Guidance On Performing Transportation Risk Analysis of Hazardous Materials

SOFTWARE
Guidance on performing transportation

risk analysis of hazardous materials
Spend your time reducing transportation risks rather
than spending time producing numbers
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SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER
Contents
The hazards and risks of transporting hazardous materials
Transport Risk Assessment
TRA challenges
Mobile transport unit TRA Case Study
Pipeline TRA Case Study
Before we get started
The results
Risk reduction options
References
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The hazards and risks of transporting

hazardous materials
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Pipeline Accidents
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 2014: Gas pipeline leak and explosions, 25 fatalities, 257
injured
Qingdao, China, 2013: Oil pipeline leak and explosion, 62 fatalities, 136
hospitalized. (Wikipedia - 2013 Qingdao pipeline explosion, 2014)
Dalian, China, 2010: Oil release to sea from port for 90km, covering 946km2.
Fatalities and injuries occurred, number not reported. Extent of environmental
damage also not reported. (Wikipedia - 2010 Xingang Port oil spill, 2013)
San Bruno, California, natural gas pipeline explosion, 8 fatalities. (Wikipedia 2010 San Bruno pipeline explosion, 2014)
Ghislenghien, Belgium 2004: 24 fatalities, 120+ injuries. (French Ministry of
Sustainable Development, 2009)
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Mobile Transport Accidents

Oil rail tank car
Lac-Mgantic, Canada, 6/6/2013, 42 fatalities, 5 missing presumed dead. 66 of
69 downtown buildings destroyed (30) or to be demolished (36).
West Virginia, USA, 16/2/15, Fireball, Fires, two towns evacuated, no injuries or
fatalities. Using CPC 1232, not DOT 111 tank cars.
Timmins, Ontario, Canada, 14/2/15, 29 tank cars derailed, fires, no reported
injuries or fatalities.
Road
Kannur, India, 27/8/12, 16 tonne road tanker collision with road divider, 41
seriously injured.
Kannur, India, 13/1/14, 18 tonne LPG tanker car collision and overturned, fire, no
injuries.
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Transport Risk Assessment
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Questions TRA can answer

What would an accident from my pipeline look like?
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http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/09/photogallerie
s/100910-san-bruno-fire-explosion-nation-gas-locationpictures/#/california-san-bruno-gas-explosion-franciscocars_25824_600x450.jpg
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http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/09/photogallerie
s/100910-san-bruno-fire-explosion-nation-gas-locationpictures/#/california-san-bruno-gas-explosion-franciscocars_25824_600x450.jpg
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(Lutostansky, 2013) 35 kW/m2 Radiation Contour for

San Bruno Pipeline Rupture calculated by Safeti

What is the risk to people, property and the environment?
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(UK HSC, 1991) Major Hazard Aspects of the Transport of

Dangerous Substances
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Risk Contours with impact on surrounding population
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What are the benefits of prevention measures that I can take?
Failure frequency and Wall Thickness
Failure frequency per km.yr
0.0007
0.0006
0.0005
y = 0.0015e-0.333x
R = 0.9755
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
0
10
12
14
Wall thickness (mm)
(EGIG 2015)
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What mode of transport should I use?
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Which route should I take?
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What operating conditions optimise production, reliability and safety?
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Which sections of my route requires most attention?
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Where and how frequently should I place my ESD systems?
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What pipeline design shall I use?
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What is the cost-benefit of risk reductions measures?
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Do I comply with regulations?
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Do I comply with regulations?
Has anybody encroached into my High Consequence Area?
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TRA Framework (CCPS, 2008)
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TRA Framework (CCPS, 2008)
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TRA workflow (CCPS, 2008)
TRA challenges
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Scope is large
(CCPS, 2008)
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Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large
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Operating Procedures
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Ignition
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Ignition
Regulations
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Ignition
Regulations
Population
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Ignition
Toxicity
Regulations
Population
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Ignition
Toxicity
Regulations
Population
Traffic information
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Ignition
Toxicity
Regulations
Population
Maps
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Traffic information

