school
was
as a physical
as contrasted
temptation
Cartesian
of
had
conceptions
that Descartes
the living body
feature of modern,
by the natural
certain modifications
He
though, as I think, there is no doubt
the fundamental
recent biological
says :2
seemingly rendered necessary.

"But
CONSCIOUSNESS.
distributors
as a machine
of
that kind."
then leads up to the modern conception of

Professor Huxley
as
animal
the
constituted by a multitude of cell-units, together
body
with certain of their products ; and quotes from Bichat the follow
ing intermediate
"All
which
animals,"
performs
the whole.
and
are
They
so many
But
of different
assemblages
concurs,
after its fashion,
of these special machines
of
of
con
which
is itself compounded
in truth constitute
which
natures,
each
organs,
in the preservation
in the general machine
machines
special
each
tissues of very different
many
"are
says Bichat,
its function
the individual.
stitutes
conception
of
the elements
of
these organs."3
In view of this conception of the body as a complex structure

composed of special organs and tissues, supplemented by the more
recent conception of the tissues themselves as constituted of cellu
lar units,
ley thus indicates

"The
actions
says,
proposition
are
of which
''
unquestionably
synthesis
of
an organic
by the known
largely
true.
is that which
metamorphosis
sense
and
in which
and
co-ordinates
true, that
elements
is a machine,
regulates
these
each
school
physiological
the
is," he
the living body
metabolism
the Cartesian
Hux
and motion,
[the cell-units],
functional
and
required
laws of matter
it is also
But
physiological
in the precise
is a
of which
: and
that
understood
units
into
whole."4
^Collected Essays,
zLoc.
of restatement,
that the body of a living man
of Descartes
explicable
of structural
the only machinery,
in need
stand
the nature of the modification
innumerable
[is] susceptible
mechanism,
views
Descartes's
cit., p.
367.
Vol.
III.,
pp.
350 et. seq.
ALoc. cit., pp.
2Loc. cit., pp.
362-363.
368-369.
10
THE
MONIST.
to show that, with regard to the action

then proceeds
Huxley
of the living protoplasm of the cell unit, physiologists fall into two
schools.
First, those "who look with as little favor as Bichat did
upon any attempt to apply the principles and the methods of phys
ics and chemistry to the investigation of the vital processes
of
"
and
and
those
who
;
growth, metabolism,
contractility
secondly,
to molecular
"look
physics to achieve the analysis of living proto
And he himself accepts
plasm itself into a molecular mechanism."
the latter alternative.
matter," he says, "differs from
"Living
other matter in degree and not in kind ; the microcosm
repeats the
macrocosm
; and one chain of causation
connects
the nebulous
inal of suns and planetary systems with the protoplasmic

tion of life and organisation."1
orig
founda
far good.
Professor Huxley, however, does not proceed,
with his accustomed
thoroughness, to exhibit the connexion of this
of
cellular automatism with the modified Cartesian view,
conception
So
to which, he says, the only machinery is that which co

and regulates these physiological
units into an organic
according
ordinates
whole.
I may perhaps
stricted
automatism
under
inwhich
gans
the conditions
of these minute
Groups
bined.
I am
here
to do so in terms of that re
advocating.
cell may be regarded as a minute machine specially fitted

certain chemical products or to undergo certain physical
Every
to produce
changes
which
be permitted
The
which
obtain
cellular machines
in the living body.

constitute tissues and or
their joint and related activities are effectively com

and its pro
organ thus forms a composite machine;
or its physical
changes are the net result of the mechanical
in the cell units of which it is constituted.
transactions
And the
ducts
is an automatic
machine
which
occurs
one in the sense that every physical

or causes.
therein has physical antecedents
change
But it
also presents this peculiarity ; that the structure of the machine

is
modified by its functional activity; that it is to some extent a plastic
machine which is moulded
to its work by the performance of that
work.
So
that ifwe speak of it as a piece of automatic mechanism
1Loc. cit., pp.
370-371.
ANIMAL
we must
remember
AUTOMATISM
AND
CONSCIOUSNESS.
II
that its automatism
is, within certain limits,

; that there is in addition to auto
capable of adaptive modification

matic performance
and automatic
adjustment
something more,
it is well to apply
namely adaptation to new conditions. Whether
"
to such adaptation
the term "automatic
is a matter that is open
to discussion.
The conception of automatism carries with it, for
an idea of relative
fixity and invariability with which the idea

is incongruous ; and I should myself
of plasticity and adaptation
to
to environing conditions is
that
say
prefer
organic adaptation
me,
something beyond and superadded to automatism.

