Central Bank Employees Assn Vs Bangko Sentral NG Pilipinas - 148208 - December 15, 2004 - J

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CentralBankEmployeesAssnvsBangkoSentralngPilipinas:148208:December15,2004:J.Puno:EnBanc:Decison
ENBANC
[G.R.No.148208.December15,2004]
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION,INC.,petitioner,vs.BANGKOSENTRALNGPILIPINAS
andtheEXECUTIVESECRETARY,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO,J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the

ground that its continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold
that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other
governmentalfinancialinstitutions(GFIs),thecontinuedoperationofthelastprovisoofSection
15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the
2,994rankandfileemployeesoftheBangkoSentralngPilipinas(BSP).
I.
TheCase
Firstthefacts.
OnJuly3,1993,R.A.No.7653(theNewCentralBankAct)tookeffect.Itabolishedtheold
CentralBankofthePhilippines,andcreatedanewBSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner
Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against
BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from
furtherimplementingthelastprovisoinSection15(c),ArticleIIofR.A.No.7653,ontheground
thatitisunconstitutional.
ArticleII,Section15(c)ofR.A.No.7653provides:
Section15.ExerciseofAuthorityIntheexerciseofitsauthority,theMonetaryBoardshall:
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(c)establishahumanresourcemanagementsystemwhichshallgoverntheselection,
hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system
shallaimtoestablishprofessionalismandexcellenceatalllevelsoftheBangkoSentral
inaccordancewithsoundprinciplesofmanagement.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/dec2004/148208.htm
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BangkoSentralshumanresourcedevelopmentprogram:Provided,ThattheMonetary
Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles
provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided,
however,Thatcompensationandwagestructureofemployeeswhosepositions
fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribedunderRepublicActNo.6758.[emphasissupplied]
Thethrustofpetitionerschallengeisthattheaboveprovisomakesanunconstitutional
cutbetweentwoclassesofemployeesintheBSP,viz:(1)theBSPofficersorthoseexempted
fromthecoverageoftheSalaryStandardizationLaw(SSL)(exemptclass)and(2)therank
andfile (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the
SSL (nonexempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class
legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but
solelyontheSGoftheBSPpersonnelsposition.Petitioneralsoclaimsthatitisnotgermaneto
the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to
[1]
establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the
followingsubsetofarguments:
a.thelegislativehistoryofR.A.No.7653showsthatthequestionedprovisodoesnotappearin
the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of
[2]
SenateBillNo.1235
b.subjectingthecompensationoftheBSPrankandfileemployeestotherateprescribedbythe
[3]
SSLactuallydefeatsthepurposeofthelaw ofestablishingprofessionalismandexcellence
[4]
atalllevelsintheBSP (emphasissupplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of
Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even
[5]
admittedbyonesenatorasdiscriminatoryagainstlowsalariedemployeesoftheBSP
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL thus
withintheclassofrankandfilepersonnelofgovernmentfinancialinstitutions(GFIs),theBSP
[6]
rankandfilearealsodiscriminatedupon and
e.theassailedprovisohascausedthedemoralizationamongtheBSPrankandfileandresulted
[7]
inthegrossdisparitybetweentheircompensationandthatoftheBSPofficers.
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and
[8]
capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also
stresses:(a)thatR.A.No.7653hasaseparabilityclause,whichwillallowthedeclarationofthe
unconstitutionalityoftheprovisoinquestionwithoutaffectingtheotherprovisionsand(b)the
urgencyandproprietyofthepetition,assome2,994BSPrankandfileemployeeshavebeen
prejudicedsince1994whentheprovisowasimplemented.Petitionerconcludesthat:(1)since
the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation of such
amounts to lack of jurisdiction and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequateremedyintheordinarycourseexceptthroughthispetitionforprohibition,whichthis
Courtshouldtakecognizanceof,consideringthetranscendentalimportanceofthelegalissue
[9]
involved.
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[10]
Respondent BSP, in its comment,
contends that the provision does not violate the
equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in
harmonywithotherprovisionsofthesamelaw,suchasfiscalandadministrativeautonomyof
BSP,andthemandateoftheMonetaryBoardtoestablishprofessionalismandexcellenceatall
levelsinaccordancewithsoundprinciplesofmanagement.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the
validityoftheprovision.Quitesimplistically,hearguesthattheclassificationisbasedonactual
and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to
establishprofessionalismandexcellencewithintheBSPsubjecttoprevailinglawsandpolicies
[11]
ofthenationalgovernment.
II.
Issue
Thus, the sole albeit significant issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last
paragraphofSection15(c),ArticleIIofR.A.No.7653,runsafouloftheconstitutionalmandate
[12]
that"Nopersonshallbe...deniedtheequalprotectionofthelaws."
III.
Ruling
A.UNDERTHEPRESENTSTANDARDSOFEQUAL
PROTECTION,SECTION15(c),ARTICLEIIOFR.A.NO.7653
ISVALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the
classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutionalinfirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde
[13]
[14]
RopeWorkersUnion,
andreiteratedinalonglineofcases:
Theguarantyofequalprotectionofthelawsisnotaguarantyofequalityintheapplicationof
thelawsuponallcitizensofthestate.Itisnot,therefore,arequirement,inordertoavoidthe
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
requirethatthingswhicharedifferentinfactbetreatedinlawasthoughtheywerethesame.
Theequalprotectionclausedoesnotforbiddiscriminationastothingsthataredifferent.Itdoes
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not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territorywithinwhichitistooperate.
TheequalprotectionofthelawsclauseoftheConstitutionallowsclassification.Classificationin
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculationorpracticebecausetheyagreewithoneanotherincertainparticulars.Alawisnot
invalidbecauseofsimpleinequality.Theveryideaofclassificationisthatofinequality,sothatit
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law that it must not be limited to
existingconditionsonlyandthatitmustapplyequallytoeachmemberoftheclass.ThisCourt
hasheldthatthestandardissatisfiediftheclassificationordistinctionisbasedonareasonable
foundationorrationalbasisandisnotpalpablyarbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over
matterswithinitsjurisdiction,thestateisrecognizedasenjoyingawiderangeofdiscretion.Itis
notnecessarythattheclassificationbebasedonscientificormarkeddifferencesofthingsorin
theirrelation.Neitherisitnecessarythattheclassificationbemadewithmathematicalnicety.
Hence,legislativeclassificationmayinmanycasesproperlyrestonnarrowdistinctions,forthe
equalprotectionguarantydoesnotprecludethelegislaturefromrecognizingdegreesofevilor
harm,andlegislationisaddressedtoevilsastheymayappear.(citationsomitted)
[15]
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.
The equal
protectionclauseisnotinfringedbylegislationwhichappliesonlytothosepersonsfallingwithin
[16]
a specified class.
If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
[17]
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.