Ignition
Toxicity
MSDS
Regulations
Population
Maps
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Traffic information

Ignition
Meteorology
Toxicity
MSDS
Regulations
Population
Maps
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Traffic information

Ignition
Meteorology
Failure Rates
Toxicity
MSDS
Regulations
Population
Maps
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Traffic information
Large x Large = Very Large!
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How do we handle a very large scope?
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How do we handle a very large scope?
TRA study cube (CCPS, 1995)
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What does this mean?
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We cant do everything at once, we need to be strategic
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We need to systematically screen a broad study set and then zoom-in
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Zoom in means:
Use more quantitative methods
Get more accurate local information
Smaller step sizes in the calculations
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Zoom in means:
When should we zoom in?
Sensitive area
Uncertain of the results
When we have detailed data available
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Zoom in means:
When should we zoom in?
Sensitive area
Uncertain of the results
When we have detailed data available
We need to be efficient and systematic using consistent, validated models
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Mobile Transport Unit TRA Case

Study
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Mobile transport unit releases
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We can think of rail cars and tank trucks as vessels which move along a route
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We can assess the reasons why the containment can fail due to:
Operation
Accident initiated event (collision, allision, overturn, derailment)
Non-accident initiated event (corrosion crack, overpressure, valve/fitting leaks)
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Operation
This means we can define a fixed set of cases and then move them along the
route
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Operation
This means we can define a fixed set of cases and then move them along the
route
We can supplement the route releases with fixed point rest stops or high risk
locations such as cross roads
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Route modelling schematic
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Route
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Route
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Route
Effect Zone
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Route
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Route
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Route
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Route
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Route Model Capabilities

Safeti contains a Route model
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We define a folder of potential
accidents
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accidents
We define routes along which the
vehicle may travel
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accidents
vehicle may travel
This can be used for road tankers, rail
cars, barges, ships
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accidents
vehicle may travel
cars, barges, ships
The hazard zones are calculated and
then the risk model spreads them
along the routes
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accidents
vehicle may travel
cars, barges, ships
The hazard zones are calculated and
then the risk model spreads them
along the routes
The failure frequency/distance is
applied to the hazard zone when it is
placed in each location
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Route Model Example - CCPS TRA Guidance 1995 Case Study

From Here To Eternity
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Along either Route 27 or Route 46
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Population changes along each
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Which is the best risk option?
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Which is the best risk option?
Lets look at this in Safeti
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CCPS TRA 1995 Case Study - Safeti Results Summary
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Route 27 PLL: 30/yr
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Route 27 PLL: 30/yr
Route 46 PLL: 0.011/yr
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Route 27 PLL: 30/yr
Who is being impacted and where?
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Route 27 PLL: 30/yr
Route 27 section 1
Route 27 section 2
Route 27 section 3
Total PLL/yr
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7.21
8.89
14.09
30.19

Route 27 PLL: 30/yr
Route 27 section 1
Route 27 section 2
Route 27 section 3
Total PLL/yr
7.21
8.89
14.09
30.19
pop density?
distance?
frequency?
consequence?
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How is this helping you to overcome TRA challenges?
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You can define a large, coarse route and get an overview based on semiquantified parameters
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For example
Put in broad population locations
Put in broad ignition values

Put in different routing with different failure frequencies
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For example

Zoom in and apply more details when you see risks are getting relatively larger or
when hazards are near populations
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For example

Phast and Safetis discharge, dispersion, pool, fire and explosion models are
validated against a wide range of experiments
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For example