We must in any case distinguish between the multifarious
lecular
and
processes
the
which
processes
co-ordinating
and which
occur
in muscular
and glandular
occur
which
in nervous
mo
tissues
centres,
serve
to give unity to the working of the compound

It is here that we find that ma
mechanism
of the body at large.
chinery, "in the precise sense inwhich the Cartesian school under
stood mechanism,"
which regulates the activities of the physiolo
and
them into an organic whole. But there
units
co-ordinates
gical
are two distinct types of the regulative process involved in this co
ordination
; the one characterised
by relative fixity and invariabil

ity ; the other characterised
by relative plasticity and adaptation.
It is to the former that the term animal automatism is, I conceive,
properly applicable.
in reflex action and
vention of conscious
It comprises that co-ordination which is seen

in instinctive response.
It involves no inter
In so far as it is sub
guidance and control.
it ceases to be automatic in character. Strongly

ject to modification
contrasted with this type of regulative co-ordination
is that which
as
a
to
the
whole.
It
gives plasticity
organism
comprises that co
ordination which
is seen in voluntary action and renders acquisition

a more or less modifying influence on instinc
It exercises
possible.
tive responses
and thus lifts them above
the level of automatism.
It involves the direct intervention of those molecular

cesses which have
choice,
upon
for their conscious
concomitants
on previous
individual experience
the association of impressions and ideas.
On
based
this view an
intelligent (and still more
cortical
what we
pro
term
and dependent
rational)
automa
12
THE
MONIST.
Intelligence takes in hand the au

tomatism presented through heredity, modifies it, and, in the early
days of life drills the activities and reorganises them into habits.
ton is a contradiction
in terms.
a drill-sergeant takes in hand a number of raw recruits

When
he has to keep a vigilant eye on all their actions, checking useless,
or mistaken
misguided,
activity in this direction, eliciting more
more
and
prompt
vigorous response to his commands in that direc
tion ; making his men act not as isolated units but as constituent
members
of a corporate body, and aiming throughout at that co
their future efficiency will depend ; so
ordinated action on which
that, when they take their places in the ranks, each may be ready
to perform his own part, in due subordination to the combined ac
tion of the whole, without faltering and without hesitation.
The
men are duly organised into squads,
on ; and thus we have a disciplined
companies,
army with
battalions,
and so
its brigades, divi

its
with
sions,
army corps ;
artillery, engineers, cavalry, and
infantry ; with its staff divided into intelligence, commissariat, and
medical departments, each with distinctive responsibilities and un
and
der its own especial commanding officers ; the whole capable of the
most varied and yet most orderly evolutions at the will of the com
mander-in-chief.
It is the function of consciousness,

represented in the flesh by
the cerebral cortex, to drill and organise the active forces of the
animal body in a somewhat analogous manner.
But when it enters
finds that a considerable amount of
upon its duties consciousness
the drilling has already been done for it. There is no need to teach
the organic mechanism
how certain activities are to be performed.
are already carried out automatically.
The intelligence de
partment, with its special senses and so forth, is already organised
so far as the supply of information is concerned. The commissariat
They
digestive organs, heart, lungs, and the rest, is in pretty

good working order and eagerly on the look-out for supplies. Many
actions of the reflex kind and of the
complex activities, adaptive
department,
type termed instinctive, are at once performed without the guid

ance of consciousness
under appropriate conditions. Consciousness
on
looks
and
makes a memorandum
of what is going for
merely
ANIMAL
AND
AUTOMATISM
CONSCIOUSNESS.
13
number and the complexity of those instinctive activi

ties that consciousness
thus finds ready to its hand varies in the
The
ward.
different grades of animal life ; being at a maximum