The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
[18]
belongingtothesameclass.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers
(SG20andabove)fromtheSSLwasintendedtoaddresstheBSPslackofcompetitivenessin
terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate
againsttherankandfile.Iftheendresultdidinfactleadtoadisparityoftreatmentbetweenthe
officersandtherankandfileintermsofsalariesandbenefits,thediscriminationordistinction
hasarationalbasisandisnotpalpably,purely,andentirelyarbitrary inthelegislativesense.
[19]
Thattheprovisionwasaproductofamendmentsintroducedduringthedeliberationofthe
Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent
[20]
cases,
this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse
invalidatingaprovisionoflaw,onthegroundthatthebillfromwhichitoriginatedcontainedno
such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both
Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be
[21]
resolvedinfavoroftheconstitutionalityofastatute.
Anactofthelegislature,approvedby
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[22]
theexecutive,ispresumedtobewithinconstitutionallimitations.
Tojustifythenullificationof
a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
[23]
equivocalbreach.
B.THEENACTMENT,HOWEVER,OFSUBSEQUENTLAWS
EXEMPTINGALLOTHERRANKANDFILEEMPLOYEES
OFGFIsFROMTHESSLRENDERSTHECONTINUED
APPLICATIONOFTHECHALLENGEDPROVISION
AVIOLATIONOFTHEEQUALPROTECTIONCLAUSE.
WhileR.A.No.7653startedasavalidmeasurewellwithinthelegislaturespower,wehold
that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rankandfile employees of other
GFIsleechedallvalidityoutofthechallengedproviso.
1.Theconceptofrelativeconstitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere
comparisonofitsprovisionswithapplicableprovisionsoftheConstitution,sincethestatutemay
beconstitutionallyvalidasappliedtoonesetoffactsandinvalidinitsapplicationtoanother.
[24]
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
[25]
circumstances.
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory,itsvalidity,eventhoughaffirmedbyaformeradjudication,isopentoinquiryand
[26]
investigationinthelightofchangedconditions.
[27]
DemonstrativeofthisdoctrineisVernonParkRealtyv.CityofMountVernon,
where
theCourtofAppealsofNewYorkdeclaredasunreasonableandarbitraryazoningordinance
whichplacedtheplaintiff'spropertyinaresidentialdistrict,althoughitwaslocatedinthecenter
ofabusinessarea.Lateramendmentstotheordinancethenprohibitedtheuseoftheproperty
exceptforparkingandstorageofautomobiles,andservicestationwithinaparkingarea.The
Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to
constitutionaldueprocess.Itruled:
Whilethecommoncouncilhastheunquestionedrighttoenactzoninglawsrespectingtheuse
ofpropertyinaccordancewithawellconsideredandcomprehensiveplandesignedtopromote
publichealth,safetyandgeneralwelfare,suchpowerissubjecttotheconstitutionallimitation
that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning
ordinanceprecludestheuseofthepropertyforanypurposeforwhichitisreasonablyadapted.
Bythesametoken,anordinancevalidwhenadoptedwillneverthelessbestrickendown
as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves
confiscatorysuch, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which
[28]
thecourtswillaffordreliefinanappropriatecase.
(citationsomitted,emphasissupplied)
InthePhilippinesetting,thisCourtdeclaredthecontinuedenforcementofavalidlawas
unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v.
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[29]
Esteban
upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law its enactment and operation
[30]
beingavalidexercisebytheStateofitspolicepower
butalsoruledthatthecontinued
enforcementoftheotherwisevalidlawwouldbeunreasonableandoppressive.Itnoted
thesubsequentchangesinthecountrysbusiness,industryandagriculture.Thus,thelawwas
set aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the
[31]
oppressionofthecreditors.Thelandmarkrulingstates:
Thequestionnowtobedeterminedis,istheperiodofeight(8)yearswhichRepublicActNo.
342grantstodebtorsofamonetaryobligationcontractedbeforethelastglobalwarandwhois
a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission
reasonableunderthepresentcircumstances?
ItshouldbenotedthatRepublicActNo.342onlyextendsrelieftodebtorsofprewarobligations
who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the
PhilippineWarDamageCommission.Itisthereinprovidedthatsaidobligationshallnotbedue
anddemandableforaperiodofeight(8)yearsfromandaftersettlementoftheclaimfiledby
the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay
their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is
admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is
notsowithregardtothosewhohavesufferedtheravagesofwarandsoitwasthereindeclared
asapolicythatastothemthedebtmoratoriumshouldbecontinuedinforce(Section1).
Butweshouldnotlosesightofthefactthattheseobligationshadbeenpendingsince1945as
aresultoftheissuanceofExecutiveOrdersNos.25and32andatpresenttheirenforcementis
still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be
unenforceable during the eightyear period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an
opportunitytorehabilitatethemselves,whichinplainlanguagemeansthatthecreditorswould
havetoobserveavigilofatleasttwelve(12)yearsbeforetheycouldeffectaliquidationoftheir
investmentdatingasfarbackas1941.hisperiodseemstousunreasonable,ifnotoppressive.
While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded
works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to
effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the
injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest
duringtheoperationoftherelief,unlikesimilarstatutesintheUnitedStates.
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Inthefaceoftheforegoingobservations,andconsistentwithwhatwebelievetobeastheonly
course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us
under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and
enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same
shouldbedeclarednullandvoidandwithouteffect.(emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)
2.Applicabilityoftheequalprotectionclause.
[32]
Intherealmofequalprotection,theU.S.caseofAtlanticCoastLineR.Co.v.Ivey
isilluminating.TheSupremeCourtofFloridaruledagainstthecontinuedapplicationofstatutes
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authorizingtherecoveryofdoubledamagesplusattorney'sfeesagainstrailroadcompanies,for
animalskilledonunfencedrailroadrightofwaywithoutproofofnegligence.Competitivemotor
carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they
werenotyetinexistencewhenthestatuteswereenacted.TheCourtruledthatthestatutes
becameinvalidasdenyingequalprotectionofthelaw,inviewofchangedconditionssince
theirenactment.
[33]
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,
the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a
railroadcompanyofprovingthatitwasfreefromnegligenceinthekillingorinjuryofcattlebyits
engineorcars.This,notwithstandingthattheconstitutionalityofthestatute,enactedin
1893,hadbeenpreviouslysustained.RuledtheCourt:
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar
corporations and had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of
property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration
and development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common
carriersoffreightandpassengerscreatedevengreaterriskstothesafetyofoccupantsofthe
vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the
operatorsofthatmodeofcompetitivetransportationarenotsubjecttothesameextraordinary
legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for
killingthemontheirprivaterightsofway.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v.