Phast and Safetis discharge, dispersion, pool, fire and explosion models are
validated against a wide range of experiments
By systematically approaching this problem you are saving time to apply your
skills to managing safety, not crunching numbers
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Pipeline TRA Case Study
(adapted from CCPS 1995 case study 7.1)
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Pipeline releases
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Pipeline releases
Release
Pressure Front
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Pressure Front
Pipeline releases
Pipelines are continuously variable along their length
Friction causes pressure drop
Pipe construction may be variable
Proximity to ESD
Release
Pressure Front
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Pressure Front
Pipeline releases
Pipelines are continuously variable along their length
Friction causes pressure drop
Pipe construction may be variable
Proximity to ESD
Long distances to consider
Release
Pressure Front
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Pressure Front
New pipeline risk modelling capabilities in Safeti 7.2
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Define your pipeline
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Draw it on a map
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Draw it on a map
Specify where valves are and the valve properties
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Draw it on a map
Define sections of the pipeline which differ:
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Draw it on a map
Elevation
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Draw it on a map
Elevation
Pipe wall thickness
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Draw it on a map
Elevation
Pipe wall thickness
Diameter differences
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Draw it on a map
Elevation
Pipe wall thickness
Safeti creates a complete pipeline definition containing segments to be modelled
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Draw it on a map
Elevation
Pipe wall thickness
Create breaches of interest (small, medium, large etc.) which will be modelled for
all sections along the pipeline
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Draw it on a map
Elevation
Pipe wall thickness
Create breaches of interest (small, medium, large etc.) which will be modelled for
all sections along the pipeline
In addition to the systematic breaches you can produce detailed results from a
location of interest along the pipeline
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Pipeline Case Study adapted from CCPS 1995
(adapted)
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Sour Gas transported 50 miles, past populations from Facility A to Facility B
(adapted)
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Releases:
One inch holes
Full bore rupture
Pinholes are omitted
(adapted)
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Releases:
One inch holes
Full bore rupture
Pinholes are omitted
What level of protection
do we need?
(adapted)
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Case Study Data
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Case Study Data

Pipe: 5 inch OD, 0.337 wall, 4.663 ID
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Case Study Data

Flowrate 0.2 kg/s
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Case Study Data

Flowrate 0.2 kg/s
Pressure: 80 barg
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Case Study Data

Flowrate 0.2 kg/s
Pressure: 80 barg
Product temperature: 30C
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Case Study Data

Flowrate 0.2 kg/s
Pressure: 80 barg
Valve stations: 7 (evenly distributed)
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Case Study Data

Flowrate 0.2 kg/s
Pressure: 80 barg
Valve stations: 7 (evenly distributed)
Consequence scenario inputs:
Elevation 0 ft
Angle 10 from horizontal
Weather conditions: 12C, D11mph, F4.5mph
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Frequency Estimation
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Using (EGIG 2015) we can obtain
failure frequency information
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It is a very sophisticated data
source which allows us to analyse
the frequency of events in detail
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We can look at total failure rates
per breach size
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per breach size
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per breach size
Or we can look at rates for pipe
diameters
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per breach size
diameters
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per breach size
diameters
Given that around 5 inch diameters
sees a peak we should use those
values for our case
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per breach size
diameters
values for our case
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per breach size
diameters
values for our case
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before we get started
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The problems with modelling pipelines
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For the reasons discussed above, every outcome location has different
consequences
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consequences
Pipeline
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consequences
Pipeline
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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consequences
Pipeline
Village
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We need to create individual scenarios for continuously changing release locations
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This requires:
Pipeline pressure at the release location
Distance to closure valves
Local pipe wall thickness
Local burial depth
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This requires:
Pipeline pressure at the release location
Distance to closure valves
Local pipe wall thickness
Local burial depth
The solution in Safeti is to automate this process
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Manually sectioning the pipeline
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Pipeline
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Section 1
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ESD Valves
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Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4
Local wall thickness
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4
Culverted section
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4
Automatically Sub-sectioning the pipeline
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

pressure drop
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

pressure drop
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

pressure drop
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

pressure drop
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

pressure drop
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

pressure drop
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

pressure drop
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

pressure drop
Section 1
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Section 2
Section 3
Section 4

pressure drop
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pressure drop
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Sub section 8
Sub section 7
Sub section 6
Sub section 5
Sub section 4
Sub section 3
Sub section 2
Sub section 1

pressure drop
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Sub section 8
Sub section 7
Sub section 6
Sub section 5
Sub section 4
Sub section 3
Sub section 2
Sub section 1

pressure drop
mass flowrate
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Sub section 8
Sub section 7
Sub section 6
Sub section 5
Sub section 4
Sub section 3
Sub section 2
Sub section 1
Continuously variable scenarios