in such forms
as insects and spiders ; being more marked
in birds than inmam
mals
; and being inconspicuous

are, however, also many more
or difficult to trace in man.
There
or less isolated activities, with very

little initial adaptive value, which resemble raw recruits. Such are
the comparatively aimless and random limb-movements of the hu
man
infant, as he lies helpless on his mother's lap. Consciousness

has to lick these into shape ; to combine and organise their vague
efforts in directions that are useful for the purposes of animal life,
to the conditions under which the forces of that life
adapted
are employed ; gradually to bring the effective work done by the
several companies, represented by groups of muscles,
into due re
and
lation to each other ; and to assume the supreme command of all

the forces and thus to carry on the battle of life at the best advan
tage.
an analogy as this must not be pressed too far. It is ad

duced merely for the purposes of illustration. The drill-sergeant,
Such
for example, is dealing with intelligent beings

of directing and controlling their own actions.
as a drill-sergeant
or
instinctive
ties,
is dealing with
random
as
the
automatic
case
may
themselves
But
capable
consciousness
movements
be,
themselves
or activi
incapa
ble of self-guidance.
What
the analogy here serves to illustrate is
this, that neither the drill-sergeant, on the one hand, nor conscious
the activities which
ness, on the other hand, can directly produce
are dealt with.
be done
check
duced
The
activities must be given. The utmost that can

some to increased energy of action and to
is to stimulate
or repress others. The activities cannot be created or pro

: they can only be educed or reduced.
Secondly, just as the
drill-sergeant must vigilantly watch his men, since he is dependent

on such observation for information as to the correct performance
of their actions ; so, too, is consciousness
entirely dependent on the
through the incoming channels or afferent
nerves for the data upon which its guidance, through the exercise
of its power of augmentation, and inhibition, is based.
Thirdly,
information
received
THE
MONIST.
just as the superior officer has to bring into due relation the evolu
tions which are carried out under the control of his subordinates, so
does consciousness
correlate
the data received
of different nerves and co-ordinate
through many groups

a number of varied activities into
a more or less definite course of behavior.
It is true that the anal
ogy here again, to some extent, fails us, since the drill-sergeant and
his superior officer are separate individuals, while consciousness
is
continuous and is drill-sergeant and superior officer rolled into one.
remains unbroken, we
But, though this continuity of consciousness
have
abundant
evidence,
in
the
course
of
our
own
experience,
of
the fact that, during the gradual establishment of the supreme con
scious control of the bodily activities, the regulation of details of ac
is, step by step, relegated to subconscious
guidance,
attention
in
but
little
touch
with, requires
which, though constantly
from, the supreme centres of voluntary control. The horseman, the
cyclist, the pianist, knows well that, when once skill has been at
tive response
tained, such further guidance as is required under the special con

ditions of any particular performance of the act of skill may be safely
left to subconsciousness,
scarcely troubling the attention at all.
Habit has, in large degree, rendered these actions part of the ac
But consciousness,
like a wise superior officer,
quired automatism.
still keeps vigilant watch.
So long as the performance is satisfac
tory and accurate the superior officer sees as if he saw not ; but
as superior officer, steps
when anything goes wrong, consciousness,
inmore
or less smartly and decisively.

Few are likely to question the importance
in animal
life of the
acquisition of habits, including, as we must, under this term, nearly

all the varied forms of animal skill. For even when the skill is
founded upon a congenital
haps, in some instinctive
and instinctive basis,

activities
it is (except, per
of insects and other inverte
to finer and more delicate issues in

brates) improved and guided
course
of individual experience.
So that we may regard the
the
as twofold ; first, it is concerned
in the
function of consciousness
of habits ; and, secondly, it is concerned in the utili
sation of all the active powers, including the habits so established,
in meeting the varied requirements of daily life.
establishment
ANIMAL
AND
AUTOMATISM
CONSCIOUSNESS.
15
then, we may proceed to ask, is the guidance of con

of
effected ? Upon what principles are the acquisition
skill and the utilisation of skill to be explained ?
How,
sciousness
can be no question that, from the psychological