Walters,294U.S.405,55S.Ct.486,488,79L.Ed.949,stated,Astatutevalidwhenenacted
maybecomeinvalidbychangeintheconditionstowhichitisapplied.Thepolicepoweris
subjecttotheconstitutionallimitationthatitmaynotbeexertedarbitrarilyorunreasonably.A
numberofprioropinionsofthatcourtarecitedinsupportofthestatement.TheStateofFlorida
formanyyearshadastatute,F.S.A.356.01etseq.imposingextraordinaryandspecialduties
upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad company was liable for double
damagesandanattorney'sfeeforkillinglivestockbyatrainwithouttheownerhavingtoprove
anyactofnegligenceonthepartofthecarrierintheoperationofitstrain.InAtlanticCoastLine
Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle
transportationrenderedthestatuteunconstitutionalsinceifacommoncarrierbymotorvehicle
had killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the
[34]
operationofitsequipment.Saidthecourt,Thiscertainlyisnotequalprotectionofthelaw.
(emphasissupplied)
Echoesoftheserulingsresonateinourcaselaw,viz:
[C]ourtsarenotconfinedtothelanguageofthestatuteunderchallengeindeterminingwhether
that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be
grosslydiscriminatoryinitsoperation.Thoughthelawitselfbefaironitsfaceandimpartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and
unequalhand,soaspracticallytomakeunjustandillegaldiscriminationsbetweenpersonsin
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
[35]
prohibitionoftheConstitution.
(emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which
permitsofsuchdenial.Alawmayappeartobefaironitsfaceandimpartialinappearance,
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yet,ifitpermitsofunjustandillegaldiscrimination,itiswithintheconstitutionalprohibition..In
otherwords,statutesmaybeadjudgedunconstitutionalbecauseoftheireffectinoperation.Ifa
[36]
law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. .
(emphasissupplied,citationsomitted
3.EnactmentofR.A.Nos.7907+8282+8289+8291+8523+8763
+9302=consequentialunconstitutionalityofchallengedproviso.
Accordingtopetitioner,thelastprovisoofSection15(c),ArticleIIofR.A.No.7653isalso
violativeoftheequalprotectionclausebecauseafteritwasenacted,thechartersoftheGSIS,
LBP,DBPandSSSwerealsoamended,butthepersonnelofthelatterGFIswereallexempted
[37]
fromthecoverageoftheSSL.
Thus,withintheclassofrankandfilepersonnelofGFIs,the
BSPrankandfilearealsodiscriminatedupon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993,
CongressalsoundertooktheamendmentofthechartersoftheGSIS,LBP,DBPandSSS,and
threeotherGFIs,from1995to2004,viz:
1.R.A.No.7907(1995)forLandBankofthePhilippines(LBP)
2.R.A.No.8282(1997)forSocialSecuritySystem(SSS)
3.R.A.No.8289(1997)forSmallBusinessGuaranteeandFinanceCorporation,(SBGFC)
4.R.A.No.8291(1997)forGovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem(GSIS)
5.R.A.No.8523(1998)forDevelopmentBankofthePhilippines(DBP)
[38]
6.R.A.No.8763(2000)forHomeGuarantyCorporation(HGC)
and
7.R.A.No.9302(2004)forPhilippineDepositInsuranceCorporation(PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven
otherGFIssharethiscommonproviso:ablanketexemptionofalltheiremployeesfromthe
coverageoftheSSL,expresslyorimpliedly,asillustratedbelow:
1.LBP(R.A.No.7907)
Section10.Section90of[R.A.No.3844]isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
Section90.Personnel.
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All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system
and qualification standards approved by the Banks Board of Directors based on a
comprehensivejobanalysisandauditofactualdutiesandresponsibilities.Thecompensation
planshallbecomparablewiththeprevailingcompensationplansintheprivatesectorandshall
be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without
prejudicetoyearlymeritreviewsorincreasesbasedonproductivityandprofitability.TheBank
shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation,
position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its
system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758.
(emphasissupplied)
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2.SSS(R.A.No.8282)
Section1.[AmendingR.A.No.1161,Section3(c)]:
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(c)TheCommission,upontherecommendationoftheSSSPresident,shallappointanactuary
andsuchotherpersonnelasmay[be]deemednecessaryfixtheirreasonablecompensation,
allowances and other benefits prescribe their duties and establish such methods and
proceduresasmaybenecessarytoinsuretheefficient,honestandeconomicaladministration
oftheprovisionsandpurposesofthisAct:Provided,however,ThatthepersonneloftheSSS
below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further,
ThatthepersonnelappointedbytheSSSPresident,exceptthosebelowtherankofassistant
manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission Provided further, That the
personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil
service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the
provisionsofRepublicActNo.6758andRepublicActNo.7430.(emphasissupplied)
3.SBGFC(R.A.No.8289)
Section8.[AmendingR.A.No.6977,Section11]:
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TheSmallBusinessGuaranteeandFinanceCorporationshall:
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(e)notwithstandingtheprovisionsofRepublicActNo.6758,andCompensationCircular
No.10,seriesof1989issuedbytheDepartmentofBudgetandManagement,theBoardof
DirectorsofSBGFCshallhavetheauthoritytoextendtotheemployeesandpersonnel
thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently
enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other government financial institutions.
(emphasessupplied)
4.GSIS(R.A.No.8291)
Section1.[AmendingSection43(d)].
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Sec.43.PowersandFunctionsoftheBoardofTrustees.The Board ofTrustees shallhave
thefollowingpowersandfunctions:
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(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS
organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review,
reviseandadjusttheappropriatecompensationpackagefortheofficersandemployeesofthe
GSISwithreasonableallowances,incentives,bonuses,privilegesandotherbenefitsasmaybe
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necessary or proper for the effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS,
which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law.
(emphasissupplied)
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5.DBP(R.A.No.8523)
Section6.[AmendingE.O.No.81,Section13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. The Board of Directors shall provide for an
organizationandstaffofofficersandemployeesoftheBankanduponrecommendationofthe
PresidentoftheBank,fixtheirremunerationsandotheremoluments.AllpositionsintheBank
shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and qualification
standardsapprovedbytheBoardofDirectorsbasedonacomprehensivejobanalysisofactual
duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensationplansintheprivatesectorandshallbesubjecttoperiodicreviewbytheBoardof
Directorsonceeverytwo(2)years,withoutprejudicetoyearlymeritorincreasesbasedonthe
Banks productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing
laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards.TheBankshallhowever,endeavortomakeitssystemconformascloselyas
possiblewiththeprinciplesunderCompensationandPositionClassificationActof1989
(RepublicActNo.6758,asamended).(emphasissupplied)
6.HGC(R.A.No.8763)
Section9.Powers,FunctionsandDutiesoftheBoardofDirectors.TheBoardshallhavethe
followingpowers,functionsandduties:
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(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and
administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty
Corporation(HGC)shallbegovernedbyacompensationandpositionclassificationsystemand
qualifications standards approved by the Corporations Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further,
Thatthecompensationplanshallbecomparablewiththeprevailingcompensationplans
intheprivatesectorandwhichshallbeexemptfromRepublicActNo.6758,otherwise
knownastheSalaryStandardizationLaw,andfromotherlaws,rulesandregulationson
salaries and compensations and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the
CorporationsandtheemployeescontributionstotheFund(emphasissupplied)
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7.PDIC(R.A.No.9302)
Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to
read:
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3.