We can now calculate release scenarios for every sub-section
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Sub section 8
Sub section 7
Sub section 6
Sub section 5
Sub section 4
Sub section 3
Sub section 2
Sub section 1

Each sub-section will comprise location specific properties
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Sub section 8
Sub section 7
Sub section 6
Sub section 5
Sub section 4
Sub section 3
Sub section 2
Sub section 1

Each sub-section will comprise location specific properties
Safety systems are modelled, giving rise to cases for:
Valves close
Upstream valve fails to close
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Sub section 8
Sub section 7
Sub section 6
Sub section 5
Sub section 4
Sub section 3
Sub section 2
Sub section 1
Downstream valve fails to close
Lets take a look at the results
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Study set up
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Pipeline construction
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Pipeline construction
Lets look at this in Safeti
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Auto sectioning results
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Pressure drop along pipeline
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1 Inch Breach
Average Release Duration vs Downstream Distance
1800
Average Release Duration (s)
1600
1400
1200
1000
No Isolation
Full Isolation
800
Successful Upstream Isolation

Successful Downstream Isolation
600
400
200
0
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
Downstream distance (m)
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60000
70000
80000
1 Inch Breach
Average Mass Flowrate vs Downstream Distance
20
18
Mass flowrate (kg/s)
16
14
12
No Isolation
10
Full Isolation
6
4
2
0
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
Downstream Distance (m)
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60000
70000
80000
Full Bore Rupture

Release Duration vs Downstream Distance
700
Release Duration (s)
600
500
400
No Isolation
Full Isolation
300

200
100
0
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
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70000
80000
Full Bore Rupture

Average Release Rate vs Downstream Distance
100
Average Release Rate (kg/s)
90
80
70
60
No Isolation
50
Full Isolation
40
30
20
10
0
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
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70000
80000
Risk Contours
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FN Curve
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FN Curve
Is this as low
as reasonably
practicable?
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Risk reduction options
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Failure frequency effects of pipe wall thickness (EGIG 2015)
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Failure frequency correlations
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Discrete
Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
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Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
0.00056
0.000167
0.00002

Discrete
Wall thickness (mm)
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
wt<5
0.00056
5<wt<10
0.000167
10<wt<15
0.00002
Failure Frequency (/km.yr)
Discrete Failure Frequency and Wall

Thickness
54
0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
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10
Wall Thickness (mm)
15
20

Exponential interpolation
Discrete
Wall thickness (mm)
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
wt<5
0.00056
5<wt<10
0.000167
10<wt<15
0.00002

Thickness
54
0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
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10
Wall Thickness (mm)
15
20

Discrete
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
wt<5
0.00056
5<wt<10
0.000167
10<wt<15
0.00002
0.0007
Failure frequency (/km.yr)
Wall thickness (mm)

Thickness
54
0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
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0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
10
Wall Thickness (mm)
15
20
10
Wall thickness (mm)
15

Discrete
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
wt<5
F = 0.0015e-0.333t
0.00056
5<wt<10
0.000167
10<wt<15
0.00002
0.0007
Wall thickness (mm)

Thickness
54
0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
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0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
10
Wall Thickness (mm)
15
20
10
Wall thickness (mm)
15

Discrete
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
wt<5
F = 0.0015e-0.333t
0.00056
5<wt<10
0.000167
10<wt<15
0.00002
0.0007
Wall thickness (mm)

Thickness
54
0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
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0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
10
Wall Thickness (mm)
15
20
10
Wall thickness (mm)
15

Discrete
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
wt<5
F = 0.0015e-0.333t
0.00056
5<wt<10
0.000167
10<wt<15
0.00002
0.0007
Wall thickness (mm)

Thickness
54
0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
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0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
10
Wall Thickness (mm)
15
20
10
Wall thickness (mm)
15

Discrete
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
wt<5
F = 0.0015e-0.333t
0.00056
5<wt<10
0.000167
10<wt<15
Caution!
0.00002
0.0007
Wall thickness (mm)