point of
of impressions and ideas is of fundamental im
There
view,
the association
portance.
sociation
question
may be the position assigned to so-called "as

in human psychology,
there can be no
by contiguity"
as to its essential importance in the more primitive psy
Whatever
chology of such animals as young birds and young mammals. When

chicks learn rapidly to distinguish between the caterpillars of the
cinnabar moth and those of the cabbage moth, so that they gobble
up the one without hesitation and avoid the other without fail, they
give us the plainest intimation which can be conveyed by objective
has been formed in either case between
signs that an association
and taste. Professor Preyer notes that his chicks rap
to
the sound of tapping with the presence of
learnt
associate
idly
food. I have elsewhere described how one of my chicks which had
but recently learnt to drink standing in its tin, subsequently stopped
as it ran through the water in such a way as to lead one to infer that
appearance
the wet
feet had become
associated
with
the satisfaction
of thirst.
seemed to associate water with the sight of a

pheasants
on
so thoroughly
which
I gave them drops.
toothpick
Ducklings
associated water with the sight of their tin that they tried to drink
from it and wash in it, though itwas empty, nor did they desist for
Young
some minutes. A young moor-hen, forwhose benefit we had dug up

worms with a spade, and which, standing by, jumped on the just
turned sod and seized every wriggling speck which caught his keen
eye,
would
soon
run
from
some
distance
to me
so
soon
as
I took
hold of the spade.

There is no need to multiply instances of this
kind. The study of these young birds is an impressive lesson in as
sociation psychology, and one daily grows more convinced of the
in the acquisition of experience of this
homely elementary but essentially practical kind.
But it may be said that though association
is unquestiona
importance
of association
bly important, yet its efficiency in the guidance of action depends

that, in a chick which has
upon something deeper still. Granted
16
THE
MONIST.
is formed
first seen and then tasted a nasty morsal, an association
between sight and taste, so that on a subsequent occasion its pecu
is the con
What
liar appearance
suggests its peculiar nastiness.
of a cinnabar caterpillar and the
the nastiness
nexion between
to
eat
the niceness of a
it, or between
checking of the tendency
cabbage moth caterpillar and the added energy with which it is
seized ? Why do taste-stimuli of one kind have the one effect and
taste-stimuli of a different kind have just the opposite effect ?What
are the physiological
concomitants of the augmentation of response
in the one case and of the inhibition of response in the other ease?
that there is but one honest answer
to these questions.
and much beside must be left for the physi
of the future to explain.
This much may be said : Certain
I conceive
We
do not know. This
ology
stimuli
call
forth cortical
the result of which is the

disturbances,
inhibition of activities leading to the repetition of these stimuli;
the result of which is
certain others call forth cortical disturbances
the augmentation
The
able
lead to their repetition.

of the latter we call pleasur
in consciousness of the former we call un
of the activities which

in consciousness
accompaniments
; the accompaniments
distasteful,
pleasant,
ment
of
the
facts
or painful.
as we
at present
That
to be a plain
appears
understand
state
them.
there can be no question as to the strongly-marked hered

of response when the cortical
itary element in such augmentation
have pleasurable
concomitants
disturbances
and the inhibition of
Now
response
when
the
cortical
disturbances
have
unpleasant
concom
is, in fact, grounded on the innate powers or faculties

which the organism derives from its parents or more distant ances
tors. But if the cortical augmentation and inhibition form the basis
itants.
This
all acquisition
of the distinction between
upon which
of that between
automatic
and all control are based, what becomes

instinctive and acquired activities? What
and controlled behavior?
Do we not
come back, after all, to the universal

fessor Huxley?
automatism
advocated
by Pro
Let us look again at the facts. A chick sees for the first time
in its life a cinnabar caterpillar, instinctively pecks at it under the
influence of the visual stimulus ; seizes it, and instinctively shrinks
ANIMAL
AUTOMATISM
AND
CONSCIOUSNESS.
under the influence of the taste stimulus.
17
So farwe have
instinct
Presently we throw to it another similar caterpil

lar. Instinct and automatism alone would lead to a repetition of the
seizing, tasting, shrinking. The
previous series of events?seeing,
and automatism.
oftener the experiment was performed themore smoothly would the

the same se
organic mechanism work, the more definitely would
Is this
quence be repeated?seeing,
seizing, tasting, shrinking.
what we actually observe ? Not at all. On the second occasion the
chick acts differently as the result of the previous
experience.
Though he sees, he does not seize, but shrinks without seizing.
that there is a revival
in memory of the nasty taste.