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A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to
the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporations human
resource development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be
governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards
approvedbytheBoardbasedonacomprehensivejobanalysisandauditofactualdutiesand
responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall be subject to
review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit
reviewsorincreasesbasedonproductivityandprofitability.TheCorporationshalltherefore
be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system
conformascloselyaspossiblewiththeprinciplesunderRepublicActNo.6758,asamended.
(emphasessupplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rankandfile of
seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank
andfile of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioners injury, even the Securities and
ExchangeCommission(SEC)wasgrantedthesameblanketexemptionfromtheSSLin2000!
[39]
ThepriorviewontheconstitutionalityofR.A.No.7653wasconfinedtoanevaluationof
itsclassificationbetweentherankandfileandtheofficersoftheBSP,foundreasonable
because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two
classes.
The abovementioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant
changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued
operationofthelastprovisoofSection15(c),ArticleIIofRepublicActNo.7653,thereby
exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the
constitutionalityoftheclassificationalbeitmadeindirectlyasaconsequenceofthepassageof
eight other laws between the rankandfile of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The
classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of
theclass.Theprovisomay be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be
grosslydiscriminatoryinitsoperation,soaspracticallytomakeunjustdistinctionsbetween
[40]
personswhoarewithoutdifferences.
Stateddifferently,thesecondlevelofinquirydealswiththefollowingquestions:Giventhat
CongresschosetoexemptotherGFIs(asidetheBSP)fromthecoverageoftheSSL,canthe
exclusionoftherankandfileemployeesoftheBSPstandconstitutionalscrutinyinthelightof
the fact that Congress did not exclude the rankandfile employees of the other GFIs? Is
Congresspowertoclassifysounbridledastosanctionunequalanddiscriminatorytreatment,
simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but
gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal
protectionofthelawboundedintimeandspacethat:(a)therightcanonlybeinvokedagainsta
classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises
indirectly,orasaconsequenceofseveralotheractsand(b)isthelegalanalysisconfinedto
determiningthevaliditywithintheparametersofthestatuteorordinance(wheretheinclusionor
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exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation visvis the grouping, or the lack
thereof,amongseveralsimilarenactmentsmadeoveraperiodoftime?
Inthissecondlevelofscrutiny,theinequalityoftreatmentcannotbejustifiedonthemere
assertionthateachexemption(grantedtothesevenotherGFIs)restsonapolicydetermination
bythelegislature.Alllegislativeenactmentsnecessarilyrestonapolicydetermination
eventhosethathavebeendeclaredtocontravenetheConstitution.Verily,ifthiscouldserveas
a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection
challengeswouldeverprosper.Thereisnothinginherentlysacrosanctinapolicydetermination
madebyCongressorbytheExecutiveitcannotrunriotandoverruntherampartsofprotection
oftheConstitution.
Infine,thepolicydeterminationargumentmaysupporttheinequalityoftreatmentbetween
the rankandfile and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment
betweenBSPrankandfileandotherGFIswhoaresimilarlysituated.Itfailstoappreciatethat
whatisatissueinthesecondlevelofscrutinyisnotthedeclaredpolicyofeachlawperse,
buttheoppressiveresultsofCongressinconsistentandunequalpolicytowardstheBSP
rankandfile and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the
constitutionalityofSection15(c),ArticleIIofRepublicActNo.7653ispremisedpreciselyon
the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons
similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be
deniedtheequalprotectionofthelawsincludestheprohibitionagainstenactinglawsthatallow
invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
[41]
protectionofthelaw,orpermitssuchdenial,itisunconstitutional.
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rankandfile from the
other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of
theSSL,thereexistnosubstantialdistinctionssoastodifferentiate,theBSPrankandfilefrom
theotherrankandfileofthesevenGFIs.Onthecontrary,ourlegalhistoryshowsthatGFIs
have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other
governmentalentities.
BeforetheSSL,PresidentialDecree(P.D.)No.985(1976)declareditasaStatepolicy(1)
to provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions.P.D.No.985waspassedtoaddressdisparitiesinpayamongsimilarorcomparable
positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees. But even then,
GFIs and governmentowned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already
identifiedasadistinctclassamonggovernmentemployees.Thus,Section2alsoprovided,
[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all employees, additional
financialincentivesmaybeestablishedbygovernmentcorporationandfinancialinstitutionsfor
theiremployeestobesupportedfullyfromtheircorporatefundsandforsuchtechnicalpositions
[42]
asmaybeapprovedbythePresidentincriticalgovernmentagencies.
ThesamefavoredtreatmentismadefortheGFIsandtheGOCCsundertheSSL.Section
3(b)providesthatoneoftheprinciplesgoverningtheCompensationandPositionClassification
System of the Government is that: [b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government
and governmentowned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be
comparablewiththoseintheprivatesectordoingcomparablework,andmustbeinaccordance
withprevailinglawsonminimumwages.
Thus,theBSPandallotherGFIsandGOCCswereundertheunifiedCompensationand
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[43]
PositionClassificationSystemoftheSSL,
butratesofpayundertheSSLweredetermined
on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work.
Notably, the Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the
followingprinciples:(a)justandequitablewages,withtheratioofcompensationbetweenpay
[44]
distinctions maintained at equitable levels
and (b) basic compensation generally
[45]
comparablewiththeprivatesector,inaccordancewithprevailinglawsonminimumwages.
Also,theDepartmentofBudgetandManagementwasdirectedtouse,asguideforpreparing
the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following
[46]
factors:
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
positions
(2)thenatureandcomplexityoftheworktobeperformed
(3)thekindofsupervisionreceived
(4)mentaland/orphysicalstrainrequiredinthecompletionofthework
(5)natureandextentofinternalandexternalrelationships
(6)kindofsupervisionexercised
(7)decisionmakingresponsibility
(8)responsibilityforaccuracyofrecordsandreports
(9)accountabilityforfunds,propertiesandequipmentand
(10)hardship,hazardandpersonalriskinvolvedinthejob.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary
Grades1to20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rankandfile of all GFIs were similarly situated in all
aspects pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5,
[47]
ArticleIXBofthe1997Constitution.
ThencametheenactmentoftheamendedcharteroftheBSP,implicitlyexemptingthe
MonetaryBoardfromtheSSLbygivingitexpressauthoritytodetermineandinstituteitsown
compensationandwagestructure.However,employeeswhosepositionsfallunderSG19and
belowwerespecificallylimitedtotheratesprescribedundertheSSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each
government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and
institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted without
distinctionastosalarygradeorpositionallemployeesoftheGFIfromtheSSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of
exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need to fulfill the mandate of the institution
concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in
character (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in the
private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of
hiring and retaining competent personnel and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic]
experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining
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these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular
circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by
theemployeesismerelyincidental.
Thefragilityofthisargumentismanifest.First,theBSPisthecentralmonetaryauthority,
[48]
[49]
andthebankerofthegovernmentandallitspoliticalsubdivisions.