Thickness
54
0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
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0.0006
0.0005
0.0004
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0
10
Wall Thickness (mm)
15
20
10
Wall thickness (mm)
15
Translating trends into practical tools
Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
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Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
0.00056
0.000167
0.00002
Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
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Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
0.00056
0.000167
0.00002
We didnt use
this failure
frequency for
our base case
Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
0.00056
0.000167
We didnt use
this failure
frequency for
our base case
0.00002
We used a failure frequency of 0.401/1000 km.yr as per EGIG table 3.
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Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
0.00056
0.000167
We didnt use
this failure
frequency for
our base case
0.00002

This is important as we wanted to account for the adverse influence of our
5 diameter pipeline.
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Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
0.00056
0.000167
We didnt use
this failure
frequency for
our base case
0.00002

5 diameter pipeline, not including pin holes.
5 pipes are easier to break!
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Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
0.00056
0.000167
We didnt use
this failure
frequency for
our base case
0.00002

We must therefore use the Wall Thickness failure frequency effect as a
factored influence on our base case, rather than as an absolute frequency.
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Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
0.00056
0.000167
0.00002

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Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
Factor
0.00056
3.35
0.000167
0.00002
0.12

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Wall thickness (mm)

wt<5
5<wt<10
10<wt<15
Failure Frequency
(/km.yr)
Factor
0.00056
3.35
0.000167
0.00002
0.12

Our 0.401/1000km.yr can be factored by 0.12 to 0.04812/1000km.yr
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Risk reduction measure 1 use 12mm pipe wall everywhere
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x10 reduction
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Risk reduction measure 2 use 12mm pipe wall near towns
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Societal Comparison
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Societal Comparison
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Societal Comparison
Can make a cost

benefit decision
about steel costs
and risk reduction
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Conclusions
TRA is vast and complex
There are excellent resources such as EGIG and OGP reports which can provide us
with guidance on how to model accidents and how to predict the effect of risk
reduction measures
Use caution when applying information sources to your cases (E.g. EGIG is for
steel, methane pipelines)
Software tools exist which can speed up systematic work
Making the laborious parts of a TRA more efficient frees us up to ask What If?
and make better risk management decisions, and hence improve safety
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References
CCPS. (1995). Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis. New York:
AIChE.
CCPS. (2008). Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Safety, Security and Risk
Management. Hoboken: Wiley.
Lutostansky, E., Shork, J., Ludwig, K., Creitz, L., & Jung, S. (2013). Release
Scenario Assumptions for Modeling Risk From Underground Gaseous Pipelines.
Global Congress on Process Safety. AIChE CCPS.
EGIG. (2015). 9th Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group.
Groningen: European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group.
OGP. (2010 - 434-7). Consequence Modelling Report - 434-7. London, International
Association of Oil & Gas Producers.
Hickey, C., Oke, A., Pipeline Transportation of Hazardous Materials an Updated
Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodology, CCPS China, Qingdao, 2014
Safeti. DNV GL. dnvgl.com/safeti
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www.dnvgl.com
SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER
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Guidance On Performing Transportation Risk Analysis of Hazardous Materials

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The hazards and risks of transporting

Mobile Transport Accidents

Transport Risk Assessment

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

(Lutostansky, 2013) 35 kW/m2 Radiation Contour for

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

(UK HSC, 1991) Major Hazard Aspects of the Transport of

Questions TRA can answer

Risk Contours with impact on surrounding population

Questions TRA can answer

Failure frequency per km.yr

Wall thickness (mm)

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

Questions TRA can answer

TRA Framework (CCPS, 2008)

TRA Framework (CCPS, 2008)

TRA workflow (CCPS, 2008)

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Level of detail needed for accurate modelling is large

Large x Large = Very Large!

How do we handle a very large scope?

How do we handle a very large scope?

TRA study cube (CCPS, 1995)

What does this mean?

What does this mean?

What does this mean?

What does this mean?

What does this mean?

What does this mean?

We need to be efficient and systematic using consistent, validated models

Mobile Transport Unit TRA Case

Mobile transport unit releases

Mobile transport unit releases

Mobile transport unit releases