And in this we seem justified, since we may observe that sometimes
the chick, on such occasions, wipes its bill on the ground as he does
We
believe
when he experiences an unpleasant

the larva. The chick, then, does
instinct and
like an automaton.
taste, though he has not touched

not continue to act merely from
His behavior is modified in the
What,
then, has taken place in and
light of previous experience.
which
this
born
of
modification,
through
experience, is introduced ?
In answering this question we seem to put our finger upon that in
the distinction now regarded as of so much biolog
between congenital and acquired activities?
ical significance?that
virtue of which
has a valid existence.

Association
answer may be given in two words?

and the Suggestion that arises therefrom. The chick's
The
first experience of the cinnabar caterpillar leads to an association

between the appearance
of the larva and its taste ; or, from the
of
the sev
view, a direct connexion between
physiological
point
On the second occasion the taste is sug
the
of
the
cinnabar larva; or, physiologically,
the
gested by
sight
disturbance associated with taste is directly called forth by the dis
It is through association and sug
turbance associated with sight.
eral cortical disturbances.
gestion
behavior
that an organism is able to profit by experience

ceases to be merely instinctive and automatic.
and that its

And
such
seem to be a purely individual matter?founded,

an
no doubt, on
innate basis, linking activities of the congenital
none
but
the
less wholly dependent upon the immediate touch
type,
association
would
of individual experience.
i8
the
monist.
In watching, then, the behavior of young birds or other ani

mals, we observe a development which we interpret as the result of
For the chick, to which a handful
conscious choice and selection.
caterpillars is thrown, chooses out the nice ones and leaves
The selection is dependent upon an in
the nasty ones untouched.
nate power of association which needs the quickening touch of indi
vidual experience to give it activity and definition, without which it
of mixed
lies dormant as a mere potentiality.

On this conscious
selection
and choice depends throughout its entire range this development of
those habits which are acquired as opposed to those which are con
the whole of mental as contrasted with
genital ; and on it depends
merely biological evolution. On it, too, depends the distinction be
tween animal automatism,
in the restricted sense here advocated,
and those higher powers which, though founded thereon, constitute
a new field of evolutionary progress.
C.
Lloyd
Morgan.

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Hegeler Institute

ANIMAL AUTOMATISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS

forcible essays which have done so much to

to thought new life and interest, Professor Huxley discussed, with

the light of modern physiology by an accredited master

man himself, with the proviso that automatism is not to be regarded

outrun his common

allowed his subtlety to

his favorite dog is an automatic machine, conscious or unconscious

is implicitly, or explicitly, adopted

no less than his four-footed companion, he will, I

himself tells him is trained and or

In order that we may be in a position to consider how far such

stinct and not by reason,

yet their actions

as the rest of their actions,

is the best expres

and are simply accompanied

times been bestowed

the acts which

as the steam whistle

as such, has not the slightest

tion, can act upon

the function of which

that this generally

in relation with changes

sion of the facts at present

one part of which

ing into existence

the results of their physical

that they are machines,

true that, to the best of my

that all states of con

is, and has been,

of that state of the

and effects which,

the feeling we call

that our mental

that, to take an extreme

any state of consciousness

the less parts

and shall be?the

I take it that Professor Huxley's position, as set forth in the es

change, in the animal body,

they always accompany

anism, no matter how complex, all the workings of which

some of the phy

first of these propositions may claim, I take it, our unhes

second proposition, that certain molecular

general terms, the conclusion which physiological psychology tends

tion," as in conceiving how "volition, which is a state of conscious

states are merely collateral products which symbolise oc

of this piece of theory is unnecessary so far as the present

; and that, from either point

; but the definition above given, that the term "au

time are explicable

the principle of motion is contained within the mechanism