Ithasthesole
[50]
power and authority to issue currency
provide policy directions in the areas of money,
banking, and credit and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and nonbank
[51]
financial institutions performing quasibanking functions, including the exempted GFIs.
Hence, the argument that the rankandfile employees of the seven GFIs were exempted
becauseoftheimportanceoftheirinstitutionsmandatecannotstandanymorethananempty
sackcanstand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that the need for the scope of exemption
necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution. Nowhere in the
deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rankandfile from the
exemptionwhichwasgrantedtotherankandfileoftheotherGFIsandtheSEC.Aspointin
fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it
necessaryfortheseinstitutionstobeexemptedfromtheSSL.True,theSSLexemptionofthe
BSPandthesevenGFIswasgrantedintheamendedchartersofeachGFI,enactedseparately
andoveraperiodoftime.Butitbearsemphasisthat,whileeachGFIhasamandatedifferent
and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that the raison dtre of the SSL
exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the
eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy (2) the necessity of hiring and
retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the GFIs mandate and (3) the
recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall
substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI
grantedSSLexemptionand(b)thesubsequentexemptionsofotherGFIsdidnotdistinguish
betweentheofficersandtherankandfileitispatentthatthe classification made between
the BSP rankandfile and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT
intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction visvis the particular
circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express
referencetoallowanceandfringebenefitssimilartothoseextendedtoandcurrentlyenjoyedby
[52]
theemployeesandpersonnelofotherGFIs,
underscoringthatGFIsareaparticularclass
withintherealmofgovernmententities.
ItispreciselythisunpremeditateddiscrepancyintreatmentoftherankandfileoftheBSP
mademanifestandglaringwitheachandeveryconsequentialgrantofblanketexemptionfrom
the SSL to the other GFIs that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the
SEC which is not a GFI was given leave to have a compensation plan that shall be
[53]
comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],
then
granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rankandfile endowed a more preferred
treatmentthantherankandfileoftheBSP.
Theviolationtotheequalprotectionclausebecomesevenmorepronouncedwhenweare
faced with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of
exemptingtheeightGFIsfromthecoverageoftheSSL,theexclusionoftheBSPrankandfile
employeeswouldhavebeendevoidofanysubstantialormaterialbasis.Itbearsnomoment,
therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. Nemo
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potestfacereperaliumquodnonpotestfacereperdirectum.Nooneisallowedtodoindirectly
whatheisprohibitedtododirectly.
Ithasalsobeenprofferedthatsimilaritiesalonearenotsufficienttosupporttheconclusion
thatrankandfileemployeesoftheBSPmaybelumpedtogetherwithsimilaremployeesofthe
otherGOCCsforpurposesofcompensation,positionclassificationandqualificationstandards.
The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make
themmembersofthesameclasswithrespecttoalegislativeclassification.Citedistherulingin
[54]
Johnson v. Robinson:
this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic
sharedbybeneficiariesandnonbeneficiariesalike,isnotsufficienttoinvalidateastatutewhen
othercharacteristicspeculiartoonlyonegrouprationallyexplainthestatutesdifferenttreatment
ofthetwogroups.
ThereferencetoJohnsonisinapropos.InJohnson,theUSCourtsustainedthevalidityof
the classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly
recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting
educationalbenefitstomilitaryserviceveteransasameansofhelpingthemreadjusttocivilian
life.TheCourtlistedthepeculiarcharacteristicsasfollows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by
alternativecivilianservice.Aconscientiousobjectorperformingalternativeserviceisobligated
to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a sixyear
commitment
xxxxxxxxx
Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are
qualitativelydifferent.Militaryveteranssufferafargreaterlossofpersonalfreedomduringtheir
service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the military
establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely
aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in consequence of which military
[55]
servicemenhaveaspecialneedforreadjustmentbenefits
(citationsomitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL,
therearenocharacteristicspeculiaronlytothesevenGFIsortheirrankandfilesoasto
justifytheexemptionwhichBSPrankandfileemployeesweredenied(nottomentionthe
[56]
anomalyoftheSECgettingone).Thedistinctionmadebythelawisnotonlysuperficial,
but
alsoarbitrary.Itisnotbasedonsubstantialdistinctionsthatmakerealdifferencesbetweenthe
BSPrankandfileandthesevenotherGFIs.
Moreover,theissueinthiscaseisnotasthedissentingopinionofMme.JusticeCarpio
Morales would put it whether being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and
sufficientbasisforexemptionfromR.A.No.6758.ItisCongressitselfthatdistinguishedthe
GFIsfromothergovernmentagencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of
R.A.Nos.7653,7907,8282,8289,8291,8523,8763,and9302.Theselawsmayhavecreated
apreferredsubclasswithingovernmentemployees,butthepresentchallengeisnotdirectedat
thewisdomoftheselaws.Rather,itisalegalconundruminvolvingtheexerciseoflegislative
power, the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in
andbyitself(R.A.No.7653),butalsoastothelegaleffectsbroughtaboutbysevenseparate
exercisesalbeitindirectlyandwithoutintent.
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Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged a comparable change in the factual milieu as
regardsthecompensation,positionclassificationandqualificationstandardsoftheemployees
oftheBSP(whetheroftheexecutiveleveloroftherankandfile)sincetheenactmentofthe
[57]
new Central Bank Act is of no moment. In GSISv.Montesclaros,
this Court resolved the
issueofconstitutionalitynotwithstandingthatclaimanthadmanifestedthatshewasnolonger
interestedinpursuingthecase,andevenwhentheconstitutionalityofthesaidprovisionwas
not squarely raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also
others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the challenged
proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the
constitutionalityoftheproviso.Andsoitiswiththechallengedprovisointhecaseatbar.
ItbearsstressingthattheexemptionfromtheSSLisaprivilegefullywithinthelegislative
prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rankandfile of the seven
otherGFIsandcontinueddenialtotheBSPrankandfileemployeesbreachedthelattersright
toequalprotection.Inotherwords,whilethegrantingofaprivilegeperseisamatterofpolicy
exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the
[58]
exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.
So when the distinction made is
superficial,andnotbasedonsubstantialdistinctionsthatmakerealdifferencesbetweenthose
includedandexcluded,itbecomesamatterofarbitrarinessthatthisCourthasthedutyandthe
[59]
powertocorrect.
AsheldintheUnitedKingdomcaseofHooperv.SecretaryofStatefor
[60]
WorkandPensions,
oncetheStatehaschosentoconferbenefits,discriminationcontrary
to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to
[61]
another,eventhoughtheStateisundernoobligationtoprovidethatfavorabletreatment.
The disparity of treatment between BSP rankandfile and the rankandfile of the other
seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination no one can,
withcandorandfairness,denythediscriminatorycharacterofthesubsequentblanketandtotal
exemptionofthesevenotherGFIsfromtheSSLwhensuchwaswithheldfromtheBSP.Alikes
arebeingtreatedasunalikeswithoutanyrationalbasis.
Again,itmustbeemphasizedthattheequalprotectionclausedoesnotdemandabsolute
equalitybut it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and
unduepreferencecannotbeallowed.Fortheprincipleisthatequalprotectionandsecurityshall
begiventoeverypersonundercircumstanceswhich,ifnotidentical,areanalogous.Iflawbe
lookeduponintermsofburdenorcharges,thosethatfallwithinaclassshouldbetreatedinthe
same fashion whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.
[62]
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal
treatment between the rankandfile of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be
declaredasanoutlaw.
IV.
EqualProtectionUnder
InternationalLens
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Inourjurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main
have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
[63]
classifications
andareluctancetoinvalidatealawunlessthereisashowingofaclearand
[64]
unequivocalbreachoftheConstitution.
A.EqualProtection
intheUnitedStates
Incontrast,jurisprudenceintheU.S.hasgonebeyondthestaticrationalbasistest.
Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to
[65]
wit:
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts.
Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only that government must not impose
differencesintreatmentexceptuponsomereasonabledifferentiationfairlyrelatedtotheobject
ofregulation.Theoldvarietyofequalprotectionscrutinyfocusedsolelyonthemeans used
bythelegislature:itinsistedmerelythattheclassificationinthestatutereasonablyrelatesto
the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not
typically concerned with identifying fundamental values and restraining legislative ends. And
usuallytherationalclassificationrequirementwasreadilysatisfied:thecourtsdidnotdemand
a tight fit between classification and purpose perfect congruence between means and ends
wasnotrequired.
xxxxxxxxx
[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Courts new equal
protectionandthetwotierapproach.]
Fromitstraditionalmodestrole,equalprotectionburgeonedintoamajorinterventiontool
during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the
deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social
legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as everBut the
Courtlaunchedanequalprotectionrevolutionbyfindinglargenewareasforstrictratherthan
deferentialscrutiny.Asharplydifferentiatedtwotierapproachevolved by the late 1960s: in
addition to the deferential old equal protection, a new equal protection, connoting strict
scrutiny, arose. The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two
demandsademandnotonlyastomeansbutalsooneastoends.Legislationqualifying
forstrictscrutinyrequiredafarcloserfitbetweenclassificationandstatutorypurposethanthe
roughandreadyflexibilitytraditionallytoleratedbytheoldequalprotection:meanshadtobe
shown necessary to achieve statutory ends, not merely reasonably related ones.
Moreover,equalprotectionbecameasourceofendsscrutinyaswell:legislationintheareasof
thenewequalprotectionhadtobejustifiedbycompellingstateinterests,notmerelythewide
spectrumoflegitimatestateends.
TheWarrenCourt identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two
characteristics:thepresenceofasuspectclassificationoranimpactonfundamentalrightsor
interests.Inthecategoryofsuspectclassifications,theWarrenCourtsmajorcontributionwas
tointensifythestrictscrutinyinthetraditionallyinterventionistareaofracialclassifications.But
other cases also suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well:
illegitimacyandwealthforexample.Butitwasthefundamentalinterestsingredientofthenew
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equal protection that proved particularly dynamic, openended, and amorphous.. [Other
fundamentalinterestsincludedvoting,criminalappeals,andtherightofinterstatetravel.]
xxxxxxxxx
TheBurgerCourtandEqualProtection.
TheBurgerCourtwasreluctanttoexpandthescopeofthenewequalprotection,although
itsbestestablishedingredientretainsvitality.Therewasalsomountingdiscontentwiththe
rigid twotier formulations of the Warren Courts equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to
usetheclauseasaninterventionisttoolwithoutresortingtothestrictlanguageofthenewequal
protection.[Amongthefundamentalinterestsidentifiedduringthistimewerevotingandaccess
totheballot,whilesuspectclassificationsincludedsex,alienageandillegitimacy.]
xxxxxxxxx
Even while the twotier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an
increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential old and
interventionistnewequalprotection.Anumberofjusticessoughtformulationsthatwouldblur
the sharp distinctions of the twotiered approach or that would narrow the gap between strict
scrutinyanddeferentialreview.ThemostelaborateattackcamefromJusticeMarshall,whose
frequentlystatedpositionwasdevelopedmostelaboratelyinhisdissentintheRodriguezcase:
[66]
TheCourtapparentlyseekstoestablish[that]equalprotectioncasesfallintooneoftwoneat
categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review strict scrutiny or mere
rationality.Butthis(sic)Courts[decisions]defysucheasycategorization.Aprincipledreading
of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly
comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize particular
classification,depending,Ibelieve,ontheconstitutionalandsocietalimportanceoftheinterests
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classificationisdrawn.
JusticeMarshallsslidingscaleapproachdescribesmanyofthemoderndecisions,althoughit
isaformulationthatthemajorityrefusedtoembrace.ButtheBurgerCourtsresultsindicate
atleasttwosignificantchangesinequalprotectionlaw:First,invocation ofthe oldequal
protectionformulanolongersignals,asitdidwiththeWarrenCourt,anextremedeferenceto
legislative classifications and a virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead,
several cases, even while voicing the minimal rationality handsoff standards of the old equal
protection, proceed to find the statute unconstitutional. Second, in some areas the modern
Courthasputforthstandardsforequalprotectionreviewthat,whileclearlymoreintensivethan
the deference of the old equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the new
equalprotection.Sexdiscriminationisthebestestablishedexampleofanintermediate level
of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that classifications by gender must serve
importantgovernmentalobjectivesandmustbesubstantiallyrelatedtoachievementofthose
objectives. That standard is intermediate with respect to both ends and means: where ends
must be compelling to survive strict scrutiny and merely legitimate under the old mode,
important objectives are required here and where means must be necessary under the new
equal protection, and merely rationally related under the old equal protection, they must be
substantially related to survive the intermediate level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations
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omitted)
B.EqualProtection
inEurope
TheUnitedKingdomandothermembersoftheEuropeanCommunityhavealsogone
forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic
law,themostextensivelistofprotectedgroundscanbefoundinArticle14oftheEuropean
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as sex,
race,colour,language,religion,politicalorotheropinion,nationalorsocialorigin,association
withanationalminority,property,birthorotherstatus.Thislistisillustrativeandnotexhaustive.
Discriminationonthebasisofrace,sexandreligionisregardedasgroundsthatrequire
strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination are regarded as
particularlysuspectundertheCovenantcanbegleanedfromArticle4,which,whileallowing
states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits
derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of race, colour, language,
[67]
religionorsocialorigin.
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification
[68]
which varies with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case
the
EuropeanCourtsetthestandardofjustificationatalowlevel:discriminationwouldcontravene
the Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of
[69]
proportionalitybetweenthemeansemployedandtheaimsoughttoberealised.
But over
theyears,theEuropeanCourthasdevelopedahierarchyofgroundscoveredbyArticle
14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification being required in respect of those
regarded as suspect (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of
[70]
others.Thus,inAbdulaziz,
theEuropeanCourtdeclaredthat:
...[t]headvancementoftheequalityofthesexesistodayamajorgoalinthememberStates
of the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced
beforeadifferenceoftreatmentonthegroundofsexcouldberegardedascompatiblewiththe
Convention.
[71]
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,
the European Court held that very weighty reasons
would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based
[72]
exclusivelyonthegroundofnationalityascompatiblewiththeConvention.
TheEuropean
Court will then permit States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to
discriminationongroundsofsex,race,etc.,intheapplicationoftheConventionrightsthanit
will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for example, large and small land
[73]
owners.
C.Equalityunder
InternationalLaw
Theprincipleofequalityhaslongbeenrecognizedunderinternationallaw.Article1ofthe
UniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsproclaimsthatallhumanbeingsarebornfreeand
equal in dignity and rights. Nondiscrimination, together with equality before the law and
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equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the
[74]
protectionofhumanrights.
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on
[75]
discrimination and/or provisions about equality.
The general international provisions
pertinenttodiscriminationand/orequalityaretheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPolitical
[76]
Rights (ICCPR)
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)theInternationalConventionontheEliminationofallFormsofRacialDiscrimination
[77]
(CERD)
theConventionontheEliminationofallFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomen
(CEDAW)andtheConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC).
Inthebroaderinternationalcontext,equalityisalsoenshrinedinregionalinstruments
[78]
such as the American Convention on Human Rights
the African Charter on Human and
[79]
[80]
People's Rights
the European Convention on Human Rights
the European Social
Charterof1961andrevisedSocialCharterof1996andtheEuropeanUnionCharterofRights
(ofparticularimportancetoEuropeanstates).EventheCounciloftheLeagueofArabStates
hasadoptedtheArabCharteronHumanRightsin1994,althoughithasyettoberatifiedbythe
[81]
MemberStatesoftheLeague.
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional
"first generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather
than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires guarantee[s] of equal and
effective protection against discrimination while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and
EuropeanConventionsobligeStatesPartiestoensure...thefullandfreeexerciseof[therights
guaranteed]...withoutanydiscriminationandtosecurewithoutdiscriminationtheenjoymentof
[82]
the rights guaranteed.
These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on
StatesPartiestotakestepstoeradicatediscrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and
[83]
prevention of discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR
and in a very large number of
[84]
ConventionsadministeredbytheInternationalLabourOrganisation,aUnitedNationsbody.
Additionally, many of the other international and regional human rights instruments have
[85]
specificprovisionsrelatingtoemployment.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier
tendency to view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR
[86]
[87]
[88]
rights.
In Broeks
and Zwaande Vries,
the issue before the Committee was
whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within
thescopeofArticle26.TheDutchgovernmentsubmittedthatdiscriminationinsocialsecurity
benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the
ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights
containedintheCovenanttoothercivilandpoliticalrights,suchasdiscriminationinthefieldof
taxation,butcontendedthatArticle26didnotextendtothesocial,economic,andculturalrights
containedinICESCR.TheCommitteerejectedthisargument.Initsview,Article26appliedto
rightsbeyondtheCovenantincludingtherightsinotherinternationaltreatiessuchastheright
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tosocialsecurityfoundinICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself
containanyobligationwithrespecttothemattersthatmaybeprovidedforbylegislation.Thus
it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation to provide for social security.
However,whensuchlegislationisadoptedintheexerciseofaState'ssovereignpower,then
[89]
suchlegislationmustcomplywithArticle26oftheCovenant.
Breachesoftherighttoequalprotectionoccurdirectlyorindirectly.Aclassificationmaybe
struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection.
Internationallawrecognizesthatdiscriminationmayoccurindirectly,as the Human Rights
[90]
Committee
took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and
CEDAWindeclaringthat:
. . . discrimination as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction,
exclusion,restrictionorpreferencewhichisbasedonanygroundsuchasrace,colour,sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
[91]
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.
(emphasissupplied)
Thus,thetwotieranalysismadeinthecaseatbarofthechallengedprovision,and
its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in
consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law.
Thereshouldbenohesitationinusingtheequalprotectionclauseasamajorcuttingedgeto
eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice
imperativesintheConstitution,coupledwiththespecialstatusandprotectionaffordedtolabor,
[92]
compelthisapproach.
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international
[93]
law,weheldinInternationalSchoolAllianceofEducatorsv.Quisumbing:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution
andlawsreflectthepolicyagainsttheseevils.TheConstitutionintheArticleonSocialJustice
andHumanRightsexhortsCongressto"givehighestprioritytotheenactmentofmeasuresthat
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
politicalinequalities."TheverybroadArticle19oftheCivilCoderequireseveryperson,"inthe
exerciseofhisrightsandintheperformanceofhisduties,[to]actwithjustice,giveeveryone
hisdue,andobservehonestyandgoodfaith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination.Generalprinciplesoflawincludeprinciplesofequity,i.e.,thegeneralprinciples
offairnessandjustice,basedonthetest ofwhatisreasonable.TheUniversalDeclarationof
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation all embody the general principle
against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
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Constitution,hasincorporatedthisprincipleaspartofitsnationallaws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital,inequalityanddiscriminationbytheemployerareallthemorereprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work."
Theseconditionsarenotrestrictedtothephysicalworkplacethefactory,theofficeorthefield
butincludeaswellthemannerbywhichemployerstreattheiremployees.
TheConstitutionalsodirectstheStatetopromote"equalityofemploymentopportunitiesforall."
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employmentopportunities,closesitseyestounequalanddiscriminatorytermsandconditions
ofemployment.
xxxxxxxxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7
thereof,provides:
TheStatesPartiestothepresentCovenantrecognizetherightofeveryonetotheenjoymentof
justand[favorable]conditionsofwork,whichensure,inparticular:
a.Remunerationwhichprovidesallworkers,asaminimum,with:
i.Fairwagesandequalremunerationforworkofequalvaluewithoutdistinction
of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not
inferiortothoseenjoyedbymen,withequalpayforequalwork
xxxxxxxxx
Theforegoingprovisionsimpregnablyinstitutionalizeinthisjurisdictionthelonghonoredlegal
truismof"equalpayforequalwork."Personswhoworkwithsubstantiallyequalqualifications,
skill,effortandresponsibility,undersimilarconditions,shouldbepaidsimilarsalaries.(citations
omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies
shouldbeaccordedrecognitionandrespectbythecourtsofjusticeexceptwhentheyrunafoul
[94]
of the Constitution.
The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguardofconstitutionalguaranties,andrequireastricterandmoreexactingadherence
toconstitutionallimitations.Rationalbasisshouldnotsuffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English
jurisprudence.Nevertheless,theseforeigndecisionsandauthoritiesarenotperse controlling
in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our
[95]
decisions.
Weshouldnotplaceundueandfawningrelianceuponthemandregardthemas
indispensablementalcrutcheswithoutwhichwecannotcometoourowndecisionsthroughthe
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employmentofourownendowments.Weliveinadifferentambienceandmustdecideourown
problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even
[96]
idiosyncrasiesasapeople,andalwayswithourownconceptoflawandjustice.
Ourlaws
mustbeconstruedinaccordancewiththeintentionofourownlawmakersandsuchintentmay
be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related
thereto.Moreimportantly,theymustbeconstruedtoserveourownpublicinterestwhichisthe
beall and the endall of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is
[97]
distinctanddifferentfromothers.
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that:
[A]mericanjurisprudenceandauthorities,muchlesstheAmericanConstitution,areofdubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of
whicharehardlyapplicablebecausetheyhavebeendictatedbydifferentconstitutionalsettings
[98]
andneeds.
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
[99]
UnitedStates,theirpathsofdevelopmenthavelongsincediverged.
Further,thequestforabetterandmoreequalworldcallsfortheuseofequalprotectionas
atoolofeffectivejudicialintervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The
Preamble proclaims equality as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippinesociety.ThecommandtopromotesocialjusticeinArticleII,Section10,inallphases
ofnationaldevelopment,furtherexplicitatedinArticleXIII,areclearcommandstotheStateto
take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. [T]here is thus in the Philippine
Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a
[100]
reasonablemeasureofequality.
OurpresentConstitutionhasgonefurtheringuaranteeingvitalsocialandeconomicrights
[101]
to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
Under the policy of social justice, the
law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
[102]
justificationthatthosewithlessprivilegeinlifeshouldhavemoreinlaw.
Andtheobligation
toaffordprotectiontolaborisincumbentnotonlyonthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesbut
[103]
alsoonthejudiciarytotranslatethispledgeintoalivingreality.
Socialjusticecallsforthe
humanizationoflawsandtheequalizationofsocialandeconomicforcesbytheStatesothat
[104]
justiceinitsrationalandobjectivelysecularconceptionmayatleastbeapproximated.
V.
AFinalWord
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged
provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with
Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653.
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Indeed,abillproposingtheexemptionoftheBSPrankandfilefromtheSSLhassupposedly
beenfiled.
Undermostcircumstances,theCourtwillexercisejudicialrestraintindecidingquestionsof
constitutionality,recognizingthebroaddiscretiongiventoCongressinexercisingitslegislative
power.Judicialscrutinywouldbebasedontherationalbasistest,andthelegislativediscretion
[105]
wouldbegivendeferentialtreatment.
Butifthechallengetothestatuteispremisedonthedenialofafundamentalright,or
the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection,judicialscrutinyoughttobemorestrict.Aweakandwatereddownviewwould
call for the abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutionalactisaprivatepersonorthegovernmentitselforoneofitsinstrumentalities.
[106]
Oppressiveactswillbestruckdownregardlessofthecharacterornatureoftheactor.
Accordingly,whenthegrantofpowerisqualified,conditionalorsubjecttolimitations,theissue
onwhetherornottheprescribedqualificationsorconditionshavebeenmet,orthelimitations
respected,isjusticiableornonpolitical,thecruxoftheproblembeingoneoflegalityorvalidity
of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations
particularlythoseprescribedorimposedbytheConstitutionwouldbesetatnaught.Whatis
more,thejudicialinquiry into such issueandthesettlementthereofarethemainfunctionsof
courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution,
and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We
haveneithertheauthoritynorthediscretiontodeclinepassinguponsaidissue,butare
under the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and peremptory by
our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the
Constitutiontosettleit.Thisexplainswhy,inMillerv.Johnson,itwasheldthatcourtshave
a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has
"kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and
stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended as it is in our 1935
Constitution "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court speaking through
JusticeLaurel,anoutstandingauthorityonPhilippineConstitutionalLaw,aswellasoneofthe
highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution
declared,asearlyasJuly15,1936,that"(i)ntimesofsocialdisquietudeorpoliticalexcitement,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
[107]
departments"ofthegovernment.
(citationsomittedemphasissupplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or
officeremployeestatus.Itisakintoadistinctionbasedoneconomicclassandstatus,with
thehighergradesasrecipientsofabenefitspecificallywithheldfromthelowergrades.Officers
oftheBSPnowreceivehighercompensationpackagesthatarecompetitivewiththeindustry,
while the poorer, lowsalaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implicationsarequitedisturbing:BSPrankandfileemployeesarepaidthestrictlyregimented
ratesoftheSSLwhileemployeeshigherinrankpossessinghigherandbettereducationand
opportunitiesforcareeradvancementaregivenhighercompensationpackagestoenticethem
tostay.Consideringthatmajority,ifnotall,therankandfileemployeesconsistofpeople
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whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability,itistheyandnottheofficerswhohavetherealeconomicandfinancial
needfortheadjustmentThisisinaccordwiththepolicyoftheConstitution"tofreethepeople
frompoverty,provideadequatesocialservices,extendtothemadecentstandardofliving,and
[108]
improve the quality of life for all.
Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass
muster.
To be sure, the BSP rankandfile employees merit greater concern from this Court.
Theyrepresentthemoreimpotentrankandfilegovernmentemployeeswho,unlikeemployees
in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and
negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to
protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to
lobbyinCongressisalmostnilasR.A.No.7653effectivelyisolatedthemfromtheotherGFI
rankandfileincompensation.TheseBSPrankandfileemployeesrepresentthepolitically
powerlessandtheyshouldnotbecompelledtoseekapoliticalsolutiontotheirunequal
andiniquitoustreatment.Indeed,theyhavewaitedformanyyearsforthelegislaturetoact.
Theycannotbeaskedtowaitsomemorefordiscriminationcannotbegivenanywaitingtime.
UnlesstheequalprotectionclauseoftheConstitutionisamereplatitude,itistheCourtsdutyto
savethemfromreasonlessdiscrimination.
INVIEWWHEREOF,weholdthatthecontinuedoperationandimplementationofthelast
provisoofSection15(c),ArticleIIofRepublicActNo.7653isunconstitutional.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, SandovalGutierrez, AustriaMartinez,
Azcuna,Tinga,andChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.
Panganiban,Carpio,CarpioMorales,andGarcia,JJ.,seedissenting.
Corona,andCallejo,Sr.,JJ.,onleave.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Rollo,p.7.
Id.,p.9.
i.e., (1) make the salary of the BSP personnel competitive to attract highly competent personnel (2) establish
professionalismandexcellenceatalllevelsintheBSPand(3)ensuretheadministrativeautonomyofthe
BSPasthecentralmonetaryauthority
Rollo,pp.810.
Id.,pp.1012,quotingFormerSenatorMaceda,RecordoftheSenate,FirstRegularSession,March15toJune
10,1993,Vol.IV,No.86,p.1087.
Id.,pp.1214.
Id.,p.14.
Id.,pp.25.
Id.,pp.1415.
[10]
Id.,pp.6275.
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Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the

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